LIBRARY
'ut.iv.rsitY ol <Ulitom»_
IRVINE^
THE LIBRARY
OF
THE UNIVERSITY
OF CALIFORNIA
IRVINE
GIFT OF
J. A. C. Grant
i
!
i
THE
American State Reports,
COMTAimNO THB
CASES OF GENERAL VALUE AND AUTHORITY
SUBSEQUENT TO THOSE CONTAINED IN THE "AMERICAN
DECISIONS" AND THE "AMERICAN REPORTS,"
DXCIDSD IV THB
COURTS OF LAST RESORT
. OP THE SEVERAL STATES.*
By a. C. freeman,
amd thb associatb kdit0b8 07 thb -amesicah dbcisiolia'*
Vol. LXX
SAN FRANCISOOt
BANCROFT-WHITNEY COMPANY,
IiAir PSBUSBBBa AND LAW BOOKMIil.BBfc
1900.
Xntored Moording to Act of Congress In the year 1900, by tti»
BANCROFT -WHITNEY COMPANJ.
Id tfa* 0£So« of the Librarian of Congress, at Washington.
Bah Fkakcisoo;
TVt PTLinnt-ROLLINS KLKCTROrm COlffAXT,
lYKKJUAPUBBS AND STKSBOTYPKBa.
AMERICAN STATE REPORTS.
VOL. LXX.
SCHEDULE
showing the original volumes of reports in which the
cases herein selected and re-reported may be found,
and the pages of this volume devoted to each stkte.
Georgia Reports . . , , ,
. Vol.105.
17- 84
Illinois Reports
. Vol. 179.
85-142
Iowa Reports ......
. Vol. 107.
143-231
Massachusetts Reports • ,
. Vol. 172.
232-308
Minnesota Reports . • • •
. Vol. 71.
309-365
Nebraska Reports . . . .
. Vol.55.
366-423
New York Reports . . . ,
. . Vols. 158, 159.
424-573
North Carolina Reports . .
. Vol. 124.
674-622
Pennsylvania State Reports .
. Vol. 190.
623-649
Tennessee Reports . . . .
. Vol. 101.
650-718
Texas Criminal Reports • ,
. Vol.38.
719-766
Utah Reports ..... i
. Vol. 17.
767-824
ViRaiNiA Reports . • • . •
. Vol.96.
826-893
Wisconsin Reports . • . .
. Vol. 101.
894-944
Digitized by the Internet Archive
in 2007 with funding from
IVIicrosoft Corporation
http://www.archive.org/details/americanstaterep70freeiala
SCHEDULE
8H0WINO IN WHAT VOLUMES OP THIS SERIES THE OASES
REPORTED IN THE SEVERAL VOLUMES OF OFFICIAL
REPORTS MAY BE FOUND.
lute report! are In parentheses, and the numbers of this series In bold-faced figures
Alabama. -> (83) 3; (84) 6; (85) 7; (86) 11; (87) 13; (88) 16; (89) 18; (90,
91) 24; (92) 85; (93) 30; (94) 33; (95) 36; (96, 97) 38; (98) 39; (99)
42; (100, 101) 46; (102) 48; (103) 49; (104, 105) 53: (106. 107, 108) 64;
(109, 110) 66; (111) 66; (112) 57; (113) 59; (114) 62; (115. 116) 67.
Abkansas. — (48) 3; (49) 4; (50) 7; (51) 14; (62) 20; (63) 22; (54) 26;
(55) 29; (56) 36; (57) 38; (68) 41; (59) 43; (60) 46; (61. 62) 64;
(63) 58; (64) 62; (65) 67.
Oaluorota. — (72) 1; (73) 2; (74) 5; (75) 7; (76) 9; (77) U; (78, 79) 12; (80)
13; (81) 15; (82) 16; (83) 17; (84) 18; (85) 20; (86) 21; (87, 88) 22|
(89) 23; (90, 91) 26; (92, 93) 27; (94) 28; (95) 29; (96) 31; (97) 33;
(98) 36; (99) 37; (100) 38; (101) 40; (102) 41; (103) 42; (104) 43;
(105)45; (106)46; (107) 48; (108)49; (109) 60; (110. Ill) 62; (112)
63; (113) 54; (114) 66; (115) 56; (116) 58; (117) 59; (118) 62; (U9) 63;
(120) 65; (121) 66; (122) 68; (123) 69.
Ck>LOBADO. — (10) 3; (11) 7; (12) 13; (13) 16; (14) 20; (15) 22; (16) 26}
(17) 31; (18) 36; (19) 41; (20) 46; (21) 62; (22) 66; (23) 58; (24) 66.
CJOHNECTICUT. — (54) 1; (55) 8; (56) 7; (57) 14; (58) 18; (59) 21; (60) 26;
(61) 29; (62) 36; (63) 38; (64) 42; (65) 48; (66) 60; (67) 52; (68) 67;
(69) 61; (70) 66.
DsLAWARB.— (5 Houst.) 1; (6 Houst.) 22; (7 Honst) 40; (9 Hoast.) 48;
(1 Marv.) 66; (2 Marv.) 69.
Florida. — (22) 1; (23) 11; (24) 12; (25, 26) 23; (27) 26; (28) 29; (29) 30;
(30) 32; (31) 34; (32) 37; (33) 39; (34) 43; (35) 48; (30) 61; (37) 53;
(38) 66; (.39) 63.
Oborgia. — (76) 2; (77) 4; (78) 6; (79) 11; (80, 81) 12; (82) 14; (83, 84) 20|
(85) 21; (86) 22; (87) 27; (88) 30; (89) 32; (90) 35; (91, 92. 93) 44;
(94) 47; (95, 96) 61; (97) 64; (98) 68; (99) 69; (100) 62; (101) 66;
(102) 66; (103) 68; (104) 69; (105) 70.
Idaho. — (2) 35.
Illinois.— (121) 2; (122) 8; (123) 5; (124) 7; (125) 8; (126) 9; (127) 11;
(128)16; (129)16; (1.30) 17; (131) 19; (132) 22; (133, 134) 23; (135)
25; (136) 29; (137) 31; (138, 139) 32; (140, 141) 33; (142) 34; (143,
144, 145) 36; (146, 147) 37; (148) 39; (149, 150)41; (151) 42; (152) 43;
(154)46; (153,155)46; (156)47; (157)48; (158)49; (159)50; (160.
161) 52; (162)53; (163)54; (164, 165)56; (166)67; (167)59; (168. 169)
61; (170) 62; (171) 63; (172, 173) 64; (174) 66; (175) 67; (176) 68;
(177, 178) 69; (179) 70.
Ihdiana. — (112) 2; (113) 3; (114) 5; (115) 7; (116) 9; (117, 118) 10; (119)
12; (120, 121) 16; (122) 17; (123) 18; (124) 19; (125) 21; (126, 127) 22;
a)
8 Schedule.
028) 85; (129) S8; (ISO) 30; (131) 31; (132) 3S; (133) 36; (134) 39;
(136) 41; (136) 43; (137) 45; (138) 46; (139) 47; (140) 49; (1, 2, 3,
Ind. App.; 141) 50; (4, 6, 6, lad. App.; 142) 51; (7, 8, Ind. App.; 143) 52;
(9, 10 Ind. App.) 53; (11 lud. App.) 54; (13 Ind. App,; 144) 55; (14
Ind. App.) 56; (15 lud. App.; 145) 57; (146) 58; (16 Ind. App.) 59; (17
Ind. App.) 60; (147, 148) 62; (18 Ind. App.; 149) 63; (150, 19 lud.
App.) 65; (20 Ind. App.) 67; (151) 68; (21 lud. App.) 69.
Iowa.— (72) 2; (73) 5; (74) 7; (75) 9; (76, 77) 14; (78) 16; (79) 18; (80) 20;
(81) 25; (82) 31; (83) 32; (84) 35; (85) 39; (86) 41; (87) 43; (88) 45
(89, 90), 48; (91) 51; (92) 54; (93) 57; (94, 95) 58; (96, 97) 59; (98) 60
(99) 61; (100) 62; (101, 102) 63; (103) 64; (104) 65; (105) 67; (106) 68
(107) 70.
Kansas. — (37) 1; (38) 5; (39) 7; (40) 10; (41) 13; (42) 16; (43) 19; (44) 21;
(45) 23; (46) 26; (47) 27; (48) 30; (49) 33; (50) 34; (51) 37; (52) 39;
(53) 42; (54) 45; (55) 49; (56) 54; (57) 57; (58) 62; (59) 68.
Kkntuckt. — (83, 84) 4; (85) 7; (86) 9; (87) 12; (88) 21; (89) 25; (90) 29;
(91) 34; (92) 36; (93) 40; (94) 42; (95) 44; (96) 49; (97) 53; (98) 56;
(99) 59; (100) 66.
Louisiana. — (39 La. Ann.) 4; (40 La. Ann.) 8; (41 La. Ann.) 17; (42 La.
Ann.) 21; (43 La. Ann.) 26; (44 La. Ann.) 32; (45 La. Ann.) 40; (46,
47 La. Ann.) 49; (48 La. Ann.) 55; (49 La. Ann.) 62; (50 La. Ann,) 69.
Mains. — (79) 1; (80) 6; (81) 10; (82) 17; (83)23; (84) 30; (85)35; (86) 41;
(87) 47; (88) 51; (89) 56; (90) 60; (91) 64; (92) 69.
Maryland. — (67) 1; (68) 6; (69) 9; (70) 14; (71) 17; (72) 20; (73) 25; (74)
28; (75) 32; (76) 35; (77)39; (78) 44; (80) 45; (79)47; (81)48; (82)51;
(83) 65; (84) 57; (85) 60; (86) 63; (87) 67.
MASSACHUSSriTS.— (145)1; (146)4; (147)9; (148)12; (149)14; (150)15; (151)
21; (152) 23; (153) 25; (154) 26; (155) 31; (156) 32; (157) 34; (158) 35;
(169) 38; (160) 39; (161) 42; (162) 44; (163) 47; (164) 49; (165) 52;
(166) 56; (167) 57; (168) 60; (169) 61; (170) 64; (171) 68; (172) 70.
Michigan. — (60, 61) 1; (62) 4; (63) 6; (64, 65) 8; (66, 67) 11; (68, 69, 75) 13;
(70) 14; (71, 76) 15; (72, 73, 74) 16; (77, 78) 18; (79) 19; (80) 20; (81,
82, 83) 21; (84) 22; (85. 86, 87) 24; (88) 26; (89) 28; (90. 91) 30; (92)
31; (93) 32; (94) 34; (95, 96) 35; (97) 37: (98) 39; (99) 41; (100) 43;
(101) 45; (102) 47; (103) 50; (104) 53; (105) 66; (106) 58; (107) 61;
(108) 62; (109) 63; (110) 04; (111) 66; (112. 113) 67; (114) 68; (115)
69.
MiMMKsoTA. — (36) 1; (.37) 6; (.38) 8; (39, 40) 12; (41) 16; (42) 18; (43) 19)
(44) 20; (45) 22; (46) 24; (47) 28; (48) 31; (49) 32; (50) 36; (51, 52)
38; (53) 39; (54) 40; (55) 43; (56) 45; (57) 47; (58) 49; (59) 50; (60) 51;
(61) 52; (62) 54; (63) 56; (64) 58; (65) 60; (66) 61; (67, 68) 64; (69)
65; (70) 68; (71) 70.
MissLssiPPi. — (65) 7; (66) 14; (67) 19; (68) 24; (69) 30; (70) 35; (71) 42;
(72) 48; (73) 66; (74) 60; (75) 65.
Missouri.- (92) 1; (93) 3; (94) 4; (95) 6; (96) 9; (97) 10; (98) 14; (99) 17
(100)18; (101)20; (102)22; (103) 23; (104, 105) 24; (106)27; (107) 28
(lOS. 109)82; (110, 111)33; (112)34; (113, 114) 35; (115)37; (116, 117
88; (118) 40; (119, 120) 41; (121) 42; (122) 43; (12.3) 45; (124, 125) 46
(126) 47; (127) 48; (128) 49; (129) 50; (130) 51; (131) 52; (132) 53,
(13.3) 64; (134) 66; (1:^5. 136) 58; (137) 59; (1.38) 60; (139) 61; (140)
62; (141, 142) 64; (143) 65; (144) 66; (145) 68; (146) 69.
Schedule. 9
Montana. — (9) 18; (10) 84; (11) S8; (12) 83; (13) 40; (14) 48; (15)48;
(16) 60; (17) 52; (18) 56; (19) 61; (20) 63; (21) 69.
Nmkaska. — (22) 3; (23, 24) 8; (25) 13; (26) 18; (27) 20; (28, 29) 26; (30)
27; (31) 28; (32, 33) 29; (34) 33; (35) 37; (36) 38; (37) 40; (38) 41;
(39, 40) 42; (41) 43; (42, 43) 47; (44) 48; (45, 46) 50; (47) 63; (47, 48,
58; (49) 59; (50) 61; (51, 52) 66; (53) 68; (54) 69; (55) 70.
NlVADA. — (19) 3; (20) 19; (21) 37; (22) 58; (23) 62.
Nkw Hahpshxbk. — (64) 10; (62) 13; (65) 23; (66) 49; (67) 68.
New Jkrsbt. — (43 N. J. Eq.) 3; (44 N. J. Eq.) 6; (60 N. J. L.) 7; (51
N. J. L.; 46 N. J. Eq.) 14; (46 N. J. Eq.; 52 N. J. L.) 19; (47 N. J.
Eq.) 24; (53 N. J. L.) 26; (48 N. J. Eq.) 27; (49 N. J. Eq.) 31; (54
N. J. L.) 33; (50 N. J. Eq.) 35; (55 N. J. L.) 39; (51 N. J. Eq.) 40; (56
N. J. L.) 44; (52 N. J. Eq.) 46; (57 N. J. L.; 53 N. J. Eq.) 51; (54 N. J.
Eq.; (58 N. J. L.) 65; (59 N. J. L.) 69; (55 N, J. Eq.)62; (60 N. J. L.)
64; (56 N. J. Eq.) 67; (61 N. J. L.) 68.
Niw York. — (107) 1; (108) 2; (109) 4; (110) 6; (111) 7; (112) 8; (113) 10;
(114) 11; (115) 12; (116, 117) 15; (118, 119) 16; (120) 17; (121) 18; (122)
19; (123) 20; (124, 125) 21; (126) 22; (127) 24; (128, 129) 26; (130,
131) 27; (132, 133) 28; (134) 30; (135) 31; (136) 32; (137) 33; (138) 34;
(139) 36; (140) 37; (141) 38; (142) 40; (143) 42; (144) 43; (145) 45;
(146) 48; (147) 49; (148) 51; (149) 52; (150) 55; (151) 56; (152) 57;
(153) 60; (154) 61; (155) 63; (156) 66; (157) 68; (158, 159) 70.
North Carolina. — (97, 98) 2; (99, 100) 6; (101)9; (102) 11; (103) 14; (104)
17; (105)18; (106)19; (107)22; (108)23; (109)26; (110)28; (111)32;
(112) 34; (113) 37; (114) 41; (115) 44; (116) 47; (117) 53; (118) 54;
(119) 56; (120) 58; (121) 61; (122) 65; (123) 68; (124) 70.
North Dakota. —(1) 26; (2) 33; (3) 44; (4) 50; (5) 57; (6, 7) 66.
Ohio. —(45 Ohio St.) 4; (46 Ohio St.) 15; (47 Ohio St.) 21; (48 Ohio St.) 29;
(49 Ohio St.) 34; (50 Ohio St.) 40; (51 Ohio St.) 46; (52 Ohio St.) 49;
(53 Ohio St.) 53; (54 Ohio St.) 56; (55, 56 Ohio St.) 60; (57 Ohio St.) 63;
(58 Ohio St.) 65; (59 Ohio St.) 69.
Oregon. — (15) 3; (16) 8; (17) 11; (18) 17; (19) 20; (20) 23; (21) 28; (22)
29; (23) 37; (24) 41; (25) 42; (26) 46; (27) 50; (28) 52; (29) 64; (30)
60; (31) 65; (32) 67.
PENNSYLVANIA.- (115, 116, 117 Pa. St.) 2; (118, 119 Pa. St.) 4; (120, 121
Pa. St) 6; (122 Pa. St.) 9; (12.3, 124 Pa. St.) 10; (125 Pa. St.) 11; (126
Pa. St.) 12; (127 Pa. St.) 14; (128, 129 Pa. St.) 15; (130, 131 Pa. St.) 17;
(132, 133, 134 Pa. St.) 19; (135. 136 Pa. St.) 20; (137, 133 Pa. St.) 21;
(139, 140, 141 Pa. St.) 23; (142, 143 Pa. St.) 24; (144, 145 Pa. St.) 27;
(146 Pa. St.) 28; (147, 150 Pa. St.) 30; (151 Pa. St.) 31; (148 Pa. St.)
83; (149. 152. 153 Pa. St.) 34; (154, 155 Pa. St.) 35; (156 Pa. St) 36;
(157 Pa. St) 37; (158 Pa. St) 38; (159 Pa. St) 39; (160 Pa. St) 40;
(161 Pa. St) 41; (162 Pa. St) 42: (163 Pa. St) 43; (164, 165 Pa. St) 44;
(166 Pa. St) 45; (167 Pa. St) 46; (168, 169 Pa. St) 47; (170, 171 Pa.
St) 60; (172, 173 Pa. St) 51; (174, 175 Pa. St) 62; (176 Pa. St) 63;
(177 Pa. St) 66; (178 Pa. St) 66; (179. 180 Pa. St) 57; (181 Pa. St)
59; (182 Pa. St) 61; (183, 184 Pa. St.) 63; (185 Pa. St) 64; (186 Pa.
St) 66; (187 Pa. St) 67; (188 Pa. St) 68; (189 Pa. St) 69; (190 Pa.
St.) 70.
Bhodk Island. — (15) 2; C16) 27; (17) 38; (18) 49; (19) 61.
10 Schedule.
SoTTTH Casollva. — (26) 4; (27, 28, 29) 13; (30) 14; (31, 32) 17; (33) 28;
(34) 27; (35) 28; (36) 31; (37) 34; (38) 37; (39) 39; (40) 42; (41) 44;
(42) 46; (43) 49; (44) 61; (45) 66; (46)57; (47) 68; (48) 69; (49) 61;
(50) 62; (51) 64; (52) 68; (53) 69.
South Dakota. — (1) 36; (2) 39; (3) 44; (4) 46; (5) 49; (6) 65; (7) 68;
(8) 69; (9) 62; (10) 66.
Tennessex.— (85) 4; (86) 6; 87) 10; (88) 17; (89) 24; (90) 26; (91) 30;
(92) 36; (93) 42; (94) 46; (95 )49; (96) 64; (97) 66; (98) 60; (99) 63;
(100) 66; (101) 70.
Tecas. — (68) 2; (69; 24 Tex. App.) 5; (70; 25, 26 Tex. App.) 8; (71) 10;
(27 Tex. App.) 11; (72) 13; (73, 74) 15; (75) 16; (76) 18; (77; 28 Tex.
App.) 19; (78) 22; (79) 23; (29 Tex. App.) 25; (80, 81) 26; (82) 27;
(30 Tex. App.) 28; (83) 29; (84) 31; (85) 34; (31 Tex. Cr. Rep.; 86) 37;
(86; 32 Tex, Cr. Rep.) 40; (87; 33 Tex. Cr. Rep.) 47; (34 Tex. Cr.
Rep.; 88) 53; (89, 90) 59; (35 Tex. Cr. Rep.) 60; (36 Tex. Crim. Rep.)
61; (91; 37 Tex. Crim. Rep.) 66, (38 Tex. Crim. Rep.) 70.
Utah.— (13) 57; (14) 60; (15) 62; (16) 67; (17) 70.
VxBMOirr. — (60) 6; (61) 15; (62) 22; (63) 26; (64) 33; (65) 36; (66) 44}
(67) 48; (68) 54; (69) 60; (70) 67.
ViEGiNiA- — (82)3; (83)6; (84)10; (85)17; (86)19; (87)24; (88)29; (89)
37; (90) 44; (91) 50; (92) 53; (93) 67: (94, 95) 64; (96) 70.
Washingtoit.- (1) 22; (2) 26; (3) 28; (4) 31; (5)34; (6) 36; (7) 38; (8)
40; (9) 43; (]0) 46; ^1) 48; (12) 50; (13) 62; (14) 63; (15) 65; (16) 68;
(17) 61; (18) 63; (19) 67.
West Vibginia. — (29) 6; (30) 8; (31) 13; (32, 33) 26; (34) 26; (.36) 29;
(36) 32; (37) 38; (38, 39) 45; (40) 62; (41) 66; (42) 67; (43) 64; (44>
67.
Wisconsin. —(69) 2; (70, 71) 6; (72) 7; (73) 9; (74, 75) 17; (76, 77) 20; (78;
23; (79) 24; (80) 27; (81) 29; (82) 33; (83) 36; (84) 36; (85, 86) 39;
(87) 41; (88) 43; (89) 46; (90) 48; (91) 61; (92) 53; (93) 67; (94) 69;
(95) 60; 96, (97) 66; (98, 99) 67; (100) 69; (101) 70.
Wtoxino. — (3) 31; (4) 62; (5) 63.
AMERICAN STATE REPORTS.
VOL. LXX.
CASES REPORTED.
Kaio. Subject. Ripobt. Pass.
Anderson ▼. Hayes LandVd and Tenant. 101 Wis. 638 .... 930
Austin V. State Interstate Commerce. 101 Tenn. 663. . . . 70S
Avery v.^ Monroe &amwAm«n<. ... ...172 Mass. 132... 250
Balk V. Harris AUachmeni 124 N. C. 467 606
Bastrup v. Prendergast Mechanics' Liens ... 179 III. 553 1 28
Bear v. Commissioners Schools— Mandamus. 124 N. C. 204 .... 585
Bergner etc. Brewing Co. v. Dreytaa-Corporationa 172 Mass. 154 . . . 251
Bloorafield State Bank v. Miller. . .Statute of Frauds . . 55 Neb. 243 ... . 381
Broadfoot V. Fayetteville Municipal Bonds. . .12^ "S. C. 478.... 610
Brown v. Brown Husband and Wife.Ui N, C. 19 674
Brown ▼. Electric Ry. Co. Master arid Servant. 101 Tenn. 252.... 666
Brown V. Bose Attachment 55 Neb. 200 . . . . 370
Buchanan v. TUden Husband and W\fe.\b% N. Y. 109 .. . 454
Burdis V. Burdis Devise 96 Va. 81 .. 825
Bush V. Board of Supervisors of K-^^ jgg N. Y. 212... 63»
Orange County (
Camp V.Bruce Contracts 96 Va. 621 875
Casey v. Casey Cotenancy 107 Iowa, 192 . . . 190
Charleston etc. Ry. Co. v. Hughes • Eminent Domain ... 1 05 Ga. 1 17
Clement v. Insurance Co Life Insurance 101 Tenn. 22 ... . 650
Commonwealth v. Hnbley Police Power 1 72 Mass. 68 242
Commonwealth v. Wireback. Homicide 190 Pa. St. 138 . . 625
Cooper V. Hay ward Ex'ra and Adm'rs . . 71 Minn. 374 . . . 330
Coupe V. Piatt Landl'd and TenanL\12 liaLsa. 458 ... 293
Crescent Min. Co. v. Silver King ) ^^^, 17 ^tah, 444 .. . 810
Mm. Co )
CuUiford v. Walser Suretyship 168 N. Y. 65 437
DeCamp V. Thomson Setoff 159 N. Y. 444 ... 670
Delafield v. Smith Brokers 101 Wis. 664 .... 938
(U)
743
740
12 Cases Reported.
Namb. SnBjBor. Rbpoht. Pasb.
Dorr V. Life Insurance Clearing Co. Corporations 71 Minn. 38.... 309
Dorsey v. State Police Povotr—Food \ ^ ' gg; f • • ''62
Ellsbury v. New York etc. R. R. Co . Railroads 172 Mass. 130 .. . 248
Eayard v. Enyard Dower 190 Pa. St. 114 .. 623
Equitable Trust Co. v. Garis Insane Persons 190 Pa. St. 544 . . 644
Ex parte Brown Police Power j Rep! 29*5 j
r. * XT p •; i 38 Tex. Cr. \
Ex parte Newman Bail ^ j^^p j^jg ^
Fall Brook Coal Co. v. Hewson .... WUnesses 158 N. Y. 150 . . . 466
Feder v.^Iowa State etc. Assn Insurance 107 Iowa, 538 . .. 212
First Nat. Bank v. German Bank.. 5anis and Banhing.lOl Iowa, 543... 216
Fonda v. St. Paul City Ry. Co Negligence 71 Minn. 438 .. . 341
Foster v. Commonwealth Rape 96 Va. 306 846
Oannv. Railroad Negligence 101 Tenn. 380.... 687
Oarvey v. Long Island R. R, Co. . .Eminent Domain. . .159 N. Y. 323 .. . 550
Gay V. State Criminal Law. 105 Ga. 599 68
German Nat. Bank v. Kautter Attachment. „„,,.... 55 Neb. 103. . . . 37 1
Gouce V. McCoy Execution 101 Tenn. 587.... 714
Ooralski V. Kosiuski Cotenancy 179 III. 177 98
Oorrell v. Water Supply Co Water Companies . . 124 N. C. 328 598
Oration Nat. Bank v. Wing Neg. Instruments. ..112 Mass. 513 ... 303
Green v. Ashland Water Co Polluted Water 101 Wis. 258 911
Hancock Nat. Bank v. Ellis Evidence 172 Mass. 39 ... . 232
Hardiman v. WhoUey Animals 172 Mass. 411 ... 292
Harrison v. Harrison Devise 105 Ga. 517 60
Hasbrouck v. Western Union T. Co.Tel. Companies ....107 Iowa, 160.... 181
Hayden v. Barrett Wills 172 Mass. 472 ... 295
Herter V. Mullen Landl'd and Tenant.} 59 l!f. Y. 28.... 517
HoflFv. Olson Equity Jurisdiction .101 Wis. 118 903
HoUman v. Platteville Cemeteries 101 Wis. 94 899
Howard v. Cassels Ouard'n and H^arrf. 105 Ga. 412 44
Illinois Central R. R. Co. v. King.. Railroads 179111. 91 93
In re Assignment Mut. etc. Ins. Co.Insurance 107 Iowa, 143.... 149
In re Christensen JUa}-. and Divorce.. 17 Utah, 412 ... 794
In re Fauton Habeas Corpus 55 Neb. 703 ... . 418
Iowa Savings and Loan Assn. v. J Building and J m-r t nni m-r
Heidt \ LoanAssn. } 107 Iowa, 297 ... . 197
Jackson etc. Works v. Hurlbnt.... Camera 158 N. Y. 34 .... 432
Jacobson v. Wisconsin etc. R. R. Co.Railroads 71 Minn. 519 .. . 358
Jonesv. State Homicide I ^^ 'S'"" ^^7 ^
( Rep. 87 S
719
761
Kendriok T. Life In*. Co. Insurance 124 N. 0. 315.... 692
Cabes Bbpobteo. 13
Kaio. BiTBjKcr. Brpobt. Pags.
Latimer ▼. State .' Criminal Law 65 Neb. 609 .... 403
^Felfc.!!T.?.*\^'!:.^!;.^^^ j^^*" 96Va.337 861
^fH-THn""; S'*^*"'^*''" ^^"*"° I Master and Servant.m Maw. 89 .... 244
Liignting Co (
McMahoD V. Dubuque Damage* 107 Iowa, 62 .... 143
McPeek V. Weateru Union T. Co. . . TeL Companies .... 107 Iowa, 356 .. . 205
Maufull V. Graham Judgments. 55 Neb. 646 .... 412
Matter of Stryker Wages 158 N. Y. 526 ... 489'
Maxwell v. Bank of New 'RSchmonA . Attachment 101 Wis. 286 ... . 926
Mercautile Nat. Bank V. Macfarlaue./n«o/vency 71 Minn. 497... 352
Merrill V. Security Trust Co Dower 71 Minn. 61 312
Mofifett V. Parker Mortgages 71 Minn. 139... 319
Mohrman V. State Social Clubs 105 Ga. 709 74
Moore ▼. Triplett Judicial Sales 96 Va. 603 882
Morrison v. Willard Mechanic's Lien. ... 17 Utah, 306 .. . 784
Munro V. Callahan Judgments 55 Neb. 75 .... 366
Murphy v. Commonwealth Ex Post FactoLaws. 172 Mass. 264 . . . 266
Murphy V. Moyle Mar. and Divoice.. 17 Utah, 113... 767
^7ssn.°v.*Re^d?!^^?^.*!^ ^!',\ Husband and Wife.. 96 Va. 345 858
^Turnlr G^!'. .?T^, , !['J'!l^'. {(^orporati^ 71 Minn. 413.
334
Pain V. Societe St. Jean Baptiste. . .Benefit Societies. ... 172 Mass. 319 .. . 287
Parmenter Mfg Co. t. Hamilton. . . Bankruptcy 172 Mass. 178 .. . 258
Parsons T. Parsons Adoption. 101 Wis. 76 894
Payne T. State Bape ) ^^Rep^" 494 f ' ' "^^^
People V. Fielding Trial 158 N. Y. 542... 495
People T. Kennedy Murder 159 N. Y. 346... 557
Perkins V. Heert Statutes 158 N. Y. 306... 483
Portance v. Lehigh Valley Coal Co. Master and Servani.\Q\ Wis. 574 932
Rogers r. Burr Corpwations 105 Ga. 432 60
Scanlan T. Grimmer Nanus 71 Minn. 351. .. 326
Scottv. Hawk Wills 107 Iowa, 723... 228
Shane v. Lyons. Husband and Wife. 112 Mass. 199 .. . 261
Singer v. Salt Lake eta Mfg. Co. . .CorporaCn Meetings. 17 Utah, 143 .. . 773
Snyder v. Grandstafif Vendor and Purch'r. 96 Va. 473 863
Spade V. Lynn etc. R. R. Co. Bailroads 172 Mass. 488 .. . 298
Spiller V. Wells Jurisdiction 96 Va. 598 878
Staines V, Burton Wills 17 Utah, 331 ... 788
Steinback v. Diepenbrock Insurance 1 68 N. Y. 24 ... . 424
Steinmeyer V. Siebert Specific Per/orm'ce.. 190 Fsl. St. 471.. 641
Stoddard v. Lnm Corporations 159 N. Y. 265 ... 641
Supreme Lodge E. of P. v. Kntscher . i5«n«/tt Societies 179 111. 340 116
Supreme Lodge K. of P. v. Trehhe . Benefit Societies.. . . 179 111. 348 120
Swope V. Donnelly Wilb 190 Pa. St. 417.. 637
14 Cases Reported.
Vaio. SuBJScti BspoB*. ?4en»
Telegram ete. Co. ▼. Common- J ^^^^^ .....172 Mass. 294 ... 280
Tidioute Sav. Bank v. Libbey Omranty , 101 Wis. 193 907
Troxler v. Southern Ry. Co Master and Servant. 124 N. C. 189 .. . 580
TarcottT. Railroad Lmitat'nao/Actions.lOl Tenn. 102.... 661
United States Nat. Bank ▼. Geer ..NegoCbleliutrumenU 65 Neb. 462.... 390
Van Norman r. Gordon Judgment. 172 Mass. 676 . . 304
Walker y. Warner..... »,,.. Mortgages 179111. 16 85
Weeks ▼. McNulty Innkeepers 101 Teun. 495.... 693
Wehn V. Fall Corporations 55 Neb. 547 . . . . 397
Welton r. Atkinson Notaries Public. ... 55 Neb. 674 ... . 416
Weston T. Syracuso Mun. Corporations.. 158 N. T. 274 . . . 472
Whiting T. Price Fraud 172 Mass. 240 .. . 262
WikoT. Garner Homestead 179111. 257 102
'Wilcoxen T. Smith \ ^"^^^L^m Assn. [ 107 Iowa, 555.... 220
Williamar. State Larceny 105 Ga. 814. 82
Wilson T.Hnndley | '^''■"' ^S»pa„i«. f »6 Va. 96 837
Witherow T. Slaybaok Corporations 158 N. Y. 649... 607
Wolf ord r. Cook Limitat'ns qf Actions. 71 Minn. 77 ... . 315
Wright V. Independence Nat. Bank . ConiracU 96 Va. 728 889
Wymany. Eaton Receivers... 107 Iowa, 214... 193
WyattT. Rome Mun. Corporations.. 105 Qa. 312. 41
Yancey's Case Devise 124 N. C. 161 ... 677
Young Men's 0. A. ete. Oo. r. { Negotiable )i7otii koq ibk
Eockford Nat. Bank i JtutnumUa. \"^ "^ ^^ **
AMERICAN STATE REPORTS.
VOL. LXX.
CASES
IN THB
SUPREME COURT
or
GEORGIA.
Chableston & Western Carolina Railway Com-
pany V. Hughes.
[105 Gkorqia, 1.]
EMINENT DOMAIN,— THB AWARD OF APPRAISERS
in condemnation proceedings operates as a Judgment between the
parties, and Is governed by the same rules that are ordinarily ap-
plied to judgments of courts. Such an award, or a verdict and
judgment on appeal therefrom, has the same force as an ordinary
judgment rendered by a court of competent jurisdiction. It is con-
clusive upon the parties and privies, but Is not binding upon stran-
gers.
EMINENT DOMAIN— CONDEMNATION PROCEEDINGS—
CONCLUSIVENESS OF— LIFE ESTATE AND REMAINDER.— If,
at the time condemnation proceedings were had, there were two
estates in the property, one a life estate, and the other a contingent
remainder, the fact that it was impossible to ascertain the persona
who would eventually take as remaindermen does not authorize
the conclusion that the Interest of such remaindermen was acquired
by proceedings against the life tenant, who cannot be held to rep-
resent them.
EMINENT DOMAIN— CONDEMNATION PROCEEDINGS-
<;ONCLUSIVENESS AGAINST UNKNOWN OWNERS— If the con-
dition of the title to property at the time of condemnation proceed-
ings is such that notice cannot be given to all interested, notice
to such as are definitely linown to be Interested Is not sufficient to
-deprive of their rights othera whose identity is unknown, but whose
interest in the property is ascertainable.
EMINENT DOMAIN-JURISDICTION.- ONE WHO CAN-
NOT BE AND IS NOT NOTIFIED, is not bound by the award or
Judgment.
EMINENT DOMAIN.— A RAILROAD COMPANY, by con-
demnation proceedings, acquires whatever interest the person against
^vhom such proceedings are had has In the land, and no more.
AM. St. Rkp., \ou LXX.— 2 (17
18 Charleston etc. Ry. Co. v. Hughes. [Georgia,
EMINENT DOMAIN— CONDEMNATION PROCEEDINGS
ARE NO MORE THAN A COMPULSORY SALE of all the owner's
interest in the property, and no one can be thus compelled to sell
who is not a party to the judgment rendered by the tribunal which
is erected for this purpose.
EMINENT DOMAIN— INTEREST ACQUIRED BY RAIL-
ROAD COMPANY, — A railroad company which constructs its road
over land, the title to which is not fixed and determined, acquires
the interest of all those with whom it deals by negotiation or against
whom it proceeds by condemnation, but takes the risk of other
persons making claims in the future, whether they are left out of
the negotiations or proceedings by mistake or from necessity.
EMINENT DOMAIN— ESTOPPEL^CONDEMNATION PRO-
CEEDINGS against the assignee of a life tenant, to whom the
entire amount awarded as damages has been paid, cannot be pleaded
in bar of the right of the remainderman in the same property to
have compensation for his interest after the termination of the life
estate.
RAILROAD COMPANIES— ENTRY ON LAND BY CON-
SENT—ESTOPPEL AGAINST LANDOWNER.— If a railroad com-
pany enters upon land with the consent of the owner, or under
license from him, and the property thus taken possession of become*
such a component part of its railroad that to surrender its possession
would interfere seriously with the interests of the company or of
the public, the landowner, though entitled to compensation for hi»
property, is estopped from asserting against the company the legal
title to the property by an action of ejectment.
RAILROAD COMPANIES — ENTRY ON LAND— EJECT-
MENT.—If a railroad company enters upon land and constructs it»
road either with the consent of the owner or without lawful author-
ity, and the landowner acquiesces in the appropriation of the prop-
erty to a great public use until it has become a necessary component
part of the property acquired by the railroad to perform its public
duties, the landowner must be held to have waived his right to
retake the property in ejectment, and must be remitted to such other
remedies for the wrong done him as will not interfere with the
rights of the public to have the railroad maintained and operated.
INTERVENTION IN EQUITY.— One who intervenes In a suit
In equity, and prays for relief, both legal and equitable, is bound
to admit and provide for all the equitable rights, claims, and de-
mands justly belonging to the adversary party, and growing out of,
or necessarily involved in, the subject matter of the controversy.
RAILROAD COMPANIES— ENTRY ON LAND— RIGHT TO
IMPROVEMENTS.— If a railroad company lawfully enters upon
land under conveyance from a tenant for life, and makes improve-
ments necessary to its business, it has a right, upon abandoning
the premises at the expiration of the life estate, to remove such
improvements, and, If it continues in possession thereafter, the value
of such improvements should not be considered in assessing the
damages to which the remaiuderman Is entitled. The amount which
the latter is entitled to recover is the market value of the property
at the time the life estate terminated, with interest, the value of
such Improvements placed on the property at the expense of th&
company and necessary to Its business not being considered In ascer-
taining such market value.
S. J. Simpson, B. Gumming and H. Crawford, for the plain-
tiff in error.
July, 1898.] Charleston etc. Ry. Co. v. Hughes. 19
W. K. Miller and J. E. Ijamar, for the defendants in error.
* COBB, J. The last will of Charles De Laigle was duly pro-
hated and admitted to record in the court of ordinary of Eich-
mond county on May 3, 1866. By the ninth item he made the
following devise : "To my son Louis I give, devise, and bequeath
three other such parts [meaning three-fourths of his estate after
tlio payment of his debts] to be held by him in trust for the
sole and separate use of my daughters, Martha, Mary, and Emma,
one part to each respectively for and during the terms of their
natural lives, with remainders to such child or children of my
said daughters respectively as may be living at the time of their
respective deaths, and, in default of such child or children, then
to the right heirs of each of my said daughters respectively."
After paying the testator's debts, his executors, on April 17,
1867, assented to the devise and allotted the property in which
Emma De Laigle was interested to Louis De Laigle as trustee for
her during her natural life, with remainder and executory devise
over as mentioned above. At that time Emma De Laigle, the
life tenant, was a minor and unmarried, Louis De Laigle, the
original trustee, died in 1867 ^ after the division of the testa-
tor's estate, and on October 14, 1868, while Emma De Laigle was
still a minor and unmarried, Andrew W. Walton, upon her ap-
plication, was appointed as trustee for her alone by the judge of
the superior court of Bichmond county. She attained her ma-
jority on March 9, 1869, being still single. Walton resigned
as trustee on March 5, 1869; and on the next day E. F. Verdery
was appointed trustee for her alone, upon her application, by
the judge of the superior court. No bond was required of Ver-
dery, and none was given by him. In 1870, while Emma De
Laigle was still unmarried, upon the joint petition of herself
and Verdery, an order was granted authorizing Verdery to sell
the fee in certain property for reinvestment, and it was sold
by him under sucb order in that year. After the passage of
this order Emma De Laigle married, and died on January 13,
1894, leaving one child surviving her, who was bom on March
17, 1872, and who intermarried with one Hughes. After the
passage of the order above referred to Verdery, the trustee, sold
the property to Alfred C. Holt for the sum of four thousand
dollars and conveyed the same to him in fee simple by a deed
dated September 9, 1870. Verdery resigned as trustee after
Mrs. Hughes was born. Thereafter, in proceedings regularly
had in which Mrs. Hughes was a party, represented by her
20 Charleston etc. Ry. Co. v. HuanEs. [Georgia,
mother as her next friend, Joseph B. Harris, her father, was ap-
pointed trustee in the place of Verdery and ordered to give a
bond in the sum of four thousand five hundred dollars, and upon
the giving of such bond Yerdery was directed to turn over to
him all the trust property he held as trustee for Mrs. Harris
and her child. Harris, as trustee, gave the bond required. In
1872, the Port Royal Railroad Company, a corporation of this
state, located its line of road across the land which had been
acquired by Holt under the deed from Verdery, trustee. The
company not being able to agree with Holt as to the compensa-
tion to be paid to him for the acquisition of the strip required
for its purposes, condemnation proceedings were instituted
against Holt to have the value of the same assessed in accord-
ance with the provisions of the company's charter. The only
parties to these proceedings were the railroad company and
Holt. The amount fixed * by the appraisers not being satiS'
factory to the railroad company, an appeal was entered to the
superior court, and on the trial there a verdict in favor of Holt
for the sum of eleven hundred dollars was the result. N'o judg-
ment was entered upon this verdict. The amount specified was
subsequently paid to Holt, who conveyed the property in fee
simple to the railroad company by a warranty deed dated May 8,
1873. The railroad company entered into possession and placed
thereon a part of its tracks which were necessary to a complete
construction and operation of the railroad which it was author-
ized by its charter to build. The Port Royal Railroad Company
having mortgaged its entire property, including the strip ac-
quired from Holt, to secure a large issue of negotiable bonds,
and default in payment of the same having been made, in 1878
a decree of foreclosure was made by the circuit courts of the
United States for the district of South Carolina and the south-
em district of Georgia; and under such decree a sale was had,
at which certain persons representing the creditors of the cor-
poration became the purchasers, and afterward conveyed the
same to a new corporation created by the laws of the states of
South Carolina and Georgia, and called the Port Royal & Au-
gusta Railway Company. The latter company executed two
mortgages upon its entire property to secure a large issue of
bonds, and in 1893 default in payment upon these bonds was
made. Thereafter a proceeding in equity was instituted in the
superior court of Richmond county, to foreclose the mortgages
executed by the railroad company to secure the issue of bonds
above referred to, and a receiver was appointed to take charge
July, 1898.] Charleston etc. Ry. Co. t;. Hughes. 21
of the property and assets of the company. The strip of land
which had been acquired by the Port Eoyal Railroad Company
from Holt passed into the possession of the receiver.
On August 20, 1896, Mrs. Hughes, W. K. Miller, and J. E.
Lamar presented a petition to the judge of the superior court,
setting forth that they were the owners of the land in the pos-
session of the receiver, which was described in the deed from
Holt to the Port Royal Railroad Company; that upon the same
there had been erected six railroad tracks which were now in
the possession of the receiver and in use by him as a part of the
^ railroad yard and terminals in the city of Augusta; that Mrs.
Hughes acquired title to the property under the will of Charles
De Laigle, and became entitled to possession on the death of
her mother, Emma De Laigle Harris, which occurred on Janu-
ary 13, 1894; that she had conveyed an undivided half-interest
in the same to W. K. Miller and J. R. Lamar; that the property
is of great value, to wit, five thousand dollars or other large
sum, and that the railroad iron laid upon the same is the prop-
erty of petitioners and is of the value of seven hundred and
fifty dollars, and the yearly rental value of the property is six
hundred dollars or other large sum; that the company is in-
solvent, in the hands of a receiver, and its assets in the state of
South Carolina are also in the hands of a receiver, and its prop-
erty is about to be sold under a final decree in that state, which
sale is advertised to take place on the first Tuesday in Septem^
ber, 1896; that petitioners cannot obtain payment for the use
of their land nor eject the receiver therefrom without the per-
mission of the court. They pray that they be allowed to sue the
receiver, and for mesne profits from January 13, 1894, and that,
unless arrangements can be made for the purchase of the same,
the receiver be ejected and possession be surrendered by the
court to them; that pending the final determination of the is-
sue, the receiver be enjoined from surrendering possession of
the property in Georgia and the assets and income in his hands,
until the final order of this court; and that the receiver hold
up sufficient money to pay the judgment that may be rendered.
On this petition the presiding judge passed the following order:
"Read and sanctioned. Let this petition be filed. Petitioners
are allowed to intervene in said cause, and to sue J. H. Averill,
receiver of the Port Royal & Augusta Railway Company; and
he and the said company are required to show cause before me
on the thirty-first day of August, 1896, in the superior court
room at Augusta, Georgia, why the prayer of the petitioners
22 Chableston etc. Ry. Co. v. Hughes. [Georgia,
should not be granted. In the meantime, he and the said com-
pany are restrained from changing the existing status of the
said property or permitting the same to be sold in the state of
South Carolina, as advertised, until the further order of this
court. August 20, 1896." On August 31, 1896, the receiver «
filed an answer to the petition of the intervenors, in which
some of the allegations were denied, and others were neither ad-
mitted nor denied, for the alleged reason that the receiver was
not informed as to the matter. It was alleged that when he
was appointed receiver he found the Port Royal & Augusta
Railway Company in possession of the property, and the same
passed into his possession, and he is informed and believes that
the railway company had been for many years in open and
peaceable possession of the same, claiming it as its own, in good
faith, adversely to the claims of all others. The prayer of the
answer was that the intervenors be required to make strict, proof
of their allegations; and that if it be shown to the court that
they are the owners and entitled to possession, he be allowed
a reasonable opportunity to ascertain what will be a fair and
reasonable price at which to acquire the lot and negotiate for
the purchase thereof, subject to the final approval of the court;
and that, in the event the intervenors and the receiver fail to
oome to an agreement as to the price to be paid, the question
be submitted to a jury, and if the amount found in favor of the
intervenors meet with the approval of the court, he have the
option of acquiring the same at the price so found; that if, in
the meanwhile, the property of the railway company shall have
been sold in pursuance of the orders of the court, the purchasers
have the option of acquiring the lot at such price. Thereafter
on the same day the receiver filed an amendment to his answer,
in which it was alleged that Charles De Laigle devised a certain
parcel of land to trustees for the use and benefit of his daugh-
ter, Emma De Laigle; that Verdery was appointed successor to
the trustee named in the will, and by an order of court made
a deed to Holt, undertaking to convey the fee simple title; and
that he is informed and believes that both Verdery, trustee,
and Holt believed that the fee in the land was acquired by Holt,
under the conveyance; that thereafter Holt executed a deed un-
dertaking to convey to the Port Royal Railroad Company a fee
simple estate in the land described in the petition of the inter-
veners, which is a portion of the tract which Holt acquired un-
der the deed from Verdery, trustee; that Holt and the company
believed that the fee simple title had been acquired; '' that
July, 1898.] Charleston etc. Ry. Co. v, Hughes. 23
"thereafter the property of the Port Eoyal Railroad Company
vas sold and a deed to the same was made, including the land
in dispute, to the Port Royal & Augusta Railway Company;
that by virtue of the several conveyances, and in the belief that
it had acquired a fee simple estate in the strip of land, the
Port Royal & Augusta Railway Company entered upon and took
possession of the same, and as its receiver respondent took con-
trol of it as the property of such company. It is further alleged
that the first information that the receiver ever had that inter-
veners claimed title to the land in controversy was wheal their
petition was served upon him.
On April 28, 1897, the receiver filed another amendment to
his answer, in which it was set up that the Port Royal Railroad
Company acquired a right of way over and through the premises
sued for, by virtue of condemnation proceedings had in accord-
ance with the powers conferred upon such company in its char-
ter, as will fully appear by the record of the court in which
the present case was pending, and that the receiver is the suc-
cessor to the right so acquired by the Port Royal Railroad Com-
pany. On the same day the following order was passed: "The
Charleston & Western Carolina Railway Company having pur-
chased the property of the Port Royal & Augusta Railway Com-
pany, and being in possession of the said property and that sued
for by B. H. Hughes et al., ordered that the said Charleston &
Western Carolina Railway Company be allowed to defend the
claim filed by B, H. Hughes et al., and to file the pleas this day
presented." The pleas of the Charleston & Western Carolina
Railway Company which were referred to in the order were, in
substance, as follows: It denies that the petitioners, or either of
them, have any right, title, or interest, at law or in equity, in
or to the premises in dispute. It admits that the main line and
tracks of the Port Royal Railroad Compainy were located and
constructed over the strip of land sued for, about the year 1873,
and that ever since that time the land and the tracks thereon
have constituted an indispensable portion of the main right of
way and railroad of that company and now of the defendant,
and that the same has been operated continuously as a part of
the public highway from Port Royal to the city of Augusta
for ** more than twenty years. It admits that Mrs. Hughes was
the only surviving child of Emma De Laigle Harris, and that
the latter died on the date alleged; the land sued for was once
owned by Charles De Laigle, and passed under his will to Louis
De Laigle as trustee for Emma De Laigle and her children; that
24 Charleston etc. Ry. Co. v. Hughes. [Georgia^
Walton was appointed trustee to succeed Louis DeLaigle, and
that Verdery was appointed to succeed Walton; that on Sep-
tember 9, 1870, upon the joint petition of Verdery, trustee, and
Emma De Laigle, the sale of the property was authorized, Emma
De Laigle at that time being the only beneficiary of the trust
in esse; that in accordance with the order the land was sold
to Holt, the trustee conveying to him in fee simple; that the
purchase money (four thousand dollars) was paid in cash to the
trustee, who invested it for the benefit of the trust estate; that
subsequently Verdery resigned the trust after Mrs. Hughes, the
petitioner, was bom, and that on the petition presented by Mrs.
Hughes on her own behalf and as next friend of her daughter,
Joseph B. Harris was appointed trustee; that Verdery fully ac-
counted for the amount received by him and paid the same over
to Harris, trustee, after the execution by Harris of a bond re-
quired by the order of court; that Mrs. Hughes has never repu-
diated or disaffirmed the petition that was filed in her behalf,
or restored the money paid for her use; that the Port Royal
Railroad Company had acquired the premises in dispute as a
right of way under condemnation proceedings which were au-
thorized by its charter; that under such proceedings it acquired
title and went into possession, and at great cost proceeded to
construct the main track of its railroad, placing thereon divers
sidetracks which were necessary for its use, and completed the
construction of its entire railroad from Augusta to Port Royal,
South Carolina; that the property passed from the Port Royal
Railroad Company to the Port Royal & Augusta Railway Com-
pany by virtue of the decree rendered in the foreclosure pro-
ceedings brought by the bondholders of the former company;
that in 1893, in the foreclosure proceedings had against the
Port Royal & Augusta Railway Company, under authority of
the orders of court passed therein, receiver's certificates to the
amount of one hundred thousand dollars were * issued, and de-
clared to be a first lien upon the entire line of railroad in the
possession of the receiver; that none of such certificates were
ever paid, and that the entire property of the railroad was sold
because of the nonpayment of the same, together with a large
amount of the other indebtedness of the receiver, amounting
to not less than one hundred and fifty thousand dollars; that
the defendant became the purchaser of the Port Royal & Au-
gusta Railway Company at such sale, and received a conveyance
of the same from the master; that under the law of Georgia
the trustee of such a trust as was created by the will of Charlea
July, 1898.] Charleston etc. Ry. Co. v. Hughes. 26
De Laigle was not only for the benefit of the life tenant, but
was to preserve the contingent remainders, and that Mrs.
Hughes and her grantees are concluded; and especially, under
the sale of the trustee to Holt, that Mrs. Hughes elected to
ratify and affirm the sale when she applied for the appointment
of Joseph B. Harris as trustee, under which order the purchase
money received by Verdery, trustee, was recognized as repre-
senting the entire estate in the property and turned over to
Harris, trustee, as such; that Mrs. Hughes well knew all of the
facts, and when she became of age did not disaffirm such trans-
action or undertake to avoid the condemnation proceedings un-
til August, 1896, and stood by and allowed the railroad com-
pany to occupy that portion of its right of way, many times a
day using the same for the handling thereon of trains carrying
passengers, freight, and mails; that petitioners are not entitled
to maintain an action of ejectment or destroy the unity of the
property as maintained and enjoyed for more than twenty years,
and thus deprive the public of the benefit of a completed and
operated railroad.
The court sustained a deiflurrer to the plea of the Charleston
& Western Carolina Railway Company, and this ruling is the
basis of one of the assignments of error in the main bill of ex-
ceptions. Thereafter the Charleston & Western Carolina Rail-
way Company offered the following amendment to its pleading:
"Now comes the Charleston & Western Carolina Railway Com-
pany, admitted to defend against the intervention of B. H.
Hughes and others, and presents for refiling under the sanction
of the court its original answer, and protesting against any judg-
ment or decree against *** it, and reserving the right to except!
thereto, and reserving also all exceptions heretofore made and
the right to insist thereon, for an amendment to the original
prayer of the answer prays that the court order that if any ver-
dict or decree is rendered against this defendant, the Charleston
& Western Carolina Railway Company, that it be not one of
ejectment, but a money verdict for the value of the land, upon
the payment of which this defendant may retain the premises
in dispute." The presiding judge refused to allow the original
answer to be refiled with the amendment, and this is assigned
as error. While the original answer of the defendant was
stricken on demurrer, it appears from the record that at the
trial of the case all of the evidence which would have been ad-
missible under such an answer was admitted, and the facts ap-
pearing in such evidence are set forth in the first part of this
'2Q Charleston etc. Ry. Co. v. Hughes. [Georgia,
statement. After all the evidence was submitted, the judge di-
rected the jury to find for the plaintiffs the premises in dispute,
hut that the railroad iron thereon was the property of the de-
fendant. Upon this verdict a judgment was entered for the
plaintiffs against the defendant for the land in dispute, direct-
ing a writ of possession to issue, and authorizing the sheriff,
on demand of the plaintiffs, to put defendant, its agents and
servants, out of possession. Thereupon the defendant excepted,
and the plaintiffs by cross-bill complained of rulings which will
he hereafter referred to. The errors assigned in the main bill
■of exceptions were: 1. The court erred in sustaining the demur-
rer to the original answer of the defendant; 2. The court erred
in refusing to allow the defendant to refile its answer with the
amendment so as to have a money verdict against the receiver,
because, if under the evidence petitioners show a title in them
which would ordinarily authorize a recovery in ejectment, there
should in the present case be a finding for a sum of money, or
a decree authorizing the receiver to acquire the premises by the
exercise of the power of eminent domain enjoyed by the Port
Royal & Augusta Railway Company. The assignment of error
in the cross-bill of exceptions was, that the court erred in di-
recting the jury to find for the defendants the iron rails and
other improvements located upon and permanently attached to
the railroad, ** it being insisted that such rails and other im-
provements, being permanently attached to the railroad, should
pass with the real estate.
1. The item of the will of Charles De Laigle under which the
petitioners derived title was construed by this court in the case
of Fleming v. Hughes, 99 Ga. 444. It was there held that the
legal title passed to the trustee as to the life-estate only; that
the remainder created was a legal and not an equitable estate,
and that therefore the order of sale which was granted on the
application of Verdery, trustee, did not authorize the sale of
any other interest in the land than the life estate of Emma
De Laigle. The only interest acquired by Holt under such sale
being the life estate, that was all that he could convey. By
the terms of this decision the title to the fee vested in Mrs.
Hughes upon the death of her mother on January 13, 1894. It
appears, therefore, that all the issues raised in the present case
involving the question of title are conclusively settled by the
case cited.
2. The Port Royal Railroad Company was incorporated by an
act of the general assembly, approved December 19, 1859; and
July, 1898.] Charleston etc. Rv. Co. v. Hughes. 27
by its charter it was declared that "the said company shall pos-
sess and enjoy the same privileges as to right of way as are
■vested in, and enjoyed by, the Central Railroad & Banking
Company of Georgia": Acts 1859, p. 324. In the charter of the
Central Railroad & Banking Company it was provided that that
company should have power to construct a railroad, "paying
to the owners of lands through which the same may pass a just
indemnity" for the value of the land covered by the railway and
the right of way on either side thereof. If the company could
not acquire the title to the right of way by purchase, it was
provided that the amount of damage or injury occasioned by the
construction and maintenance of the road should be ascertained
And determined by the award of three appraisers, one to be
chosen by the company, one by the "owner," and one by the
inferior court of the county where the land lay; and if the "own-
er," should decline to appoint an appraiser, then two were to
be appointed by the inferior court, the finding of the appraisers
to operate as a judgment for the amount against the company,
*^ either party having the right to appeal from the award of
the appraisers to a special jury in the superior court. It was
provided that "the decision shall vest in the company the fee
simple of the land in question, and in the other party a judg-
ment for its value." In making the valuation the appraisers,
and in case of appeal the jury, should take into consideration
the loss or damage which may occur to "the owner** or "owners"
in consequence of the land being taken, and also the benefit
and advantage to be received from the construction of the rail-
road: Prince's Digest, 331, 332; Acts 1835, p. 217. It will be
seen that, under the charter above quoted from, it was contem-
plated that the right of way should be acquired by purchase from
the "owner** of the land, and that upon failure of the company
and the owner to agree upon the amount to be paid, condemna-
tion proceedings could be had in the manner above referred to,
and that the persons against whom such condemnation proceed-
ings must be instituted were the owners of the property — that
is, the same persons with whom the company would be required
to negotiate for the purchase of the property. The persons,
•therefore, who are the owners and who would have to be con-
sulted if a purchase at private sale was desired, are ones wlio
should be made parties to the condemnation proceedings. If
the person in possession of the property was not clothed with
the power to make a conveyance of the interest of another in
the same property, then such person could not acquire the right
28 Charleston etc. Ry. Co. v. Hughes. [Georgia,
to dispose of the interest of the other party by submitting to
condemnation proceedings to which the other person at interest
was not a party, nor deprive the other of his right to assert
his interest, whatever it may be, against the corporation in-
stituting the condemnation proceedings. If a life-tenant could
not convey to a railroad company for a right of way the interest
of a remainderman, the most solemn judgment that could be
rendered in condemnation proceedings, to which the railroad
company and the life tenant alone were parties, could not ope-
rate as an estoppel upon the remainderman. It becomes neces-
sary in the present case to determine whether, in condemnation
proceedings instituted under the provisions of the charter re-
ferred to against a person who was the assignee of the ^^ life
tenant, the interest of a contingent remainderman, who was
not in esse when the proceedings were had, passed to the rail-
road company. The award of appraisers in such proceedings
• operates as a judgment between the parties, and is governed by
the same rules that would ordinarily be applied to judgments
of courts; and such an award, or a verdict and judgment on
appeal from the same, has the same force as an ordinary judg-
ment rendered by a court of competent jurisdiction. It is con-
clusive upon the parties and privies, but is not binding upon
strangers. If at the time the condemnation proceedings were
had there were two estates in the property, one a life estate,
and the other a contingent remainder, the fact that it was im-
possible to ascertain the persons who would eventually take as
remainderman upon the happening of the contingency provided
for in the will would not authorize the conclusion that the in-
terest of such remaindermen was acquired by proceedings
against the life tenant, who under no circumstances could be
held to represent them. If the condition of the title to the
property at the time of the condemnation proceedings is such
that notice cannot be given to all interested, notice to such as
are definitely known to be interested would not be held to be
sufficient to deprive of their rights others whose identity was
unknown, but whose interest in the property was ascertainable.
Condemnation proceedings pass title to whatever interest the
parties who took part in the proceedings have in the property,
and a party who could not be notified is not bound by the award
or judgment. In such cases the railroad company would fail to
acquire a perfect title to the property; and this imposes no
greater hardship upon a railroad company than it does upon any
other person who desires to purchase property in which there
July, 1898.] Charleston etc. Ry. Co. t>. Hughes. 29
is a contingent interest outstanding in some one whose identity
cannot be determined at the time of the purchase. The con-
demnation proceedings are no more than a compulsory sale of
All the owner's interest in the property, and no one can be thus
■compelled to sell who is not a party to the judgment rendered
by the tribunal which is erected for this purpose. Therefore
a railroad company which sees proper to construct its railway
over land where the title is in the condition above ** referred
to acquires the interest of all those with whom it deals by nego-
tiation, or against whom it proceeds by condemnation, but takes
the risk of other persons interested making claims in the fu-
ture, whether they be left out of the negotiations or the con-
demnation proceedings by mistake or from necessity. In the
present case, condemnation proceedings against the assignee ot
the life tenant, to whom the entire amount awarded as damages
was paid, is pleaded in bar of the right of the remainderman
in the same property to have compensation for her interest after
the termination of the life estate. This cannot be the law. For
if so, the right of the legislature to confiscate in the interest
of public improvements under the guise of condemnation pro-»
ceedings would be complete, it being only necessary that one
person who was interested in the property should have notice,
and by such notice the interest of every other person would be
held to pass, although ignorant of the proceedings under which
their property was taken. Under the ruling made in the case
of Fleming v. Hughes, 99 Ga. 444, Emma De Laigle had only
& life estate in the property, and this was the only estate
acquired by Holt under the purchase from Verdery, trustee.
Holt, therefore, represented no one but himself, and in the
condemnation proceedings instituted against him his interest
in the land was all that could be affected by the judgment. As
he did not acquire the interest of Mrs. Hughes, and as it is not
pretended that any part of the money paid to him by the rail-
road company was ever paid over to Mrs. Hughes, or to any one
authorized to represent her, or was ever used for her benefit in
any way, the condemnation proceedings, if they had terminated
in a regular judgment, instead of a conve5'ance voluntarily exe-
cuted by Holt in accordance with the verdict of the jury, could
not be used against Mrs. Hughes to raise either an estoppel by
record or any other estoppel which would have the effect of pre-
venting her from asserting her rights in the property. Under
this view of the case, it is unnecessary to determine whether
the condemnation proceedings were invalid on account of one
30 Charleston etc. Ry. Co. v. Hughes. [Georgia,
of the arbitrators not having been regularly appointed, or
whether the railroad company waived its rights under the con-
demnation proceedings by taking the deed from ^^ Holt. Holt
was lawfully in possession of the life estate under the convey-
ance made to him by Yevderj, trustee, and he had a right to
sell that interest, and the same passed to the railroad company
under the deed which he executed to it after the verdict had
been rendered in the condemnation proceedings. In the case of
Bentonville R. R. Co. v. Stroud, 45 Ark. 278, it was held that it
was incumbent on the railroad company which was seeking a
condemnation of a right of way to ascertain the owners of the
land and make them parties to the proceedings, and by select-
ing the parties against whom it proceeded it admitted their own-
ership. In the opinion, Cockrell, C. J., referring to the rule
above stated, says: "The company alone can start the proceed-
ings, and when it does so it must proceed against the owner, and
it selects the parties to be proceeded against at its peril, because,
by starting the proceedings against them, it admits that they
are the owners. This is no hardship on the company. The rec-
•ords and other means of information are open to it, and if the
title to the land to be taken is uncertain or in dispute, it may
bring all persons who appear to be owners or part owners into
court, and, when the damages are assessed and paid into court,
leave the contending claimants to settle among themselves their
controversy as to the fund awarded."
3. When a railroad company, without warrant or authority,
enters upon the land of another, it is, as a general rule, no less
a trespasser than any other person who is guilty of an act of a
similar nature. If, however, a railroad company enters upon
the land with the consent of the owner, or under license from
him, and the property thus taken possession of becomes such a
necessary component part of its railroad that to surrender its
possession would interfere seriously with the interests of the
company, the landowner, although entitled to compensation for
his property, might, by his conduct in allowing the entry upon
his land and permitting the company to so use it as that it could
not be abandoned without great prejudice to its rights, estop
himself from asserting against the company the legal title to
the property by an action of ejectment. The propositions above
stated are simply the application of familiar principles of law
^" which govern in all transactions of the character above
referred to, whether the controversy be between natural persons
elone, or between such persons and corporations, and whether
July, 1898.] Charleston etc. Ry. Co. v, Hughes. 31
the corporation be public or private. A railroad corporatioiv
being one charged by the law with the performance of certain,
duties to the public, is allowed, under some circumstances, to-
set up rights connected with the land over which it operates its-
line of railway, of which an individual or an ordinary private
corporation would not generally be allowed to avail itself. Con-
troversies in reference to the possession of land, where the rights
of individuals only are involved, are purely matters of private-
concern. Controversies in which a corporation charged with the
duties incumbent upon carriers of passengers, freight, and mails,
in which an effort is made by private individuals or others to-
take away from such corporation a part of the property in ita
possession which is absolutely essential to its complete perform-
ance of the public duties required of it, become matters of more
than private concern, and in which the public is deeply and
seriously interested. For this reason it has become settled law
that the harsh remedies which would be allowed to one indi-
vidual against another in reference to the possession of land
will not be allowed to one who is seeking to recover such prop-
erty from a railroad company, when exact justice can be done
to such owner by giving him remedies which are less severe in
their nature, and by which he would secure substantially the
same rights, thereby saving to the public the right to require
a performance of the public duties incumbent upon the corpo-
ration whose property is the subject matter of the controversy.
That a railroad corporation has a right to deprive a person of
his property for its uses by doing acts which in an individual
would be dealt with as a trespass is not contended for; but when
a railroad company enters upon land and constructs its road
without lawful authority, and the landowner acquiesces in the
wrongful act and the consequent appropriation of the property
to a great public use until the same has become a necessary
component part of the property required by the railroad to per-
form its public duties, such landowner will be held to have
waived his right to retake the property, and will be remitted to-
such *'' other remedies for the wrong done him as will not inter-
fere with the rights of the public to have the railroad main-
tained and operated. If this is the case in reference to unlawful
entry, for a stronger reason the same result would follow if the
entry by the railroad company in the first instance was by the
authority or consent of the landowner, even though it be under
a parol license and the legal title to the land still remain in the
landowner. The current of modem authority sustains the prop-
32 Charleston etc. Ry. Co. v. Hughes. [Georgia,
osition that when a railroad company is in possession of land,
using it as a right of way, although not having acquired the
legal title thereto, the landowner would be estopped from eject-
ing the company from the premises if it was shown either that
the original entry was with his consent, or that the entry without
his consent was so long acquiesced in that to allow the company
to be ejected would either dismember the property of the com-
pany, or essentially interfere with its ability to discharge the
public duties incumbent upon it. This, however, is subject to
the qualification that the landowner is entitled to compensation
for his property and this must be ascertained and paid to him
before the corporation is vested with a complete right to hold
and enjoy his property as its own.
In the case of Indiana etc. Ry. Co. v. Allen, 113 Ind. 581, the
general rule is stated to be, that when land is seized by a rail-
road company without right the owner may maintain eject-
ment; but where there has been an acquiescence on the part of
the owner until public rights have intervened, such action will
not lie, but the landowner will be confined to a recovery of com-
pensation. In Louisville etc. Ry. Co. v. Beck, 119 Ind. 124, it
was held that: "A landowner who stands by without demanding
-compensation, until a railroad company has so far completed
^nd put in operation its road over his land as to involve the pub-
lic interest, can neither enjoin the company nor maintain eject-
ment to recover his land. The only remedy left to the land-
owner, in such a case, is to proceed within the proper time to
have his damages assessed and enforced against the railroad
company." In the case of Galveston etc. R. R. Co, v. Pfeuffer,
56 Tex. 66, it was held that where land was appropriated by a
railroad company without authority the right of the owner to ***
•compensation was not waived by his standing by and permitting
the company to construct its road over his land, nor was his
right to recover the land lost if the company refused to make
•compensation. In the case of McAulay v. Western etc. R. R.
-Co., 33 Vt. 311, 78 Am. Dec. 627, it was held, where a land-
owner acquiesced in the occupation of his land for the construc-
tion of a railroad, without requiring prepayment of damages
\ipon a contract for future payment by the company, and the
road was constructed and put in operation, that he could not
afterward, on failure to obtain payment, maintain ejectment or
trespass for the land : See, also, Roberts v. Northern Pac. R. R.
€o., 158 U. S. 1; 3 Elliott on Railroads, sec. 1049. In those
<;ase8 where it has been held that the landowner would be en-
July, 1898.] Chableston etc. Ry. Co. v. Eughix. 53
titled to bring suit against the company in ejectment, and
where a judgment in ejectment was allowed to be rendered, it
was also held that upon appropriate pleadings the issuing of a
writ of possession would be stayed until the company could be
allowed a reasonable time in which to acquire title to the prop-
erty, either by purchase or condemnation, or that the enforce-
ment of such a judgment in ejectment would be enjoined for a
similar reasoa: Pittsburg etc. K. E. Co. v. Bruce, 102 Pa. St.
23; Pittsburg etc. R. R. Co. v. Jones, 59 Pa. St. 433; Conger v.
Burlington etc. Ey. Co., 41 Iowa, 419; Jacksonville etc. Ry. Co.
V. Adams, 33 Fla. 608, In the case of Yonng v. McKenzie, 3
Ga. 31, it was held that an action of ejectment against a bridge
company to recover property in its possession, and necessary for
the purpose of building the bridge, but to which the title had
not been acquired either by purchase or condemnation, should
be enjoined until the bridge company should have a reasonable
time to comply with the terms of its charter in reference to
<;ondemning the property for its use. In this case there had
been an attempt to acquire the land by condemnation, which
failed for the reason that the proceedings before the appraisers
were recorded in the wrong place. Under color of this author-
ity the land was entered upon and the bridge built, and this
was one of the reasons which brought the court to the conclu-
sion that in equity the company should not be ejected until an
opportunity had been afforded it to acquire the land by con-
demnation.
■^* It is contended however, in the present case, as the title
acquired by the railroad company under the deed from Holt
was for the life estate of Emma DeLaigle only, that upon her
death the title immediately vested in Mrs. Hughes, and that
the possession of the railroad company, relatively to Mrs.
Hughes, became wrongful and unauthorized, and that therefore
she is entitled to treat it as a naked trespasser upon her prop-
erty, she having done nothing which would amount to a con-
sent on her part to the appropriation of the property by the
company^ and the lapse of time between the death of her mother
and the filing of the suit not being sufficient to have amounted
to such an acquiescence as would deprive her of the right to
maintain an action of ejectment against the company. Noth-
ing appears in the record which would amount to an estoppel
against her. There was no evidence that she received any part
of the money which was paid to Verdery, trustee, when the
property was sold to Holt, nor that any part of the same was
Am. St. Rkp., Vol. LXX.— 3
84 Charleston etc. Ry. Co. v, Hughes. [Georgia^
ever used for her benefit; nor has tHere been any ratification of
the acts of those persons who attempted to convey to the rail-
road company her interest in the property; nor has the time-
which has elapsed since her right of entry been of snch dura-
tion as to show an acquiescence in the wrongful appropriation of
her property. The case should be treated as one in which the
owner of the land who is asserting title against the railroad
company never consented to its occupation by the company^
either by herself or by anyone authorized to represent her. But
while this is true, we think that, under the circumstances of this
case, Mrs. Hughes should not be allowed to treat the company
as a naked trespasser. Its entry upon the property in the life-
time of Emma De Laigle was lawful and authorized. At the
time of its entry, and so far as the record shows, up to the time
of the claim now set up by Mrs. Hughes, it and its successors
believed that they had acquired a fee simple title to the prop-
erty, the deeds under which they claimed purporting to convey
such an estate. Their right to possession after the death of
Emma De Laigle was at least colorable. It has been said that
"an original entry by the consent of a tenant for life is lawful,
and will not subject the party enjoining to an action for dam-
ages ^® on the part of the remainderman, although damages
have not been paid" : Mills on Eminent Domain, see. 142. The
statement above made was quoted approvingly and followed in
the case of Chicago etc. Ry. Co. v. Goodwin, 111 111. 273; 53
Am. Rep. 623. In the case of Austin v. Rutland R. R. Co., 45-
Vt. 215, it was held that where a railroad company had entered
into possession of property with the consent of the life tenant
and continued to use and possess the same after the termina-
tion of the life estate, to the exclusion of the remainderman,
and without appraisal or payment of damages, the remainder-
man could not maintain ejectment against the company.
Even if we were disposed to do so, it is not necessary for us to
go to the length of the decisions just cited. We are of opin-
ion that the petitioners in the present case have waived their
right, if any they had, to insist in the first instance upon a
judgment in ejectment against the railroad company, not by
anything they have done before they instituted their suit, but.
by the way in which they have brought their suit and the char-
acter of the same and of the relief prayed in the original peti-
tion. The assets of the Port Royal & Augusta Railway Com-
pany were in the custody of a court of equity through the me-
dium of a receiver, and he had possession of the property now
July, 18S8.] Charleston etc. Ry. Co. v. HuaHES. 35
in controversy. The petitioners did not apply to this court for
leave to go into a common-law court and assert there a strict
and technical common-law right; but they applied to this court
of equity to be allowed to come in and make themselves par-
ties to the pending suit, and set up their right in such suit
against the receiver and the company which was represented by
him; and they prayed for a judgment declaring them to be the
owners of the property described in their petition, and that they
be placed in possession of the same, if the court should decide
in their favor; and distinct prayers were made for an order in
the nature of an injunction against the receiver to prevent him
from delivering any of the property in Georgia to those who
might become purchasers under the order of court in the state
of South Carolina until the issues raised by them should be de-
termined; and, further, that the receiver should be required to
retain in his hands a sufficient sum of money to pay the judg-
ment that might be rendered in favor of petitioners. ** On
this petition the court passed an order allowing the petitioners
to intervene in the cause, and granted an order restraining the
receiver from changing the existing status of the property, or
permitting the same to be sold in the state of South Carolina,
as petitioners alleged was about to be done. The petitioners
have not only resorted to a court of equity to set up their claim,
but they have come in praying in their behalf distinct equita-
ble relief. They practically concede that a contingency may
arise in which the parties in possession of the land claimed by
them would be authorized to purchase the same, such being the
inevitable inference to be drawn from the prayer asking that a
snm of money be impounded in the hands of the receiver for
their benefit.
"He who would have equity must do equity, and give effect
to all equitable rights in the other party respecting the subject-
matter of the suit": Civ. Code, sec. 3924. The meaning of
this maxim is, "that whatever be the nature of the controversy
between two definite parties, and whatever be the nature of the
remedy demanded, the court will not confer its equitable relief
upon the party seeking its interposition and aid unless he has
acknowledged and conceded, or will admit and provide for, all
the equitable rights, claims, and demands justly belonging to
the adversary party, and growing out of or necessarily involved
in the subject matter o^ the controversy. It says, in effect, that
the court will give the plaintiff the relief to which he is entitled,
only upon condition that he has given, or consents to give, the
36 Charleston etc. Ry. Co. v. Hughes. [Georgia,
defendant such corresponding rights as he also may he entitled
to in respect of the subject matter of the suit": 1 Pomeroy's
Equity Jurisprudence, sec. 385. Anyone going into a court of
equity and asking its aid, whether that aid he such as could he
obtained in a court of law, or whether it be of a character ob-
tainable only in a court of equity, submits himself to the juris-
diction of the court, and in asking its aid subjects himself to
the imposition of such terms as well-established equitable prin^
ciples would require. Especially would this be true where the
relief sought by the party applying to the court is both legal
and equitable in its nature. No one can read the facts of the
present case without being impressed that there is an over-
whelming equity in favor of this railroad ^^ company being al-
lowed to purchase from the petitioners the property owned by
them, and which is so necessary to the complete operation and
maintenance of the company's road in the discharge of its publie
duties. Whatever might have been Mrs. Hughes' rights
against the company if she had sued at law, or if she had ob-
tained leave of this court of equity to have maintained at law
an independent suit against the receiver or other persons in pos-
session, under the remedy which she has elected she is bound
to submit the subject matter of the litigation to the adjudica-
tion of the court upon equitable principles. Her right to insist
upon a judgment of ouster in the first instance is therefore gone,
if the defendant desires to insist upon its right to purchase the
properi;y; and the pleas of the defendant, which set up its right
to have the value of the property passed upon by a jury, that
they might be given an opportunity to purchase and pay for
the same, were good in substance, and should not have been
stricken. It is contended, however, that as the defendant is a
foreign corporation, and as it has no authority under the laws
of this state to acquire property by condemnation, it had no
right to come into court and file a plea asking that what was
equivalent to a condemnation be had in the pending suit.
While it is not a corporation organized under the laws of this
state, by comity it is permitted to come into this state, and is
here discharging public duties of the nature usually performed
by corporations of that character, and it is as fully under the
control of the laws of this state in regard to the discharge of
such public duties as if it had been incorporated under our laws.
As a foreign corporation it has the right, until stopped by the
state, to maintain and operate its railroad within the limits of
this state. In order to exercise this right, the property in con-
July, 1898.] Charleston etc. Ry. Co. v. HuaHES. 37
troversy is an essential part of its right of way and terminals.
Such being the case, the equity in its favor, requiring that the
court of equity to which petitioners have applied should accord
to it the right to acquire by purchase the possession of the prop-
erty before a harsh judgment of ouster should be rendered
against it, is just as strong as if it had authority to acquire pos-
session of the property under the exercise of the power of emi-
nent domain. The equity in favor of *^ a railroad company,
in such a case, does not grow out of the right it might have under
the law to acquire title to the property in which it happens to
be in possession, but it grows out of the fact that it is in pos-
session of the property; that the entry of its predecessor in title
was lawful and authorized ; and that the same has become a nec-
essary component part of the property of the corporation, which
is discharging duties of a public nature. The court should
have allowed the pleas filed; and, after the damages had been
assessed by a jury, a decree should have been entered, allowing
the defendant a reasonable time, to be stated in the decree, to
pay the damages so assessed, and, upon its failure to pay the
same within the time specified, that the petitioners recover the
land and writ of possession issue.
4. The judge of the superior court directed the jury to re-
turn a verdict in favor of petitioners for the land in dispute;
and directed them also to find that the railroad iron thereon
was the property of the defendant. This latter ruling is the one
complained of in the cross-bill of exceptions. It appears from
the record that the railroad iron referred to in the verdict was
the tracks which had been placed upon the land in controversy
by the railroad company as a part of its main track between its
terminal points, and also sidetracks used as a part of its ter-
minals in the city of Augusta. It is apparent that these im-
provements were made upon the property with no intention on
the part of the railroad company to improve the value of the
estate, but solely for its uses and purposes in its business as a
common carrier of freight and passengers. Upon the termina-
tion of the life estate which the railroad company acquired un-
der the conveyance from Holt, did the title to these improve-
ments vest in the remainderman at the same time that the title
to the land vested? In the case of Elwes v. Maw, 3 East, 38,
Lord Ellenborough reached the conclusion, after an elaborate
examination of authority, that buildings and the like, erected
by a tenant upon the leased premises for the purposes of agricul-
ture and necessary for the occupation of the farm and the im-
88 Charleston etc. Ry. Co. v. Hughes. [Georgia,
mediate profits of the land, were not remoTable by the tenant
even during his term; but that such improvements as were
placed by the tenant upon the premises-for purposes of ^^ trade
were not governed by the same rules, and were removable by the
tenant at any time before the expiration of his term. This de-
cision was followed by the supreme court of the United States
in the case of Van Ness v. Paoard, 2 Pet. 137. The same doc-
trine is recognized in the case of Can v. Georgia E. R. Co., 74
Ga. 73, though what is said in that case is merely obiter. In
Meigs' Appeal, 62 Pa. St. 28, 1 Am. Rep. 372, it appeared that
during the Civil War the United States authorities erected cer-
tain buildings used as military barracks and hospitals in the bor-
ough of York. After the war had ended and the buildings were
no longer used by the government, they were offered for sale,
the purchaser to have the privilege of removing the same from
the premises. The authorities of the borough applied for an
injunction to prevent the removal of the buildings, alleging that
they were of a permanent nature, attached to the realty, and
therefore became the property of the borough, and could not be
removed after the government had abandoned the use of them
for the purposes for which they were erected. It was held that
the buildings thus erected being placed there at the time when
the necessities of the government required the same for mili-
tary purposes, when the conditions requiring their use ceased
to exist the government had a right to remove the same from
the premises. In the case of Wagner v. Cleveland etc. R. R.
Co., 22 Ohio St. 563, 10 Am. Rep. 770, it was held that stone
piers built by a railroad company as a part of its railroad, on
lands over which it had acquired a right of way for its road, did
not, though firmly imbedded in the earth, become the property
of the owner of the lands as part of the realty; and that when
the railroad company abandoned the purpose of completing the
railroad it had a right to remove such structures from the prem-
ises as personal property; and the fact that the landowner had
been allowed to take possession of the land embraced in the
right of way and hold it for a term of years less than is required
to extinguish the easement, did not, in itself, imply a relinquish-
ment on the part of the railroad company of its right to enter
and remove the piers. In the case of Toledo etc. Ry. Co. v.
Dunlap, 47 Mich. 456, it was held that a railway track, or other
improvement wrongfully placed upon ^** land by a railway com-
pany, and not abandoned to the owner of the premises, cannot
be treated as a part of the realty for the purpose of increasing
July, 1898.] Charleston etc. Ry. Co. v. Hughes. 39
its value in estimating the damages due to the owner in subse-
quent proceedings to condemn the land for the use of the com-
pany. In Justice v. Nesquehoning etc. E. R. Co., 87 Pa. St.
28, it was held that where a railroad company was a trespasser
«nd its entry upon land not in conformity to law, stfucturea
placed upon the property, for use by the company in its business
did not pass to the landowners, and their value was not to be
included in an assessment of damages in proceedings afterwards
instituted to acquire the property. In Chicago etc. Ry. Co. v.
<Joodwin, 111 111. 273, 53 Am. Rep. 622, it was held that a rail-
road company which had entered upon land and constructed its
road over the same under a license from the life tenant would
not be required to pay to the person entitled to the property,
after the termination of the life estate, the value of the struc-
tures which had been placed upon the property at its own ex-
pense: See, also, Elliott on Railroads, sees, 997, 998,
In the present case, at the termination of the life estate, if
the railway company had abandoned the possession of the prop-
erty without removing the improvements which it had placed
thereon, such improvements would probably have passed to the
remainderman; but under the facts of this case, where it re-
mained in possession, using the same in discharging public dutie3
which were incumbent upon it, although its possession would
be, in some sense, wrongful as against the remainderman, it ia
not to be treated, as has been shown, as a naked trespasser. It
would have had the undoubted right, under the authorities
above referred to, to remove from the premises the structures
which it had placed thereon at any time during the existence
of the life estate. As it had a right to remain upon the prem-
ises and have their value ascertained in order to acquire a com-
plete title to the same, the mere fact that at the time of the
assessment these improvements were still upon the property
does not require that they shall be dealt with as the property
of the land owner. Therefore, the petitioners having gone into
a court of equity, in assessing the damages which should be paid
to them the value of the improvements should not be consid-
ered. The '^ amount which the plaintiff would be entitled to
recover would be the market value of the property at the time
the life estate terminated, with interest from that time to the
date of the verdict, the value of the improvements placed on the
property not being considered in ascertaining such market value.
5. Under the rulings we have made, the only question to be
determined upon another trial of this case would be, what com-
40 Charleston etc. Ry. Co. v. Hoghes. [Georgia,.
pensation shoTild be paid to the petitioners for the interest of
the remainderman in the property ? As all other questions are
finally settled by this decision, direction is given that this single
issue be submitted to a jury, and that they determine it in ac-
cordance with instructions given by the trial judge, following
the rulings we have made. When the amount to be paid to the
petitioners is thus ascertained, a decree should be entered, al-
lowing the railway company a reasonable time in which to pay
the amount thus found, and upon payment of the same, the title
to the property to vest in the railway company. Upon a failure
to pay the same within the time limited, the right of the com-
pany to acquire the property should be decreed to be lost, and
a writ of possession should issue to enforce the judgment in
ejectment already rendered in the case.
Judgment on main bill of exception reversed with direction;
on cross-bill affirmed.
. All the justices concurring.
EMINENT DOMAIN — CONDEMNATION PROCEEDINGS —
CONCLUSIVENESS.— A judgment of a court having jurisdiction to
award damages In a proceeding to condemn lands for railroad pur-
poses is conclusive upon the parties thereto as to all questions
therein actually litigated, as well as all matters necessarily withia
the issue joined, although not formally litigated: Atchison etc. R. R.
Co. V. Boerner, 34 Neb, 240; 33 Am. St. Ry. 637; Atchison etc. Ry.
Co. V. Forney, 35 Neb. 607; 37 Am. St. Rep. 450. Concluslvenesa
where the damages are assessed by commissioners: Aldrich v.
Cheshire R. R. Co., 21 N. H. 359; 53 Am. Dec. 212.
EMINENT DOMAIN — CONDEMNATION PROCEEDINGS —
"WHO BOUND.— A bona fide purchaser of land is not affected by
proceedings for its condemnation to public use, pending at the time
of the purchase, if he had no notice of such proceedings, and no
notice of lis pendens had been filed: Bensley v. Mountain Lake
Water Co.,. 13 Cal. 306: 73 Am. Dec. 575. The owner of a limited
interest in property Is entitled to compensation: Ex parte Jennings,
6 Cow. 518; 16 Am. Dec. 447. A railway company, authorized to
condemn lands for a right of way, cannot condemn a temporary use,
Dor a use contingent on the happening of a future event: Hibernia
R. R. Co. V. De Camp, 47 N. J. L. 518; 54 Am. Rep. 197.
EMINENT DOMAIN — CONDEMNATION PR0CE:EDTNGS —
CONDITIONS PRECEDENT.— Bona fide effort to agree for the pur-
chase of property acquired for a railroad crossing is a condition,
precedent to a resort to proceedings for the condemnation thereof,
and must be alleged in the petition of the company Instituting such
proceedings: Toledo etc. Ry. Oa v. Detroit etc. R. R. Co., 62 Mich.
564; 4 Am. St. Rep. 875.
EMINENT DOMAIN— TAKING PROPERTY BY CONSENT.
The consent of owners of land taken for public use by a statute
may be subsequent, presumed, and tacit, as well as previous and
positively expressed; Wellington, Petitioners, 16 Pick. 87; 26 Am.
Dec. 631.
July, 1898.] Wyatt v. Rome. 41
RAILROAD COMPANIES— ENTRY ON LAND— EJECTMENT.
Where a railroad .company relies only upon a grant of a right of
way from an alleged owner In entering upon land to construct its
road, the subsequent grantee of the real owner may maintain eject-
ment against the company. Where the company knew the true
owner, the true owner may maintain ejectment, and is not estopped
by the fact that he was present when the grant was made, and
encouraged Its execution by his words or his silence, and afterward
permitted the company to construct and operate its road for eleven
years without objection: Richards v. Buffalo etc. R. R. Co., 137 Pa.
St. 524; 21 Am. St. Rep. 892. When ejectment cannot be main-
tained: McAulay v. Western etc. R. R. Co., 33 Vt. 311; 78 Am. Dec.
627.
INTERVENTION— RIGHTS OP INTER VENORS: See Clapp v.
Phelps, 19 La. Ann. 461; 92 Am. Dec. 545; Thompson v. Chauveau,
7 Mart., N. S., 331; 18 Am. Dec. 246.
RAILROAD COMPANIES— ENTRY ON LAND— RIGHT TO IM-
PROVEMENTS.—Where a railroad company takes possession of
land and constructs a track on it with the consent of the person In
possession, under claim and color of title, and the paramount owner
afterward sues for damages, the railroad company cannot be com-
pelled to pay for improvements made by itself: Cohen v. St. Louis
etc. R. R. Co., 34 Kan. 158; 55 Am. Rep. 242; LouIsvUle etc. R. R.
Co. V. Dickson, 63 Miss. 380; 56 Am. Rep. 809; Mississippi etc. R. R.
Go. T. Devaney, 42 Miss. 555; 2 Am. Rep. 608.
Wyatt v. Eomb.
[105 Georgia, 812.]
MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS— ENFORCEMENT OF VAC-
CINATION ORDINANCE— LIABILITY FOR DAMAGES.— A mu-
nicipal corporation Is not liable to a citizen who may sustain dam-
age on account of Impure vaccine matter administered to him by the
ofQcer or agent of such corporation In the enforcement of an ordi-
nance requiring citizens of the city to submit to vaccination,
MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS ARE NOT LIABLE FOR
THE NEGLIGENCE OF ITS OFFICERS or agents In executing
sanitary regulations adopted for the purpose of preventing the
spread of contagious disease.
Action to recover damages for injury alleged to have been
caused by the use of impure virus in the vaccination of plain-
tiff. Judgment for the defendant, and plaintiff appealed.
C. A. Thomwell and Fouche & Fouche, for the plaintiff.
^^'^ LEWIS, J. The right to prescribe regulations looking
to the preservation of the public health is one of those sover-
eign powers that belong to the state. This power can be dele-
gated by the state to any of its subdivisions of government, such
as a municipality or a county, and in the use of it by such sub-
42 Wyatt v. Kome. [Georgia,
divisions they are in tlie exercise of a function purely govern-
mental. As a general rule, a subordinate branch of the govern-
ment is not liable for injuries sustained by anyone growing out
of negligence, misfeasance, or nonfeasance of its officers and
agents who are charged with the duty of enforcing laws or or-
dinances enacted for the public good in the exercise of a govern-
mental **^* function, and not in the exercise of a private fran-
<3hise. The exceptions to this general rule are not founded so
much upon principle as judicial precedents. The rule itself is
based upon a principle as old as English law, that "the king can
do no wrong." It is upon this idea that the sovereignty of a
state protects it against suits by its subjects, no one having a
Tight to hold it liable for any act of its officers or agents, unless
fiuch right is expressly granted by the state itself. When a mu-
nicipality exercises a governmental power conferred upon it by
the state, it is just as if the state itself were in the exercise of the
iunction thus conferred. Among the precedents which have
been established by courts of last resort that are apparently ex-
€eptions to this general rule, we have been able to find none that
would hold a city liable for any injury that may be sustained
as the result of enforcing measures legally enacted for the pro-
motion and preservation of the public health. On the contrary,
authority is abundant and almost limitless establishing the non-
liability of a municipality in such cases. We do not think this
is an open question in this state, for it has practically been de-
cided in the case of Love v. Atlanta, 95 Ga. 129; 51 Am. St.
Eep. 64. The reasoning for the decision in that case given in
the lucid opinion of Justice Atkinson follows the uniform trend
of judicial expression, and is especially applicable to the case at
bar. On page 133 he says: "If the state delegate to a munici-
pal corporation, either by general law or by particular statute,
this power, aild impose upon it within its limits the duty of
taking such steps and such measures as may be necessary to the
preservation of the public health, the municipal corporation
likewise, in the discharge of such duty, is in the exercise of a
purely governmental function, affecting the welfare not only of
the citizens resident within its corporation, but of the citizens
of the commonwealth generally, all of whom have an interest
in the prevention of infectious or contagious diseases at any
point within the state, and in the exercise of such powers is en-
titled to the same immunity against suit as the state itself en-
joys." Upon the same line, and practically in point, we cite
the following as a few of the many decisions and authorities on
July, 1898.] Wyatt v. Rome. 43
this subject: 15 Am. & Eng. Ency. of Law, 1164, 1165, with
citations; 2 Dillon on ^^'^ Municipal Corporations, sec. 977;
Tiedeman on Municipal Corporations, sec. 332; Sherbourne v.
Yuba County, 21 Cal. 113; 81 Am. Dec. 151; Summers v. Com-
missioners, 103 Ind. 262; 53 Am. Rep. 512; in which it is de-
cided that "counties are instrumentalities of government, and
are not liable for injuries caused by the negligence of the com-
missioners in the selection of an unskillful or incompetent phy-
sician for the care of the poor"; Ogg v. Lansing, 35 Iowa, 495,
14 Am. Rep. 499, in which it is ruled that "a city is not liable
for the negligence of its officers or agents in executing sanitary
regulations, adopted for the purpose of preventing the spread of
contagious disease, or in taking the care and custody of persons
afflicted with such disease, or the houses in which such persons
are kept." The city in the present case was in the exercise of
a most important function of government, in which not only
the inhabitants of the city but the public at large were inter-
ested. The measure in question which it adopted looked to the
prevention of the spread of a contagious and serious malady
with which it was at the time perhaps threatened. To allow
any. citizen a right of action on account of injuries real or sup-
posed that he may have suffered in the interest of the public
good would be to paralyze the arm of the municipal government,
and either render it incapable of acting for the public weal, or
would render such action so dangerous that the possible evil
consequences to it, resulting from the multiplicity of suits,
might be as great as the smallpox itself. Hence the wisdom of
the law in exempting it from liability on such an alleged injury
as is set forth in the petition. It was not contended, either in
the pleadings or argument, that the city of Rome did not have
the right to pass the ordinance requiring its citizens and resi-
dents to submit to vaccination. On the contrary, the suit was
not based on any alleged want of authority in the city to legis-
late on the subject, but solely on the negligent manner in which
the city, through its officers and agents, enforced this ordinance.
Judgment affirmed.
All the justices concurring.
MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS-LIABILITY FOR ACTS OP
OFFICERS.— A city while acting, not In the managemept of Its
private or corporate affairs, but In the Interest of the public, and
as the guardian of the health, peace, convenience, and welfare of
the public. Is not liable for the negligent acts of Its officers or em-
ployes engaged in the execution of Its ordinances: Whitfield v. Paris,
44 Howard v. Cassels. [Georgia,
84 Tex. 431; 31 Am, St. Rep. 69. A municipal corporation Is not
liable for the negligence of a physician for the poor, unless the
corporation is shown to have been negligent in his selection: Sum-
mers y. Board of Commrs., 103 Ind. 262; 53 Am. Hep. 512.
Howard v, Cassels.
[105 Georgia, 412.]
GUARDIAN AND WARD— PARTIES.— If a testamentary
guardian enters into a contract for the purchase of land, pays part
of the purchase money with the funds of his minor wards, and gives
a note in his representative capacity for the balance, such wards
are not necessary parties, and cannot complain that they are not
made parties to a suit by the vendor to recover on such note.
GUARDIAN AND WARD— CONTRACT FOR PURCHASE
OF LAND— PARTIES.— If a contract for the purchase of land en-
tered into by a testamentary guardian, under which part of the
purchase price Is paid with funds of his wards, is authorized by
law or the terms of the will, the guardian, as the legal representa-
tive of the wards, is the only necessary party to a suit by the vendor
to recover the balance of the purchase price, and judgment against
him binds the property of the wards in his hands, and, if such con-
tract is not within the power of the guai*dian to malie, it binds him
In his Individual capacity only, and does not bind the property of
the wards.
GUARDIAN AND WARD — MISAPPROPRIATION OF
FUNDS.— If an unauthorized purchase is made by a guardian with
the funds of his ward, the guardian, and all other persons who,
with a knowledge of such illegal use, participate in the conversion
of such money, are liable to the ward.
GUARDIAN AND WARD— RATIFICATION OF UNAU-
THORIZED CONTRACT.— If a guardian enters into an unauthor-
ized contract for the purchase of land, pays part of the purchase
money with the funds of his ward, and gives a note In his represen-
tative capacity for the balance, the ward cannot claim the fruits
of such contract, and deny the right of the vendor to proceed against
the property for the balance of the purchase money. If the ward
ratifies the Illegal act, such ratification relates to the contract of
purchase, and he must ratify the contract as an entirety. He can-
not take the part only which is favorable to him, but he must also
take that other part which makes the land liable for the balance of
the purchase money.
GUARDIAN AND WARD.— RATIFICATION by a ward, by
claiming the fruits of his guardian's unauthorized investment, pre-
cludes a denial of the vendor's right to proceed against the property
purchased according to the contract to recover the balance due. The
ward must adopt and ratify the whole contract or none of It.
Townes & Nicholes, for the plaintiffs.
Arnold & Arnold, for the defendant.
*** LITTLE, J. The plaintiffs seek to set aside a iiidj:;Tnent
In favor of Inman v. George W. Howard, their testamentary
July, 1898.] Howard v. Cassels. 45
guardian. They allege that they were not made parties to the
action; that they had a good defense to it, which was that the
note sued on was given by Howard, their guardiaji, in his ac-
pacity as such, and did not bind the plaintiffs, nor should such
judgment be a lien on their property, because the testamentary
guardian did not have the power to encumber the estate of the
minors in any manner; and, referring to the judgment, they
pray that it be declared null and void as against them and their
property, and that it be set aside. We cannot see the necessity
for the decree prayed for. If it be true that the guardian ^^'^
had no legal power to enter into a contract which would bind
the property of his wards, then they were not bound by such
■contract, nor would it be necessary for their protection that
they should be made parties, and urge a defense in a suit on
a contract which did not include them in its obligations. If
the guardian alone was sued on the note, and the minors were
not parties, they would not be bound by the judgment rendered.
If, on the contrary, the guardian had the power to bind the
property of his wards by his promise to pay, then the property
of the wards would be bound by virtue of the power he had to
make the contract; but in neither event would it be necessary
to make the minor wards parties defendant in such an action.
The suit in which the judgment was rendered was based on a
promissory note executed by the guardian. This note he was
personally bound to pay. There was, as we understand it, no
effort made to obtain a judgment binding the property of the
wards; but a judgment by default was rendered against the
guardian, his contract being unconditional. No judgment is
«et out in the pleadings, and of course we have no means of
ascertaining its character. It makes no difference that the
judgment rendered designates him as the guardian of the plain-
tiffs; it is, nevertheless, only a personal judgment. "A judg-
ment against a party, as guardian, is no more than a judgment
against him without the addition, that being only a descriptio
personae": Tobin v. Addison, 2 Strob. 3. Our Civil Code, sec-
tion 2555, declares: "The guardian cannot .... by any con-
tract other than those specially allowed by law, bind his ward's
property, or create any lien thereon." In Story on Promissory
Notes the rule governing the question is laid down as follows:
*'And as to trustees, guardians, executors, and administrators,
and other persons acting en autre droit, they are by our law
generally held personally liable on promissory notes, because
they have no authority to bind ex directo the persons for whom.
46 Howard v. Cassels. [Georgia,
or for whose benefit, or for whose estate they act; and hence to
give any validity to a note they must be deemed personally
bound as makers" : See Lovelace v. Smith, 39 Ga. 130. In Mc-
Farlin v. Stinson, 56 Ga. 396, this court ruled that an executor
could not bind the estate of his testator by a promissory note
**" executed by him and signed as executor; and in Gaudy v.
Babbitt, 56 Ga. 641, it was in terms held that this rule has not
been relaxed as to executors, administrators, or guardians; and
in Harrison v. McClelland, 57 Ga. 531, it was held that a note
signed as administrator bound the maker individually. So that,
if our reasoning be correct, the promissory note given by How-
ard as guardian bound him individually; and if no power was
conferred on him by the will which created him guardian to so
bind the estate of his wards, then while the judgment rendered
became a lien on his property, it did not create any lien on the
property of the latter. We do not mean to say that there are
no contracts entered into by guardians which can be enforced
against the property of the wards; there may be, but where such
is the case, it is brought about generally, not by virtue of the
contract alone, but as a result of an equity in favor of the prom-
isee. In all such cases, however, the pleadings and proof must
show the subsisting equity. As a matter of law, guardians of
the property of wards are trustees, whose powers over the prop-
erty of their cestui que trusts are defined by law. Among these
powers are not included the execution of a contract binding the
estate of his wards; hence, where such a contract was sought to
be enforced against him, it was not necessary that the wards
should be made parties to the suit; and inasmuch as the judg-
ment rendered on such contract created no lien on the property
of the wards, there can be no reason for entertaining the peti-
tion on their part to set aside such judgment. In this case the
guardian was invested with his power by will. It was entirely
competent for the testator to fix his powers, and it was also com-
petent for the testator to confer on the guardian the power ta
contract, and by his contracts bind the estate of the wards. If
this power was conferred by the will, then the contract made by
the guardian depends for its validity on that instrument, and
the effect of the judgment rendered on such a contract is deter-
mined, not by the law regulating the powers of guardians, but
by the powers given him by the will. But if we admit that in
this case power was given to him to bind the property of his
wards by his contract as guardian, even in that case the wards
are not necessary parties in **'' a suit to enforce such contract^
July, 1898.] Howard v. Cassels. 47
because the contract of the guardian is authorized to be made,
and, when made, to bind the estate of the ward, by the term*
of the will of the donor who had the power to annex such condi-
tions.
2. The petition alleges that the guardian of the plaintiffs
purchased a described tract of land for the sum of two thousand
five hundred dollars; that he only paid two thousand dollars of
the purchase price, and gave his promissory note for the remain-
ing five hundred dollars, signed by the maker as guardian. It
further alleges that the guardian had sufficient property belong-
ing to the wards ^o pay the entire purchase money for the land,
but that he did not do so. It alleges that the note was traded
to Inman; that it was sued to judgment, and that the execution
issuing on such judgment was levied on the land so purchased,
which was sold under the execution and bought by Caseels, who
was put in possession. It further alleges that Howard, the
guardian, at the time of the purchase received a bond from Pen-
dleton, conditioned to make title to him as guardian on pay-
ment of the balance of the purchase money as expressed in the
note. The plaintiffs allege that they have tendered to Pendle-
ton the balance of the purchase money as expressed, and have
demanded a deed to the land and possession ; and they pray that
the sheriff's deed to Cassels be canceled, that Pedleton pay ta
Cassels the amount paid out by the latter, and that Pendleton
be required to make a deed conveying the land to the plaintiffs.
In other words, the plaintiffs allege that it was an illegal act for
their guardian to make the purchase, but that he did make it,
and paid two thousand dollars of money belonging to them as
part of the purchase money. Under these circumstances, they
claim the benefit of the purchase, and insist that they have the
right, on payment of the balance of the purchase money, te
have a title to the property and possession. Thus they seek ta
ratify a part of the transaction; but at the same time they re-
pudiate that part of the contract which reserved title to the land
in Pendleton, with the right in the latter to proceed against the
land for the collection of the balance of the purchase money.
We think this cannot be done after suit for balance of purchase
money and a sale of the land under the judgment ■**® therein
obtained. Conceding the purchase made with the funds of the
wards to have been illegal, then the guardian is liable to the
wards for the money so illegally used; and this is true not only
of the guardian, but of all other persons who, with a knowledge
of such illegal use, participated in the conversion of their
48 Howard v. Cassels. [Georgia,
money. Fnder well-settled principles, the wards can follow the
money, so paid, into the hands of anyone who received it with
& knowledge of their rights and of the illegality of the trans-
faction; but it is not consistent to ratify an illegal investment
made by the guardian and repudiate a part of the contract by
which the guardian undertook to pay the balance of the pur-
chase money before he received a title. The rule is, that the
principal cannot ratify a part and repudiate a part. He must
adopt the whole contract or none: Civ. Code, sec. 3021. And
a ratification relates back to the act ratified: Civ. Code, sec.
-3019. See also. Hunter v. Stembridge, 17 Gfa. 243; Perry v.
Mulligan, 58 Ga. 479; Barclay v. Hopkins, 59 Ga. 566.' So
that if the plaintiffs claim this land, such claim must be based,
■either on a ratification of the action of their guardian in mak-
ing the purchase, or because their money went into the pur-
chase. If they ratify the illegal act, such ratification extends
back to the contract of purchase and they must ratify the con-
tract as an entirety. If it be contended that they are follow-
ing their funds and are attempting to recover the land because
their funds went into its purchase, as a resulting trust, then,
Tinder the doctrine of such trusts, they might have a right to
have the land for which their money paid; but in this case
the land is not alleged to be in the possession of the person who
received the money belonging to them. The guardian did not
«,cquire a title to the land, but under the contract it remained
in the original vendor; and while it may be true that the wards
had an equitable interest in the land to the extent of the amount
of their funds which went toward its purchase, it is a question
■whether the equity so possessed by them attaches to the land
while in the hands of a purchaser at judicial sale, by which sale
title, under the terms of the contract, first passed out of the
•vendor. If the allegations in the petition be true, it is certain
that Pendleton could not now convey title to the land. In our
"*** opinion, the wards are not entitled to have a decree vesting
in them title to the land on the simple tender to Pendleton of
the balance of the purchase money contracted to be paid by the
guardian. It is too late, after a sale of the land has been made
tinder a judgment rendered on a note given for the balance of
the purchase money under the terms of a contract, to demand
of the original vendor of the land that he make a title on pay-
ment of the balance of the purchase money originally con-
tracted to be paid. If the wards stand on the contract made by
their guardian, they must not only take that part which is
July, 1898.] Howard v. Cassels. 49
favorable to them, but that other part also which made the land
subject to be sold for the balance of the purchase money.
It is a matter of regret that the record does not contain more
of the facts. We cannot determine to whom Pendleton con-
veyed the title to the land, if he ever conveyed it to anyone.
We do not know from this record whether, when Pendleton
traded the note to Inman, he gave to the latter title so as ta
comply with the terms of the bond which he had executed to
the guardian. These are pregnant questions which, in our view
of the case, materially affect the rights of the plaintiffs. We
only deal with the case as it is brought to our attention. The
plaintiffs, under the statement of facts made in the petition, are
not remediless. Certainly, if the stated facts are true, the
guardian would be liable to them for the value of their property
which he misapplied. Whether this liability extends to those
who received it, and to the purchaser of the land, are questions
to be governed by faicts not shown in the record. But under
any view which we take of the case the plaintiffs are not en-
tilled, under the facts alleged in the petition, to a decree for
the land; and the court committed no error in sustaining a de-
murrer to th^ petition.
Judgment affirmed.
All the justices concurring.
GUARDIAN AND WARD — PERSONAL LIABILITY OP
CUARDIAN.— Tlio guardian is personally bound to third persons
for all contracts he makes on behalf of his ward. Note to Fessenden
V. .Jones, 75 Am. Dec. 450. Where one gave a promissory uote as
puariiian to efTcct the release of his ward from an execution. It was
held that he was personally liable for its payment: Forster v. Fuller,
6 Mass. 58; 4 Am. Dec. 87.
GUARDIAN AND WARD— UNAUTHORIZED CONTRACTS-
RATIFICATION.— Heirs who, with knowledge, accept the procoe<ls
of an unauthorized sale of their lands, are estopped from disiiutinj?
the validity of the sale. They cannot retain the purchase money
and also recover the land: Wilmore v. Stetler, 137 Ind. 127; 45 Am.
St. Rep. 1G9, and note; Tracy v. Roberts, 88 Me. 310; 51 Am. St. Rep.
394. The assent of a ward to a purchase by a puardian need not
be express, but may l>e implied from circumstances, one of the
strongest of which is the failure to take immediate steps, on cominp:
of ajre, to have the sale set aside, provided the party knew It: Scott
V. Freeland, 7 Smedes & M. 400; 45 Am. Dec. 310.
GUARDIAN AND WARD-THIRD PERSONS PURCHASING
WARD'S PROPER ry.—A person receiving property of a ward from
the guardian will be deemed a trustee for the amount. If he took
wiih notice of the trust: Hill v. Mclntire, 39 N. H. 410; 75 Am. Dec.
229; McDuffie v. Mclntyre, 11 S. 0. 551; 32 Am. Hep. 500.
AtL bT. iisr.. Vol. LXX.-4
50 Rogers v. Burr. [Georgia,
EoGERS V. Burr.
[105 Geobgia, 432.]
CORPORATIONS— STOCK SUBSCRIPTIONS— VALIDITY
OF GUARANTY— CONSIDERATION.— If a number of persons, in
order to induce another to subscribe to tlae capital stock of a manu-
facturing corporation in wliich they are all interested, execute a
joint agreement guaranteeing the payment of an annual dividend
of eight per cent for three years on such stock to subscribers who
take enough stock for the successful organization of the corporation,
and also agreeing that if. at the expiration of such three years, the
holders of such stock do not desire to carry It any longer, "We
hereby agree, with thirty days' notice from any or all of them, to
pay each holder par value, or fifty dollars, for each share of stock
held by tliem, their heirs or assigns," such agreement of guaranty
is valid and based upon a sufficient consideration, where the guar-
antors are residents of the town in which the manufacturing cor-
poration is to be located, are interested in its growth and develop-
ment, and jointly interested with the subscribers in the furtherance
of the undertaking.
CORPORATIONS — STOCK SUBSCRIPTIONS — STATUTE
OF FRAUDS.— It is not necessary to the validity of a contract of
subscription to shares of stock in a manufacturing corporation that
it be reduced to writing. Shares of stock in joint stock companies
are not within the statute of frauds.
CORPORATIONS— CONTRACT FOR STOCK SUBSCRIP-
TION—CONSTRUCTION.— A contract made to induce stock sub-
scriptions, whereby the promisors agree to repurchase the stock
at the end of three years, upon receiving thirty days' notice that the
subscriber desires to return the stock, is conditional, and liability
thereunder does not exist in favor of a particular promisee, unless,
within a reasonable time after the expiration of the three years,
the thirty days' notice is given by him to the promisors of his elec-
tion to carry the stock no longer.
CORPORATIONS— STOCK— SUBSCRIPTIONS— CONSTRUC-
TION OF CONTRACT.— If several persons, in order to Induce a
promisee to subscribe for stock, jointly agree to buy such stock
back at the end of three years, upon receiving a specified notice
from the promisee of his election to sell, notice to one or more
joint promisors of an election by the promisee to sell his stock is not
notice to the others, and this, though one of them, as agent for the
others, has procured stock subscriptions under the contract.
CORPORATIONS-STOCK SUBSCRIPTIONS— CONTRACT
OF GUARANTY— CONSTRUCTIQN.—If joint promisors, to induce
stock subscriptions, guarantee the payment of eight per cent divi-
dends to subscribers for three years, and, at the expiration of that
time, on receiving a specified notice, to purchase the stock at its
par value, the guaranty as to the dividends is imconditlonal and
binding without notice, and covers a period of three years, although
the guaranty as to purchasing the stock becomes Inoperative for
want of notice.
J. S. Boynton, It. L. Berner, and Estes & Jones, for the plain-
tifts in error.
.T. F. Redding and S. N. Woodward, for the defendant in
error.
July, 1898.] TloGERS t;. Bubb. 61
480 LITTLE, J. There are two main facts on whicli the
parties are at issue, and the right of the plaintiff to recover de-
pends upon the determination of both in her favor, to wit: 1.
Did the plaintiff's intestate contract for sixty shares of the capi-
tal stock of the Barnesville Manufacturing Company on the
faith of a written agreement signed by the defendants, condi-
tioned that the defendants guaranteed to her intestate the pay-
ment of an annual dividend amounting to eight per cent on the
shares subscribed, and also by which they undertook, after the
expiration of three years from the date of the agreement and on
thirty days' notice, to pay him the par value of the stock for
which he had subscribed; and 2. If the plaintiff's intestate did
so subscribe *^* did he or his personal representative so comply
with the terms of such agreement as to notice, as would entitle
the plaintiff to recover? This case has heretofore been before
this court, and is reported in Rogers v. Burr, 97 Ga. 10. Con-
struing the contract, this court there held that if the intestate
did so subscribe, he or his personal representative had the right,
at the expiration of three years from the time stated, to elect
whether he would keep the stock, or turn it over to the defend-
ants and require them to pay him par value for such stock.
The court further held that such election could not be made
until after November 30, 1892, and it was further held that the
petition now under consideration set out a good cause of action
against the defendants. To determine whether the verdict
which is sought to be set aside is unsupported by evidence in
the record, it is necessary to ascertain the obligations imposed
by the contraet on each of the parties thereto, as well as to re-
view such portions of the evidence as bear on the questions pre-
sented. The contract upon which the suit was brought was an
original undertaking by the makers with such persons as would
subscribe for any portion of the balance of the capital stock of
the Barnesville Manufacturing Company which remained un-
taken at the time of the execution of the instrument, that such
makers would guarantee to such subscribers the payment of an
annual dividend on the amount of stock so taken, equal to eight
per cent per annum on the money paid into said company on
said stock. So that the obligation of the makers of the con-
tract was to pay to these subscribers annually such a sum as,
when added to any dividends which might be declared by the
manufacturing company, would equal the amount of eight per
cent per annum on the amount which such subscribers had ac-
tually paid into the company on the stock for which they sub-
52 Rogers v. Burr. [Georgia^
scribed, and this guaranty was to he in force for the term of
three years from December 1, 1889. The makers further con-
tracted with the subscribers, that at the expiration of said three-
years, if the holder or holders of the stock so subscribed should
so desire, and did not wish to carry the stock any longer, they
would, with thirty days' notice given by any or all of such sub-
scribers, pay to each holder of the stock fifty dollars (being the
par value) for every share of stock so subscribed. **^ So that
the stipulations of the agreement bound the makers to pay the
subscribers, as dividends on their stock for three years, eight
per cent per annum on the money such subscribers had paid
for the stock, less such a sum as might be paid by the company
as dividends thereon. Also, if, after three years from Decem-
ber 1, 1889, any or all of such subscribers did not desire to
hold the stock subscribed for, the makers, after thirty days
notice from such of them as did not desire to carry the stock,
would pay to such subscribers fifty dollars for each share of such
stock, upon a transfer of the same. The theory of the plain-
tiff's case, as set out in her petition, is that her intestate, H. E.
Chambers, in his lifetime, under the terms and conditions of the
agreement aforesaid, subscribed to sixty shares of such capital
stock, of the aggregate par value of three thousand dollars.
The evidence does not show the date at which the alleged sub-
scription was made, nor whether the same was in writing. But
the petition alleges that before her intestate had paid for the
stock he died, and that K. J. Powell, his administrator, know-
ing that the intestate had contracted and subscribed for the
stock, carried out such contract and paid the subscription there-
for and received a certificate. It was, of course, a question of
fact to be determined by the jury whether such contract had
been entered into by the plaintiff's intestate with the manufac-
turing company.
1. It was insisted by counsel for plaintiff in error that even
if Chambers had contracted for the sixty shares of stock, the
plaintiffs in error were not bound, because there was no consid-
eration moving them in the execution of the instrument sued
on, and also that the contract of subscription was not in writ-
ing, and did not, therefore, become a binding contract of sub-
scription. A reference to the instrument shows that the
makers of it were residents of the town in which it was pro-
posed to erect and put in operation a manufacturing plant in
which the promisors and promisees were jointly interested, and
the subscription to the stock invited to be made was in further-
July, 1898.] Rogers v. Burk. 58
ance of the undertaking: See 6 Am. & Eng. Ency. of Law, 704;
Bryan v. Dyer, 28 111. 188. In the opinion of the makers, the
•establishment of such plant would add to the prosperity of the
town, and thus directly to their own. Undoubtedly, such a
-consideration is sufficient to support '*'** the undertaking en-
tered into; for a consideration is valid if any benefit accrues to
him who makes the promise: Civ. Code, sec. 3657.
2. We also think it is not necessary to the validity of a con-
tract of subscription to the shares of stock in a manufacturing
company that such contract should be reduced to writing.
Shares of joint stock companies are neither goods, wares, nor
merchandise, within the meaning of the statute of frauds: 1
Thompson on Corporations, sec. 1068, and authorities cited in
notes 11 and 12 on page 858, and note 1 on page 859. In the
same volume, section 1147, this author says: "It is neither nec-
essary that there should be a contract in writing to take and pay
for shares, nor an actual receipt of them, or, what is tanta-
mount, a receipt of their symbol, a stock certificate, in order
to constitute one a shareholder. It has accordingly been held
that one may become a shareholder without signing the stock-
book or any agreement to take shares, and that a parol agree-
ment made with the directors of the corporation to take stock
can be enforced, when neither the governing statute, nor the
charter, requires such contract to be in writing"; and in notes
2 and 3 cases are cited to support the doctrine laid own. The
contract of subscription for shares of stock in an incorporated
company may be entered into in various ways. Whenever an
intention to become a subscriber is manifest, the courts incline,
without particular reference to formality, to hold that the con-
tract of subscription subsists. It is, as in the case of other
contracts, very much a question of intention. Formal rules
are for the most part disregarded, and, in general, a contract
of subscription may be made in any way in which other con-
tracts may be made. Any agreement by which a person shows
an intention to become a stockholder is sufficient to bind him
and the corporation: 1 Cook on Stock and Stockholders, sec.
52, note 1.
3. In the present case, the plaintiff testified that her intestate
■entered into a contract with the corporation for sixty shares of
its capital stock, in addition to the forty shares theretofore sub-
flcribed; and a receipt was introduced in evidence showing the
payment by the administrator to the company of the amount
due for such stock at its par value. The plaintiff further testi-
54 Rogers v. Burr. [Georgia,
fied '*^^ that such subscription was made to that part of the
capital stock which the defendants in error referred to in their
written agreement, and that such stock was taken under the
terms and on the faith thereof; and we must rule as a matter
of law that the consideration shown was sufficient to support
the contract, and the evidence that the stock was subscribed
under the terms of the instrument sued on was sufficient to au-
thorize the finding by the jury that a valid contract for stock
had been made by the intestate under the defendants' agree-
ment. The jury having determined that a subscription to sixty
shares of stock had been made by the intestate under the terms
of the agreement executed by the defendants, the question then
arises, under the evidence, whether the plaintiff had so com-
plied with the other terms of the agreement as to entitle her to
recover. As we have seen, the obligation that the plaintiff
should receive eight per cent per annum for three years on the
money which her intestate, or any other representative of his
estate, had paid into the company under the subscription, was
absolute, depending on no condition. But the agreement that
the makers of the instrument would pay, at the expiration of
three years, to the holders of stock subscribed under such agree-
ment, the par value thereof, was conditional. The holders of
such stock were under no obligation, at the end of three years,
to sell their stock to the defendants for fifty dollars per share,
but it was optional with them whether they would do so Or not.
If any holder so desired and would indicate such desire by notice
as stipulated, then the makers agreed to make the purchase. It
was therefore necessary in any event, at the expiration of such
term, if any holder desired to sell his stock, that notice be given
to the makers of the instrument that he elected to exercise
his right of option and call on them to purchase the stock. The
pregnant clause in the agreement was: "And if, at the expira-
tion of said three years, the holder or holders of said stock de-
sire and wish not to carry the same any longer, we hereby agree,
with thirty days' notice from any or all of them, to pay each
holder par value of fifty dollars for each share of stock held by
them." This contract, therefore, so far as it imposed liability
on the defendants to purchase the stock, was, as has been said,
conditional; and if a holder desired, *^ under its terms, ta
eell his stock, he was bound to give to the makers of the in-
strument, within a reasonable time after November 30, 1892
(Rogers v. Burr, 97 Ga. 10), thirty days' notice of the exercise
of his option and of his wish to sell them his stock; and until
July, 1898.] Rogers v. Burr. 55
such notice was given, there was no obligation on the part of
the makers to purchase the stock of any holder; and if no such
obligation existed until notice was given and no liability to
purchase in the absence of such notice, then no right of action
accrued to the plaintiff against the defendants to recover the
purchase money of the stock until such a notice had been given.
The notice required by the contract was a condition precedent
to the liability of the defendants to purchase the stock. If, by
the express terms of a contract, notice be a condition precedent
to performance, or be implied from the nature of the contract,
such notice must be averred and proved: 2 Story on Contracts,
5th ed., sec. 1332, and authorities cited in note 1 on page 504.
Clark, in his work on Contracts, page 667, says: "A promise
may be conditional in the sense that its operation awaits the
performance of some act to be done by the promisee. If no
time is specified in which the act is to be done, the nonfulfill-
ment of the condition merely suspends and does not discharge
the rights of the promisee. Common illustrations of such con-
ditions are furnished by cases of promises conditional upon de-
mand or notice. If a person promises another to do something
upon demand, he cannot be sued until demand has been made;
or if he promises to do something upon the happening of an
event, and stipulates that notice shall be given him of the event
having happened, he cannot be sued until such notice has been
given." Apply this rule to the contract under consideration.
It will be found that no time was specified in which the makers
of the instrument obligated themselves to purchase this stock,
except that it was not to be done until after three years from a
given date. The instrument contained a promise that if it
should so happen that the holder desired, after a given time, to
sell his stock for a given price, then the defendants agreed to
purchase it at that price, upon thirty days' notice of such de-
sire being given to them. It must, therefore, be held that,
until such notice was given, the defendants were under no ^^'^
obligation to purchase the stock held by the plaintiff, although
it had been taken under the terms of the agreement. Whether
or not the notice was given was a question of fact. The plaintiff
avers that it was so given. The defendants in their answer
deny it. The plaintiff, in her testimony on the subject of no-
tice, says: "I never made any demand of the defendants for
the eight per cent interest; nor did I make demand of them to
take the stock off of my hands. The only demands that ever
were made were made by Mr. Burr, my husband, and they re-
56 Rogers v. Burr. [Georgia,
fused. Mr. Butt, foT me, demanded that the parties should take
the stock. This was done by a demand on Mr. Eogers. I never
did make any demand personally. I never did give any per-
sonal notice that I wanted them to take the stock and to pay the
interest." Burr in his testimony says: "I served each of the
defendants on June 5, 1893, with a copy of the notice (writ-
ten demand). I mailed a copy to each one." So far as the rec-
ord discloses, this written demand constituted the only notice
which was ever given. Some of the defendants admitted hav-
ing received this notice at a given date. Others of them denied
that they had ever received any notice prior to the bringing of
the suit. It is fair to treat Mr. Burr, in giving the notice, as
the agent of his wife and as acting for her. Of course, such of
the defendants as received this written demand before the in-
sitution of the suit must be affected with the notice referred to
in the agreement as of the date of the receipt thereof, if the
same was given within a reasonable time after the expiration
of the time when the plaintiff had a right to exercise the option ;
but can those defendants who deny that they received the writ-
ten demand be affected with the notice required by the terms of
the agreement? It will be noted that while Mr. Burr says he
served each of the defendants with a copy of the notice on June
5, 1893, he explains this by saying that he mailed a copy to
each one. The notice required by the terms of the contract as
fixing a right in the plaintiff to demand of the defendants the
purchase of her stock could only be met by showing actual per-
sonal notice to the defendants. The notice required is equiva-
lent to demand. If it was a condition precedent to the institu-
tion of her suit that thirty days' notice should be given that she
'**" desired to sell her stock, in order to render the defendants
legally liable to purchase it, then such notice must be a demand
that the defendants purchase the stock; because it is only on
the failure or refusal to so purchase that the right of action ac-
crues. The notice required being actual, it is apparent that the
requirement is not met by simply mailing to the address of each
of the defendants a statement that she exercised her right of
option and demanded that they purchase the stock, where the
defendants or any of them deny that they received such notice,
unless it be further shown that such written notice was in fact
received by them. The evidence is uncontradicted, therefore,
that some of the defendants received no notice prior to the
bringing of the suit. In our opinion, before the plaintiff could
maintain the action and recover against the defendants, on this
July, 1898.] RoQERS v. Burr. 67
branch of the case, it was necessary that the requisite notice
ehould have been given to each of the makers. The contract
was a joint obligation; and as to any particular undertaking
therein set forth all must be shown to be liable, or none are.
4. In the next place, we do not think that the contention of
the defendant in error, that notice to one or more of the defend-
ants was, in law, notice to each and every one of them, because
of the fact that they are joint contractors, is sound. We are
aware that in the case of Cox v. Bailey, 9 Ga. 467, 54 Am. Deo.
358, it was held that a payment made by one of two or more
joint contractors, within the statute, and before its bar had at-
tached, constituted a new starting point for the staitute, and
bound all of such joint contractors; and the ruling there made
was adhered to in the case of Tillinghast v. Nourse, 14 Ga. 641.
The principle upon which those cases were decided was, that the
same rule applied to joint contractors or joint promisors as did
to partners (for wliich as it now exists see section 3791 of the
Civil Code). Such joint contractors or joint promisors were
regarded as partners with reference to the particular joint obli-
gation. In the latter of the cases cited above, however, Lump-
kin, J., delivering the opinion of the court, after stating that,
owing to disqualification, he did not preside in the former case,
says: "We know that the correctness of the principle, that the
admission of one joint contractor or partner binds the other, has
^^'^ been frequently doubted and sometimes denied. The doc-
trine was first laid down by Lord Mansfield in Whitcomb v.
Whiting, Doug. 652, and it is founded upon the idea that the
bar created by the statute rests entirely upon the presumption
that the debt has been paid, and that such an acknowledgment
or payment removes the presumption and revives the original
promise. And the conclusion is, that in this, as in other cases,
an acknowledgment by one of many who are jointly concerned
is evidence against all, sufficient to remove the presumption of
payment." He further says: "But I must say that this prin-
ciple has not only been questioned in England (Brandram v.
Wharton, 1 Barn. & Aid. 467), but from the examination by the
supreme court of the United States, in Bell v. Morrison, 1 Pet.
363, the foundation on which it rests found to be altogether un-
satisfactory. In Pennsylvania and some of the other states it
has been utterly exploded": Citing Levy v. Cadet, 17 Serg. & R.
126; 17 Am. Dec. 650; Leavitt v. Leavitt, 4 Me. 161; also cases
collected in Hunt v. Bridgham, 2 Pick., 2d. ed., 583, note 1. In
the case of Hunter v. Robertson, 30 Ga. 479, the court, in declin-
58 Rogers v. Bubb. [Georgia^
ing to extend the principle announced in the cases from 9 Geor-
gia and 14 Georgia, supra, so 35 to prevent the statute of lim-
itations from attaching as against the indorser or surety by rea-
Bon of a payment on a note made by the principal or maker, said
that the correctess of the principle, even as to joint contractors
and partners, was gravely doubted by this court, but as the ques-
tion was no longer open, but an adjudicated one, the principle
was adhered to, although a contrary holding would have been
the better policy. The court further said, Lyon, J., delivering
the opinion: "If the principle is wrong when applied to joint
makers — and there is no doubt in my mind but that it is — shall
we extend it to an indorser on the same fallacious reason?"
AYe think the true law is enunciated in the case of Coleman v.
Fobes, 22 Pa. St. 156, 60 Am. Dec. 75, where it was held that
partial payment by one of several joint debtors, not partners
at the time, was not such an act as justifies an inference of a
new promise by the others, so as to remove the bar of the stat-
ute of limitations; and that joint debtors, as such, are not
agents of each other. In that case, Lowrie, J., delivering the
opinion of the court, after commenting upon the case of '*^*
Whitcomb v. Whiting, Doug. 652, and charging to it, for the
most part, the confusion which exists in the decisions, both in
England and in this country, on this subject, says: "It is not
true that joint debtors, as such merely, are the agents of each
other. Partners are so while the relation continues, and this
is part of the law and essence of that relation, but not of that
of joint debtors. The distincticn is palpable, when it is noticed
that a joint contract by persons not partners can have no incep-
tion, and cannot be changed in time, amount, subject, form, or
substance, without the several act of each of the joint con-
tractors. Their interests are joined only in so far as the con-
tract joins them. Their contract or understanding by which
Ihey agree together to enter into the joint liability to the cred-
itor is one thing, and the joint contract with the creditor
another thing. Their relations to each other are defined by the
former, and their joint relations to their creditor by the latter;
and their joint relations in one aspect in no sense define those
in the other. Whether, as among themselves, one is to pay all
or half or none depends, not upon the contract with the cred-
itor, but on their own arrangement. One alone may be the
real debtor, and may be so abundantly able to pay that the
others may be said to have no real interest in the matter. And
even if they are, as among themselves, equal debtors, there is
July, 1898.] Rogers v. Burr. 6^
no real community of interest, for by enforcing contributiop^.
each is made to answ er for his true share.'*
It cannot be seriously contended that, under the evidence^
service of a notice to purchase the stock on Rogers was notice
to the other promisors. It appears from the evidence that Mr.
Rogers procured the makers to execute the agreement which
after execution was left with him to procure, under its terms,
the desired amount of subscription. His agency could, under
this, extend no further than to procure subscribers; when this
was done his agency ceased.
What has been said in reference to notice or demand does-
not apply to the question of recovering the dividends contracted
to be paid. That right, so far as it is stipulated in the contract,
is absolute: Rogers v. Burr, 97 Ga. 14; and if any legal reason-
exists why the plaintiff is not entitled to recover the amount
of the dividends contracted to be paid during the period '*^®'
of three years, such reason must be founded on causes other
than the want of notice.
In the view we take of the law applicable to the case, we are
constrained to rule that as some of the defendants in this case
were without notice, prior to the bringing of the suit, and there-
fore no right of action as to them accrued to the plaintiff upo»
the obligation to purchase the stock in her hands, it must follow
that the verdict in her favor, requiring the defendants to pay
over to her the par value of this stock, was contrary to law, and
should be set aside. As above stated, the contract on which the
suit was brought was joint, not several, and was an obligation of
the promisors jointly to purchase the stock, and not an under-
taking on the part of anyone severally to do so. The action,,
therefore, was not, as to this particular stipulation, maintain-
able, unless each and all of the promisors, who were in life and
within the jurisdiction of the court, were not only made parties
but shown to be liable: Booher v. Worrill, 43 Ga. 587; Graham
V. Marks, 95 Ga. 38. We have shown there could be no re-
covery against all for a breach of this stipulation, and there-
fore, because of the joint character of the obligation, there could
have been no recovery against any.
Judgment reversed.
All the justices concurring, except Simmons, C. J., disquali-
fied.
CORPORATIONS-STOCK SUBSCRIPTIONS— CONDITIONAL.
A conditional subscription to stock is a continuing oCFei, which 1»
CO Harrison v. Harrison. [Georgia,
final and absolute when accepted, and is not contrary to public pol-
icy, for all subscriptions thus ultimately become unconditional and
absolute: Taggart v. Western etc. R. it. Co., 24 Md. 563; 89 Am.
Dec. 7G0; See note to Parljer v. Thomas, 81 Am. Dec. 398. Contra,
Morrow v. Nashville Iron etc. Co., 87 Tenn, 262; 10 Am. St. Rep.
t)58. An agreement exacted by a subscriber to stocli of a coi-pora-
tion from the other subscribers, to the effect that if, at the end of
one year, he should desire to sell the shares subscribed for, they
will purchase the same, and pay the amount paid by him, with
Interest, is valid and enforceable: Meyer v. Blair, 109 N. Y. 600; 4
Am. St. Rep. 500.
CORPORATIONS-STOCK SUBSCRIPTIONS— STATUTE OP
FRAUDS.— A subscription for stoclj in a corporation is not a con-
tract for the sale of goods, wares, or merchandise, and Is not within
the statute of frauds: Webb v. Baltimore etc. Ey. Co., 77 Md. 92;
S9 Am. St. Rep. 896.
Harrison v. Harrison.
[105 Georgia, 517.]
DEVISE — CONSTRUCTION — COTENANCY. — A will by
•which land is devised to specified legatees, to have and to hold in
common for a home and support so long as they remain together,
and should one ormore leave they can take such as given them
Individually in this~will, but have no share or control of this that is
given in common without the consent and signature of those that
remain'on the place," with restriction on the right of either to alien-
ate or lease any part of the land without the consent of all, con-
stitxates such legatees cotenants in the lands devised, with a con-
dition subsequent that the whole must be used for the support of
«uch of the legatees as choose to remain on the place.
DEVISE— RE.IECTION OF CONDITION INCAPABLE OF
PERFORMANCE.— A devise of land to specified legatees, "to have
and to hold in common for a home and support as long as they
remain together, and should one or more leave they can take such
as given them individually in this will, but have no share or control
of this that is given in common, without the consent and signature
of those that remain on the place," imposes a condition subsequent
that the whole land be used for the support of such legatees as
choose to reside thereon, but if such condition becomes incapable of
performance, it must be rejected and the devise held to be absolute.
Hence, if one of the legatees is forced to remove from the land by
the cruel treatment of another, the former is entitled to his share
of the estate, and the full and absolute use thereof freed of the
condition. He is also entitled to the immediate possession of his
share of the estate, and can exercise the right of partition or seek
any other remedy afforded to a cotenant.
Evans & Evans and J. A. Harley, for the plaintiff.
R. H, Lewis and J. K. Hines, for the defendants.
518 LITTLE, J. Mary J. Harrison filed her petition in the
•uperior court of Washington county, making in brief the fol-
Oct. 1898.] Harrison v. Harrison. 61
lowing case: In July, 1877, the will of her father, William D.
Harrison, was admitted to probate and letters testamentary
were issued to William T. Harrison and Seleta L, Harrison.
After providing for a number of specific legacies to several of
his children, the thirteenth item of the will is in the following
language: "That all of my lands and other property, after the
above-named bequests have been settled, I give and bequeath
to my five children that remain to me, to wit, Seleta L,, Emma
S., Martha W., Mary J., and William T., to have and to hold in
common for a home and support so long as they remain together.
Should one or more leave, they can take such 83 is given them in-
dividually in this will, but have no share or control of this that
is given in common, without the consent and signature of those
that remain on the place. No one or more shall sell, lease,
rent, or in any way convey to any other than those that re-
main on the place, without the signature of the five named irk
this item." The petition alleges that the realty on which item
13 operated consisted of a tract of land lying in Washington
county, containing four hundred acres (fully described), and
also another tract of land in Johnson county, containing two
hundred acres (also fully described), and that the personal prop-
erty was of the value of fifteen hundred dollars. The petition
also sets out as a fact that W. T. Harrison has had the exclusive
management and control of the property referred to in item 13
since his qualification as executor in July, 1877, and that he
has made no annual returns. It also alleges that W. T. Harri-
son has received from the property referred to in item 13 the
sum of twelve hundred dollars, which he has invested for his
own use and benefit, and denies to petitioner the right of partici-
pating therein. It also alleges that William T. Harrison, from
the rents and profits of the property referred to in item 13, has
purchased two tracts of land in Hancock county, and that at the
request of W. T. she and her sisters who are named in the thir-
teenth item, in 1894, empowered said W. T. to sell the Johnson
county land, which he did for five hundred dollars, but has not
accounted to her for any of the purchase money. It is also
alleged that the affairs of the testator have long since been *^*'*
settled and there is no legal obstacle in the way of a final dis-
tribution. The petitioner also alleges that she lived on the land
named in this item, which was the W. D. Harrison home place,
with the said W. T. Harrison and her sisters, Seleta L. and
Emma, from the death of her father until July, 1895; that her
treatment by her brother, W. T., was so cruel and unpleasant
62 Harrison v. Harrison. [Georgia,
that she was forced to leave said land and reside with her sister,-
and that since her removal the defendants have set up an ad-
verse claim to the home place, and pretend that petitioner for-
ieited her interest in that portion of the land known as the home
place by her removal therefrom. The petitioner makes W. T.
Harrison and Seleta L. Harrison defendants, and prays that they
come to a full and complete accounting of the rents, issues, and
profits of the property embraced in the thirteenth item of the
will, and the court decree that the defendants pay over to peti-
tioner her share of such rents and profits; and she prays that
she have a special lien for said sum on the land lying in Han-
cock county, purchased by the defendant "W. T. with the funds
arising from the estate of W. D. Harrison. Petitioner also prays
to recover her share of the home place, with reasonable rents
since July, 1895.
To this petition the defendants demurred on the following
grounds: The petition sets out no cause of action. The petition
shows that the petitioner has no interest in the land and other
property devised and bequeathed in the thirteenth item of the
will. Because Martha W. Duggan and Emma S. Harrison, sis-
ters of the petitioner, named in the thirteenth item, are not
made parties defendant. Because petitionerdoesnot set out any
definite sum due her by defendants. Because petitioner having
assented to the terms of the thirteenth item from the probate of
the will until July, 1895, she is now estopped from claiming
contrary thereto. The demurrer was sustained and the petition
was dismissed. At the September term, 1897, by leave of the
court the petition was amended, and at the same term the de-
fendants also by leave of the court amended their demurrer.
Petitioner excepted, and assigned as error the ruling of the court
in allowing the demurrer to be amended and in sustaining the
demurrer to the petition.
1. Questions affecting the construction of this will were be-
fore ^'"^ this court in the case of Duggan v. Harrison, 97 Ga.
738. That decision grew out of an application on the part of
Martha W. Duggan, one of the legatees named in the will, to
bring W. T. and Seleta Harrison, as executors, to a settlement
before the ordinary. The decision in that case ruled the fol-
lowing propositions: 1. The executor and executrix, by living
upon the land and pennitting the other devisees to do so, as-
scntcfl to the legacy in so far as the income was concerncrl, and
all of these parties accepted the legacy to this extent; 2. If
Mrs. Duggan was entitled to any of the rents and profits which
Oct. 1898.] Harrison v, Harrison. 63
accrued during the period of her voluntary absence from the
land, her claim is not against the estate, but against the other
four as individuals; 3. The case did not involved a ruling on
the question as to whether the other legatees were liable to
her. On the latter point Mr. Justice Lumpkin, who delivered
the opinion of the court, says: "The terms of the will, so far
as it relates to this land, are peculiar, and it is quite a difficult
matter to determine what is the precise interest of Mrs. Dug-
gan, either in the land itself or in its income during the period
whilst she was absent from the premises and the other devisees
remained upon, used, and enjoyed the property in common. "We
are quite certain, however, she has no right to demand of W. T.
Harrison and Seleta, in their representative capacity, an account-
ing as to the income of the land during the time she was ab-
sent."
Under the case made here, we are called on to determine the
rights of the plaintiff in this land under the terms of the will,
as affected by the allegations made in the petition. It will be
seen by reference to the petition that the action is brought
against the persons named as executor and executrix of the will,
but not in their representative capacity. Indeed, while Selefa
L. Harrison is made formally a party defendant, no specific
prayer for relief is made as against her.. As said by Mr. Justice
Lumpkin, the language of the thirteenth item of the will is pe-
culiar, and it is difficult to carry into effect the evident inten-
tion and wish of the testator, and at the same time preserve
to the legatees their absolute legal rights under the instrument.
It would seem that some of the language used in making the
devise evidences an intention to create an estate in joint ten-
ancy. This estate only '^^^ exists when the tenants have one
and the same interest arising by the same conveyance, com-
mencing at the same time, and held by one and the same undi-
vided possession: 2 Blackstone's Commentaries, 180. So far
these incidents are present. But the principal incident to an
estate in joint tenancy is the right of survivorship, which under
no fair constructon of this item can be found to be present.
However, we will not enter into a discussion to determine
whether the will created an estate in joint tenancy, for while
we do not think it does, yet if it could be construed to do =o,.
such estates are abolished by our statute and must be held to
be tenancies in common: Civ. Code, sec. 3142. By reference
tv) the will as a whole, it will be found that the expressed inten-
tion of the testator, as set out in the preamble, was to divide
64 Harrison v. Harrison. [Georgia,
tlie property "among my children as equitably as the nature
of the case will admit, some having received more than others^
and some having been with me longer and some having done
more for me than others.'' Again, in item 2 of the will, the
testator directs "that my property and effects be divided among
my children in the following order." Coming now to the point
of difficulty, the thirteenth item, the words preceding those
which fix the character of the estate devised are, "that all of
my lands and other property, after the above-named bequests
have been settled, I give and bequeath to my five children that
remain with me, to wit"; so that it cannot be doubted that it
was the intention of the testator to give to each of the children
named in the thirteenth item of his will equal shares in the prop-
erty therein described. It is true that the words used in fixing
the estate of each limits the use of the property so devised.
Each of said children is "to have and to hold in common for
a home and support so long as they remain together. Should
one or more leave, they can take such as is given them individ-
ually, .... but have no share or control of this that is given
in common, without the consent and signature of those that
remain on the place." If it be contended from this language
that when one or more of the legatees remove from the place,
the removal works a forfeiture of their estate in the land there-
tofore devised, the reply iy, that forfeitures are not favored, and
while it is the duty of the courts to give effect to the intention
**^^ of the testator, a forfeiture will not be decreed unless ex-
pressed in plain and unambiguous language. We do not con-
strue this language to work a forfeiture by removal from the
place. The property is given to the children "to have and to
hold .... for a home and support so long as they remain to-
gether." Suppose all of the children should remove from the
land, it would hardly be claimed that the last one to re-
move took an estate in fee in the whole of the land; and yet
6uch would be the only logical conclusion of the contention
that the removal by one from the land forfeited all his in-
terest therein; because when all had removed save one, that
one, under the contention, would have the whole land, and title
would vest in him, and, as there is no limitation over, the right
of disposition would rest in him. As we construe this item, it
vests in the five children named equal interests in the land and
other property covered by this item, as tenants in common. So
long as any of the named children remain on the home place,
the rents, issues, and profits of the place are to be used exclu-
Oct. 1898.] Harrison v. Harrison, 65
sively for the support and maintenance of those who remain.
When the place is abandoned by all, the property is relieved
from this charge and the .devisees are entitled as tenants in com-
mon to its control and disposition.
It is not an uncommon thing for devises to be made on a
condition requiring residence in some particular place or some
particular house. The rule is, that all such conditions are to
be reasonably interpreted if possible, or else pronounced void as.
unreasonable of themselves and obnoxious to public policy.
This latter view is tenable where the restraint must so operate
as to involve the donee in some breach of permanent duty; as,
for example, in compelling married persons to live apart. On
this subject it is said in Schouler on "Wills, second edition, sec-
tion G04: "Ordinarily, one who is to be supported under a pro-
vision in a will is not limited to live in a particular place, es-
pecially if there be good reason for leaving it. But a condition
that an infant shall live during minority with a suitable person
named as sole guide and guardian, may be upheld under most
circumstances"; and that "a condition not uncertain or ambigu-
ous happens to be injudicious is an insufficient reason for setting
it aside, but all conditions should be justly and reasonably con-
strued." If the '^^^ terms of this will are to be so construed
as that the condition of residence was required in order for the
estate to vest, even then such condition would be liberally con-
strued. In the case of Fillingham v. Broumley, Turn. & R. 530,
Lord Eldon said: "Suppose the devisee had been a member of
parliament, and had had a house in London, would you say that
ho did not live and reside at J.?" "Even should the devisee
be required to reside in the house during a defined period, or to
make it his principal or usual place of abode, the condition may
still be frustrated, for personal presence in a specified place for
any part of a day is sufficient residence for that day; and it is
not necessary to pass the night of that day there": Jarman on
Wilis, *901; citing Walcot v. Botfield, Kay, 534; Wynne v.
Fletcher, 24 Bcav. 430; Warner v. Moir, L. R. 25 Ch. Div. 605.
But, as we have before said, we do not construe the terms of this
•will as vesting an estate in these children on condition that
they live on the place, which is to be forfeited by removal. As
we construe its terms, it vests an absolute estate in each of these
children, but while any one or more of the five remain on the
land the profits arising therefrom shall be devoted to the support
of those who so remain. For the testator's intention to quaHfv
reasonably what he chooses to dispose of is not incapable of tak-
AM. ST. Bkp., You LXX.— 6
66 Harbison v. Harrison. [Georgia,
ing effect when not contrary to law, and a devise absolute in
terms may be modified in effect by other clauses of the will and
restrict the gift in accordance with his intentions: Schouler on
Wills, sees. 599-602.
It will be noted that the plaintiff alleges she lived on the
home place with her brother and sisters from the death of her
father until July, 1895, and that her treatment by her brother
W. T. was so cruel and unpleasant that she was forced to leave
the land and reside elsewhere. If these allegations be true,
then such forced removal is not to be counted against her. She
had the same right under the will to reside on the land as her
brother had, and he as much right as she had, and if the con-
duct of either toward the other was such as with due regard
to personal comfort required one to remove, then it may well be
held that the use contemplated by the testator was impossible
of performance, and in that event the devisees would be entitled
to immediate possession of the estate, divested of the right of
use as prescribed in the will. Conditions subsequent are con-
strued beneficially, ^^"^ in order to save, if possible, the vested
estate or interest, and if such condition prove illegal or inca-
pable of performance, whether as against good morals or as im-
possible under any circumstances, or is rendered impossible in
a particular case and under existing circumstances, the gift,
whether of real or personal property, relieved of the condition,
becomes absolute in effect: Jarman on Wills, *848-850, Collett
v. Collett, 35 Beav. 312; Harvey-Bathurst v. Stanley, L. R. 4 Ch.
Div. 272; Conrad v. Long, 33 Mich. 78; 4 Kent's Commentaries,
130. And Professor Schouler, in his work on Wills, says, that
"public policy may constitute an element in such cases besides;
and as conditions are here construed into conditions subsequent
rather than precedent — for conditions precedent are never fa-
vored in the construction of wills — the impossible, illegal, or
impolitic condition being rejected, the gift stands absolute";
and he further says that "a will, of all writings, deserves the
most flexible interpretation which can lay open the mind of its
maker": Schouler on Wills, sec. 600.
The testator devised this property in equal interests to his
named children, but intended that those of them who chose to
do so should reside on the land and receive an equal part of the
rents and profits of the property devised. This right vested
equally in each of these named children, under the will. If, by
disagreement among themselves, it became impossible for the
use to continue, if by the conduct of one any other of them
Oct. 1898.] Harbison v. Harrison. 67
was forced to leave, possessing an equal right with the others,
that one could not be legally deprived of the benefit which the
testator intended him to enjoy. It will not do to say that the
one so compelled to leave would have a right of action to re-
cover his damages against that other for his eviction; because
he was entitled to live on that place and have a home there, and
the deprivation of this right is contrary to the will of the tes-
tator; and that intention being thus impossible of performance,
such devisee is entitled then to have the full and absolute use
of the estate devised to him. For such right the only method
of enforcement is to have his estate free from the condition im-
posed; and if it is found to be true that the petitioner was sub-
jected to annoyance and bad treatment on the part of one of the
other devisees having equal but no more rights than hers, she
is entitled to her estate free of the condition. Indeed, we
might go further and say '^"^ that the provision for home and
support was intended by the testator to be a reasonable one;
and if such could not be afforded from any cause — the unpro-
ductiveness of the land, the incapacity of the dwelling-house to
afford suitable shelter, or other similar causes — the condition
would be held to be impossible of performance and be therefore
defeated.
Sufficient averments are made in this case, if proved, to de-
feat the condition attached to the devise, that is, that the prop-
erty devised should be used for a home and support for the five
children named. In that event the petitioner would have the
right to immediate possession of that portion of the estate de-
vised to her, and could exercise the right of partition, or seek
any other remedy afforded to a tenant in common. She could
not, however, have any partition under the proceeding institut-
ed in this case, if for no other cause than for the want of par-
ties. She, however, alleges in the petition that one of the de-
fendants, W. T. Harrison, has received the sum of five hundred
dollars for the sale of the Johnson county land, sold by the con-
sent of all the devisees, and in which she alleges she has a fifth
interest. She also alleges that he has received the rents and
profits of the home place, in which she has an interest. The alle-
gations in the petition are sufficient to allow it to be held in
court, at least to recover such of these items as she is entitled
to receive from the defendant ; and limited as it may be in this
respect, the petition sets forth a leiral cause of action to recover
such interests, and the court erred in sustaining the demurrer
thereto.
63 Gay v. State. [Georgia,
Judgment reversed.
All the justices concurring. .
DEVISE— COTENANCY— A devise to several persons equally,
and when either dies his share to be divided among the rest, vests
the property in the devisees as tenants in common, with cross-
remainders between them, and the ultimate limitation to the last
survivor. The heirs of the devisees other than of the last survivor
acquire no title to the property: Reber v. Bowling, 65 Miss. 259; 7
Am. St. Rep. 651; Simmons v. Hendricks, 8 Ired. Eq. 85; 55 Am.
Dec. 439. For a good statement as to what constitutes cotenancy,
see Metcalfe v. Miller. 96 Mich. 459; 35 Am. St. Rep. 617.
DEVISE.— A DISTURBANCE OF THE ARRANGEMENTS OF
A WILL is to be justified oiily where the testator's schemes prove
Impracticable, and the interests of all his legatees require a de-
parture from the prescriptions of the will: Drayton v. Eose, 7 Rich.
Bq. 828; 64 Am. Dec. 731.
Gay v. State.
[105 Georgia, 699.]
CRIMINAL LAW— ABANDONMENT OF CHILD.— Under a
statute providing that "if any father shall willfully and voluntarily
abandon his child, leaving it In dependent and destitute condition,
he shall be guilty of a misdemeanor, in order to constitute the of-
fense of abandonment, there must be an actual desertion, followed
by a refusal to support, and the absence of either of such elements
prevents the offense from being made out.
CRIMINAL LAW— ABANDONMENT OF CHILD,— If, after
a completed act of desertion, a father has been convicted under a
statute making it a misdemeanor for "any father to willfully and
voluntarily abandon his child, leaving it in a dependent and desti-
tute condition," there can be no new act of abandonment until a re-
turn to the discharge of the parental obligation, and no new offense
of abandonment until such a return, followed by another act of de-
sertion, and this although the original abandonment is willfully and
voluntarily continued and the child remains dependent and destitute.
T. L. Bishop and G. P. Roberts, for the plaintiff in error.
J. F. O'Neill, solicitor, for the state.
*^^ COBB, J. Alexander Gay was tried in the criininal'
court of Atlanta upon an accusation charging him with the of-
fense of abandoning his child, leaving her in a dependent and
destitute condition. The accused filed pleas of former convic-
tion and not guilty, and the issues thus arising were, by con-
Bent, submitted to the decision of the judge without a jury,
upon an agreed statement of facts, which was, in substance, as
follows: Accused is the husband of Sally Gay. They have one
Oct. 1898.] Gay v. State. 69
cliild, Lillian, bom in 1896. Neither has any property from
which the child can derive a support. The accused has for some
years had good paying employment as a laborer, but he refuses
now, and has constantly refused since the begetting of the child,
to pay anything to the maintenance or support of either his
wife or child. He abandoned his wife and child before the birth
of the latter, and has refused to live with the wife or support
the child since its birth. The wife has no means of support ex-
cept her manual labor, and she lives with her father, who is
forced to assist her, otherwise the child would be thrown upon
the charity of the public, The child was abandoned by the
father and 'left in a dependent and destitute condition" before
its birth. On February 2, 1897, the accused was convicted in
the criminal court of Atlanta for the abandonment of his child,
which had taken place prior to that date, and he paid the fine
which was then imposed upon him. He has never returned to
his family, or provided for it or for the child in any way since
the abandonment which was the foundation of the conviction
above referred to. The court entered judgment refusing to
sustain the plea of former conviction, and adjudging the ac-
cused guilty of the offense charged in the accusation. To this
judgment the accused excepted.
The accusation in the former aase, as well as in the present
case, was brought under section 114 of the Penal Code. This
section had its origin in an act of the general assembly, ap-
proved December 13, 1866, which was as follows: "An act to
add an additional section to the fourth division, part 4, title 1,
of the Penal Code. 4. Section 1. Be it enacted, et cetera,
that if ***** any father shall willfully and voluntarily abandon
his child or children, leaving them in a dependent and destitute
condition, such father shall be guilty of a misdemeanor, and on
conviction thereof shall be punished as for other misdemean-
ors": Acts 1866, p. 151. In 1879 an act was passed making
the wife a competent witness in prosecutions under the act just
quoted : Acts 1878-79, p. 66. The original act as thus amended
now appears in the Penal Code in the following language:
*^f any father shall willfully and voluntarily abandon his child,
leaving it in a dependent and destitute condition, he shall be
guilty of a misdemeanor. The wife shall be a competent wit-
ness in such cases to testify for or against her husband." The
accused having been convicted and punished under this section,
and being a second time placed upon trial for what is claimed
to be the same offense, it becomes necessary to determino
70 Gay v. State. [Georgia,
whether the word "ahandon," in the statute, refers to one. com-
pleted act of desertion, continuously persisted in, and therefore'
constituting only one offense, or whether the desertion will-
fully continued in from day to day constitutes each day a sepa-
rate act of abandonment. In other words, does the actual de-
sertion of a child by a father under circumstances which would
render him liable to punishment under the law consititute the
offense; and when this actual desertion is once punished is the
law satisfied; or does an actual desertion, once taken place and
willfully persisted in, make a separate and distinct case of
abandonment for each day it continues? If the former is cor-
rect, the accused was improperly convicted in the present case.
If the latter position is sound, the judgment of conviction was
right. In order to determine this question, it is necessary to
ascertain what was meant by the general assembly when they
nsed the word '"abandon" in this statute. The word "aban-
don," in its ordinary sense, means to forsake entirely; to re-
nounce and forsake; to leave with a view never to return; to
give over entirely; to forsake or renounce utterly: See Webster's
and Standard Dictionaries. When referring to the desertion
of a wife by a husband, the word has been defined to mean, "the
act of a husband in voluntarily leaving his wife with an inten-
tion to forsake her entirely — tiever to return to her, and never
to resume ^^^ his marital duties toward her or to claim his mari-
tal rights. Such neglect as either leaves the wife destitute of
the common necessaries of life, or would leave her destitute but
for the charity of others": Anderson's Law Dictionary, 4. The
word "abandonment," when referring to the act of one consort
in leaving the other, is defined to mean, "the act of a husband
or wife who leaves his or her consort willfully, and with an in-
tention of causing perpetual separation": Bouvier's Law Dic-
tionary. And as "the willful departure of the husband or wife
from the society of the other and the common home, with an
intention never to return or to resume the marital relation":
Rapalje & Lawrence's Law Dictionary. In Schouler on Domes-
tic Relations, fifth edition, ffection 219, it is declared that
"abandonment by either spouse consists in leaving the other
willfully and with the intention of causing their perpetual sepa-
ration." In the case of State v. Davis, 70 Mo. 467, where the
court had under consideration the meaning of the word "aban-
don" in a statute which punished a father who should abandon
his child or children, and fail, neglect or refuse to maintain and
provide for them, Henry, J., in the opinion, says: "Abandon-
Oct. 1898.] Gay v. State. 71
ment does not mean a mere temporary absence from home, or
temporary neglect of parental duty." In the case of Stan-
brough V. Stanbrough, 60 Ind. 275, the court had under consid-
erajtion a statute which provided for the relief and support of
married women when deserted by the husbands, and it became
necessary to determine what the word "abandonment" meant
when used in such a connection. Niblack, C. J., in the opinion,
says: "Abandonment, in the sense in which it is used in the
statute under which this proceeding was commenced, may be
defined as the act of willfully leaving the wife, with the inten-
tion of causing a palpable separation between the parties, and
implies an actual desertion of the wife by the husband." In the
case of Moore v. Stevenson, 27 Conn. 14, the court had under
consideration the meaning of the word "abandon" in a statute
which authorized a married woman abandoned by her husband
to transact business as a feme sole, and the conclusion was
reached that in such a statute the abandonment is complete
when the husband "voluntarily left the wife with an intention
to forsake her entirely, and never to return to her, and never to
resume his marital duties toward ^^^ her, or to claim his marital
rights." Appl3dng to the word "abandon," as found in this
statute, the meaning which is to be drawn from the definitions
above given, it seems clear that, to constitute the abandonment
of a child by a father, there must be an actual desertion, accom-
panied with an intention to entirely sever, so far as it is possible
to do so, the parental relation, and throw off all obligations
growing out of the same; that when the effect of this separation
is to leave the child in a dependent and destitute condition, the
offense under the statute is complete, and nothing less than this
will constitute the offense. The act of desertion and the at-
tempt to throw off all parental obligation are necessary com-
ponent parts of the offense. The continued refusal to provide
for the support of the child after the actual desertion takes place
is necessary to complete the offense, but it alone is not an offense
under the statute. It follows that if a father desert and forsake
his child, and the consequence of such desertion is that the
child is left in a dependent and destitute condition, the father
becomes amenable to the law, and may be punished for that of-
fense; but persistent refusal to provide for the support of the
child will not constitute a new offense, unless it is accompanied
by another act of desertion. Applying these principles to the
present case, the accused was entitled to a discharge on his plea
of former conviction. When he deserted his child before its
72 Gay v. State. [Georgia,
birth, and persisted in the refusal to maintain and support it
after its birth, the offense of abandonment became complete, the
two elements necessary being present. He cannot, however, be
again convicted of abandonment, under this statute, until he
shall return to the discharge of his parental duties and be guilty
of another act of desertion. That such is the case is to be re-
gretted, but the meaning of words contained in the statute re-
quires this ruling. The statute is not a remedial measure in
the interest of the child, providing for its maintenance. It is
a punitive measure, intended in its enforcement to deter parents
from deserting their children and leaving them in the condi-
tion described in the statute. While abandonment of a child
by a father is a misdemeanor, it is possible for the court to im-
pose such a penalty, when the case is clearly made out, as would
have the effect of ****^ deterring parents from abandoning their
children, if it should not have the effect of making the delin-
quent father return to the discharge of his parental duties.
There is nothing in the decisions of this court bearing direct-
ly upon the question here involved. In McDaniel v. Camp-
bell, 78 Ga. 188, it was held that an indictment which failed to
allege that the abandonment was willful, and that the child was
left in a destitute condition, was fatally defective. .In Benne-
field V. State, 80 Ga. 107, it was held that, while a father may
have been unable to live in peace with the mother of his chil-
dren, and compelled by her conduct to separate from her, he
was, notwithstanding, under a legal obligation to support the
children begotten of her, although on account of the tender
years of the children, in order to support them, it was necessary
to support the adulterous mother; and where the father had
caused his wife and children to be removed to another county,
where the children became dependent and destitute, the father
was guilty of the crime of abandonment in the latter county.
An examination of this case, we think, will show that the act
of desertion which was necessary to make out the offense of
abandonment under the statute was completed in the latter
county, by the father's voluntary removal of the wife and chil-
dren to that place and leaving them there in such a position
that the children became dependent and destitute. While the
case of Jemmeraon v. State, 80 Ga. Ill, is not directly in poini,
the ruling made, and some of the language used by the present
chief justice in the opinion, tend to support the conclusion
reached in the present case. There the act of desertion took
place in the state of Alabama. The wife and child subsequent-
Oct. 1898.] Gay v. State. 78
ly came to this state, the child being then in a dependent and
destitute condition. It was held that there was no offense
against the laws of this state, notwithstanding that the child waa
then dependent and destitute within its limits, because the act
of desertion,, which was a necessary part of the offense, was
committed beyond the limits of the state. In the opinion we
find this language : "Before the state can convict of this offense,
two things must affirmatively appear: 1. The willful and vol-
untary abandonment of a child by its father; 2. The leaving
***' of the child in a dependent and destitute condition. It is
not only necessary that these two things should affirmatively
appear, but it also must appear that they occurred in this state.
It appears from the testimony in this case that the abandon-
ment of the children took place in Alabama, five or six years
before the finding of this indictment. That is one of the main
ingredients of the offense charged; but of that part of the of-
fense the courts of this state had no jurisdiction. And we do
not think that the refusal of the father to support the children
when notified of their condition by the mother, in this state,
subsequent to the abandonment in Alabama, and the removal
of the mother to this state, would be such an abandonment as
contemplated by the code: Code, sec. 4373. The abandonment
is something more than 'leaving them in a dependent and des-
titute condition.' It means the forsaking and desertion of the
children; the refusal of the father to live where they are domi-
ciled, and to perform the duties of a parent to his offspring. If
he abandons them in this manner in this state, and leaves them
dependent and destitute, the offense is complete." In Bull v.
State, 80 Ga. 704, it was held, that a father who within this
state willfully and voluntarily abandons his child before its
birth, and persists in the abandonment afterward, leaving it in
a dependent and destitute condition, is guilty of a violation of
the section under consideration. In Crow v. State, 96 Ga. 297,
it was held that when, in the trial of an indictment for the of-
fense of abandonment, the evidence showed that the father had
deserted the child before its birth, and notwithstanding such
desertion made from time to time suitable provision for its sup-
port, and never at any time refused to make adequate provision
therefor, a verdict of guilty was unwarranted by the evidence.
Construing the statute in the light of these decisions, it seems
to be settled that, to constitute the offense of abandonment,
there must be an actual desertion, followed by a refusal to sup-
port; and that the absence of either would prevent the offense
74 MoHRMAN V. State. [Georgia,
from being made out. As, after a completed act of desertion,
there cannot be a new act of abandonment until a return to the
discharge of the parental obligation, there can be no new offense
of abandonment until such a return, followed by **^^ another
act of desertion. The plea of former conviction should have
been sustained, and the accused should have been, discharged
from custody.
Judgment reversed.
All the justices concurring.
CRIMINAL LAW— FAILURE TO PROVIDE FOR CHILD— NE-
GLECT OF CHILD,— The neglect of a parent to provide for his in-
fant child of lender years is an indictable misdemeanor: Matter of
Ryder, 11 Paige, 1S5; 42 Am. Dee. 109. The authoritative head of
an asylum for cliildi'en may be criminally liable for the neglect of a
child in the asylum, under a statute providing that "whoever, hav-
ing the care or custody of any child, shall willfully cause or permit
the life of it to be endangered, or the health of it to be injured,"
et cetera, should be guiltv of a misdemeanor: Cowley v. People, 83
N. Y. 464; 38 Am. Rep. 464.
MoHRMAN V. State.
[105 Georgia, 709.]
SOCIAL CLUBS— TIPPLING-HOUSE.— Although the selling
and drinking of liquor in a social club is merely incidental to the
main purposes of the club, it is none the less a tippling-house within
the meaning of a statute prohibiting the keeping open on the Sab-
bath day of houses whei'e liquor is furnished and drank.
SOCIAL CLUBS - TIPPLING-HOUSE — LIABILITY OP
MANAGER.— The mannger of a social club, who is also a member
and officer therein, and who exercises general superintendence over
a bar therein from which Intoxicating liquors are sold, is amenable
to a statute prohibiting the keeping open of tippling-houses on Sun-
day.
SOCIAL CLUBS— TIPPLING-HOUSE.— A social club which
furnishes intoxicating liquors to its meml>ers only, to be drunk by
thom on the premises where sold, is a tippling-house within the
meaning of a statue prohibiting the keeping open of tippling-houses
on Sunday.
E. B. Baxter, for the plaintiff in error.
C. H. Cohen, solicitor for the state.
'■**" COBB, J. Mohrman was arraigned in the city court of
Richmond county, charged with the offense of keeping open a
tippling-house on the Sabbath day. At the trial the following
facts were agreed to: "1. The rooms for keeping open which
Nov. 1898.] MoHRMAN V. State. 75
the defendant was indicted were kept open on the day named
in the indictment. 2. Said rooms were used as a rendezvous
where the 'Grabemax Social Club' did gather on the Sabbath
day named in the indictment, and other days, and drink, from
a bar kept in the said rooms, intoxicating liquors. 3. They
were kept open with the defendant's knowledge, on the Sabbath
day as alleged. 4. Said rooms were rented by 'The Grabemax
■^^^ Social Club,' which is incorporated, and which is an organi-
zation composed of some one hundred citizens of Augusta. All
that is in them belongs to said corporation, which pays taxes^
thereon. The stock of liquors therein is the property of said
club, and drinks therefrom were sold to members of said club
on the days mentioned in the indictment. The selling of liquor
on Sunday [was] only an incident and not the main object of
the organization. 5. Defendant is manager of "the said club,
and receives a salary for his services. He was an employ^ and
officer of the said club, with designated duties, one of which
was to see that the bar in the club was properly conducted, and
kept open for the use of the members, from which drinks were-
sold. It was his business to look after the general conduct and
running of the club, but he was in no sense, other than the
above, the proprietor or owner of said rooms; nor had he any
authority or control over them. He acted under orders, and
was strictly amenable to the governing board of the said club.
His authority to do all that he did do flowed wholly from his
employment, and only members are permitted in the said club-
rooms on Sunday or any other day." On the above facts the
presiding judge, sitting without a jury, found the accused guil-
ty. His motion for a new trial on the general grounds wa»
overruled, and he excepted.
An examination of the statement of facts above quoted will
show that the "Grabemax Social Club" was distinguished from,
an ordinary tippling-house in three particulars: 1. The selling-
of liquor on Sunday was incidental to, and not the main object
of, the organization. 2. The accused was an employ^ and offi-
cer of the club, and not the owner thereof. It was his duty,
acting under orders of the governing board of the club, to see
that the bar was properly conducted and kept open for the use
of the members, and to exercise a general superintendence over
the club. 3. "Only members are permitted in the said club-
rooms on Sunday or any other day." We are called upon to de-
cide whether these three distinguishing characteristics of thia
76 MoHRMAN V. State. [Georgia,
social organization take it out of that class of liquor-selling
establishments commonly denominated "tippling-houses."
1. We are of opinion that the incidental selling of liquors
will make a place none the less a tippling-house than if that was
the "^^^ main object of its establishment. The evil intended to
be corrected by the statute is the keeping open on the Sabbath
<ilay of houses where liquor is furnished and drunk; and it makes
no difference, we think, for what purpose the house is being
operated, if tlie fact remains that intoxicating liquors are fur-
nished on the Sabbath day, to be drunk on the premises where
they are supplied. It certainly can be no reply to the statute
that the persons guilty of keeping open a house where liquors
are sold and drunk had some other business in view as the pri-
mary object of its operation, and that the selling of such liquors
is merely an incident to this object. A person keeping a gro-
cery store, but who kept, as incidental to his grocery business,
■a bar in one corner of the store, at which his friends were accus-
tomed to gather on the Sabbath day and partake with him of
•intoxicating drinks, might as well make this plea as the plain-
tiff in error. The fact that the main purpose of the one was
social pleasure, and of the other the realization of profit from
his grocery business, can make no difference. In both the sell-
ing was merely incidental to, and not the main object of, the
business. In the case of Harris v. People, 1 Colo. App. 289, the
accused was convicted of "keeping open a tippling-house on the
Sabbath." It appeared from the evidence that he was a grocer,
and kept the usual stock of goods in that line of business, and
in addition kept on hand intoxicating liquors. Eeed, J., in the
opinion, uses this language: "The object of the statute, evi-
dently, was to prevent places where intoxicating liquors were
sold from keeping open and pursuing their traffic upon the Sab-
bath. It requires such places to be closed, and parties cannot
•evade the law by carrying on two kinds of business in the same
room, and claiming that the sale of groceries was the principal,
and the sale of liquors only an incident." In Williams v. State,
100 Ga. 511, it was held that where a person "in her dwelling-
house, sold whisky by retail to different persons, and on each
occasion permitted the same, or a portion thereof, to be drunk
on the premises," she was guilty of keeping open a tippling-
house. The selling of whisky was only incidental to the pur-
pose for which she occupied the house. And yet the fact that
it was her dwelling did not shield her: See, also, Harvey v.
State, 65 Ga. 668. '^^^ While furnishing intoxicating drinks
Nov. 1898.] MoHRMAN V. State. 77
might have been a mere incident to the purposes for which the
Grabemax Social Club was established, it does not appear but
that its members, or some of them, went to the rooms of the
club for the sole purpose of procuring and drinking intoxicants.
A person who carries on, in connection with some other em-
ployment, a business which is a violation of the law, is just as
guilty as he who carries on such business alone.
2. The second point is controlled by the principle announced
in the case of Cochran v. State, 102 Ga. 631. It was there held
that:- ''Evidence showing that the accused was an officer of a
social club, that gaming with cards for money was carried on in
a room thereof, that portions of the losses in the games played
were appropriated to the use of the club, and that the accused,
knowing these facts, collected and received the same for its bene-
fit, was sufficient to warrant a verdict finding him guilty of
keeping a gaming-house": See, also. State v. Mercer, 33 Iowa,
405.
3. Is a social club which furnishes intoxicating liquors to its
members only, to be drunk by them on the premises where sold,
a tippling-house within the meaning of section 390 of the Penal
Code, which provides that "any person who shall be guilty of
open lewdness, or any notorious acts of public indecency, tending
to debauch the morals, or of keeping open tippling-houses on the
Sabbath day, or Sabbath night, shall be guilty of a misdemean-
or"? Keepers of tippling-houses have sought in various ways
to evade the effect of this statute, and escape the punishment
which it prescribes. Some of the methods resorted to are strik-
ingly unique; and this court has not looked with favor upon
violators of this law, and has, in every instance where it could
possibly do so, upheld convictions thereunder. It has been held
that "it makes no difference as to whether any liquors be sold
or not; the offense consists in its being open, not in selling, or
offering to sell, or giving it away": Harvey v. State, 65 Ga.
568. See, also, Klug v. State, 77 Ga. 734; Menses v. State, 78
Ga. 110; Seyden v. State, 78 Ga. 105. In the case of Hussey v.
State, 69 Ga. 54, no authoritative ruling was made on the ques-
tion as to whether a club which ''*^ furnished liquors to its mem-
bers only was a tippling-house, within the meaning of the stat-
ute. True, the court uses this language: "It makes no difference
in law whether the place be called a bar-room, or a glee-club re-
sort, or a parlor, or a restaurant; if it be a place where liquor is
retailed and tippled on the Sabbath day, with a door to get into
it, so kept that anybody can push it open and go in and drink.
78 MoHBMAN V. State. [Georgia,
the proprietor of it is guilty of keeping open a tippling-house
on Sunday. It makes no difference if the drinking be done
standing or sitting — at a bar or around a table — it is tippling,
and the place where it is done is a tippling-house; and if any-
body wishing to drink can have access thereto — if ingress and
egress be free to all comers — it is a tippling-house kept open on
Sunday." The court was in that case dealing with a public re-
sort, and in so far as any language in the headnotes or the opin-
ion indicates that any other character of resort would not be
a .tippling-house, it is, of course, merely obiter. We think^ how-
ever, that the first part of the language quoted will show that,
in the opinion of the court, a house of the character now under
consideration would be a tippling-house. In the case of Minor
V. State, 63 Ga. 318, an organization known as the"Albany Glee
€lub" was under investigation. Resolutions and by-laws for the
government of the club were in evidence. From these it ap-
peared tliat the main and controlling purpose of the organiza-
tion was to engage in selling and drinking liquors on the Sab-
bath day. It was not in a strict sense a public resort, for it was
provided that, "no member shall invite an outsider that Ijas not
paid his quota to the benefit of the club, without the consent of
two-thirds of the members present." This club was held to be
a tippling-house. We can see, however, some difference be-
tween the Albany club and the club under consideration in the
present case, for the latter club, according to the evidence, was
thoroughly exclusive, and under no circumstances could per-
sons other than those enjoying membership therein partake of
its benefits. It does not appear, however, from the evidence,
that any limitation was put upon its membership.
The object of the general assembly in passipg this statute, as
was said by Warner, J, in Hall v. State, 3 Ga. 18, "was to re-
move ''*'* all temptation to idle and dissolute persons who might
de disposed to congregate at such places, and violate the Sabbath
by any improper conduct." It was said in Sanders v. State, 74
Ga. 88, that "the purpose of the act was not only to close up
such establishments on Sunday, in deference to the finer and
better feelings of orderly and well-disposed people, but to re-
move this incitement to graver and more dangerous violations
of the law."
It is rather difficult to embrace within ons comprehensive
definition every class of resort which could properly be called a
tipplinir-honse. Judge "Rlrrklfv. in i\finor v. State, fi3 Ga. 318,
Bays that "it is something easier for an offender to baffle the die-
Nov. 1898.] MoHRMAN V. State. 79
tionary than the Penal Code, for the former is perplexed with
verbal niceties and shades of meaning, while the latter grasps
in a broad, practical way at the substantial transactions of men.
The code offers no definition of a tippling-house. It deals with
them as establishments too well known to need description, and
simply prescribes a penalty for keeping them open on the Sab-
bath day or Sabbath night." According to Black's Law Dic-
tionary, a tippling-house is "a place where intoxicating drinks
are sold in drams of small quantities to be drunk on the prem-
ises." Anderson says it is "a place of public resort where spiiv
ituous, fermented, or other intoxicating liquors are sold or
drunk in small quantities without a license therefor." Also,
"a public drinking-house — where intoxicating liquor is either
sold by drams to the public, or else given away and imbibed":
Anderson's Law Dictionary, "tippling-house." The house un-
der consideration in the present case comes within the letter of
the definition first quoted, and within the spirit, at least, of the
last : See, also. Black on Litoxicating Liquors, sec. 20. But, as
Judge "Warner, quoting from Chief Justice Marshall, says in
Hall V. Slate, 3 Ga. 18, "although penal laws are to be construed
strictly, they are not to be construed so strictly as to defeat the
obvious intention of the legislature." And in Sanders v. State,
74 Ga. 82, we find the following: "Courts are not very astute
in shielding violators of this provision from punishment by re-
sorting to niceties of verbal criticism, such as would be intelli-
gible only to grammarians and fastidious scholars, but would
utterly fail to impress less "^^^ cultivated minds and tastes, in
order to provide for them a way to escape."
Even if a sale is necessary before a place where liquors are fur-
nished can be characterized as a tippling-house, the weight of
modem authority seems to be, that such a furnishing as the evi-
dence in the present case discloses is a sale. In the case of
State V. Lockyear, 95 N. C. 633, 59 Am. Eep. 287, a number of
persons organized a club for social and literary purposes, and be-
came duly incorporated. Incidental to the main purpose of the
organization, the members, but no other persons, were permit-
ted to purchase from the defendant, its steward, liquors and
other articles, which were furnished by the club at a price fixed
by its officers, sufficient to cover the cost, but not for the pur-
pose of profit. It was there held that the furnishing of liquors
to the members of the club, under these circumstances, was a
sale, in violation of the local option act. In the opinion Chief
Justice Smith uses this language: "There can be no question
80 MoHRMAN V. State. [Georgia,
that in a strict legal sense the transaction described in the ver-
dict is a sale of spirituous liquors. All the elements of an exe-
cuted contract are present. The corporate body, a legal entity,
and the owner of the liquor, through its servant, the defendant,
delivers it to the purchaser at his call, and receives a fixed com-
pensation in money therefor. The property in the goods passes
and vests in the purchaser, and the money paid is received for
and becomes the property of the club. Can there be any doubt
that a corporation may make contracts and deal with a corpora-
tor, precisely as with a stranger, and valid obligations, capable
of enforcement, be thus formed between the parties? And is
not this dealing with the prohibited subject directly within the
terms of the statute, and does it not open the door to the mis-
chiefs intended to be suppressed? It is not necessary that the
vendor should be authorized to sell to any applicant, as an ordi-
nary retailer. He is not allowed to sell to anyone, and the fact
that customers must be members of the association does not re-
lieve him from criminal responsibility under the mandatory
statute." In the opinion will be found several citations of
authority supporting the ruling there made: See, also, State v.
Keis, 108 N. C. 787. ''^^ Substantially the same ruling has
been made in New York: People v. Sinell, 58 Hun, 607; 12
K Y. Supp. 40; People v. Bradley, 58 Hun, 601; 11 N. Y. Supp.
594. At the conclusion of his opinion in State v. Essex Club,
53 N. J. L. 99, Van Syckel, J., says that: "It is wholly imma-
terial whether the sale is made in open view to all who apply,
or in the most secluded place, to which only the trusted few can
gain admittance. The penalty of the statute is denounced
against the sale without license, whether in public or private.
The prohibited act is the sale without license, and, in my opin-
ion, the admitted facts show that such sale was made by the
defendant below in contravention of the law": See, also, Martin
V. State, 59 Ala. 34; People v. Soule, 74 Mich. 250; Kentucky
Club V, Louisville, 92 Ky. 309; State v. Horacek, 41 Kan. 87.
There are cases which hold that the furnishing of liquors under
circumstances similar to those in the present case is not a sale,
and we do not attempt to reconcile thera. We think, however,
that the better view is the one supported by the authorities
above cited, the reasoning of which seems to be conclusive.
In this state, a sale is not necessary, as has been shown, to
make out the offense of keeping open a tippling-house on the
Sabbath. Does the statute, fairly construed, embrace within its
Nov. 1898.] MoHRMAN V. State. 81
terms a house of the character described in the present case?
We think so. The statute intended that all places where per-
sons are accustomed to congregate and drink intoxicating liq-
uors should be closed on the Sabbath day. The fact that liquors
are furnished to a hundred designated persons, and no others,
makes the place where such liquors are supplied none the less
a tippling-house. It is still a place where men congregate for
the purpose of drinking intoxicants. There is no limitation
placed upon the membership of the club over which the plaintiff
in error exercised a general superintendence; it is one hundred
now, and next year mpy be five hundred. It is not unfair to
assume that some, at least, of its membership are accustomed to
congregate at the club-rooms on the Sabbath day for the sol©
purpose of procuring intoxicating drinks. To hold that such a
place was not a tippling-house would be doing violence to the
''*'" statute, and would defeat, in a large measure, the very ob-
ject for which it was enacted; that is, to prevent persons congre-
gating and imbibing intoxicants on the Sabbath day. It was
claimed by counsel for plaintiff in error, in his brief, that the
Grabemax Social Club of Augusta was "a respectable place to
which the public has not access, in which members of a club
owning the resort meet for social ends, and merely drink as an
incident of being there." This may be true, but it is neverthe-
less a tippling-house within the meaning of the statute, and
must be closed on the Sabbath day.
Judgment affirmed.
All the justices concurring, except Simmons, C. J., and
Lumpkin, P. J., absent.
SOCIAL CLUBS-SALE OP LIQUOR— CRIMINAL LIABILITY.
The question whether or not the furnishing of intoxicating or fer-
mented liquor by a social or literary club to its members constitutes
a sale in violation of laws prohibiting sales, or whether or not it
constitutes a sale within the meaning of a law requiring a iiconsw
before one can engnge In retailing such liquor, has been the subject
of various and conflicting decisions by the courts. While the cases
cannot be reconciled, the current, as well as the weight of author-
ity is undoubtedly in favor of the rule that the distribution antl
consumption of liquors In a club by its members is a sale, and a
violation of the laws of the nature stated: Monographic note ta
Barden v. Montana Clubj 24 Am. St. Rep. So-.'O, where the cases are
collected. Thef doctrine of the principal case lb Alao sustained by
State v. Ixjckyear, 95 N. C. 0.^3: ."9 Am. Rep. 2S7. As holding a
contrary doctrine, that a social club is not within the meaning of
statiites restraining or regulating the sale of Intoxicating liquors,
see Klein v. Livingston Club. 177 Pa. St. 224; 55 Am. St. Rep. 717;
People V. AdelphI Club. 149 N. Y. 5; 52 Am. St Rep. 700; Columbia
Au. St. Kkp., Vol. LXX.-«
82 Williams v. State. [Georgia,
Club V. McMaster, 35 S. C. 1; 28 Am. St Rep. 826; Barden v. Mon-
tana Club, 10 Mont. 330; 24 Am, St. Rep. 27; Commonwealtb v. Pom-
phret, 137 Mass. 564; 50 Am. Rep. 340. As holding that the officei-s
of a social club are not criminally liable for selling liquors on Sun-
day in violation of a statute, see Seim v. State, 55 Md. 566; 39 Am.
Rep. 419.
Williams v. State.
[105 Georgia, 814.]
LARCENY.— HOUSE— WHAT IB.— A structure eight feet
high, stationary, inclosed with wire and covered with shingles, and,
maintained for the safekeeping of birds and fowls, is a house within
the meaning of a statute defining larceny from a house or any build-
ing.
C. J. Thornton and A. E. Thornton, for the plaintiff in error.
E. J. W)'nn, solicitor for the state.
^^'*' LITTLE, J. An accusation was preferred in the city
court of Columbus against the plaintiff in error, charging him
with the offense of larceny from the house. The specific details
of the charge made are, that on the fifteenth day of August,
1898, Esau Williams, unlawfully and with force and arms,
certain pigeons of the value of one dollar, the property of Frank
Kirven, in the chicken-house of one R. M. Kirven, feloniously
and wrongfully, with intent to steal said pigeons, did take and
carry away, et cetera. The defendant entered a plea of not
guilty; and at the trial one of the questions was whether or not
the pigeons were taken from a house. The prosecutor testified
that he had a large number of pigeons in a coop, from which
a number were stolen. In describing the coop he testified that
it was a chicken-house; that the house was made of wire, and
was about eight feet tall, two stories, covered with shingles; that
while he called it a coop, it was really a chicken-house; that it
was nailed to the fence; it could not be moved about; that the
posts that held it were not in the ground, but that the structure
was stationary. That is all the testimony that related to the
house from which it was alleged that the property was stolen.
There was other evidence which tended to show, that the plain-
tiff in error privately took the pigeons from this structure; and
when the state closed its testimony the defendant moved the
court to order a discharge of the prisoner, upon the ground that
**° the accusation charged the pigeons to have been stolen from
a chicken-house and the proof showed that it was not a chicken-
Nov. 1898.] Williams v. Statb. 83
house, but a chicken-coop; and that the probata did not follow
the allegata. The court refused the motion, and the plaintiff
in error excepted.
Assuming' that the judg'e has the right to direct a verdict at
the close of the evidence introduced by the state, whenever the
same is plainly insufficient to sustain a verdict of guilty, then
the only question which we are to decide is, whether the evi-
dence establishes the fact that the pigeons were stolen from a
house. Section 179 of the Penal Code provides that: "Any per-
son who shall, in any dwelling-hous'e, store, shop, warehouse, or
any other building, privately steal any money, or any other
thing, under the value of fifty dollars, shall be punished as for
& misdemeanor." The language of this section is very broad;
and a punishment is not only prescribed for a larceny from the
dwelling-house, store, shop, or warehouse, but from any other
building. A building is defined to be "an edifice for any use;
that which is built, as a dwelling-house, barn, et cetera" : Stand-
ard Dictionary. The structure from which the pigeons were
taken, as shown by the evidence in this case, was about eight
feet high, stationary, inclosed with wire and covered with shin-
gles. The fact that it was inclosed with wire instead of other
material, in our judgment, makes no difference; and it comes
plainly under the definition of a house, as used in our statute.
Speaking for myself, I am not aware of any law in this state
which either requires or allows a trial judge, on motion, to or-
der the discharge of the accused during trial and before verdict,
for the want of evidence to convict. It is the province of the
jury to determine, under instructions from the court, whether
the evidence sufficiently shows the guilt of the accused to au-
thorize a conviction. If, for any reason, a conviction is had un-
der insufficient evidence, the person convicted has his remedy
under the provisions of law to have such verdict set aside. In
the trial of a criminal case, as I understand the law of this state,
the weight of the evidence, in the first instance, is to be passed
upon by the jury exclusively, and the jury is the tribunal created
by law to say whether the accused is or is not guilty of the crime.
***** I cannot sanction the practice which has grown up in this
state for judges who preside at the trial of criminal cases, in ad-
vance of a verdict, to pass upon the evidence in the case. And
this without any regard to the practice which obtains in other
jurisdictions. Section 5331 of the Civil Code, which authorises
the judge, in certain instances, to direct a verdict, applies ex-
clusively to civil cases, and was codified from the opinion of this
84 Williams v. State, [Georgia,
court rendered in the case of Hooks v. Frick, 76 Ga. 715; and
while I fully recognize the rule there laid down as being th&
established law of this state, such rule, even in civil cases, ought
not to be extended beyond the plain and literal meaning of the
words used in the section.
We are all of the opinion that no error was committed by tho
presiding judge in his ruling; and the judgment is aflBrmed.
All the justices concurring, except Simmons, C. J., and Lump-
kin, P. J., absent.
BURGLARY— BUILDING— WHAT IS.— Under the Wlsconsia
statute relative to burglary, a building Is a structure "which has
capacity to contain, and is designed for the habitation of, man or
animals, or the sheltering of property. It need not be completed,
if it is in condition to hold tools or other articles of personal prop-
erty: Clarli V. State, 69 Wis. 203; 2 Am. St. Rep. 732. A building
may be within the statutory definition, althongh when the statutei
■was passed no such building was linown; Monographic note to
People T, Richards, 2 Am. St Rep. 391,
CASES
IN THB
SUPREME COURT
ILLINOIS.
Walker v. Warner.
[179 Illinois, 16.]
MORTGAGES — FORECLOSURE — REDEMPTION BY
GRANTEE OP MORTGAGOR.— By foreclosure of a mortgage, sale
of the premises, and master's deed thereunder, the legal title be-
comes vested in the grantee, leaving nothing In the mortgagor or
his grantee to whom he has conveyed before the commencement
of the foreclosure proceeding, but to which the latter Is not made
a party, except the right of redemption, which must be asserted In
a court of equity.
MORTGAGES — FORECLOSURE- REDEMPTION-
LACHES.— Whether an equitable right to redeem from a foreclos-
nre sale has been lost by laches must be determined with reference
to the date of the amended petition praying redemption, when the
original petition seei^s to establish a fee simple title in the com-
plainant.
MORTGAGES- FORECLOSURE -RE DEMPTION—
LACHES.— An equitable right to redeem from a foreclosure sale
may be lost by laches unless asserted within a reasonable time,
and before the situation of the parties has changed, and the righta
of others have intervened, or Improvements have been made.
MORTGAGES — FORECLOSURE — REDEMPTION-
LACHES— LIMITATIONS.— In determining whether there has been
laches In exercising a right of redemption from a mortgage fore-
closure, a court of equity is not necessarily controlled by the per-
iod of limitations as_ fixed in actions at law. A delay for a much
less time than that "prescribed by the statute of limitations may,
according to the circumstances of the case, be held to be laches,
and a bar to the right of redemption.
MORTGAGES— F ORECLOSURB —REDEMPTION—
LACHES.— An equity of redemption from a mortgage foreclosure
cannot be enforced when all parties have supposed that the fore-
closure was good, and the holder of the equity of redemption has
abandoned the premises and all claim to them, never paying any
taxes or offering to redeem, until after a series of years, when the
property had passed through many hands and had become valuable.
86 Walker v. Warner. [Illinois^
MORTGAGES— PAYMENTS— LIMITATIONS.— The effect of
payments upon a mortgage debt must be determined by the stat-
ute in force at tlie time they were made, with reference to the toll-
ing of the statute of limitations, although the mortgage was exe-
cuted prior to such time.
Wilson^ Moore & Mcllvaine, for the appellant.
L. F. English, C. V. Gwin, J. Fentress, E. Dunlap, and E. D.
Kenna, for the appellees.
22 MAGEUDER, J. The original petition in this case al-
leges that appellant is the owner in fee simple of the premises
claimed by him, and asks that his title as such owner be estab-
lished and confirmed. The amended petition is so framed a?
to be a bill to redeem from the foreclosure sale. The prayer of
the amended petition is, that if the purchaser at the foreclosure
sale, or his assigns, have any lien or charge upon said premises,
the amount thereof may be ascertained, and appellant may b&
permitted to pay the samel
Samuel J. Walker wa^ the mortgagor, who executed the Stew-
art mortgage. On August 27, 1873, he sold and conveyed a part
of the premises subject to that mortgage to George J. Sher-
man. When the Stewart mortgage was foreclosed, Samuel J.
Walker, the mortgagor, was made a party defendant, but his
grantee, Sherman, was not made a party defendant. Sherman
acquired his interest by deed from 'W'alker more than five years
before the foreclosure proceeding was begun, the foreclosure bill
having been filed on January 6, 1879.
2^ It is contended by the appellant that, as Sherman was not
made a party to the foreclosure proceeding, the sale thereunder
was utterly void as to him, and as to appellant, his grantee.
Appellant does not allege in his petition that either Samuel J.
Walker, or Sherman, or he himself, paid the Stewart mortgage
or any part thereof, or that he or Sherman has offered to redeem
from the sale under the Stewart mortgage, but insists that the
purchaser at the foreclosure sale acquired only a right of subroga-
tion, which right has been barred by the statute of limitations;
and that, by reason of such bar and also by reason of the alleged
satisfaction of the Stewart mortgage by the foreclosure sale, ap-
pellant's title has ripened into an absolute fee simple title. Un-
doubtedly, Sherman, as the grantee of the equity of redemp-
tion, should have been m'ade a party to the foreclosure suit.
His rights could not be cut off by that proceeding, unless he
was made a party thereto. But the decree of foreclosure wa»
April, 1899.] Walker v. Warner. 87
not, for that reason, a void decree. Sherman was still the
owner of the equity of redemption. As the court obtained no
jurisdiction over him in the foreclosure suit, his rights remained
unaffected by it. The right, however, which thus remained un-
affected, was simply a right to redeem : Cutter v. Jones, 52 111,
84; 2 Jones on Mortgages, 5th ed., sec. 1048.
Samuel J. Walker could invest his grantee, Sherman, with no
greater title than he himself possessed. The purchaser of the
mortgaged premises from the mortgagor stands in the shoes of
the mortgagor, and is charged with notice of the mortgage and
its legal effect. He merely succeeds to the rights of the mort-
gagor. The failure to make him a party to the proceeding to
foreclose the mortgage does not affect the validity of the decree,
but simply leaves his right of redemption unimpaired. The
original mortgagor, Samuel J. Walker, was a party to the fore-
closure decree, and, as there is no claim that the sale was not
fair and regular, the purchaser at the sale and his ** grantees
should be protected. The purchaser at the sale under the de-
cree of foreclosure takes the interests of the defendants, and
also of the mortgagee, divested of any equity of redemption on
the part of all persons who are parties. Although the grantee
of the mortgagor, who is not a party, is not affected, yet his in-
terest, which remains the same, is only a right to redeem. By
the foreclosure and sale and the master's deed thereunder, the
legal title becomes vested in the grantee in such deed, and
leaves nothing in the mortgagor, or his grantees, who are not
parties to the proceeding, except the right to redeem in equity.
Inasmuch as the interest of the grantee of the mortgagor, who
is not made a party to the foreclosure, is merely a right of re-
demption, the right which he has is an equitable one, and must
be asserted in a court of equity. The views thus expressed are
sustained by the following authorities: Carroll v. Ballance, 26
111. 9; 79 Am. Dec. 354; Oldham v. Pfleger, 84 111. 102; Taylor
V. Adams, 115 111. 570; Rose v. Walk, 149 111. 60; Cutter v.
Jones, 52 111. 84; Kelgour v. Wood, 64 HI. 345; Kenyon v.
Shreck, 52 111. 382; West v. Reed, 55 111. 242; Seaman v. Bisbee,
163 111. 91; Barrett v. Hinckley, 124 111. 32; 7 Am. St. Rep.
331; Mulvey v. Gibbons, 87 111. 367; Bryan v. Kales, 162 U. S.
411 ; Bryan v. Brasius, 162 U. S. 415.
• By the foreclosure sale to McCoy, and the execution of the
master's deed to Steele, who obtained the certificate of sale from
McCoy by assignment, the legal title passed to Steele, subject
88 Walker v. Warner. [Illinois,
only to a right of redemption in Sherman, who w&s not made a
party to the foreclosure proceeding.
Inasmuch aa the only right which Sherman had after the
foreclosure sale was a right of redemption, the question arises
whether or not that right was barred or lost when the amended
and engrossed petition was filed in this case on May 8, 1897.
It is a difficult question to determine, and is left in much un-
certainty by the authorities, as to when an equitable right of
redemption is barred, especially where the redemption is to be
made from a mortgage, or a sale under the foreclosure thereof,
where ^^ the claimant of the right of redemption has not been
made a party to the proceeding. In determining whether, in
this case,the right has been barred the time of filing the amended
petition, to wit, May 8, 1897, and not the time of filing the
original petition, to wit, May 21, 1896, is to be taken into con-
sideration. The original petition was not a bill to redeem, but
a bill to establish title. There was no prayer asking for the
exercise of the right of redemption, until the filing of the
amended petition. The appellant abandoned the case made by
his original bill or petition, and made a new and different case
by way of amendment, thus making use of the privilege of
amending, in order to make an entirely new bill: Shields v.
Barrow, 17 How. 130. As, therefore, the amendment to the
original petition transformed it into a bill to redeem, we must
regard the date of the filing of the amended petition as the date
when the prayer for the exercise of the right of redemption was
first made. Whatever may be the period of time within which
the appellant ought to have exercised his right of redemption,
that period must be calculated with reference to the date of
filing the amended petition.
The right of redemption being a purely equitable estate, a
court of chancery will not protect and enforce it unless equita-
ble considerations require it to do so. As the right is the crea-
tion of a court of chancery, it can only be asserted in such
court when its assertion is plainly equitable: West v. Reed, 55
111. 242; Kenyon v. Shreck, 52 111. 382. It may, therefore, be
lost, unless it is asserted within a reasonable time, and before
the situation of the parties has changed, and the rights of others
have intervened, or improvements have been made. In other
words, the right may be lost by laches. In the recent case of '
McDearmon v. Burnham, 158 111. 65, 62, we said: '^^en a
court of equity is asked to lend its aid in the enforcement of a
demand that has become stale, there must be some cogent and
April, 1899.] Walker v. Warner. 89
weighty reasons presented why it has been permitted *^ to be-
come so. Good faith, conscience, and reasonable diligence of
the party seeking its relief are the elements that call a court
of equity into activity. In the absence of these elements, the
court remains passive, and declines to extend its relief or aid.**
In determining whether there has been laches in the matter
of exercising a right of redemption, a court of equity is not nec-
essarily controlled by the period of limitation as fixed in actions
at law. A delay for a much less period than that prescribed by
the statute of limitations will, according to the circumstances
of the case, be held to be laches and a bar to the right of re-
demption: Williams v. Rhodes, 81 111. 571. Where there has
been a defective foreclosure, the equity of redemption will not
be permitted to be asserted against a superior equity, or an
equity still stronger: Mulvey v. Gibbons, 87 111. 367.
In the present case, the debt secured by the mortgage to
Stewart was due on December 1, 1866. When the present bill
to redeem was filed on May 8, 1897, more than thirty years had
elapsed since the maturity of the debt secured by the Stewart
mortgage. More than twenty-three years had elapsed since the
last partial payment on September 30, 1873, had been made
upon that mortgage. More than eighteen years had elapsed since
the proceeding to foreclose the mortgage was instituted, to wit,
January 6, 1879; nearly sixteen years had elapsed since the de-
cree of foreclosure was entered on December 12, 1881. Sher-
man obtained his deed from Samuel J, Walker on August 27,
1873. He held the title for twenty years until August 18, 1893,
when he made a deed to the present appellant. Sherman was
affected with notice of the existence of the mortgage when he
obtained his deed from Walker. For a period of twenty years
he held the title without making any payment whatever upon
the mortgage debt. The appellant waited nearly four years
after obtaining his deed from Sherman before he filed this peti-
tion or bill to redeem. When the bill was filed *'' more than
fifteen years had elapsed since the property was sold under the
foreclosure decree by the master in chancery on January 28,
1882. The master's deed to Steele was executed on April 9,
1887, and more than ten years had elapsed after that date before
the filing of the bill to redeem. Neither Sherman, nor the ap-
pellant, paid any taxes upon the land after January 6, 1879,
when the bill to foreclose was filed, nor, so far as appears, did
Sherman pay any taxes prior to the filing of the bill to fore-
close. In the meantime, Nelson A. Steele, who obtain'n' the
9J Walker v. Warner. [Illinois,
master's deed, had parted with his interest to the appellees here-
in. The appellees, who are railroad companies, had acquired a
right of way through the property in question, and laid down
their tracks about six years before the present bill was filed.
The failure of the appellant and his grantor, Sherman, to pay
taxes or make any payments upon the mortgage would indicate
an abandonment of the property on their part. Under these
circumstances it would be inequitable to allow a redemption.
The equity of redemption cannot be enforced where there has
been an attempted foreclosure, and all parties have supposed
that the foreclosure was good, and the holder of the equity of
redemption has abandoned the premises and all claim to them,
never paying any taxes or offering to redeem until after a series
of years, when the property has passed through many hands for
full value, and has become valuable: Mulvey v. Gibbons, 87 111.
367.
In some cases, it is said that the right to redeem and the
right to foreclose are mutual and reciprocal, and that when the
one is barred the other is barred. This proposition, rightly
understood, only means that, if the instrument be a mortgage
with one party, it must be a mortgage with both; that it can-
not be a mortgage on one side only, but must be a mortgage
with both parties: Bradley v. ISTorris, 63 Minn. 156; Locke v.
Caldwell, 91 111. 417; Jackson v. Lynch, 129 111. 72; Green v.
Capps, 142 111. 286. So long as the relation of mortgagee and
mortgagor exists the right ^^ of redemption exists. It seems
to be assumed by counsel for appellant that, as the appellees
eucceeded to the rights of the mortgagees by reason of holding
under the purchaser at the foreclosure sale, the relation of the
appellees, as such mortgagees, to the appellant, as mortgagor,
or as holding under the mortgagor, continued to exist by rea-
son of the fact that appellees took possession of the property
in 1891, a little more than five years before the filing of the
amended petition. It is true that, after condition broken, the
mortgagee has two methods of enforcing the security for the
debt; one of these methods is by bill in equity for the sale of
the mortgaged property; the other is by entry and possession
of the property by the mortgagee and the application by him
of '^he rents and profits to the payment of the debt and interest.
When the mortgagee enters and takes possession after condition
broken, and before the debt is paid for the purpose of enforcing
his security, the relation of mortgagee and mortgagor continues
to exist and the mortgagee occupies a position of trust with
April, 1899.] Walker v. Wauner. 91
reference to the mortgagor. But in the present case, x'osses-
sion was not taken by the purchaser at the foreclosure sale, or
any of his grantees, until the proceeding by foreclosure had
been completed, and a sale had been made and a master's deed
had been executed. The initiation of the forclosure proceed-
ings may have operated to acknowledge the outstanding right
of redemption at that time, but the culmination of the proceed-
ings and the deed of the master must be recognized as evidence
of the assertion, on the part of the mortgagee or the purchasers
at the sale, of an extinguishment of the equity of redemption:
Harter v. Twohig, 158 U. S. 448. The possession taken in
1891 was not under the mortgage, but was adverse to the rights
of the mortgagor and his grantees. Such possession was taken
in assertion of the rights of the purchaser and his grantees, as
acquired by virtue of the mortgage sale and the master's deed.
Even if the *® limitation upon the right to redeem be re-
garded by analogy as the same as the statutory limitation on
foreclosure by suit, here the master's deed, executed on April 9,
1887, to Steele was so executed more than ten years before the
present bill to redeem was filed. Under the limitation law,
suits to foreclose mortgages are barred within ten years after
the right of action, or the right to make sale, accrues. The
amended petition may be fairly construed to allege that a pay-
ment was made upon the Steele mortgage as late as September
30, 1873. This payment was made after the limitation law of
1872 went into force. Hence, the payment of September 30,
1873, relied upon as constituting a new promise and as reviving
the debt, revived the debt for a period only of ten years from
that date: Drury v. Henderson, 143 HI. 315. Although this
mortgage was executed when the statute of limitations of 1849,
barring the debt in sixteen years, was in force, yet, inasmuch
as a payment was made after the act of 1872 went into force,
that act governed as to the time of the extension created by the
payment. It follows that, even if Sherman or the appellant wa»
entitled to redeem from the mortgage sale for ten years after
the execution of the master's deed, ten years had expired before
the amended bill or petition in this case was filed.
One of the counsel has suggested another view of the matter,
and that is, that under section 15 of the limitation law of 1872,
"all civil actions not otherwise provided for shall be commenced
within five years next after the cause of action accrued.'* It is
urged that a proceeding to enforce the right of redemption i»
a civil action, and should, therefore, be commenced within five
52 Walker v. Warner. [Illinois,
years after the right to redeem has accrued. If this view be
adopted, the five years had elapsed after the taking out of the
master's deed on April 9, 1887, before May 8, 1897, the time
■of the filing of the present bill or petition.
It is apparent, therefore, that whether we apply to the facts
of this case the doctrine of laches as enforced in ^^ equity —
which does not fix any particular period for the termination of
the right of redemption, but leaves it to depend upon the
equitable circumstances developed in each case — or the doctrine
that the limitation of the right to redeem in equity must be
governed, by analogy, by the statute of limitations, as enforced
in actions at law, or as applied to the right of foreclosure, in
either view, the appellant's right of redemption was gone when
the amended bill or petition was filed.
We are, therefore, of the opinion that the court below com-
mitted no error in sustaining the demurrer to the petition
filed by the appellant. Accordingly, the decree of the circuit
<;ourt, dismissing the petition, is affirmed.
MR. JUSTICE BOGGS dissented and said: "I do not concur In
the view a decree of foreclosure, sale, and master's deed there- •
under leave nothing in the grantee of the mortgagor holding under
a. recorded deed, who was not a party to the foreclosure proceed-
ing, except a right to redeem in equity. Such a grantee, by the
conveyance from the mortgagor, became vested with the title to
the mortgaged land subject to the lien of the mortgage. His rlglit
and title are in nowise affected by a decree in a proceeding to
which he was not a party: Ohling v. Luitjens, 32 111. 23; Duulap
V. Wilson, 32 111. 517; 9 Ency. of PI. & Pr. 305. Prior to the filing
of a bill to foreclose a mortgage the grantee of the mortgagor
might discharge the mortgage lien by making payment of the prin-
cipal and interest of the mortgage debt. The rendition of a decree
to which he is not a party has no efficacy to deprive him of that
Tight."
MORTGAGES— FORECLOSURE— EFFECT ON TITLE.— A fore-
closure sale divests the title of all the parties to the suit, and hence
the mortgagor plaintiff therein cannot assert against the purchaser
tax titles held by him prior to such sale: Ames v. Storer, 98 Wis.
372; G7 Am. St. Rep. 813. Upon a foreclosure sale, the purchaser
takes the title of the mortgagor as of the time when the mort-
gage lien was created: Batterman v, Albright, 122 N. Y. 484; 19 Am.
St. Rep. 510. See, also, Norris v. He, 152 111. 190; 43 Am. St. Rep.
233; Hokanson v. Gunderson, 54 Minn. 499; 40 Am. St. Rep. 354.
MORTGAGES — FORECLOSURE — REDEMPTION — LIMITA-
TIONS.— The equity of redemption is a creature of the courts of
chancery, and is impliedly reserved by the mortgagor. This re-
served estate belongs to the mortgagor, Is regarded as an estate
distinct from the right vested In the mortgagee, and is indefinite in
it» duration: Beverly v. Barnitz, 55 Kan. 466; 49 Am. St. Rep. 257;
April, 1899.] Illinois Central R. R. Co. v. King. 93
Toule V. Richards, 1 N. J. Eq. 534; 23 Am. Dec. 722. The time
within which the right to redeem must be exercised may be regu-
lated by statute, and In such a case the statutory time is conclu-
sive: Whitney v. Hlgglns, 10 Cal. 547; 70 Am. Dec. 748; Cunning-
ham V. Hawkins, 24 Cal. 403; 85 Am. Dec. 73.
MORTGAGES— LIMITATIONS— EFFECT OP PAYMENT.— The
bar of limitations does not attach to a mortgage paid in part un-
til the statutory period has run from such payment: Stump v.
Henry, 6 Md. 201; 61 Am. Dec. 300.
Illinois Central Railroad Company v. King.
[179 Illinois, 91.]
RAILROAD COMPANIES— DUTY TO TRESPASSERS.— A
person stealing a ride on a railroad train Is a trespasser and gaina
no rights; but It is the duty of the railroad company and Its em-
ployes not to Injure him willfully or intentionally.
RAILROAD COMPANIES-DUTY TO TRESPASSERS— EVI-
DENCE OF WILFULNESS.— Evidence that a brakeman pulled a
person who was stealing a ride on a railroad train from under the
train while It was in motion, and manifested his feeling and will-
ingness to inflict needless injury by cursing him and throwing a
stone at him, is evidence that the act of the brakeman was willful.
RAILROAD COMPANIES— DUTY TO TRESPASSERS-
LIABILITY FOR ACT OP BRAKEMAN.— A railroad company is
liable for the willful act of Its brakeman within the scope of his
authority in putting a trespasser off Its train.
RAILROAD COMPANIES— LIABILITY FOR WILLFUL
INJURY TO TRESPASSER.— The negligence of a trespasser In tak-
ing a position under the cars to steal a ride upon a train is not an
issue In an action to recover for Injury received while he was be-
ing dragged from such position by the willful act of a brakeman
while the train was In motion.
NEGLIGENCE.— ALTHOUGH A PERSON IS BOUND TO
USE ORDINARY CARE to protect himself against the known dan-
gers of his situation, he need not exercise care to protect himself
against an intentional injury by another of which he has no no-
tice.
TRIAL-ERRONEOUS INSTRUCTIONS.-It is not ground
for reversal of a judgment that an instruction assumes as proven
a fact established by the evidence without contradiction.
W. H. Green and J. Fentress, for the appellant.
Vemor & Carson and J. A. Watts, for appellee.
»a CARTWRIGHT, J. On September 7, 1897, appellee, a
colored boy thirteen years old, was stealing a ride on a freight
train of appellant running south from Ashley, Illinois. His
home was in Jackson, Mississippi, and he was making his way
to said place in that way. He got under the car between the
94 Illinois Central R. R. Co. v. King. [Illinois,
box and the running gear and laid down on the iron rods which
rnn lengthwise under the car, and was nearly midway between
the ends of the car. After the train started a brakeman
climbed down from the side of the car further forward, and
as the train was running six or eight miles an hour he ran
along by the side of the car where appellee was, cursing him,
and reached under the car and caught appellee by the coat
collar and pulled him out and threw a stone at him. In doing
the act, the right foot of appellee was run over and crushed
so that it had to be amputated, and he brought this suit to re-
cover damages for his injury. In the first and third counts of
his declaration he alleged that the servant of defendant wan-
tonly, maliciously, and willfully threw him from the train to
the ground, and in the second charged that while he was on the
train, with the knowledge and consent of servants of the de-
fendant, they forcibly pushed and pulled him from the train of
cars to the ground. The general issue was pleaded, and there
was a trial, which resulted in a verdict for two thousand dollars,
upon which judgment was entered. The appellate court af-
firmed the judgment.
At the conclusion of the evidence the defendant asked the
court to instruct the jury to return a verdict of not guilty,
and it is argued that this instruction should have ®^ been
given because there was a want of evidence tending to prove
these essential facts: 1. That the act of the brakeman was will-
ful; 2. That it was within the scope of the duties intrusted to
him by defendant, so as to make defendant liable for his act.
It is further contended the negligence of plaintiff was the proxi-
mate cause of the injury.
The liability of defendant to plaintiff for his injury is not
founded upon any duty or obligation imposed by law arising
out of the relations of the parties. Duties may arise from con-
tracts or from relative situations in which parties are brought
where they have relative rights, and here there was no right or
corresponding duty arising out of such relation. Plaintiff was
a trespasser, and defendant owed him no duty other than such
as it owed to any stranger. But although he was a trespasser
he did not forfeit the right which inheres in every person as
against every other person, in all conditions, that defendant
should not willfully and intentionally inflict an injury upon
him. The violation of the corresponding duty not to inflict a
willful or intentional injury is usually punished as a public
wrong, and the person injured may also recover for the private
April, 1899.] Illinois Central R. R. Co. v. Kino. 95
injury. Although plaintiff gained no right by being upon de-
fendant's train as trespasser, and was wrongfully there, it waa
the duty of defendant not to injure him willfully or intention-
ally: Illinois Cent. E. E. Co. v. Godfrey, 71 111. 500; 23 Am.
Eep. 112.
There was evidence tending to prove that the act of the
brakeman was willful. He pulled the plaintiff from under the
cars when the train was running at a speed of six or eight miles
an hour, and manifested his feeling and willingness to inflict a
needless injury upon plaintiff by cursing him and throwing a
stone at him.
The liability of defendant rests upon the further question
whether the act of the brakeman was in the course of his em-
ployment and authority as a servant of the defendant. If he
was acting within the scope of his duty ®^ and employment,
the defendant would be liable for his act, although willful and
malicious: Chicago City Ry. Co. v. McMahon, 103 111. 485; 43
Am. Rep. 29. There was no want of evidence to show that the
brakeman did the act within the scope of his duty. He testi-
fied as follows: "Our instructions are to stop and put them off
if we find someone beating their way No, sir; when
you put a man off the train you do not mean that you jerk him
off — kick him off. It means that when we find a man on the
train we instruct him that he can't ride, and he gets off. That
is as far as our directions run as brakeman." This evidence
shows conclusively that" it was within the scope of his direc-
tions and duties to put trespassers off the train.
The other question, whether plaintiff was negligent, was not
relevant to the inquiry. If he bad been injured in consequence
of the very dangerous position in which he placed himself, his
negligence would have barred a recovery. But his injury was
not in consequence of the dangers of his position on the rods,
but because of the willful act of the brakeman in pulling him
off while the train was running. A person is bound to use ordi-
nary care to protect himself against the known dangers of hia
situation, but the law does not exact of him the exercise of care
to protect himself against an intentional injury by another of
which he has no notice. No one is bound to anticipate and
guard against a willful and intentional wrong such as was com»
mitted in this case. The motion for the peremptory instruc-
tion was properly denied.
The remaining complaint mride is, thnt the court rave to f1ie
jury the first instruction asked by the plaintiff, as follows: **The
96 Illinois Central R. R. Co. v. King. [Illinois,
court instructs you that if you believe, from the evidence, that
the injury complained of was wantonly and willfully inflicted,
as charged in the declaration, then the plaintiff will be entitled
to recover, although you may believe, from the evidence, that
plaintiff was guilty of some negligence."
^® This instruction is objected to because it purported to
etate to the jury the conditions under which plaintiff would be
entitled to recover and under which they should return a ver-
dict for him, and omitted the requirement of proof that the
brakeman was acting within the line of his duty or within the
scope of his employment. The law cannot assume, at least as to
a subordinate employe on a train who is not intrusted with the
general management and control of it, that he has control over
passengers or persons attempting to ride, or that he is intrusted
by his employer with authority in respect to them or to eject
them, and it was necessary to make the proof: 3 Elliott on
Railroads, sec. 1255; Farber v, Missouri Pac. R. R. Co., 116
Mo. 81 ; Corcoran v. Concord etc. R. R. Co., 56 Fed. Rep. 1014.
The requirement of such proof was omitted from the statement
of what would entitle the plaintiff to recover in the instruction.
There were instructions given on the part of defendant which
stated the correct rule, but they did not serve to cure admis-
sions in this instruction, which purported to contain all the ele-
ments necessary to a recovery. In such a case, the jury may
follow either instruction, and if they find all the facts proved
which are recited in an instruction purporting to give all the
grounds of a recovery, they would be bound to return a verdict
according to its directions without proof of the omitted fact.
The instruction referred the jury to the declaration, which la
eaid to be specific enough to obviate this objection. We have
not held it error to refer to the declaration by an instruction
which requires proof of all its allegations, and the practice of
making such reference is, perhaps, not infrequent, but it is not
to be commended. In Thompson on Trials, section 1027, the
learned author, in defining the province of the court and jury,
says: "The construction of the pleadings is, of course, always
a question for the court It is, therefore, the duty of the
court to state the issues to the jury, without referring them to
the pleadings to ^* ascertain what the issues are It is
error to leave the jury to construe and determine the effect of
the pleadings." Again, in discussing the requirements of the
law respecting instructions, he says (section 2314): "It is the
duty of the court to determine what are the issues, and to state
April, 1899.] Illinois Central R. R. Co. v. Kino. 97
them to the juTj, and it is error to refer them to the pleadings
to determine the issues, in whole or in part." Again (section
2582): "Properly, the jury have nothing to do with the plead-
ings, and argument directed to the pleadings is addressed to the
court The pleadings are often drawn in technical lan-
guage, which might not be correctly understood by persons un-
learned in the law." In 11 Encyclopedia of Pleading and
Practice, 151, it is said: "The clear weight of authority is, that
it is the province and duty of the court to state specifically to
llie jury what issues are raised by the pleadings, and that it is
erroneous to refer to the pleadings to ascertain what the issues
^vere; that the construction of the pleadings and the issues
raised thereby are questions for the court alone, and not for the
jury."
It is a proper office of an instruction to explain the issues and
to state to the jury the facts from which a conclusion of law is
to be drawTi, and that is undoubtedly the better practice. But
the reference here to the declaration could not supply the de-
fects, both because there is no averment in the declaration that
the brakcman was acting within the scope of his employment
or duty or had authority to do the act, and also because the
reference embraces nothing except the willful and wanton
character of the act. All that it would be necessary for the
jur}' to find would be that the injury was wanton and willful,
as the declaration alleged it to have been. The defect in the
instruction was not cured in any way, but we do not think the
judgment should be reversed on account of it, because defend-
ant was not prejudiced by the omission. The brakeman testi-
fied as to his authority and directions, and there was no con-
tradictory evidence. It is not ground **'' for reversal than an
instruct iou assumes as proven a fact conclusively established by
the evidence without contradiction: Gerke v. Fancher, 158 111.
375; 11 Ency. of PI. & Pr. 132.
The judgment of the appellate court is affirmed.
RAILROAD COMPANIES— DUTY TO TRESPASSERS.— A rail-
road company Is not answerable to a trespasser on a train for neg-
ligence, and owes liim no duty otlier than that of doing hlni no
wanton or willful injury: Riclimond etc. R. R. Co. v. Burnsed. 70
Mls-s. 437; 35 Am. St. Rop. 650, and note; Chicaffo etc. R. R. Co. v.
Mehls.ick. 131 111. Gl; 19 Am. St. Rep. 17, an>l note. Duty of a rail-
road company toward trespassers upon the track of a railroad:
Lake Shore etc. Ry. Co. v. Bodemer. 1.39 III. 506; 32 Am. St. Rep.
218; Central R. R. etc. Co. v. Vaughan, 93 Ala. 209; 30 Am. St Rep.
50, and extended note thereto.
AM, ST. rkp.. You lxx.— 7
98 GoRALSKi V. KosTusKi. [Illinois,
RAILROAD COMPANIES— DUTY TO TRESPASSERS— WILL-
FUL ACT OF SERVANT— A railroad company is liable for the
willful WTODg of its employSs in expelling a trespasser from its
freight train while in motion, to his injury, only upon clear proof
that the act was done by such employs in the course of his em-
ployment and within the scope of his authority: Bess v. Chesa-
peake etc. R. R. Co., 35 W. Va. 492; 29 Am. St. Rep. 820. A rail-
road company Is liable for the willful and wanton acts of a brake-
man in ejecting a trespasser from a train while it is in motion:
Alabama etc. R. R. Co. v. Frazier, 93 Ala. 45; 30 Am. St. Rep. 28.
NEGLIGENCE.— THE MERE FAILURE to ward against a re-
sult which could not reasonably have been expected is not negli-
gence: Davis V. Chicago etc. Ry. Co., 93 Wis. 470; 57 Am. St. Rep.
935.
TRIAL—INSTRUCTIONS— ASSUMPTION OF FACTS.- Where
there is no conflict in the evidence, the court may, in Instructing
the jury, assume it to be true, and charge upon it directly without
any hypothesis: Bynon v. State, 117 Ala. 80; 67 Am. St Rep. 163,
and aote; State r. Jackson, 36 S. C. 487; 31 Am. St Bep. 890.
GoRALSKI V. KOSTUSKL
[179 Illinois, 177.]
COTENANCY— PRIVATE ALLEY.— Owners of lots abutting
upon a private alley, established for their common benefit and ap-
purtenant to each lot, have a unity of possession and are eotenamts
therein.
COTENANCY— DUTY OF COTENANT TO PAY TAXES.— A
widow entitled to unassigned homestead and dower in property on
which she resides, and holding with her children in cotenancy, is
bound, in order to protect their common interest, to contribute to-
ward the taxes upon a private alley constituting part of the com-
mon property.
COTENANCY— TAX TITLES.— While cotenants remain In the
actual possession of the common property and maintain the unity
of possession by actual common use, neither, as against his fel-
low tenants, by purchasing a tax title upon the common premises
can obtain a title that is not subject to the election of the cotenants,
within a reasonable time, to avail themselves of the purchase by
contributing their proper proportion to reimburse the purchasing
tenant.
E. J. Price, for the appellants.
King & Gross and J. Stelk, for the appellees.
***® BOGGS, J. Lot 5 was the homestead of Stephen
Malinowski, deceased. Section 2 of the homestead exemption
act operated to continue a right of homestead therein for
the benefit of his widow Barbara and their minor children.
Barbara was also entitled to dower in the premises. Neither
April, 1899.] Goralski v. Kostuskl 99
homestead nor dower had been assigned. The widow and
children remained in possession of the premises, and having
unity of possession the.ir relation to each other was that of
tenants in common, the mother, by reason of the parental re-
lation, having the superior right of control: *** Montague v.
Selb, 106 111. 49; Freeman on Cotenancy, 2d ed., sec. 108.
The alley was established for the common use and benefit of
the owners and occupants of lots 1, 2, 3, 4, and 5. It waa
highly convenient and beneficial to the full and complete en-
joyment of said lots by the owners and persons in possession.
It was an appurtenant to each of said lots, and the right of pos-
session thereof was common to all occupants and owners of each
of said lots. Such occupants and owners, including said Bar-
bara, had unity of possession of the alley and were tenants in
common therein. Tenancy in common requires but one unity
— that of possession: Freeman on Cotenancy, 2d ed., sec. 86.
The possession of said lot 5, held by said Barbara for herself
and her said minor children, carried with it, as incident thereto,
the right to use the alley in common with the owners and oc-
cupants of the other lots. She realized the value of the alley
as an appurtenance to said lot 5 and insisted on all her rights
therein. She invoked the aid of a court of chancery to pre-
vent others from closing it up or obstructing it. Her cotenants
in lot 5 had common interest with her in the alley. It was
private property and was subject to taxation. It was essential
the taxes should be paid in order to preserve it for her use and
the use of her children who had their home with her on said
lot 5 and whose rights and interests were in her charge. She
received the entire income from the flats on lot 5 and enjoyed
the use of the other building thereon as a home. Her duty
to her children and her own interest required she should have
contributed to the payment of the taxes upon the alley. She
recognized her duty and obligation to pay taxes on said lot 5.
It was equally important to the rights and interests of her chil-
dren, her cotenants, taxes should also be paid on the alley, and,
as we think, equally her duty to contribute to the payment of
the taxes on the alley as to pay the taxes on the lot. She was,
as we have seen, also *^^ tenant in common in the alley with
the appellees, the owners of lots 1 to 4 inclusive, and enjoyed,
in common with them, the poss'ession and benefit of the alley.
Mr. Freeman, in his work on Cotenancy and Partition, says
it is the general rule a cotenant will not be permitted to assert
against his cotenants a title acquired by purchase at a tax sale
100 GoRALSKi V. KosTUSKi. [Illinois^
for taxes imposed on the common property during the joint
ownership, and that where the cotenant purchasing at a tax
sale is in fault for not making payment on his own moiety, there
is no doubt that his purchase cannot he enforced against his
companions except as a basis for compelling them to reimburse
him for their pro rata of the sum paid to relieve the common
property from a common burden: Freeman on Cotenancy and
Partition, sec. 158. In Blackwell on Tax Titles, section 571,
it is said: "It is a general principle that no person can be al-
lowed to purchase [at a tax sale] who is in a situation of trust
or confidence with respect to the subject of the purchase, or
where he has a duty to perform inconsistent with the character
of purchaser. But where a joint tenant or tenant in common
buys an outstanding title which is adverse to the common title,
the purchase is not void but subject to the election of the co-
owners, who must, within a reasonable time, elect to avail them-
selves of the purchase and offer to contribute their share 'of the
purchase money."
ISTo objection is urged to the tax deed in this case other than
the relation of Mrs. Malinowski to the property purported to
be conveyed by it forbade her from buying it except for the
benefit of all interested with her in the alley. The position
of counsel for appellants is that it is to be considered the
deed is otherwise effective and valid, and that it operated to
vest the title to the alley in Baird, the purchaser at the tax
sale, and that Baird, by force and effect of the tax, deed, be-
same seised of the absolute title in fee to the alley, and that
the relation of tenants in common which formerly existed was
thereby destroyed, ***^ and those who had formerly sustained
that relation were absolved from all further duty pertaining
to it. Black on Tax Titles, section 284, and cases cited by
that author, seem to support this view. Mr. Freeman, in his
work on Cotenancy and Partition, section 159, says the cases
relied upon to support the position "do not represent the true
state of the law, because they are directly in conflict with the
well-settled rule that a person under any legal or moral obliga-
tion to pay the taxes cannot, by neglecting to pay the same and
allowing the land to be sold in consequence of such neglect,
add to or strengthen his title by purchasing at the sale himself
or by subsequently buying from a stranger who purchased at
the sale, otherwise he would be allowed to gain an advantage
from his own fraud or negligence in failing to pay the taxes.
• ... If a long period elapses after the creation of a tax title^
April, 1899.] Gorai.ski v. Kostuski. 101
and the purchaser is regarded and treated by the late cotenants
AS the true owner, and the latter, on their part, have abandoned
all pretensions to the property, then it may be that either of
them is at liberty to disregard his former relations and to pur-
chase the whole property for himself." Each of these authors
cites adjudged cases in support of the position assumed.
Without adverting further to this conflict of authority, it ia
sufficient for all the purposes of this case we should hold, as we
do, that while cotenants remain in the actual possession of the
common property and maintain the unity of possession by actual
common use, neither, as against his fellow tenants, by purchas-
ing a tax title based upon a sale of the common premises for
the unpaid taxes in the payment whereof said purchaser was in
part in default, can obtain a title that is not subject to the elec-
tion of the cotenants, within a reasonable time, to avail them-
selves of the benefit of the purchase by contributing their
proper proportion to reimburse the purchasing tenant for re-
lieving the common property from a common burden. In the
case at bar, the relation of tenants *** in common actually
existed when said Barbara received a conveyance from the
Jlder of the title, and the rule that the purchase inured to the
>mmon benefit of all cotenants was properly applied by the
)ancellor.
The decree is affirmed.
a
COTENANCY— WHO ARE COTENANTS.— Persons ownmg nn-
ivided Interests In real property are tenants in common, though
heir titles were acquired by separate conveyances and at different
imes: Stevens v. Reynolds, 143 Ind. 467; 52 Am. St. Rep. 422; Met-
alfe V. Miller, 96 Mich. 459; 35 Am. St. Rep. 617.
COTENANCY— PURCHASE OP TAX TITLE BY COTENANT.—
cotenant in possession cannot acquire title as against his coten-
nt by purchasing a tax title to the common property: Thompson
V. McCorkle, 136 Ind. 4S4; 43 Am. St. Rep. 334. A cotenant,
whether in or out of possession, cannot buy and hold a tax title
against the other cotenants: Cohea v. Hemingway, 71 Miss. 22; 42
Am. St. Rep. 449; Tanney v. Tanney, 159 Pa. St. 277; 39 Am. St.
Rep. 678, and note. But when the interests of several cotenants
are assessed, neither is under obligation to pay the taxes due from
the other, and tlierefore, either may purchase the Interest of the
other at a tax sale thereof and assert any title acquired from such
sale: Bennett v. North Colorado etc. Co., 23 Colo. 470; 58 Am. St.
Rep. 281, and note.
COTENANCY— TAXES-CONTRIBUTION.— A tenant in common
•who pays the taxes against the whole of the common property is
entitled to contribution from his cotenants to the amount of the
taxes due bv each on his Interest: Cocks v. Simmons. 55 Ark. 104;
29 Am. St. Rep. 28. and note; Stewart v. Stewart, 90 Wis. 516; 48
Am. St Rep. 949; Tanney v. Tanney, 159 Pa. St 277; 39 Am. St Eep.
678.
102 WiKE V. Gaeneb. [IllinoiB,
WiKE V. Garner.
[179 Illinois, 257.]
HOMESTEADS— HEAD OF FAMILY— WHO IS.— A bache-
lor brother residing on premises with his two sisters, who are de-
pendent upon him for soipport, is a householder having a family^
Of which he is the head and entitled to a homestead exemption.
HOMESTEADS— COTENA NTS RIGHT TO.— An undlvidecl
Interest in land, accompanied by the exclusive possession, manage-
ment, and control in consideration of maintenance of his cotenant.
Is sufficient to support a right of homestead in the occupying co-
tenant.
HOMESTEADS — OCCUPANCY WITHIN EEASONABLB
TIME. — If a person buys a lot for a home, and erects a house
thereon, a creditor cannot acquire a lien on the property, if, withio
a reasonable time, the purchaser moves on the property and oc-
cupies it as a homestead.
HOMESTEADS.— RIGHTS OP CREDITORS as to property
occupied by their debtor as his homestead, after filling a bill
to cancel a previous satisfaction of their judgment to enjola
the sale of the property and subject it to such judgment, attach
from the date of the decree and not from the time of the filing
of the bill, if the court does not cancel the satisfaction of the
judgment, but enters a money decree and directs execution to Issue.
W. E. Williams, for the appellant.
W. L, Coley, for the appellee.
*®^ CRAIG, J. This is a writ of error sued out to reverse a
decree of the circuit court of Pike county. It appears from the
record that plaintiffs in error, John and George Wike, on the
eleventh day of September, 1893, obtained a judgment before
a justice of the peace against defendant in error, Jonathan
Garner, for the sum of one hundred and fifty-three dollars and
costs. On the sixteenth day of the same month, on the oath of
plaintiffs, an execution was issued on the judgment and deliv-
ered to a constable. On the eighteenth day of the same month
the execution was returned nulla bona, and on the same day a
transcript of the judgment was made out and filed in the office
of the clerk of the circuit court. Thereafter, on the twenty-
fifth day of August, 1894, an execution was issued on the judg-
ment and delivered to the sheriff. The sheriff levied on real es-
tate, which was advertised and sold to plaintiffs in error on the
22d of September, 1894, for the amount of the judgment and
costs, and the execution was returned satisfied. Upon the ex*
piration of the time allowed by law for redemption, December
24, 1895, the sheriff made plaintiffs a deed for the land sold.
Upon obtaining the deed plaintiffs in error discovered that de-
fendant in error never owned or had any title to the land which
April, 1899.] Wike v. Garner. 108
had been sold. Thereupon they filed this bill to vacate the sat-
isfaction *^*^ of their judgment and to enjoin the defendant in
error from selling a certain house and lot in the town of El
Dara, which it was alleged he owned, and to subject the prop-
erty to sale in payment of the judgment.
The defendant answered denying the allegations of the bill
and alleging "that the deed to such property was taken in his
name together with that of his sister, Susan Gamer, and the
said property was paid for by him and the said Susan Garner,
and was bought by them with the intention and for the pur-
pose of using the same as and for a home for him, the defend-
ant, and his sister Susan Garner and his sister Emma Gamer,
who then was, and for a long time prior thereto had been and
now is, a distracted person and dependent upon him for care
and support, and he, together with the two sisters aforesaid,
as soon thereafter as a house could be erected upon the prem-
ises, did occupy the same as a home, and since then have and
now do occupy the same, which said above described property
does not exceed in value one thousand dollars; that he is the
head of the family, consisting of himself and his sisters, Susan
and Emma Garner aforesaid, and that they, the said sisters,
now are, and since, to wit, November 20, 1889 (at which time
his father died), have been dependent upon him for support,
and he has since that time supported them and taken upon him-
self the duty so to support and care for them."
On the hearing the defendant in error testified as follows: 'T.
am postmaster at El Dara. I am thirty-three years of age.
Parents are not living. Father died in 1889 and mother in
1896. I live with two sisters. One sister is a year older than
myself — a distracted porson. Has been since she was fifteen
years of age. My other sister is thirty years old, and she keeps
house for us. We have lived together since mother died, and
I have supported and cared for the two girls since that time.
I bear all the expenses. I own no property at El Dara except
the house and lot — the same property described ^*^ in the bill.
I bought the property in June of this year (1897). The title
to the property is in myself and sister Susan. That is the sister
that is not distracted. We proceeded to build a residence at
once. We moved into the residence and now occupy it. We
bought the lot for a home. The house and lot was six hundred
dollars. Paid one hundred and thirty dollars for the lot. The
building cost about four hundred and fifty dollars. I claim to
be the head of the family and to occupy the house as a home-
104 WiKE V. Garner. [Illinois,
stead." On cross-examination, the witness further testified that
at the time the injunction was served he had contracted to sell
the place for six hundred and fifty dollars and intended to in-
vest the money in another home. The testimony of this witness
was not contradicted nor were the facts disclosed hy him con-
troverted.
Among other facts found by the court and incorporated in
the final decree are the following: "The court further finds that
the said Jonathan Garner and his sister, Susan Garner, pur-
chased said property and erected a residence thereon for the
purpose and with the intention of making the same a homestead;
that he is a single man, residing with a family consisting of two
sisiters, and that he is the head of the same. The court further
finds that at the time of service of the writ of injunction herein
and the commencement of this suit said property was the home-
stead of the defendant, and that the same was exempt from
execution and sale and that the same was not subject to the
lien of any judgment obtained by complainants, and that the
injunction should be dissolved.'*
Three questions are raised in the argument of counsel for
plaintiffs in error: 1. Will the undivided interest of the defend-
ant, under the circumstances of the case, support a homestead
right; 2. Will the mere intention to occupy property as a home-
stead, not carried into effect by subsequent actual occupancy,
support a homestead right; and 3. Will the homestead right at-
tach by the voluntary act of the claimant moving into and ^^^
occupying the property and claiming the same as a homestead,
pending the injunction proceedings?
Section 1 of the homestead act provides "that every house-
holder having a family shall be entitled to an estate of home-
stead, to the extent in value of one thousand dollars, in the
farm or lot of land and buildings thereon owned or rightly pos-
sessed, by lease or otherwise, and occupied by him or her as a
residence." In Holnback v. Wilson, 159 111. 148, 154, in con-
sidering the question who might be regarded as a householder,
we said: "A bachelor or a widower who occupies a home, as the
head of a family, on land which he desires to sot apart as a
homestead, who has living with him a mother, father, sisters,
or brothers who ar^dependent upon him for support, and where
there is a corresponding duty of support resting on him, might
properly be regarded as a householder having a family within
the meaning of the statute." The defendant in error, Jonathan
Garner, occupied a house with two sisters. He and they consti-
April, 1899.] Wike v. Gabnbu. 106
tuted the family. He, as appears from the evidence, was the
head of the family and the two sisters were supported by him.
We think, therefore, under the facts as they appeared in evi-
dence, the defendant in error was a householder having a family,
within the meaning of the statute.
By purchasing the loi; which plaintiffs in error seek to suhject
to the payment of their debt against Jonathan Gamer, it is ap-
parent that if he had taken the title in his own name he would
be entitled to claim the benefit of the homestead exemption act.
But the title to the lot was conveyed to Jonathan Garner and
Susan Garner, his sister, and it is claimed that as Jonathan Gar-
ner held only an undivided one-half interest in the property he
could not claim the benefit of the .homestead act. This ques-
tion arose in Brokaw v. Ogle, 170 111. 115, and it was there held
that an undivided interest in land, accompanied by exclusive
possession, will support a right of homestead in one of the co-
tenants. Here Jonathan Garner ^^^ was in the undisputed pos-
session of the entire property. While Susan Garner owns the
fee to an undivided half of the lot, she accords to Jonathan
Gamer the sole possession, management, and control of the
property. Tlic statute does not require the householder to own
the fee to enable him to claim the benefit of the homestead act.
On the contrary, the statute expressly provides that the house-
holder shall be entitled to an estate of homestead in the property
owned or rightly possessed, by a lease or otherwise. Under this
statute, if defendant in error owned an undivided half and had
a lease of the other half, no reason is perceived why he might
not claim the benefit of the statute, and that was, in effect, his
position, as he owned one-half and occupied the whole property
with the consent and agreement of the owner of the other half,
and she in turn received her support. Indeed, we are inclined
to the opinion that where a householder is in the exclusive pos-
session of a lot of land occupied by him as a residence, it does
not concern the judgment creditor -whether such householder
possesses the fee, an estate for life or for years, or what title he
may have. Here the controversy is solely between plaintiffs in
error, as judgment creditors, and defendant in error, and as
against his judgment creditors defendant in error is entitled to
claim the exemption of the statute.
It is next claimed that there was a mere intention to occupy
the property as a homestead, which was abandoned, and hence
no right of homestead existed in favor of the defendant in error.
The evidence shows that the defendant in error purchased the
106 WiKE V. Garner. [Illinois,
lot for a home, and that he proceeded at once to erect a house
thereon for a residence. When the house was about completed
defendant in error had an offer for the place, and concluded to
sell and invest the money in another place, but after the bill
was filed he abandoned the sale and moved into the house, and
since that time occupied it as a homestead. We do not think
the fact that the defendant in error made up ^*^ his mind to
sell the property but did not consummate the sale deprived him
of the right, when he saw proper to move in and occupy the
property as a residence, to claim it as a homestead. The prop-
erty was worth less than one thousand dollars, and if the lot
was purchased and the house erected for a residence, and was
followed by actual occupancy by defendant in error without un-
reasonable delay, as the evidence shows was the case, it was not
liable to be seized and sold by plaintiffs in error on anyjudginent
or decree they might obtain. Where a person buys a lot for a
home, as was the case here, and erects a house on the lot, a
creditor cannot acquire a lien on the property, if, within a rea-
sonable time, the purchaser moves on the property and occupies
it as a homestead. The rule laid down in Crawford v. Richeson,
101 111. 351, applies here.
It is finally claimed that defendant in error, by moving into
and occupying the property, claiming it as a homestead, could
not defeat the intervening rights of plaintiffs in error — in other
words, it is claimed that defendant in error coilld acquire no
rights by moving in property after the bill was filed. The
bill was filed to enjoin defendant in error from selling the prop-
erty, but he was not enjoined from moving into the prop-
erty or using it as he might desire. When the bill was filed
plaintiffs in error had no lien on the property. Indeed, they
had no judgment against defendant in error. Their judgment
had been satisfied, and one object of the bill was to vacate the
satisfaction and reverse the judgment. Plaintiffs in error, so
far as the property was concerned, had no intervening rights
to be defeated. • Section 1 of chapter 77 of the Revised Statutes
provides "that a judgment of a court of record shall be a lien
on the real estate of the person against whom it is obtained,
situated within the county for which the court is held, from the
time the same is rendered or revived, for the period of seven
years, and no longer." It will be observed that the court, by
its decree, did not cancel or set aside the satisfaction of the
judgment, **"" but entered a money decree and directed execu-
tion to issue. Under such circumstances, as is suggested in ar-
April, 1899.] Wike v. Garner. 107
gument of defendant, the rights of .plaintiffs in error to sub-
ject any property of the defendant to the payment of their de-
mand dates from the time their decree was rendered, which was
July 2, 1898. When the decree was rendered, and for a long'
time previous to that date, defendant in error was occupying th&
house and lot in question as a homestead.
. We think the court properly held that the property in ques-
tion was the homestead of the defendant in error, and the de-
cree will be afiSrmed.
HOMESTEAD— COTENANT'S RIGHT TO.— A tenant In commoa
Is entitled to a homestead In the common estate: See note to Arendt
V. Mace, 9 Am. St. Rep. 209; contra. Bishop v. Hubbard, 23 Cal.
514; 83 Am. Dec. 132. See note to Wolf v. Fleischacker. 63 Am.
Dec. 122.
HOMESTEAD— OCCUPANCY.— Homestead rights attach to a lot
which has been purchased for a homestead, and which the pur-
chaser intends to use as such, though he has not yet occupied it,
and It is not fit for such occupancy until be can have a residence
built thereon, if he is proceeding in good faith to secure the erec-
tion of such residence for the purpose of us.ing it as his homer
Cameron v. Gebhard, 85 Tex. 610; 34 Am. St. Rep. 832, and note.
As to whether actual occupancy is necessary in order to stamp^
property with the character of a homestead, see Mason v. Columbia
Finance etc. Co., 99 Ky. 117; 59 Am. St. Rep. 451.
Homesteads— Head of Family -Who Is.*
The head of a family, within the meaning of exemption and home-
stead statutes. Is one who controls, supervises, and manages the-
affalrs about a home; but Is not necessarily a father or husband.
A family Is generally understood to be a collective body of per-
sons who live In one house, under one head or manager: Ridenour-
Baker Grocery Co. v. Monroe, 142 Mo, 165. Any individual of
either sex may be the head of a family. It is not necessary that
he or she should be married; Revalk v. Kraemer, 8 Cal. 66; 68 Am.
Dec. 304. It is not necessary that the relation of husband and
wife, or of parent and child should exist. In order to constitute a
family having a head within the meaning of the homestead law.
The exemption extends to one who has residing with him those-
so connected with him by blood, or ties of residence and associa-
tion, as to become part of his household, and who have no residence-
but that which they enjoy under his favor, and whom he is under
a legal or moral duty to support: Moyer v. Drummond, 32 S. C.
165; 17 Am. St. Rep. 850. "The whole theory and policy of the
homestead law is founded upon the principle that there Is a natural
and moral obligation on the head of a family, to provide for the
support of his wife and children, and other persons dependent upon
him toward whom he stands almost in loco parentis, which is, if
not paramount, equal to his obligations to pay his debts, and the
family may consist of a wife and children, or of other person»
•bfferknce to monographic not*.
Head of {amily, who is: 61 Am. Dec. 586-698.
108 WiKE V. Garner. [Illinois,
"Who may stand In a state of dependence In the family relation, or
it may consist of persons standing In either of these relations,
whether the father or mother, or a brother or sister, or other re-
lation is the head; but they must be persons who are dependent, la
«ome measure, on the head for support, and who have an inter-
est in his holding his property, and would be prejudiced by its
seizure and sale imder execution or other process, and who would
be benefited by its exemption": Calhoun v. Williams, 32 Gratt. 18;
34 Am. Rep. 759.
The leading idea of the homestead laws is doubtless to secure to
such persons as constitute a family, primarily considering the hus-
band or father as the head thereof, in contradistinction to single per-
sons, a home, and to foster and upbuild the family interest, upon
which, mainly, society depends. The idea of a family cannot be
■disassociated from the idea of an assemblage of persons among
whom some are dependents and over whom some one of their num-
■ber has and legally exercises control. This one is their head, and
the only one who is entitled to claim a homestead exemption in
their behalf. To constitute a family with a head within the mean-
ing of such laws, there must be a state of dependence In law, If
cot in fact, upon the part of some of those who constitute the
family, or some other member of the family whom the law desig-
nates as the head thereof, and this dependence may result, as a
matter of law, from the relationship existing between the parties,
whether they be parent and minor child, husband and wife, guar-
•dian and ward, or master and servant or other relation. Or it may
result, as a matter of fact, from the head of the family control-
ling the homestead property, in which the dependent has either a
present or prospective interest. This state of dependence necessa-
rily implies, upon the part of the person whom the law designates
as the head of the family, not only a control of the dependent, or
of the property In which the dependent has an Interest, either
present or prospective, but also implies a legal right to such con-
trol. There must be a mutual obligation between the parties
which entitles the one to control, and which imposes upon the other
the duty of submitting to such control, and there must be also not
only a dependence, but also, upon the part of the head of the fam-
ily, a corresponding obligation to provide for the wants of the de-
pendent, let that obligation result from whatever fact it may.
Husband.— Any man who has a wife Is, while the marriage de
Jure exists, the head of a family, within the meaning of homestead
or exemption statutes, although he has no children: Whitehead v.
Tapp, 69 Mo. 415; Cox v. Stafford, 14 How. Pr. 519; Brown v.
Brown, G8 Mo, 388; and it makes no difference that his wife may
have deserted him and may be residing in another state, and that
he may be living In improper relations with another woman: White-
head V. Tapp, G9 Mo. 415; Brown v. Brown, 68 Mo, 389, A hus-
l)aDd who has his children at school away from home, or tempo-
rarily separated from him In any way, while his relation to them
as his family continues, and while he stipports them, is still their
bead, and may declare a homestead in their favor: Seaton v. Mar-
April, 1899.] Wike v. Garneb. 109
Bhall, 6 Bush. 429; 99 Am. Dec. 683; Robinson's Case. 3 Abb. Pr.
466. But a husband In one state, with a family in another, cannot
be considered the head of a family in the former, though he shows
that during his residence In the former state he was accompanied
by his son. He must also show that his son is depen<ient upon
him for support: Allen v. Manasse, 4 Ala. 554.
Unmarried Man.— Anj individuals of either sex may be the head
of a family, and it Is not necessary that such head should be a mar-
ried man; there must, however, be some dependence upon such head
in order to enable him to declare a homestead: Revalk v. Kraemer,
8 Cal. 72; 68 Am. Dec. 304. Thus, an unmarried man whose indi-
gent mother and sisters live with, and are supported by, him. Is the
head of a family within the meaning of the homestead statute:
Marsh v. Lazenby, 41 Ga. 153. A bachelor, for whom a sister keeps
house, and whom he supports. Is the head of a family: Bailey v. Com-
ings, 16 Bank Keg. 382, Fed. Cas. No. 733. And a brother who re-
sides with his sister In her house, the rental value of which Is in-
sufficient to support her, and who supports her and manages the
household, is the head of a family, and entitled to the chattel ex-
emption allowed by the homestead law: Moyer v. Drummond, 32
S. C. 165; 17 Am. St. Rep. 850. A widower without children, whose
mother is the sole member of his family, is Its head If he supports
her, within the meaning of a statute exempting from forced sale
the homestead of every head of a family: Parsons v. Livingston,
11 Iowa, 104; 77 Am. Dec. 135. A father living with his Indigent
widowed daughter and her children, dependent upon him, Is en-
titled to a homestead as the head of the family: Blackwell v.
Broughton, 56 Ga. 390. A father and his illegitimate children
living with him constitute such a family as may assert homestead
rights, and such rights cannot be defeated by the fact that such
father permits a woman with whom he unlawfully cohabits to
dwell on the land: Lane v. Philips, 69 Tex. 240; 5 Am. St. Rep. 41.
A son is in legal contemplation the head of a family, if he is of
fuU age and assumes the obligation of providing for a widowed
mother and her children, with whom he lives, and who are depend-
ent on him: Conuaughton v. Sands. 32 Wis. 387; and If a man and
his sister live together, both owning some personal property, and
contributing toward their household expenses, the brother direct-
ing and controlling the affairs of the* household, he is a house-
holder and entitled to an exemption: Graham v. Crockett, 18 Ind.
119.
To constitute a family within the meaning of the homestead
laws, a mere aggregate of individuals in the same house is not suffi-
cient. There must also be an obligation, legal or moral, upon the
head of the house to supiwrt the others, or some of them, and on
their part, a corresponding state of dependence: Bosquett v. Hall,
90 Ky. 566; 29 Am. St. Rep. 404; Harbison v. Vaughn, 42 Ark. 539.
Hence, when the persons residing with a debtor, though children, are
strangers in blood to him, and he is under no legal or natural olv
ligation to support them, he Is not the head of a family so as to
be entitled to a homestead exemption: Bosquett v. HaJI, 90 Ky,
ilO WiKE V. Garner. [Illinois,
666; 29 Am. St. Rep. 404. It has been held that a family composed
of persons neither related by blood nor connected by marriage can-
not have a head who is entitled to declare a homestead exemption:
Howard v. Marshall, 48 Tex. 471. Hence, a widower cannot thus
exempt his property by voluntarily taking upon himself, for some
temporary or indefinite period, the support of persons having no
•claim upon him in law or morals. Such a union of persons in one
household, directing their attention to a common object, does not
•constitute a family: Whitehead v. Niclielson, 48 Tex. 517. An un-
married man, with whom his brother and sister-in-law reside, and
for whom they keep house, he furnishing the necessaries of life,
is not the head of a family: Whalen v. Cadman, 11 Iowa, 226. A
widower without children or otheis dependent upon him is not enh
titled to a homestead exemption: Revalk v. Kraemer, 8 Cal. G6;
€»8 Am. Dec. 304. A father residing with his adult daughter, who
has been married and separated from her husband, and whom the
father is under no obligation to support, is not the head of a fam-
ily: Walker v. Thomason, 77 Ga. 682. And it has been held that
an indigent sister and her children, though mainly dependent on
their brother for support, and living with him, do not constitute
a family for whose benefit he can take a homestead, because he
is not legally bound to support them. "If the applicant could ob-
tain a homestead as the head of a family of persons whom he
is not legally bound to support, then he might enjoy it for his
own benefit exclusively, and refuse with impunity to support those
for whose benefit be claimed to have obtained it": Dendy v. Gam-
ble, 64 Ga. 528. A man and woman living together in adultery-
do not constitute a family within the meaning of the law exempt-
ing the homestead of the head of a family from forced sale under
execution: Lane v. Phillips, 69 Tex. 240; 5 Am. St. Rep. 41.
A bachelor having no children or other persons dependent upon
him, and no one residing with him except servants and employfis,
Is not the "head of a family," though he is a householder and
keeps house, in the sense that such term is used in constitutional
and statutory provisions, with reference to homestead exemptions:
Calhoun v. Williams, 32 Gratt. 18; 34 Am. Rep. 759; Garaty v. Du
Bose, 5 S. C. 493. Consequently, a man with no family of his own,
but renting a house, in which he resides with a number of per-
sons whom he Is under no obligation to support and to whom he
Is In no manner related, Is not entitled to a homestead exemption:
Holnback v. Wilson, 159 111. 148. "A collection of individuals
occupying a house, In no manner related or connected with each
other, no obligation resting on the head of the household to sup-
port the others and no dependence existing on their part upon the
head of the family, cannot, In our opinion, be regarded as a fam-
ily, within the meaning of the homestead act. But we do not think
that it was Intended by the legislature to restrict the operation of
the statute to a married man with a family. A bachelor or a
widower who occupies a house as the head of a family, on land
which ho desires to set npnrt as a homestead, who has living with
bim a mother, father, sisters or brothers who are dependent upon
April, 1899.] Wike v. Garner. lit
him for support, and where there Is a corresponding duty of sup-
port resting on him, might properly be regarded as a householder
having a family, within the meaning of the statute": Holnback v.
Wilson, 159 111. 148. 154.
Wi/e.— Whether a wife may, while her husband Is living, be con-
sidered the head of the family for the purpose of declaring a •
homestead, even in her separate property, Is a much disputed ques-
tion, but the conflict arising In the authorities may, to a great de-
gree, be reconciled by reason of the different phraseology employed
in the homestead statutes of the several states.
The majority of the cases hold that the statutory homestead or
exemption cannot be talien in property which does not belong to
the head of the family, and that a wife living with her husband
and children Is not the head of the family. Hence, she is not
entUled to have property, the title to which Is in herself, exempted
from levy and sale, for the benefit of herself and her minor chil-
dren. In an early case in California It was doubted whether the
separate property of a wife could become a homestead: Revalk v.
Kraemer, 8 Cal. 66; 68 Am. Dec. 304. While in Rosenberg v. Jett,
72 Fed. Rep. 90, It was held that during coverture, and while the
husband and wife are living together, there can be no such thing
as a separate homestead of a wife, distinct from that of her hus-
band.
A married woman living with her minor children and with her
husband as a member of his family is not entitled, even under
the most liberal statutes, to have a homestead set apart to her as
the head of a family out of her separate estate, although her hus-
band may be physically weah: and unable to work, and possessed
of no property, nor means of support: Johnson v. Little, 90 Ga.
781. A wife is not the head of the family and cannot take a home-
stead in her separate property for the benefit of herself, her
minor children by a former marriage, and a minor child by her
present husband, with whom she lives: Neal v. Sawyer, 02 Ga.
352. The law does not confer the privilege of a homestead upon
a married woman for the reason that during the marriage her hus-
band Is the head of the family, upon whom devolves Its support,
and whether. In exceptional cases, the wife may have to contribute
to the support of the family or not cannot affect the Interpreta-
tion of an unambiguous statute: Fuselier v. Buckner, 28 La. Ann.
694. A wife who has no family individually dependent on her for
support, and whose husband Is able to work and support her, and
who owns more land than Is exempt from seizure, cannot claim
the benefit of a homestead statute: Taylor v. McElvin, 31 La. Ann.
283.
On the other hand, in Thompson v. King, 54 Ark, 11, It was held
that the expressions "married or the head of a family," used in a
homestead statute as designating who might declare a homestead,
are not synonymous, or mere equivalents the one for the other, and
that all of either sex, who are either married or the heads of fami-
lies, are entitled to the exemption. The object of the statute "is
to protect the home of the married and the family against selx-
112 WiKE V. Garner. [Illinois,
ure and sale, and no reason can be advanced why the land of the
wife occupied as the home of the husband and his family should
not be protected as well as the land of the husband should be
when it is a homestead": Thompson v. King, 54 Arlj. 11. In Mis-
issippi, the /law gives a homestead to every owner of land being
a householder and head of a family. In that state, it has been
held that a married woman owning separate estate, and residing
thereon as a domicile with her family, Is entitled to a homestead
therein, although a husband is the head of the family in the sense
that the wife and children are subject to his marital and paternal
control; yet he has no authority or control over the separate prop-
erty of the wife or the application of it to the support of the fam-
ily. Hence, the wife may declaxe a homestead therein.
In a late case In Illinois, It was decided that a statutory ex-
pression that every householder having a family is entitled to a
liomestead exemption does not require such householder to be the
head of a family, and a wife is entitled to the exemption in her
separate property when occupied as a homestead by herself, hus-
band, and children: Zander v. Scott, 165 111. 51. Under the Colorado
statute, a wife has the character of the head of the family, while
occupying with her husband her property as a home, so as to en-
able her to designate and affect It with the character of a home-
stead, and thus exempt it from seizure and sale for the joint debt
of herself and husband: McPhee v. O'Rourke, 10 Ck)lo. 301, 3 Am.
St. Rep. 579; Norton v. Bradham, 21 S. C. 375; and under the
South Carolina statute the right of a homestead exemption, as
against her own debts, is extended to a wife living with her hus-
band who has no property: Norton v. Bradham, 21 S. 0. 375.
Under the California statutes, a husband is designated as the head
of the family for the purpose of declaring a homestead exemption,
but upon his failure to declare it the wife Is given the right to de-
clare a homestead on their property for their joint benefit: Cali-
fornia Civ. Code, sees. 1261, 1202. After the husband has declared
a homestead In his property, the wife cannot declare another In
her separate property: Neal v. Sawyer, 62 Ga. 352.
Widow or Unmarried Woman.— \t Is a well-settled rule that a
widow as the head of a family, consisting of herself and minor
child or children, Is entitled to a homestead out of his or her
estate: Groover v. Brown, CO Ga. 60; Smith v. Wright, 13 Tex.
Civ. App. 480; Wood v. Wheeler, 7 Tex. 13; Norrls v. Moulton, 34
N. H. 392. When a widow, who Is the step-mother of her de-
ceased husband's minor children, undertakes to keep together, care
for, and support them, she has a right, as the head of a family, to
take a homestead In his real estate: HoUoway v. Holloway, 86 Ga.
57G; 22 Am. St. Rep. 484; Sauderlln v. Sanderlin, 1 Swan. 442;
Brlgham v. Bush, 33 Barb. 596. Upon the death of a husband, his
widow takes the capacity as head of the family, with all tlie inci-
dents, privileges, and responsibilities attached to It; and if she aiwJ
her children continue to reside together In the house of her deceased
husband, and constitute a family, she Is entitled to a homestead
exemption as the bead of a family: Becker v. Becker, 47 Barb. 497.
April, 1899.] Wjke v. Garner. 113
If a widow, with her children, resides In the house, and on the
land of her aged father, she has been held to be the head of a
family: Bachman v. Crawford, 3 Humph. 214; 39 Am. Dec. 163;
and if a widow keeps house upon land allotted to her in dower
without. children of her own, but with five orphan children of a
deceased sister who have been members of the family during the
husband's life, and with two orphan children of her late husbaud's
sister, she is the head of a family: Ex parte Brien, 2 Tenn. Cb.
33. A widow occupying a house and lot as her homestead, with
two adult children living with her, has been held to be a house-
keeper and head of a family: Brooks v. Collins, 11 Bush, 022. But
it has been held under the North Carolina statute, that a widow
cannot have a homestead laid oti to her and her minor children
after the death of the husband, when he dies without leaving
debts: Hager v. Nixon, C9 N. C. 108. And it has also been held
that a widow who lias no children living with her dependent ou
her for support, is not entitled to a homestead out of the property
of her deceased husband as the head of a family: Kidd v. Lester,
4G Ga. 231.
An unmarried woman, keeping house, and bringing up two chil-
dren of her deceased sister, is the head of a family and entitled to
a homestead exemption: Arnold v. Waltz, 53 Iowa, 700; 30 Am.
Itep. 248. So is a single woman, who supports an invalid sister
who resides with her and has no other means of support: Cham-
berlain V. Brown, 33 S. C. 597. An unmarried woman who has the
care and custody of her minor bastard child Is entitled to a home-
stead as the head of a family: Ellis v. White, 47 Cal. 73. But a
woman who has never been married, and who has no children, is
not entitled to a homestead under the Massachusetts statute,
though she lives with her mother: Woodworth v. Comstock. 10
Allen, 425. Although an adult daughter owns part of the premises
in which her parents reside, while she lives elsewhere and aids
her brother in supporting such parents, does not constitute her
, the head of a family so as to entitle her to claim such premises as
a homestead: Ilidenour-Baker Co. v. Monroe, 142 Mo. 105.
Separation or Divorce— A husband does not cease to be the head
of the family, in the eyes of the law, by reason of his desertion by
his wife. As such head he retains the home until and to which
she may return. While the marriage relation exists he is the
head of the family, although he has no family but his wife, and
she has left the home: Brown v. Brown, 68 Mo. 388; Gladnoy v.
Berkley, 75 Mo. App. 98; Gates v. Steele, 48 Ark. 539. Although
his wife may have deserted him, and may be residing in another
state, and he himself may be living In Improper relations with an-
other woman, he is still regarded as the head of the family witliia
the meaning of the homestead law: Whitehead v. Tapp, 69 Mo.
415. A husband who lives with his family remains the head
thereof, although he falls to support such family, quarrels wUh
his wife, and occupies a separate bed: Barry v. Western Assur.
Ck)., 19 Mont. 571; 01 Am. St. Rep. 530. But a husband who has
AM. St. Rkp., Vol. LXX.— «
114 WiKE V. Garner. [Illinois,
voluntarily allowed his family to separate, and has abandoned the
maintainance of a family home, cannot set up a homestead exemp-
tion: Cooper V. Cooper, 24 Ohio St. 488.
The protection of a homestead exemption is still retained by the
wife and minor children of a man who has left the state and de-
sires them to follow him, so long as they remain upon the home-
stead left by him. Upon the husband's leaving the state, the wife
becomes the head of the family, and she cannot be prevented from
remaining in the state and continuing the occupancy of the home,
whatever may be the purposes or desires of the husband after leav-
ing the state: McDannell v. Ragsdale, 71 Tex, 23; 10 Am. St. Rep.
729. A vpife permanently separated from her husband by agree-
ment, after his neglect to support her, may acquire a homestead
as a householder and head of a family: Kenley v. Hudelson, 99
111. 493; 39 Am. Rep. 31. And where a married woman has been
abandoned by her husband, but is living with and supporting her
child, she is the head of a family: Nash v. Norment, 5 Mo. App.
545. The fact that a husband has absconded and left the state,
leaving his family to care for themselves, is an abandonment of
them, entitling the wife to declare a homestead, no matter wh.Tt
the motive of such abandonment was, whether fear of criminal
prosecution or dissatisfaction with his family: People v. Stitt, 7
111. App, 294. In Alabama, it is held that a married woman, hav-
ing no children, whose husband resides out of the state, is not
entitled to claim the benefit of a homestead exemption: KeifiCer v.
Barne.v. 31 Ala. 192.
A divorce obtained by a wife does not deprive her of her home-
stead rights acquired during coverture In her husband's land, when
she comiuues to reside upon it with her minor children, and is the
head of the family. This is especially true where the husband has
first abandoned the wife before she secures the divorce, and he
has not acquired a homestead elsewhere: Blandy v. Asher, 72 Mo.
27; Bonnell v. Smith, 53 111. 375.
The gxiardian of a minor child is entitled to a homestead as the
head of a family: Roundtree v. Dennard, 59 Ga. 629; 27 Am. Rep.
401. And an adopted child occupies the same place in the family
under homestead exemption laws as a child of the blood. Hence
a landowner who, together with his adopted daughter and her
husband, resides on the land forming one household, is the head of a
family: Wagener v. Parrott, 51 S. C. 489; 64 Am. St. Rep. 095. It
has been held, however, that the adoption of another's child by an
unmarried man, and the maintenance of servants and a house-
hold, does not constitute such man the head of a family entitled
to a homestead: In re Lambson, 2 Hughes. 233.
A trnant, by renting and occupying the premises of the owner,
cannot deprive the latter of such control over the property as to
forfeit his right of homestead, where the owner boards and lodges
In the house. The tenant cannot thus be made the head of the
family: Brown v. Brown, 68 Mo. 388.
A partnership cannot be the head of a family, and the members
of a firm cannot claim a homestead exemption In the partnership
April, 1899.] Supreme Lodge K. of P. v. Kutscheb. 115
property, one of the reasons therefor being that a partnership can-
not be the head of a family as required by statute: State v. Spen-
cer, 64 Mo. 355, 356; 27 Am. Rep. 244; and the general rule is,
that the members of a partnership cannot jointly or severally claim
an exemption in partnership property: Kingsley v. Kingsley. 39
Cal. 665; Guptil v. McFee, 9 Kan. 30; In re Handlin, 3 Dill. 290;
Pond V. Kimball, 101 Mass. 105; In re Hafer, 1 Bank. Reg. 547; Fed.
Cas. No. 5,896; In re Price, Fed. Cas. No. 11,410, 6 Bank. Reg. 400;
In re Blodgett, 10 Bank Reg. 145, Fed. Cas. No. 1,555; Terry v.
Berry, 13 Nev. 515; Wright v, Pratt, 31 Wis. 99; Gaylord v. Imhoff,
26 Ohio St 317; 20 Am. Rep. 762; Drake v. Moore, 66 Iowa, 58;
Hoyt V. Hoyt, 69 Iowa, 174.
Children of a deceased owner cannot claim, each for himself, as
the head of a family, a separate homestead out of the lands of the
deceased debtor against his debt, but collectively they are entitled
to one homestead, whether they are minors or adults: National
Bank y. Senn, 25 S. C. 572.
Supreme Lodge Knights of Pythias v. Kutscher.
[179 ILIINOIS, 840.]
ASSOCIATIONS— BENEFIT SOCIETIES — DELEGATION
OF POWER.— The supreme lodge of a benefit society cannot dele-
gate to a subordinate lodge the power to enact a by-law forfeiting
the certificate of membership and all claims thereunder of any
member whose death results from self-destruction, voluntary or
involuntary, whether sane or insane.
ASSOCIATIONS- BENEFIT SOCIETIES— CONSTRUC-
TION OF CERTIFICATE.— A certificate of membership in a benefit
society which binds the member to comply with all the laws gov-
erning the endowment rank which are in force when he becomes a
member, or which may thereafter be enacted by the supreme lodge
or the board of control, binds him to comply with such laws only as
such board or the supreme lodge may lawfully enact and adopt.
ASSOCIATION— BENEFIT! SOCIETY— ADOPTION OF BY-
LAW.—The adoption by the supreme lodge of a benefit society of an
unauthorized by-law passed by a subordinate lodge renders such
by-law effective, and binds members of such subordinate lodge who
have agreed to comply with the by-laws now "in force or that may
be hereafter enacted by the supreme lodge."
ASSOCIATIONS— BENEFIT SOCIETIES.— THE CONSTI-
TUTION OF A BENEFIT SOCIETY, if no part of Its charter, has
■only the eft'ect of a by-law, and cannot take from the rightfully
coustltuted authorities of the society their inherent power to adopt,
from time to time, such other by-laws as its charter permits or
necessity requires.
ASSOCIATIONS— BENEFIT SOCIETIES— EFFECT OF BY-
LAW.—A by-law of a benefit society forfeiting claims of a member
for suicide is binding on one who joins the society before its p.is-
sage, and whose contract requires compliance with the by-laws in
force or "hereinafter enacted."
H. H. Field and Greene & Humphrey, for the appellajit.
116 Supreme Lodge K. of P. v. KutscBeb. [Illinois,
Connolly, Mather & Snigg, for the appellee.
8*1 PER CUEIAM. The appellate court has affirmed a
judgment of the Sangamon circuit court in favor of appellee^
against appellant, on a certificate of membership issued by ap-
pellant to William C. Henry, payable to Louisa M. Henry, hia
wife. While in a drunken frenzy, Henry killed his wife and
the^i himself, and the suit was brought by the administrator of
her estate.
The applications of Henry for the certificate contained this
clause: "I hereby agree that I will punctually pay all dues and
assessments for which I may become liable, and that I will be
governed and this contract shall be controlled by all the laws,
rules, and regulations of the ^*^ order governing this rank now
in force or that may hereafter be enacted by the Supreme Lodge
Knights of Pythias of the World, or submit to the penalties
therein contained, to all of which I willingly and freely sub-
scribe." They were made, respectively, June 4, 1889, and April
26, 1892. The certificate was issued to him July 19, 1892, and
it certified thai Henry received the obligation of the endowment
rank of the order and was a member in good standing in said
rank, and contained the following provisions: "And in consid-
eration of the representations and declarations made in his ap-
plications, .... which applications are made a part of this
contract, and the payment of the prescribed admission fee, and
in consideration of the payment hereafter to said endowment
rank of all assessments as required, and the full compliance with
all the laws governing this rank now in force or that may here-
after be enacted by the Supreme Lodge Knights of Pythias of
the World, or the board of control of the endowment rank, and
shall be in good standing undter said laws, the sum of three
thousand dollars will be paid by the board of control of the
endowment rank Knights of Pythias of the World to Louisa M.
Henry, his wife, as directed by said brother in his application,
or to such other person And it is understood and agreed
that any violation of the within-mentioned conditions or the
requirements of the laws in force governing this rank shall ren-
der this certificate and all claims null and void, and that the
said endowment rank shall not be liable for the above sum or
any part thereof."
The by-laws of the order, called its "constitution," empowered
the board of control to establish sections of the endowment rank,,
and to enact, alter, and amend, from time to time, all laws and
regulations necessary to govern the same. Acting under thia^
A.pril, 1899.] Supreme Lodge K. of P. v. Kutschbb. 117
authority, the board of control on January 13, 1893, passed the
following alleged law for the government of the members of the
endowment rank: "If the death of any member of the endow-
ment ^*^ rank heretofore admitted into the first, second, third,
or fourth classes, or hereafter admitted, shall result from self-
destruction, either voluntary or involuntary, whether such mem-
ber shall be sane or insane at the time, or if such death shall be
caused or superinduced by the use of intoxicating liquors, nar-
cotics, or opiates, or in consequence of a duel, or at the hands
of justice, or in violation or attempted violation of any criminal
law, then in such case the certificate issued to such member
and all claims against said endowment rank on account of such
membership shall be forfeited." The board of control reported
its action in passing this law, with a copy thereof, to the su-
preme lodge at its regular session held in August and Septem-
ber, in 1894, where said report was by the action of that body
referred to one of its committees, which committee reported to
the supreme lodge in session approving the action of the board
of control in adopting said law and recommending the adoption
of the report. After the report had been printed it was adopted
by the supreme lodge September 7, 1894. This by-law was
published as one of the laws of the order.
These facts appear from the evidence adduced by the defend-
ant under the issues. The trial court excluded the evidence of
the defendant and instructed the jury to find for the plaintiff
and to assess the damages at the amount specified in the cer-
tificate.
"We regard the question as settled that the supreme lodge
could not delegate to a subordinate body the power to enact
laws of this character, and that said board of control had no
power to enact said law: Suprem? Lodge v. McLennan, 171 111.
417; Supreme Lodge v. La Malta, 95 Tenn. 157. There are,
then, but two questions to be considered: 1. Was said alleged
law binding upon Henry and his beneficiaries by virtue of his
contract to comply with all the laws governing the endowment
rank which were in force when he became a member or which
might thereafter be enacted by the supreme lodge or the board
^** of control; and 2. If he was not bound by a law of the
board of control which it had no power to enact, was the action
of the supreme lodge adopting the report of its committee ap-
proving the action of the board of control and recommending
the adoption of its report a sufficient adoption itself of said law,
80 as to make it a law, legally enacted, of said order ?
118 Supreme Lodge K. of P. v. Kutscher. [Illinois,
After a further consideration of the case upon rehearing, we
have reached the conclusion that, as a law of this character could
be enacted only by the supreme lodge, it would be a strained
construction of the contract to hold that the parties to it, by th&
terms employed, intended that the members of the order should.
be bound by it though enacted by a subordinate body having
no lawful authority to do so. The board of control had power,
by the laws of the order, to pass certain laws and regulations
for the government of members of the endowment rank to which
Henry belonged, but not of the character of the law in question,
and the terms of the contract should not be construed to extend
farther than to such laws and regulations, and to embrace others
of a general character which the board of control could not law-
fully enact. It is no answer to say that appellee is bound by
Henry's contract with appellant, and that Henry had the right
and power to stipulate that the certificate should be forfeited
in case he violated any law which the board of control might
thereafter enact, whether it had power to enact it or not. The
question here is, not the power of Henry to make such a con-
tract, but what is the meaning of the contract which he did
make. It will be noticed that there is a difference between the
terms of the applications and those of the certificate in the re-
spect mentioned. The certificate makes the applications a part
of the contract, but also binds Henry to a "full compliance with
all laws governing this rank now in force or that may hereafter
be enacted by the Supreme Lodge Knights of Pythias of the
"World, or the board of control of ^^^ the endowment rank.'*^
This is the language of appellant in its certificate, and should
be construed more strictly against it than against the insured.
To confine it to laws which the board of control had power and
could lawfully enact will give it all the force it is reasonably
entitled to. To extend it further would be to construe it more
strictly against the insured and his beneficiary. The by-law is
a reasonable and wholesome one, and if properly enacted should
be enforced.
It is contended that the action of the supreme lodge in adopt-
ing said report did not, under the constitution of said supreme
lodge, have the effect of adopting or passing said by-law by the
supreme lodge itself. This contention is based on provisions of
Buch constitution, the most pertinent of which are as follows:
"Sec. 15. No proposition shall become a statute until it shall
have passed three successive readings, the second and third of
which shall not be had on the same calendar day.
April, 1S99.] Supreme Lodge K. of P. v. Kutscheb. 119
"Sec. 16. The afSnnative vote, by yeas and nays, of a majority
of all the members of the supreme lodge shall be required for
the final passage of a proposition.
"Sec. 18. The enacting clause of every proposition shall be
as follows: Be it enacted by the supreme lodge Knights of
Pythias,' and shall precede or be a part of the first section of
such proposition."
By-laws of the general character of the one in question were
by the constitution designated "statutes," and when merely pro-
posed for enactment, "propositions." It is apparent that the
supreme lodge did not observe these provisions of its constitu-
tion in adopting this by-law, if it did adopt it, but the appel-
lant contends that the by-law was lawfully adopted, although
not in the manner provided in the constitution. In this view
we concur. The constitution was no part of the charter of the
corporation, and was but a by-law under another name, and
could not take from the lawfully constituted authorities ^'^ of
the corporation the power inherent in it as a corporate body to
adopt, from time to time, such other by-laws as its charter per-
mitted and its necessities required. The same body that enacted
the by-laws called the "constitution" had the power to alter,
amend or repeal them, and to do so in any lawful manner. The
majority of the corporate authorities cannot at one meeting pass
a by-law taking away from their successors, acting within the
charter and by a majority, the power to repeal or amend the
by-laws of the corporation or to enact new ones. They may
make rules and by-laws regulating their own proceedings and for
their convenience, but a by-law otherwise lawfully adopted, of a
general character like the one in question, is not rendered in-
valid because in adopting it the corporate authorities violated
certain rules of procedure which they had previously prescribed.
This precise question, involving the same by-law in controversy
here, was fully considered by the supreme court of Mississippi
in Domes v. Supreme Lodge etc., 75 Miss. 466, and the same
conclusion reached. See, also, Supreme Lodge v. Knight, 117
Ind. 495; Commonwealth v. Mayor, 5 Watts, 152; Angell and
Ames on Corporations 459 ; Christ Church v. Pope, 8 Gray, 140 ;
Sayre v. Louisville etc. Assn., 85 Am. Dec. 618, note; 5 Am. &
Am. Ency. of Law, 2d ed., 88; 1 Thompson on Corporations,
sec. 943.
William C. Henry, the insured, committed suicide on October
3, 1895 — ^more than a year after this by-law was adopted by the
Bupreme lodge. By force of his contract he and his beneficiaries
120 Supreme Lodge K. of P. v. Trebbe. [Illinois,
were bound by it, although it was adopted after lie became a
member and received his certificate. The trial court erred in in-
structing the jury to return a verdict for the plaintiff.
The judgments of the circuit and appellate courts are both
reversed, and the cause will be remanded to the circuit court
for further proceedings not inconsistent with the views herein
expressed.
ASSOCIATIONS— BENEFIT SOCIETIES-DELEGATION OP
POWEItS.— The supreme lodge of a beneficial association, sucli as
the Knights of Pythias, cannot delegate to a subordinate managing
committee the legislative power vested by the charter in the su-
preme lodge alone. Hence, a by-law or regulation adopted by such
committee undertaking to forfeit a member's rights in the event of
his suicide is inoperative: Supreme Lodge K. of P. v. Stein, 75 Miss.
107; 65 Am. St. Itep. 589. See monographic note to Lalje v. Minne-
sota etc. Assn., 52 Am. St. Rep. 556; on the entire question.
ASSOCIATIONS— BENEFIT SOCIETIES— ADOPTION OF BY-
LAWS.—Under a contract of insurance, issued by a mutual com-
pany, conditioned to be subject to any laws thereafter to be en-
acted, the insured is bound by a subsequent by-law forfeiting the
policy on account of suicide: Daughtry v. Knights of Pythias, 48
La. Ann. 1203; 55 Am. St. Rep. 310, and note.
ASSOCIATIONS-BENEFIT SOCIETIES.-THE CONSTITU-
TION AND BY-LAWS of a voluntary association stand on the same
footing. No provision in either is binding, unless it be in accord-
ance with the law of the land and with public policy: See note to
Austin v. Searing, 69 Am. Dee. 672. But see the note to Lake v.
Minnesota etc. Assn.. 52 Am. St. Rep. 556.
Supreme Lodge Knights of Pythias v. Trebbe.
[179 Illinois, 348.]
ASSOCIATIONS— BY-LAWS— REPEAL.— The valid passage
of a by-law by the supreme lodge of a benefit society in any mode
not prohibited by its charter or general law is necessarily a repeal
of any other mode previously prescribed by the same supreme lodge.
ASSOCIATIONS-BY-LAWS.— THE CONSTITUTION OF A
VOLUNTARY ASSOCIATION is nothing more than a b.v-law
which may be altered, abrogated, or repealed by the power enact-
ing it. unless some higher rule restrains or prohibits a change or
repeal.
ASSOCIATIONS— BENEFIT SOCIETIES — ENACTMENT
OF BY-LAWS.— The adoption by the supreme lodge of a benefit so-
ciety, by a viva voce vote, of a by-law passed by a subordinate
lodge or board of control without authority, is a valid enactment of
such law, although the constitution of such supreme lodge pro-
vides another method of enacting by-laws. The by-law thus en-
acted binds members whose contracts require compliance with all
by-laws "now In force or hereafter enacted by such supreme lodge."
W. M. Hough, for the appellant.
April, 1899.] Supreme Lodge K. of P. v. Trebbe. 121
M. Millard and F. C. Smith, for the appellee.
348 PHILLIPS, J. The appellee recovered a judgment for
three thousand dollars against the appellant in the city court
of East St. Louis, which, on appeal to the appellate court for
the fourth district, was affirmed, and an appeal is prosecuted
to this court.
The order of Knights of Pythias was incorporated in 1870 un-
der the laws of the District of Columbia, as "The Supreme
Lodge of the Knights of Pythias of the World." By an amend-
ment to its certificate of incorporation in October, 1875, it was
provided the supreme lodge should be and remain a body cor-
porate for the term of twenty years. A further amendment,
dated in March, 1883, authorized the establishment of the en-
dowment rank, to be governed by such laws as to the said su-
preme lodge may seem proper. Subsiequently, in June, 1894, by
a special ^® act of Congress the Supreme Lodge Knights of
Pythias was incorporated as a fraternal and benevolent associa-
tion. The endowment rank was the insurance branch of the
order, and it was provided that it should be governed by such
laws as the supreme lodge may enact or authorize. The supreme
lodge created the board of control, which was given entire charge
of the endowment rank, and that board was authorized to estab-
lish a table of rates for insurance of its members, to make special
assessments when necessary, and to make, alter, and amend all
laws pertaining to the endowment rank, and to issue certificates
therein.
At the eighteenth convention of the Supreme Lodge Knights
of Pythias, held at Washington, D. C, August 28 to September
8, 1894, the board of control made a report of having adopted
for the government of the endowment rank a law with reference
to the suicide of one holding a certificate of insurance in the
order. The law passed by the board was substantially as follows:
"If the death of any member of the endowment rank hereto-
fore admitted into the first, second, third, or fourth classes, or
hereafter admitted, shall result from self-destruction, either vol-
untary or involuntary, whether such member shall be sane or
insane at the time, or if such death shall be superinduced by the
use of intoxicating liquors, narcotics, or opiates, or in conse-
quence of a duel, or at the hands of justice, or in violation or
attempted violation of any criminal law, then, in such case, the
certificate issued to such member, and all claims against said
endowment rank on account of such membership, shall be for-
122 Supreme Lodge K. of P. v. Trebbe. [Illinois,
feited." The report was referred to a committee of the endow-
ment rank, who reported they had "given the same careful con-
sideration in every respect, and fully concur and approve of the
legislation, in all details, enacted by said board for the govern-
ment of the endowment rank." That report was subsequently
adopted by the supreme lodge on a viva voce vote.
350 rpjjg |)oard of control was in existence prior to the first
day of January, 1889. On the nineteenth day of August, 1889,
G. H. Trebbe filed an application to become a member of the
endowment rank, and his application contained the following
provision :
''I hereby agree that I will punctually pay all dues and assess-
ments for which I may become liable, and that I will be gov-
erned and this contract shall be controlled by all the laws, rules,
and regulations for the order governing this rank now in force
or that may hereafter be enacted by the Supreme Lodge Knights
of Pythias of the World, or submit to the penalties therein con-
tained. To all of which I willingly and freely subscribe.
"Dated at East St. Louis this the nineteenth day of August,
1889.
«G. H. TREBBE.'*
The president of the board of control, on that application, is-
sued a certificate, which contained the following provisions:
"This certifies that brother G. H, Trebbe received the obli-
gation of the endowment rank of the Order of Knights of Pyth-
ias in section No. 324 on September 6, 18S9, and is a member
in good standing in said rank, and in consideration of the repre-
sentations and declarations made in his application, bearing date
of August 19, 1889 (which application is made a part of this
contract), and the payment of the prescribed admission foe, and
in consideration of the payment hereafter to said endowment
rank of all assessments as required, and the full compliance with
all laws governing this rank now in force or that may hereafter
be enacted, and shall be in good standing under said laws, the
sum of $3,000 will be paid by the Supreme Lodge of Knights
of Pythias of the World to Matilda Trebbe, his wife, as directed
by said brother in his application, or to such other person or
persons as he may subsequently direct by change oi beneficiary
entered upon the records of the supreme secretary of the endow-
ment rank, upon due notice of proof of death and good standing
in the rank at the time of death and surrender of this certificate;
provided, however, that the interest of any beneficiary, as desig-
April, 1899.] Supreme Lodge K. of P. v. Tbebbe. 125
nated by said brother, or in the interest of his or her heirs, shall
ceaee and determine in case of the death of said beneficiary dur-
ing the lifetime of such member, and in that case the benefit
accruing under this certificate shall be paid as provided for in
article 12, section 1, of the endowment '"^^ rank cons'titution;.
provided further, that if, at the time of the death of said brother,,
the proceeds of one assessment on all members of the endow-
ment rank shall not be sufficient to pay in full the maximum
amount of endowment held under this certificate, then there-
shall be paid an amount, less ten per cent for expenses, equal
to the proceeds of one full assessment on all remaining mem-
bers of the endowment rank, and the payment of such sum to
the beneficiary or beneficiaries mentioned shall be in full of all
claims and demands under and by virtue of this certificate.
And it is understood and agreed that any violation of the within-
mentioned conditions, or the requirements of the law in forc&
governing this rank, shall render this certificate and all claims
null and void, and that the said supreme lodge shall not be liable
for the above sum or any part thereof.
"In witness whereof we have hereunto subscribed our namea
and affixed the seal of the Supreme Lodge Knights of Pythia*
of the World. Issued this 17th day of September, 1889, pp.
xxvi, at Chicago, Illinois, and registered in book 2, folio 168.
[Seal] "J. A. HINSEY,
Pres. Board of Control.
"Attest:
"W. B. Kennedy,
"Supreme Sec. Endowment Rank."
And the certificate was accepted by the applicant, as follows t
'T. hereby accept this certificate of membership subject to all
the conditions therein contained.
«G. H. TREBBB.
"Attest:
"Frank Martin,
"Sec. Section No. . . ., E. R."
The endowment rank was the insurance branch of the order,
and the board of control was created by the supreme lodge and
given entire charge of the endowment rank. It was authorised
to make rates for insurance, make special assessments, and
make, alter, and amend all laws pertaining to the endowment
rank and to issue certificates therein. G. H. Trebbe had knowl-
edge of that board and its powers when he applied for insurancft
124 ScPBEME Lodge K. of P. v. Trebbe. [Illinois,
and took a certificate from its president. The application by
him contained this provision: "This contract shall be controlled
by all the laws, rules, and regulations for the order governing,
this rank now in force or that may hereafter be enacted
by the Supreme Lodge Knights of ^^^ Pythias of the World,'*
et cetera. By the terms of the certificate of insurance it was
provided that if compliance should be had with all laws "gov-
erning this rank now in force or that may hereafter be enacted,'*
-et cetera, payment was to be made, et cetera. Under the by-laws
the J)oard of control had the right to make, alter, and amend
the law governing the endowment rank, and it being necessarily
assumed that Trebbe had knowledge of the powers of that board,
he took his certificate with notice of its powers.
Long after the issue of this certificate, and whilst the enact-
ment of the board of control was in force, G. H. Trebbe did, on
the seventh day of September, 1896, commit suicide. The bene-
ficiary in the policy brought suit on the certificate, and, on trial
before a jury, the court refused instructions, asked by the de-
fendant, that if they believed from the evidence that the death
of G. H. Trebbe resulted from self-destruction, whether sane
or insane at the time, they must find for the defendant, and
gave an instruction for the plaintiff that the jury must find the
issue for the plaintiff and assess her damage at three thousand
dollars. To the refusal to instruct as asked by the defendant,
«nd giving the instruction asked by the plaintiff, the defendant
excepted.
It is apparent that in the organization of this association a
provision was made for the organization of a constitution regu-
latingN and governing the order itself. By the organization of
the endowment rank it embodied and embraced the insurance
part of this order. The board of control was given control of
the endowment rank with reference to insurance and with ref-
€rnce to rates of insurance, and had the right to amend, change,
or make additional laws for the government of the same. When
the board of control enacted a statute under the terms and pro-
visions of the powers conferred upon it by the supreme lodge,
■and the supreme lodge at a meeting had presented to it a re-
port of the committee of the endowment rank, stating that it,
the board of control, liad ^^"* enacted a statute for the govern-
ment of the endowment rank, and the supreme lodge adopted
and approved, by a viva voce vote, the report of the committee
of the endowment rank which showed the adoption of the re»
April, 1899.] Supreme Lodge K. of P. t;. Trebbb. 125
port of that committee, it was the enactment by the supreme
lodge of a statute for the government of that body.
In Domes v. Supreme Lodge Knights of Pythias, 75 Miss.
466, it was held: "The valid passage of a law by the supreme
lodge in anymode not prohibited byits charter or the general law
of the land is necessarily a repeal of any other mode previously
prescribed by the same supreme lodge — the same source of power.
The authorities make this perfectly clear. In Supreme Lodge
V. Knight, 117 Ind. 495, it is said: 'Charters are not created
by the act of the corporation or association, but are granted by
the sovereign power of the state. A constitution of a voluntary
association or a corporation is nothing more than a by-law under
an inappropriate name. The power that can enact a by-law,
whether called a constitution or not, can alter or abrogate it,
unless some higher rule restrains or prohibits a change or re-
peal. "When the authorities speak of a charter they mean an
essentially different thing from a law or constitution of the as-
sociation's own creation. "What counsel call a charter is nothing
more than a code of laws established, not by the sovereign power
of the- government, but by the creature of that power — ^the cor-
poration or association. The most that can be justly said is,
that the later by-laws are in conflict with the earlier. There is,
therefore, no clashing between corporate utterances and charter
provisions.' And this was said by Elliott, C. J., speaking of
provisions of the supreme constitution of the order itself. In
Kichardson v. Union Congregational Soc, 58 N. H. 188, the
court say: 'Complaint is made that the amendment of by-law
13, requiring a two-thirds vote for the admission of new mem-
bers, was not properly and legally enacted because its passage
was not obtained by a vote of two-thirds of those present, ***
according to by-law 12, requiring a vote of two-thirds of the
members present to alter or amend the by-laws of the society.
.... By-law 12 was not part of the charter or constitution
of the society and not a law for the guidance of its officers and
agents. It was an enactment made by one meeting of the so-
ciety to govern the proceedings of future meetings, and was in-
operative beyond the pleasure of the society acting by a majority
vote at any regular meeting. The power of the society, derived
from its charter and the laws under which it was organized, to
enact by-laws is continuous, residing in all regular meetings of
the society so long as it exists. Any meeting could, by a ma-
jority vote, modify or repeal the law of a previous meeting, and
126 Supreme Lodge K. of P. v. Trebbe. [Illinois,
no meeting conld bind a subsequent one by irrepealable acts 05
rules of procedure. The power to enact is a power to repeal, and
a by-law requiring a two-thirds vote of members present to alter
or amend the laws of the society may itself be altered, amended,
or repealed by the same power which enacted it: Angell and
Ames on Corporations, 450; Commonwealth v. Mayor etc., 5
Watts, 152, 155; Christ Church v. Pope, 8 Gray, 140, 142. The
society, by a majority vote, might amend or repeal by-law 12.
By a like vote they might adopt any mode for the admission of
members.' This is directly in point. Mr. Thompson in Com«
mentaries on the Law of Corporations, volume 1, sec. 943, lays
down the same rule, saying: 'If the charter is silent as to the
formalities to be observed, a by-law may be adopted by acts as
well as by words.' "
It was held in State v. Grand Lodge A. 0. TJ. W., 70 Mo. App.
456: "The ruling in the Davenport case, and its approval and
adoption by the grand lodge and the subsequent recognition
of the rule by the grand lodge, can be taken in no other light
or be reconciled upon any other hypothesis than the adoption
of the ruling as a rule of the order. This conduct and these acts
of the grand lodge are irrefragable proof of the adoption ^^'^
of the law, which it might do as well, by acts and conduct as by a
formal and express adoption of the by-law: (Angell and Ames
on Corporations, sec. 328; Lockwood v. Mechanics' Bank, 9 E. I.
308; 11 Am. Rep. 253.) This law having been adopted, the sec-
ond question is. Was the defendant, he having become a mem-
ber of the order and received his beneficiary certificate prior
to its adoption, amenable to it? The right to amend its by-
laws is necessarily inherent in a corporation of this kind, and its
members might reasonably expect that they would be amended :
Ellerbe v. Faust, 119 Mo. 653; Schrick v. St. Louis etc. Build-
ing Co., 34 Mo. 423; Allen v. Life Assn. of America, 8 Mo. App.
S2."
In Supreme Lodge etc. v. McLennan, 171 111. 417, the ques-
tion was presented on demurrer to a plea, and it was held that
the provisions of the application for certificate by which it was
provided that the applicant would be bound by all laws then in
force or which might be thereafter enacted by the supreme lodge
would be binding, could not be pleaded, as the agreement
averred that the *T3oard of control of the endowment rank of
the supreme lodge adopted the by-law so relied upon."
The board of control having enacted a law for thcgovernment
of the endowment rank, which was reported to the supreme
April, 1899.] Supreme Lodge K. of P. v. Trebbe. 127
lodge by a committee of the endowment rank, and the supreme
lodge having adopted the report and approved the law, it must
be held that the statute thus. reported by the board of control
was enacted by the supreme lodge. To hold otherwise would be
to hold that one legislative body might limit the power of an-
other legislative body with equal powers, and prevent the enact-
ment of laws by a body of equal authority.
We hold that the exercise of the power conferred on the board
of control for the governnient of the endowment rank, author-
izing them to enact, amend, and annul laws, when acted on by
that board and reported to the supreme lodge and approved by
it, was the enactment of the particular provision involved, in this
case with reference to ^'® a bar of a right of action where death
resulted from self-destruction, either voluntary or involuntary,
whether such member shall be sane or insane at the time, or if
such death shall be superinduced by the use of intoxicating liq-
uors, narcotics, or opiates, or at the hands of justice.
Under the replications to the pleas and under the evidence
appearing in this record no question is presented for the consid-
eration of this court as to whether the character of insanity
was such that the deceased, at the time of committing suicide,
was unconscious of the act, or whether the degree of insanity
would in any manner cause this by-law to be of no effect in
barring the right of recovery. As tried, the case presented to
this court is simply the case of the certificate and the by-law
and an act of self-destruction.
It was error in the trial court to refuse the instructions asked
by the defendant, and it was also error to give the instruction
asked by the plaintiff.
The appellate court erred in affirming the judgment of the
city court of East St. Louis, The judgment of the city court
of East St. Louis and the judgment of the appellate court for
the fourth district are each reversed and the cause is remanded
for further proceedings.
ASSOCIATIONS, BENEFIT— BY-LAWS.— THE CONSTTTr-
TION of a benefit society, If no part of Its charter, has only the «'f-
fect of a by-law, and cannot take from the rightfully constituted au-
thorities of the society their inherent power to adopt, from time to
time, such other by-laws as its charter permits or necosslty require^:
Supreme Lodge K. of P. v. Kutscher, 179 111. 340; ante, p. 115, and
uote thereto collecting former cases. See especially the niouo-
graphic note to Lake v. Minnesota etc. Assn., 52 Am. St. Rep. 556.
128 Basteup v. Pbendeeqast. [Illinoiik,
Bastrup V. Prendergast.
[179 Illinois, 663.]
MECHANICS' LIENS— ESTOPPEL AGAINST WIFE.— If a
wife, with knowledge that her husband has made false representa-
tions as to the ownership of property and has contracted In his
own name for the erection of buildings thereon, assists in procur-
ing the worli to be done under the contracts, without disclosing to
the contractor her title to the property, which is of record, she is
estopped to assert her title for the purpose of defeating a mechan-
ic's lien arising out of such contract.
MECHANICS' LIENS-WANT OF DESCRIPTION OF
PROPERTY IN CONTRACT.— The mere omission of a description
or designation of the property in a building contract cannot defeat
a mechanic's lien otherwise established when the notice, or claim of
lien, filed for record properly describes the property, and all of the
interested parties understood what property was referred to In the
contract, and the material was furnished and the building erected
upon that understanding.
MECHANICS' LIENS— FLATS AS ONE BUILDING.— Flats
built on adjacent lots belonging to the same owner are one build-
ing, for the purpose of a mechanic's lien, although the division wall
rises above the roof, and there are separate entrances, if they are
erected as one structure, under one contract, at the same time,
heated with one furnace, and a porch extends across the entire rear
of the structure with one continuous and unbroken roof.
K. Prendergast and Bastrup & O'Neill, for 'the appellants.
Masterson & Haft, F. A. and H. F. Pennington, G. Langhenry,
and J. F. Dillon, for appellees.
'^'^ CAETER, C. J. With proceedings to enforce mechanics*
liens instituted by the appellees and others in the circuit court
of Cook county, a bill afterward filed by the appellants in the
superior court was consolidated, and the two causes proceeded
to final decree in the circuit court as one case. In the final de-
cree, it was found that as to the claims of the appellees in con-
troversy here appellees were not entitled to any lien, but that
appellants had a lien on the property to the extent of their
mortgage debt. The appellees took their appeal to the api)el-
late court, where the decree was reversed and the cause re-
manded, with directions to enter a decree in accordance with the
prayer of the pleadings of the claimants of mechanics' liens for
the amount found due them and of the dates found by the cir-
cuit court, thus establishing their liens which had been denied
by the circuit court and fixing the amounts due as found by
that court. The effect of this judgment '***" is to give appellees
precedence over the mortgage lien of the appellants.
If appellees were entitled to a lien at all, they were entitled
June, 1899.] Bastrup v. Prendebgast. 129
to a preference over appellants, inasmuch as the mortgage was
given after the mechanics' liens attached. Appellants, there-
fore, have the right to insist, on this their appeal, that appellees
have no lien. These mortgagees are the only appellants here,
the owners of the property having acquiesced in the judgment
of reversal.
Catherine MeNally was the owner of the property, which con-
sisted of two lots in Chicago, together having a frontage of
forty-eight feet and seven and three-fourths inches on Fifty-fifth
street and extending back on Wright street one hundred and
forty feet, and the public records showed title in fee in her.
She and her husband, John McNally, resided in a frame house
on these lots as their home. In the latter part of the year 1893
appellee Norton prepared plans, at the request of John McNall)',
for a building covering both lots, to be used as stores below
and flats above. These plans were shown and explained to Cath-
erine McNally by Norton, the architect, at the request of John
lilcNally. She decided that the building would be too expensive,
and the plans were afterward, in January. 1894, changed to meet
her views, so as to provide for a smaller building covering the
front part of the lots and extending back only fifty-five feet and
six inches. For the construction of this building John McNally
entered into contracts under seal in his own name with various
contractors and mechanics, including the appellees, except Nor-
ton, in which contracts McNally described himself as owner, but
the property was not therein in any way described or located.
Before the construction of the building was entered upon, and
on February 13, 1894, Catherine McNally made a written ap«
plication to Loeb & Gatzert for a loan of thirteen thousand dol-
lars, to be secured by a deed of trust on the premises, the money
to be used in the erection of the building, and stating that tho
money might be paid out by Loeb & Gatzert, at their option,
for '^'^^ labor, materials, et cetera, and if the amount should
prove insufficient for the erection of the building she would sup-
ply the deficiency from her own funds. In this application she
described in detail the character of the building to be erected,
stating also that it was to be used as a residence for hers^elf and
her husband. The holders of the obligations for this loan were
not parties to the suit, and it does not appear what amount of
money was advanced upon it, except that they advanced one
thousand dollars to Burkhardt & Sons and about four hundred
dollars to Norton, and this loan, or the application for it, is
Am. 8r. Rkp., Vou LXX.— 9
130 Bastrup v. Pbendergast. [Illinois,
important here only as tending to connect Catherine Morally
with the construction of the building, and as hearing upon the
allegation that she is estopped by her conduct from claiming
that her said property is not subject to the liens sought to be
established and enforced. The frame dwelling occupied by
Catherine and John McNally was mored to the rear of the lots
and faced on Wright street, and was occupied by them during
the construction of the building in front. Without rehearsing
the evidence, it shows that she observed the progress of the
work, frequently inspecting it; that important changes were made
and contracts entered into in accordance with her directions,
and there can be no doubt, when all the evidence is considered,
that she fully understood and authorized all that was being
done by the appellees in doing the work and furnishing the
materials for w^hich the liens are claimed. John McNally was
insolvent, and she knew it, and knew the building could be paid
for in no other way than by moneys secured by liens upon the
property But while the evidence shows that appellees did not
in fact know that she, and not her husband, was the owner of
the lots, it does show that she was such owner and that it so
appeared from the records of deeds in the recorder's office of
Cook county, and that appellees made no examination of such
records until after the work was done. Inasmuch as the con-
tracts were with John McNally only, and under his seal, the
only question, ^^"^ as we view 'the case, is whether or not
Catherine McNally is estopped from claiming title in herself,
as against appellees' right to liens on the property.
The contracts disclosed no question of agency, and Catherine
McNally was not in any way mentioned in them. She could
not sue or be sued on them as an undisclosed principal, and
as the law in force when these liens are claimed to have attached
required that the contract, whether expressed or implied, should
be made with the owner of the property, her property was not
liable, under the contracts, on proof merely that she was princi-
pal and that her husband acted as her agent: Walsh v. Murphy,
167 111. 228, and cases there cited. The proof given was in-
admissible to show that in making the sealed contracts with
appellees John McNally acted as the agent of his wife, the
owner of the property, for the purpose of holding her liable as
principal, but in so far as it tended to prove that she aided and
abetted John McNally in holding himself out to appellees as
the owner of the property and induced them to act upon that
June, 1899.] Bastrup v. Prenderqast. 181
representation, thus operating to estop her from claiming title
as against appellees, it was admi&sible. But the mere fact that
she stood by and permitted her husband to construct the build-
ing on her property, and to enter into contracts for the pur-
pose in his own name without objection on her part and without
informing appellees that she was the owner of the lots, would
not, of itself, if she did not know that he represented himself
as owner, show any fraudulent conduct on her part from which
a,n estoppel would arise: Campbell v. Jacobson, 145 111. 389.
Her title was of record, and if the appellees saw proper to im-
prove her property under contracts with her husband without
examining the records or without inquiring of her as to the title,
she would not be estopped from asserting her title as against
their claim for a lien for the improvements, unless her conduct
was such as to amount to a fraud, actual or constructive, upon
appellees in claiming ^^^ title in herself after the work was
done. Thus, in Campbell v. Jacobson, 145 111. 389 (a case
similar, in many respects, to this except as to allegations of
fraud,) where it was held that no lien attached to the wife's
land, it was said that there was nothing in the conduct of Mrs.
Jaoobson which called for the application of the doctrine of
estoppel, and that "if she had withheld her deed from record
until after the contract had been entered into, as was the case
in Schwartz v. Saunders. 46 111. 17, thus placing it in the power
of her husband to hold himself out to the world as the owner
of the property, or if she had fraudulently permitted her hus-
band to represent himself as such owner, as appeared to be the
case in Oglesby Coal Co. v. Pasco, 79 111. 164, the case would
doubtless have been different. But nothing of that kind ia
shown." In that case there was nothing in the pleadings or
the evidence under which the doctrine of estoppel could be ap-
plied, and in this respect that case is different from this. Here
it was a question of fact pertinent in the case whether or not
she had knowledge that John McNally held himself out to the
appellees as the owner of the property, and permitted him to
contract as own-er with appellees for the work and materials to
be used in constructing the building on her property. Both
husband and wife resided upon the premises, and we are of the
opinion that the evidence is sufficient to charge her with knowl-
edge that in making his contracts with the builders her husband
represented himself as owner of the property and that they re-
lied upon that repres^entation in doing their work and furnish-
182 Bastrup v. Prenderqast. [Illinois^
ing the materials. While an examination of the public records
would have disclosed that the title of record stood in her, still
it cannot be doubted that had she informed appellees that her
husband was the owner of the property they would have been
justified, as against her, in relying upon her statement with-
out examining the records, and she would have been estopped,
after the work was done, from asserting her own title as against
her claim for a lien. ^^^ It was a fraud upon a^ellees for John
McNally to obtain their work and materials in the construction
of the building upon his wife's land under representations that
he was the owner, and if sihe, with knowledge of such false
representations of ownership, assisted in procuring the work to
be done under the contracts without disclosing to appellees her
title to the property, she was as much a party to the fraud a&
if she had falsely stated to them that her husband was the owner
of the property.
Appellants say that appellees should have examined the rec-
ords or inquired of Catherine McNally as to the ownership of
the property. This would ordinarily be correct, but in this
case such action was rendered unnecessary by the false repre-
sentations of McNally, connived at by his wife. If husband
and wife are in possession of land, the title whereof is in the
wife, and a third person is about to purchase from the husband
upon his representation that he is the owner, and the wife,^
knowing this, stands by and encourages the sale and urges the
purchaser to buy, and the purchaser, relying upon such repre-
sentations, buys and takes title from the husband without know-
ing the title is in his wife, she would B* estopped from setting
up her own title against the purchaser, for otherwise she would
be perpetrating a fraud upon him, and this would be so even if
her title appeared of record. Thus it is said in 2 Herman on
Estoppel and Ees Judicata, section 964: "When a title has been
once duly recorded no responsibility will arise from a failure ta
take further or immediate steps to warn subsequent purchasers,
who may fairly be presumed to have taken the means pointed
out by law and acquired all the knowledge which it is import-
ant for them to have. But this is applicable only in the case-
where the foundation of the estoppel is in silence or acqui-
escence, for where the owner concurs in a sale by participating
in it at the time, it becomes his own act, and he certainly cannot
be allowed to make his own good faith a reason for throwing hia
*<*" lofifi upon third persons who are equally innocent." And
June, 1899.] Basteup v. Pbenderqast. 138
the ease is, of course, stronger where the owner is guilty of fraud,
actual or constructive. And in Fisher v. Mossman, 11 Ohio St.
42, it was said if a mortgagee of real estate whose mortgage was
of record stood by at a sheriff's sale of the property and kept
silent as to his lien he would not be estopped, but the case
would have been different if he had said or done anything to
deceive or mislead the purchaser. Also in Hill v. Blackwelder,
113 111. 283, this court said that the rule that the estoppel would
not arise where the title of the party sought to be estopped ap-
peared of record, applies "only in cases where the foundation
of the estoppel is in silence, and omission to give notice of one's
right, and not in a case where the landowner has actively en-
couraged and induced the injured party to act.'*
In Anderson v. Armstead, 69 111. 452, this court said: "The
law is familiar that where the owner of property holds out
another, or allows him to appear, as the owner of, or as having
full power of disposition over, the property, and innocent parties
are thus led into dealing with such apparent owner or person
having the apparent power of disposition, they will be protected.
Their rights in such cases do not depend upon the actual title or
authority of the party with whom they have directly dealt, but
they are derived from the act of the real owner, which precludes
him from disputing, as against them, the existence of the title'
or power he caused or allowed to appear to be vested in the party
upon the faith of whose title of power they dealt." It is true,
as said by appellants, that the principal ground on which it was
held in that case that the wife was estopped was that her deed,
dated shortly before the contract for the work, was not filed
for record until four days after the contract was made, and that
she did not disclose her title, although she knew of the work
as it progressed and received the benefit of it, while in the case
at bar Catherine McNally ^^^ had owned the property for many
years and it so appeared from the public records. It need not
be stated that estoppel by conduct does not rest on any specific
fact or facts, but will arise from any act of conduct of the party
sought to be estopped which justifies the application of the
general principle.
It is contended, however, that there is no evidence that Cath-
erine McNally knew that her husband held himself out as owner,
but we are of a different opinion. It is said, also, that the
evidence shows that at least one of the appellants testified that
he did not rely on her for payment but relied upon her husband.
134 Bastrup v. Pbendergast. [Illinois,
If he relied on ownership in the husband, as the contract repre-
sented, it would not be expected that he would rely on the wife,
and there was no testimony that appellants did not rely upon
their right to a statutory lien upon the property.
It is next said that the property was not described or located
by the contract, and the right to a lien must fail for that reason.
It was alleged in the pleadings that the contract was made with
reference to the lots in question, and the evidence supports th&
allegations. There was no contention to the contrary, either
in the pleadings or in the evidence. All the parties in interest
BO understood, and the material was furnished and the house
was built on the strength of that understanding, and the notice
or claim for a lien filed for record properly described the prop-
erty. We cannot hold, under the circumstances, that the mere
omission of a description or designation of the property in the
contract can defeat a lien otherwise established. All the parties
in interest interpreted the contract as referring to this property
where the McKally lived and of which John McNally claimed
to be the owner. The case, in this respect, is distinguishable
from Wendt v. Martin, 89 111. 139, and the view we have taken
finds support in Martin v. Eversal, 36 111. 222, Power v. McCord,
36 111. 214, and Clark v. Manning, 90 111. 380.
663 rpj^g jjg^^ point made by appellants is, that the lien can-
not be established or enforced because the labor was done and
materials furnished on two different buildings, each under a
different roof, located on a different lot from the other and
divided by a partition wall rising above the roof, there being;
no apportionment in the claims for hens, nor in the pleadings
and evidence, as to the amount due on the separate buildings.
The so-called '^buildings" were erected as one structure, located
on the comer of Fifty-fifth and Wright streets. The work on
the whole progressed together under the same contract, with the
same materials. The side on Wright street was more expen-
sively and elaborately finished than the other. There were
separate entrances in front. There was a door in the partition
wall in the basement, and through this opening steam pipes
passed so as to heat the entire structure with one furnace. At
the second floor there was a jog in the partition wall (which
wall so far was upon the lot line between the two lots) so as to
form a small court, into which windows opened from each side.
There wfts a rear porch extending across the entire structure
with one continuous and unbroken roof. Under this evidence
June, 1899.] Y. M. C. A. etc. Co. v. Rockford Nat. Bank. 135
we are of the opinion that no apportionment was necessary,
and that the structure must be regarded as one building, and
not two separate and distinct buildings.
We find no substantial defects in the statements for lier,
filed by the respective claimants and their verification, and can
not hold with the contention of appellants that appellees failed
to comply with the statute in this respect.
We are of the opinion that the judgment of the appellate
court is correct, and it will therefore be affirmed.
MECHANICS' LIENS— ESTOPPEL AGAINST WIFE.— If a
husbaud euters into a contract for the erection of a building on his
wife's land, with her linowledge, she participating in conversatious
between her husband and the contractors relative to the work dur-
ing the time It is being done, and making no objection at any time,
such land is liable for mechanics' liens arising out of the work
done: Jobe v. Hunter, 165 Pa. St. 5; 44 Am. St. Rep. 639; Spears v.
Lawrence, 10 Wash. 368; 45 Am. St. Rep. 789; Bodey v. Thackara,
143 Pa. St. 171; 24 Am. St. Rep. 526; Bevan v. Thackara, 143 Pa. St.
182; 24 Am. St. Rep. 529. Contra, Santa Cruz Rock Pavement Co.
V. Lyons, 117 Cal. 212; 59 Am. St. Rep. 174; Hoffman v. McFadden,
56 Ark. 217; 35 Am. St. Rep. 101.
MECHANICS' LIENS— DESCRIPTION OP PROPERTY.— A de-
scription of property sufficient for identification is indispensable to
a mechanic's lien: Maynard v. East, 13 Ind. App. 432; 55 Am. St.
Rep. 238, and note. But the insufficiency of the description of the
property in one part of a mechanic's lien claim is cured by a de-
scription in correct form in a subsequent part of such claim: Whit-
tier V. Stetson etc. Co., 6 Wash. 190; 36 Am. St. Rep. 149.
MECHANICS' LIENS— DISCONNECTED BUILDINGS.— A
claim of lien can be filed and asserted upon several disconnected
buildings without there being any account of the amount of mate-
rial furnished each: Salt Lake etc. Co. v. Ibex Mine etc. Co., 15
Utah, 440; 62 Am. St. Rep. 944, and note. The contract must be
single and entire in such a case: Maryland Brick Co. v. Spilman, 76
Md. 337; 35 Am. St. Rep. 431. But see Wilcox v. Woodruff, 61 Conn.
578; 29 Am. St. Rep. 222, for a contrary rule. See, also, Chapin v.
Persse etc. Works, 30 Conn. 401; 79 Am. Dec. 263, and extend©*
note thereto.
Young Men's Christian Assootation Gymnasium
Company v. Kockford National Bank.
[179 ILUNOIS, 599.]
NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS— PURCHASE OP OVER-
DUE NOTES INDORSED IN BLANK— PROTECTION AGAINST
THIRD PARTIES.— A bank advancing money to the holder of
overdue negotiable notes Indorsed in blank by he payee without
notice that they are held as collateral securitj is protected against
latent equities In third parties.
136 Y. M. C. A. ETC. Co. v. Rockfobd Nat. Bank. [Illinois,
NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS— NOTICE THAT NOTES
ARE HELD AS COLLATERAL— The mere fact that negotiable
notes Indorsed in blanl£ by the payee are overdue is not sufficient to
charge a banlc advancing money thereon to the holder with con-
structive notice that the notes are held merely as collateral security.
A. D. Early, W. Lathrop, and Fisher & North, for the appel-
lants.
E. K. Welsh and "Works & Hyer, for the appellee.
<^^ WILKIN, J. The circuit court of Winnebago county
granted the prayer of a bill by the Young Men's Christian
Association Gymnasium Company, and of a cross-bill by War-
ren Gilmore, against appellee, for an injunction restraining
it from collecting certain promissory notes and to compel it
to pay over money received on a certain other note. Tl\e ap-
pellate court reversed that decree and remanded the cause with
directions, and to reverse that judgment this appeal is prose-
cuted.
There is no dispute as to the facts. The gymnasium com-
pany, having arranged with Marcus S. Parmele, of the firm of
Ivnapp & Parmele, for a loan of four thousand dollars, executed
its five promissory notes, dated September 3, 1891, due three
years after date, with interest at seven per **"^ cent per annum,
payable semi-annually at the office of Knapp & Parmele — one
for two thousand dollars, payable to the order of Warren Gil-
more; one for six hundred dollars, to the order of Elizabeth L.
Stires; and one for six hundred dollars and twx) for four hun-
dred dollars each, to Knapp & Parmele or bearer. The pay-
ment of each of these notes was guaranteed by William H.
Worthington, E. M. Aikin, Marcus S. Parmele, Charles E. Shel-
don, and F. G. Hogland, officers and stockholders in the gym-
nasium company, and the notes were placed in the hands of
Parmele with twenty other promissory notes, each for two hun-
dred dollars, dated August 5, 1891, due three years after date,
•with seven per cent interest, payable semi-annually to the order
of the gymnasium company, six of which were severally signed
by John G. Penfield, P. R. Walker, C. R. Wise, H. H. Robinson,
Charles E. Sheldon and Anton Neumeister, stockholders in said
company, the remaining fourteen being executed by other per-
sons, also stockholders. Each of these two hundred dollax notes
was indorsed by the payee, the gymnasium company, in blank,
and a receipt taken from Knapp & Parmele therefor, as follows :
June, 1899.] Y. M. C. A. etc. Co. v. Rockfobd Nat. Bank. 137
*Tlockford, 111., Sept. 3, 1891.
''Eeceived of the Young Men's Christian Association Gym-
nasium Company notes as follows: [Here follows a description
of each of the twenty not€s] indorsed by William H. Worthing-
ton, president, and E. M. Aikin, secretary and treasurer. Above
notes held by undersigned as collateral security for the pay-
ment of notes as follows: [Here follows a description of the
five notes.] When said notes last mentioned are paid and this
receipt returned, said collateral security will be delivered up.
"KNAPP & PARMELE."
The six hundred dollar note payable to Knapp & Parmele was
indorsed by them to Mrs. Katherine Scott and one of the four
hundred dollar notes to Mary R. Tanner, the other being re-
tained by Parmele. With these notes the desired four thou-
sand dollar loan was obtained and the money paid over to the
gjminasium company by Parmele. Although the name of the
firm of Knapp & Parmele appears in connection with the pro-
curement of this loan, the transaction throughout was ®^*^ with
Marcus S. Parmele individually, and he retained possession of
both the principal and collateral notes until September, 1896,
when he delivered the six first described, for two hundred dol-
lars each, indorsed in blank, as above stated, to the defendant
bank as security for a loan procured by him. These notes were
then past due and unpaid except as to the interest, which was
indorsed upon each as paid to August 5, 1896. The bank had
no actual notice of the capacity in which Parmele held them,
and received them in the usual course of business without
inquiry.
On October 2, 1896, Parmele made a general assignment for
the benefit of his creditors to Joel B. Whitehead, as assignee,
and turned over to him the four hundred dollars principal note
remaining in his hands and all the collaterals except the six
transferred to the bank. On October 6, 1896, the bank collected
of Neumeister two hundred and two dollars and ninety-two
cents — the amount then due on his note — and afterward brought
suit against John G. Penfield on his note. The five principal
notes and each of the collateral notes, except the one collected,
remain wholly unpaid. Both the original and cross-bills seek
to restrain the defendant from collecting the five remaining
notes in its hands and to require it to pay to the gymnasium
company the amount of the one collected. The right to this
relief is predicated upon the theory that the assignment of said
138 Y. M. C. A. ETC. Co. v. Rockford Nat. Bank. [Illinois,
notes to the defendant by Parmele was without authority, and
vested in it no title as against complainants.
The proposition that a pledgee or holder of negotiable paper
as collaterals, in the absence of express authority, has no legal
right to negotiate the same, may, as a general rule, be granted;
but unless the bank, when it took the notes in question, was
chargeable with notice that they were held by Parmele merely
as collaterals, the rule cannot affect the decision of this case.
If it was so chargeable, it must be upon the ground that, hav-
ing required them after due, it was bound to take notice of
the rights of complainants, which is the principal ®®* question
upon which the decision must turn and to be hereafter con-
sidered.
That class of cases cited by counsel for appellants in which
the assignor of commercial paper obtained possession without
any right or legal title thereto, as by theft, finding, or fraud,
are not in point here. In those cases, the rule that an owner
cannot be deprived of his property without his consent obtains,
subject, however, to the exception in favor of the negotiability
of such instruments, that if they are transferred to an innocent
purchaser for value before due, without any notice of the absence
of title in the assignor, the transferee will obtain the legal title
even against the true owner, but if the transfer is after maturity
no title whatever will pass, no matter how innocently or with
what good faith the assignee acquires the instrument. In the
one case the purchaser gets a better title than his assignor had,
while in the other he does not. And it had been held in cases
falling within the latter rule that the assignee takes the over-
due paper subject not only to the equities of the maker, but also
of those of the true owner or othe third parties having an in-
terest therein, the question in such cases being not one of nego-
tiability but of legal title. Henderson v. Case, 31 La. Ann. 215,
cited and quoted from in the argument, was a case of that kind,
and the court said: "We do not think that the authorities cited
by the defendant, to the effect that no collateral equities can
effect an assignment of commercial paper transferred after
maturity, can be applied to the case where there is a total want
of right in the transferrer." The same distinction exists in the
other cases of this class referred to by counsel.
In the case at bar, the six notes in suit were placed in the
hands of Parmele, bearing the indorsement of the payee, with-
out any evidence whatever indorsed thereon or attached there-
June, 1899.] Y. M. C. A. etc. Co. v. Rockford Nat. Bank. 13&
to that they were to be held by him otherwise than as absolute
owner. He was thus clothed with every indicia of the legal
title and absolute ownership ^*^^ by the party to whom they
were made payable. It is well settled that such instruments
indorsed in blank pass by delivery, the indorsement being treated
as made to each subsequent transferee; also, that the negotia-
bility of commercial paper does not cease with its maturity, but
may still be negotiated by indorsement. We are unable to find
any fact in this record with which appellee was chargeable when
it obtained these notes, or any principle of law which can be said
to distinguish it from the ordinary assignee of negotiable bills
and notes after maturity.
The inquiry then must be, Is the fact that such paper is past
due when transferred, sufficient, of itself, to charge the taker
with notice of the latent equities of third parties? Our stat-
ute fixes the rights of the maker in such cases upon clear prin-
ciples of justice, without materially affecting the negotiability
of commercial instruments; but to extend the same protection
to whoever may have acquired some collateral interest in the
paper, in the absence of actual notice of the same to a trans-
feree, would be to charge him with knowledge of a fact not
within his power of ascertainment and practically destroy the
negotiability of overdue instruments. While the question has
never been before us in the present form, it is not altogether a
new one. We have frequently held that the assignee of a mort-
gage holds it, and the indebtedness secured by it, subject to the
same defenses which might have been urged against the mort-
gagee. In Olds V. Cummings, 31 111. 188, it was held that such
an assignee was, nevertheless, protected against the latent equi-
ties of third persons, and in Silverman v. Bullock, 98 111. 10, 20.
we said: "The rule in Olds v. Cummings, 31 111. 188, is a rea-
sonable one, and can readily be observed. Persons dealing in
such securities can, without difficulty, inquire of the makers if
any defenses exist against them, but more than that it is not
practicable to do. Of course, it would not be possible to dis-
cover, even by the utmost diligence, all persons that might have
equitable rights in the subject matter of *®* the assignment,
and the adoption of a rule that would let in latent equities to
prevail against the assignee would be to ensnare dealers in such
securities." To the same effect are the cases of Himrod v. Gil-
man, 147 111. 293, and Humble v. Curtis, 160 111. 193.
Other courts and text- writers have, so far as we can ascertain^
140 Y. M. C. A. ETC. Co. V. Rockfokd Nat. Bank. [IllinoiB,
Applied the same rule to negotiable securities assigned after due.
In National Bank of Washington v. Texas, 20 Wall. 89, the su-
preme court of the United States says: "The transferee of over-
due negotiable paper takes it liable to all the equities to which
it was subject in the hands of the payee. But those equities
must attach to the paper itself, and not arise from any collateral
transaction." And again : "The position of the transferee must
be. at least as favorable as that of the assignee of a chose in ac-
tion. There the assignee takes subject to the equity residing
in the debtor, but not to an equity residing in a third person
against the assignor." And in support of the doctrine thus an-
nounced the language of Chancellor Kent is cited, as follows:
"The assignee can always go to the debtor and ascertain what
<;laims he may have against the bond or other chose in action
which he is about purchasing from the obligee, but he may not
be able, with the utmost diligence, to ascertain the latent equity
of some third person against the obligee. He has not any ob-
ject to which he can direct his inquiries, and for this reason
the assignee, without notice, of a chose in action was preferred
in the late case of Eedfearn v. Ferrier, 1 Dow, 50, to that of a
third party setting up a secret equity against the assignor.
Lord Eldon observed in that case that if this were no't so no
^assignment could ever be taken with safety."
Upon the contention of appellants that appellee could take no
better title than Parmele himself had, Lee v. Turner, 89 Mo.
494; Hill v. Shields, 81 N. C. 253; 31 Am. Eep. 499; Bradford
y. Williams, 91 N. C. 7, and McNeil v. Tenth Nat. Bank, 46
N. Y. 329; 7 Am. Rep. 341, cited by counsel for appellee
against the position, ^^"^ are in point. In the first case the
supreme court of Missouri said: "But we do not see that the
■doctrine that the transferee of negotiable paper, to whom it is
transferred after maturity, acquires nothing but the actual
right and title of the transferrer, should control the disposition
of this case. The note is assignable. If the true owner of a
negotiable note overdue, or of a nonnegotiable note, clothes
another with the usual evidences of ownership, .... and third
persons are led into dealing with such apparent owner, they
will be protected in their dealings." And in the McNeil mse,
passing upon the same question, the court used this language:
■"It must be conceded that, as a general rule applicable to prop-
•erty other than negotiable securities (meaning, of course, be-
fore maturity), the vendor or pledgor can convey no greater
June, 1899.] Y. M. C. A. etc. Co. t>. Rockfoed Nat. Bank. 141
right or title than he has. But this is a truLsm predicable of a
simple transfer from one party to another where no other ele-
ment intervenes. It does not interfere with the well-estab-
lished principle that where the true owner holds out another or
allows him to appear as the owner of or as having full power of
disposition over the property, and innocent third parties are
thus led into dealing with such apparent owner, they will be
protected. Their rights in such cases do not depend upon the
actual title or authority of the party with whom they deal di-
recth', but are derived from the act of the real owner, which
precludes him from disputing, as against them, the existence of
the title or power which, through negligence or mistaken confi-
dence, he caused or allowed to appear to be vested in the party
making the conveyance."
Story on Promissory Notes, section 178, states what we con-
ceive to be the law of this case, as follows: "In general, it may
be stated that a transfer may be made any time while the note
remains a good, subsisting, unpaid note, whether it be before
or after it has arrived at maturity. But the rights of the holder
against the antecedent parties may be most materially affected
by the time ***** of transfer If the transfer is after the
maturity of the note, the holder takes it as a dishonored note,
and it is affected by all the equities between the original par-
ties, whether he has any notice thereof or not. But when we
speak of equities between the parties, it is not to be understood
by this expression that all sorts of equities existing between the
parties from other independent transactions between them are
intended, but only such equities as attach to the particular
note, and, as between those parties, would be available to con-
trol, qualify, or extinguish any rights arising thereon. (The
true test to determine whether a note is subject to an equity
set up by the maker is this: Could the payee, at the time he
transferred the note, have maintained a suit upon it against
the maker if it had then been mature.) Still, however, sub-
ject to such equities, the holder, by indorsement after the ma-
turity of the note, will be clothed with the same rights and ad-
vantages as were possessed by the indorser, and may avail him-
self of them accordingly." To the same effect are 2 Randolph
on Commercial Paper, sec. 675; Daniel on Negotiable Instru-
ments, sec. 726b; 2 Parsons on Bills and Notes, 42, et seq.;
Tiedeman on Commercial Paper, sec. 295.
In Eversole v. Maull, 50 Md. 95, the appellant, Eversole, be-
142 Y. M. C. A. ETC. Co. v, Rockford Nat. Bank. [Illinois.
ing the payee of a proinissory note made by Caskey, indorsed it
generally and delivered it to one Frame, an attorney, for col-
lection. Frame transferred it to the appellee, Maull, after ma-
turity, for value, without notice of the purpose for which he
held it. The court sustained the title of Maull against the
claim of Eversole on the authority of the foregoing text by
Judge Story and its own former decisions based thereon. The
case seems to have received careful consideration, and the
opinion of the court ably disposes of every substantial question
raised in this case.
We have duly considered the cases referred to and quoted
from by counsel in their extended argument on behalf of appel-
lants, and we find them distinguishable *^^ from this case
either in the fact that the controversy arose between the maker
of the instrument sued on and a transferee, or that the assignor
had not the legal title to the paper when he transferred it. But
if this were not so, we are clearly of the opinion that the claim
of the appellee bank that it took these notes without becoming
chargeable with notice of the rights of the complainants below
is abundantly sustained by authority and is in consonance with
our own decisions. As was said by the supreme court of Mary-
land in Eversole v. Maull, 50 Md. 95: "The equitable principle
which underlies this doctrine and which is universally admitted
to be just and sound, is, that if a loss occurs by which one of
two innocent persons must suffer, that one should sustain the
loss who has most trusted the party through whom the loss
came."
The judgment of the appellate court will be affirmed.
NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS— RIGHTS OP PURCHASER
OF OVERDUE NOTES— If a negotiable note Is transferred after
It becomes due, the assignee takes it subject to all equities and de-
fenses as between the maker and payee, but in such case it is only
subject, in the hands of the indorsee, to such equities and de-
fenses as are connected with the note Itself, and not such as grow
out of transactions disconnected therewith: Kelly v. S-taed, 136 Mo.
430; .58 Am. St. Rep. 648. and note; Davis v. Noll, 88 W. Va. 66; 45
Am. St. Rep. 841; and note; Carpenter v. Greenop, 74 Mich. 664; 16
Am. St. Rep. 662, and note. See, also, Lodwen v. Porsee, 137 Mo.
29; 59 Am. St Rep. 489.
OASES
VX THI
SUPREME COURT
IOWA.
MoMahon v. Dubuque.
[107 Iowa, 62.]
DAMAGES— MEASURE OF— DESTRUCTION OF PROP-
ERTY HAVING NO MARKET VALUE.— For the destructian of
household goods and wearing apparel having no recognized market
value, the measure of damages is their actual value, which may be
determined by evidence of their original cost, the extent of their use,
and their condition at the time of destruction.
WITNESSES— MATTERS OF OPINION.— In determining,
the condition of a house at the time of its destruction, whether or
not It was in good repair, a witness may describe the house In de-
tail, but he should not be permitted to testify whether or not the
house was in good repair, such testimony being merely an opinion.
DAMAGES— MEASURE OP-DESTRUCTION OF DWELL-
ING-HOUSE.—The measure of damages for the destruction of a
dwelling-house by fire Is Its actual and not necessarily its market
value.
WITNESSES— TESTIMONY OF EXPERTS.— In an action
for damages occasioned by fire ignited from sparks escaping from a
road-roller engine, it being alleged that the defendant was negligont
in failing to provide such engine with a spark arrester, expert wit-
nesses, in testifying, may be allowed to exhibit a model of a loco-
motive engine to the jury to Illustrate the use of a spark arrester,
and to Indicate how it could be applied to the roller-engine in ques-
tion, but they should not be allowed to use such models for any fur-
ther pui-pose.
MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS— NEGLIGEN*CE-WOIi K
DONE FOR PRIVATE CORPORATE BENEFIT.— Where a city,
having been empowered to improve its streets and assess the cost
of improvements to abutting owners, owns and operates a steam
roller and retains compensation for rolling streets when macadam-
ized, its liability for injuries resulting from fire started through the
negligent operation of the roller is similar to that of an Individual
engaged In doing the same work. It cannot escape such liability by
pleading that the work was done for the public benefit.
(1*3)
144 McMahon v. Dubuque. [Iowa,
Action for damages occasioned by a fire set out from sparks
escaping from the smokestack of a steam road roller, owned and
being operated by the city of Dubuque in rolling newly-laid
macadam on one of its streets on which the lots of plaintift
abutted. The house thereon, and its contents, were destroyed.
The plaintiff had judgment at the trial and defendant appeals.
Duffy & Maguire, for the appellant.
Longueville, McCarthy & Kenline, for the respondent.
*** LADD, J. The household goods and wearing apparel of
the plaintiff and his family were destroyed. Thes:e had been
used, were worn and somewhat out of style. Such property has
no recognized market value, and recovery must be based on its
actual value: Gere v. Council Bluffs Ins. Co., 67 Iowa, 272;
Clements v. Burlington etc. Ey. Co., 74 Iowa, 442. To ascer-
tain the actual value, it was proper to take into consideration
the original cost of the articles, the extent of their use, whether
worn or out of date, their condition at the time, and from all
these determine what they are fairly worth. The cost alone
would not be the correct criterion for the present value, but it
would be difficult to estimate the value of such goods except by
reference to the former price, in connection with wear, depre-
ciation, change in style, and present condition: Luse v. Jones,
39 N. J. L. 707; International etc. Ry. Co. v. Nicholson, 61
Tex. 550; Mouat Lumber Co. v. Wilmore, 15 Colo. 136; Printz
V. People, 42 Mich. 144; 36 Am. Eep. 437; State v. Hathaway,
100 Iowa, 225; Latham v. Shipley, 86 Iowa, 548. The cross-
examination of Lizzie McMahon indicated that she spoke only
of the actual value, and not of the market price.
2. A witness was not permitted to testify whether the house
destroyed was in good repair, because merely an opinion. The
value of the house was in controversy. The condition of a
dwelling-house as a whole is not observable, except upon exam-
ination, and for this reason does not come within the rule of
Kelleher v. Keokuk, 60 Iowa, 474, that testimony of matters
within the observation of all are to be treated of as facts rather
than opinion. There might well be wide differences of opinion
as to what would constitute good repair, and the court rightly
held that the house might be described in detail, and from such
evidence the jury determine its condition.
3. Evidence was received, over the defendant's objection,
•Lowing the actual value of the house at the time **" of the
Dec. 1898.] McMahon v. Dubuque. lib
fire, and it is said this does not furnish the true basis of recov-
ery. The fundamental principle in all actions for damages is
that just compensation be made to him who has suffered injury
from another in his person or property, and, in order to give
satisfaction, measured in money, such rules are formulated as
are thought best adopted to accomplish this purpose. A dis-
tinction has, for this reascJn, been made between growing crops,
shrubs, and trees, wliose chief value is because of their connec-
tion with the soil and their incidental enhancement of the value
of the land, and those improvements which may be replaced at
will, and whose value may readily be determined, apart from
the ground on which they rest. It is thus put by Mr. Suther-
land in his work on Damages, volume 3, page 368: "If the thing
destroyed, although it is a part of the realty, has a value which
can be accurately measured and ascertained without reference
to the soil on which it stands, or out of which it grows, the re-
covery may be the value of the thing thus destroyed, and net
for the difference in value of the land before and after such de-
struction." In Drake v. Chicago etc. Ry. Co., 63 Iowa, 310,
60 Am. Eep. 746, crops were destroyed by overflow caused by
en embankment, and the measure was held to be the difference
between the market value of the land immediately before and
after the injury. This rule was approved in Sullens v. Chicago
etc. Ry. Co., 74 Iowa, 660, 7 Am. St. Rep. 501, and applied
Avhere growing trees were burned, in Greenfield v. Chicago etc.
Ry. Co., 83 Iowa, 276, and Brooks v. Chicago etc. Ry. Co., 73
Iowa, 182: See Smith v. Chicago etc. Ry. Co., 38 Iowa, 518;
Striegel v. Moore, 55 Iowa, 88. In Rowe v. Chicago etc. Ry.
Co., 102 Iowa, 288, the court said: "Appellant's contention re-
sults in fixing the value of each tree destroyed or damaged by
the fire, and the aggregate of such values would be the measure
of plaintiff's recovery. Such a rule may well be held applicable
to the destruction by fire of buildings, fences, and other im-
provements, which may at once be replaced, where the exact
cost of restoring the property destroyed is capable of definite
ascertainment, and where- there is no damage of the *** realty
itself." It is apparent that growing crops, small trees, and or-
chards are of little or no use separated from the soil, and that
their value must necessarily be determined in connection with
the land on which they stand. This is not true of improve-
ments which may be replaced at will. In Graessle v. Carpenter,
70 Iowa, 167, the defendant, by digging trenches and laying
AM. 8r. KKP.. Vou LXX — u
146 McMahon v. DuBUtiUB. [Iowa,
water-pipes, injured the plaintiff's fences, walks, house, and
shrubs. It was not shown the acts were of such a nature as to
permanently injure the real estate, or that it could not be re-
stored to its condition before the fire. The court, through
Beck, J., announced the rule to be that which will "give the
plaintiff just and full compensation .... In the case before us,
the familiar and simple rule applicable to such cases would per-
fectly attain that end. That rule is this : The plaintiff may re-
cover as damage the sum which, expended for the purpose,
would put the property in as good condition as it was in before
the injury, with the additional sums which would compensate
the plaintiff for the use and enjoyment of the property, should
he be deprived thereof of the injury, and the value of such prop-
erty, as trees, buildings, and the like, which have been wholly
destroyed, and cannot be restored to the condition they were in
before the injury." We take it the trees and shrubs were of a
character which might be replaced by others of the same ac-
tual value; otherwise the case is not in harmony with those
cited. In Frecland v. Muscatine, 9 Iowa, 465, the defendant,
in changing the gi*ade, dug away the dirt, and caused the plain-
tiff's house to fall, and it was held: "The cost of rebuilding or
repairing was properly taken into consideration, if we under-
stand it as having reference to the quality and condition of the
building before the accident, and the instruction cannot be
taken in any other sense. It is the cost of rebuilding and re-
pairing, which implies the restoring it to as good condition as
before, and not the putting a new and firm building in the place
of an old and decayed one." To prove the market value of the
land immediately before and after ^"^ the fire would be accom-
plishing, by circumlocution, what might be directly ascertained,
for such difference would be the value of the house. True, lo-
cation may sometimes hare a bearing, as where a building is so
situated as not to be useful for the purpose of its construction.
In such cases this must be taken into consideration in fixing the
real value. But it could be as readily done in estimating this
separate from as with the land. Simplicity and directness are
particularly favored in modern jurisprudence. True, such
property may have no market value. It does, however, have
actual value, and this is, then, the measure of recovery. The
ruling was right.
4, The alleged negligence of the defendant was the failure
to use any device such as a spark-arrester, to prevent the escape
Dec. 1898.] McMahon v. Dubuque. 147
of cinders, coals, and sparks from the engine. No other issue
as to negligence was submitted, and the state of repair of the
-engine was not material. Experts, in testifying, were allowed
to use a model of a locomotive engine to illustrate the use of a
spark-arrester, and to indicate how it could be applied to the
roller-engine, and for no other purpose. The court was careful
to caution the witnesses that, "in so far as the different parts
of this model are shown to be similar in this model to the steam
roller, you may call attention to them, but the other parts of
the model you are not to mention." We discover no error in
this. This model was used to better bring to the understand-
ing of the jury a mechanical device. It was like the use of a
plat or sketch by a witness to indicate relative locations or di-
rections.
5. The appellant asserts that in operating the steam roller ifc
acted solely for the public, and not for any private corporate
benefit. It may be observed that the defendant is incorporated
under a special charter, and that by chapter 210 of the acts of
the sixth general assembly it was given the power and made
its duty to grade, pave, and otherwise improve its streets, and
for this purpose it may levy a special tax on any lot or lots, or
the owner thereof, for ®® the purpose of grading, paving, or
macadamizing the same, and is authorized to collect it under
the regulations prescribed by ordinances. That such powers
and duties are peculiarly municipal, and injuries occasioned by
the negligence of the corporation in carrying out or performing
them may be redressed in actions against the city, is not an open
question in this state: Wallace v. Muscatine City, 4 G. Greene,
373, 61 Am. Dec. 131; Creal v. Keokuk, 4 G. Greene, 47;
Cotes V. Davenport, 9 Iowa, 227; Ross v. Clinton, 46 Iowa, 606,
26 Am. Rep. 169.* See collection of authorities generally in
note to Goddard v. Harpswell, 84 Me. 499, 30 Am. St. Rep. 373.
Though" the city might have, under its charter, contracted with
others to properly roll its streets, when macadamized, at the cost
of the abutting lotowners, it chose to do this work itself and re-
tain compensation therefor. Contractors were required, in
making bids, to include, for Telford macadam, "five cents per
square yard, the price charged by the city of Dubuque, for the
use of the roller and for rolling the street." The contract with
Tibey did this, and that amount was detained from the price
for such work. It was when rolling the street he had improved
that the fire was set out. Had Tibey been employed to do this,
148 McMahon v. Dubuque. [lowa^
as he might have been, and through his negligence, like that of
the city, fire has escaped and burned the property of citizens,,
would anyone question the right of recovery? Upon what
theory, then will the municipality escape liability? There are
two very satisfactory reasons why it must be held to answer in
damages for its negligence: 1. It was engaged in doing, with
its own instrumentality, that which it was authorized to con-
tract with another to do at the expense of the abutting lot
owners; and 2. The work was voluntarily assumed and carried
on for compensation. Mr. Dillon thus states the rule: "The
liability of the corporation for its own negligence, or that of it*
servants, is especially clear, and in fact indisputable, where it
has received a consideration for the duties performed, or where,
under permissive authority from the legislature ®® it volun-
tarily assumes and carries on a work or undertaking from which
it receives tolls or derives a profit" : 2 Dillon on Municipal Cor-
porations, sec. 881. The city was authorized to make the im-
provement, but was not bound to undertake it with its own in-
strumentalities. Having done so, it incurred the same liability
an individual would have done in performing like work. W&
have found no authorities precisely in point, but the principle
is so just that none are required. It finds analogy in the casea
holding municipalities, owning and operating water and gas
works, docks, piers, and other property, to the same liability as
individuals or private corporations with similar ownership and
performing like duties. In operating the steam roller, the city
was acting peculiarly for the benefit of the municipality, and in
a way to enable it to exact compensation from property owners
within its limits. Its liability, similar to that of an individual
if engaged in doing the same work, is .within the principle ap-
proved by the authorities generally.
Affirmed.
DAMAGES— MEASURE OF-DESTRUCTION OF PROPERTY
HAVING NO MARKET VALUE.— If property situated at a place
where it has no mariiet value is destroyed by the negligence of an-
otlier, its owner having no immediate use for It, the damages for
which the wrongdoer is answorable are to be ascertained by find-
ing the value of the hay at the nearest place where it has a market
value and deducting therefrom the cost of putting it in a market-
able shape and transporting it to that place: Watt v. Nevada etc.
R. R, Co., 23 Nev. 154. 62 Am. St. Rep. 772, This rule is severely
crltlclzod In the extended monographic note which follows the case,
where it is shown that market value is only one of the tests of real
value, and that other tests may be applied and sometimes must be-
applied in order to accomplish Justice.
Jan. 1899.] In ek Assignment Mutual etc. Ins. Co. 149
WITNESSES— MATTERS OF OPINION.— Opinions of witnesses
are sometimes admissible from necessity, and to prevent the failure
of justice; but when the facts upon which the opinion is formed can
be stated and described, they must be, and the jury be left to form
their own opinion: Whittler v. Franklin, 46 N, H. 23, 88 Am. Dec.
185; Clark v. Fisher, 1 Paige, 171, 19 Am. Dec. 402; Hurt v. St.
Louis etc. Ry. Co., &4 Mo. 255, 4 Am. St. Rep. 374.
WITNESSES— EXPERTS.— When the testimony of experts Is ad-
missible: First etc. Church v. Holyoke etc. Ins. Co., 158 Mass. 475,
35 Am. St. Rep. 508; O'Neil v. Dry Dock etc. R. R. Co., 129 N. Y.
125, 26 Am. St. Rep. 512.
MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS— LIABILITY FOR NEGLI-
GENCE.—Municipal corporations, acting within the purview of their
authority, and in their ministerial or corporate character, in the
management of property for their own benefit, or In the exercise of
powers, assumed voluntarily for their own advantage, are Impliedly
liable for damage caused by the negligence of their officers and
agents, though they may be engaged in some work that will Inure
to the general benefit of the municipality. Grading streets, cleans-
ing sewers, or keeping wharves in safe condition, from which a
profit i^ derived, are duties of this character: Moffitt v. Asheville,
103 N. C. 237, 14 Am. St. Rep. 810; Hitchlns v. Mayor etc., 68 Md.
100, 6 Am. St. Rep. 422; Gibson v. Huntington, 38 W. Va. 177, 45
Am. St. Rep. 853; Helgel v. Wichita County, 84 Tex. 392, 31 Am. St.
Rep. 63.
In be Assignment Mutual Guaranty Fire
Insurance Company.
[107 Iowa, 143.]
INSURANCE COMPANIES— MUTUAI^WHEN DO NOT
BECOME STOCK COMPANIES.— A mutual Insurance company or-
ganized under a statute authorizing an association of persons mak-
ing mutual pledges and giving valid obligations to each other for
their own insurance on the assessment plan, does not become a
stcck company by the Issuance of shares to the subscribers of a guar-
anty fund, which shares are secured by obligations of the holders,
and are subject to assessment from time to time to meet any de-
ficiency that might arise in the advancements, assessments, and
pledges made to pay losses and expenses. Therefore it cannot do
business on the stock plan, cannot write a policy for a fixed amount,
Accept premiums as such, nor declare dividends.
INSURANCE COMPANIES— MUTUAI^WHO ARE NOT
MEMBERS.— One who insures his property in a mutual company
in a stated amount, for a specific premium, does not become a mem-
ber of the company so as to be liable for future assessments.
INSURANCE COMPANIEJS— POWERS— ASSURED MUST
TAKE NOTICE OF.— One who takes out a policy In a mutual in-
surance company which the latter has no power under Its charter
to make must take notice of the laws of the state and the articles
of Incorporation adopted thereunder, and cannot recover upon OxQ
policy unless enabled to do so upon the ground of estoppel.
INSURANCE COMPANIES— ULTRA VIRES— POLICY FOR-
BIDDEN BY STATUTE.— Where a mutual insurance company
issues a policy which it Is prohibited by law to issue, the policy is
illegal and void, and the fact that premiums have been paid thereon.
150 In be Assignment Mutual etc. Ins. Co. [Iowa,
and used by the company, will not estop it from pleading ultra
vires as a defense to a suit upon the policy.
INSURANCE COMPANIES— MUTUAL— LIABILITY OF
MEMBERS TO A PERSON ILLEGALLY INSURED.— While the
officers or directors of a mutual insurance company may be held in-
diividually liable for a wrong done to a person to whom they have
Issued an illegal and void policy, no liability for such wrong can
be enforced against the members of the company as partners.
Chase & Seaman and Eldred S. James, for the appellant.
A. P. Barker and F. "W. & L. A. Ellis, for the appellees.
144 DEEMEE, J. The Mutual Guaranty Fire Insurance
Company was organized in the year 1888. On the ninth day of
August of that year, it filed its articles of incorporation, which
stated, in substance, that certain persons, naming them, and all
others who might associate with them and become members
thereof, organized under the name hereinbefore stated, "fo make
insurance upon .... property against loss or damage by fire,
.... upon the plan of mutual insurance.'* A guaranty fund
of fifty thousand dollars, consisting of shares of one hundred
dollars each, was also provided for, which was subject to in-
crease, and which was to be secured by the obligations of the
shareholders in such form as the board of directors should ap-
prove, and be subject to assessment from time to time to meet
any deficiency that might arise in the advancements, assess-
ments, and pledges made to pay losses and expenses. These
assessments were to be treated as advancements to be repaid
from the funds of the association. The articles further pro-
vided that the fund to pay losses and expenses should consist
exclusively of moneys raised by advancements and assessments
given by the members for their insurance, such assessments to
be made by the board of directors or executive committee, and
apportioned pro rata among the members insured. They also
provided that all persons insured should be members ^'^ of
the company during the life of their policies, and that charges
for insurance should be regulated by the directors. Further
provision was made for the adoption of by-laws, such as the-
directors might deem expedient for the conduct of the affairs of
the company. The notice of incorporation stated that it was a
corporation for pecuniary profit, organized under the laws of tha
state, to insure the property of its members by mutual pledges
or obligations against loss or damage by fire, et cetera. The
by-laws provided for the issuance of one and five-year policies^
premiums for the one-year policies to be in cash, and for tha
Jan. 1899.] In re Assignment Mutual etc. Ins. Co. J 51
five-year policies a note for five times the annual premium, to
be paid in installments of not more than one-fifth of the amount
in any one year, at such time or times as the board of directors
or executive committee might order. But one full annual
premium was required to be paid in cash upon the delivery of
all policies. Assessments were to be equitably levied upon the
notes to pay losses and expenses, and notice of these assessments
was required. Another article of the by-laws provided for the
cancellation of policies, and return of such part of the cash
premiums as were unearned, based upon the usual short rates.
Subscribers to the guaranty fund were to be allowed five per
cent of the amount of their shares as compensation for the re-
sponsibility assumed by them, which amount was to be charged
to the expense account of the company. The policy in suit
was issued by this corporation, insuring the Ness County Sugar
Company, of Ness county, Kansas, against loss or damage by
fire upon its plant in said Ness county, loss, if any, to be paid
to A. E. Alvord, mortgagee. The policy was for one year, and
the sugar company paid the premium (twenty-five dollars) in
cash. It was called a "nonparticipating policy," and pro-
vided for cancellation at customary short rates. This condition
also appears therein: "In consideration of the issuance of this
policy for the amount of premium before stated, the holder of
this policy hereby releases any and all claims for dividends,
earnings, or profits of this company." The only *^® thing on
the face of the policy to indicate that it was issued by a mutual
company or upon the mutual plan is the name "Mutual Guar-
anty Fire Insurance Company." On the twenty-third day of
August, 1890, and during the life of the policy, the property in-
sured was totally destroyed by fire. Proper notice and proofs
of loss were given the company, but the loss was not paid; and
on the second day of January, 1891, the company made a gen-
eral assignment for the benefit of its creditors. A. P. Barker
was made assignee and he makes the objections which are inter-
posed to appellant'^ claim.
The record presents two questions for our determination: 1.
Was the policy issued without authority by the officers of the
company ? 2. Is the policy invalid because made in contraven-
tion of the statutes of the state? Some other questions are ar-
gued which will be considered during the course of the opinion,
but these are the controlling ones in the case.
At the time the company was organized, the law authorized
152 In KE Assignment Mutual etc. Ins. Co. [Iowa,
two kinds of mutual insurance companies — one to do business
on the plan of mutual insurance, under sections 1123 and 1159,
inclusive, of the code of 1873; and the other an association of
persons making mutual pledges and giving valid obligations to
each other for their own insurance on the assessment plan,
under section 1160. The company which issued the policy in
suit had no stock, except the shares issued to the subscribers of
the guaranty fund. The issuance of these shares and the crea-
tion of this fund did not make it a stock company, however:.
Corey v. Sherman, 96 Iowa, 114. The idea of the incorporators,
no doubt, was to organize under section 1160 of the code; and
we shall treat the company as organized under that section, our
authority for so doing being the Corey-Sherman case, to which
we have just referred, and which is in many respects much like
the case at bar. Under such articles of incorporation, the per-
sons becoming members ^^"^ of the company may make mutual
pledges, and give valid obligations to each other for their own
insurance, but cannot insure property not owned by one of
their number, nor can they receive premiums or make dividends :
Code 1873, sec. 1160. Another provision of the law is to this
effect: "No company organized upon the mutual plan shall do
business or take risks upon the stock plan. Neither shall a
company organized as a stock company do business upon the
plan of a mutual insurance company." Eeferring back to the
articles of incorporation which we have heretofore quoted, and
we find that the company was to do business upon the mutual
plan, and that the funds for the payment of the losses and ex-
penses were to consist of moneys raised by advancements and
assessments on mutual pledges given by the members of the
company. Now, it may be that the company was authorized
to accept an advance payment of money as a pledge against
which assessments might be levied from time to time; but it is
clear that it was not permitted to accept premiums as such, not
could it declare dividends. It had no power to write a policy
for a stated and definite amount of insurance. Neither could
it do business on the stock plan. That it undertook to insure
the sugar company for a definite and specific amount, in consid-
eration of a fixed and stated premium, is too plain for success-
ful contradiction. The assured was not a member of the com-
pany, except in name, and there was no mutuality between him
and the other policy holders. It has been held, and with good
reason, that one who insures his property in a mutual company
Jan. 1899.] In re Assignment Mutual etc. Ins. Co. 153
in a stated amount, for a specific premium, does not become
a member of the company, so as to be liable for future assess-
ments: Farmers' etc. Ins. Co. v. Smith, 63 111. 187; Illinois
etc. Ins. Co. v. Stanton, 67 111. 354; Given v. Eettew, 1G3 Ta.
St. 638. Certainly there was no liability on the part of the
sugar company or the appellant to pay assessments for losses.
The cash premium demanded by the company was paid, and the
company agreed to pay a definite and certain amount in ****
case of loss. There was no mutuality between the members of
the company who were insured on the assessment plan and those
who paid cash premiums in full. The contract was one which
the company had no power to make; and, as the assured must
take notice of the laws of the state and the articles of incorpora-
tion adopted thereunder, it follows that appellant cannot re*
cover, unless it be on the theory of estoppel.
The doctrine of ultra vires, as applied to corporations, is one
of the most difficult with which courts have to deal, and the
rules are not as definitely settled as we might wish. "Were it
not for the statutes prohibiting mutual companies organized
under section 1160 from taking premiums and from doing busi-
ness on the stock plan, we would be inclined to hold that as the
corporation had accepted and used the premium paid for the
policy in suit, it should be estopped from pleading ultra vires as
a defense. Indeed, the modern authorities seem to sustain that
rule: Thompson v. Lambert, 44 Iowa, 239. See Denver Fire
Ins. Co. V. McClelland, 9 Colo. 11, 59 Am. Eep. 134; Matt v.
Roman Catholic etc. Soc, 70 Iowa, 455; Beach on Private Cor-
porations, sec. 423, and cases cited. But where, as in this case,
the act is prohibited by statute, the contract is illegal and void,
and cannot be enforced. The rule as stated by Taylor in his
work on Corporations, sec. 299, is as follows: "If a statute ex-
pressly forbids a corporation to make a certain contract, the con-
tract is void even though not expressly declared to be so, and
is incapable of ratification; and that the contract is void, as
unlawful, may be pleaded by anyone to an action founded di-
rectly and exclusively on such contract; unless: 1. The* stat-
utes expressly state what the consequences of violating it shall
be, and those consequences are other than that the contract,
shall be void: or 2. Unless the statutory prohibition was evi-
dently imposed for the protection of a certain class of persons,
who may alone take advantage of it; or 3. Unless to adjudge
the contract void and incapable of forming the basis of a right
154 In ee Assignment Mutual etc. Ins. Co. [Iowa,
of action *■** would clearly frustrate the evident purposes of
the prohibition itself." Sustaining his conclusions are the fol-
lowing, among other cases : New York etc. Trust Co. v. Helmer,
77 N. Y. 64; Utica Ins. Co. v. Scott, 19 Johns. 1; Lester v.
Howard Bank, 33 Md. 558, 3 Am.'Eep. 211; Beecher v. Mar-
quette etc. Mill Co., 45 Mich. 103; McPherson v. Foster, 43
Iowa, 48, 22 Am. Eep. 215. Such a contract will not be en-
forced, although it may have been executed by one of the par-
ties. Nor can the doctrine of estoppel be invoked to bind the
corporation to a forbidden act: Kent v. Quicksilver Min. Co.,
78 N. Y. 159; Miller v. Insurance Co., 92 Tenn. 167. Section
1160 of the code of 1873 provides that companies organized
thereunder shall not accept premiums. This the appellant
knew, or ought to have known, as he was charged with knowl-
edge of the law. His position is not such as appeals very
strongly to a court of equity. He paid his money knowing that
the company had no right to accept it, and ought not to be al-
lowed to base an estoppel thereon. Again, the company was ex-
pressly prohibited from issuing such a policy as the one in suit.
Appellant further contends that, if the corporation was not
permitted to do the business in which it was engaged, no corpo-
ration existed, and that the incorporators became liable as a
partnership for the business done under the articles. The
difficulty with this contention is that the corporation was not
organized to do an illegal or unlawful business: See Corey v.
Sherman, 96 Iowa, 114. Its articles clearly provide that it is
to do business under section 1160 of the Code, and, if it did not
do so, the promoters thereof are not liable as partners. They
took the necessary steps to incorporate, and, if the officers or
directors thereafter proceeded to do an illegal business, they
may be individually liable for the wrong done, but the other
members of the corporation will not be held liable as partners.
These propositions are elementary, and require no citation of
authorities in their support. See, as sustaining our conclusions
on the whole case, Rockhold v. Canton etc. Soc, 129 111. 440;
*»" Pittsburgh etc. Ey. Co. v. Keokuk etc. Bridge Co., 131 U. S.
371; Miller v. Insurance Co., 92 Tenn. 167; O'Neil v. Pleasant
-Prairie etc. Ins. Co., 71 Wis. 621; Eddy v. Merchants' etc. Ins.
Co., 72 Mich. 651 ; Lucas v. White Line Transfer Co., 70 Iowa,
641, 69 Am. Eep. 449.
The case differs essentially from Beach v. Wakefield, 107 Iowa,
667. In that case the corporation had power to make contracts
Jan. 1899.] In be Assignment Mutual etc. Ins. Co, 155
like the one upon which it was sued. The prohihition wa&
against an indebtedness exceeding two-thirds of its capital stock.
In this case the insurance company had no power to make a con-
tract of insurance on the stock plan and it was absolutely in-
hibited from receiving premiums. Again, in that case the cor-
poration had the benefit of the money borrowed, and was asked
to repay it. To a plea of ultra vires we quoted the following
rule from Morawetz on Corporations : "If an agreement is legally
void and noneniorceable by reason of s6me statutory or com-
mon-law prohibition, either party to the agreement who has re-
ceived anything from the other party, and has failed to perform
the agreement on his part, must account to the latter for what
he has received. Under these circumstances the court will grant
relief, irrespective of the invalid agreement, unless it involves
some positive immorality, or there are other reasons of public
policy why the courts should refuse to grant relief'*: See, also,.
Heuer v. Carmichael, 83 Iowa, 290 ; Peatman v. Centerville etc.
Power Co., 100 Iowa, 245. If this were an action to recover back
the premium paid or for benefits received, the rule just quoted
might apply: Pittsburgh etc. Ry. Co. v. Keokuk etc. Bridge Co.^
131 U. S. 371. But such is not the nature of the proceeding.
It is to recover upon a contract of indemnity which the cor-
poration had no power to make, and which is prohibited by
statute. The case does not differ in principle from Lucas v.
White Line Transfer Co., 70 Iowa, 541, 59 Am. Rep. 449, which
was an action upon a contract of suretyship. ^^^ We there held
that the corporation was not liable and that the officers of thtt
corporation could not ratify such a contract. In the Beach-
Wakefield case we held that the corporation was bound to ac-
count for the money it had received on the theory of an equitable-
estoppel, or that he who has accepted the benefits of a transac-
tion must accept its burdens. The law expressly enjoined the
officers of the insurance company from receiving premiums, and
it prohibited the making of just such contracts as the one in
suit. Surely, the members of the society who were bound to
each other by mutual pledges should not be held to respond
to appellee for the amount of his loss. The order disallowing
appellant's claim was clearly right, and it is affirmed.
INSTTRANCB COMPANIES-MUTUAL INSURANCE COMPA-
NIES differ epspntlally from stock Insurance companies: Baxter v.
Chelsea Mut etc. Co.. 1 Allen. 294, 79 Am. Dec. 730.
INST'RANCB COMPANIES -MUTUAIv-MEMBERS NOT PART-
NERS.—The holder of a policy of insurance in a mutual company i»
156 In be Assignment Mutual etc. Ins. Co. [Iowa,
in uo sense a partner of the corporation; bis relation with the com-
pany is one of contract, measured by the terms of the policy: Uhl-
man v. New York Life Ins. Co., 109 N. Y. 421, 4 Am. St. Rep. 482;
see, also, Payne v. Snow, 12 Cush. 443, 59 Am. Dec. 203.
The Doctrine of Ultra Vires in Relation to the Contracts of Private
Corporations.*
The rapid spread of the corporation idea in the business world,
particularly in the United States, during the last half-century, has
necessitated a correspondingly rapid development of corporation
law. This latter development has been to a large degree forced and
unnatural. The questions arising have been both new and numer-
ous, following upon each other in a rapid complexity, more or less
■disconcerting to the judicial temperament, accustomed from time
immemorial to leisurely and dignified mental operations. In such
a state of affairs, our judicial system has apparent disadvantages.
■Corporation law has been developed by our numerous state and
federal courts under varying conditions, varying statutes, and vary-
ing constitutional provisions, and it is to be expected that corpora-
tion law, as a separate body of our law, should present the aspect
-of an unfinished structure being hastened to completion in a man-
ner at once unsystematic and spasmodic. Much of it still remains
for building, and much that has been placed in the structure will
have to be torn away before a logical and congruous completion
will be had.
Involved State of Our Subject.— ThoBe students of corporation law
"Who have considered the doctrine of ultra vires bear unanimous wit-
ness that the subject is much confused and unsettled. Mr. Brlce,
having prepared his work on Ultra Vires, speaks of the doctrine in
his preface as "a guiding, or rather misleading, principle in the
legal system" of England, and says that "the decisions and dicta
upon this subject are very conflicting, and some absolutely irrecon-
cilable, while the principle is become, if not an excrescence upon,
at least a very aisturbing element in, the legal system.' Mr. Brlce
speaks concerning the state of the doctrine in Englacd. That the
same conditions obtain in our own country cannot be doubted by
one who has attempted to collect and classify the American cases.
Perhaps the best qualified of American writers to speak upon this
matter is Seymour D. Thompson, who, in an article on "The Doc-
trine of Ultra Vires in Relation to Private Corporations," published
in the American Law Review, volume 28, page 376. says: "After
"having given a long and attentive study to the subject, the writer
afllrms that the Anglo-American law with reference to it is in a
state of hopeless and inextricable confusion; that contradictory de-
cisions are constantly rendered by the same courts, that opposing
principles, tending to contrary results, jostle and crowd each other
as the Ice floes jostle and crowd each other going southward out of
Baffin's bay through Davis straits; and that the judge seizes upon
♦reference to monographic notes.
Sale by corporation of Its assets: 99 Am. Dec. 833-3:^8.
Power of corporation to purchase its own capital stock: 33 Am. St. Rep. 83»-847.
Right of one corportUlon to acquire stock In another: 86 Am. St. Rep. 184-142.
Eight to transfer public franchl^es: 35 Am. St. Rep. 89(M07.
Jan. 1899.] In re Assignment Mutual etc. Ins. Co. 157
one of these principles to-day and to-morrow upon another, and en-
larges It or applies it according to the seeming exigencies of justice
in the particular case."
Misuse of Terms.— Although partly traceable to other causes, this
confusion is due In a great measure to the carelessness with which
courts hav# used the term "ultra vires." "There is nothing of mys-
tery or of sanctity In the use of the words of a dead language— 'ul-
tra vires,' " said the court in National Bank v. Porter, 125 Mass.
333, 28 Am. Rep. 235. The term. If It have any proper place In the
vocabulary of the law, must have a definite and ascertainable mean-
ing. Whether with strict propriety or not, the term, "ultra vlres,"l»
used In different senses. "An act is said to be ultra vires when it
is not within the scope of the powers of the coi-poratlon to perform
it under any circumstances, or for any purpose. An act is also,
sometimes, said to be ultra vires with reference to the rights of
certain parties when the corporation Is not authorized to perform
it without their consent; or with reference to some specific purpose,
when it is not authorized to perform it for that purpose, although
fully within the general powers of the corporation, with the con-
sent of the parties Interested, or for some other purpose": Miners'
Ditch Co. V. Zellerbach, 37 Cal. 543, 99 Am. Dec. 300. It Is a rather
common error to confuse the terms "illegality" and "ultra vires,"
terms which represent totally different and distinct ideas. A con-
tract of a corporation may be both ultra vires and illegal, though
!t by no means follows that because such a contract is ultra vires it
is also Illegal, nor Is Illegality a necessary, or perhaps even a usual,
characteristic of ultra vires contracts. Whether a contract is illegal
or not is determined by its quality, and In this connection It matters
little whether it be the contract of a corporation or of an Individ-
ual; whether It be ultra vires or not Is determined from a consid-
eration of the powers expressly conferred upon the corporation by
the Instrument of its creation, together with those other powers
implied in the purposes of its creation and In the powers expressly
granted: BIssell v. Railroad Cos., 22 N. Y. 258. An illegal contract,
the same being Illegal In the sense of malum in se or malum pro-
hibitum, is ultra vires of anyone to make, corporation or private
individual; so when the contract in question is of a corporation it
would avoid confusion If the terms "illegal" and "ultra vires" were
divorced, and only the latter used, especially where the question Is
not of its legality but purely whether or not It is ultra vires of the
corporation making It: Compare People v. Chicago Gas Trust Co.,
130 111. 2G8, 17 Am. St. Rep. 319; Franklin Company v. Lewiston
Inst, for Savings, 68 Me. 43, 28 Am. Rep. 9. To say that a con-
tract is ultra vires is to affirm that It is Illegal in the sense that
It is beyond the powers conferred by law upon the corporation mak-
ing the contract, but It is to this especial sense that the term is
properly applicable. Or, we may say, the term "Illegal" is generic
while that of ultra vires is specific, and to use a generic term where
a specific term only Is applicable is to sacrifice exactness and pro-
duce confusion. Of what value are refinements in legal terms and
definitions if we do not recognize them?
158 In re Assignment Mutual etc. Ins. Co. [Iowa,
Proper Use of "Ultra Vires" and the Meaning of the Term.— When acts
of corporations are spoken of as ultra vires, it is not intended that
they are unlawful, or even such as the corporation cannot perform,
but merely those which are not within the powers conferred upon
the corporation by the act of its creation, and are In violation of the
trust reposed in the managing Ixtard by the shareholders, that the
affairs shall be managed and the funds applied solely for carrying
out the objects for which the corporation was created: Whitney
Arms Co. V. Barlow, 63 N. Y. 62, 20 Am. Rep. 504; Kadish v. Garden
City etc. Assn., 151 111. 531, 42 Am. St. Rep. 256. The term "ultra
vires" is applicable to contracts of corporations only when they in-
volve adventures or undertakings outside and not within the scope
of the power given by their charters: Leslie v. Lorillard, 110 N. Y.
519; Jemison v. Citizens' Sav. Bank, 122 N. Y. 135, 19 Am. St. Rep.
482; Monument Nat. Bank v. Globe Works, 101 Mass. 57, 3 Am. Rep.
322; Citizens' State Bank v. Hawkins, 71 Fed. Rep. 369; Matthews
V. Skinner, 62 Mo. 329, 21 Am. Rep. 425. Mr. Justice Gray, In Rail-
way Cos. V. Keokuk Bridge Co., 131 U. S. 371, thus states the basis
of the doctrine of ultra vires: "The reasons why a corporation is
not liable upon a contract ultra vires, that Is to say, beyond the
powers conferred upon it by the legislature and varying from the
objects of its creation as declared in the law of its organization are:
1. The interest of the public, that the corporation shall not transcend
the powers granted; 2. The interest of the stockholders, that capi-
tal shall not be subjected to the risk of enterprises not contem-
plated by the charter, and therefore not authorized by the stock-
holders In subscribing for the stock; 3. The obligation of everyone
•entering into a contract with a coi-poration to take notice of the
'legal limit of its powers."
As we shall have occasion to note later, courts have adopted dif-
ferent views as to the status of ultra vires contracts and the en-
forceable rights which may arise out of them. The doctrine of ul-
tra vires as it first took shape was quite rigid. It proceeded upon
the old theory as to the character of corporations which were re-
garded as purely artificial persons having absolutely no powers be-
yond those given under a strict construction of their charters. Be-
yond the limits of these powers they could create no valid obliga-
tions. A contract beyond these powers was absolutely null and
void: Straus v. Eagle Ins. Co., 5 Ohio St., 60. A corporation had no
potential existence outside the scope of its creation: Davis v. Old
Colony R. R., 131 Mass. 258, 41 Am. Rep. 221. So, where a corpora-
tion attempted to make a contract entirely foreign to the purpose
and objects of its creation, such contract was void: Rock River
Bank v. Sherwood, 10 Wis. 230. 78 Am. Dec. 669. "A contract of a
corporation which is ultra vires, in (he proper sense, that Is to say
outside the object of Its creation as defined in the law of its organ-
ization, and therefore beyond the powers conferred upon It by the
legislature. Is not voldahle only," said Mr. Justice Gray in Central
Transp. Co. v. rullmau's Car Co., 139 U. S. 24, "but wholly void,
and of no legal effect The objection to the contract is, not merely
Jan. 1899.] In be Assignment Mutual etc. Ins. Co. 159
that the corporation ought not to have made It, but that It could not
make It. The contract cannot be ratified by either party, because
It could not have been authorized by either. No performance on
either side can give the unlawful contract any validity, or be the
foundation of any right of action upon it": Xhomas v. Railroad Oo.,
101 U. S. 71; Elevator Co. v. Memphis etc. R. R. Co., 85 Tenn. 703,
4 Am. St. Rep. 798. A corporation having taken and used steam-
boats purchased under an ultra vires contract was held to have in-
curred no liability upon notes given for the purchase price: Pearce
v. Madison etc. R. R. Co., 21 How. 441. These matters open up large
questions which we will treat later herein. Here It is only our pur-
pose to give an outline of the tlieories out of which the doctrine un-
der consideration grew. It should be remembered that the purely
private corporation Is a modern creation. Early corporations were
mostly created for public purposes and invested with public fran-
chises. Therefore the interest of the public that they should be al-
lowed no other powers than those granted them was more than Imag-
inary. The same Is to be said of quasi public corporations. The
purely private corporation, however, still has a doubtful status, and
it Is obvious that in applying to It the doctrine of ultra vires new
problems have been encountered which have rendered such appli-
cation difficult. In many ways the old conception of a corporation
has been qualified, as, for example, in holding corporations liable
for torts, though the commission of torts is certainly otftside and
beyond the pui-poses and objects for which corporations are cre-
ated. The tendency has been, and Is, to treat private corporations
as private Individuals, a tendency which cannot be too highly com-
mended. It Is coming to be sensibly recognized that a private cor-
poration Is really an association of persons and that no judicial dic-
tum or legislative enactment can alter this fact: Stockton v. Cen-
tral R. R. Co., 50 N. J. Eq., 52.
Judicial Prejudice Against Plea of Ultra Firc».— The modern tend-
ency is to relax the ancient rigor of the doctrine of ultra vires as
applied to the contracts of private corporations. The doctrine is
held to have no application in favor of corporations for wrongs com-
mitted by them: National Bank v. Graham, 100 U. S. 699. "The
law," it Is said, "never sustains the defense of ultra vires out of re-
gard for the corporation. It does so only where the most persuasive
considerations of public policy are involved": Wright v. Hughes,
119 Ind. 324, 12 Am. St. Rep. 412. A liberal application of the doc-
trine is generally approved, and It Is held that the plea of ultra vires
should not, as a general rule, prevail, whether it is interposed for or
against a corporation, when It would not advance justice, but, on
the contrary, would accomplish a legal wrong: Whitney Arms Co.
V. Barlow, 63 N. Y. 62, 20 Am. Rep. 504; Wright v. Hughes, 119 Ind.
324, 12 Am. St. Rep. 412; Third Avenue Sav. Bank v. Dimock. 24
N. J. Eq., 26; Holmes etc. Co. v. Holmes etc. Metal Co., 127 N. Y.
252, 24 Am. St. Rep. 448; Linkauf v. Lombard, 137 N. Y. 417, 33 Am.
St. Rep. 743; Carson City Sav. Bk. v. Elevator C5o., 90 Mich. 550,
30 Am. St Rep. 454; Bear River Valley etc. Co. v. Hanley, 15 Utah.
100 In re Assignment Mutual etc. Ins. Co. [Iowa,
506; Lewis v. American Sav. etc. Co., 98 Wis. 203; Railway Co. y.
McCarthy, 96 U. S. 258. The defense of ultra vires is looked upon
by the courts with disfavor whenever it is presented for the pur-
pose of avoiding an obligation which the corporation has assumed
merely in excess of powers conferred upon it and not in violation
of some express provision of the statute: Kennedy v. California
Sav. Bank, 101 Cal. 495, 40 Am. St. Rep. 69. "The safety of men
In their daily contracts requires that this doctrine of ultra vire»
should be confined within narrow bounds," said Lord St. Leonards
In Eastern Counties Ry. Co. v. Hawkes, 5 H. L. Cas. 331. A court
will be very slow to set aside a contract as ultra vires because not
beneficial to the corporation, where the general power to make it is
conceded, and when the stockholders, at the time it was made, with
the lights they then had, considered it to be beneficial: Marbury v.
Kentucky Union Land Co., 62 Fed. Rep. 335. The old doctrine of
ultra vires, resting in the close interest that the public has in re-
straining corporations from contracting beyond their powers, is left
far behind in the holding that a corporation, to make the defense of
ultra vires availabe in an action on contract, must plead it and
make manifest the defect in power relied upon: Charleston etc.
Turnpike Co. v. Willey, 16 Ind. 34. It' is presumed that a contract
.made by a corporation is ultra vires and one assumes the burden of
proof who sets up that it is ultra vires: Downing v. Mount Wash-
ington Rbad Co., 40 N. H. 230; Rider Life Raft Co. v. Roach, 97 N.
Y. 378.
Whut Contracts are Ultra Fires.— It Is to be deplored that the term
"ultra vires" has been applied in various senses to the contracts of
private corporations. The proper sense, and the one to which we
shall try to adhere herein, is found in its application to contracts
which are outside the objects for which the corporation was cre-
ated, and in excess of the powers conferred upon it by the legislature
In the instrument of its creation. As we have said already, the term
Is improperly applied to contracts which are forbidden by pubic
policy, or by positive law, such contracts being illegal. Again, It
Is applied to contracts which are defective, not In the fact that
their execution is outside the purjjose and power of the corporation,
but in the fact that they ai"e executed in an unauthorized manner;
and, again, to contracts the defect In which Is that they were en-
tered into by officers of the corporation in excess of the scope of
their authority, although the power of the corporation to properly
enter Into such contracts is undoubted. The latter class of cases
pertain to agency and none of the applications made of the term,
ultra vires, is strictly correct except that one first mentioned and
approved herein. An Indefinite amount of space might be taken up
Id calling attention to the infinite variety of contracts made by
private corporations and construed by courts to be or not to be ul-
tra vires. The businesses for the transaction of which corporations
are formed and chartered are as various as those engaged In by
private Individuals, and these corporations transact their businesses
along much the same Hues as do individuals. There is a continued ;
J:;n. 1899.] In re Assignment Mutual etc. Ins. Co. 161
stress toward tbe allowance to corporations of the same right to
contract that Is allowed individuals, but the special difference be-
tween the two is a restraining factor. A corporation's powers are
limited by the charter of its creation, an impediment with which
iudividuais are not burdened, and in any case involving the ultra
vires quality of a corporation's contract, the contract and the
charter in question are the important matters. However, a cer-
tain degree of classification is possible and may serve to illustrate
the reason of the doctrine, as well as the unreason with which It
is sometimes interpreted and applied.
The statement of the sense in which we shall use the term "ultra
vires" is the groundworlj of any attempt to answer the querj',
What contracts of private corporations are ultra vires? A detailed
notice of the cases will simply elaborate this statement. It may be
regarded as well settled that where general authority is given a
corporation to engage in business, and there are no special restraints
in its charter, it takes power as a natural person enjoys it, with
all its incidents and accessories; it may borrow money to attain
its legitimate objects precisely as an individual, and bind itself
by any form of obligation not forbidden: Wright v. Hughes, 119 Ind.
324; 12 Am. St. Rep. 412; Memphis etc. R. R. Co. v. Dow, 19 Fed.
Rep. 388; New England Fire etc. Ins. Co. v. Robinson, 25 Ind. 53G;
Reichwald v. Commercial Hotel Co., 106 111. 430; Hays v. Gallon
Gas Light etc. Co., 29 Ohio St., 330; Booth v. Robinson, 55 Md. 419.
It is a question of what is directly or impliedly inhibited by the char-
ter of a corporation. Unless such an inhibition exists, a corporation
may loan its undivided profits: Dock v. Schlichter Jute Cordage
Co., 107 Pa. St. 370. A statute providing that, "No corporation
shall engage in mercantile or agricultural business, nor in commis-
sion, brokerage, stock-jobbing, exchange, or banking business of
any kind," refers only to the buying and selling of merchandise as
an employment, implies oi)erations conducted with a view of realiz-
ing the profits wlijch come from skillful purchase, barter, specu-
lation, and sale, and does not render ultra vires a single purchase
of cotton by a railroad corporation incorporated thereunder: Gra-
ham V. Hendricks, 22 La. Ann. 52.3. Whether an act of a corpo-
ration comes within the powers granted by its charter must be de-
termined in each case from all its facts and circumstances. Acts
wliich, if standing alone, or when engaged in as a business, would
be beyond the powers of the corporation, are not necessarily ultra
vires when they are merely incidental to, or form part of, an en-
tire transaction, that, in its general scope, is within the corporate
purpose: Central Ohio Nat. Gas etc. Co. v. Capital City Dairy Co.,
60 Ohio St. 90.
If a contract Is Intended to further the Interests and objects of a
corporation, courts are loth to declare it ultra vires; and it is ob-
vious that such a criterion allows courts a very liberal latitude.
A contract by a railroad corporation employing a surgeon to at-
tend injured employes is not ultra vires: Bedford Belt Ry. Co. v.
McDonald, 17 Ind. App. 492; fiO Am. St. Rep. 172. Two railroad
companies may enter into a contract to advance one another's io-
AM. ST. Kkp., Vol. LXX.— 11
162 In ee Assignment Mutual etc. Ins. Co. [Iowa,
terests In all lawful manners: Tonawanda R. R. Co. v. New York
etc. R. R. Co., 42 Hun, 496. It is said in Jaclisonville etc. Ry. etc. Co.
V. Hooper, 160 U. S. 514: "Courts may be permitted, where there
Is no legislative prohibition shown, to put a favorable construc-
tion upon such exercise of power by a railroad company as is suita-
ble to promote the success of the company within its chartered
powers, and to contribute to the comfort of those who travel
thereon. To lease and maintain a summer hotel at the seaside ter-
minus of a railroad might obviously increase the business of the
company and the comfort of its passengers, and be within the pror
visions of the statute of Florida above cited, whereby a railroad
company is authorized 'to sell, lease, or buy any land or real es-
tate not necessary for its use,' and to 'erect and maintain all con-
venient buildings .... for the accommodation and use of their pas-
sengers.' "A contract entered into by a railroad corporation before,
for the transportation of freight after, the completion of its line, is
not ultra vires: Louisville etc. Ry. Co. v. Flanagan, 113 Ind. 488; 3
Am. St. Rep. 674. But a corporation chartered to carry on the busi-
ness of a common carrier is not authorized to contract for the pur-
chase and sale of grain: Northwestern Union Pacliet Co. v. Shaw,
37 Wis. 655, 19 Am. Rep. 781; though in that case it was doubted
but that such corporation might lawfully purchase grain and other
produce for storage and shipment, for the purpose of lieeping its
warehouses and boats employed.
Where a corporation was chartered "to buy, own, and sell real
and personal property and to improve the same," it was held not
ultra vires for it to contract for the erection of a building on its
lands and to turn the same over to a college corporation to be or-
ganized. This upon the ground that the corporation had power to
build the college, or do. anything else, the direct or proximate ten-
dency of which would be to improve the property of the corpora-
tion by enhancing its value, or to render it more desirable and
salable: Fulton v. Sterling Land etc. Co., 47 Kan. 621. Compare
Kentucliy Lumber Co. v. Green, 87 Ky. 257. Similarly, a corpora-
tion created for the purpose of dealing in lands, and to which the
powers to purchase, to subdivide and to sell, and to make any con-
tract essential to the transaction of Its business, are expressly
granted, possesses, as fairly Incidental, the power to incur liability
In respect of securing better facilities for transit to and from the
lots of land, as by building a bridge: Fort Worth City Co. v. Smith
Bridge Co., 151 U. S. 294. A contract by a mining corporation to
advance a sum of money for the construction of a tunnel to be used
In conducting its business is not ultra vires: Sutro Tunnel Co. v.
Segregated Belcher Min. Co., 19 Nev. 121. It is not ultra vires for
a corporation organized for the manufacture of certain articles to
assume to fill a contract made with another for furnishing such
articles: Louis Cook Mfg. Co, v. Randall, 62 Iowa, 244. But a sav-
ings bank empowered by its charter to "borrow money, buy and
Bell exchange, bullion, bank notes, government stocks, and other
securities, has not the power to enter into speculative contracts
for the sale or purchase of stocks at the stock board or elsewhere
Jan. 1899.] In re Assignment Mutual etc. Ins. Co. 163
•ubject to the hazard and contingency of gain or loss. Such con-
tracts are ultra vires: Jemlson v. Citizens' Sav, Bank, 122 N. Y.
135, 19 Am. St. ,Rep. 482. The character of the transactions in such
a, case Is all-important. Thus, the fact that a cotton-mill corpo-
ration purchases cotton for future delivery, through a broker, and
puts up margins necessary to carry It, does not render the pur-
■chases ultra vires, if they were not in fact speculations on the rise
And fall of cotton, but vrere made in the ordinary and legitimate
business of the mill for Its own use: Sampson v. Camperdown Cot-
ton Mills, 82 Fed. Rep. 833. Contracts in furtherance of the busi-
ness of a corporation are not ultra vires because made in antici-
pation of legislation that will authorize the completion of the con-
tract: New Haven etc. Co. v. Hayden, 107 Mass. 525; Supervisors
v. Wisconsin Cent. R. R. Co., 121 Mass. 4G0. But a corporation
<loes not possess the power to acquire by assignment claims of
■others for damages growing out of an alleged conspiracy to de-
fraud, but in no way connected with its affairs, and not necessary
to preserve its property or protect its interests: Farwell Co. v.
Wolf, 96 Wis. 10; 65 Am. St Rep. 22. See as illustrative cases: Sim-
mons V. Troy Ii'on Works, 92 Ala. 427; Richelieu Hotel Co. v. Mili-
tary etc. Co., 140 111. 248; 33 Am. St. Rep. 234.
Contracts Transferring or Leasing Corporate Property.— In an earlier
note In this series we discussed the right of corporations to transfer
public franchises, and stated that the cases are virtually in unison
as to the doctrine that a transfer of franchises cannot be effected
without the authority of the sovereign grantor, and that the rule
is the same whether the transfer Is attempted to be made by a vol-
tintary act, such as conveyance, mortgage, lease, consolidation, or
by a forced sale at the Instance of the creditors of the holder of
the franchises: See monographic note to Brunswick Gas Light Co. v.
United Gas etc. Co., 35 Am. St. Rep. 390; Central Transp. Co. v.
Pullman's Car Co.. 139 U. S. 24; Smith v. Cornelius, 41 W. Va. 60;
Stockton V. Central R. R. Co., 50 N. J. Eq. 52. This rule, which la
•with good reason applied to public and quasi public corporations,
loses Its reason when attempted to be applied to strictly private
■corporations in regard to their corporate assets. No reason is ap-
parent why such a corporation may not in good faith and while
solvent dispose of its assets in whole or In part: See monographic
note to Miner's Ditch Co. v. Zellerbach, 99 Am. Dec. 333. Such
■corporations, like a partnership or Indivdual, may either sell or
lease their property: Holmes etc. Mfg. Co. v. Holmes etc. Metal
CJo., 127 N. Y. 252, 24 Am. St. Rep. 448; Central Transp. Co. v. Pull-
man's Car Co., 139 U. S. 24; Treadwell v. Salisbury Mfg. Co.. 7
<Jray, 393, 66 Am. Dec. 490; Evan v. Boston Heating Co., 157 Mass.
37; Lauman v. I^banon Valley R. R. Co., 30 Pa. St. 42, 72 Am. Dec
«85; Ardesco Oil Co. v. North American Oil etc. Co., 66 Pa. St. 375;
State V. Western Irrigating Canal Co., 40 Kan. 96, 10 Am. St Rep.
166; Bartholomew v. Derby Rubber Co., 69 Conn. 521, 61 Am. St.
Rep. 57. Compare Byrne v. Schuyler Electric Mfg. Co., 65 Conn.
S36; McCutoheon v. Merz Capsule Co., 71 Fed. Rep. 787.
Negotiable Paper— Contracts of Guaranty and Suretyship.— It seems
164 In bb Assignment Mutual etc. Ins. Co. [Iowa,
that It Is not ultra vires for a corporation to enter Into contract*
of guaranty and suretyship when it does so in the legitmate fur-
therance of its purposes and business. Thus, a lumber company^
where it is essential to the successful prosecution of its business
that a short line of railway penetrating its timber lands should
be constructed and operated, may guarantee the bonds of a railroad
company taking such matter in hand: Mercantile Trust Co. v. Kiser,
91 Ga. 636; Tod v. Kentucky Union Land Co., 57 Fed. Rep. 47; Mar-
bury V. Kentucky Union Land Co., 62 Fed. Rep. 335. So a lumber
company may become surety upon the bond of a contractor to whouv
it furnishes building material, such being the custom of manufac-
turers of lumber in the same locality: Wheeler v. Everett Land Co.»
14 Wash. 630. And it was held not to be ultra vires for a brew-
ing corporation to guarantee the rent of a hotel, the bar fixtures
and furniture of which it owned and in which its beer was to be
sold: Winterfield v. Cream City Brewing Co., 96 Wis. 239; though
the contrary has also been held: Filon v. Miller Brewing Co., 60
Hun, 582. However, If two business corporations have different
charter purposes, and have, therefore, no lawful right to aid or as-
sist each other in business, one cannot, in the absence of statutory
authority, become surety for the other: Northside Ry. Co. v. Worth-
Ington, 88 Tex. 562, 53 Am. St. Rep. 778. See, also, Lucas v. White
Line Transfer Co., 70 Iowa, 541, 59 Am. Rep. 449. The power of
corporations to enter into contracts of guaranty and suretyship Is.
closely related to their power to execute negotiable and accommo-
dation paper. A corporation with i)ower to execute negotiable
paper may bind Itself as indorser or guarantor of bonds received
by it in due course of business, for the purpose of increasing the
value of such bonds: Tod v. Kentucky Land Co., 57 Fed, Rep. 47.
The proposition Is well supported by authority that it is ultra virea
of a corporation to execute accommodation paper or to enter into
contracts of guaranty or suretyship not in furtherance of Its busi-
ness, unless given express authority to do so: Tod v. Kentucky
Union Land Co., 57 Fed. Rep. 47; Lyon v. First Nat. Bank, 85 Fed.
Rep. 120; Park Hotel Co. v. Fourth Nat. Bank, 86 Fed. Rep. 742;
Hall V. Auburn Turnpike Co., 27 Cal. 255, 87 Am. Dec. 75; National
Park Bank v. German-American etc. Warehousing etc. Co., 116 N.
Y. 281; Bridgeport City Bank v. Empire Stone etc. Co., 30 Barb.
421; Madison etc. Road Co. v. Watertown etc. Road Co., 7 Wis. 59.
But It has been held that the stockholders may ratify and validate
accommodation paper executed without authority by the oflJcers of
a corporation, no other rights Intervening: Martin v. Niagara Falls
Paper etc. Co., 122 N. Y. 165.
On the Purchase by a Corporation of Its Own or Stock of Another Cor-
poration.—In America, the great wefght of authority sustains a doc-
trine directly opposed to that announced by the English courts,,
and In this country It Is very generally maintained that, In the ab-
sence of statutory prohibition, a solvent corporation or Its oflJcers
may Invest Its funds in the purchase of Its own stock; or may take
such stock In payment of debts due It from a stockholder; or may
take It lu exchange for other property owned by the corporation: See
Jan. 1899. J In re Assignment Mutual etc. Ins. Co. 165
monographic note to Commercial Nat. Bank v. Burch, 33 Am. St.
Rc'p. 339, thoroughly discussing this subject. Compare Adams &
Westlake Co. v. Deyette, 5 S. D. 418, 49 Am. St. Rep. 887, and
Dock V. Schlichter Jute Cordage Co., 167 Pa". St. 370. As to the
purchase by one corporation of stock in another a contrary rule
obtains. Such transactions are viewed by the courts with particu-
lar disfavor because of their tendency to create and encourage
monopolies. In this matter we are confronted with great difficul-
ties, because the acquisition of the stock may be so connected with
the business of the corporation that much doubt may reasonably
€xlst as to whether or not the transaction is defensible, on the
ground that it was incidental to the exercise of some power clearly
possessed by the corporation. It is well settled, however, that the
power of one corporation to purchase the stock of another corpo-
ration must be authorized by Its charter or by general law, and that
while this power may sometimes be incidental to some undisputed
authority, its exercise when the object is to obtain the control and
management of another corporation Is distinctly ultra vires: Sefr
monographic note to Denny Hotel Co. v. Schram, 36 Am. St. Rep.
134; Commercial Fire Ins. Co. v. Board of Revenue, 99 Ala. 1, 42
Am. St. Rep. 17; Railway Co. v. Iron Co., 46 Ohio St. 44; Marble
Co. V. Harvey, 92 Tenn. 115, 36 Am. St Rep. 71; Knowles v. Sand-
ercock, 107 Cal. 629; Marbury y. Kentucky Union Land Co., 62 Fed.
Rep. 335.
Executory Contracts under the Doctrine of Ultra Tires.— We have,
perhaps, taken up too much space In discussing what contracts of
private corporations are ultra vires. Any treatment of that ques-
tion within the limits of a note of this kind must be quite inade-
quate, but a rapid resumi such as we have attempted seemed nec-
essary as a preparation to taking up the phase of the subject upon
which we now enter. In discussing the application of the doctrine
of ultra vires to the contracts of private corporations, we find that
such contracts fall Into two classes— executory and executed; and
that executed contracts are divided Into those wholly executed, and
those partially executed. The doctrine of ultra vires may be said
to be only applicable, in its fullest force, to executory contracts:
Thompson v. Lambert, 44 Iowa, 239. When a contract has been
executed wholly or in part either by the corporation or the other
party, other elements enter, as we shall see, equities arise which
demand recognition, and the application of the doctrine is qualified.
An ultra vires contract which is purely executory cannot be en-
forced by either party, and in a suit thereon the plea of ultra ylrea
is a good defense either for the corporation or against It: Sherwood
V. Alvis, 83 Ala. 115, 3 Am. St. Rep. 605; Long v. Georgia Pac. Ry.
Co., 91 Ala, 519, 24 Am. St. Rep. 931; McNulta v. Corn Belt Bank,
164 111. 427. 56 Am. St. Rep. 203; Pennsylvania etc. Navigation Co.
V. Dandridge, 8 Gill. & J. 248, 29 Am. Dec. 543; Garrett v. Kansas
City Coal Min. Co., 113 Mo. 3.30, 35 Am. St Rep. 713; Greenville
Compress etc. Co. v. Planters' Compress etc. Co., 70 Miss. 669, 35
Am. St Rep. 681; San Francisco Gas Co. v. San Francisco, 9 Cal.
453; Nassau Bank v. Jones. 95 N. Y. 115, 47 Am. Rep. 14; Jemisoa
166 In re Assignment Mutu4l etc. Ins. Co. [lowa^
V. Citizens' Sav. Bank, 122 N. Y. 135, 19 Am. St. Rep. 482; Shermaa
Center Town Co. v. Morris, 43 Kan. 282, 19 Am. St. Rep. 134; State-
Board V. Citizens' Street Ry. Co., 47 Ind. 407, 17 Am. Rep. 702;
Bradley v. Ballard, 55 III. 413, 8 Am. Rep. 656; Day v. Spiral Springs
Buggy Co., 57 Mich. 146, 58 Am. Rep. 352; Wright v. Hughes, 119^
Ind. 324, 12 Am. St. Rep. 412; Simpson v. Building etc. Assn., 38-
Ohio St. 349; Easun v. Buckeye Brewing Co., 51 Fed. Rep. 156. By
the same cases it is affirmed that an ultra vires contract which i»
executory cannot be made the basis of a recovery of damages. It
is a reasonable rule that one whose condition has not been changed
or prejudiced by an ultra vires contract cannot compel its enforce-
ment: Twiss V. Guaranty Life Assn., 87 Iowa, 733, 43 Am. St. Rep.
418. Courts will not decree a conveyance to a corporation under
an ultra vires contract, and will hesitate to set aside such convey-
ance when already completed: Case v. Kelly, 133 U. S. 21. While a
contract ultra vires remains executory courts interfere to prevent
its enforcement, or, on the application of a shareholder or other au-
thorized person, the court prevents its execution: Kadish v. Gar-
den City etc. Assn., 151 111. 531, 42 Am. St. Rep. 256; Bradley v.
Ballard, 55 111. 413, 8 Am. Rep. 656; Board of Commrs. v. Lafayette
etc. R. R. Co., 50 Ind. 85; Small v. Minneapolis Electro-Matrix Co.,
45 Minn. 264; Stewart v. Erie etc. Trans. Co., 17 Minn. 372; Gifford
V. New Jersey R. R. etc. Co., 10 N. J. Eq. 174; Elkins v. Camden
etc. R. R. Co., 36 N. J. Eq. 5; Dodge v. Woolsey, 18 How. 331. The
right of a stockholder to such relief does not depend in any respect
upon the profitableness or unprofitableness of the contract in ques-
tion: Byrne v. Schuyler Electric Mfg. Co., 65 Conn. 336. Though
he may be precluded from obtaining relief by his laches in seek-
ing it: Boyce v. Montauk Gas Coal Co., 37 W. Va. 73; Boston etc.
R. R. Co. V. New York etc. R. R. Co., 13 R. L 260; or by his ac-
quiescence in the contract: Alexander v. Searcy, 81 Ga. 536, 12 Am.
St. Rep. 337; Memphis etc. R. R. Co. v. Grayson, 88 Ala. 572, 16
Am. St. Rep. 69.
Executed Ultra Vires Contracts.— Where an ultra vires contract has
been fully performed by both parties, it is Justly held that It is na
longer assailable by either party: Cincinnati etc. R. R. Co. v. Mc-
Keen, 64 Fed. Rep. 36; Thomas v. Railroad Co., 101 U. S. 71; Par-
ish v. Wheeler, 22 N. Y. 494; Long v. Georgia Pac. Ry. Co., 91 Ala.
519, 24 Am. St. Rep. 931; Camden etc. R. R. Co. v. May's Land-
ing etc. R. R. Co., 48 N. J. L. 530; Taylor v. South & North Ala»
R. R. Co., 4 Woods, 575; Union Trust Co. v. Illinois Midland Ry.
Co.. 117 U. S. 434; Pennsylvania R. R. Co. v. St. Louis etc. R. R.
Co., 118 U. S. 290. It Is only when we come to consider ultra vires
contracts which have been fully performed on one side that we
find the cases Inextricably confused. There are sound and appar-
rent considerations .which give to such contracts a standing different
from that cither of wholly executory or wholly executed contracts.
They pre.««cnt the spectacle of benefits received and enjoyed by one
party, and outlays by the other party, with no consideration hav-
ing passed between them. A right Is presented for which, accord-
ing to the foundation maxim of equity, there must be a correspond-
Jan. 1899.J In be Assignment Mutual etc. Ins. Co. 167
Ing remedy. Few courts, If any at all, attempt to deny this, but
in their search for thQ desired remedy they have taken dlflferent
paths, some of which have led far away from the object sought
to be attained. Pei-haps, as we have already suggested, a great
deal of the. present confusion in this branch of the law would have
been avoided had courts agreed, at the beginning, upon a definition
of the term "ultra vires" as applied to the contracts of private cor-
porations. The attempt of some courts to recognize no distinction
between an ultra vires contract and one that Is Illegal because in
violation of the letter of the law, or because contrary to public
policy, was most unfortunate. Beginning with the proposition that
an ultra vires contract Is unlawful and void, courts naturally held
that such a contract could not be the foundation of any rights. No
performance or ratification, no application of the rules of estoppel,
could give to such a contract any semblance of validity. From
another point of approach courts were confronted by the rule of
law that persons dealing with a corijoratlon must take notice of Its
powers, and, therefore, a person having entered into a contract
with a corporation which was ultra vires of the corporation, did so
with notice of such fact, and was guilty of a species of contributory
negligence which disabled him to acquire any rights under such
contract But the injustice of such a rule became manifest soon
enough, and exceptions became numerous. Approaching from still
another direction, the problem presented itself In this wise: Limi-
tations upon the powers of corporations are made for the benefit
of the public. Ultra vires contracts violate the obligations of cor-
porations to the sovereign which delegates them their powers.
Hence, grew the doctrine that the question as to whether an act
or contract of a corporation Is ultra vires can only be raised by,
or at the instance of, the state. These matters, coupled with a
mistaken idea of the character of private corporations, and of the
real nature of an ultra vires contract, served to bring about the con-
fusion to which we have adverted.
Estoppel Arising from Receipt of Benefits.— We have already said
that the plea of ultra vires, either when made for or against a
corporation, will not be sustained when it will not advance jus-
tice, but on the contrary, will promote -injustice. When the plea
of ultra vires is excluded, it Is generally upon the ground of es-
toppel, It being well settled that neither party to an ultra vires
contract will be allowed to plead ultra vires while at the same time
retaining benefits received thereunder: "Memphis etc. R. R. Co. v.
Dow, 19 Fed. Rep. 388; American Nat. Bank v. National Wall Paper
Co., 77 Fed. Rep. 85; San Francisco Gas Co. v. San Francisco, 9
Cal. 453; Kennedy v. California Sav. Bank, 101 Cal. 495, 40 Am. St.
Rep. 09; Macon etc. R. R. Co. v. Georgia R. R. Co., 63 Ga. 103;
People's Gas Light etc. Co. v. Chicago Gas Light etc. Co., 20 111.
App. 473; Bradley v. Ballard, 55 111. 413, 8 Am. Rep. 656; Heims
Brewing Co. v. Flannery, 1.37 111. 309; Kadlsh v. Garden City etc.
Assn.. 151 111. 531, 42 Am. St. Rep. 256; People v. Suburban R. R.
Co.. 178 111. 594; State Board v. Citizens' Street Ry. Co., 47 Ind.
407, 17 Am. Rep. 702; Wright v. Hughes, U9 Ind. 324, 12 Am. St
168 In be Assignment Mutual etc. Ins. Co. [Iowa,
Rep. 412; White v. Marquardt, 105 Iowa, 145; Sherman Center
Town Co. V. Fletcher, 43 Kan. 282, 19 Am. St. Kep. 134; Canal etc.
R. R. Co. V. St. Charles Street R. R, Co., 44 La. Ann. 1069; Nims
V. Mt. Hermon Boys' School, 160 Mass. 177, 39 Am. St. Rep. 467;
Dewey v, Toledo etc. R. R. Co., 91 Mich. 351; Grohmaun v. Brown,
68 Mo. App. 630; Williams v. Bank of Commerce, 71 Miss. 858, 42
Am. St. Rep. 503; Linkauf v. Lombard, 137 N. Y. 417, 33 Am. St.
Rep. 743; Seymour v. Spring Forest Cemetery Assn., 144 N. Y. 333;
Whitney Arms Co. v. Barlow, 63 N. Y. 62, 20 Am. Rep. 504; Man-
chester etc. R. R. Co. V. Concord R. R. Co., 66 N. H. 100, 49 Am.
St. Rep. 582; Camden etc. R. R. Co v. Mays' Landing etc. R. R. Co.,
48 N. J. L. 530; Oil Creek etc. R. R. Co. v. Pennsylvania Transpor-
tation Co., 83 Pa. St 160; Williamson v. Eastern etc. Assn., 54
S. O. 582; Horton v. Long, 2 Wash. 435, 26 Am. St. Rep. 867;
Tootle V. First Nat. Bank, 6 Wash. 181; McElroy v. Minnesota etc.
Horse Co., 96 Wis. 317. Contra, Chambers v. Falkner, 65 Ala. 448;
Long V. Georgia Pac. Ry. Co., 91 Ala. 519, 24 Am. St. Rep. 931;
Miller v. Insurance Co., 92 Tenn. 167; Day v. Spiral Springs Buggy
Co., 57 Mich. 146, 58 Am. Rep. 352.
The courts which deny that such an estoppel arises under the
circumstances mentioned, base their holdings upon various grounds.
In City Council v. Montgomeiy etc. Plank Road Co., 31 Ala. 76,
the court adverted to the proposition just stated and said: "If this
doctrine be established, these corporations, no matter how limited
their powers, may make themselves omnipotent. They have only
to induce persons to contract with them beyond the scope of their
powers, and their very usurpations have the effect of conferring
powers on them which the legislature have witheld. A proposi-
tion so erroneous can scarcely need argument to overturn it." See,
also, Marion Sav. Bank v. Dunkin, 54 Ala. 471. Thus, in Miller v.
Insurance Co., 92 Tenn. 167, the court having fairly stated the
grounds upon which this application of the law of estoppel rests,
sums up its own views in these sentences: "It seems to us that
the true foundation of the doctrine of ultra vires lies in the propo-
sition that every act of a corporation in excess of its power is an
act in contravention of public policy, and, for that reason, to be
held null and void. The ground upon which corporate privileges
are conferred is, that the public interests may be thereby subsi^rved.
If this be not so, then all such concessions are mere acts of legis-
lative favoritism, and contravene the foundation upon which free
government Is supposed to rest— that all are to be protected in the
enjoyment of equal rights and privileges It must be, there-
fore, that any act In excess of these granted powers is an act con-
trary to public policy, and, upon tliat ground, Illegal and void." The
court approves the English rule that, as to such contracts, there
can be no ratification or estoppel.
But the reasoning of these cases Is not convincing. The Inter-
est which the public, or the state, has In the business transactions
of private corporations Is greatly exaggerated. Such exaggeration
Is traceable to the earlier times when corporations were mostly
public or quasi public, iu which the public had more than an imagi-
Jan. 1899.] In re Assignment Mutual etc. Ins. Co. 169
nary Interest. When It Is shown that a corporation of the present
day Is abusing Its corporate privileges, 'effectual means of conserv-
ing the public Interest are found in proceedings brought by the
state to forfeit the charter of the offending corporation. In the
meantime, the Interest of private individuals who have dealing*
with corporations is important, and it seems to us that since there
is an adequate and proper remedy available to the state to confine
corporate transactions within proper limits, the law should also
protect private parties from the "aggressions" of corporations. The
legal evolution of private corporations has brought them close to
the status of private individuals, or associations of individuals, and
in their private dealings they should be subject to the same rules
of law which prohibit fraud and unfair dealing between man and
man. Otherwise their charters, granted by the state in the fur-
therance of the public interest, become mere special dispensations
authorizing an infinite variety of wrong and oppression. The proper
rule is, that when a transaction Is complete, and the party seeking
relief has performed on his part, the plea of ultra vires Is inad-
missable in an action brought against the corporation for not per-
forming Its side of the contract, in all those instances where the
party who has performed cannot, upon rescission, be restored to
his former status: Camden etc. R. R. Co. v. Mays Landing etc. Co.,
48 N. J. L. 530. The same rule should protect a corporation which
on its side has in good faith performed an ultra vires .contract.
The doctrine of estoppel, however, has no application in favor of
one furnishing goods to a third person on the ultra vires order of a
corporation. This was held upon the ground that there had been
no receipt of benefits by the corporation: Famous Shoe etc. Co.
V. Eagle Iron Works, 51 Mo. App. 66. Nor does estoppel by receipt
of benefits apply to a covenant to pay advance rent for future oc-
cupation under an ultra vires lease, because the consideration for
the promise is not the past but the future use of the property: Ore-
gonian Ry. Co. v. Oregon Ry. & Nav. Co., 23 Fed. Rep. 232.
Of the Remedy where an Ultra Vires Contract has been Partly Per'
formed.— Where an ultra vires contract of a corporation has been
performed, either partially or entirely, by one of the parties to it, it
is unanimously conceded that the party who has so performed has
enforceable rights. How are his rights to be enforced? Do they
arise out of the contract, or outside of it; To these questions our
courts give an Inharmonious response. If all of the courts recog-
nized a distinction between a contract that is illegal and one that
is simply ultra vires, their disagreement might be avoided. An il-
legal contract cannot be sued upon nor enforced, so If It be con-
ceded that the distinction mentioned does not exist, it follows of
necessity that no performance or ratification of an ultra vires con-
tract will enable suit to be brought upon it. We have already ex-
pressed our opinion that the distinction does exist, and we think
it supported both by reason and authority. The term "ultra vires"
does not apply to illegal or immoral contracts in the proper sense,
and actions upon ultra vires contracts which are also Illegal or Im-
moral cannot be allowed. Such contracts constitute a separate
170 In re Assignment Mutual etc. Ins. Co. [Iowa,
class, actions upon which are denied by the rule of law which de-
nies a right of action upon illegal and immoral contracts generally.
And we thinli it an eminently just and sensible rule, which, when
an ultra vires contract, not void because illegal, immoral, or con-
trary to public policy, has been wholly or partially performed on
one side, and the benefits of such performance have been enjoyedi
on the other side, permits an action for relief to be brought directly
oii the contract. This rule is well supported by authority: Ore-
gonian Ry. Co. v. Oregon Ry. & Nav. Co., 23 Fed. Rep. 232; Gas-
quet V. Crescent City Brewing Co., 49 Fed. Rep. 49C; Campbell v.
Argenta Gold etc. Mln. Co., 51 Fed. Rep. 1; Southern Life Ins.
etc. Co. V. Lanier, 5 Fla. 110, 58 Am. Dec. 448; Bank of the State
V. Hammond, 1 Rich. 281; Grand Gulf Bank v. Archer, 8 Smedes &
M. 151; Madison Avenue Baptist Church v. Baptist Church, 73 N. Y.
82; Bradley v. Ballard, 55 111. 413, 8 Am. Rep. 656; Peatman v. Light
etc. Co., 100 Iowa, 245; State Board v. Citizens' Street Ry. Co., 47
Ind. 407, 17 Am. Rep. 702; Wright v. Hughes, 119 Ind. 324, 12 Am.
St. Rep. 412; Chicago etc. Ry. Co. v. Derkcs, 103 Ind. 520; Whitney
Arms Co. v. Barlow, 63 N. Y. 62, 20 Am. Rep. 504; Kadish v. Gar-
den City etc. Assn., 151 III. 531, 42 Am. St. Rep. 256; Bloomingtoa
Mut. Ben. Assn. v. Blue, 120 111. 128, 60 Am. Rep. 558; People v.
Suburban R, R. Co., 178 111. 594; Camden etc. R. R. Co. v. Mays
Landing etc. R. R, Co., 48 N. J. L. 530; Arkansas Valley Town etc.
Co. V. Lincoln, 56 Kan. 145; Sherman Center Town Co. v. Fletcher,
46 Kan. 524; Argenti v. San Francisco. 16 Cal. 255; Union Water
Co. V. Murphy's Flat etc. Co., 22 Cal. 621; Main v. Casserly, 67 Cal.
127; North Hudson Mut. etc. Assn. v. First Nat. Bank, 79 Wis. 31;
McElroy v. Minnesota Percheron Horse Co., 96 Wis. 317; Dewey v.
Toledo etc. Ry. Co., 91 Mich. 351; Chapman v. Ironclad Rheostat
Co., N. J., Nov. 1898; Holmes etc. Mfg. Co. v. Holmes etc. Metal
Co., 127 N. Y. 252, 24 Am. St. Rep. 448; Hamilton etc. Hydraulic
Co. V. Cincinnati etc. R. R. Co., 29 Ohio St. 341; Rutland etc. R. R.
Co. V. Proctor, 29 Vt. 93; Johnson v. Mason Lodge No. 33, Ky. Ct.
of Appeals, June, 1899.
Where an ultra vires contract is also void because illegal, Immoral,
or contrary to public policy, it cannot, though executed by one
party, be enforced by him: McNulta v. Corn Belt Bank, 164 111. 427,
56 Am. St. Rep. 203. Performance by either party does not estop
the other to plead the invalidity of the contract as a defense to an
action thereon: Visalia Gas etc. Co. v. Sims, 104 Cal. 326, 43 Am.
St. Rep. 105. A contract that is unlawful as being against the ex-
press provisions or general policy of any particular statute is void
and will not be enforced by the courts: Cincinnati Mut. Health
Assur. Co. v. Rosenthal, 55 111. 85, 8 Am, Rep. 626. See, also, Win-
scott V. Guarantee Inv. Co., 03 Mo. App. 367; Grohmann v. Brown,
OS Mo. App. 630; Littlowort v. Davis, 50 Miss. 403; Denver Fire Ins.
Co. V. McClellan, 9 Colo. 11, 59 Am. Rep. 134. In the last case,
a Are Insurance company had, ultra vires. Insured against ha:l. Th©
Insured having performed his part of the contract, and the com-
pany having received the benefit of such performance, the latter
■ought to escape liability under the policy on the ground that it was
Jan. 1899.] In re Assignment Mutual etc. Ins. Co. 171
ultra vires. In denying the company's right to set up such defense
the court said: "It is argued on behalf of the appellant that the
courts ought, In all such cases, to sustain the defense of ultra vires,
here interposed, on the ground of public policy; that the public
which confers the corporate powers upon such companies has an
Interest in the protection of innocent stockholders and creditors of
such companies by confining the exercise of corporate powers strictly
within their authorized limits, and this is given in the books as the
chief reason for the rule of decision in the cases which sustain the>
defense of ultra vires. That the public has such an interest is-
quite true, but whether to afCord such protection the defense of ultra
vires is always necessary in such cases is another thing. Stock-
holders are but one portion of the public; another portion, with equal
rlglits of protection, is that with whom these multiform corporations^
deal, in the daily exercise of their assumed powers. And it seema
illogical to assume that the interests of the public would be best
subserved by a public policy which will allow a corporation, any
more tlian an individual, to violate the principles of common honesty
and claim exemption from the obligations of its contracts by plead-
ing its own wrongdoing. Such policy would rather seem to offer a
premium for dishonest dealing." A particular examination of the
many cases cited above to the proposition that an action may be
brought directly upon an ultra vires contract, where it has been
executed on one side, and is not void from illegality, immorality,
or because in violation of public policy, will Indicate the habitual
assurance with which corporations and private parties attempt to
use the plea of ultra vires to further injustice.
That no Action can he Based upon an Ultra Tires Contract— Decision*
of United States Supreme Cour#.— Opposed to the cases which, under
the circumstances above recited, allow an action to be brought upon
an ultra vires contract, there is a respectable array of authoritiea
which deny that such a contract may be made the basis of an action
under any circumstances. Chief among these latter are the decis-
ions of the United States supreme court, which august tribunal has
shown a distinct disinclination to fall In with the modern tendency
toward liberaLzing the ancient doctrine of ultra vires. According to
the decisions of that court, a contract made by a corporation ultra
vires is unlawful and void, and does not, by being carried into exe-
cution, become lawful and valid so that It may be sued upon: Rail-
way Cos. V. Keokuk Bridge Co., 131 U. S. 371. The views of the
supreme court are thus expressed by Mr. Justice Gray In Central
Trans. Co. v. Pullman's Car Co., 139 U. S. 24: "A contract of a cor-
poration which Is ultra vires in the proper sense, that is to say,
outside the object of its creation as defined by the law of its organ-
Ization, and therefore beyond the powers conferred upon It by the
legislature, is not voidable only, but wholly void, and of no legal
effect. The objection to the contract is, not merely that the cor-
poration ought not to have made It, but that It could not make It.
The contract cannot be ratified by either party, because it could not
have been authorized by either. No performance on either Bld»
172 In re Assignment Mutual etc. Ins. Co. [Iowa,
•can give the unlawful contract any validity, or be the foundation
of any right of action upon it." The doctrine so generally main-
tained that an estoppel to set up the defense of ultra vires arises
from the receipt of benefits under an ultra vires contract is repudi^
a ted by the United States supreme court. The decisions supporting
the foregoing are: Pearce v. Madison etc. R. R. Co., 21 How. 441;
Pennsylvania R. R. Co. v. St. Louis etc. R. R. Co., 118 U. S. 290;
Railway Cos. v. Keokulj Bridge Co., 131 U. S. 371; Central Transp.
•Co. V, Pullman's Car Co., 139 U. S. 24; .Tacksonville etc. Ry. v.
Hooper, 160 U S. 514; California Bank v. Kennedy, 167 U. S. 362.
According to these decisions, a suit to enforce rights growing out of
dealings under an ultra vires contract must be brought, not upon
the contract, but in disaffirmance of it.
In Railway Co. v. McCarthy, 96 U. S. 258, Mr. Justice Swayne,
-speaking for the court, said: "The doctrine of ultra vires, when in-
voked for or against a corporation, should not be allowed to prevail
■where it would defeat the ends of justice or work a legal wrong."
This was a direct statement of the doctrine of estoppel arising from
a receipt of benefits, and was a step in the right direction, but In
view of the established doctrines of the court for which the learned
justice spoke, it becomes meaningless except as Indicating a re-
bellion against the rigor of those doctrines. In Thomas v. Rail-
road Co., 101 U. S. 71, which was a suit to enforce the unexecuted
portion of an ultra vires lease, the court expressly approved the
rule that the executed dealings of corporations, though invalid for
Avant of corporate power, shall remain as the foundation of rights
acquired by the transaction, but held that such rule did not apply
to the case in hand. So in Hitchcock v. Galveston, 96 U. S. 341,
Which, however, was an action against a municipal corxwratlon,
the court recognized the distinction, which we have already urged,
between a case where there is a defect in the power of a corporation
to make a contract and one where the contract is directly violative
of its charter or statute. In the former case, the contract Is said
to be, "at farthest, only ultra vires; and in such a case, though spe-
cific performance of an engagement to do a thing transgresslve of
Its corporate power may not be enforced, the corporation can be held
liable on its contract. Having received benefits at the expense of
the other contracting party. It cannot object that It was not empow-
•ered to perform what It promised In return, in the mode in which
It promised to perform." Cited and approved in Fort Worth City
€o. V. Smith Bridge Co., 151 U. S. 294. So, In Jacksonville etc. Ry.
Co. V. Hooper, 160 U. S. 514, the court expressly reaffirms Its adher-
ence to the doctrines established by Its previous decisions, but sa5^
that in the application of the doctrine of ultra vires "the court must
be Influenced somewhat by the special circumstances of the case,"
and, In effect, should not hold a contract of a corporation ultra
vires to the prejudice of innocent parties, unless there Is nothing
■upon which to base a contrary conclusion. The outworking of such
a doctrine must, it seems to us, tend to defeat the very end of the
doctrine of ultra vires as adhered to by the court, for It will result
Jan. 1899.] In bb Assignment Mutual etc. Ins. Co. 173
In allowing corporations to add to their corporate powers by simply
exceeding them and drawing In Intervening equities to help them
out. In Pennsylvania R. R. Co. v. St. Louis etc. R. R. Co., 118 U. S.
290, Mr. Justice Bradley, with whom Mr. Justice Harlan concurred,
dissented from the prevailing opinion of the court, saying In part:
"The contract has been performed on the part of the lessor com-
pany, and the lessee and Its guarantors have enjoyed the benefit
of it. With what face can they now refuse to pay what they have
agreed to pay? With what face can they plead Incapacity to con-
tract? This Is not a suit to compel the specific performance of
the contract In future; but to compel the payment of money earned
by past performance of the contract. It seems to me that the com-
panies concerned are estopped to deny their liability to malse this
payment."
That no Action may be Brought upon an Ultra Vires Contract— De-
cisions of State Courts.— The doctrines of the United States supreme
court as we have stated them have been adhered to in somo of the
states, where it Is held that a contract made by a corporation which
Is unlawful and void because ultra vires does not, by being carried
into execution, become lawful and valid, and that the proper remedy
of an aggrieved party is to sue, not upon the contract, but in dis-
affirmance of It: Brunswick Gas Light Co. v. United Gas etc. Co.,
85 Me. 532, 35 Am. St. Rep. 385. No performance on either side,
it is maintained, can give validity to such a contract or enable suit
to be brought upon It: Marble Co. v. Harvey, 92 Tenn. 115, 36 Am.
St. Rep. 71. No action lies upon the Invalid contract; no decree
can be made by a court of equity for its specific enforcement, nor
a recovery had at law for its breach: Greenville Compress etc, Co. v.
Planters' Compress etc. Co., 70 Miss. 6G9, 35 Am. St. Rep. 681. The
Btate court decisions upholding these propositions, in addition to
those already cited, are: National Trust Co. v. Miller, 33 N. J. Eq.
155; Miller v. Insurance Co., 92 Tenn. 107; Chambers v. Falkner, 65
Ala. 448; Marion Sav. Bank v. Dunkin, 54 Ala. 471; Sherwood v.
Alvis, 83 Ala. 115, 3 Am. St. Rep. 695; Davis v. Old Colony R. R.,
131 Mass. 258, 41 Am. Rep. 221; Northwestern Union Packet Go. v.
Shaw, 37 Wis. 655, 19 Am. Rep. 781.
Recovery tor Benefits Received.— A comparison of the opposing prop-
ositions to which we have cited authorities reveals the fact that
the point of disagreement is not vital, but rather technical In Its
nature. As we have already stated, all the cases agree that where
one in reliance upon an ultra vires contract entered into by him
In good faith, makes expenditures or Incurs prejudice, the mere fact
that the contract is ultra vires does not deprive him of the right
to recover. The question upon which the cases disagree is as to the
manner In which he may enforce such right. Those courts which
deny his right to sue upon the contract, without exception admit
that he may recover by a suit In disaffirmance of the contract.
In this connection It is said In Central Transp. Co. v. Pullman's
Car Co., 139 U. S. 24: "A contract ultra vires being unlawful and
void, not because it is In Itself Immoral, but because the corpora-
tion, by the law of its creation, is incapable of making it. the courts.
174 In re Assignment Mutual etc. Ins. Co. [Iowa,
while refusing to maintain any action upon tlie unlawful contract,
have always striven to do justice between the parties, so far as
could be done consistently with adherence to law, by permitting
property or money parted with on the faith of the unlawful con-
tract to be recovered back, or compensation to be made for it.
In such case, however, the action is not maintained upon the unlaw-
ful contract nor according to its terms; but on an implied contract
of the defendant to return, or, failing to do that, to make compen-
sation for property or money which it has no right to retain. To
maiutain such an action is not to affirm, but to disaffirm, the unlaw-
ful contract." To this statement might be cited all of the cases
just cited to the proposition that under no circumstances may an
action be maintained upon an ultra vires contract.
The action brought may be for money had and received: North-
western Union Packet Oo. v. Shaw, 37 Wis. G5«5, 19 Am. Bep. 781;
iVIorvilie v. American Tract Soc, 123 Mass. 129, 25 Am. Rep. 40.
Assumpsit for work and labor on account of engi-aving bank bills
will lie against a corporation, although such corporation is prohib-
ited by law from engaging in the business of banking: Underwood
V. Newport Lyceum, 5 B. Mon. 129, 41 Am. Dec. 260. Where a
corporation has enjoyed the benefit of the consideration for an ultra
vires contract, an implied assumpsit rises against it: San Fran-
cisco Gas Co. V. San Francisco, 9 Cal. 453. A common remedy is
by suit for an accounting. If a corporation has received the ben-
<>fit of performance by the other party to an ultra vires contract, it
will be required in equity to account to such other party for what
is due him under the contract: Boyd v. American Carbon Black Co.,
182 Pa. St. 206; Pauly v. Pauly. 107 Cal. 8, 48 Am. St. Rep. 98.
Where a corporation has received a large consideration for a con-
tract ultra vires for the sale of a telegraph franchise, it will be
restrained from resuming possession of said franchise and the prop-
erty connected therewith, until an accounting and settlement can
be had between the parties: American Union Tel. Co. v. Union Pac.
Ry. Co., 1 McCrary, 188. And a court of equity. In setting aside
an ultra vires construction contract at the instance of railroad com-
pany, may compel the company to account to the other party for
benefits received from a partial performance: New Castle Northern
R. R. Co. v. Simpson, 23 Fed. Rep. 214. If one railroad company
has used the road, rolling stock, and equipments of another under a
contract, it Is estopped to set up that such contract is ultra vires
when sued for an accounting and return of the property: Manchester
etc. R. R. Co. V. Concord R. R., 66 N. H. 100, 49 Am. St. Rep. 582.
See, also, Manville v. Belden Min. Co., 17 Fed. Rep. 425; Miller v.
Insumnce Co., 02 Tenn. 1G7. And, generally, an action in the nature
of quantum meruit Is an effective remedy, where one has expenrled
labor or parted with property In bona fide reliance upon an ultra
vires contract of a corporation: Greenville Compress etc. Co. v.
Planters' Compress etc. Co., 70 Miss. 609. 35 Am. St. Rep. 681; Day
V. Spiral Springs Buggy Co.. 57 Mich. 146, 58 Am. Rep. 352; Davis
V. Old Colony R. R., 131 Mass. 25S. 41 Am. Rop. 221; Farmers^
Loan etc. Co. v. St. Joseph etc. R. R. Co., 1 McCrary, 247; Roberts v.
Jan. 1899.] In re Assignment Mutual etc. Ins. Co. 175
Demlng Woodworking Co., Ill N. C. 432; Brunswick Gas Light Co.
V. United Gas etc. Co., 85 Me. 532, 35 Am. St. Rep. 385; RaUway
Cos. V. Keokuk Bridge Co., 131 U. S. 371; Central Transp. Co. v. Pull-
man's Car Co., 139 U. S. 24. Compare Pennsylvania R. R. Co. y.
St. Louis etc. R. R. Co., 118 U. S. 290,
Before a corporation will be allowed to repudiate its ultra vires
contract It will be compelled to restore and repay the consideration
received: Williams v. Bank of Commerce, 71 Miss. 858, 42 Am. St.
Rep. 503. Equity will not, at the Instance of a corporation, rescind
an agreement as ultra vires after the parties have acquiesced there-
in for more than fifteen years, and large expenditures have beea
incurred and improvements made upon the faith thereof, and the
corporation has received commensurate benefits and been relieved
of burdensome obligations: Odd Fellows' Assn. v. Hegele, 24 Or. IG.
And, in general, equity will Insist upon a return of the consideration
received under an ultra vires contract before decreeing the rescis-
sion thereof: American Union Tel. Co. v. Union Pac. Ry., 1 McCrary,
188; Madison Avenue Baptist Church v. Oliver Street Baptist
Church, 73 N. Y. 82; Brown v. Atchison, 39 Kan. 37, 7 Am. St. Rep.
515; Memphis etc. K R. Co. v. Dow, 19 Fed. Rep. 389. Though
money is loaned under an ultra vires contract, the ultra vires char-
acter of the contract will not defeat a recovery of the money so
loaned: Gold Mln. Co. v. National Bank, 96 U. S. 640; West v. Mad-
ison County etc. Board, 82 111. 205; Kadish v. Garden City etc. Assn.,
151 111. 531, 42 Am. St. Rep. 250; Germantown Farmers' etc. Ins.
Co. V. Dhein. 43 Wis. 420, 28 Am. Rep. 549; Pratt v. Short, 79 N. Y.
437, 35 Am. Rep. 531; Bowditch v. New England Mut. Life Ins. Co.,
141 Mass. 292, 55 Am. Rep. 474; Poock v. Lafayette Building Assn.,
71 Ind. 357; Pancoast v. Travelers' Ins. Co., 79 Ind. 172; Steam Nav.
Co. V. Weed, 17 Barb. 379. Contra, Grand Lodge v. Waddill, 38
Ala. 313. Whether or not securities given for money loaned ultra
vires are valid and enforceable is a doubtful question: North River
Ins. Co. V. Lawrence, 3 Wend. 482; Germantown Mut. Ins. Co. v.
Dhein, 43 Wis. 420, 28 Am. Rep. 549; Matthews v. Sklnker, 62 Mo.
329, 21 Am. Rep. 425; Macon etc. R. R. Co. v. Georgia R. R. Co..
€3 Ga. 103; Life etc. Ins. Co. v. Mechanic Fire Ins. Co., 7 Wend.
31; Pratt v. Short, 79 N. Y. 437, 35 Am. Rep. 531. Where a cor-
poration is expressly forbidden by its charter to loan money upon
other than specified securities. It cannot recover upon securities of
another character, but where no such prohibition exists, and a cor-
poration is not expressly forbidden by its charter to loan money, no
reason is apparent that it should not be allowed to enforce securities
given for the loan. Where a corporation gives In security for a loan
its bonds Issued In violation of law, neither the corporation nor a
stockholder thereof, who as president participated in the unlawful
issue of the bonds, can maintain a suit In equity for a surrender
or cancellation of the bonds. The doctrine of in pari delicto apj)lies:
Hinckley v. Pflster, 83 Wis.- 64. Canal boats bought by a railroad
ultra vires become its property: Parish v. Wheeler, 22 N. Y. 494;
and machinery acquired by a corporation ultra vires cannot ba
176 In ee Assignment Mutual etc. Ins. Co. [Iowa,
seized by creditors of the vendor to pay his debts: Edwards v. Fair-
banks, 27 La. Ann. 449.
A lease by one railroad corporation to another of its property
and franchises for a long period of years, which is ultra vires of one
or both corporations, will not be set aside in equity at the suit of the
lessor, when the lessee has been in possession, paying the stipulated
rent, for seventeen years, and has taken no steps to repudiate or re-
scind the contract: St. Louis etc. R. R. Co. v. Terre Haute etc. B. R.
Co., 145 U. S. 393. Though a lessee may throw up an unexpired
ultra vires lease and refuse to pay rent for the remainder of the
term, and under ultra vires contracts generally one may refuse to
complete his performance begun upon: Malloa-y v. Hanaur Oil
Works. 86 Tenn. 598; Bowman Dairy Co. v. Mooney, 41 Mo. App.
665; Oregonian Ry. Co. v. Oregon Ry. & Nav. Co., 23 Fed. Rep. 232;
McNulta V. Corn Belt Bank, 164 111. 427, 56 Am. St. Rep. 203; Penn-
eylvania R. R. Co. v. St. Louis etc. R. R. Co., 118 U. S. 290. Compare
Heims Brewing Co. v. Flannery, 137 111. 309. Where one has
furnished and received payment for part of the goods agreed to be
furnished under an ultra vires contract with a corporation, he may
refuse to furnish any more thereunder: Day v. Spiral Springs Buggy
Co., 57 Mich. 146, 58 Am. Rep. 352.
Duty of Persons Dealing tcith Corporations to Know the Scope of
Their Powers.— It is a much reiterated rule in the law of private
corporations that persons dealing with them are deemed to have
notice of the scope of their powers as conferred in the instruments
of their creation and as had under the law generally. The rapid
development of the coiT>oration idea, the multiplicatioai In myriad
form and variety of corporations, and the extreme complexity of the
laws governing them, must make apparent to the most superficial
student that a strict adherence to this rule of the law of notice
must entail endless Injustice, not to say, involve Infinite absurdity.
This rule lies at the foundation of the doctrine of ultra vires as it
was originally conceived. It is maintained by many cases that one
who has Incurred expenses or parted with property under an ultra
Viires contract made by him with a corporation, has no claim to
enforce it because he Is held to have had constructive notice of
the capacity of the corporation, so that he parted with his property
with knowledge that the contract was Illegal and void: Chambers
V. Falkner, 65 Ala. 448; Sherwood v. Alvis, 83 Ala. 115, 3 Am. St.
Rep. 695; Hood v. New York etc. R. R, Co., 22 Conn. 1. He cannot
plead Ignorance In avoidance of the defense of ultra vires: Franklin
Co. V. Lewiston lust., 68 Me. 43, 28 Am. Rep. 9; Franco-Texan Land
Co. V. McCormick, 85 Tex. 416, 34 Am. St. Rep. 815; Durkee v.
People, 155 III. 354, 46 Am. St. Rep. 340; Jemlson v. Citizens' Sav.
Bank, 122 N. Y. 135. 19 Am. St. Rep. 482; Elevator Co. v. Memphis
etc. R. R. Co., 85 Tenn. 703, 4 Am. St. Rep. 798, See, also. Railway
Cob. v. Keokuk Bridge Co., 131 U. S. 371; St. Louis etc. R. R. Co.
V. Terre Haute R. R. Co., 145 U. S. 393. These rigid rules must,
however, be qualified, and the proper qualification is suggested la
Blssell v Railroad Cos., 22 N. Y. 258, by Seldon, J., thus: "Where
the want of power Is apparent upon comparing the act done with
Jan. 1899.] In be Assignment Mutual etc. Ins. Co. 177
the terms of the charter, the party dealing with the cofporation is
presumed to have knowledge of the defect, and the defense of ultra
vires is available against him. But such a defense would not be
permitted to prevail against a party who cannot be presumed to have
had any linowledge of the want of authority to make the contract.
Hence, if the question of power depends not merely upon the law
under which the corporation acts, but upon the existence of certain
extrinsic facts, resting peculiarly within the knowledge of the cor-
porate officers, then the corporation would, I apprehend, be es-
topped to deny that which, by assuming to make the contract, it
bad virtually affirmed." Quoted and approved in Monument Nat.
Bank v. Globe Works, 101 Mass. 57, 3 Am. Rep. 322. See, to same
effect. Miller v. Insurance Co., 92 Tenn. 1G7; Ossipee Hosiery etc.
Mfg. Co. V. Canney, 54 N. H. 295. Although it would be ultra vires
of a corporation to build and operate a railroad, it may neverthe-
less be liable for "railroad supplies" purchased and used by it
where the goods purchased were not of such character as to charge
the seller with notice that the corporation could not use them in its
legitimate business, and where the seller had no notice that the
goods were not to be used In such business: Luttrell v. Martin, 112
N. C. 593.
It Is held, too, that one who sells stock to a corporation, although
he knows that the corporation is purchasing to sell again as a specu-
lation, contrary to a penal provision In the charter, may nevertheless
recover, on an implied assumpsit, the value of the stocks; otherwise
when the contract provides for the Illegal use of the thing sold or
when the seller does any act to promote it. Tracy v. Talmage, 14
N. Y. 162, 67 Am. Dec. 132. Nor can a corporation avoid the payment
of borrowed money on the ground that, although It had power to
borrow money, it expended the money borrowed in prosecuting a
business which it was not authorized to prosecute, even though the
lender of the money knew that the corporation was transacting a
business beyond its chartered powers, and that his money was to be
used in such business, provided the business itself was free from
any intrinsic immorality or Illegality: Bradley v. Ballard, 55 111. 413,
8 Am. Rep. 656. See Parish v. Wheeler, 22 N. Y. 494; Wright v.
Hughes. 119 Ind. 324, 12 Am. St. Rep. 412; Thompson v. Lambert, 44
Iowa, 239. But the same cases affirm that the rule Is otherwise
where the contract provides for the illegal use of the money or the
lender does anything to promote such use. The doctrine of ultra
vires will not enable a corporation to resist the payment of a debt
because io excess of its statutory limit, where the creditor had
no notice of such fact: Ossipee Hosiery etc. Mfg. Co. v. Canney. 54
N. H. 295; Connecticut River Sav. Bank v. Fiske, 60 N. H. 363;
Humphrey v. Patrons' Mercantile Assn., 50 Iowa, 607; Auerbach
V. La Sueur Mill Co., 28 Minn. 291. 41 Am. Rep. 285. 'The rule re-
quiring persons dealing with corporations to take notice, at their
peril, of the scope of the corporate powers, yields to the general
rule protecting bona fide holders of negotiable paper when the
transaction In question Involves the rights of such holders without
AM. ST. RiP., \ou LXX.—U
178 In re Assignment Mutual etc. Ins. Co. [Iowa,
notice of corporate negotiable paper Issued ultra vires: Lehigh Val-
ley Coal Co. V. West Depere Agricultural Works, 63 Wis. 45; To J
V. Kentucky Union Land Co., 57 Fed. Rep. 47; Auerbach v. La
Sueur MiU Co., 28 Minn. 291, 41 Am. Rep. 285; Bailey v. Methodist
etc. Church, 71 Me. 472; National Bank v. Young, 41 N. J. Eq. 531;
Mechanics' Bkg. Assn. v. Saugerties White Lead Co., 35 N. Y.
504; Credit Co. v. Howe Machine Co., 54 Conn. 357, 1 Am. St. Rep.
123; Monument Nat. Bank v. Globe Works, 101 Mass. 57, 3 Am.
Rep. 322. Though the rule applies here as elsewhere that where a
corporation is not authorized to give its notes for any purpose per-
sons taking such notes are deemed to have notice of the defect of
power and cannot recover thereon: Bailey v. Methodist etc. Church,
71 Me. 472.
Of the Doctrine that only the State may Raise the Question of Ul-
tra Tires.— In the meantime, the disintegration of the ancient doc-
trine of ultra vires has proceeded from another direction. The
most Important of the propositions upon which the doctrine is based
is that the public which confers corporate powers has the right to
insist that these powers be not exceeded. In case of usui-pation
or abuse of its powers by a corporation, this public right is efifect-
Ively enforceable by proceedings to forfeit the charter or franchise
of the corporation. It Is not ordinarily proper to raise questions
of public right In private actions; In other words, where there is
a transgression of a public right, the initiation of proceedings to
punish such transgression is ordinarily made by the state. So there
has been growing up a doctrine, as yet In a rather nebulous state,
and the outcome of which cannot be clearly seen, that the ques-
tion of ultra vires, as applied to the transactions of corporations,
can only be raised by, or at the instance of, the state: Barrow v.
Nashville etc. Turnpike Co., 9 Hump. 304; Helskell v. Chickasaw
Lodge, 87 Tenn. 668; Union Water Co. v. Murphy's Flat Fluming
Co., 22 Cal. 621; Grand Gulf Bank v. Archer, 8 Smedes. & M. 151;
Oil Creek etc. R. R. Co. v. Pennsylvania Transp. Co., 83 Pa. St. 160;
National Bank v. Matthews, 98 U. S. 621; Jones v. Guaranty etc.
Co., 101 U. S. 622; Southern Pac. R. R. Co. v. Orton, 6 Saw. 157;
State V. Minnesota Thresher etc. Co., 40 Minn. 213; St. Louis Drug
Co. V. Robinson, 81 Mo. 19; Prescott Nat. Bank v. Butler, 157 Mass.
548; Grant v. Henry Clay Coal Co., 80 Pa. St. 208; Southern Life
Ins. etc. Co. v. Lanier, 5 Fla. 110, 58 Am. Dec. 448; Hovelman v.
Kansas City etc. R. R. Co., 79 Mo. 632. The rule, however, can-
not be stated as broadly as this. It is simply a step beyond the
well-settcd rule that the legal existence of a de facto corporation
cannot be questioned in a collateral proceeding: Bushnell v. Con-
solidated Ice Co., 138 111. 67; Johnson v. Mason Lodge No. 33, Ky. Ct.
of Appeal, Jan. 1899. And exceptions to It are recognized, as where
the charter of the corporation in question specifies and limits the
business In which It may engage, and expressly, or by fair implica-
tion. Invalidates transactions outside of its legitimate corporate busi-
ness: St. Louis Drug Co. v. Robinson, 81 Mo. 19. It is also limited In
State v. Minnesota Thresher etc. Co., 40 Minn. 213, thus: "But in case
of excess of powers, it is only where some public mischief is done
Jan. 1899.] In rb Assignment Mutual etc. Ins. Co. 179
■or threatened that the state, by the attorney-general, should Inter-
fere. If, as between the company and its stockholders, there Is a
wrongful application of the capital, or an illegal incurring of lia-
bilities, it is for the stockholders to complain. If the corporation
Is entering into contracts ultra vires, to the prejudice of persons
•outside the corporation, such as creditors, it is for such persons to
take steps to protect their interests."
That the question of ultra vires may be raised otherwise than by
the state cannot be doubted, under the law as it now stands. It
is said: "The objection may come from the state, from a dissent-
ing stockholder, or from the party with whom the contract is made.
And the courts often give a different meaning to the term accord-
ing to the source whence the objection comes. An act or a con-
tract may be ultra vires if the state objects when it would not be
80 held if the objection came from a stockholder or from a con-
tracting party: Byrne v. Schuyler Electric Mfg. Co., 65 Conn. 336.
When the action of a corporation is challenged by the sovereign
which gave it existence, or by whose favor it is permitted to pur-
sue its business. It may be required to show a clear warrant for
the acts called in question; while in suits between Individuals or
corporations, or between corporate bodies where private rights only
are involved, the rule Is not Inflexible, and yields to considera-
tions of right and justice: Central Ohio Nat. Gas. etc. Co. v. Capi-
tal City Dairy Co., 60 Ohio St. 96; Chicago etc. Ry. Co. v. Union
Pac. Ry. Co., 47 Fed. Rep. 15; Tod v. Kentucky Union Land Co.,
57 Fed. Rep. 47. When tffe state challenges the legality of the
transaction, the paramount and only question is, whether it has be-
stowed upon the company the requisite authority to engage in it.
When the question arises between the company and the other party
to the contract other legal principles apply in determining whether
the contract shall be observed: Camden etc. R. R. Co. v. May's
Landing etc. R. R. Co., 48 N. J. L. 530. See Lucas v. White Lino
Transfer Co., 70 Iowa, 541, 59 Am. Rep. 449; Llttlewort v. Davis, 50
Miss. 403. One whose rights are not Invaded cannot complain that
a corporation is acting ultra vires. In such case only the state or
stockholders can complain: Belcher Sugar Refining Co. v. St. Louis
■Grain Elevator Co., 101 Mo. 192; New Orleans etc. R. R. Co. v.
Ellerman, 105 U. S. 166; Jersey City Gaslight Co. v. Consumers'
Cas. Co., 40 N. J. Eq. 427; Rafferty v. Central Traction Co., 147 Pa.
St. 579, 30 Am. St. Rep. 763; Smith v. First Nat. Bank, 45 Neb. 444;
Erhman v. Union Cent. etc. Ins. Co., 35 Ohio St. 324. The right
of one or more stockholders in a corporation to maintain a suit to
restrain the corporation from entering Into or performing ultra
vires contracts. Is recognized In many other decisions: Davis v. Old
Colony R. R., 131 Mass. 258, 41 Am. Rep. 221; Bliss v. Anderson,
31 Ala. 612, 70 Am. Dec. 511; Pratt v. Pratt, 33 Conn. 446; Board
of Commrs. v. Lafayette etc. R. R. Co., 50 Ind. 85; Smith v. Bangs,
15 111. 400; Teachout v. Des Moines etc. St. Ry. Co., 75 Iowa, 722;
Lauman v. Lebanon Valley R. R. Co., 30 Pa. St. 42, 72 Am. Dec.
€85. These cases pertain more closely to the law of agency, for
180 In ee Assignment Mutual etc. Ins. Co. [lowa^
they are usually Instituted to restrain the officers of a corporation
from acting or contracting beyond the scope of their agency. S(x
stockholders cannot complain where they all consent to the con-
struction and maintenance of a new enterprise authorized by &
supplemental charter, but not within the grant of the original char-
ter: Zabriskie v. Hackensack etc. R. R. Co., 18 N. J. Eq. 178, 90
Am. Dec. 617. A stockholder cannot question the vires of a con-
tract made by a corporation while the corporation retains the bene-
fits of the contract: Buford v. Keokuk etc. Packet Co., 69 Mo. 611.
See Alexander v. Searcy, 81 Ga, 536, 12 Am. St. Rep. 337. When &
corporation enters into a contract which under no circumstances
It has power to make, the contract is held to be void as to creditors,
although assented to by all of its stockholders: Washington Mill
Co. V. Sprague Lumber Co., 19 Wash. 165. But where the indebt-
edness that a corporation is authorized by its charter to contract
is limited, the objection that a mortgage for a sum in excess of this
amount is ultra vires cannot be successfully urged by an unse-
cured creditor, who became such after the mortgage was executed,
and whose claim is open to the same objection: Allis v. Jones, 45
Fed. Rep. 149.
Conclusion.— Kttev a study of the cases upon the subject of this
note, the impression is forced upon us that the doctrine of ultra
vires, as applied to the contracts of private corporations, has al-
most lost its meaning. The undermining of the foundation upoD
which it has rested from its inception has proceeded simultaneously
from different directions until the doctrine itself seems almost ready
to fall of its own weight. The original rule, that an ultra vires
contract was illegal and void, could give rise to no rights, nor be
validated by any performance or application of the law of estop-
pel, has practically been erased from the law, for those courts
which do not contradict it directly do so indirectly by their man-
ner of applying it. An appeal to the public interest that pri-
vate corporations should be restricted in the making of contracts
to the scope of their granted powers is growing more and more
Ineffectual where the rights of persons innocently entering into ul-
tra vires contracts with such corporations intervene. Mr. Seymour
D. Thompson says: "My own view is, that the doctrine of ultra
vires has no proper place In the law of private corporatilons ex-
cept in respect of contracts which are bad in themselves, th&
making of which Is prohibited by considerations of public mor-
ality, of justice, or of a sound public policy, and which, there-
fore, stand upon such a footing that neither party can be re-
garded as Innocent or blameless In entering into them": Am. IjAW
Rev. 28, 397, 398. That the trend of the cases Is toward the adop-
tion of this advanced view admits of little doubt, and It may be
suggested that contracts of corporations "which are bad In them-
selves" are generally sufficiently provided for In our law without
any reference to the doctrine of ultra vires.
Jan. 1899.] Hasbrouck v. Western Union Tel. Co. 181
Hasbrouok V. Westeen Union Telegraph Co.
[107 Iowa, 160.]
AGENCY — AUTHORITY OP AGENT — ERRONEOUSLY
TRANSMITTED TELEGRAM.— Where an agent, sent by a bank-
ing firm to settle and adjust a claim against a third person, tele-
graphs his principal: "Has stock twelve hundred dollars. Mort-
gage on for fifteen hundred dollars. Am offered note, with Hark-
uess as surety, for tweniy-five hundred dollars, due in eighteen
mouths, in full settlement," and the telegram is erroneously trans-
mitted to read thus: "Have secured twelve hundred dollars mort-
gage on fifteen hundred dollars and offered note, with Harkness as
surety, for twenty-four hundred dollars," et cetera, to which the
principal answers: "If twelve hundred mortgage is on fifteen hun-
dred dollars property, accept," the agent is justified in understand-
ing that he is to accept the offer of settlement under the facts as
he had stated them, unless the conditions are more favorable to
plaintiff than they would be with a twelve hundred mortgage on
a fifteen hundred dollar stock, and a settlement based upon and
within such an understanding is binding upon the principal.
AGENCY— NEGLIGENCE OP rillNCIPAL-ERRONEOUS
TELEGRAM.— Where a principal, being in doubt as to the mean-
ing of a telegram from his agent relating to the matter of the lat-
ter's agency, requires the telegraph agent to have the message re-
peated and the latter reports that the message as received is cor-
rect, the principal is not guilty of contributory negligence, as a mat-
ter of law, in acting upon the message as he understands it.
TELEGRAPH COMPANIES— DAMAGES FOR ERRONE-
OUSLY TRANS]\riTTED MESSAGE— DUTY OF PLAINTIFF TO
RESCIND CONTRACT ENTERED INTO IN RELIANCE UPON.—
Where a principal has been influenced through the erroneous
transmission of a telegram from his agent to authorize the latter
to enter into a contract of settlement with the former's creditor
which he would not have authorized except for such erroneous
transmission, he is not bound to take steps to rescind the contract
before bringing suit against the telegraph company for damages
suffered.
INSTRUCTIONS— ERRONEOUS SUBMISSION TO JURY
OF MATTER OF LAW.— It is harmless error for the court to sub-
mit to the jury the question of interpretation of a telegram con-
ferring certain authority upon an agent, when, from the verdict
rendered, it is apparent that the interpretation adopted by the jury
gave to the telegram the meaning which, as a matter of law, was
proper.
INSTRUCTIONS - IMMATERIAL ERROR.— Erroneous in-
structions as to the interpretation to be given a doubtful telegram,
when without prejudice, are not ground for reversal.
TELE(;RAPH COMPANIES— ACTION FOR ERRONEOUS
TRANSMISSION OF. MESSAGE — EVIDENCE. — In an action
against a telegraph company for damages resulting from a con-
tract entered into in reliance upon an erroneously transmitted mes-
sage, the plaintiff is properly allowed to testify that the contract
in question would not have been entered into except for such error
on the part of the defendant.
APPEAIv— ERROR FIRST OB.TECTED TO ON APPEAL.—
It cannot be first objected to on appeal that evidence, properly
admissible for a certain purpose, was admitted without instruc-
182 Hasbrouck v. Western Union Tel. Co. [Iowa,
tions limiting its application to such purpose, where no request
was made for such instructions.
Action for damages resulting to plaintiff from a contract en-
tered into in reliance upon an erroneously transmitted telegram
sent from plaintiff's agent to him. The agent was sent by th&
plaintiff, a banking firm, to adjust and settle a claim held by
the plaintiff against one Henderson upon a note for three thou-
sand six hundred dollars. Having looked into the matter th&
agent telegraphed his principal: "Has stock twelve hundred dol-
lars. Mortgage on for fifteen hundred dollars. Am offered note^
with Harkness as surety, for twenty-fire hundred dollars, due
in eighteen months, in full settlement. Shall I accept? An-
swer quick, care Leggett House. E. C. Poston." The messag'e
as delivered to plaintiff was as follows: "Have secured twehe
hundred dollar mortgage on fifteen hundred dollars and offered
note, with Harkness as surety, for twenty-four hundred dollars,"
et cetera. To the message received the plaintiff telegraphed in
reply : "If twelve hundred dollar mortgagre is on fifteen hundred
dollar property, accept." On receipt of this telegram Poston, the
agent, settled with Henderson, taking his note for twenty-five
hundred dollars, secured as promised. The loss complained of
was of eleven hundred dollars, representing the twelve hundred
dollar mortgage expected by the plaintiff, less the one hundred
dollars by which the note secured exceeded that promised. Ap-
peal from verdict and judgment in favor of the plaintiff.
McNett & Tisdale and George H. Fearons, for appellant.
Miles & Steele, for the respondent.
*«2 GRANGER, J. 1. It is contended that, independent of the
telegraphic correspondence, Poston had authority to make the
settlement; and the first proposition argued is this: "Did the
dispatch written at Fairfield, taken in connection with the reply
which Po.ston received thereto, constitute apparent authority
on his part to effect the settlement which he did, or was he justi-
fied in drawing that conclusion ?" It seems to us that the propo-
sition is very fairly stated to test the legal question involved.
It probably will not be disputed ^^^ that there must have been
a binding settlement with Henderson, before damages legally
accrued to plaintiff; and a binding settlement, as to plaintiff,
could only arise from such a delegation of authority as that, in
the exercis'e of it, he would be bound. Appellant argues the
question on the theory that Poston had the right to consider
Jan. 1899.] Hasbrouck v. Westebn Union Tel. Co. 183
the answer to his dispatch on the assumption that his dispatch
to plaintiff was correctly transmitted, and we think the method
of reasoning correct. Appellant then takes this position: The
Poston dispatch notified plaintiff that there was a stock worth
twelve hundred dollars, on which there was a fifteen hundred
dollar mortgage, and a secured note for two thousand five hun-
dred-dollars was offered in settlement. The answer was: "If
twelve hundred dollar mortgage is on fifteen hundred dollar
property, accept." 'Now, leaving out of mind the erroneous dis-
patch, we may see the exact conditions under which Poston
acted and determine the question of his authority. It is said the
authority to accept was conditional on there being a twelve hun-
dred dollar mortgage on a fifteen hundred dollar §tock,and not on
there being a fifteen hundred dollar mortgage on a twelve hun-
dred dollar stock, and that plaintiff had a right to impose an arbi-
trary condition. AVithout doubt, it had that right ; and the query
comes, Did it impose such a condition? That is, was Poston
justified in construing the dispatch as authorizing the settle-
ment only upon a literal construction of the dispatch, or was
he to treat the words imposing the condition as meaning that
there must not be a settlement less favorable to plaintiff? The
situation and understanding of the parties have much to do with
this construction, and the case is presented on that theory.
From Poston's dispatch, as written by him, plaintiff would have
known that the mortgage on Henderson's stock exceeded its
value by three hundred dollars. It would be known to be an
estimate. When the answer came, Poston would read it as if
plaintiff knew what he (Poston) had said. ^^^ and he must hare
understood that he was to accept the offer of settlement under
the facts as he had stated them, and also that he was to accept,
unless the conditions were more favorable to plaintiff than they
would be with a twelve hundred dollar mortgage on a fifteen
hundred dollar stock. We hazard little in saying that had Pos-
ton's dispatch been correctly transmitted, and had the same an-
swer been returned, both plaintiff and Poston would have so
understood the matter, and that it would be the natural and
reasonable conclusion from the premises. The case, from a legal
point of view, differs little, if any, from facts like these: A is the
agent for B for the purchase of horses. A writes to B and says:
"I can buy horses of a certain class for one hundred dollars per
head. Shall I purchase?'* B answers, **If you can get them
for ninety-five dollars per head, buy them." A buys them for
184 Hasbrouck v. Western Ukion Tel. Co. [Iowa,
ninety dollars per head. No one would doutt his authority.
Why? Because it is necessarily involved in the authority
granted. The situation justifies a conclusion that the limitation
arising from the conditional words is only against going further
in one direction; that is, paying more. So in the case at bar.
The conditional words imposed a limitation as to settlement only
in case the stock, in value, exceeded the mortgage by more than
three hundred dollars.
Appellant invokes some rules under the law of contracts, and
cites numerous authorities, and among them Mecliem on Agency,
sections 294, 297, 303. We do not discover a word in these sec-
tions against our theory of this question. Appellant omits sec-
tion 298, which we think quite significant, and we quote it, with
the one proceding it: "Sec. 297. In this case, as in the other
cases, the intention is to be gathered from the whole instrument,
whether it be made of one piece of paper or of many." "Sec.
298. And so, in doubtful cases, resort must be had to the situa-
tion, surroundings, and relation of parties; for though the writ-
ing cannot, in general, be contradicted by oral evidence, *^'
yet the circumstances may properly be used as aids, and, by put-
ting the court more or less fully into the exact situation of the
parties, to enable it to see the subject matter as they saw it."
Such is the method of inquiry we pursue in this case. The rule
that, in the making of contracts by correspondence, the accept-
ance must be unconditional, is strongly urged as applicable in
this case. With our view of the case, the acceptance was un-
conditional. That rule has application as between Henderson
and plaintiff. AVhen the answer came to Poston, it fixed his
authority; and the acceptance followed that, and was uncondi-
tional. The only condition imposed was upon Poston, which,
as we hold, was observed, so that his authority was complete.
It is probably true that with our construction of the terms of
the telegram, appellant would not urge the authorities cited as
applicable.
2, Contributory negligence is pleaded, and urged against
plaintiff. The claim is based first on the negligence of Poston,
in that when he received the reply to his dispatch, it should
have put him on inquiry, because of the language as to a twelve
hundred dollar mortgage on a fifteen hundred dollar stock, in-
stead of as it was expressed in the dispatch as written by Pos-
ton, and as to plaintiff, it is thought there was negligence be-
cause of the doubt and uncertainty arising from the dispatch aa
Jan. 1899.] Hasbrouck v. Western Union Tel. Co. 185
delivered by the defendant. It does appear from the record
that, when plaintiff received the telegram from Poston, its mean-
ing was thought to be doubtful; and the agent at Humeston was
asked if it was correct, and he said he would have it repeated,
which he said he did, and that it was correct. The court sub-
mitted the question to the jury, and said in its instructions:
"As to whether the plaintiff, under the circumstances shown,
did all that reasonable, prudent men would do under like circum-
stances, and exercised reasonable care under the facts shown,
will be a question for the jury to determine from the evidence.
If they did, they are not guilty of contributory negligence in
that regard. If they *^° did not, they are guilty of contribu-
tory negligence, and cannot recover beyond the amount paid for
the telegram, with interest." And to the negligence of Poston,
the court said: "It is also alleged that plaintiffs were guilty of
contributory negligence, for the reason that the plaintiffs' reply
message to their agent, Poston, was of such a nature as to put
him on his guard that they had not truly interpreted the mes-
sage sent by him to them. The plaintiffs in the case at bar are
responsible for the acts of their agent, Poston, and any negli-
gence on his part in the performance of his duties would be im-
puted to plaintiffs. If the jury find that, under the circum-
stances shown, the said Poston did not use reasonable care, the
plaintiffs would be held guilty of contributory negligence, and
could not recover." We do not think the defendant has any
ground for complaint on this branch of the case. As to the
claim of negligence on the part of plaintiff, it could not be
said to be negligence, as a matter of law, after the pains taken
to know if the dispatch as received was correct; and, as to the
negligence of Poston, the only doubtful question is if it does
not affirmatively appear that he was not negligent. In this
particular we may refer to our discussion in the first division
of the opinion.
3. It is claimed that, after plaintiff knew of the mistake, it
should have taken steps to rescind the contract of settlement;
and reliance is placed on the familiar rule in Greenleaf on Evi-
dence, section 261, and stated in Beymer v. McBride, 37 Iowa,
114, that: "It is a general principle of law, in case of a breach
of a specific contract, that if the injured party can protect him-
self from damage, he is bound to do so, if practicable, at a mod-
erate expense, or by ordinary efforts, and he can charge the de-
linquent party for such expense and efforts and for such damages
186 Hasbkouck v. Western Union Tel. Co. [Iowa,
only as could not be prevented by the exercise of such diligence."
"We have found no case like this where such a rule has been ap-
plied. Appellant's claim in this respect is that: "As the extent
and scope of Poston's. authority to settle or compromise ^^"^ was
measured and defined by the two telegrams, and Henderson
knew of the contents of the one sent, and either knew or had
opportunity of knowing the one received, he was bound by the
extent of the authority which Poston in fact had, and was
charged with notice of its limitations. Hence he was in no
position to legally resist a rescission or repudiation of the set-
tlement." In view of what we have already said, there is a very
conclusive answer to the claim. The claim is that Henderson
was bound by the extent of the authority, on the theory of the
first dispatch being correctly transmitted; and, conceding Hen-
derson's knowledge to have been the same as that of Poston,
the same inferences as to authority would be justified. If the
situation would justify Poston in accepting the settlement of-
fered, it would justify Henderson in completing the transac-
tion. We are not to be understood as determining this question
on any other theory or claim than the one presented. The case
of Reed v. Western Union Tel. Co., 135 Mo. 661, 58 Am. St.
Pep. 609, is, in several particulars, like the one at bar. The
facts in that case are substantially these: One Hedges, residing
at Cedar Rapids, Iowa, was the agent for Reed, the plaintiff,
residing at Kansas City, Missouri. Hedges filed with the com-
pany a dispatch to Reed as follows (omitting date, et cetera):
"Offered thirteen hundred dollars cash, lot two, houses near
planing mill. Must hear immediately. Can't get more." In
transmission the word "thirteen" was changed to "nineteen,"
80 that the offer to her was nineteen hundred dollars. She an-
swered: "Sell property for amount offered. Will send deed Mon-
day, 27." Hedges completed the agreement for the sale, and
accepted part payment. When the deed came, it expressed a
consideration of ninceteen hundred dollars, and Hedges, think-
ing there might be a mistake, suggested waiting until he could
write; but the purchaser refused and threatened suit, and the
transaction was completed by accepting thirteen hundred dol-
lars. The action was to recover the deficiency, to make up the
amount of nineteen hundred dollars. The court permitted a
**^ recovery, and on the question of authority, which we have
before considered, it said: "The defendant was fully advised
of its importance on the face of the message; and, after being
Jan. 1899.] Hasbrouck ». Western Union Tel. Co. 187
60 advised, its agent assured plaintiff that it had been repeated^
and she could rely upon its correctness. In this way plaintiff
was led to believe she w^as offered nineteen hundred dollars for
her property. Being willing to part with it for that sum, she
wired acceptance of the proposition made. The proposal was
only thirteen hundred dollars, but in this way she was made to-
accept that proposal. Her agent was clothed, not only with ap-
parent, but actual, authority to sell for thirteen hundred dollars
so far as he was advised. Being thus empowered to sell, he made
a binding contract, and accepted a part of the purchase money.
The deed was forwarded, and he delivered it. All this was done
upon reliance in the correctness of defendant's actions. Could
a more natural consequence erer follow a transaction than this^
loss did upon the mistake of defendant ?" In the same connec-
tion the court said upon the question of plaintiff's obligation,
to rescind: "Does it lie in defendant's mouth to speculate how
plaintiff or her agent, by the exercise of care, which it failed to
exercise, might have avoided her contract with the purchaser ?
lias the defendant the right to require plaintiff to enter upon.
a long and doubtful litigation to rescind the contract, which
was fully executed by delivery of her deed, and the receipt of
the purchase money? "We most clearly think not. The cases-
cited by learned counsel do not meet this case. Here the dam-
ages are the direct result of defendant's negligence. Moreover^
they had fully accrued when plaintiff discovered the mistake.
There were no means of avoiding them, except to sue the blame-
less purchaser or the negligent company. She chose the latter
course, and we think properly." In this case the note against
Henderson for three thousand six hundred dollars had been sur-
rendered, if not other securities, and the transaction was com-
plete, so far as to make it binding between the parties.
i«o 4 rpj^g court, by its fifteenth instruction, left it to the-,
jury to determine whether the telegram authorized Boston to-
make the settlement. This is said to be error, and that it wa»
the duty of the court to construe the telegrams. Appellant**
claim is made specific that Boston's authority must be deter-
mined by the two telegrams, omitting the erroneous one, and
that it was the duty of the court to tell the jury what the twa
telegrams meant. We determine the question on that theory,
and such is the rule we have so far observed. Under such a
rule we need not determine the correctness of the instruction;
for we had held that, as a matter of law, the telegrams gave
188 Hasbrouck: v. Western Union Tel. Co. [Iowa,
authority, and the jury must have so found, in order to return
A verdict for plaintiff. Hence, no prejudice resulted from giving
the instruction. In view of another objection to the same in-
struction, we set out the important part of it, as follows: "In
regard to such defense, the jury are instructed that, in de-
termining the true purport and meaning of the telegrams sent,
the words used are to be taken in their usual and ordinary
significance and meaning, and are to be interpreted in the light
■of the facts as they were known to the parties at the time. If
the said Poston did not exercise reasonable oare in interpreting
and acting on the message received in view of the facts as he
inew them, the plaintiffs cannot recover. [The mere fact, how-
ever, that said Poston did not follow the strict letter of his au-
thority in the message sent him, as to whether the niortgage
jeferred to was a twelve hundred dollar mortgage on a fifteen
hundred dollar stock or a fifteen hundred dollar mortgage on a
twelve hundred dollar stock, would not, alone, prevent a re-
>covery, unless the jury find from the evidence that such de-
parture occasioned, in whole or in part, the loss complained of.]"
The part now complained of we have included in brackets. Tho
•complaint is, that it permits a departure from the strict letter
of the authority granted, which is said to violate the rule. We
read the instruction to mean, in the particular suggested, that,
if there was otherwise a right of recovery, a departure from the
strict letter not affecting ^''^ such right would not defeat a re-
•covery. It is saying, in effect, that an immaterial departure
would be without prejudice. Surely such an instruction does
not violate the law. A further complaint is made of the same
instruction in the use of the words: "If said Poston did not
•exercise reasonable care in interpreting and acting on the mes-
sage received, in view of the facts as he knew them, the plain-
. tiffs cannot recover." The complaint is, that "although the jury
should find that the interpretation put upon the message by
Poston was not the true one, and they should find that Poston
•used reasonable care in his effort to interpret, but made a mis-
take, they would still find for the plaintiff." Appellant's con-
'Clusion is not warranted. But, aside from this, in view of the
legal construction to be put on the telegrams, and that must
have been put upon them in reaching the verdict, no prejudice
could result. We think, as does appellant, that it was a ques-
tion of correct interpretation, and we think it affirmatively ap-
pears that the verdict is in accord with such an interpretation.
Jan. 1899.] Hasbrouck v. Western Union Tel. Co. 18&
because of which language complained of, even if erroneous^
would be without prejudicee.
5. Mr. Hasbrouck, a member of the plaintiff firm, was per-
mitted to testify, as was also the other member, that if the
telegram as filed by Poston for transmission had been received,
they would not have sent the message they did send. Ther&
was no error in permitting the answers. It was a necessary fact
to be shown under the issues, and it is difficult to imagine any
other method of proving it. They were the only ones who knew
the fact, and they did know. A state of facts so similar as to
make the holding clear authority on this question is in State
Ins. Co. V. Jamison, 79 Iowa, 245. We need add nothing to
what we have said in that case. The rule has support in cases
therein cited, and in Western Union Tel. Co. v. Mitchell, 91
Tex. 454, 66 Am. St. Eep. 906.
6. Dr. McCuUoch, one of the plaintiff firm, in connection with
his testimony as to the meaning of the telegram ^"^^ received
from Poston was permitted to state that he then knew, or had
an idea in regard to, the value of the stock of goods, and to
state that, according to his idea, the value was about fifteen
hundred dollars. It seems to be conceded in argument that, had
had the court limited the application of the evidence as to what
was in the witness' mind in interpreting the dispatch from Pos-
ton, it might have been proper. There is scarcly room to doubt
that the jury so understood it, from the connection in which
it was given. We have no doubt that it was proper for that
purpose, and, if proper, the error was not in admitting it; but
in a failure to limit its application. The court was not asked
60 to do, nor error assigned upon such a refusal or neglect.
The instructions given are without prejudicial error, and they
80 fairly submit the case that there was no error in the refusal of
those asked. The evidence clearly sustains the verdict. The
judgment is affirmed.
TELEGRAPH COMPANIES— CONTRIBUTARY NEGLIGENCE
OP PARTY RECEIVING TELEGRAM.— Where the recipient of a
telegraphic message sent from Staten Island, but appearing to have
bren sent from South Carolina, after going to the telegraph office
to make Inqu'lry and finding It closed, has been misled into taking
a fruitless trip to South Carolina, it cannot be said as matter of
law that he is chargeable with contributory negligence: Tobin v.
Western Union Tel. Co., 146 Pa. St. 375, 28 Am. St. Rep. 802.
TELEGRAPH COMPANIES — LIABILITY FOR ERRONEl-
OUS^LY TRANSMITTED MESSAGE.— Proof that a telegraphic
message was not transmitted as it was delivered to the comxMiny,
and that it was acted u];>on as received by the sendee, establishes a
190 Casey v. Casey. [Towa,
prima facie case of negligence against tlie company: Eeed v. Westv
«rn Union Tel. Co., 135 Mo. 661, 58 Am. St. Rep. 609, and note. See
Rittenliouse v. Independent Line etc., 44 N. Y. 263, 4 Am. Rep. 673.
INSTRUCTIONS— NONPREJUDICIAL ERROR— FAILURE TO
REQUEST INSTRUCTIONS.— Error cannot be based upon the fail-
ure of the trial court to give instructions when no request was
jnsjde: Wragge v. South Carolina etc. R. R. Co., 47 S. C. 105, 58
Am. St. Rep. 870, and note; State v. Harrison, 66 Vt. 523, 44 Am.
St. Rep. 864. See monographic note to Strohn v. Detroit etc. R. R.
€o., 99 Am. Dec. 118; Macfarland v. Heim, 127 Mo. 327, 48 Am. St.
Rep. 629. If the result reached by the trial is correct, errors in
giving or denying declaration of law, or in giving or denying in-
structions, must be treated as harmless on appeal: Fox v. Windes,
127 Mo. 502, 48 Am. St. Rep. 648.
Casey v. Casey.
[107 Iowa, 192.]
COTENANCY— ADVERSE POSSESSION— EVIDENCE.— To
prove adverse possession by one cotenant of the land of the co-
tenancy, his declarations claiming sole ownership are admissible
in evidence though not made in the presence of his cotenant.
COTENANCY — ADVERSE POSSESSION BETWEEN CO-
TENANTS.— Exclusive occupancy by one tenant in common, ac-
companied by acts and declarations of sole ownership, if known
To his cotenant, will amount to ouster so that his possession may
ripen into title.
COTENANCY — ADVERSE POSSESSION BETWEEN CO-
TENANTS— NOTICE.— In order that exclusive possession of the
land of the cotenancy by one cotenant, accompanied by hostile acts
and claims of ownership, may amount to an ouster of his cotenant,
such acts and declarations must be Ivnown to the latter. Actual no-
tice, must be shown, but it may be by circumstantial evidence.
Willett & Willett, for the appellants.
L. BuUis, for the appellee.
103 WATERMAN, J. Plaintiff is the widow of one Timothy
Casey, who died in the year 1894. Her claim to the real estate
in question is founded upon the will of her husband, in which
it was devised to her. Timothy Casey and his brother, the de-
fendant William Casey, obtained title to this land jointly, a part
in the year 1858 and a part in 1860. In the deeds they were
both named as grantees. Both went into possession, and they
continued in the joint occupation of the premises until the year
1865, when William purchased another farm some three miles
distant, and moved thereon. Timothy remained in sole posses-
sion of the premises in dispute from that time until his death.
Jan. 1899.] Casey v. Casey. 191
and since his death such possession has been held by his widow.
Plaintiff claims title by adverse possession, and also asserts that
a deed was made therefor by William to Timothy, which has
been lost. Both *®^ of these claims are denied, and defendant
William Casey seeks to have title to the undivided one-half
quieted in him. In the year 1867, Timothy and William Casey,
with their wives, joined in making a mortgage on the land, and
there is evidence from two sons of William Casey that Timothy
admitted that William owned an interest therein. These decla-
rations, it is said, were made in 1892 and later. There seems
to have been nothing in the conversation, as it appears in the
record, to have called them out. The facts just stated, together
with the fact that the last deed in the chain of title, stands in
the name of the two brothers as grantees, makes the case for
defendants. On the other hand, the undisputed testimony shows
that Timothy Casey held exclusive possession from the time his
brother moved, in 18G5. During that time he paid the taxes,
received the rents and profits, and made various improvements
upon the land. Among other of such improvements he built
a dwelling-house. At different times he claimed sole owner-
ship. Evidence of this fact was objected to, because the decla-
rations were not shown to have been made in the presence of
William Casey. But we think such evidence was admissible to
prove, not the title, but the intent of the party in possession:
Youngs V. Cunningham, 57 Mich. 153; Lamoreaux v. Huntley,
€8 Wis. 24. Furthermore, to sustain plaintiff's claim it is shown
without dispute that during all the years of Timothy Casey's
occupancy of the land the defendant William lived only three
miles distant, and that he was aware of many, if not all, of
the improvements made upon the premises. There is no pre-
tense of his ever exercising any act of ownership after 1865,
other than his joining in the mortgage mentioned. On the con-
trary, we find that in the year 1893 a son of William, with the
latter's knowledge and assent, leased a part of the land from
Timothy and farmed it that year. These are the facts. Ap-
plying to them well-recognized principles of law, and we find
that Timothy and his brother, the defendant, *"^ were tenants
in common. Exclusive occupancy by one tenant in common,
accompanied by acts or declarationes of sole ownership, if known
to his cotenant, will amount to an ouster: Flock v. Wyatt, 49
Iowa, 466; Warfield v. Lindell, 38 Mo. 561; 90 Am. Dec. 443;
Campau v. Dubois, 39 Mich. 274; Cummings v. Wyman, 10 Mass.
192 Casey v. Casey. [Iowa,
4.64; Hubbard v. Wood, 1 Sneed, 279. And where there is an
ouster, the possession of the occupying tenant may ripen into a
title. Actual notice of the hostile acts and claim must be shown,
bui this may be done by circumstancial evidence, as in this
case. In Lara way v. Larue, 63 Iowa, 408, the defendant was
one of several tenants in common. He set up title by adverse
possession founded upon facts quite similar to the facts in this
case relied upon by plaintiff. This court held the possession
to be adverse, and the title based thereon to be valid, and said
upon the issue: "The deed to defendant was made in March,
1854, more than twenty years prior to the commencement of this
action. The land was wild prairie. The defendant took posses-
sion at once, paid the back taxes, broke and fenced the land,
and built a good common farmhouse, sixteen by twenty-four,
and also barns, stables and cribs. He rented it for six years,
and collected the rents. Afterward he moved upon it, and oc-
cupied it continuously as a homestead, and kept the taxes paid.
.... No one of the heirs claimed an interest in the land during
this twenty years, nor claimed any rents or profits, though two
of them lived near the land We cannot think for a mo-
ment that the defendant supposed he was a mere tenant in com-
mon, and held with half a dozen others, as the plaintiff con-
tends that he did." So, in the case at bar, while the death of
Timothy Casej' renders it impossible to show what understand-
ing or agreement he had with his brother when the latter re-
moved from the land in 1865, yet we cannot think, in view
of what subsequently transpired, that he supposed he was only
a tenant in common with William. Knowles v. Brown, 69 Iowa,
11, is a case similar in principle to the one we have cited. A
tenant in common was there *®^ awarded title, based upon ad-
verse possession, against his cotenant. While we are unable, un-
der the evidence, to reconcile the making of the joint mortgage
by the two brothers after William had removed from the land
with the claim of TimoLhy to sole ownership at that time, it
must be remembered that the latter's death seals the lips of the
only witness who could speak in plaintiff's behalf on this point.
On the other had, it is impossible to make the conduct of these
two brothers during Timothy's long occupancy accord with any
other theory than that there was some conveyance or contract
by which Timothy acquired William's interest in this land. To
the claimed declarations of Timothy to the sons of William wo
ere not inclined to allow any weight. The time and circum-
Jan. 1899.] Wyman v. Eatox. 193
stances when they are said to have been made give an air of
improbability to the occurrence, and the fact said to have been
stated is contradicted by all the other facts and circumstances
in evidence. "We see no reason to interfere with the judgment
of the district court. It is just, and has support in the evidence,
and is therefore affirmed.
COTENANCY— ADVEKSE POSSESSION BETWEEN COTEN-
AN'i'S— NOTICE.— The possession of oue coteiiaut is prosuiued to
be llie possession of all, and, in order to rebut this presumption
and make the possession adverse, it must be shown that the pos-
session was with the intent to hold adversely, and such intent must
be indicated by acts calculated to exclude the colenant: Bader v.
Dyer, lOG Iowa, 715, G8 Am. St. Rep. 332. There must be an actual
ouster: Manstield v. McGinncss, 8G Me. 118, 41 Am. St. Rep. 532.
Exclusive possession by a tenant in common who has taken a con-
veyance purporting to convey the property in severalty, does not
constitute an ouster of his cotenants, and therefore cannot bar their
right to partition, although he claims to own the whole of the
tr:ict. unless knowledge of such claim is brought home to them:
lliirnite v. Hignite. 05 Miss. 447, 7 Am. St. Rep. 073; Boyd v. Boyd,
170 111. 40, 08 Am. St. 109.
COTENANCY — ADVERSE POSSESSION — EVIDENCE. — The
evidence necessary to prove ouster by one cotenant against an-
other is much greater than in cases in which such relation does
not exist between the parties: Wheeler v. Taylor. 32 Or. 421; 07
Am. St. Rep. 540, and note. As to the burden of proof In such
cases, see Stewart v. Stewart, 83 Wis. 3^4, 35 Am. St. Rep. 67, and
cote.
Wyman v. Eaton.
[107 IOWA, 214 ]
RECEIVERS-FOREIUN-SUITS— BY.— The right Of a re-
ceiver to bring suits in a foreign jurisdiction to enforce a liabil-
ity arising under the law. of the state of his appointment canuot
be conferred upon him absolutely by his order of appointment, but
can arise only through an exercise of comity between states, and
such exercise will be denied where it would be in contravention of
the rights of citizens and opposed to equity.
The defendants in this action were original subscribers for
stock in the Iowa and Nebraska State Insurance Company.
They paid fifty per cent of their several subscriptions, as re-
quired by the Nebraska statute under which the company was
incorporated. They later surrendered their certificates, and new-
stock was issued to the parties purchasing from them. Accom-
panying these transfers of stock were substitutes for the prom-
issory notes given by the defendants to secure the unpaid half
of their subscriptions, of other notes given for the same purpose
AM. ST. Rkp., Vol. LXX.-13
194 Wyman v. Eaton. [Iowa,
by thoS'e persons to whom the defendants transferred their
stock. These substitutions and transfers were made in good
faith by all parties, and recorded in the books of the company
while the latter was solvent. From the date of these transac-
tions, which were completed prior to 1887, these defendants
ceased to have any connection with or control over the corpo-
ration. The remaining facts appear from the opinion. Appeal
from judgment in favor of the defendants.
E. & A. C. Wakley and Flickinger Brothers, for the appellant.
Harl & McCabe, Finley, Burke, Wright & Baldwin, Sanders &
Stewart, John Y. Stone and C. R. Marks, for the appellees.
^i'' GEANGEE, J. It will be well to repeat that this action
is by a receiver appointed to wind up the affairs of the Nebraska
Fire Insurance Company, on the application of one of its stock-
holders, to recover from the defendants on their subscriptions
to the original enterprise, wherein was contemplated the organi-
zation of two companies — one in Nebraska, to be known as the
Nebraska & Iowa Insurance Company, and one in Iowa, to be
known as the Iowa & Nebraska Insurance Company, the two
companies to be thereafter consolidated. The first-named com-
pany was organized under the laws of Nebraska and located at
the city of Omaha, in that state, and the latter under the laws
of Iowa, and located at the city of Council Bluffs, in Iowa. The
consolidation was never made and the latter company was
changed to that of the Western Home of Sioux City, and its
place of business changed to Sioux City, Iowa, about May, 1885.
The Nebraska & Iowa Company was changed to the Nebraska
Fire Insurance Company, and continued to operate until 1891,
when the insurance department of Nebraska withdrew its cer-
tificates authorizing the company to do business, and, on the
application of one of its stockholders, its insolvency was decreed ;
and the plaintiff is now engaged in winding up its affairs, and
this action is in aid of that purpose.
The action has for a legal basis a provision of the constitu-
tion of Nebraska, as follows (Neb. Const., art. 11, sec. 4) : "Lia-
bilities of Subscribers to Stock. — In all cases of claims against
corporations and joint stock associations, the exact amount due
shall be first ascertained, and after the corporate property shall
have been exhausted, the original subscribers thereof shall be
individually *^® liable to the extent of their unpaid subscrip-
Jan. 1899.] Wyman t;. Eaton. 195
tions, and the liability for unpaid subscriptions shall follow the
stock." Dismissing for the moment the effect of an arbitrary
legal liability, which must be respected and enforced when
known, there is not, in view of the entire record in this case,
-an equitable consideration favorable to a recovery against these
■defendants. The present liabilities of the Nebraska corporation
cannot truthfully be said to have accrued in consequence of, or
with reliance upon, the former connection of these defendants
with the enterprise from which sprang the present company.
These facts are important as aiding in the solution of a legal
proposition urged by appellees, to the effect that this action can-
not be maintained in Iowa because it is brought by a receiver
of a Nebraska corporation to enforce a provision of the law of
that state; the claim being that such a proceeding can only
be had as a result of comity between the states, and that the
basis of such an exercise is that the citizens of the state granting
it shall not be thereby prejudiced or injured. Admitting, for the
«ake of argument, the rule that comity controls as to the au-
thority of plaintiff to sue in this state, and, as we have in effect
said, the record leaves us without doubt that its exercis'e should
be denied, because it would be in contravention of the rights of
our citizens, and operate to their injury.
Upon the question of the absolute right of plaintiff to sue in
this state, we are not without precedent in our own decisions;
and while, in announcing a rule, we have recognized the fact
of a conflict of authority, we are not persuaded by the argu-
ment in this case that a change should be made, or the rule
modified. Stress is given in argument to the fact that the order
of appointment in Nebraska gives to the receiver authority to
bring suits in other states. That authority is valuable as an
aid to secure the right to do so in the state where the privilege
is sought, and is judiciously granted; but it is without efficiency
to create such a right independent of sanction *** within the
state. The case of Booth v. Clark, 17 How. 322, contains a
somewhat exhaustive consideration of the question of the right
of a receiver appointed in one state to bring a suit for the pos-
session of property in another state, and it is there said: "He
has no extraterritorial power of official action; none which the
court appointing him can confer, with authority to enable him
to go into a foreign jurisdiction to take possession of the debtor*s
property; none which can give, upon the principle of comity, a
privilege to sue in a foreign court or another jurisdiction, as the
196 Wyman v. Eaton. [lowa^
judgment creditor himself might have done, where his debtor
may be amenable to the tribunal which the creditor may seek.'*
An underlying thought of the rule seems to be that, within the
jurisdiction of one's appointment as receiver, he is amenable in
his official capacity to the courts, and he may exercise his au-
thority under the law of the jurisdiction; while, in a foreign
jurisdiction, the law d-oes no more than to make the person
entering it amenable to its laws, and in no way recognizes th&
official capacity. As a citizen in a jurisdiction foreign to his
residence, he has a legal status, and is amenable to, and may
invoke the protection of, the law. As an officer of a court from
a foreign jurisdiction, he has, and is entitled to, no legal recog-
nition, except as the courts may, in their discretion, grant it,
because he is without the official obligation that he assumed in
his own jurisdiction, and which is essential to a proper and safe
exercise of such power. In Ayres v Siebel, 82 Iowa, 347, we
denied the right of a trustee, appointed by the court in Indiana,
to sue and recover on a contract in this state; and in Parker
V. Lamb, 99 Iowa, 265, we denied such a right to receiver, and
cited the Ayres-Siebel case. In Parker v. Lamb, 99 Iowa, 265,^
we quoted approvingly from High on Eeceivers, section 289^
as follows: "Upon the question of the territorial extent of a
receiver's jurisdiction and power for the purpose of instituting
actions connected with his receivership, the prevailing doctrine
established by the supreme court of the United States, and sus-
tained by the weight of authority in various ^^^ states, is that
the receiver has no extraterritorial jurisdiction or power of of-
ficial action, and cannot go into a foreign state or jurisdiction,
and there institute a suit for the recovery of demands due the
person or estate subject to his receivership. His functions and
powers, for the purpose of litigation, are held to be limited to-
the courts of the state in which he was appointed ; and the prin-
ciples of comity between states and nations which recognize the
judicial decisions of one tribunal as conclusive on another do not
apply to such a case, and will not warrant a receiver in bringing
an action in a foreign court or jurisdiction." These authorities
are broad and conclusive, and, unless we are to set them aside,,
are conclusive of this case. Counsel have shown great zeal and
tact in presenting authorities more or less in point, and we ac-
knowledge somewhat of a conflict, as we have done in other
cases ; but the weight of authority we regard as in line with our
holdings, and we are not disposed to disturb them. Beach on
Jan. 1899.] Iowa Savings & Loan Assn. v, Heidt. 197
Eecedvers, section 680, states the same rule, and cites Booth v.
€lark, 17 How. 332, from which we have quoted, and then says:
''The rule thus laid down by the supreme court of the United
States has been followed by other courts with essential una-
nimity, and can hardly be said to be seriously questioned." In
Fitzgerald v. Fitzgerald etc. Construction Co., 41 Neb. 374, these
authorities are approvingly cited and applied. It remains for
us to state as a conclusion that the plaintiff is not entitled to
recover in the courts of Iowa, and the judgment of the district"
court will be affirmed.
RECEIVERS— FOREIGN— SUITS BY.— A receiver appointed in
anotlier state for an insolvent corporation may, in this state, main-
tain an action in its name upon a liability due it. Through comity
between states a representative of a court of one state will be per-
mitted to sue in the courts of the other when the suit does not in-
juriously aCfect tlie interests of the citizens of the latter nor violate
its policy or laws: Castleman v. Templeman, 87 Md. 546, 67 Am.
St. Rep. 363, and note. See the extended note to Straughan v. Hall-
wood, 8 Am. St. Rep. 49; also the note to Alley v. Caspari, 6 Am.
St. Rep. 185.
lowA Savings & Loan Association v, Heidt.
[107 lOWA, 297.]
BUILDING AND LOAN ASSOCIATIONS — LOANS TO
ME>[RERS— PROPER DEDUCTIONS.— A building and loan asso-
ciation may retain from loans made to members a sum sufficient
to rover the cost of examining abstract, appraiser's fee, recording
mortgage, and expenses of management.
BUILDING AND LOAN ASSOCIATIONS— USUBY—EXAO-
TION OF PREMIUMS.— A building and loan association author-
ized by statute to receive "premiums bid by members for the right
of precedence in taking loans," has no authority to exact from the
borrower, where there is no competition, an arbitrary sum in ad-
dition to the interest on his loan, where the whole amounts to more
than legal interest.
BUILDING AND LOAN ASSOCIATIONS-USURY— INTER-
EST UPON FAQE. RATHER THAN AMOUNT, OF LOAN.— A
building and loan association, having deducted from a loan to a
member a sum sufficient to pay expenses incidental to malting the
loan, which are properly charged to the borrower, may compute
legal interest upon the face of the loan instead of the amount ao^
tually received by the borrower without making the transactioa
usurious.
BUILDING AND LOAN ASSOCIATIONS-EXORBITANT
FINES.— One who purchases stock In a building and loan associa-
tion is held to a knowledge of the terms of his membership, and
will not be heard later to complain of the Imposition of reasonable
fines for defaults in payments, which fines are authorized by stat*
ote.
398 Iowa Saving & Loan Assn. v. Heidt. [Iowa,
BUILDING AND LOAN ASSOCIATIONS-TJSURY— CON-
STITUTIONAL LAW— The legislature may exempt transaction*
between building and loan associations and their members from the
operation of the law against usury.
USURY — STATUTORY CHANGES — RETROACTIVE EF-
FECT.—The privilege of pleading usury pertains only to the rem-
edy and may be taken away by statute as to contracts entered
into before the enactment of the statute, nor does such a statute'
impair vested rights when enacted pending an appeal from a de-
cree in favor of a member of a building and loan association on a
plea of usury, made to avoid the enforcement of a contract betweert
liimself and the association.
BUILDING AND LOAN ASSOCIATIONS— AMOUNT RE-
COVERABLE FROM MEMBERS— STATUTORY CONSTRUC-
TION.—A statute fixing the amounts that may be included in the
recovery by a building and loan association from a borrower should
be construed as fixing the maximum amount of recovery, and not
as preventing the association from contracting to receive a less
amount.
Action in equity to foreclose a mortgage on real estate and to
cancel certain shares of stock held hy the defendant in plaintiff
association. The defense of usury was sustained by the trial
court. An accounting was had. A judgment of forfeiture
was given in favor of the school fund. The appeal is from a
decree in favor of the plaintiff for seventy-two dollars and eighty
cents without either interest or costs.
Bailey & Ballreich, for the appellant.
Dudley, Coffin & Byers, for the appellee.
298 WATERMAN", J. Plaintiff is a building and loan as-
sociation, having incorporated as such originally in 1889. On
July 2, 1896, its articles were amended to comply with the re-
quirements of chapter 85 of the acts of the twenty-sixth general
assembly. Defendant was the owner of ten shares of stock in
Baid association, and on February 15, 1891, he borrowed from
it the sum of one thousand dollars, giving as security his sharesi
of sto<!k in pledge and the mortgage in suit. At the time of
^^^ making the loan, plaintiff deducted from the amount of the
loan the following sums: Attorney's fee for examining abstract,
two dollars and fifty cents; appraiser's fee, two dollars; record-
ing mortgage, one dollar; abstractor's fee, nine dollars. The
remainder, nine hundred and eighty-five dollars and fifty cents,
was paid to defendant. Defendant was to pay, according to the
contract contained in his note and mortgage, the sum of seven-
teen dollars per month until the maturity of hia stock. Thi»
Jan. 1899.] Iowa Savings & Loan Assn. v. Heidt. 199
amount was made up as follows: sixty cents per share, install-
ments on his stock, six dollars; sixty cents per share, premium
for the loan, six dollars; and fifty cents per share as interest on
the money received, five dollars. Out of the dues on stock, the
association deducted seven cents from each sixty cents paid for
expenses of management, but only so much of this was used or
kept as was necessary for actual expenses. From time to time
the surplus of the expense fund was carried to the credit of the
stockholders.
1. It is claimed that defendant did not receive the full
amount of his loan, and this is correct. But the amounts de-
ducted were necessary expenses in perfecting the loan. These
sums were not retained by the association, but were paid to
others, and were proper charges against defendant: Hawkeye
State etc. Assn. v. Johnston, 106 Iowa, 218.
Some complaint is also made because of the deduction by the
association of seven cents out of each sixty cents of dues, for
expense of management. We see no ground for a member's
objection to this method. It is not claimed that more was used
for expens'es than was actually necessary. Now, it is apparent
that these expenses had to be paid by the members. If a fund
was not raised in this way, the amount would have to be taken
from the earnings. In any event the burden would fall on the
stockholders.
2. With these minor matters out of the way, we take up the
next question in the case, which is the claim of usury. It k
said: 1. That the contract is usurious, because the premium ex-
acted was not bid for the right of precedence in ^^® taking the
loan; 2. Because interest was charged upon the face of the loan;
and 3. Because the fines and fees were exorbitant. It is true
that the premium was a fixed sum, established by the by-laws
of the association, and chapter 6, title 9, of the Code of 1873,
was in force when this loan was made. In that chapter such
associations are given the right to receive "premiums bid by
members for the right of precedence in taking loans," and then
it is said the taking of such premiums shall not be held to be
usury. We are of the opinion that, under the statute, it was
not lawful for the association to exact from a borrower, where
there was no competition, an arbitrary sum in addition to the in-
terest on his loan, where the whole amounted to more than legal
interest; and we may say, without setting out the computation,
that we think it did in this case. In Burlington etc. Assn. v.
200 Iowa Savings & Loan Assn. v. Heidt. [Iowa,
Heider, 55 Iowa, 424, and Hawkeye etc. Assn. v. Blackburn, 48
Iowa, 385, each of which involved a construction of the statute
we are now considering, while usury was pleaded, the question
presented now was not raised. Except in name, the premium
here does not differ in any way from interest. It is paid for the
use of money, and not for the privilege of getting the loan.
As it is claimed that the acts of plaintiff in exacting from de-
fendant the various sums it did as consideration for the loan
were validated by subsequent legislation, it may be well for us
to determine to just what extent curative acts were needed.
AVe take up, therefore, defendant's further claims of usury.
3. It is said that the loan was usurious, because interest was
charged on the face of the note, and not on the amount ac-
tually paid to defendant. The two cases last cited are thought
by counsel for appellee to support this claim. In those cases
the premium charged for the loan was deducted at the time
the loan was made, and was retained by the association for its
benefit, and interest was collected upon the whole sum, includ-
ing the amount of the premium; and this interest exceeded the
rate fixed by law. The items which defendant claims should
not have been included in the principal in the ^^^ case at bar,
and upon which interest was computed, are the two dollars and
fifty cents for examining abstract and two dollars appraisement
fee. Both of these were legitimate matters of expense, as we
have already said. As we understand the record, while the two
dollars fee was paid into the expense fund, it was the exact
amount that was paid by the association out of that fund for
the appraisement in the making of this loan; and the other fee
was paid to an attorney for services actually rendered. The
payment by the borrower of the necessary expenses of the
lender, incurred in making the loan, in addition to the legal
interest, will not constitute usury: Smith v. Wolf, 55 Iowa,
555. These amounts were not exacted as a bonus by the asso-
ciation, and it got no benefit whatever from their payment.
This case is materially different from those upon which de-
fendant relies.
4. Next, it is said that the fines charged were exorbitant.
Doubtless, a fine may be so unreasonable and excessive as to be
void. But these do not appear to be that of character. Im-
positions proportionately as heavy have been approved in simi-
lar cases: See 4 Am. & Eng. Ency. of Law, 1042, note 4. The
statute authorized these penalties, and it fixed no limit to the
Jan. 1899.] Iowa Savings & Loan Assn. v. Heidt. 201
amount that might be imposed. The amount fixed by the by-
laws of the association was five cents for the first default on
each share, and ten cents for each subsequent default. This
amount was not exceeded in defendant's case. He knew, or
should have known, the terms of his membership when he pur-
chased stock in the association, and we do not think he can be
heard now to complain of an obligation which he voluntarily
assumed.
5. As we have found that the contract was tainted with usury
because of the exaction of the level or arbitrary premium, it
now becomes necessary to determine whether it had been purged
of this illegality by subsequent legislation. This loan was
made in 1891. In 1896 the twenty-sixth general assembly
passed an act (chapter 85) providing for the government, man-
agement, and operation of associations of ^*** this character.
Section 9 of that act, so far as material, is as follows: "All
building and loan and savings and loan associations upon re-
ceiving the certificate of the auditor shall have power ....
to assess and collect from members such dues, membership fees,
fines, premiums and interest on loans as may in the articles of in-
corporation and by-laws have been provided, and the same shall
not be held to be usurious .... to make loans to members on
feiich terms and conditions as the articles of incorporation and
by-laws provide In case of foreclosure, the borrower
shall be charged with the full amount of the loan made to him,
together with dues, interest, premium, and fines for which he
is delinquent, and he shall be credited with the same value of
his pledged shares as if he had voluntarily withdrawn the same."
It is claimed by plaintiff that this section applied to contracts
made prior to its passage, and validated acts already done.
This law is not expressly made retroactive, and we should hesi-
tate before giving it that effect, especially to the extent claimed
by plaintiff. But in view of our holding upon another statute,
which is set up, and which we shall next consider, it is not
necessary that we decide this question.
6. Section 9, which we have set out, with some changes not
material to be noticed here, went into the present Code as sec-
tion 1898. The twenty-seventh general assembly, by chapter
48, amended this section, as follows: "The provisions of said
section shall apply to and govern all contracts between build-
ing and loan and savings and loan associations and their mem-
bers, made and entered into prior to the taking effect of the
202 Iowa Savings & Loan Assn. v. Heidt. [Iowa,
code^ and every such contract shall in all actions and proceed-
ings be construed and enforced as in said section provided, and
with the same force and effect, as if made and entered into after
the code took effect, anything in the statutes in force when such
contracts were made to the contrary notwithstanding." We
think this act was intended to make valid and enforceable all
previous contracts for loans, which were within the terms of
section 1898, as the contract in suit clearly was.
303 ipj^g jjg^^ question is as to the legislative power to do this.
As a general rule, it may be said the legislature can validate any
act which it might originally have authorized. "Windsor v.
Des Moines, 101 Iowa, 343; Clinton v. Walliker, 98 Iowa, 655.
A number of objections are made to the application of this rule
to the case at bar. First, it is said 'that the building and loan
law of the state is unconstitutional, because it is class legisla-
tion. Some of the arguments advanced in support of this claim
assail rather the policy of such statutes than the power to enact,
them. In theor}^, these institutions are profit-sharing. The
amounts directly paid for the use of money go indirectly to the
benefit of the stockholders, through the increase in the value of
their shares. Where the loans are confined to shareholders, we
can see good reason for exempting such associations from the
operation of the usury law. That the constitutional power ex-
ists to make this exemption, we think, is without serious doubt:
People's Bldg. etc. Assn. v. Billing, 104 Mich. 186; Vermont
etc. Trust Co. v. Whithed, 2 N. Dak. 82; Archer v. Baltimore
etc. Assn. (W. Va. April, 1898), 30 S. E. Rep. 241. See also,
on the general character of these institutions, and the reasons
for special legislation in their favor, Hawkins v. American etc.
Assn., 96 Ga. 206; Granite State etc. Assn. v. Monk (N. J. Ch.
Jan. 3, 1895), 30 Atl. Eep. 872; Natchez etc. Assn. v. Shields,
71 Miss. 630. Next, it is said the curative act is invalid, so far
as this case is concerned, for to give it effect as against de-
fendant would impair vested rights. The act in question was
passed after the decree was rendered by the trial court in this
case; and for this reason it is thought that defendant's rights
had so accrued and vested as that they could not be disturbed
or altered such legislation. In Clinton v. Walliker, 98 Iowa,
655, the curative act was given application to a contract in-
volved in a suit which was pending when the act was passed.
The same holding was made in Tuttle v. Polk, 84 Iowa, 12.
Richman v. Supervisors, 77 Iowa, 513, 14 Am. St. Rep. 308,
Jan. 1899.] Iowa Savings & Loan Assn. v. Heidt. 205
^*** was a certiorari proceeding to test the validity of an assess-
ment and levy of a tax for building a levee. In a former pro-
ceeding, the action of the board of supervisors had been set
aside, and the assessment declared void, by the circuit court,
and this holding was affirmed by this court. After this final
judgment, the general assembly passed an act authorizing a new
assessment. This was had, and proceedings were again insti-
tuted to test the validity of the tax levied under the curativo
act. This last is the case we have cited. It was urged by tho
petitioners that they had vested rights under the first decision,
but the claim was denied by this court. In Huff v. Cook, 44
Iowa, 639, defendant, a woman, claimed to have been elected
to the office of county superintendent. In a proceeding to test
her right to the office, the trial court held that she was ineli-
gible because of her sex. She appealed. After the judgment
below, an act was passed by the general assembly, which in effect
declared that no person previously elected to such office should
be disqualified from holding the same because of her sex. It
was held by this court that the bringing of an action vests no
right to a particular decision, and that defendant being eligible
when final judgment was pronounced it should go in her favor.
See, also, Iowa etc. Land Co. v. Soper, 39 Iowa, 112, 124. It
is difficult to perceive what right of the plaintiff in the case at
bar was disturbed by the curative act other than a mere privi-
lege of pleading usury; and this pertains only to the remedy,
which, it is uniformly held, may be altered at the legislative
will: Kossuth County v. Wallace, 60 Iowa, 508; State v.
Squires, 26 Iowa, 340. So far as the payments made and fines
imposed are concerned, they were in accord with the terms of
defendant's contract. The effect of the subsequent legislation
was not to change the agreement, but only to remove a bar to
its enforcement. The cause being triable de novo in this courts
there seems no legal objection to the entering of a decree in con-
formity with the law as it now exists.
*^ 7. It is further urged against the validity of the subse-
quent legislation that it allows a recovery which may be greater
than the amount fixed by the contract in some cases; and it i»
said that, in the case at bar, plaintiff could recover more under
the law than it could lawfully claim on its contract. But, so
far as plaintiff is concerned, it is seeking nothing more than it»
contract calls for. Furthermore, we do not think the measure
of recovery specified in the law is meant to be mandatory, in the
201 Iowa Savikgs & Loan Assn. v. Heidt. [Iowa,
cense that the parties may not make a contract more favorable
to the debtor by which they will be bound. The law fixes the
maximum of recovery against a debtor, and we can see no rea-
feon why, within the limit specified, an agreement for a differ-
ent settlement may not be made.
8. Plaintiff is entitled to a judgment for the sum of five
hundred and seventy-one dollars and eighty cents, with interest
^t eight per cent from November 1, 1895, the date of defend-
ant's default. We find this amount by adding the dividends
to the dues and premiums paid, which makes a total of four
hundred and twenty-eight dollars and twenty cents, and de-
ducting this from the face value of the note. We have made
no deduction from defendant's credits for expenses, because we
are unable to determine what the actual expenses were. The
amount plaintiff withheld from premiums for this purpose is
^iven; but it appears that this was often too liberal an allow-
ance, and left a balance to be carried to the loan fund. Plain-
tiff is entitled to charge defendant only for his share of the ac-
tual and necessary expense of management, and, as is said, we
-cannot determine what this would be. It is manifest from what
has been said that the judgment in favor of the school fund is
■erroneous. Under the circumstances, we think an apportion-
ment of the cosits should be made. Following the rule applied
in Iowa etc. Land Co. v. Soper, 39 Iowa, 112, the copts both of
the court below and of this court will be equally divided be-
tween the parties. Modified as we have suggested, the decree
against defendant will be affirmed.
BUILDING AND LOAN ASSOCIATIONS— USURY.-In some
parts of the United States are statiites authorizing the formation
of such associations and the loaning of their moneys upon pre-
miums paid by their members, and wher'e such Is the case the cor-
porate mode of doing business Is necessarily legalized and ex-
•empted from the penalties of usury. Partly from the Influence
of special statutes and partly because the courts have not regarded
transactions of tliis class as mere loans of money, but as being
part of a general business scheme In which the borrower partiei-
patps in the profits and obtains advantages In addition to the mere
loan of money to hlra, the majority of the decisions in this coun-
try sustain the transactions in question, and declare that they do
not offend against the statutes upon the subject of usury: See the
extended note to Bank of Newport v. Cook, 46 Am. St. Rep. 200;
Pollock V. Carolina etc. Assn., 51 S. C. 420, 64 Am. St. Rep. 683.
■Contra, see Meroney v, Atlantic etc. Assn., 116 N. C. 882, 47 Am.
€t. Rep. 841, and note. See the monographic note to Robertson
▼. Homestead Assn.. 60 Am. Dec. 150-166.
Jan. 1899.] McPeek v. Western Union Tel. Co. 205
BUILDING AND LOAN ASSOCIATIONS-USURT-EXACTION
OF PREMIUMS.— A premium, to be legal, must be one that Is bid
for a right of precedence in taking a loan at a competitive sale,
and, when there is no such sale and no bid, there can be no legal
premium: McCauley v. Building etc. Assn., 07 Tenn. 421, 56 Am.
St. Rep. 813.
BUILDING AND LOAN ASSOCIATIONS— FINES.— Fines for
nonpayment of dues are essential to the exercise of the express
powere conferred upon building and loan associations in their Inr
corporation, and they have a right to impose them whether any
express warrant is found for it in the statute of incorporation or
not. They have such power by Implication, but when not fixed by
statute, such fines must be prescribed by the charter or by-laws of
the association in precise and unequivocal terms, so as to be readily
understood by members, and they must be reasonable, or they can-
not be enforced: Roberts v. American etc. Assn., 62 Ark. 572, 54 Am.
St. Rep. 309, and note.
MoPeet^ V, Western Union Telegraph Co.
[107 Iowa, 356.]
REWARDS -EVIDENCE TO PROVE OFFER— COPY OP
GOVERNOR'S PROCLAMATION.— To prove the offer of a reward
for the arrest of a person, a copy of the governor's proclamation,
duly certified by the secretary of state, with whom the original is
deposited. Is admissible in evidence.
TELEGRAPH COMPANIES— NOTICE OF IMPORTANCE
OP MESSAGE.— In an action for damages occasioned by the delay
of a telegraph company in delivering a message, extrinsic evidence
is admissible to show that the company had notice of the import-
ance of the messatre.
TELEGRAPH COMPANIES- LIABILITY FOR NONDE-
LIVERY OF MESSAGE.— The liability of a telegraph company \o
the sendee of a message for damages resulting from a delay In
delivery is not one arising from contract, but is based uixtn its
negligence In the performance of a duty In its public capacity as a
common carrier of messages.
TELEGRAPH COMPANIES— DELAY IN DELIVERING
MESSAGE— MEASURE OP DAMAGES.— A person injured by the
delay of a telegraph company in delivering a message to him is
not limited in his recovery to such damages as might reasonably
have been within the contemplation of the parties, but recovery
may be had for all the injurious results which flow therefrom, by
ordinary natural sequence, without the Interposition of any other
negligent act or overpowering force.
TELEGRAPH COMPANIES— DAMAGES FOR DELAY IN
DELIVERY OF MESSAGE— LOSS OP REWARD.— Where a per-
son has laid a plan for the capture of a fugitive from justice with a
view to obtaining the reward offered therefor, and has notified a
telegraph agent tbat he Is expecting a telegram of great Importance
to the success of his plan, and the agent knows that prompt de-
livery of such message will be necessary, the telegraph company
will be liable in damages to the amount of such reward If the agont'8
206 McPeek v. Western Union Tel. Co. [Iowa,
delay in delivery of the message frustrates the sendee's plan. It is
not necessary that the agent have actual notice of the offer of the
reward, he being charged vrith knowledge that such offer might be
made.
TELEGRAPH COMPANIES— NEGLIGENCE IN DELIV-
ERY OF MESSAGE— BURDEN OF PROOF.— In an action aga nst
a telegraph company for the loss of a reward offered for the capture
of a fugitive from justice, which loss is alleged to have resulted
from the negligence of the defendant in delivering a certain tele-
gram, the burden of proof rests upon the plaintiff, and the question
whether or not such loss resulted from the negligence alleged Is for
the jury.
TELEGRAPH COMPANIES— LIABILITY FOR NONDE-
LIVERY OF MESSAGE— OFFICE HOURS.— An agent of a tele-
graph company undertaking to deliver a message outside of office
hours is acting within the scope of his agency, and the company
is liable for his failure to exercise reasonable diligence. Whether
or not such diligence was exercised is a question for the Jury.
Blake & Blake, for the appellant.
John D. Dill and W. I. Babb, for the appellee.
3s» LADD, J. September 20, 1896, after mortally wound-
ing John Finley, the marshal of Morning Sun, Orman McPher-
son fled. A few days after the plaintiff saw McPherson's wife,
who promised to assist him in procuring the arrest of her hus-
band. McPeek obtained McPherson's pension papers from
Keithsburg, Illinois, for her and she advised him (being in
secret correspondence under an assumed name) of having these,
and he came to her room at the hotel at Morning Sun, where
she was employed as cook, October 23, 1896, at about 10 o'clock
P. M. (having so arranged earlier in the evening), and there re-
mained until between 3 and 4 o'clock the following morning.
Before coming in, he gave up his revolvers, and she placed them
in a bureau where they remained during his stay. She had
agreed to write to McPeek when she expected her husband, but,
if he came unexpectedly, then to telegraph him. At about
7 o'clock P. M. of the twenty-second, she delivered to the de-
fendant's agent at Morning Sun this telegram: "E. E. McPeek,
Winfield. Come on first train. Answer. M. E. M." — telling
him she wanted it "sent right away and delivered, and wanted
an answer." Ridgway, the agent at Winfield, usually closed his
office at 6 o'clock, but was ordinarily at the station at about 9
o'clock. He received the message at 9:15 o'clock P. M., and
carried it to the plaintiff's house, reaching there at about 9:30.
After repeatedly rapping at the door, and being unable to arouse
Jan. 1899.] McPeek v. Western Union Tel. Co. 207
anyone, as he says, he placed the message over the door knob,
with the end of the envelope between the door and the jamb,
where it was found the next day at between 9 and 10 o'clock
A. M. It seems the agent supposed the family was away from
home, and would find it upon their return. They had in fact i
retired, and all testify that they did not hear the rapping of
Eidgeway, or any noise at the door, and that they would have
heard it had there been any. The only train carrying passen-
gers leaving Winfield for Morning Sun, a distance of about
twelve miles, left the former place ^*® at 6 o'clock A. M. LIc-
Peek had told liidgeway he was making an effort to capture
McPherson, and might get a telegram from Morning Sun con-
cerning the matter, and that if a message came, and he was un-
able to find him, to deliver it to Siberts, a constable. Both had
repeatedly called at the office for such a telegram. It also ap-
pears that Siberts, by direction of McPeek, had arranged for a
team at the livery stable and a driver to be ready for him at any
time, and that Siberts was to go with McPeek in case McPher-
son should come to Morning Sun. The constable at the latter
place, and another, had agreed to assist him, though not ad-
vised as to the nature of the business except that it was to make
an arrest. The evidence was such that the jury was warranted
in finding the facts as stated, though it must be added that
Eidgeway denies having previously talked with either the plain-
tiff or Siberts; and McPherson, who was afterward arrested,
declared he was not at Morning Sun as testified by his wife,
and did not correspond with her. On the twenty-first day of
October, 1896, the governor of Iowa, by proclamation, offered
a reward of three hundred dollars for the arrest of McPherson,
and his delivery to the proper authorities. The plaintiff's ac-
tion is ba^ed on the allegation that he lost this reward through
the negligence of the defendant in not delivering the message
on the evening of October 22d. "With these preliminary state-
ments we shall be able to consider the different questions pre-
sented by the record.
1. A copy of the governor's proclamation, duly certified by
the secretary of state, was received in evidence ove/ the objec-
tion of defendant. That such a reward was authorized by sec-
tion 58 of the code of 1873 is not questioned. The method of
making the offer is not pointed out, but it is to be paid upon the
certificate of the governor. Usage has approved offering such
rewards by way of proclamations, and this fully complies with
203 McPfiKK V. Western Union Tel, Co. [Iowa,
the statute. That the original proclamations made by the
executire of a state should be preserved admits of no doubt.
The statute makes no express provision ^^^ for such pres-
ervation, but by section 66 the secretary of state "shall have
charge of and keep .... papers which are now or may be
hereafter deposited to be kept in his office." The secretary
certified that he was the custodian of the record of the official
acts of the executive department, and that the proclamation
was a part of the files of his office. "We take it, then, that this
was deposited, to be kept by the secretary of state. Section
4649 provides, in substance, that acts of the executive of this
state are proved by the records of the state department. The
very evident purpose is to avoid the necessity of calling the gov-
ernor before a co-ordinate branch of government to give evi-
dence or answer for any of his acts. While the statute does
not in express terms make such papers a part of the files to be
kept and preserved by the secretary of state, we are of opinion
that section 66 is broad enough to include them, that by fair
implication section 4649 authorizes them to be so kept, and
that, under sections 4649 and 4635 of the code, a certified copy
thereof is admissible in evidence in lieu of the originals.
3. The defendant also interposed objections to the testimony
of the plaintiff, Siberts, and Mrs. McPherson to the arrange-
ment made between them with reference to the capture of Mc-
Pherson. This' was original, and not hearsay, evidence. It re-
lated to circumstances and facts essential to be proven as lead-
ing up to the sending of the telegram and had a direct bearing
upon the probability of the plaintiff effecting the arrest of Mc-
Pherson, had the telegram been properly delivered. It was
necessary to show the exact situation, and all that had been done
to accomplish that purpose. The appellant is impressed by the
danger of fraud in this class of evidence. It is suggested that,
if there be possibility of fraud, it may readily be obviated by the
exercise of diligence.
3. It is insisted that the damages were remote, and not such
as either party might have contemplated from the ""^ wording
of the message. But extrinsic evidence was admissible to show
that defendant had notice of the importance of the message:
Postal Tel. Cable Co. v. Lathrop, 131 111. 575, 19 Am. St. Eep.
55; Western Union Tel.* Co. v. Edsall, 74 Tex. 329, 15 Am. St.
Rep. 835. The appellant argues the case on the theory that the
action of plaintiff is for the breach of contract. He made no
Jan. 1899.] McPeek v. Western Union Tel. Co. 209
contract with the defendant. This is conceded by appellant in.
its opening argument, and denied in its reply. The first im-
pression was undoubtedly the correct one. The contract was
with the sender of the message, and whether recovery might be
had for breach thereof, because made for plaintiff's benefit, we
need not determine. This action is based on the negligence of
the defendant in the performance of a duty in its public ca-
pacity as a common carrier of messages. In all such actions,
sounding in tort, the injured party is not limited to damages
which might reasonably have been within the contemplation of
the parties, but recovery may be had "for all the injurious re-
sults which flow therefrom, by ordinary, natural sequence,
without the interposition of any other negligent act or over-
powering force": Mentzer v. Western Union Tel. Co., 93 Iowa,
757, 57 Am. St. Rep. 294; Code, sec. 2163; Western Union
Tel. Co. v. Du Bois, 128 111. 248, 15 Am. St. Rep. 109; West-
ern Union Tel. Co. v. Allen, 66 Miss. 549; Ellis v. American
Tel. Co., 13 Allen, 226; Western Union Tel. Co. v. Fenton, 52
Ind. 1; Smith v. AVestern Union Tel. Co., 83 Ky. 104, 4 Am.
St. Rep. 126; Milliken v. Western Union Tel. Co., 110 N. Y.
403; Young v. Western Union Tel. Co., 107 N. C. 370, 22 Am.
St. Rep. 883; AVestern Union Tel. Co. v. Adams, 75 Tex. 531,
16 Am. St. Rep. 920. There was evidence tending to show that
immediate delivery was requested, and that the agent at Win-
field knew that McPeek was expecting a message, that it would
relate to the capture of McPherson, and that prompt delivery
was required. If so, while he may not have known of the re-
ward being offered he may well be credited with understanding
that McPeek was putting forth his efforts to accomplish a ^****
purpose from which he anticipated some benefit to accrue to
himself. The law authorizes the offering of such rewards, and it
is not too strict a rule to hold the defendant responsible for such
losses as may reasonably be anticipated to follow its negligence,
whether informed definitely what these may be or not. It was
charged with knowledge that such a reward might be made, and
it might reasonably reckon on such a contingency, in omitting
its duty with reference to such a message. Nor was the plaintiff
advised that the reward had actually been offered on October
22d, though he understood it would be, and was acting to se-
cure this and others proposed by local officers. That the omis-
sion of the defendant caused greater loss than he then supposed
does not affect its liability, or his right of recovery. Certainly,
Am. St. Rbp.. Vou LXX.— 14
iilO McPeek v. Western Union Tel. Co. [Iowa,
the loss of the reward was the direct result of the failure to ar-
rest and deliver McPherson to the proper authorities, for this
was the very condition of its payment.
4. The burden was on the plaintiff to prove that in all rea-
sonable probability the loss resulted from the negligence of the
defendant: Hendershott v. Western Union Tel. Co., 106 Iowa,
529, 68 Am. St. Eep. 313. Had the plaintiff proceeded by team
to Morning Sun, with the assistance of the two constables and
another, there §eems no good reason to doubt that he would
have arrested McPherson, who had been disarmed by his wife.
This is not absolutely certain, for many contingencies may be
supposed which could have intervened. While these might well
be considered, they do not warrant us in saying that these men
would not have accomplished that which has often been done
before, and which is ordinarily done by officers in like situation.
Whether they would in all probability have succeeded was for
the jury to determine.
5. It is suggested that, as the train did not go until 6:06 in
the morning, even if the message had been delivered the plain-
tiff could not have reached Morning Sun in time to make the
arrest. But the plaintiff had made every arrangement to go by
team. This message was understood '^^^ by the plaintiff to
require immediate attention owing to his agreement with Mrs.
McPherson.
6. It may be that the defendant can fix office hours which
are reasonable, and that those from 8 A. M. to 6 o'clock P. M.
are not unreasonable. This we do not decide. But see West-
ern Union Tel. Co. v. Harding, 103 Ind. 505; Given v. Western
Union Tel. Co., 24 Fed. Eep. 119. The company received thisi
message, if Mrs. McPherson is to be believed, with the under-
standing that it was to be delivered at about 9 o'clock. The
agent at Winfield received it, and the company, having under-
taken to deliver it, was bound to do so with reasonable dili-
gence: Thompson on Electricity, sec. 300. He was acting with-
in the scope of his agency, although not within the hours fixed
for the active discharge of his duties. This could not relieve
the company from discharging the obligation incurred by fe-
ceiving the message to be delivered out of office hours.
7. The defendant asserts that no negligence in failiT><T to de-
liver the message has been shown. If the testimony of llidgeway
be accepted as true, it might be that, in loudly rapping on the
door repeatedly, and receiving no response, he exercised reasona-
Jan. 1899.] McPeek v. Western Union Tel. Co. 211
ble diligence. Tliis is in dispute. The daughter of the plaintiff
testified that she was at his home from 9 o'clock P.M., and did not
retire until a half-hour later, and that she heard no noise at the
door. Mr. and Mrs. McPeek also testified that they heard no
€uch noise, and that they would have been likely to have heard
it, had there been any. Whether Kidgeway made any effort to
arouse the family is put in question by this evidence. If he was
■advised of the importance of the message, as claimed by the
plaintiff, he was bound to exercise diligence accordingly, and
whether he so did was for the determination of the jury.
Some other matters are discussed, but they are not of suri-
cient importance to call for special attention. We discover nc
€rror in the record, and the judgment must be affirmed.
TELEGRAPH COMPANIES-DELAY IN DELIVERY OP MES-
SAGE—LIABILITY TO SENDEE.— No relation of contract exists
between the receiver of a dispatch and the telegraph company, and
the proper remedy of the former for damages is an action in tort:
Webhe v. Western Union Tel. Co., 169 111. 610. 61 Am. St. Rep. '207;
Western Union Tel. Co. v. Dubois, 128 III. 248, 15 Am. St. Rep. 109.
TELEGRAPH COMPANIES— DELAY IN DELIVERY— DAM-
AGES.—It is as much the duty of a telegraph company to use dili-
gence in delivering messages without unreasonable delay as in
transmitting them, and it is generally liable in special damages for
such delay or for the nondelivery of a message: Western Union Tel.
Co. V. Moore, 12 Ind. App. 136, 54 Am. St. Rep. 515, and note. A
telegraph company is liable for such damage as is the direct and
natural result of Its ^allure to deliver a message: Western Union
Tel. Co. V, Broesche, 72 Tex. 654, 13 Am. St. Rep. 843. The general
rule is, that the damages must be such as may fairly be supi)osed
to have entered into the contemplation of the parties when they
made the contract; that Is, must be such as might naturally be ex-
pected to follow its violation: See the extended note to Western
Union Tel. Co. v. Cooper, 10 Am. St. Rep. 778. The loss of a mere
opportunity or possibility to make some money does not render a
telegraph company liable in damages for the nondelivery of a tile-
gram: Clay V. Western Union Tel. Co., 81 Ga. 285, 12 Am, St. Rep.
316.
TELEGRAPH COMPANIES— NOTICE OF IMPORTANCE OF
MESSAGE.— To authorize a recovery of special damages for delay
in the delivery of a message, the telegraph company must have
had notice, either from the face of the message or otherwise, at the
time of receiving it, of the circumstances out of which special dam-
ages might arise: Gulf etc. Ry. Co. v. Loonio. 82 Tex. 323, 27 Am.
St. Rep. 891, and note. Contra, Western Union Tel. Co. v. Hyer,
22 Fla. 037, 1 Am. St. Rep. 222, and note.
TELEGRAPH COMPANIES — DELIVERY OF MESSAGE—
BURDEN OF PROOF.— A prima facie case is made out asainst a
telegraph company when it is shown that the message which the
company undertook to send was not delivered, and that damage
has resulted, and the burden of proof is then thrown upon the
company to show the exercise of ordinary care, and that its fnllure
to transmit and deliver the message was not caused by Its fault
or nesligpnoe, or that of its tMuplov/^s: Fowler v. Western Union
Tel. Co., 80 Me. 381, 6 Am. St Rep. 211.
212 Feder v. Iowa State etc. Assn. [Iowa,
Fbder V. Iowa State Traveling Men's Association.
[107 Iowa, 538.]
INSURANCE - ACCIDENT - WHAT IS.-While it may be
true that an accident Is an event which takes place without one'a
foresight or expectation, and Is undesigned, It is not true that every
unforeseen, undesigned, and unexpected event is an accident A
result which, though not designed, foreseen, or expected, is yet the
natural and direct effect of acts voluntarily done, or of conditlona
voluntarily assumed, cannot be said to be accidental.
INSURANCE — ACCIDENT — DEATH BY— RUPTURE OF
ARTERY.— Where the death of an insured was due to the rupture
of an artery it will not be considered as the result of accident where,
in the circumstances attending the rupture, there is no evidence
that anything was done or occurred which the insured had not fore-
seen or planned, except the rupture and Its consequences.
Berry hill & Henry and George E. Hubbell, for the appel-
lants.
Cumm'ins, Hewitt & Wright, for the appellee.
«538 EOBINSON, C. J. The certificate in suit was issued to
one Louis L. Feder, and entitled him to all the benefits accru-
ing from membership in the defendant by virtue of its consti-
tution and by-laws. "When the certificate was issued, an article-
of the constitution of the defendant provided that "whenever
the death of a member of this association in good standing
shall occur from any accidental cause (except while such mem-
ber shall be under the influence of intoxicating liquors or nar-
cotics)," and proofs thereof should be made, the ^'^^ proceeds
of an assessment of two dollars on each member of the associa-
tion, not exceeding the sum of five thousand dollars, should be-
paid to the beneficiary named in the certificate, or to hia heirs
or legal representatives, provided, however, that if, at the time
of such death, the amount of money in the treasury of the asso-
ciation not otherwise appropriated should exceed the sum of five
thousand five hundred dollars, payment of five thousand dol-
lars was to be made from the money in the treasury. On the
eighteenth day of April, 1894, Feder died. At that time he-
was a member of the association in good standing, and this ac-
tion is brought on the certificate, to recover the sum of five-
thousand dollars. The validity of the certificate is admitted, the
death of Feder is not disputed, and notice and proofs of his
death are shown. We are required to determine whether there
was sufficient evidence tending to show that Feder's death re-
Feb. 1899.] Feder v. Iowa State etc. Assn. 213
suited "from an accidental cause" to require the submission of
the case to the jury.
The evidence tended to establish the following: The dece-
dent, at the time of his death, was about twenty-six years of
age, and had been in Denver, where his death occurred, about
nine months. He was suffering from consumption, and wet t
to Denver and resided there, on account of his health. He was
benefited by the change of climate and medical treatment he
received, and his health had been considerably improved, and
was constantly improving, at the time of his death. During
the day of his death he had been as well as usual, and in the
evening was with two of his brothers in their office. Prepara-
tory to leaving it, the decedent went to a window to close the
shutters. A chair stood in front of the window, and he stood
on his toes, and reached over the chair toward the shutters, and,
as he did so, blood began to flow from his mouth. He was
placed on a lounge, and died within a few minutes. The cause
of his death was hemorrhage from a ruptured artery, and the
evidence would have authorized the conclusion that the rup-
ture ***** of the artery was not due to the disease from which
he was suffering. There is no evidence that he fell, slipped,
lost his balance, failed to catch the shutter when he reached for
it, or that it moved at his touch more or less readily than he
had expected it would move; in other words, there is no evi-
dence whatever that anything was done or occurred which he
had not foreseen and planned, excepting the rupture of the ar-
tery, and the consequences which resulted from it.
Did his death result "from an accidental cause" ? Various .
definitions of the word "accident" are quoted by the appellants,
and among them are the following: It is an "unexpected event,
which happens as by chance, or which does not take place ac-
cording to the usual course of things": North American etc. Ins.
Co. V. Burroughs, 69 Pa. St. 43, 8 Am. Rep. 212. "The equita-
ble definition of the term 'accident' includes, not only inevitable
casualties, and such as are caused by the act of God, but also
those which arise from unforeseen occurrences, misfortunes,
losses, and acts or omissions of other persons, without fault, neg-
ligence, or misconduct on the part of the person injured" : Bost-
wick V. Stiles, 35 Conn. 198. "An event which takes place
without one's foresight or expectation"; and it may include an
injury received in a common-law affray, without the fault of
the person injured: Supreme Council etc. v. Garrigus, 104 Ind«
214 Fedeb v. Iowa State etc. Assn. [Iowa>
133, 54 Am. Eep. 298. ''An event that takes place without
one's foresight or expectation; an event which proceeds from
an unknown cause, or is an unusual effect of a known cause, and,,
therefore, not expected"; Schneider v. Provident etc. Ins. Co., 24
Wis. 30, 1 Am. Eep. 157. "An accident is the happening of
an event without the aid and the design of the person, and
which is unforeseen": Paul v. Travelers' Ins. Co., 112 N. Y.
472, 8 Am. St. Eep. 758. "An event thai takes place without
one's foresight or expectation; an undesigned, sudden, and un-
expected event" : Webster's International Dictionary. See, also,.
Fidelity etc. Co. v. Johnson, 72 Miss. 333; Games v. Iowa etc>
Ass., 106 Iowa, 281, 68 Am. St. Eep. 306. The ordinary ^^^
and popular meaning of the word "accidental" is said to be
"happening by chance; unexpectedly taking place; not accord-
ing to the usual course of things; or not as expected": United
States etc. Assn. v. Barry, 131 U. S. 100.
It is argued that the rupture of a blood vessel is not the
usual result of an effort to close shutters; therefore, when it
occurs, it is unusual, unexpected, and an accident. While it
may be true that an accident is an event which takes place
without one's foresight or expectation, and is undesigned, it
is not true that every unforeseen, undesigned, and unexpected
event is an "accident," within the ordinary and popular mean-
ing of that term. Thus, a person might voluntarily and know-
ingly expose himself to a contagious disease, or to excessive
heat or cold, or to sudden changes of temperature, or might
adopt a strange diet or mode of living; but, if death resulted, it
.would not be due to an accidental cause, although wholly un-
designed, unforeseen, and unexpected. So, if a person suffer-
ing from some weakness or disease, should subject himself to
conditions which would not injuriously affect persons in ordi-
nary health, but would be dangerous to him, and injury result^
it would not be due to an accidental cause. For example, if a
person having a diseased heart should take violent exercise vol-
untarily, and death should result, the cause would not be acci-
dental: Southard v. Eailway etc. Assur. Co., 34 Conn. 574. See,,
also. Bacon v. United States etc. Assn., 123 K Y. 304, 20 Am.
St. Eep. 748; Sinclair v. Assurance Co., 3 El. & E. 478. Al-
though a result may not be designed, foreseen, or expected, yet^
if it be the natural and direct effect of acts voluntarily done, or
of conditions voluntarily assumed, it cannot be said to be ac-
cidental.
Feb. 1899.] Fedeb v. Iowa State etc. Assn. 215
"We do not think the cases relied upon by the appellant hold
a contrary rule. In Hamlyn v. Insurance Co., 1 Q. B. Div. 750,
it appeal's that a person sustained an injury to his knee in at-
tempting to catch a rolling marble; but it was found that the
injury resulted from an unnatural position or movement of
the leg, which was not intended by the person *** injured.
The injury considered in North American etc. Ins. Co. v. Bur-
roughs, 69 Pa. St. 43, 8 Am. Rep. 212, was caused by the unin-
tended slipping of a pitchfork in the hands of the person in-
jured in such a manner that it struck him in the bowels, and
caused the injury. The case of Burkhard v. Travellers' Ins. Co.,
102 Pa. St. 262, 48 Am. Rep. 205, involved the act of a person
injured in stepping into a hole in a bridge, of which he had no
knowledge. And in the case of Schneider v. Provident etc. Ins.
Co., 24 Wis. 28, 1 Am. Rep. 157, it appears that the person in-
sured, in attempting to get upon a moving train, fell under
the cars and was killed ; but it was not claimed that his fall was
the result of his doing what he intended to do.
The certificate in suit made the defendant liable if the death
of Feder resulted from an accidental cause. The evidence
shows that the cause was the ruptured artery; but that was not
accidental, if it was the natural result of an act voluntarily
done by Feder. That he did an3rthing but what he intended to
do, in attempting to close the shutters, is not shown nor claimed.
It is not even shown that he made any unusual exertion in what
he did. Had the artery been ruptured while the decedent was
sitting quietly in his chair, or while walking at a moderate
pace, there would be no ground for claiming that the rupture
was accidental; and we do not think that, because the act of
closing the shutters may have required a little more exertion
than would have been required to remain seated or to walk lei-
surely, the rupture was accidental. So far as is shown, it may
have been, and probably was, due to a weakened or diseased
condition of the artery. But, however that was, we are satis-
fied that there was no evidence which would have authorized
the jury to find that the rupture was accidental, within the
meaning of the certificate. "We conclude that the district court
was right in directing a verdict for the defendant, and the judg-
ment rendered is therefore affirmed.
INSURANCE-ACCIDENT— WHAT IS.— An acclrlent, within the
meaning of insurance against doath from an accidental cause, is
an event happening without any human agency, or, If happening
216 First Nat. Bank v. German Bank. [Iowa,
through human agency, an event which, under the circumstances,
is unusual, and not expected, to the person to whom it happens:
Carnes v. Iowa etc. Assn., 106 Iowa, 281, 68 Am. St. Rep. 306; Meyer
V. Fidelity etc. Co., 96 Iowa, 378, 59 Am. St. Rep. 374. Death by
"accident" means death from any unexpected event which proceeds
from an unlinown and unforeseen cause, happening without the
design of the person acted upon: Lovelace v. Travelers' Protective
Assn., 126 Mo. 104, 47 Am. St. Rep. 638. See the extended note to
Paul V. Travelers' Ins. Co., 8 Am. St Rep. 763, on what is death
by accidental means.
First National Bank v. German Bank.
[107 IOWA, 643.]
BANKS AND BANKING-SELECTION OF NOTARY— LIA-
BILITY FOR HIS NEGLIGENCE.— A bank to which a draft is
sent by another bank for collection is not liable to the latter for the
negligence of a notary public prudently selected by the former to
protest the draft for nonpayment, which negligence consisted iu
the failure of the notary to ascertain the residence of the person
who indorsed the draft to the sendor bank, or to notify him of the
dishonor of the draft. This rule is not changed by the fact that
the notary was also assistant cashier of the collecting bank.
BANKS AND BANKING— COLLECTIONS— NEGLIGENCE
OF NOTARY.— Where one bank makes another bank its agent for
the collection of a draft, it impliedly authorizes it to employ a
notary, if necessary, to protest the draft, and if, through the not-
ary's negligence, collection of the draft is prevented, in the absence
of reasonable prudence on the part of the collecting bank In the
selection of a notary, such collecting bank is not liable for the
notary's negligence, but the sendor bank must seek its remedy
against the notary.
BANKS AND BANKING — SELECTION OF NOTARY-
POWERS OF NOTARIES.— In Iowa, giving notice to indorsers of a
protested instrument is made a part of the official duty of the notary
making the protest, and a collecting bank acts prudently in intrust-
ing to a notary the giving of such notice.
The plaintiff purchased of Fameraan a draft, which, comini^
into defendant's hands for collection, was properly presented
for payment, which was refused. The draft was at once placed
in the hands of a notary for protest, and through his failure to
properly notify Farneman, the plaintiff was denied a recovery
against Farneman on the draft: See Bank v. Farneman, 93
Iowa, 1G3. This action is for the amount of the draft and the
expenses and costs of that ease. Appeal from judgment for de-
fendant.
F. M. Powers, for the appellant.
M. W. Beach, for the appellee.
Feb. 1899.] First Nat. Bank v. German Bank. 217
'^'^ LADD, J. That ihe draft was sent to the defendant
bank for collection, and was presented to the drawee for pay-
ment in apt time admits of no doubt: Hamlin v. Simpson, 105
Iowa, 125. The exercise of prudence in the selection of a no-
tary public is not questioned. The very gist of the action is
that the defendant is chargeable with the negligence of that
officer in failing to learn of Fameman's residence, and notifying
him of the dishonor of the draft. But a notary is a public offi-
cer, appointed by the chief magistrate of the state, is under
bond for the faithful performance of his duties as such, and
keeps a public record of his acts, certified copies of which may
be received in evidence: Code, sec. 373 et seq. He is not a mere
agent of the bank, but a public officer sworn to properly dis-
charge his duties to the public. As such officer, the bank may
not control his acts, nor dictate in what manner he shall per-
form his duties. If guilty of malfeasance in the performance
of an official act, he, and not the bank, is responsible. That
this notary was also an employe of the bank can make no dif-
ference. When acting as such officer, he was not discharging
his duties as servant. The positions were distinct, and his acts
in the capacity of an officer of the state had no connection with
the services he owed the bank. Again, the defendant was a
mere agent for the collection of the draft, and, owing to its dis-
honor, deposited it with a notary for protest. "A subagent is
accountable, ordinarily, only to his superior agent, when em-
ployed without the assent or direction of the principal. ^'*^
But, if he be employed with the express or implied assent of the
principal, the superior agent will not be responsible for his acts.
There is, in such a case, a privity between the subagent and the
principal, who must, therefore, seek a remedy directly against
the subagent for his negligence or misconduct" : Guelich v. Na-
tional St. Bank, 56 Iowa, 435, 41 Am. Rep. 110. In making
such collections it is usual to employ a notary, and, in forward-
ing the draft, there was an implied direction to do so, if neces-
sary: See Mount v. First Nat. Bank, 37 Iowa, 457. If the
defendant exercised prudence in making the selection, its re-
sponsibility ended. This is all it could have done had the
draft been its own, and surely it will not be held to a higher
degree of care when acting for others: Baldwin v. Bank of La.,
1 I>a. Ann. 13, 45 Am. Dec. 72; Citizens' Bank v. Howell, 8 Md.
530, 63 Am. Dec. 714; Hyde v. Planters' Bank, 17 La. 560,
36 Am. Dec. 621; Tiernan v. Commercial Bank, 7 How. (Miss.)
218 First Nat. Bank v. German Bank. [Iowa,
648, 40 Am. Dec. 83; Bellemire v. Bank of U. S., 4 Whart. 105,
33 Am. Dec. 46; Britton v. Niccolls, 104 U. S. '766; Warren
Bank v. Suffolk Bank, 10 Cush. 582; Stacy v. Dane County
Bank, 12 Wis. 629; May v. Jones, 88 Ga. 308, 30 Am. St. Eep.
154; Agricultural Bank v. Commercial Bank, 7 Smedes & M.
592; Bank v. Butler, 41 Ohio St. 519, 52 Am. Eep. 94; Mechem
on Agency, sec. 514. While there is a conflict in opinion, the
rule announced is sustained by the weight of authority and the
better reason: See collection of cases in 3 Am. & Eng. Ency.
of Law, 2d ed., 808, and note to Isham v. Post, 141 N. Y. 100,
38 Am. St. Ptep. 775; also Allen v. Merchants' Bank, 22 Wend.
215, 34 Am. Dec. 289.
The distinction between a foreign and an inland bill of ex-
change should not be overlooked. To charge the makers and
indorsers, the former must be protested. Not so with the latter.
All that is required is a demand, and, on refusal to pay, notice
of dishonor in order to fix liability of the indorsers of an in-
land bill; and these may be made and given by the holder, or
anyone acting in his behalf. By the law merchant, giving
notice of dishonor is no part of a notary's official duty, and
when he does so he is merely acting as agent of the holder:
Swayze v. Britton, 17 Kan. 625; ^*^ Allen v. Merchants' Bank,
22 Wend. 215, 34 Am. Dec. 289; Daniels on Negotiable Instru-
ment, sec. 960. But it is customary for him, in protesting a
bill, to give the proper notice of dishonor: Proffatt on Notice,
sees. 142, 143. And in many of the s'tates the law merchant is
60 modified that he is required to give notice. Formerly his
certificate might not be received as proof of the protest of an
inland bill: Case v. Heffner, 10 Ohio, 180. By section 378 of
the code, "every notary public is required to keep a true record
of all notices given or sent by him, with the time and manner
in which the same were given or sent and the names of all the
parties to whom the same were given or sent, v*-ith a copy of
the instrument in relation to which the notice is served and of
the notice itself." Section 379 requires his record and official
papers to be filed with the clerk of the court upon his death,
resignation, or removal, and provides for certified copies. Very
evidently this is for the purpose of perpetuating proof of the
notice as well as of the demand and protest. Section 3054
permits a notary "to inform the indorser or any party to be
charged, if in the ?ame town or township, by notice deposited in
the nearest postoffice to the parties to be charged, on the day
Feb. 1899.] First Nat. Bank v. German Bank. 219
of the demand, and no other notice shall be necessary to charge
such party." The advantage in having an inland bill pro-
tested by a notary, and notice given by him, is that the evi-
dence is thus perpetuated; and notice to indor^ers living in the
&ame town or township may be given by mail, instead of per-
sonally. These statutes clearly recognize giving notice as a part
of the notary's official duty. Indeed, the term "protest" is-
ordinarily used as including the entire proceeding necessary to-
charge indorsers. Notaries are -nearly always resorted to for
this work, and the owner of the draft may be assumed to have-
intended this course to be pursued. As said in Tiernan v. Com-
mercial Bank, 7 How. (Miss.) 648, 40 Am. Dec. 83: "No agent
could have been selected with more propriety for the perform-
ance of this duty than one whose profession and office were-
calculated to fit him peculiarly for the discharge. They are al-
most universally resorted to for the '^'^ purpose. We cannot
perceive, therefore, that the bank was wanting either in the
degree of skill or diligence which is required under such cir-
cumstances to exempt an agent from liability": Baldwin v.
Bank of La., 1 La. Ann. 13, 45 Am. Dec. 72; Hyde v. Planters*^
Bank, 17 La. 560, 36 Am. Dec. 621; Smedes v. Utica Bank^
20 Johns. 384; Bellemire v. Bank of U. S., 4 Whart. 105, 1
Miles, 173, 33 Am. Dec. 46; Citizens' Bank v. Howell, 8 Md.
530, 63 Am. Dec. 714; Fisher v. State Bank, 7 Blackf. 610;
Turner v. Rogers, 8 Ind. 139. Bank of Lindsborg v. Ober, 31
Kan. 599, is based on the finding that the statutes of Kansas do-
not authorize the notary to give notice. Our conclusion rests
on statutes allowing a notary as such to perform this duty.
Surely, the bank acted prudently in intrustin* to a public offi-
cer the doing of that which was incumbent on him as an. officer
of the law to do.
Affirmed.
BANKS AND BANKING-SELECTION OF NOTARY— LIA«
BILITY FOR HIS NEGLIGENCE.— The authorities are divided
upon the question whether a bank is lial)le for the negligence of &
notary which it selects to protest a draft or note for nonpayment.
The weight of authority seems to be with the principal case In
holding that the bank is not liable if it has used reasonable prudence
In the selection of the notary: See the extended note to Allen v.
Merchants' Bank. 34 Am. Dec. 313, 314, where the cases on both
sides of the question are collected. As holding that the bank is not
liable for the negligence of the notary, see Citizens' Bank v. Howell^
8 Md. fim. ♦« Am. Dec. 714; Bellemire v. Bank of U. S.. 4 Whart.
lOri, 33 Ara. Dec. 40. and note: Hyde v. Planters' Bank, 17 La. nOO.
36 Am. Dec. 621; Tiernaa v. Commercial Bank, 7 How. (Miss.) 648^
220 WiLcoxEN V. Smith. [Iowa,
40 Am. Dec. 83; Baldwin v. Bank of La,, 1 La. Ann. 13, 45 Am.
Dec. 72; Bank v. Butler, 41 Ohio St. 519, 52 Am. Rep. 94. Contra,
see Allen v. Merchants' Bank, 22 Wend. 215, 34 Am. Dec. 289;
Miranda v. City Bank, 6 La. 740, 26 Am. Dec. 493; Gerhardt v.
Boatman's Sav, Inst., 38 Mo. 60, 90 Am. Dec. 407; Ayrault v. l»aciflc
Bank, 47 N. Y. 570, 7 Am. Rep. 489. See, also, the note to German
Is'at Bank y. Burns, 13 Am. St Rep. 253.
WiLCoxEN V. Smith.
[107 Iowa, 555.]
BUILDING AND LOAN ASSOCIATIONS— USURY— PREMI-
UMS.—A statute authorizing building and loan associations to col-
lect premiums from borrowing members for the right of precedence
In taking loans, and that these premiums so paid, taken with the
legal rate of interest, shall not be construed as making the loans
usurious, contemplates good-faith bidding of premiums for the right
of precedence. Where the monthly payments of premiums and in-
terest together exceed the legal rate of interest, and payments made
by a member are designated as premiums merely as a device to
evade the law against usury instead of being paid in good faith
to secure a loan, the loan is usurious.
BUILDING AND LOAN ASSOCIATIONS— USURIOUS IN-
TEREST AND PREMIUMS— APPLICATION TO MEMBER'S
OREDIT.— Usurious interest and premiums paid to a building and
loan association by a borrowing member should be applied to the
credit of such member as deductions from the amount of his loan.
BUILDING AND LOAN ASSOCIATIONS— INSOLVENCY-
RIGHTS OF BORROWING AND NONBORROWING MEMBERS.
In case of the insolvency of a building and loan association, and a
liquidation of Its affairs, there should be an equitable distribution of
its assets less its liabilities. Borrowing members are only entitled
to be credited with the actual value of their shares, although by the
by-laws of the association and under the terms of their loans they
are entitled to the book, or withdrawal, value of such shares. Such
provisions in the by-laws and terms of the loans contemplate a going
•concern, and do not apply when the association has become insol-
vent and Is In the process of final liquidation.
BUILDING AND LOAN ASSOCIATIONS— RIGHTS OF
MEMBERS— PLEDGING STOCK AS SECURITY FOR LOAN.
Where the articles of Incorporation and by-laws of a building and
loan association provide for loans to shareholders on the security
■of their shares of stock, shareholders do not cease to be members
of the association by pledging their shares for loans.
BUILDING AND LOAN ASSOCIATIONS-INSOLVENCY—
RIGHTS OP BORROWING MEMBERS— CREDIT FOR VALUE
OF SHARES.— Where a building and loan association is Insolvent,
and Its afTalrs are In process of liquidation, it will be presumed in
the absence of proof, that borrowing members are entitled to have
<;redited upon their debts to the association the book value of their
shares. The burden of proof Is upon one who would rebut this pro-
•umptlon to show the actual value of such* shares.
William M. Wilcoxen, for the appellant.
Feb. 1899.] Wilcoxen v. Smith. 221
S. B. Snyder, for the appellee.
•"^ EOBINSON", C. J. The^e cases are submitted together,
for the reason that controlling questions are common to all of
them. The case of Wilcoxen, receiver, against Smith involves
the following facts: The Union Building & Saving Association
was organized to transact business as a mutual building asso-
ciation, under and by virtue of sections 1184 to 1187, inclusive;
of the code of 1873. On the twenty-eighth day of December,
1894, it was insolvent to the extent that it was unable to pay
to the shareholders the full amounts paid by them to the loan
fund of the association, and William M. ^^"^ Wilcoxen was ap-
pointed by the district court of Polk county receiver of the
association, and he duly qualified and is acting as receiver.
About the 1st of January, 1893, the defendant T. L. Smith
subscribed for ten shares of Class A stock of the association,
and thereby became a member thereof and shareholder. A few
days later he and his wife and codefendant applied to the asso-
ciation for a loan of one thousand dollars, and signed a written
obligation, of which the following is a copy :
"January 2, 1893.
"As the holder of ten shares of stock in the Union Building
and Saving Association of Des Moines, Iowa, and in considera-
tion of the sum of one thousand dollars advanced to T. L. Smith
and wife, Elizabeth R. Smith, by said association, the receipt
whereof is hereby acknowledged, we promise, contract, and
agree to pay to said association, its successors oi assigns, as fol-
lows, to wit: The sum of eighteen and 80-100 dollars on the
first day of February, 1893, and a like sura of eighteen and
80-100 dollars on the first day of each and every month there-
after— the same being the sum of five and 80-100 dollars as
monthly installments; the sum of five dollars for one month's
interest at six per cent per annum, on said loan; the sum of
eight dollars monthly as and for premiums bid for said loan.
Also all fines and penalties which we may incur as the holder of
said ten shares of stock. In accordance with the by-laws of
srid association, all said payments are to be made on the first
day of each and every month, and shall continue to be made
until such time as the monthly installments paid in on said
ten shares of stock, together with the profits thereon, shall
equal their aggregate par value of one thousand dollars. We
further agree that if default shall be made in the payment of
said sums of money, or any of them, for the period of three
222 WiLcoxEN V. Smith. [Iowa,
months, after the same are due and payable, the whole of said
principal sum, advanced as above, shall at once become due,
and, if suit be commenced to enforce the collection of the
amount due on this contract, a reasonable sum shall be allowed
as plaintiff's attorney fee and taxed with the costs in the case.
"'(Signed) T. L. SMITH.
"ELIZABETH E. SMITH."
To secure the payment ^^^ of the loan. Smith and his wife
executed to the association a mortgage on certain lots in an
addition to the city of Council Bluffs, and Smith assigned to
the association his certificate for ten shares of stock, to be held
as further security for the loan. The plaintiff claims that the
defendants are more than three months in arrears in the pay-
ment of dues, interest, and premiums, and that, by the terms
of the loan, the entire amount thereof is due. The Smiths al-
lege that they are entitled to credit as follows: One hundred
and eighty-four dollars for premiums paid at the rate of eight
dollars per month, ten dollars paid as certificate fees, one hun-
dred and fifteen dollars paid as interest, and two hundred and
two dollars and thirty cents paid as dues on stock, and to.
earnings. They further allege that the loan was usurious, and
that the premiums paid were not in fact fixed on competitive
bids by the members of the association, but were fixed by it for
the use of the money loaned. It is admitted that Smith had
made all payments due from him prior to the appointment of
the receiver, and that he has not paid anything since that time.
He paid as premiums one hundred and eighty-four dollars, and
as interest, at the rate of six per cent per annum, one hundred
and thirty-eight dollars. It is also admitted that the associa-
tion is insolvent, and that when the receiver was appointed the
book value of the shares of stock held by the association was
two hundred and fourteen dollars and ninety-one cents, includ-
ing profits to the amount of thirty-five dollars and seven cents,
which had been apportioned to the stock. The district court
found that the loan was usurious and illegal; that the defend-
ants were entitled to credits thereon for the interest and pre-
miums paid and the book value of the stock to the aggregate
amount of five hundred and thirty-six dollars and ninety-one
cents; and rendered a decree against Smith for the balance of
four hundred and sixty-throe dollars and nine cents and for
one hundred and seventy-six dollars and forty-eight cents for
the use of the school fund, and also decreed the foreclosure of
the mortgage. The other cases involve similar facts.
Feb. 1899.] Wilcoxen v. Smith. 223
^^ 1. We first inquire whether the loans were usurious.
The by-laws of the association provided that its funds should
be loaned on real estate security, only to its members, "upon
such conditions as the board of directors may dictate"; that
the rate of interest should be six per cent per annum on the *-
money actually loaned; that all interest and premiums should
be paid monthly; and that all applications for loans would ''he
granted according to the priority of the application," in case
the security should be approved by the board of directors or
executive committee. Although the by-laws contemplated the
payment of premiums, they did not, in terms, require premiums,
nor prescribe any rule for ascertaining what premiums should
be paid. The evidence does not show that the board of direc-
tors ever adopted any formal rule in regard to them. But it
appears that the amount of premium specified in the applica-
tions of the borrowers as that which they offered to pay for the
desired loan was uniformly eighty cents for each one hundred
dollars of the loan. There was no formal bidding for the
loans. When a borrower asked for the terms on which he
could procure a loan, he was informed, in effect, that a premium
of eighty cents on each one hundred dollars of the loan would
be required each month. That amount was as definitely fixed
and as regularly exacted as was the payment of interest, and
both premium and interest were placed in the loan fund of
the association. Section 1185 of the code of 1873, which
applies to the transactions in question, provides that a mutual
building association "shall be authorized and empowered to
levy, assess, and collect from its members such sums of money,
by rates of stated dues, fines, interest on loans advanced, and
premiums bid by members for the right of precedence in
taking loans, as the corporation by its by-laws shall adopt,"
and that "the dues, fines, and premiums so paid by members,
in addition to the legal rate of interest on loans taken by them,
shall not be construed to make the loans so taken usurious."
That section contemplated good-faith bidding of ^^^ premiums
to obtain the right of precedence. The statute does not re-
quire the payment of the premium in advance, and the fact that
it is to be paid monthly, until the maturity of the loan, would
not necessarily impress it with the character of interest paid.
Whether an association can fix, in advance of application, the
premium which shall be paid, we do not determine, although
«ome authorities seem to hold that the power to do so exists.
224 , WiLcoxEN V. Smith. [Iowa,
But it is clear that the premiums must he fixed and paid in good
faith, to secure the loan, and not as a mere device to evade
the law against usury: 4 Am. & Eng. Ency. of Law, 2d ed.,
1071. The premiums paid in these cases differ from the in-
terest only in name and amount. The mortgages were given
to secure the payments of the premiums as well as other sums,
and provided that, in the event of foreclosure, the amount due
should include all monthly installments, interest, premiums,
fines, and penalties due at the date of the decree of foreclosure,
less the withdrawal value of the shares of stock held as collateral
security. It thus appears that the premium was not a fixed
sum, to be paid in any event, but that only so much of it was
to be paid as should have accrued at the time of foreclosure.
We are satisfied that the sums nominally paid as premiums
were for the use of the money loaned, and as truly interest as
were the payments made as interest, and that the designation
of some of the payments as premiums was a mere device to
evade the law against usury. As the monthly payments of
premiums and interest together exceeded the highest rate of
interest allowed by law, the loan was usurious. The cases of
Ilawkeye etc. Assn. v. Blackburn, 48 Iowa, 385, and Burlington
etc. Asso. V. Heider, 55 Iowa, 424, are not precisely in point,
but may be read with profit.
2. The district court rightly refused to allow the plaintiff
anything for the interest and premiums paid, and deducted
their aggregate amounts from the sums loaned as credits in
favor of the defendants. The district court also allowed as a
•credit in each case the book value of the stock pledged as
collateral security, and of that the appellant also complains.
As already mentioned, the ^^^ mortgage provided that the with-
drawal value of that stock should, in the event of foreclosure,
be credited on the amount due on the loan. The by-laws of the
association provide that any shareholder in good standing, who
has paid three months' dues, may, after due notice, and upon
the surrender of his certificate, withdraw the full amount of
his payments to the loan fund, together with the earnings up
to the last dividend period. We understand that the book
value of the certificates of stock allowed by the district court
in each case was the amount of installments paid on the stock
and the earnings thereof to the last dividend period preceding _
the appointment of a receiver. But the book value was not the
actual value, for the reason that the association was insolvent
Feb. 1899.] Wilcoxen v. Smith. 225
wid unable to pay to cacb shareholder the book value of his
shares. We are therefore required to determine whether the
stipulation in the mortgage to which we have referred controls.
If it does, then it is manifest that the shareholders who are
borrowers, and whose mortgages are foreclosed, will receive more
for their stock than will the shareholders who are not borrowers.
But the association is composed of members whose rights are
mutual, and among whom there should be equality, based upon
their payments to the capital stock of the association; there-
fore, if the borrowing member is allowed for all the payments
he has made and the earnings thereof, the losses of the associa-
tion will fall upon the members who have not borrowed, there
will not be an equality between the two classes of members,
and great injustice will be done. A court of equity should
seek to avoid that result. It was said in Eabbitt v. Wilcoxen,
103 Iowa, 35, 64 Am, St. Rep. 162, a case which involved an
interpretation of by-laws of the association now imder con-
sideration, that it was quite evident that the by-laws "were
adopted with reference to doing business, rather than with
reference to closing up" the affairs of the association, and that
the provision for paying back contributions to the loan fund
contemplated monthly receipts for the fund, and that there
was nothing to show a purpose to make such payments after
*^**^ the receipts had ceased, and the only business of the cor-
poration is a final settlement and an equitable division of the
assets. What was thus said is applicable in this case. The
withdrawal value of the shares of stock, as fixed by the by-laws
while the association was a going concern, was the full amount
of the shareholder's payments to the loan fund, together with
the earnings; but the by-laws did not require the payment of
that amount when the association had become insolvent, had
ceased to do business, and when its affairs were in the process
of final liquidation. In such a case, an equitable distribution
of the assets, if any, in excess of the liabilities, should be
affected ; and that requires that the fair value of the shares be
ascertained, and that the value thus ascertained, of the shares
of the borrowing members, be deducted from the loan to him
for which a foreclosure is sought. It is proper to observe, in
this connection, that the articles of incorporation and by-laws
of the association provide for loans to shareholders upon the
g^ecurity of their shares of stock, and that by pledging their
shares for loans the shareholders did not cease to be members
Am. St. Rkp., VoU LXX.— 15
226 WiLcoxEN V. Smith. [Iowa,
of the association : See Endlich on Building Associations, 2d ed.,
sees. 121-123, 475, 514; Thompson on Building Associations,
see. 15, p. 129.
Our conclusion that the appellees are only entitled to credits
for the actual value of their shares of stock has support in the
authorities: See Knutson v. N'orthwes4;em etc. Assn., 67 Minn.
201, 64 Am. St. Eep. 410; Eversmann v. Schmitt, 53 Ohio,
174, 53 Am. St. Eep. 632; Price v. Kendall, 14 Tex. Civ. App.
26; Strohen v. Franklin etc. Assn., 115 Pa. St. 273; Christian's
Appeal, 102 Pa. St. 184; People v. Lowe, 117 N. Y. 175;
Eogers v. Hargo, 92 Tenn. 35; Eogers v. Eaines, 100 Ky. 295;
Thompson on Building Associations, sec. 2, p. 60; Thompson
on Building Associations, sees. 11, 12, 15, pp. 127, 129; Endlich
on Building Associations, 2d ed., sees. 45, 77, 514, 531.
^^^ It follows from what we have said that the district court
erred in crediting the defendants with the book value of their
shares. The appellant contends that no credit for the shares
should be allowed in these actions, because the affairs of the
association are not yet settled, and, until that is done, the
credits to be allowed for the shares cannot be ascertained. It
is true that no credit for the shares should be allowed until
their -value is ascertained, and it appears that when these ac-
tions were heard in the district court the settlement of the
affairs of the .association had not progressed so far that the
value of the shares could have been known. If such value can
be determined in these actions, we know of no objection to the
allowance of proper credits therefor; but in view of the con-
ditions under which this case is submitted, and the conclusion
reached, we do not determine whether there can be a recovery
of the amount of the loans and a foreclosure of the mortgages
before the credits which should be allowed for the stock can be
ascertained. In the absence of proof, it would be presumed
that the credits should be the book values of the shares, and
the burden would be upon the plaintiff to rebut the presump-
tion and show the actual value of the shares.
3. In the case against C. B. Howard, his codefendant,
^fargaret Howard, claimed a credit on the plaintiff's cause of
action for the value of twelve shares of stock of the association
which she held. The appellant insists that she was not en-
titled to the allowance claimed. Since no allowance was made
for the credit claimed, and the appellees do not appeal, it is not
necessary to consider the matter further.
Feb. 1899.] Wilcoxen v. Smith. 227
4. It is claimed in the case against the congregation that the
proof fails to show that its trustees had authority to subscribe for
fitock and enter into the contract and mortgage in suit. The
■evidence on their part is not wholly satisfactory, but is sufficient
to sustain the action of the trustees. In reaching the con-
■clusion expressed, we have not treated chapter 48 of the acts
of the twenty-seventh general assembly '*** nor section 1898
of the code as applicable to these cases, and are not to be under-
stood as determining whether they do or do not so apply.
Nothing is claimed for them, and, in determining the questions
presented to us, we have assumed, without deciding, that sec-
tion 1185 of the code of 1873 is applicable.
The views we have expressed dispose of all questions involved
in the several cases presented in argument. For the reasons
shown, the decree in each case reversed; and, since proof of the
ectual value of the shares when the receiver was appointed was
not and could not have been made at the time of the hearing,
equitable considerations demand that the causes be remanded
to the district court for further proceedings in harmony with
this opinion, to ascertain and make due nllowance for the
credits, if any, for shares of stock to which the appellees are
€ntitled, or, if that cannot be done in these actions, to protect
the right of the appellees to recover such credits by appropriate
proceedings.
Reversed.
BUILDING AND LOAN ASSOCIATIONS — USURY PREMI-
UMS.—A building and loan association authorized by statute to re-
•ceive "premiums bid by members for the right of precedence la
taking loans," has no authority to exact from the borrower, where
there is no competition, an arbitrary sum in addition to the interest
on his loan, where the whole amounts to more than legal Interest:
Iowa etc. Assn v. Heidt, 107 Iowa, 297, ante, p. 197, and note.
BUILDING AND LOAN ASSOCIATIONS— USURIOUS INTER-
EST—APPLICATION TO MEMBER'S CREDIT.— Where a member
of a building and loan association contracts to pay usurious in-
terest and premiums, the court will merely require him to do equity
by repaying the money borrowed with legal interest, after being
first credited with such payments as he has made, with legal iuter-
■est: McCauley v. Building etc. Assn., 07 Tenn. 421, 56 Am. St.
Rep. 813.
BUILDING AND LOAN ASSOCIATIONS- INSOLVENCY -
RIGHTS OF BORROWING AND NONBORROWING MEMBERS.
For the effect of insolvency of a building and loan association on
the rights and liabilities of its members, see the monographic note to
Curtis v. Granite State Provident Assn., 61 Am. St. Rep. 24-30. See.
also, the note to Robertson v. Homestead Assn., 69 Am. Dec. 165.
228 Scott v. Hawk, [Iowa,
Scott v. Hawk.
[107 IOWA, 723.]
WILLS-SIGNATUKE-TESTATOR'S MARK.— Where a tes-
tator, being unable to write his signature to his will, makes his
marlc Instead, the will so executed Is "signed" within the meaning
of the law.
WILLS-EXECUTION— PUBLICATION.— In the executioa
of a will, nothing more than compliance with the statute Is neces-
sary, and publication is not necessary unless made so by statute.
WILLS— EXECUTION— PROOF OF— ATTESTING WIT-
NESSES.—Where a will Is signed by the testator's making his mark,
and the subscribing witnesses are dead or beyond the jurisdiction
of the court, proof of their handwriting is a compliance with the
law as to due execution; and it need not be proved that the testator
had the will read over to him, or was informed of its contents, before
he signed it.
WILLS— SIGNING WITH MARK.— Where a testator signed
his wiU by making his mark, it Is not essential to the valid execu-
tion of the will that his name be written by one of the attesting
Witnesses.
C. M. Brown and D. D. Hill, for the appellants.
Hamilton & Donohue, Woodin & Son, and C. H. Mackey, for
the appellees.
''** LADD, J. The closing part of the paper purporting to
be the will of John Scott, deceased, is as follows:
"Witness my hand this 15th day of June, 1886.
his
"JOHN X SCOTT."
mark.
On the same paper, below the signature, is this attestation :
"The foregoing instrument was at the date thereof subscribed
by John Scott, in our presence, and in the presence of each
other, and he at the same time declared the same to be his last
will and testament, and by his request we sign our names thereto
as witnesses thereof, both in his presence and in the presence
of each other.
'T). L. FIDLER.
"S. HARND.*'
The subscribing witnesses died before the trial, but the genu-
ineness of their signntures and the testamentary capacity of the
decedent were establislied beyond controversy. As the testator
was unable to write, he made his mark — the cross. Is a will
thus executed "signed," within the meaning of the law?
Dec. 1898.] Scott v. Hawk. 229
In Schouler on Wills, section 303-306, it is said: 'To write
out one's own name in full is doubtless the safest course, as well
as the most natural; for such compliance best indicates '^*' a
rational mind, a free will and physical power at the date of
execution. But, undoubtedly, the making of his mark by the
testator will satisfy the statute; and that, too, as various cases
rule, notwithstanding he was able to write at the time
If an illiterate but intelligent testator makes cross-strokes with
his pen upon the paper, the act of signature is his own; and so,
too, where the hand of the testator, who is physically unable
to subscribe without assistance, is guided by another. Wher-
ever, in truth, the act is the testator's own act, animo testandi,
though with the assistance of another, it is not necessary to
prove any express request for assistance on his part." This, we
think, a correct statement of the law, and fully sustained by
the authorities: Thompson v. Thompson, 49 Neb. 157; Higgins
V. Carlton, 28 Md. 115, 92 Am. Dec. 666; Guthrie v. Price, 23
Ark. 396; Flannery's Will, 24 Pa. St. 502; In re Guilfoyle, 96
Cal. 598; Pool v. Buffum, 3 Or. 438; Jackson v. Jackson, 39
N. Y. 159; In re Jenkin's Will, 43 Wis. 610; Rook v. Wilson,
142 Ind. 24, 51 Am. St. Rep. 163; Bevelot v. Lestrade, 153 111.
625; Stephens v. Stephens, 129 Mo. 422, 50 Am. St. Rep. 454;
2 Greenleaf on Evidence, 7th ed., 674; 29 Am. & Eng. Ency. of
Law, 168.
2. If the statute is complied with, nothing more in the exe-
cution of the will is necessary. Thus, publication, as such, is
not required in this state: In re Hulse's Will, 52 Iowa, 662; In
re Convey's Will, 52 Iowa, 199; nor is it generally, except when
made so by the statute. As far back as Bondv.Seawell,3 Burrows,
1775, Lord Mansfield remarked: "It is not necessary that the
testator should declare the instrument he executed to be his
last will": Osbom v. Cook, 11 Cush. 532, 59 Am. Dec. 155. In-
deed, it is not essential that the witnesses know the character
of the instrument the signature to which they attest: Allen v.
■Griffin, 69 Wis. 529; Remsen v. Brinckerhoff, 26 Wend. 325, 37
Am. Dec. 251; Dean v. Dean, 27 Vt. 746; Linton's Appeal, 104
Pa. St. 228; Dickie v. Carter, 42 111. 376; Leverett v. ^^ Car-
lisle, 19 Ala. 80; Brown v. McAlister, 34 Ind. 375; Flood y.
Pragoff, 79 Ky. 607.
3. In Allison v. Allison, 104 Iowa, 130, we held that, "where
subscribing witnesses are dead or beyond the jurisdiction of the
court, proof of their handwriting is a compliance with the la\r
230 Scott v. Hawk. [lowa^
as to due execution." In that case the signature was writtei*
by another for the decedent. We discover no reason for a dif-
ferent rule when the will is signed by a mark. Such a distinc-
tion has not been made by the authorities, and certainly the
recitals of the attestation should be given quite as much weight
when the will is signed by a mark as when this is done by writing
the name or having some one else do so: See Jackson v. Van
Dusen, 5 Johns. 144, 4 Am. Dec. 330; Nickerson v. Buck, 12^
Cush, 342. The point is made that proponents did not prove
the will to have been read over to the deceased before he signed
it, or that he was informed of its contents. "Whether the burden
was upon the proponents to affirmatively show this, we need not
now determine. But see notes in 29 Am. & Eng. Ency. of Law,
244. In any event it was included in the execution of the will.
As said in Kirk v. Carr, 54 Pa. St. 285: "The law allows the
attesting signature to speak when the tongue is silent; and it
attests that everything was rightly done, unless the act attested
be impeached, not negatively merely, but positively** : Carpenter
V. Denoon, 29 Ohio St. 379,
It is suggested that John Scott's name was not written by
one of the attesting witnesses. In some states this is required
by statute: St. Louis Hospital Assn. v. Williams, 19 Mo. 609;
Greenough v. Greenough, 11 Pa. St. 489, 51 Am. Dec. 567; but
such is not the law of Iowa. Indeed, the writing of his name
was not essential to the signing of the will, his mark alone being
sufficient for that purpose: Jackson v. Jackson, 39 N. Y. 159;
In re Savory, 15 Jur. 1042; Thompson v. Thompson, 49 Reb.
157; In re Bryce, 2 Curt. Ecc. 325; Everhart v. Everhart, 34
Fed. Eep. 85; 29 Am. & Eng. Ency. of Law, 168. As the evi-
dence referred to alone established the execution of the will,
we need not '^^'^ consider the alleged errors in admitting other
evidence for the same purpose.
Affirmed.
WILLS— SIGNATURE— TESTATOR'S MARK.— The mark of a
testator to his will Is just as effective as when he signs his name:
Robinson v. Brewster, 140 III. 649, 33 Am. St. Rep. 265, and note;
riat«.''8 Estate, 148 Pa. St. 55, 33 Am. St. Rep. 805; Ray v. Hill, 3
Strob. 207, 49 Am. Dec. 647; Chaffee v. Baptist etc. CJonventlcm, 10
Pajge, 85, 40 Am. Dec. 225.
WILLS-PUBLICATION.— If the due subscribing ana attesting
of a win be proved, It need not be shown that the testator made the
usual declarations that it was his last will and testament: Small
V. Small, 4 Greenl, 220, 16 Am. Dec. 253.
WILLS— EXECUTION— PROOF OF.— If the witnesses to a will
Dec. 1898.] "Scott v. Hawk. 231
cannot be found, or, though found, deny their signatures, clrcum-
Btantlal evidence may supply the deficiency. The handwriting of
the witnesses may be proved, and the jury left to determine from
all the circumstances whether the will was published with the
requisite formalities: Pearson v. Wlghtman, 1 Mill, 336, 12 Am. Dec.
636, and note; Tynan v. Paschal, 27 Tex. 286, 84 Am. Dec. 619;
Jackson v. Van Dusen, 5 Johns. 144, 4 Am. Dec. 830.
CASES
m THB
SUPEEME COURT
or
MASSACHUSETTS.
Hancock National Bank v. Ellis.
[172 MASSACmJSKTTB, 39.]
ACTIONS AGAINST STOCKHOLDERS— WHEN TRANSI-
TORY.—An action against a stockholder of a corporation organized
tinder the laws of the state of Kansas, to compel the payment of a
debt against the corporation, is transitory.
CORPORATIONS - STOCKHOLDERS — LIABILITY TO
CREDITORS- TRANSITORY ACTION.— The liability of a stock-
holder in a corporation organized under the laws of the state of
Kansas for the debts of the corporation is several, and may be en-
forced ty an action against him in any court of general jurisdiction
In the state where personal service of process can be made upon the
stockholder.
EVIDENCE.— THE LAWS OF ANOTHER STATE are facts
to be proved.
EVIDENCE— FOREIGN LAW -QUESTION OF LAW.-lf
the evidence of foreign law consists entirely of statutes or reports
of Judicial decisions, the construction and effect of the statutes
and decisions are usually for the court alone.
EVIDENCE— FOREIGN LAW— QUESTION OF FACT.— If
the evidence of foreign law consists of reports of Judicial decisions,
the question of what the law is becomes one of fact, where the
decisions are conflicting, or where Inferences of fact must be drawn.
W. R. Bigelow and H. J. Jaquith, for the plainitiff.
A. Hemenway and E. B. Adams, for the defendant.
*• FIELD, C. J. This case was once before considered by
ns on demurrer to the declaration : Hancock Nat. Bank v. Ellis,
166 Mass. 414. The demurrer having been overruled, the de-
fendant answered, and the cause was heard by a justice of the
superior court, without a jury.
(232)
Sept. 1898.] Hancock Nat. Bank v. Ellis. 233
At the close of the evidence, both the plaintiff and the de-
fendant made numerous requests for rulings. The presiding
justice gave the third, fourth, fifth, sixth, and eighth of the
rulings requested by the plaintiff, and all of the rulings re-
quested by the defendant, and made the folio-wing special find-
ings: "1. I find that the Commonwealth Loan and Trust Com-
pany ceased to do business on February 21, 1891; 2. I find from
the evidence that such corporation did not resume business
thereafter, and that by virtue of the statutory law of Kansas
there was a dissolution of the corporation previous to the date
of this writ; 3. There was no legal or competent evidence given
at the trial which enabled nae to find what were the assets or
the liabilities of this corporation at the date of the original judg-
ment against the corporation, or at the date of the issue of exe-
cution against it, or at the date of the writ in this action."
The firjst four rulings requested by the plaintiff which the
court gave were as follows:
"3. Upon all the evidence in the case, as matter of law, the
court is bound to find that, imder the law of Kansas, stock-
holders in corporations organized under the laws of Kansas are
liable severally, and not jointly, to the judgment creditors of
the corporation,^® who pursue the remedy provided byparagraph
1192 of the General Statutes of Kansas of 1889.
"4. Upon all the evidence in the case, as matter of law, the
court is bound to find that, under the laws of Kansas, stock-
holders in Kansas corporations who appear as stockholders upon
the books of the corporation are conclusively presumed to be
stockholders of the corporation within the meaning and liability
of said paragraph 1192, already referred to.
"5. Upon all the evidence in the case, as matter of law, the
court is bound to find that, under the laws of Kansas, the stock-
holder's liability under said paragraph 1192, already referred to,
is a contractual liability, and arises upon the contract. of sub-
scription to the capital stock made by the defendant in becom-
ing a stockholder; and that in subscribing to said stock and
becoming a stockholder he thereby guaranteed payment to the
creditors of the corporation of an amount equal to the par value
of the stock held and owned by him,
"6. Upon all the evidence in the case, as matter of law, the
court is bound to find that, under the laws of Kansas, the stock-
holder who is liable under said paragraph 1192 is liable to the
judgment creditor of the corporation who first pursues his rem-
234 Hancock Nat. Bank v. Ellis. [Mass.
edy under the statutes, and is discharged from all further lia-
bility by once paying the full amount thereof to such creditor."
Among the rulings requested by the plaintiff which the court
declined to give is the seventh, which is as follows:
"7. Upon all the evidence in the case, as matter of law, the
court is bound to find that, under the laws of Kansas, an action
to enforce the stockholder's liability under said paragraph 1193,
already referred to, is transitory, and may be brought in any
court of general jurisdiction in the state where personal service
can be made upon the stockholder."
The rulings requested by the defendant which the court gave
are to the effect that the obligations imposed by the statutes
of Kansas will be enforced in Massachusetts only as a matter
of comity; that the courts of Massachusetts will nat enforce
them against a resident citizen of Massachusetts unless it ap-
pears that no injustice will be done; that these courts are unable
to do justice to stockholders resident in Massachusetts who have
paid the debts of the corporation and are entitled to sue' other **
stockholders to enforce contribution, especially if the corpora-
tion has been dissolved or has suspended business; that the stat-
utes of Kansas which provide for contribution are a part of a
scheme for ultimately compelling stockholders ratably to pay the
debts of the corporation, and that, concerning as they do the
relations between the corporation and its stockholders, they can
be effectually and completely enforced only by the courts of Kan-
sas; and the enforcement of them should be left to those courts.
The Commonwealth Loan and Trust Company is a private
corporation, established under the laws of the state of Kansas
on February 2, 1887, for the purpose of transacting the business
of a loan and trust compan}'', and having places of business at
Kansas City in Kansas and in Missouri, and in the city of Bos-
ton in Massachusetts. The plaintiff, the Hancock National
Bank of Boston, is the same corporation as the Traders' Na-
tional Bank of Boston. On September 1, 1891, the Traders*
National Bank of Boston, having previously lent the Loan and
Trust Company twenty-five thousand dollars, received its prom-
issory note therefor signed by the loan and trust company, in-
dorsed on which appear payments of interest and certain sums
of money on account of the principal. On September 9, 1893,
the bank commenced suit against the loan and trust company on
this note in the circuit court of the United States for the dis-
trict of Kansas, and on December 8, 1893, recovered judgment
Sept. 1898.] Hancock Nat. Bank v. Ellis. 235
therein against the loan and trust company in the sum of six-
teen thousand, one hundred and thirty-six dollars and seventy-
six cents damages, and twenty-eight dollars and forty-five cent*
costs of suit; and on April 27, 1894, execution issued therefor,
which was returned on May 29, 1894, by the marshal of th&
United States for said district wholly unsatisfied, after he had
made diligent search for any property of the defendant on which
to levy the execution and had found none. The present suit
was brought in the superior court for the county of Suffolk in,
this commonwealth on May 25, 1895. The defendant is a resident
of the commonwealth. On April 27, 1894, the defendant owned
one certificate of five shares of stock of the loan and trust com-
pany, and had in his possession as collateral security for the-
payment of a debt due to him another certificate of five shares,,
both of which he continued to hold down to the time of the trial
here, and the certificates *^ were produced at the trial. Th&
certificates are each dated February 7, 1887, and they certify
that the defendant is the owner of five shares in the capital stock
of the loan and trust company, "transferable only on the books-
of the said company on the surrender of this certificate, properly
endorsed.'* They differ only in this, that one certificate de-
scribes the defendant as "owner of, as collateral security, five
shares," et cetera, while the other omits the words "as collateral
security." A record of these certificates appears in the transfer-
book and in the stock ledger of the corporation. On July 16,^
1894, by a decree entered in a suit in the circuit court of the
United States for the district of Kansas, William S. Hinman of
Boston, Massachusetts, and Waldo H. Howard of Kansas City,
Kansas, were appointed receivers of the loan and trust company,
for the purpose of winding up the affairs of the corporation.
The order appointing the receivers did not purport to dissolve-
the corporation. The corporation had been established to exist
for fifty years from February 2, 1887, and had a capital stock of
one hundred thousand dollars, divided into one thousand shares^
of one hundred dollars each. There was evidence that a great
many of the stockholders reside outside of the state of Kansas.
The plaintiff in the present suit put in evidence the General
Statutes of Kansas of 1889, paragraphs 1192, 1193, 1199, 1205,
1206, 4080, 4081, 4083, 4084, 4085, 4087, 4167, 4168, 4169,
4170. Paragraphs 1192, 1205, and 1206 are printed in the mar-
gin. '*^ These statutes, so far as material, were in existence for
some time before the defendant became the owner of the cer*
236^ Hancock Nat. Bank v. Ellis. [Mass.
tificates of stock, and before the organization of the loan and
trust company. The plaintiff also put in evidence the official
reports of the following decisions of the courts of Kansas:
Howell V. Manglesdorf, 33 Kan. 194; Wells v. Robb, 43 Kan.
201; Abbey v. Grimes Dry Goods Co., 44 Kan. 415; Abbey v.
Long, 44 Kan. 688; Plumb v. Bank of Enterprise, 48 Kan. 484;
Hoyt V. Bunker, 50 Kan. 574; Howell v. First Nat. Bank, 52
Kan. 133; Van Demark v. Barons, 52 Kan. 775"; Achenbach v.
Pomeroy Coal Co., 2 Kan. App. 357; United States Wind En-
gine etc. Co. V. Davies, 2 Kan, App. 611; Buist v. Citizens' Sav.
Bank, 4 Kan. Apg. 700. The defendant, subject to the excep-
tion of the plaintiff, put in evidence the General Statutes of the
state of Kansas of 1889, article 12 of the constitution, para-
graph 211, and paragraphs 1200 and 1204 of the statutes which
are printed in the margin, and also the official report of the de-
-cision of the supreme court of Kansas in Hentig v. James, 23
Kan. 326.
"** The courts of Kansas, from the nature of the question,
•can never directly decide that the liability of a stockholder, un-
der paragraph 1192 of the Genral Statutes of Kansas, is one that
may be enforced in any court of general jurisdiction in any other
state or country where due service of process can be made upon
the stockholder. Only courts of other jurisdictions can decide
that question. The courts of Kansas can only express an opin-
ion to that effect, if they entertain it in cases before them, as
one of the reasons for the judgment they render in those cases.
That opinion the supreme court of Kansas has expressed in
Howell V. Manglesdorf, 33 Kan. 194, 195. The other decisions
cited of the courts of last resort in Kansas tend to confirm that
opinion. None is inconsistent with it. The courts of the United
States inferior to the supreme court have uniformly held that
the liability under the statutes of Kansas which we are con-
sidering can be enforced against a stockholder in any s'tate or
district where he can properly be served with process: Whitman
V. National Bank of Oxford, 51 U. S. App. 536, affirming on
error tihe judgment of the circuit court in National Bank of
Oxford V. Whitman, 76 Fed. Rep. 697; Brown v. Trail, 89 Fed.
Rep. 641; American Freehold Land Mortgage Co. v. Wood-
worth, 79 Fed. Rep. 951 , 82 Fed. Rep. 269; McVickar v. Jones,
70 Fed. Rep. 754; Rhodes v. United States Nat. Bank, 66 Fed.
Rep. 512; Bank of North America v. Rindge, 57 Fed. Rep. 279.
See Auer v. liOmbard, 72 Fed. Rep. 209; Mechanics' Sav. Bank
Sept. 1S98.] Hancock Nat. Bank v. Ellis. 237
V. Fidelity Ins. etc. Co., 87 Fed. Rep. 113. These decisions are
in accordance with the principles of the decisions of the supreme
court of the United States with reference to statutes of other
states somewhat similar to those of Kansas: Flash v. Conn, 109
TJ. S. 371; Huntington v. Attrill, 146 U. S. 657.
The decisions of state courts other than those of Kansas are
not unifonn upon the question whether the statutory liability
of '*° a stockholder to creditors of the corporation under these
statutes of Kansas can be enforced by a suit against the stock-
holder in any stai,e where he resides, and can be served with
process. In favor of such a doctrine are Guemey v. Moore, 131
Mo. 650, Bagley v. Tyler, 43 Mo. App. 195, and Ferguson v.
Sherman, 116 Cal. 169. See Gushing v. Perot, 175 Pa. St. G6,
52 Am. St. Rep. 835. Contra are Fowler v. Lamson, 146 111.
472, 37 Am. St. Rep. 163; Tuttle v. National Bank of the Re-
public, 161 111. 497, and Hancock Nat. Bank v. Farnum, 20 R. I.
000. Marshall v. Sherman, 148 N. Y. 9, 51 Am. St. Rep. 654, is a
case which arose upon demurrer, and somewhat resembles Bank
of North America v. Rindge, 154 Mass. 203, 26 Am. St. Rep.
240, and the decision in both depended upon the averments of
the declaration.
This court has many times decided that the statutes of other
states, creating the liability of stockholders to creditors of a cor-
poration, which provide for a suit of a special kind to which the
corporation and all the stockholders are to be made parties, will
not in general be enforced by the courts of this state. It often
happens that the courts of this state could acquire no jurisdic-
tion over the corporation which is a necessary party, or over
many of the stockholders, and the suit itself is sometimes of a
kind unknown to our laws. The proper courts of the state un-
der whose laws the corporation is established have full jurisdic-
tion over the corporation. "Whether in such a suit such courts
can acquire jurisdiction over all the stockholders, wherever they
reside, in order to determine their liability under the statutes
to which they may be held to have assented in becoming stock-
holders, it is unnecessary now to consider. The proceedings are
somewhat analogous to the laying of assessments ratably upon
all stockolders for the purpose of paying the debts of the cor-
poration in the manner and to the extent prescribed by the stat-
utes. The special remedy provided by the statutes must be pur-
sued, and, as the statutes of a state have no force ex proprio
vigore beyond the territorial limits of the state, the remedy
233 Hancock Nat. Bank v. Ellis. [Mass.
usually must be pursued in the state where the corporation has
been established and the statutes passed: Erickson v. Nesmith,
15 Gray, 221; 4 Allen, 233; New Haven Horse Nail Co. v. Lin-
den Spring Co., 142 Mass. 349; Post v. Toledo etc. R. R. Co.,
144 Mass. 341, 59 Am. Eep. 86; Bank of North America v.
Eindge, 154 Mass. 203, 26 Am. St. Eep. 240; Coffing v. Dodge,
-*« 167 Mass. 231. See Fourth Nat. Bank v. Francklyn, 120
U. S. 747; Lowry v. Inman, 46 N. Y. 119; May v. Black, 77
Wis. 101, 107; Rice v, Merrimack Hosiery Co., 56 N. H. 114;
Nimick v. Mingo Iron Works, 25 W. Va. 184.
In Higgins v. Central New England etc. R. R. Co., 155 Mass.
176, 31 Am. St. Rep. 544, the grounds on which the courts of
this state entertain an action at law founded on the statutes of
another state are stated to be as follows: "Assuming that the
cause of action is one not existing at the common law, but cre-
ated by the statute of another state, we have seen that it is tran-
sitory, and that it survives and passes from the deceased to his
administrator. When an action is brought upon it here, the
plaintiff is not met by any difficulty upon these points. Whether
our courts will entertain it depends upon the general principles
which are to be applied in determining the question whether
actions founded upon the laws of other states shall be heard
here. These principles require that, in cases of other than penal
actions, the foreign law, if not contrary to our public policy, or
to abstract justice or pure morals, or calculated to injure the
fftate or its citizens, shall be recognized and enforced here, if we
have jurisdiction of all necessary parties, and if we can see that,
consistently with our own forms of procedure and law of trials,
we can do substantial justice between the parties. If the foreign
law is a penal statute, or if it offends our own policy, or is re-
pugnant to justice or to good morals, or is calculated to injure
this state or its citizens, or if we have not jurisdiction of parties
who must be brought in to enable us to give a satisfactory rem-
edy, or if under our forms of procedure an action here cannot
give a substantial remedy, we are at liberty to decline jurisdic-
tion: Blanchard v. Russell, 13 Mass. 1, 6, 7 Am. Dec. 106; Pren-
tis V. Savage, 13 Mass. 20, 24; Ingraham v. Geyer, 13 Mass. 146,
7 Am. Dec. 132; Tappan v. Poor, 15 Mass. 419; Zipcey v.
Thompson, 1 Gray, 243, 245; Erickson v. Nesmith, 15 Gray,
221, 4 Allen, 233, 236; ITalsey v. McLean, 12 Allen, 439, 443, 90
Am. Dec. 157; New Haven Horse Nail Co. v. Linden Spring
Sept. 1898.] Hancock Nat. Bank v. Ellis. 239
Co., 142 Mass. 349, 353; Bank of North America t. Eindge, 154
Mass. 203, 26 Am. St. Eep. 240."
In Post V. Toledo etc. K. R. Co., 144 Mass. 341, 59 Am. Rep.
86, this court say; "The obligation imposed by the statutes of
Ohio upon the stockholders for the purpose of securing the *'"
payment of the debts of the corporation is quasi ex contractu.
It must be taken that all persons who become stockholders in an
Ohio corporation know the law under which the corporation is
organized, and assent to the liability which that law imposes
upon stockholders, and that all persons who deal with the cor-
poration rely upon the liability of the stockholders as security
for the payment of whatever debts may be due them from the
corporation. It is for the people or the legislature of each state
to determine to what extent, if at all, the stockholders of cor-
porations created by the laws of that state shall be liable for the
debts of such corporations. It was early the policy of Massa-
chusetts to make every stockholder liable to have his property
taken to satisfy a judgment against a Massachusetts corporation
of which he was a member: See Child v. Boston etc. Iron Works,
137 Mass. 516, 50 Am. Rep. 328; and although this policy has
now been chang'ed, and the liability restricted to specific cases,
and to corporations of a particular character, yet there is noth-
ing in the laws of Ohio, as stated in the bill, that is so opposed
to the general policy of our laws that even citizens of Massa-
chusetts, who voluntarily have become stockholders in Ohio cor-
porations, should not be held to perform the obligations im-
posed by those laws."
When the liability is distinctly imposed by statute upon the
stockholders severally, it would be unfortunate if it could not be
enforced against stoclcholders not resident within the state un-
der whose laws the corporation has been established, on the
ground that due process could not be served on them within that
state, and the courts of the state where they reside would not
take jurisdiction of suits to enforce the liability.
It certainly concerns the due administration of justice that all
stockholders, wherever they reside, should be compelled by pro-
ceedings somewhere to perform the statutory obligations toward
creditors of the corporation which they have assumed by becom-
ing stockholders.
The remedy provided by paragraphs 1200 and 1204 of the
General Statutes of Kansas, even if applicable to the present
case, wa« not intended to be exclusive when a judgment has
210 Hancock Nat. Bank v, Ellis. [Mast.
been obtained against the corporation. The present plaintiff haa
pursued exactly the remedy provided by paragraph 1192 of those
^* statutes. That paragraph permits the plaintiff to proceed by
action to charge the stockholders with the amount of the judg-
ment. The courts of Kansas hold that the action must be
against the stockholders severally, and not jointly. The stock-
holder who pays more than his proportion of any debt of the
corporation may compel contribution from the other stockholders
by action. The creditor of the corporation can by action col-
lect the amount of his judgment remaining unpaid of any stock-
holder, "to any extent equal to the amount of stock by him or
her owned, together with any amount unpaid thereon." The
stockholder is discharged as against all creditors of the corpora-
tion when he has paid the debts of the corporation to this ex-
tent. "We are unable to see in what manner the enforcement
of these statutes by the courts of Massachusetts against stock-
holders resident here, at the instance of a creditor of the corpora-
tion, does any injustice to the citizens of Massachusetts. If they
pay what they are required to pay, they have the same remedy
for contribution which any other stockholders have. This rem-
edy may be difficult to enforce, because the stockholders may
reside in many different states or countries; but the same rem-
edy for contribution is given to all stockholders wherever they
reside. The legislature of Kansas has chosen to give to the cred-
itors of certain of its corporations the security which the indi-
vidual liability of each stockholder affords, to the extent pre-
scribed by its statutes, leaving the burden of enforcing contribu-
tion from other stockholders on any stockholder who has been
compelled to pay anything in discharge of the debts of the cor-
poration. This somewhat resembles the law of Massachusetts
whereby judgment creditors of cities and towns can levy exe-
cution on the property of any inhabitant, and such inhabitant
is left to enforce contribution from the other inhabitants. Per-
sons becoming stockholders In foreign corporations can ascertain
the nature and extent of the li^ibility of the stockholders in such
corporations according to the laws of the state or country under
which the corporations are organized, and they cannot complain
if this liability is enforced against them.
"We are unable to assent to the decision of the supreme court
of Pennsylvania in Gushing v. Perot, 175 Pa. St. G6, 52 Am.
St. Rep. 835, that the liability of the defendant passed to the
receivers of the corporation ^^ as an asset of the corporation.
i
Sept 1898.] Hancock Nat. Bank v. Ellb. 241
because we think that the liability as created by the statutes
of Kansas is directly to the creditors, and cannot be enforced
by receivers in their own names or in the name of the corpora-
tion: Hancock Nat. Bank v. Ellis, 166 Mass. 414, 419, 55 Am.
St. Eep. 414; National Bank v. Hingham Mfg. Co., 127 Mass.
563, 667; Chamberlin v. Huguenot Mfg. Co., 118 Mass. 532.
The law of Kansas was a fact to be proved in the present
suit. Where the evidence of foreign law consists entirely of
statutes or reports of judicial decisions, the constructions and
effects of the statutes and decisions are usually for the court
alone: Bride v. Clark, 161 Mass. 130; Eeyer v. Odd Fellows'
etc. Assn., 157 Mass. 367, 34 Am. St. Eep. 288; Gibson v. Manu-
facturers' Ins. Co., 144 Mass. 81. Where the decisions are con-
flicting, or where inferences of fact must be drawn, the question
of what the law is becomes one of fact: Wylie v. Cotter, 170
Mass. 356, 64 Am. St. Eep. 305.
Upon the evidence introduced at the trial, a majority of the
court think that the reasonable inference is that the action given
to enforce the liability of stockholders under paragraph 1192 of
the General Statutes of Kansas of 1889 was intended to be a
transitory action of such a nature that it might be brought in
any court of general jurisdiction over similar actions in any
state or country where service according to the laws of that state
or country could be made upon a stockholder.
They are of opinion that the superior court should have found
in accordance with the seventh request of the plaintiff. This al-
most necessarily follows in the view they have taken of the stat-
utes of Kansas, from the four rulings requested by the plaintiff
which the court gave, whether they be regarded as rulings of
law or findings of fact. It is unnecessary now to consider the
other questions which have been argued, or which appear in the
bill of exceptions.
The entry must be exceptions sustained.
CORPORATIONS-PERSON.Mi LIABILITY OP STOCKHOLD-
ERS—ENFORCEMENT OF. IN OTHER STATES.— The liability
of stockholders of corporations to creditors is several: ColemsJi v.
Howe, 154 111. 458, 45 Am. St. Rep. 133. An absolute and uncondi-
tional individual liability imposed upon a stoclvholder Is person.il,
and enforceable everywhere, in the same way that other personal
obligations are enforced, and, according to the course of proceduro,
in the place where the individual sought to be charged is found:
See monographic note to Fowler v. Lanisou, 37 Am. St. Rep. 169. on
the enforcement, in other states, of the personal liability of stoclc-
holders; but, when a special remedy Is given to the creditors of a
corporation against Its stockholders, the liabilitj of the latter can-
Am. ST. £XF., Vol. LXX.— is
242 Commonwealth v. Hubley. [Mass^
not be enforced In any state except that In which the corporation
•was organized: Note to Mandel v. Swan etc. Cattle Co., 45 Am, St.
Rep. 132. Compare Marshall v. Sherman, 148 N. Y. 9, 51 Am. St.
Rep. 654.
EVIDENCE.— FOREIGN LAWS, INCLUDING THOSE OF SIS-
TER STATES, must be pleaded and proved as other facts: Robert-
eon V. Staed, 135 Mo. 135, 58 Am. St. Rep. 569; Summer v. MltchelU
29 Fla. 179, 80 Am. St Rep. 106.
Commonwealth v. Hublet.
[172 MASSACHrSKTTS, 58.]
MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS— ORDINANCES— DEALING
IN OLD RAGS.— A city ordinance which forbids the business of
collecting, storing, and dealing in old rags, old papers, or other such
refuse material, within the thickly settled portions of the city, ex-
cept when conducted by licensed persons, is reasonable and valid.
POLICE POWER— PROTECTION OF PUBLIC HEALTH-
DEALING IN OLD RAGS.— As the business of collecting, storing,
and dealing in old rags, old papers, and lilje material, may be dan-
gerous to the health of the community, it is proper that trust-
worthy persons only should be permitted to carry it on. When th&
Interests of individuals conflict with the rights of the public, the
Individual interest must yield to the paramount right.
H. Parker, district attorney, and G. S. Taft, assistant district
attorney, for the commonwealth.
W. J. Taft, for the defendant.
»8 KNOWLTON, J. The defendant was convicted of a vio-
lation of an ordinance of the city of Worcester, which is as fol-
lows: "An ordinance to regulate the collecting and storage of
old rags, old papers, or other refuse material. Section 1. No
person shall carry on the business of collecting, storing, and deal-
ing in old rags, old papers, or other such refuse material, in any
building •** within a circle the radius of which is two miles
from the intersection of the south line of Front street and the
east line of Main street, unless he is duly licensed therefor by
the board of aldermen, for which license, if granted, no fee
shall be charged." The only question in the case is whether
the ordinance is valid. By its charter the city of Worcester has
all the rights to pass ordinances that are given to cities and
towns by general laws: Stats. 1893, c, 444, sec. 19. Under the
Public Statutes, chapter 27, section 15, towns may make "such
necessary orders and by-laws, not repugnant to law, as they may
Oct. 1898.] Commonwealth v. Hubley. 243
judge most conducive to their welfare," for tlie following pur-
poses among others, namely, "for directing and managing the
prudential affairs, preserving the peace and good order, and
maintaining the internal police thereof." By-laws and ordi-
nances looking to the preservation of the public health are
plainly within the authority conferred by this section: See
Commonwealth v. Parks, 155 Mass. 531. The authority given
by the Public Statutes, chapter 80, sections 18, 84, to boards
of health of to\^Tis to make regulations and pass orders in refer-
ence to certain mttters affecting the health of the community,
cannot properly be construed to prevent the passage of reason-
able by-laws by towns, under the authority of the Public Stat-
utes, chapter 27, section 15: Commonwealth v. Parks, 155
Mass. 531, 533. Special authority is given by the Public Stat-
utes, chapter 80, section 18, to a board of health "respecting
articles which are capable of containing or conveying infection
or contagion, or of creating sickness brought into or conveyed
from its town." It is manifest that old rags may be very dan-
gerous in this respect. The case of Train v. Boston Disinfecting
Co., 144 Mass. 523, 59 Am. Eep. 113, fully recognizes the rea-
sonableness of provisions regulating the business of dealing in
rags.
Besides the authority found in the statute already quoted, we
have in the Public Statutes, chapter 102, section 28, a provi-
eion for licensing "dealers in and keepers of shops for the pur-
chase, sale, or barter of junk, old metals, or second hand arti-
cles." There is certainly strong ground for the argument of
the district attorney thai dealing in rags is within the express
language of this statute.
We are of opinion that it was not unreasonable for the city of
Worcester to forbid the business of collecting, storing, and deal-
ing in rags within the thickly settled portions of the city except
when conducted by licensed persons. The safety of the com-
munity ^ might be found to require that only persons who
could be trusted to observe proper precautions should be per-
mitted to carry on this business. When the interests of individ-
uals conflict with the rights of the public, the individual inter-
est must yield to the paramount right : Watertown v. Mayo, 109
Mass. 315, 12 Am. Rep. 694; Train v. Boston Disinfecting Co.,
144 Mass. 523, 59 Am. Rep. 113; Newton v. Joyce, 166 Mass.
83, 55 Am. St. Rep. 385.
Exceptions overruled.
244 McIsAAc V. Northampton etc. Co. [Mass.
MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS— POLICE POWER— SANITARY
REGULATIONS.— A city has incidental power of enacting sanitary
regulations: Note to State v, Payssan. 49 Am. St. Rep. 393. It is
within the general power of the state to preserve and promote the
public welfare and health, even at the expense of private rights,
and this power may be delegated to municipal corporations:
Walker v. Jameson, 140 Ind. 591, 49 Am. St. Rep. 222.
MoIsAAo V, Northampton Electric Lighting Co.
[172 Massachusetts, 89.]
MASTER AND SERVANT— ELECTRIC LIGHT COMPA-
NIES—DUTY TO LINEMEN.— An electric light company does not
owe to a lineman, whose business it is to work upon poles on which
the company's wires are suspended, the duty to inspect its poles
below the surface of the ground to ascertain whether they are de-
cayed, and to inform him of that fact if such is found to be the
case.
MASTER AND SERVANT-ELECTRIC LIGHT COMPA-
NIES AND LINEMEN— ASSUMPTION OF RISKS— POLES.—
When a lineman enters the service of an electric light company for
the purpose of working upon poles on which the company's wires
are suspended, he assumes the risk that a pole of uncertain age
may break and fall when a lineman is working upon it, if he does
not take measures to ascertain its condition before going upon it.
ELECTRIC LIGHT COMPANIES— INJURY TO LINEMAN
—ACTION— IMMATERIAL EVIDENCE.— A lineman who was in-
jured while in the employ of an electric lighting company by a de-
cayed pole breaking below the surface of the ground, and falling
upon him while he was at work upon it, cannot maintain an action
against the company for the injury without showing that the com-
pany was negligent; and this is not done by proof that the company
faihd to inspect the pole before the accidtut. Such evidence is Im-
material, for the company owed him no duty to inspect It. On the
contrary, in any case where the apparent ago of the pole was such
as to make it probable that it was not strong enough to sustain a
man working upon it, due care on the part of the lineman would re-
quire him to examine it Just below the surface of the ground before
risking himself upon it.
WITNESSES-EXAMINATION OF— STRIKING OUT AN-
SWER.— A witness' answer which is not responsive to the question
may righily b' stricken out.
WITNESSES— RULING OUT QUESTIONS CALLING FOR
AN OPINION.— A question which calls for an opinion of the wit-
ness In regard to the legal effect of a contract is properly ruled out.
WITNESSES.— IMMATERIAL QUESTIONS asked of a wit-
ness are properly ruled out.
Tort, for personal injuries sustained by the plaintiff while in
the defendant's employ as a lineman. At the defendant's re-
quest, the court ruled that the action could not be maintained,
and directed the jury to return a verdict for the defendant.
The plaintiff excepted.
Oct. 1898.] McIsAAc V. Northampton etc. Co. 245
J. B. Carroll and W. H. McClintock, for the plaintiff.
W. G. Bassett, for the defendant.
8» KNOWLTON, J. The plaintiff was employed by the de-
fendant as a lineman, and was injured by the breaking and fall-
ing of a pole on which the defendant's wires were suspended.
The pole was about forty feet in length, was set in the ground
about five *** feet, and was about thirty-five feet high. The
undisputed evidence tended to show that it was badly decayed
a few inches below the surface of the ground, so that it broke
off square with the strain upon it resulting from the plaintiff's
weight and the force from wires drawing upon it after other
wires had been removed, which probably had previously tended
to counteract the strain from those that remained. The plain-
tiff contends that the defendant was guilty of negligence in fail-
ing to ascertain whether the pole was sound and strong, or to
take other precautions for his safety.
The plaintiff was directed to go and take down from the pole
the two wires upon it which belonged to the defendant, and to
put them on a new pole near by, which had been erected on ac-
count of a change of grade in a railroad at a crossing. He went
alone to do the work, using a horse and wagon belonging to the
defendant to carry such tools and materials as he thought he
needed. He was a man of experience in this kind of business,
and the method of doing the work he seems to have determined
for himself. The pole was of chestnut wood, about eight inches
in diameter at the top, and about fourteen inches at the surface
of the ground. It had been set between eight and nine years,
and the evidence tended to prove that it showed no weakness or
sign of decay above the ground.
A fundamental question is whether the defendant owed to a
lineman, whose business it was to work upon poles all along the
line as occasion might require, the duty to inspect its poles be-
low the ground, and inform the linemen whenever any of them
were so decayed as to be unsafe to work upon.
The plaintiff admitted in his testimony that he knew that the
life of a pole was limited, and that any pole after a time would
become unsafe. He had worked upon poles in the construction
and repair of electric lines many years. When he engaged to
work for the defendant he knew it would be his duty to go upon
poles that had been set in the ground an uncertain length of
time. He must have known that the work of climbing poles
246 McIsAAc V. Northampton etc. Co. [Mass.
and taking down and putting up wires would often put a strain
upon a pole much greater that it would be exposed to in sus-
taining wires when they were all in their proper positions. He
must have known that it would be inexpedient and impracticable
to have a man or company of men to go and examine each pole
upon which ®^ a lineman was about to work, to see whether it
would sustain the strain which the work would put upon it.
The evidence was undisputed that it was easy to determine very
quickly whether a pole was badly decayed a little below the sur-
face of the ground, and that no skill or experience was required
to do it beyond that which was possessed by ordinary linemen.
The plaintiff testified that there were risks about the business
with which he was familiar as a lineman. "We think that one
of the most common and obvious of these, in reference to which
both he and his employer must have been presumed to have con-
tracted when he entered the defendant's service, was the risk
that some pole of uncertain age might break and fall when a
lineman was working upon it, if he did not take measures to
ascertain its condition before going upon it. All the evidence
tends to show that in the ordinary course of the business, the
linemen, who are often expected to work alone without super-
vision, as the plaintiff was working at the time of the accident,
would examine the poles for themselves so far as they consid-
ered it necessary to do so for their safety. They easily could
make any necessary tests to ascertain the condition of the poles
as to soundness without the aid of special inspectors, and from
their knowledge of common affairs could judge whether the pole
was safe to go upon. The plaintiff testified that there were
pike poles belonging to the defendant at the shed from which
he started with the horse and wagon, and that he was familiar
with the use of pike poles in setting new poles and bracing up
old ones, and there is nothing to show that he might not have
taken some of them to use in the work if he had chosen to.
The burden was upon him to show that the defendant's ne-
glect of some duty caused the accident. We are of opinion that
there is no evidence that the risk of falling on account of the
weakness of old poles was not a risk of the business which the
plaintiff assumed by his contract to work upon such poles. As
between the plaintiff and the defendant, the defendant was
under no obligation to inspect the poles to see whether they
were decayed, and there was, therefore, no evidence of negli-
gence on the part of the defendant.
Oct. 1898.] McIsAAc V. Northampton etc. Co. 247
There was no error in the rulings in regard to the admission
of testimony. Evidence that the defendant had made no in-
spection ®* of its pole prior to the accident was immaterial, in-
asmuch as the defendant owed the plaintiff no duty to inspect
it.
The words, '*It is not the lineman's business to do it," in
Dorsey's answer, were rightly stricken out. To say nothing of
other objections, they were not responsive to the question.
The question whether it was a "part of the work of a lineman to
make that inspection" was properly ruled out. It called for
an opinion of the witness in regard to the legal effect of a con-
tract. The question whether linemen "customarily perform
that work of inspection" was also immaterial. So far as ap-
peared it was not the custom of anybody to make such an in-
spection; but in any case where the apparent age of the pole
was such as to make it probable that it was not strong enough
to sustain a man working upon it, due care on the part of the
lineman would require him to examine it just below the surface
of the ground before risking himself upon it.
Our review of the main question makes it unnecessary to con-
sider whether the general duty of the defendant to the plaintiff
in regard to the strength of the poles on which he was working
is affected by the fact that it was not the owner of the pole that
broke, but was merely using it in its business under the au-
thority of the owner.
Exceptions overruled.
MASTER AND SERVANT— ELECTRIC LIGHT COMPANIES-
ASSUMPTION OF RISKS— POLES.— The linemen of telephone
and telegraph companies have no right to rely upon the soundness
and safety of poles upon which they are to work. This is especially
true where it is a custom for linemen to look out for their own
safety and to Inspect and test poles for themselves, and to judge of
their safety, suitable appliances being at hand for such testing.
An experienced lineman must be presumed to have known of this
custom, and, if he climbs a pole, when ordered, without such test,
and Is injured through its rotten condition, the accident must be
regarded as due to his own fault or negligence: McGorty v. South-
ern etc. Telephone Co., 69 Conn. 635, 61 Am. St. Rep. 62.
WITNESSES— IMMATERIALITY.— A question asked of a wit-
ness Is properly excluded, when the answer to it could not have been
ma ei-lal: Eastman v. Amoskeag Mfg. Oo., 44 N. H. 143, 82 Am. Dec
201.
248 Ellsbury v. New York etc. Ry. Co. [Mass^
Ellsbuey V. New York, New Haven & Hartfori>
Railroad Company.
[172 Massachusetts, 130.]
KAILROADS— COUPLING OF CARS— ASSUMPTION OP
RISKS— LIABILITY FOR INJURY —If one railroad receives a car
from another railroad, with a drawbar different in make and
height from that which it uses itself, and an experienced man Is
ordered to couple the cars together by a linli and pin, but he is
crushed between the sills of the cars while attempting to make th&
connection, because one drawbar slides over the other, the railroad
company is not answerable for the injury, because the difference
In height was an obvious risk assumed by the plaintiff.
Tort for personal injuries received by the plaintiff while irt
the defendant's employ. The court directed a verdict for the
defendant.
J. E. McConnell, for the plaintiff.
F. P. Goulding and W. C. Mellish, for the defendant.
*^® HOLMES, J. This is an action of tort for injuries re-
ceived while attempting to couple two cars tog'ether in obedi-
ence to orders. The two cars had different kinds of drawbars
— one, belonging to the defendant, a Miller, the other belonging
to the Pennsylvania Eailroad, a Jenny, They could be coupled
only by the use of a link and pin. A fellow-servant of the plain-
tiff put a link into the Pennsylvania car, but, according to the
plaintiff's story, the drawbar of that car was too high to allow
the connection, and, when the cars came together, it slid over
the other one, and the plaintiff, who held the link, was crushed
between the sills of the cars. The plaintiff was an experienced
man but testified that he could not have told the difference in
height, or, it would seem, the alleged impossibility of the con-
nection, *^^ until the drawbars were close to each other. At
the trial the judge directed a verdict for the defendant.
We are unable to see any ground on which the plaintiff could
be allowed to recover. In Lawless v. Connecticut River E. R.
Co., 136 Mass. 1, the defendant furnished a locomotive to be
used as a switcher. The drawbar was too low for the cars with
which it was expected to be used; the plaintiff did not know it,,
and was not called on to look out for it. In Bowers v. Connecti-
cut River R. R. Co., 162 Mass. 312, there was some slight evi-
dence that the drawbar was defective in having too much lateral
play, and that the accident was due to that defect. In Groodrich
Oct. 1898.] Ellsbuby v. New York etc. Ry. Co. 24^
V. New York Cent. etc. E. R. Co., 116 N. Y. 398, 15 Am. St.
Rep. 410, there was no question that the injury was caused by a
defect in the bumper. But such cases do not dispose of the
present. It was lawful for the defendant to receive a car from
another railroad, with a drawbar different in make and height
from that which it used its'elf. It was lawful for it to couple
such a car with its own. So far as appears, both cars were in
proper condition. The difference in height was not a defect
for which the defendant was answerable, either at common law
or by Statute : Pennsylvania Co. v. Ebaugh, 144 Ind. 687. The
defendant was not called on to make preliminary measurements,
and to warn the plaintiff of the possible difference before set-
ting him to work. The possibility was obvious in a car coming
from a different road: Michigan Cent. R. R. Co. v. Smithson,
45 Mich. 212, 220. So far as appears, the cars might have been
coupled successfully, if not with a straight link, then with a
crooked one. It does not appear that the defendant failed to
furnish whatever appliances were necessary to do the work. It
was not the defendant's duty to see that the plaintiff or his
fellow-servants picked out suitable ones, if it furnished them.
All that we can say is, that an experienced man was s"et to do
a dangerous thing and met the consequences of failure. We
cannot see evidence that the failure was due to the defendant's
fault: See Michigan Cent. R. R. Co. v. Smithson, 45 Mich. 212;
Fort Wayne etc. R. R. Co. v. Gildersleeve, 33 Mich. 133; Penn-
sylvania Co. V. Ebaugh, 144 Ind. 687; Toledo etc. Ry. Co. v.
Black, 88 111. 112; Baldwin v. Chicago etc. Ry. Co., 50 Iowa,
680; Hulett v. St. Louis etc. Ry. Co., 67 Mo. 239; St. Louis
^32 etc. Ry. Co. v. Higgins, 44 Ark. 293; McDonald v. Norfolk
etc. R. R. Co., 95 Va. 98; Norfolk etc. R. R. Co. v. Brown, 91
Va. 668, 672; Kohn v. McNulta, 147 U. S. 238.
Judgment on the verdict.
RAirROADS-COUPLING OP CARS— ASSUMPTION OF RISK.
A. brakeman on a railroad train takes upon himself the manifest
ri.sk of coupling cars with double deadwoods, and of coupling the
car of another road to a caboose, where there is an apparent dlffer-
enre In the hnlght of the couplings: Note to Chicago etc. B. B. Oo.
V. Curtis. 66 Am. St. Rep. 472.
250 Avery v. Monroe. [Mass.
Avert v, Monroe.
[172 Massachusetts, 132,J
ATTACHMENT— TRUSTEE PROCESS— PROPERTY IN
HANDS OF ASSIGNEE FOR BENEFIT OF CREDITORS.— If a
debtor conveys machinery, supplies, and stoclt on hand In a shoe
factory, and laook accounts, to an assignee in trust for the benefit
of creditors, and creditors do not become parties to the deed, the
property, in the hands of the assignee, is subject to trustee process,
though nothing has been done about talcing possession of it, for the
title has passed, as between the parties to the deed, and the as-
signee or trustee has the Immediate right of possession.
Trustee process. Avery and another were the plaintiffs and
Monroe and others, including the trustee, were defendants.
The writ' was dated March 27, 1896, and was served on the
trustee on March 28, 1896. The assignment was executed on
March 25, 1896. The trustee was charged on his answers to
the plaintiff's interrogatories, and he alleged exceptions.
A. A. "Wyman, for the plaintiffs.
F. W. Blackmer and E. H. Vaughan, for the trustee.
*^ HOLMES, J. At the time of the s'ervice of the writ in
this action the person sought to be charged as trustee had ac-
cepted from the principal defendants a conveyance of all their
property not exempt from attachment, consisting mainly of ma-
chinery, supplies, and stock on hand in a shoe factory, and book
accounts, in trust for the defendant's creditors, but had done
nothing about **^ taking possession of the property. No
creditors appear to have become parties to the deed. The ques-
tion before us is whether these facts warranted the superior
court in charging the trustee.
The title had passed as between the parties to the deed. The
trustee had the right to the immediate possession. We do not
see why he was not as well "able to turn it out, to be disposed
of on execution" (Andrews v. Ludlow, 5 Pick. 28, 31) as if
he had taken possession by a formal act. The case of Viall v.
Bliss, 9 Pick, 13, seems probably to have been similar to this,
and in Maine it seems settled that in cases like the present the
trustee is to be charged: Lane v. Nowell, 15 Mc. 86; Arnold v.
Elwell, 13 Me, 261; Peabody v, Maguire, 79 Me, 572, 584;
Glenn v. Boston etc. Glass Co,, 7 Md, 287. See, also. Mechan-
ics' Sav. Bank v, Waite, 150 Mass, 234, 235; Gushing on Trustee
Process, sees. 63-55; Drake on Attachment, 7th ed., sec. 482;
Oct. 1898.] Berqner & Enqel Brewing Co. v. Dreyfus. 251
Freeman on Executions, 2d ed., sec. 160. Section 26 of the Pub-
lic Statutes, chapter 183, is not intended to limit the liability of
trustees under deeds like this' to cases where they have taken
possession, but simply to declare the existing law that they may
be charged by trustee process under section 21. Rev. Stats.,
c. 109, sec. 35, Commissioners' note. We are of opinion that
the property was "intrusted in the hands" of the trustee within
the Public Statutes, chapter 183, section 21.
It is suggested that it does not appear from the trustee's an-
swers to interrogatories that all the defendants had executed the
deed before service of the writ. It does not appear that they
had not. The deed was executed, and, if it be material, may be
presumed to have been executed by all three of the defendants
on the day of its date, as it cerfainly was by two of them.
Exceptions overruled.
GARNISHMENT— ASSIGNEE FOR BENEFIT OF CREDIT-
ORS.—Property held by an assignee for the benefit of creditors la
not subject to garnishment by a creditor: Calumet Paper Co. v.
Haskell Printing Co., 144 Mo. 331. 66 Am. St Rep. 425, and note.
Bergner & Engel Brewing Company v. Dreyfus.
[172 MASBACirnsETTS, 154.]
A CORPORATION HAS ITS DOMICILE In the jurisdiction
of the state which created It, and, as a consequence, has no domi-
cile anywhere else.
CORPORATIONS— ACTION BY A FOREIGN CORPORA-
TION— DISCHARGE OF INSOLVENT AS A BAR.— A discharge
under the insolvency laws of Massachusetts does not discharge a
debt due from the Massachusetts debtor to a corporation of an-
other state, having Its principal place of business In the latter state,
although it has a place of business In Massachusetts, and a license
under the laws of that state, and has complied with Its laws regu-
lating foreign corporations doing business there, respecting the ap-
pointment of a person upon whom process may be served.
Contract for beer and ale sold and delivered to the defendant.
The writ was dated September 30, 1896. The plaintiff was a
corporation organized under the laws of Pennsylvania. Its
principal oflRces, where its meetings were held and its books kept,
were in Philadelphia,^ where it manufactured and sold malt
liquors. It had no brewery, and manufactured nothing, in
Massachusetts. It had an office and a storeroom, however, in
Boston, which it hired in its own name, and where it sold its
252 Bekqner & Engel Brewing Co. v. Dreyfus. [Mass.
products at wholesale. It hired an agent, styled a manager, a
bookkeeper, and delivery men iov the conduct of its business
in Boston, and it owned there a complete set of office furniture
and horses and wagons sufficient for the delivery of the goods
which it sold in Boston. All of these employes resided in
Massachusetts. The plaintiff had complied with the statutes
of Massachusets regulating foreign corporations having a usual
place of business in that commonwealth and had received from
the board of police of the city of Boston a license, in its name,
of the fourth class, to sell intoxicating liquors in that city sa
a wholesale dealer. The defendant, a citizen of Massachusetts,
ordered of the plaintiff, at its office in Boston, beer and ale,
which were delivered to him in Boston from the plaintiff's
Btoreroom there and some time after this purchase was made,
and the goods delivered, the defendant filed his petition in in-
fiolvency. He received his discharge before this action was
brought. The plaintiff did not prove its claim in those pro-
ceedings, and never received payment of any part thereof. The
plaintiff contended, in this action, that the discharge was not a
bar, because it was a citizen of Pennsylvania. There was a
judgment for the plaintiff, and the defendant appealed.
H. H. Baker, for the plaintiff.
B. S. Ladd and T. F. Strange, for the defendant.
*'*'* HOLMES, J. This is a suit by a Pennsylvania corpora-
tion to recover a debt for goods sold and delivered here. The
only defense is a discharge in insolvency under our statutes,
which, of course, commonly is no defense at all. This was re-
affirmed unanimously in 1890, after full . consideration of the
objections now urged, and it was decided, also, not for the first
time, that the general language of the insolvent law was not in-
tended to affect access to Massachus'etts courts by a local rule of
procedure unless the substantive right was barred by the dis-
charge: Phoenix Nat. Bank v. Batcheller, 151 Mass. 589. The
grounds urged for an exception in the present case are that the
*'** plaintiff, although its brewery and main offices are in Penn^
Bylvania, has an office in Boston and maintains here a complete
outfit for the distribution of its products, that it has a license of
the fourth class under the Public Statutes, chapter 100, section
10, and that it has complied with the laws regulating foreign
corporations doing business here, including, we assume, that
Oct. 1898.] Bergner & Engel Brewing Co. v. Dreyfus. 253
which requires the appointment of the commissioner of corpo-
rations its "attorney upon whom all lawful processes in any ac-
tion or proceeding against it may be served": Stats. 1884, c.
S30, sec. 1; see Stats. 1895, c. 157.
We are of opinion that these facts are not enough to bring
the plaintiff under the operation- of the state insolvent law. It
is settkd that doing business here does not have that effect upon
a citizen or corporation of another state: Guernsey v. Wood,
130 Mass. 503; Eegina Flour Mill Co. v. Holmes, 156 Mass 11.
It is not pointed out what the license, whether valid or void,
has to do with the matter, and we do not perceive that complying
with the laws concerning foreign corporations ought to have any
greater effect. We think it plain that the words just quoted from
the Statutes of 1884, chapter 330, section 1, do not mean that,
by appointing the commissioner of corporations their attorney,
foreign corporations agree not only that publication of notice in
insolvency proceedings shall have the effect of personal service
upon them in an action, but also that, as a result, they shall be
subject to the jurisdiction of the state insolvency proceedings
so as to be bound by a discharge.
The most that could be deduced from the appointment would
be that, if on other grounds a foreign corporation were subject
to the operation of the insolvent law, publication of notice
should have the same effect upon it as upon other creditors
in making it a party to the proceedings. But we do not sup-
pose that it would be suggested that a natural person, a creditor
who was a citizen of another state, lost his immunity and be-
came a party to the proceedings merely by his accidental pres-
ence in the commonwealth at the moment when the notice ap-
peared: Olivieri v. Atkinson, 168 Mass. 28. No greater direct
effect than the actual presence of a natural person can be at-
tributed to the presence of an attorney authorized to receive
service of process. Furthermore, we doubt whether the ^**^
act of 1884 purports to give the appointment even so much
effect as that. The language discloses no thought about insol-
vent proceedings, and when, at a later date; it was decided to
make foreign corporations subject to be put into insolvency
here, it was thought proper to provide expressly that service
upon the commissioner of corporations should be a sufficient
notice to the corporation of the presentment of the petition by
creditors against it. Stats. 1890, c. 321, sec. 1. If the act of
1884 attempted to do more than we have construed it to at-
254 Berqner & Engel Brewing Co. v. Dreyfus. [Mass.
I
tempt, its validity might be drawn in doubt as requiring the
corporation to surrender a privilege secured to it by the con-
stitution and laws of the United States: Southern Pac. Co. v.
Denton, 146 U. S. 202, 207.
The independent ground on which it is urged that the plain-
tiff is subject to the insolvent law in the present case is that
the plaintiff is domesticated in this state, as shown by the facts
above recited, of which the appointment of an attorney is only
one. The word "domesticated," which was used in the argu-
ment for the defendant, presents no definite legal conception
which has any bearing upon the case. We presume that it was
intended to convey in a conciliatory form the notion that the
plaintiff was domiciled here — "resident," in the language of Pub-
lic Statutes, chapter 157, section 81 — and therefore barred by
the language and legal operation of the act. It could not be
contended that the corporation was a citizen of Massachusetts.
In such sense as it is a citizen of any state, it is a citizen of the
state which creates it and of no other. But there are even
greater objections to a double domicile than there are to double
citizenship. Under the law as it has been, a man might find
himself owning a double allegiance without any choice of his
own. But domicile, at least for any given purpose, is single by
its essence: Dicey on Conflict of Laws, 95. A corporation does
not differ from a natural person in this respect. If any person,
natural or artificial, as a result of choice or on technical grounds
of birth or creation, has a do^micile in one place, it cannot have
one elsewhere, because what the law means by domicile is the
one technically pre-eminent headquarters which, as a result
either of fact or of fiction, every person is compelled to have in
order that by aid of it certain rights and duties which have been
attached to it by the law may be determined. It is ^^** settled
that a corporation has its domicile in the jurisdiction of the state
which created it, and as a consequence that it has not a domicle
anywhere else: Boston Investment Co. v. Boston, 158 Mass.
461, 462, 463; Shaw v. Quincy Min. Co., 145 U. S. 444, 450;
Martine v. International etc. Ins. Co., 53 K Y. 339, 346, 13 Am.
Rep. 529. The so-called modifications of this rule by statutes
like the act of 1884 do not modify it because jurisdiction of the
ordinary personal actions does not depend upon domicile, but
only upon such presence within the jurisdiction as to make ser-
vice possible: See In re Hohorst, 150 U. S. 653. But the opera-
tion of our insolvent law by its very terms may, and in this
Oct. 1898.] BERGNER& Eng EL Brewing Co. V.Dreyfus. 255
case does, depend upon the domicile of the creditor, and aa there
can be no doubt either in fact or in law that the plaintiff was
domiciled in Pennsylvania in such a sense that a statute lika
the Public Statutes, chapter 157, section 81, would hit it there,
it cannot have been domiciled here for the same purpose at the
same time.
Judgment for the plaintiff affirmed.
FIELD, C. J., DISSENTED. He took the ground that the dis-
charge should be upheld as valid until the supreme court of the
United States has decided to the contrary. "There is no doubt,"^
he said, "that the words of the statutes relating to discharges in in-
solvency, as well as the words of the discharge itself, purport to
make the discharge pleaded in the present action a bar to the action.
Section 81 of the Public Statutes, chapter 157, provides that the
debtor, upon obtaining his discharge, shall be absolutely dis-
charged from all provable debts founded 'on any contract made by
him subsequently to the last day of July, 1838, and while an in-
habitant of this state, if made within this state, to be performed
within the same, or due to any person resident therein at the time
of the first publication of the notice of the Issuing of the warrant.'
The contract sued on was made while the defendant was axi in-
hal)itant of this state, and was made within the state, to be per-
formed within the state, and, on the part of the plaintiff, was per-
formed within the state; and therefore it is exactly within the terms
of the statutes. Whether or not the debt is due to a person resi-
dent within this state at the time of the first publication of the
notice m.'iy depend upon the question whether the plaintiff corpora-
tion had a domicile within the state."
"There is no contention," he said, "that our statutes relating to
Insolvency are In violation of the consitltution of Massachusetts.
The contention is, that in their application to creditors who are citi-
zens of other states than Massachusetts they are in violation of the
constitution of the United States." He admitted that the decisions
of the supreme court of the United States upon the meaning of the
federal constitution are conclusive; but the real difficulty, he said,
is in determining the principle on which that court has decided
that a dlschaige, granted under a state inaolveucy law enacted be-
fore the contract sued on was entered into, will not discharge a
debt due under the contract, if due to a citizen of another state
than that In whit h the law was passed.
"This difficulty," he said, "has often been noticed"; and to illus-
trate It, he quoted from Marsh v. Putnam, S Gray, 551, In which
Mr. Justice Thomas, speaking for the court, In carefully reviewing
the decisions of the supreme court of the United States up to the
time of that decision, said: "In this state of the opinions of that
tribunal to which, on these subjects, we look for guidance, we
know of no safe rule but stare decisis, and yet n»t go beyond the
precise limits of the decisions." "The principal decisions of the so-
256 Bergneb & Enqel Brewing Co. v. Dreyfus. [Mass.
preme court of the United States on this subject," said Field, C. J.,
"since those considered in Marsh v. Putnam, 3 Gray, 551, are Bald-
win V. Hale, 1 Wall. 223; Baldwin v. Bank of Newbury, 1 Wall.
234; Gilman v. Lockwood, 4 Wall. 409; and Denny v. Bennett, 12S
U. S. 489." His honor then discussed and quoted from these cases,
as well as from Stoddard v. Harrington, 100 Mass. 87, 97 Am. Dec.
80, 1 Am. Eep. 92, to show that he was unable to see any conflict
between the insolvent laws of Massachusetts and the federal con-
stitution. He also cited Phoenix Nat. Bank v. Batcheller, 151 Mass.
589; Kelley v. Drury, 9 Allen, 27; Ogden v. Saunders, 12 Wheat. 213,
358, and PuUen v. Hillman, 84 Me. 129, 30 Am. St. Eep. 340, in sup-
port of his views. In Stoddard v. Harrington, 100 Mass. 87, 97 Am.
Dec. 80, 1 Am. Rep. 92, the court said: "The suggestion that the
power of a state over the contracts of its citizens is limited by the
power to make them parties to the proceedings in insolvency does
not seem to us well founded, because we think that the effect of the
insolvent law qualifies the contract from its inception; and the ques-
tion of the sufficiency of the notice to creditors to make them so far
parties as to be bound by these proceedings does not seem to be one
over which the courts of the United States have any peculiar juris-
diction." "This decision," said the dissenting justice, "wherein it was
held that if a contract is made between two citizens of Massachu-
setts within the state, and one of them afterward removes there-
from and becomes a citizen of another state, and the other then
obtains in Massachusettts, where he continues to reside, a discharge
under the insolvent laws, which were in force when the contract
was made, the discharge is a bar to an action against him on the
contract, has not been overruled by this court, and the precise
■case does not seem to have come before the supreme court of the
United States."
He said that the doctrine that the statutes of a state, ex proprio
vigore, have no extraterritorial force is a doctrine of the common
law, and not a provision of the constitution of the United States; and
claimed that a discharge under the bankruptcy laws of England is
held, in the courts of England, to be a discharge of debts due to
citizens or subjects of other countries, without any regard to the
■question whether the courts of England have any jurisdiction over
the foreign creditors whereby they could render personal judgments
against them: Citlug Dicey on (Conflict of Laws, 448 et seq.; Ellis
V. McHenry, L. R. 0 Com. P. 228. He also considered the better
opinion to be that a corporation can have a domicile other than
that in the state under whose laws It was incorporated: Citing
Attorney General v. Bay State Min. Co., 90 Mass. 148, 153, 9G Am.
Dec. 717; Ricker v. American Loan etc. Co., 140 Mass. 346, 350; Gar-
ham V. Mutual Aid Soc, 101 Mass. 357, 3G6; and said that: "If the
•operation of the insolvent laws of Massachusetts upon contracts
made here between persons domiciled here can be avoided upon the
ground that they were made In behalf of corporations organized
under the laws of other states, although having usual places of busl-
tiess here, and subject to be sued here, then It will be possible for
Oct. 1898.] Bebgner & Engel Brewing Co. v. Dreyfus 257
foreign corporations to obtain substantially all the business advan-
tages in Massacliusetts conferred by our laws without subjecting
themselves to the liability of having debts due to them, and con-
tracted within the commonwealth, discharged by proceedings in in-
solvency on the part of inhabitants of the commonwealth with
whom the contracts were made.
"I know of no decision in the supreme court of the United States
upon exactly the state of facts appearing in the present case, and,
on principle, I do not see why the contract made and performed
here by the parties in this case is not subject to be discharged in
accordance with the laws of Massachusetts in force when the con-
tract was made. The contract undoubtedly Is to be governed gen-
erally by the laws of Massachusetts, and the plaintiff has elected
to bring its suit in a Massachusetts court, and the plaintiff is not
only subject to be sued in Massachusetts, but may be made an In-
solvent debtor under the insolvency statutes of Massachusetts:
Stats. 1890, c. 321. To enforce our insolvency statutes in the case
of such a contract entered into here between such parties, after
the Insolvency statutes were passed, does not seem to me to give
the statutes any extraterritorial force, and the plaintiff corporation
seems to me, in reference to contracts made here with citizens or
inhabitants of Massachusetts, to be subject to our laws.
"I am not aware that anyone has pointed out the particular pro-
visions of the constitution of the United States which our insolv-
ency statutes would violate if it were held by the courts of Massa-
chusetts that the discharge pleaded In the present action was a bar
to the action. The early decisions of the supreme court of thr
United States were only to the effect that contracts entered into be-
fore the passage of the insolvency statutes of a state, or entered
into in another state than that in which such statutes had been
passed, but to which the contracts were not subject, could not be
discharged under the statutes, because, under the constitution of
the United States, no state could pass a 'law impairing the obliga-
tion of contracts.' But this seems inapplicable to contracts entered
into within a state, subject to the laws thereof, when insolvency
statutes are In existence within the state; and are a part of the
laws to which the contracts are subject.
•'It is evident that, in recent years, this court, in its anxiety to do
nothing which might seem to be in violation of the constitution of
the United States according to the later decisions of the supreme
court of the United States, has rendered decisions which go far in
the direction of the decision of the court in the present case: Guern-
sey V. Wood, 130 Mass. 503; Phoenix Nat. Bank v. Batcheller, 151
Mass. 589; Regina Flour Mill Co. v. Holmes, 156 Mass. 11. In
Guernsey v. Wood, 130 Mass. 503, the plaintiff was not a corpora-
tion, but a citizen of Pennsylvania, never resident In Massachu-
setts. In Phoenix Nat. Bank v. Batcheller, 151 Mass. 589, it does
not appear that the plaintiff corporation had any usual place of
business in Massachusetts, or had complied with our statutes regu-
lating foreign corporations doing business here, or was subject to
AM. St. Rep., Vou LXX.— 17
258 Parmenter Mfg. Co. v. Hamilton. [MaBB.
legal process here. The same is true of Kegina Flour Mill Co. v.
Holmes, 156 Mass. 11. In none of these cases was there any-
thing in the nature of the license shown in the present case. These
distinctions seem to me important. Certainly it is going beyond
the 'precise limits' of the decisions of the supreme court of the
United States if it is held that the discharge pleaded in the present
suit is invalid.
"I thinli that this court ought to uphold the validity of the dis-
charge, In the present case, until the supreme court of the United
States has decided to the contrary. The question, of course, be-
comes of little importance when there are banliruptcy laws of the
United States in force; but such laws have been in force only for
short periods of time, and the insolvency laws of Massachusetts
are not repealed, but only suspended, by the banlsruptcy laws of the
United States."
CORPORATIONS— DOMICILE OF.— A corporation can have but
one legal residence, and that must be within the state or sover-
eignty creating it, although by comity it may be allowed to do busi-
ness, through its officers and agents, in other jurisdictions: Ireland
V. Globe etc. Reduction Co., 19 R. I. 180, 61 Am. St. Rep. 756; Bay
State Iron Co. v. Goodall, 39 N. H. 223, 75 Am. Dec. 219; Asplnwall
V. Ohio etc. R. R. Co., 20 Ind. 492, 83 Am. Dec. 329.
INSOLVENCY— EFFECT OF DISCHARGE AS AGAINST NON-
RESIDENT.—A discharge under the insolvent laws pf one stale
does not affect a nonresident, unless he voluntarily appears in the
insolvency proceedings, and becomes a party thereto. A banlcruptcy
or insolvency statute can have no extraterritorial operation, and a
citizen of one state cannot be required to appear in the courts of an-
other, and submit to their exercise of jurisdiction over him, or tO'
their discharge of an obligation due him, though it was created, or
Is to be performed, in the state where such courts have jurisdiction.
As the Insolvency court does not have jurisdiction of him, in such
a case, it cannot discharge his right to recover his debt: Scammart
V. Bonslett, 118 Cal. 293, 62 Am. St. Rep. 226, and note; Pullen v.
Hillman, 84 Me. 129, 30 Am. St. Rep. 340. See, also, note to Mor-
rill V. MorrUl, 23 Am. St. Rep. 113, and Chase v. Henry, 166 Mass*
677, 55 Am. St. Rep. 423.
Parmentee Manufacturing Co. v, Hamilton.
[172 Massachusetts, 178.]
BANKRUPTCY— EFFECT OF FEDERAL STATUTE UPON
STATE INSOLVENCY PROCEEDINGS.— The United Sa e»
banlsruptcy law of July 1, 1898, supersedes all state laws In regard
to insolvency from the date of the passage of the statute. Hence
Insolvency proceedings commenced in the state courts after the pas-
sage of that law are unauthorized.
Bill in equity, praying that a decree of the judg-e of insolvency
of September 6, 1898, on a petition of the defendants that a
Kov. 1898.] Pabmenter Mfg. Co. v. Hamilton. 259
warrant issue to a messenger to take possession of the plaintiff's
estate, be reversed; that the warrant be recalled and the petition
dismissed; and that the messenger be enjoined from Interfering
with the property of the plaintiff. The plaintiff contended that
the state insolvent law had been suspended by the act of Con-
gress of July 1, 1898. The defendants, Hamilton and others,
demurred for want of equity, and the question of law was re-
served by the justice who heard the bill for the opinion of the
full court.
E. I. Morgan and R. A. Stewart, for the plaintiff.
C. M. Eice, for the defendants.
1^8 KNOWLTON, J. The United States bankruptcy law
passed on July 1, 1898, ends with the following provision: "This
act shall go into full force and effect upon its passage ; provided,
howerer, that no petition for voluntary bankruptcy shall be filed
within one month of the passage thereof, and no petition for in-
voluntary bankruptcy shall be filed within four months of the
passage thereof. Proceedings commenced under st»te insolvency
laws before the passage of this act shall not be affected by it."
The question In this case is, whether this act so far superseded
the insolvency laws of this commonwealth from the time of its
^''^ passage as to deprive our courts of jurisdiction to entertain
petitions for the commencement of insolvency proceedings filed
after July 1, 1898. This depends upon the intention of Con-
gress, as manifested by the language above quoted. Of the power
of Congress to pafis an act having this effect, there is no doubt:
U. S. Const., art. 1, sec. 8, cl. 4; Griswold v. Pratt, 9 Met.
16; In re Klein, 1 How. 277, 280, 281; Sturges v. Crowninshield,
4 Wheat. 122, 192; Ogden v. Saunders, 12 Wheat. 213, 369.
The language is materially different from that of the bankruptcy
act of 1867, and from that of the earlier bankruptcy law of 1841:
See U. S. Stats., March 2, 1867; Day v. Bardwell, 97 Mass. 246;
Judd V. Ives, 4 Met. 401; Swan v. Littlefield, 4 Cush. 574. The
argument that the change in question was intentional is almost
irresistible. The act is to "go into full force and effect upon
its passage." That is to say, the rights of all persons, in the
particulars to which the act refers, are to be determined by the
act from the time of its passage. Among these rights is the right
to have insolvent estates settled in bankruptcy under the provi-
sions of the act, including the rights to have acts of bankruptcy
Pabmenter Mfq. Co. v. Hamilton. [Mass.
affecting the settlement of estates determined by it (section 3), to
have the rights of debtors to file voluntary petitions, and of
creditors to file involuntary petitions determined by it (section
4), and to have preferences and liens governed by the provisions
of it (sections 60 and 67). These various provisions affecting the
rights and conduct of debtors and creditors are different from
those previously existing in most of the states, and perhaps dif-
ferent from those found in the laws of any state, and they super-
fi'ede all conflicting provisions. The only limitation upon the
full and complete operation of the act upon its passage is that
■the right to begin proceedings is postponed one month in the
case of voluntary petitions and four months in the case of in-
voluntary petitions. Wlienever the proceedings are commenced,
the conduct of the parties after the passage of the act is to be
tested by its requirements. The only saving clause aft'ecting the
jurisdiction of state courts provides for cases commenced in
those courts before the passage of the act. The plain implica-
tion is, that proceedings commenced in the state courts after the
passage of the act are unauthorized. This is in accordance with
the earlier language giving the statute full force and effect *®*
from the time of its passage, except that the filing of petitions
is to be postponed for a short time.
We are of opinion that the language was chosen to make clear
the purpose of Congress that the new system of bankruptcy
should supersede all state laws in regard to insolvency from the
date of the passage of the statute.
Demurrer overruled.
BANKRUPTCY— EFFECT OF FEDERAL STATUTE ON
STATE INSOLVENCY LAWS.— The passage of a bankrupt act by
Congress renders It supreme; the state laws must yield to it, and
can no longer operate upon persons or cases within the purview of
such act. It suspends the state laws on the same subject, but does
not affect pending proceedings: See monographic note to Norton v.
Coolt, 23 Am. Dec. 353, 354, on what demands may be discharged
under state insolvent laws; Mlnot v. Thacher, 7 Met. 348, 41 Am.
Dec. 444; note to Sanford t. Sauford, 17 Am. Bep. 207.
Nov. 1898.] Shane v. Lyons. 261
Shane v. Lyons.
[172 Massachusetts, 199.]
HUSBAND AND WIFE>-ASSAULT IN WIFE'S ABSENCE,
BY HUSBAND, WHO IS HER AGENT— WIFE'S LIABILITY.—
A married woman is civilly answerable for personal injuries in-
flicted, not in her presence, upon a third person, by her husband,
while acting within the scope of his authority as her agent.
Tort, for an assault and battery committed by the husband
of the defendant. It appeared on the trial that he was her
authorized agent for the care of her real estate; that at the
time of the alleged assault upon the plaintiff, Mamie Shane,
by the husband, and in the commission thereof, he was acting
within the scope of his authority as such agent; and that his
wife was not then present. The court was requested by the de-
fendant to rule as follows: "The defendant in this case, being
the wife of the person committing the alleged assault, cannot
be held responsible therefor, because of the fact that she is his
wife; that is to say, a wife cannot he held legally responsible
for an assault committed by her husband, whether her husband
was at the time her lawful agent for certain purposes, such as
the care of her real estate, or not." This ruling was refused,
and the jury returned a verdict for the plaintiff, exceptions being
alleged by the defendant.
D. B. Kelly and J. F. Batchelder, for the plaintiff.
C. H. Poor and E. B. Fuller, for the defendant.
^^^ HAMMOND, J. The only question is whether a married
woman can be civilly responsible for personal injuries inflicted
not in her presence upon a third person by her husband whilo
acting within the scope of his authority as her agent.
The act of the agent is the act of the principal, and she must
be held unless there is something in the relation of husband
and wife which takes the case out of the general rule.
It is contended by the defendant that, while the wife is liable
for assaults and other torts committed by her when not acting
under the coercion of her husband, she is not so liable when
acting under such coercion, and that, as the husband was
present at the time of this assault, she herself, if she had been
personally present and had actually joined in the assault, would
have been presumed to have acted under coercion, and so would
262 Whiting v. Pbice. [Mass.
not have been liable, and tbat a fortiori she ought not to be held
liable when absent.
But this presumption of coercion is simply a presumption
■which may be rebutted by evidence, and a wife may be held re-
sponsible, either criminally or civilly, for assaults committed of
her own free will and while actually under no coercion from her
husband, even although he be present and join therein: Com-
monwealth V. Eagan, 103 Mass. 71; Handy v. Foley, 121 Mass.
259, 23 Am. Eep. 270, and cases cited; Ferguson v. Brooks, 67
Me. 251.
Our statutes have given to a married woman the right to hold,
manage, and dispose of her property in the same manner as if
she were sole, and a necessary consequence of this enlargement
of her power is a corresponding increase of her responsibility for
all acts relating thereto and growing out of her management and
control. If she appoints her husband as her agent in such a
matter, and in making such appointment acts of her own free
will and without coercion from him, we see no reason for regard-
ing her as incapable of authorizing any act to be done by him
in her name, and on her behalf, or for shielding her from
responsibility.
It must be held that whatever is done within the scope of tho
agency is done by her authority
Exceptions overruled.
AGENCY— LIABILITY OP PRINCIPAL FOR TORTS OP
AGENT.— A principal is liable to third persons, in a civil suit, for
the torts of his agent, committed in the course of his employment,
although the principal did not authorize, Justify, or participate in,
or know of, such misconduct: Note to Jarvis v. Manhattan Beach
Co., 51 Am. St. Bep. 733.
Whitinq v. Priob,
[172 Massachusetts, 240.]
FRAUD— .\CTION FOR FALSE REPRESENTATIONS IN
SALE OF BOND— WHAT WILL SUPPORT.— Although a certain
bond of an electric light company states that payment thereof Is
"secured by a first mortgage on all the property, rights, and fran-
chises of said company (present and future acquired)," a representa-
tion made, in selling the bond, that it was secured by a mortgage
of real estate of the value of half a million dollars, will support an
action for false representations, where it appears that the company
owied no real estate and that the bond was not secured by a mort-
gage of real estate.
Nov. 1898. J Whiting t>. Price. 263
FRAUD -FALSE REPRESENTATIONS IN SALE OP
BOND— RELYING ON REPRESENTATIONS— QUESTION FOR
JURY.— In an action for false representations in the sale of a bond,
where it appears that the defendant referred the plaintiff to the
sources of his information, and advised the plaintiff to consult the
persons named, the question as to whether he ought to have done
so may depend on circumstances, and It is not Improper to leave tt
to the Jury.
DAMAGES— MEASURE OF, FOR FALSE REPRESENTA-
TIONS IN SALE OP BOND.— The measure of damages, in an ac-
tion for false representations in the sale of a bond, is the difference
between the actual value of the bond, at the time of purchase, and
Its value if it had been what it was represented to be, secured as
represented. Subsequent events may be considered in arriving at
the two values, at the time of the purchase, though they show the
market value of the bond to have been worthless.
FRAUD — FALSE REPRESENTATIONS IN SALE OP
BOND— RETURN OF BOND.— In an action for false representa-
tions in the sale of a bond, the plaintiff is not required to return
the bond to the defendant.
Tort against Price and Parker for false representations in the
sale of a bond of the Jacksonville Electric Light Company.
There was a verdict for the plaintiff, and the defendants al-
leged exceptions.
G. A. Perkins, for the plaintiff.
H. J. Fuller and W. H. Pond, for the defendants.
*'*^ HOLMES, J. This is an action for false representations,
which has been before the court already upon a demurrer to the
declaration: Whiting v. Price, 169 Mass. 576, 61 Am. St. Eep.
307. It now comes up upon exceptions taken at the trial.
The bond respecting which the representations were made
stated that payment was "secured by a first mortgage on all
the property, rights, and franchises of said company (present
and future acquired)." The representation proved was that
the *^ bond was secured by a mortgage of real estate of the
value of half a million dollars. In fact, the company owned no
real estate, and the bond was not secured by a mortgage of real
estate. An exception was taken to a ruling allowing the plain-
tiff, even if he had read the bond, to recover for this further
staitement about the security. We see no reason for the excep-
tion, and none is offered for it. The alleged representations did
not contradict the bond; they made specific and definite what
the bond left vague.
The defendant Parker stated to the plaintiff at North Attle-
borough what he alleged he had been told by several persons,
named, living in the town and known to the plaintiff. The de-
264 Whiting v. Price. [Mas»,
fendant advised the plaintiff to see and consult with them. Tha
defendant asked a ruling to the effect that the plaintiff could
not recover for such statements when he was referred to the
sources of the defendant's alleged information. This was ref ased,
the judge intimating that it depended on the circumstances, and
seemingly leaving it to the jury whether the plaintiff ought to
have inquired of the persons named. So far as appears, this was
the proper course. It is true that in cases of representations as to
quality, correspondence to sample, et cetera, of goods exhibited
in the buyer's presence, the court has ruled that if the buyer
had full means of ascertaining the truth for himself, he could
not set up that he was imposed upon by fraud: Salem India
Eubber Co. v. Adams, 23 Pick. 256, 265; Slaughter v. Gerson,
13 Wall. 379; Long v. Warren, 68 N. Y. 426; and that a verdict
has been directed partly on that ground: Poland v. Brownell,
131 Mass. 138, 41 Am. Eep. 215. See Bayly v. Merrel, Cro.
Jac, 386. But the requirement as it has been worked out doe»
not call for more than reasonable diligence: Hoist v. Stewart^
161 Mass. 516, 522, 42 Am. St. Eep. 442; Brown v. Leach, 107
Mass. 364, 368; Nowlan v. Cain, 3 Allen, 261, 264; and distance
or other slight circumstances have been held sufficient to war-
rant leaving the question to the jury: Hoist v. Stewart, 161 Mass.
516, 522, 523, 42 Am. St. Eep. 442. See Burns v. Lane, 13S
Mass. 350, 355, 356; Whiteside v. Brawley, 152 Mass. 133. The
matter may have been confused a little by not distinguishing
between seller's talk as to value and the like, where the rule ia
absolute in ordinary cases that the buyer must look out for him-
eelf, and representation of facts concerning ^^^ which even sell-
lers may be held liable for fraud, and as to which the buyer may
be warranted in relying wholly on the seller's word. The no-
tion that the buyer must look out for himself sometimes has
been pressed a little too strongly into the latter class of cases.
The judge, at the defendant's request. Instructed the jury
that the measure of damages was the difference between the ac-
tual value of the bond at the time of the purchase and its value
if it had been what it was represented to be, s:ecured as repre-
sented: Morse v. Hutchins, 102 Mass. 439, 440; Nash v. Minne-
sota Title Ins. etc. Co., 163 Mass. 574, 587, 47 Am. St. Eep.
489. He then instructed them further that they "would in-
quire what the value of the bond was at that time in view of
the circumstances which have transpired," and what it would
have been if it had been secured as according to the plaintiff'*
Nov. 1898.] Whiting ». Price. 265
evidence the defendant said it was, adding, 'TTou will take into
account what has happened since in order to determine what the
value of the bond was and what it is now." The defendants
excepted to the further instruction. With some hesitation, we
have come to the conclusion that this exception should be over-
ruled with the rest. The reference to the present value of the
bond, in the last words quoted, cannot be taken to have over-
ruled the express direction as to how the damages were to be
measured. We think that what was added to that express direc-
tion merely amounted to allowing the jury to take subsequent
events into account in arriving at the two values at the time c-f
the purchase, which the jury were directed to compare. We
cannot say that this was wrong. The market value of the bond
at the time of the sale may have been illusory, because the pub-
lic also may have been deceived. The statement which we
have quoted, appearing in the bond of an electric light company,
certainly conveys the impression that it has a plant and prop-
erty which naturally would include land-. Or if it be answered
that the public, which makes market prices generally, looks a
little further than such vague words, the question remains.
What would have been the value of a bond adequately secured,
when the public were willing to pay par for one depending so
far upon speculation for its value that subsequent events have
shown it to be worthless? The subsequent events may be
likened to the coming out of a ^*^ latent disease existing in a
horse at the time of a fraudulent sale, to take an example put by
Cockburn, C. J., in Twycross v. Grant, 2 C. P. Div. 469, 544. It
was intimated that subsequent events might be considered in
CofBng V. Dodge, 167 Mass. 231, 241, and it was decided that
they might be, in order to determine the worth of stock, in
Peek V. Derry, L. R. 37 Ch. Div. 541, 591, et seq., a decision
not affected by the subsequent reversal by the house of lords,
on the ground that fraud was not made out: Derry v. Peek,
L. R. 14 App. Cas. 337. See, also, Hubbell v. Meigs, 50 N. Y.
480, 492; SedgM'ick on Damages, 8th ed., sec. 257. We may-
follow these cases without regard to the possible conflict between
the measure of damages in this state, and that adopted else-
where. It would seem probable that in the present case the
jury found the bond to have been worthless, and gave the plain-
tiff no more than he paid, but with that we have nothing to do.
The plaintiff did not offer to return the bond to the defend-
ants. He was not bound to do so. The action is for false rep-
266 Murphy v. Commonwealth. [Mass,
resentations and proceeds upon an affirmation of the purchase :
Whiteside v. Brawley, 152 Mass. 133, 134. The dictum in the
case of Hedden v. Griffin, 136 Mass. 229, 49 Am. Eep. 25, cited
for the defendant, has no hearing. There the plaintiff was in-
duced by the defendant's false representations to take a con-
tract of insurance from a third person. The insurance com-
pany was solvent, and the policy was a good policy. The repre-
sentations went to collateral matters. The plaintiff had a right
to rescind, however, which he exercised. It was intimated in
the course of the decision that, if he had chosen to keep the
contract, his damages would have been only nominal, which
very likely was true, as the plaintiff got what he expected.
Here the ground of complaint is that the plaintiff did not get
what he expected.
Exceptions overruled.
FRAUD — FRAUDULENT REPRESENTATIONS — DILIGENT
INQUIRY AS TO FALSITY IS NOT ESSENTIAL TO ACTION.— A
representation, if a falsehood, and acted upon by one deceived there-
by, is always fraudulent: Note to Hecht v. Metzler, 60 Am. St. Rep.
■914. Diligent inquii'y to discover whether representations are falsy
is not essential to recovery in an action for false representations:
Cottrill V. Krum, 100 Mo. 397, 18 Am. St. Rep. 549.
DAMAGES — MEASURE OF, FOR FALSE REPRESENTA-
TIONS.—In an action for false representations in the sale of prop-
erty, real or personal, the measure of damages is the difference be-
tween the value tliereof as sold and what its value would have been
if it had been as represented: See monographic note to Cottrill v.
Krum, 18 Am. St. Rep. 562, on action to recover for false represen-
tations: Gustafson v. Rustemeyer, 70 Conn. 125, 66 Am. St. Rep. 92;
note to Hecht v. Metzler, 60 Am. St. Rep. 914.
Murphy v. Commonwealth.
[172 MA8SACHU8KTT8, 264.J
STATUTES.— THE TERM "EX POST FACTO" applies only
to penal or criminal matters.
STATUTES.— A PENAL STATUTE IS EX POST FACTO
where It, In relation to the offense or its consequences, alters the
situation of the party accused of the crime to his disadvantage; as,
where the penalty is increased, or the accused is deprived of sub-
stantial rights or privileges to which he was entitled as the law
stood when the offense was committed.
STATUTES — EX POST FACTO LAWS — PROCEDURE-
PRISON DISCIPLINE.— Statutes which relate to procedure or penal
administration or prison discipline are not, as a general rule, ob-
jectloual)le as being ex post facto, though passed after the offense,
even where the effect may bo. in the last two instances, to enhance
the severity of the confinement.
Jau. 1899.] MufiPUY v. Commonwealth. 267
STATUTES— EX POST FACTO LAWS.— THE LEGISLA-
TURE cannot, under the guise of laws relating to procedure or
prison discipline or penal administration, take away or interfere
with any substantial right or privilege which was secured to a party
by the law as it was when the offense was committed.
STATUTES— CONSTITUTIONALITY.— A law cannot be con-
stitutional In some cases and unconstitutional in others involving
like circumstances and conditions. If it is unconstitutional as to
any it is unconstitutional as to all.
STATUTES — EX POST FACTO LAWS — INTERFERING
.WITH CREDITS FOR GOOD BEHAVIOR.— If the affect of good
conduct, on the part of a prisoner, under existing laws, is to shorten
his term of imprisonment, and to give him a right to his discharge
at the expiration of the shortened term, a subsequent statute which
bas the effect of taking away the right of deduction for good beha-
vior, or which Interferes with it to the disadvantage of the convict.
Is clearly ex post facto, because it practically lengthens the sentence
which was provided by law for the offense at the time when it was
committed.
STATUTES-EX POST FACTO LAWS^CREDITS FOR
GOOD BEHAVIOR.— A statute which gives a convict a right to de-
ductions for good behavior, thus practically shortening his term of
Imprisonment, cannot be construed merely as a measure of prison
discipline or regulation, and therefore liable to change from time to
time, as the legislature may see fit, without interfering with any
rights on the part of the convict.
STATUTES.— A CRIMINAL STATUTE IS TO BE CON-
STRUED PROSPECTIVELY, to apply to sentences for offenses
committed after it took effect.
Indictment for embezzlement. The sentence attacked was
pronounced on May 28, 1896.
E. F. McClennen, for the plaintiff in error.
J. M. Hallowell, assistant attorney general, for the common-
wealth.
2<» MORTON, J. This is a petition for a writ of error to
reverse a sentence of the superior court for the county of Essex
by which the petitioner is confined in the state prison. The
plea is in nullo est erratum, and therefore admits the facts well
assigned in the petition: Bodurtha v. Goodrich, 3 Gray, 508,
612; Conto v. Silvia, 170 Mass. 152. From those and from the
record of the superior court, it appears that the offenses of
which the petitioner was convicted were committed between
July 19, 1892, and November 17, 1893, but that he was sen-
tenced under the Statutes of 1895, chapter 50-i, entitled "An act
relative to sentences to the state prison,** which took effect on
the first day of January, 1896, and which provides, in section 1,
that "when a convict is sentenced to the state prison, otherwise
than for life, or as an habitual criminal, the court imposing the
268 Murphy v. Commonwealth. [Mass,
BenteDoe shall not fix the term of imprisonment, hut shall es-
tahlish a maximum and minimum term for. which said convict
shall he held in said prison. The maximum term shall not he
longer than the longest term fixed hy law for the punishment
of the offense of which he is convicted, and the minimum term
shall not he less than two and one-half years."
The petitioner was indicted under the Public Statutes, chap-
ter 203, section 40, and was found guilty of sixty-three counts,
each of which, except in a few instances, alleged the value of the
property stolen to he more than one hundred dollars. The
penalty is prescribed in section 20 of the same chapter, and is
imprisonment in the state prison not exceeding five years> or
fine not exceeding six hundred dollars and imprisonment in the
jail not exceeding two years, if the value of the property stolen
exceeds one hundred dollars. The maximum sentence imposed
in the present case was not more than fifteen years and thii
minimum not less than ten. The maximum term was, there-
fore, only a small fraction of ^^^ that authorized by law, and
it is agreed that it probably does not exceed the sentence which
would have been imposed before the passage of the Statutes of
1895, chapter 504.
The error assigned is, that the sentence and the commitment
pursuant to it were wholly unauthorized and void, because the
statute under which the sentence was imposed was ex post facto,
and contrary to section 10, article 1, of the constitution of the
United States, and to article 24 of the declaration of rights of
the constitution of Massachusetts.
The statute was considered by this court in Commonwealth v.
Brown, 167 Mass. 144, 146, and again in Oliver v. Oliver, 169
Mass. 592. It was also before the court in Commonwealth v.
Crowley, 168 Mass. 121. In Commonwealth v. Brown, 167
Mass. 144, the court says that it sees no reason why the statute
should not be construed to apply to all sentences in the cases
referred to in it passed after it went into effect. But it is evi-
dent that the attention of the court was directed more to the
effect of the feature of indeterminate sentences upon the con-
stitutionality of the statute than to other matters. The fact
that the statute might interfere with his rights or privileges
in regard to a permit to be at liberty, and was, therefore, ob-
jectionable as ex post facto, was not suggested in the defend-
ant's brief. In Oliver v. Oliver, 169 Mass. 592, the point de-
cided was that a sentence imposed under the statute in ques-
Jan. 1899.] Murphy v. Commonwealth. 269
tion must be regarded as a sentence for the maximum term,
and not for the minimum or any intermediate term. The
point now raised was not involved nor considered in that case.
Commonwealth v. Crowley, 168 Mass. 121, followed Common-
wealth V. Brown, 167 Mass. 144. There was in the opinion no
discussion of the statute, and the motion in arrest of judgment
did not aver that the statute was unconstitutional because of its
interference with the defendant's rights to a permit to be at
liberty for good conduct under the Public Statutes, chapter 222,
section 20, or otherwise. An examination of the defendant's
brief shows that the ground on which it was contended that the
statute was unconstitutional was the indeterminate feature of
the sentences. This had been fully considered and dispos'ed of
in Commonwealth y. Brown, 167 Mass. 144, and hence a refer-
ence to that case was all that was necessary. We discover
nothing in either of these cases which precludes us from examin-
ing the question now presented. The statute was also consid-
ered by the United States ^^"^ circuit court for the jBrst circuit
when this plaintiff was before it recently on a petition for a writ
of habeas corpus, which it was led to deny, and to leave the
petitioner to his writ of error, largely, as we infer, on account
of the views concerning the statute which this court was sup-
posed to have expressed in the two cases of Commonwealth v.
Brown, 167 Mass. 144, and Oliver v. Oliver, 169 Mass. 692, re-
ferred to above: In re Murphy, 87 Fed. Eep. 549.
"We have already quoted section 1 of the act. By section 2
it is provided that at any time after the expiration of the mini-
mum term the commissioners of prisons may issue a permit to
the convict to be at liberty on such terms and conditions as they
may deem best, and may revoke the permit at any time previous
to the expiration of the maximum term. The permit shall not
be issued without the approval of the governor and council or
unless the commissioners shall be of the opinion that the con-
vict will lead an orderly life if set at liberty. Other provisions
contained in the act were taken from the Statutes of 1884, chap-
ter 152, sections 1 and 2, which will be referred to later.
The statutes applying to the petitioner's case which were in
force when he committed the offenses of which he was con-
victed are the Public Statutes, chapter 222, sections 20-22, and
the Statutes of 1884, chapter 152. There were and are stat-
utes relating to the issue of permits to persons confined for
drunkenness in jails, houses of correction, or other places under
270 Murphy v. Commonwealth. [Mass.
the Jurisdiction of the county commibsioners, or in the county
of Suffolk under that of the board of directors of public in-
stitutions and who have reformed, and also to persons im-
prisoned in the reformatory prison for women who have re^
formed. But those are not applicable to this case.
The Public Statutes, chapter 222, section 20, provide that
every officer in charge of a prison or other place of confinement
shall keep a record of each person whose term is not less than
four months and "everj' such prisoner whose record of conduct
shows that he has faithfully observed all the rules and has not
been subjected to punishment shall be entitled to a deduction
from the terra of his imprisonment to be estimated as follows"
— stating it. Later in the section, it is provided: "Each pris-
oner who is entitled to a deduction .... shall receive a writ-
ten permit to be at liberty during the time thus deducted upon
Buch terms as the board granting the same shall fix." The
permits are to be issued to ^^^ prisoners in the state prison by
the commissioners of prisons, and they "may at any time revoke
the same, and shall revoke it when it comes to their knowledg'e
that the person to whom it was granted has been convicted of
any offense punishable by imprisonment.
The Statutes of 1884, chapter 152, section 1, provides that if
the holder of a permit shall violate any of its terms or condi-
tions, or any law of this commonwealth, "such violation shall
of itself make void said permit." Section 2 provides that,
when any permit has been revoked or has become void, the
board granting it may cause the holder of it to be arrested and
returned to the place in which he was confined, and, when so
returned, he "shall be detained therein according to the terms
of his original sentence," and "the time between his release upon
said permit and his return to said place of confinement shall not
be taken to be any part of the term of the sentence." These
provisions are embodied in the Statutes of 1895, chapter 504,
and are the ones previously referred to. The other provisions
of the statutes of 1884, chapter 152, are not now material.
From this examination it appears that the Statutes of 1895,
chapter 504, differs from the statutes which were in force at the
time when the offenses were committed, and that the differences
consist: 1. In the matter of indeterminate sentences; 2. In
Providing that the permit shall not be issued till after the ex
piration of the minimum sentence, and in omitting any provi-
sion for deductions for good behavior; and 3. In leaving the is-
Jan. 1899.] Murphy v. Commonwealth. 271
sue of the permit to the discretion of the commissioners, and
in providing that it shall receive the approval of the governor
and council. The petitioner contends that the effect of these
differences may be to make the term of imprisonment longer
than it would have been under the laws in force at the time the
offenses were committed, and to change his position in other
respects to his disadvantage, and that therefore the statute ia
unconstitutional and void. The commonwealth contends that
the provisions are in the nature of prison discipline, or of penal
administration or criminal procedure, and are not, therefore,
open to the objection of being ex post facto.
As the term "ex post facto" has been construed, it applies only
to penal or criminal matters. The objection to ex post facto
legislation consists in the uncertainty which would be intro-
duced *^® thereby into legislation of a penal or criminal char-
acter, and the injustice of punishing an act which was not pun-
ishable when done, or of punishing it in a different manner from
that in which it was punishable when done. But not all re-
trospective legislation is unconstitutional as being ex post facto.
The question in each case is, whether it will increase the pen-
alty, or operate to deprive a party of substantial rights or privi-
leges to which he was entitled as the law stood when the offensa
was committed, or "in short, which, in relation to the offensfr
or its consequences, alters the situation of a party to his dis-
advantage": Kring v. Missouri, 107 U. S. 221, 228; Calder v.
Bull, 3 Dall. 386; Gumming v. State, 4 Wall. 277; Ex parte
Garland, 4 Wall. 333; Medley, petitioner, 134 U. S. 160; Dun-
can V. Missouri, 152 U. S. 377; Thompson v. Utah, 170 U. S.
343; Hartung v. People, 22 N. Y. 95; Shepherd v. People, 25-
N. Y. 406; Eatzky v. People, 29 N. Y. 124. A statute which
mitigates the penalty is not objectionable, though passed after
the offense: Commonwealth v. Wyman, 12 Gush. 237; Com-
monwealth V. Gardner, 11 Gray, 438; Dolan v. Thomas, 12-
Allen, 421, 424; nor, speaking generally, are statutes which re-
late to procedure or penal administration or prison discipline,
even though the effect may be in the last two instances to en-
hance the severity of the confinement: Duncan v. Missouri, 152'
TJ. S. 377; Cook v. United States, 138 U. S. 157; Hopt v.
People, 110 U. S. 574; Gut v. State, 9 Wall. 35; Common-
wealth V. Hall, 97 Mass. 570; Garter v. Burt, 12 Allen, 424;
Hartung v. People, 22 N. Y. 95; Marion v. State, 20 Neb. 233,.
57 Am. Rep. 825; Ex parte Bethurum, 66 Mo. 545; People n
272 Murphy v. Commokwealth. [Mass,
Mortimer, 46 Cal. 114; Cooky's Constitutional Limitations,
Sd ed., 272; Black's Constitutional Law, sec. 184. No one has
a right to insist that particular remedies shall remain un-
changed, or that courts and their jurisdiction and the proceed-
ings in them shall continue unaltered, or that there shall bo
no departure from established methods in prison discipline or
penal administration. But the legislature, under the guise of
laws relating to procedure or prison discipline or penal admin-
istration, cannot take away or interfere with any substantial
right or privilege which was secured to a party by the law as
it was when the offense was committed: Kring v. Missouri, 107
IT. S. 221, 232; Thompson v. Utah, 170 U. S. 343; Medley,
Petitioner, 134 U. S, 160. To ^''^ deprive him in any manner
of such right or privilege would be to increase the penalty. In
-determining in any case whether this is or is not the effect of
^ statute, it is to be borne in mind that the constitutional pro-
vision was intended as a security to life and liberty, and as a
safeguard against the infliction of any punishment except such
tis was duly authorised by law, and it is to be construed so as to
promote these ends.
As the law formerly stood in this state, the effect of good
conduct on the part of the prisoner was to shorten his term of
imprisonment, and to give him a right to his discharge at the
expiration of the shortened term: Stats. 1857, c. 284; Stats.
1858, c. 77; Stats. 1859, c. 108; Gen. Stats, c. 178, sec. 47.
This was no said in the Opinion of the Justices, 13 Gray, 618.
And although the Statutes of 1857, chapter 284, was entitled,
^'An act concerning the discipline of the state prison," and the
acts of 1858 and 1859 were respectively entitled, ''An act con-
cerning the discipline of jails and houses of correction," and
"An act to amend an act concerning the discipline of jails and
houses of correction," it does not seem to have occurred to the
justices that the right of the convict was affected thereby.
They declared, on the contrary, that the act of 1857, upon the
construction of which the answer to the question proposed
mainly depended, gave the convict a right to have his term re-
•dueed and shortened by tjie scale provided in it for good be-
havior, and bore upon the sentence and shortened the term of
imprisonment, and afforded "an assurance of the highest char-
acter that, upon the condition of good behavior, the convict
ehall have the promised benefit of an earlier release." And
again they said that "the benefit promised, in consideration
Jan. 1899.] Murphy v. Commonwealth. 273
of good behavior, was intended to be an actual reduction of sen-
tence as a right, and not as a favor," and "therefore operated
upon the sentence itself." It would seem plain, therefore,
that a subsequent statute which interfered to his disadvantage
with the right of deduction for good behavior to which a con-
vict was entitled at the time the commission of the offense
under the acts of 1857, 1858, and 1859, would have been uncon-
stitutional and void, notwithstanding the fact that those acts
related, according to their titles, to the discipline of the state
prison, and to that of jails and houses of correction, and there-
fore appeared to pertain to prison regulation. To have taken
^"^^ away the right of deduction for good behavior, or to have
interfered with it to the disadvantage of the convict, would
have been in effect to lengthen the sentence which was pro-
vided by law for the offense at the ti?ae when it was committed;
and a statute which did that clearly would have been ex post
facto: See Opinion of the Justices, 13 Gray, 618; Kring v.
Missouri, 107 U. S. 221; Medley, Petitioner, 134 U. S. 160;
Thompson v. Utah, 170 IT. S. 343; Commonwealth v. Mc-
Donough, 13 Allen, 581; In re Canfield, 98 Mich. 644; Ex
parte Hunt, 28 Tex. App. 361.
The question then is, whether the changes made in regard
to deductions for good behavior by the Statutes of 1880, chap-
ter 218, which were subsequently incorporated into and are no^
found in the Public Statutes, chapter 222, section 20, have so
modified the rights which convicts had, under statutes pre-
viously in force, that those committing offenses after the pas-
sage of the Statutes of 1880, chapter 218, cannot be said to have
anything in the nature of a right to deductions for good con-
■duct, and to a 'permit to be at liberty which could not be in-
terfered with to their disadvantage by subsequent legislation — ■
in other words, whether the effect of the Statutes of 1880,
chapter 218, and of the Public Statutes, has been and is to make
deductions for good behavior and the issuing of a permit a mat-
ter of favor, and not in any sense a matter of right.
It should be noted in passing, that the words "with the con-
sent of the governor and council," were inserted in the General
Statutes, chapter 179, section 51, which, with one other amend-
ment that is not now material, is a re-enactment of the Statutes
of 1857, chapter 284, section 1. These words were not in the
commissioners' report (c. 180, sec. 50), and it does not appear
how they came to be inserted. They were not in the General
Am. St. Rkp., Vou LXX.— 18
274 Murphy v. Commonwealth. [Mass,
Statutes, chapter 178, section 47, and were omitted from the
Statutes of 1880, chapter 218, and are not found in any subse-
quent statute.
It seems to us that, under the Statutes of 1880, chapter 218,^
and the Public Statutes, chapter 222, section 20, the convict
was and is entitled to deductions for good conduct, and to a
permit to be at liberty for the time thus deducted, as a matter
of right rather than of favor. The object was to furnish an
incentive to good conduct while the convict was in confinement,
by offering him a reward therefor. Applying the language of
the Opinion of the Justices, 13 Gray, 618, the provisions of the-
Statutes of 1880, chapter 218, and of the Public Statutes,
*'afford an assurance of the highest character that, upon condi-
tion of good ^"^^ behavior, the convict shall have the promised
benefit'^ of certain deductions, and a permit to be at liberty
for the time thus deducted from the term of his sentence.
Though the provisions of the Statutes of 1880 and of the Publia
Statutes may not bear as directly upon the sentence as those
of the Statutes of 1857 did, we cannot doubt that the purpose
was to secure to the convict a substantial advantage as a reward
for his good conduct, which practically would have the effect^
of shortening his sentence. It is true that the prison com-
missioners could revoke the permit without cause shown, or
for a violation of its terms, and that they are bound to revoke it
when they have knowledge that the convict has been convicted
of an offense punishable by imprisonment. But this does not
affect the right of the convict to deductions, and to a permit in
the first instance. Besides, it is to be assumed that the power
of revocation will not be exercised capriciously. Unless the
provisions of the statute were intended to secure a substantial
advantage to the convict as a reward for his good conduct, to
the enjoyment of which he could look forward with reasonable
certainty, if he did not violate the terms of the permit, nor com-
mit an offense punishable by imprisonment, it is difficult to
Bee what object the legislature had in view.
Conlon's case, 148 Mass. 168, is relied on as tending to show
that the convict had no right to a permit. One of the conten-
tions of the petitioner in that case was that his confinement in
the reformatory was unlawful, because his removal to it from
the state prison to which he had been sentenced interfered with
or took away his right to deductions for good conduct, under
the Public Statutes, chapter 222, section 20. But neither that
Jan. 1899.] Murphy v. Commonwealth. 275
statute nor the Statutes of 1880, chapter 218, of which it was
a re-enactment, was in force at the time when the petitioner
committed the offense of which he was convicted, and no -ques-
tion under either was properly before the court. Further, de-
ductions for good conduct under the Public Statutes, chapter
222, section 20, are not limited to persons confined in the state
prison, but extend to those confined in "a prison or other place
of confinement," and the legislature had the right to change
the place of confinement of any prisoner so long as the penalty
was not thereby aggravated: Carter v. Burt, 12 Allen, 424.
Lastly, the permit in that case was issued under the Statutes of
1884, chapter 152, and was revoked by the commissioners for a
violation of its conditions, *''* as they had the right to do.
The decision would have been the same if the permit had is-
sued under the Public Statutes, chapter 222, section 20, and
had been revoked for a like cause. The nature of the right to a
permit under the Public Statutes, chapter 222, section 20, was
therefore not material to the decision.
For these reasons the case, though rightly decided, cannot be
regarded as authoritative on the question now before us. And
we think, as has been already observed, that the Statutes of
1S80, chapter 218, and the Public Statutes, chapter 222, section
20, secured to prisoners who were convicted of offenses com-
mitted when they were in force, and who came within their
scope, deductions for good conduct and permits to be at liberty
as something to which they were entitled as of right rather than
by favor, for faithful observance of the rules, and fomot having
been subjected to punishment, and that their rights in these
respects could not be taken away or interfered with to their
disadvantage by subsequent legislation.
The next question is, whether the Statutes of 1895, chapter
604, alters or may alter to their disadvantage in a substantial
manner the position of those committing offenses prior to its pas-
sage and while the Public Statutes, chapter 222, section 20, was
in force. We think that it is clear that such might be its effect.
In case the maximum sentence was for fifteen years, the convict
would be entitled for good conduct to deductions under the Pub-
lic Statutes, chapter 222, section 20, which would shorten the
term to twelve. Under the Statutes of 1895, chapter 504, how-
ever, he could be sentenced for a maximum term of fifteen years
and a minimum of thirteen, or of any number less than fifteen
and more than twelve. In the present case, the minimum was
ten, and it is possible that the statute might operate more bene-
276 Murphy v. Commonwealth. [Mass.
ficially in the case of the petitioner than the Public Statutes,
chapter 222, section 20, and the Statutes of 1884, chapter 153,
woud have operated. But that cannot avail. A law cannot be
constitutional in some cases and unconstitutional in others in-
volving like circumstances and conditions. If it is unconslitu-
tional as to any, it is unconstitutional as to all.
It is suggested in In re Murphy, 87 Fed. Rep. 549, that the sup-
posed leniency of the Statutes of 1895, chapter 504, might have
led the court to make the maximum sentence longer than it
otherwise would, and the implication is, that this also would
render the statute objectionable as to past offenses. But it is
obvious that this argument might prevent the application of
any mitigative statute ^''■* to past offenses, and we should hesi-
tate to pronounce the act unconstitutional on that ground.
It is also said in In re Murphy, 87 Fed. Eep. 549, that under
the Statutes of 1895, chapter 504, "important conditions were
added which would permit the recall of a permit, and still
others which would revoke it absolutely. The most serious new
provision is, that the act of 1895 directs that, if a permit is
revoked, no portion of the time the prisoner may have been
at liberty under it shall be taken to be any part of the term of
his sentence." But this last provision, which is called "the
moat serious new provision" of the Statutes of 1895, is found in
the Public Statutes, chapter 222, section 21, and in the Statutes
of 1884, chapter 152, section 2, and was not therefore new, and
was in force when the offenses were committed of which the
petitioner was convicted, and applied to persons confined in the
state prison. So far as the revocation of permits is concerned,
it is doubtful if the Statutes of 1895, chapter 504, adds anything
new. Under the Public Statutes, chapter 222, section 20^ the
commissioners have power, as already observed, to revoke permits
without cause shown. They have the same power under the
Statutes of 1895, chapter 504. Under the Statutes of 1884, chap-
ter 152, a violation by the holder of a permit of any of its terms
or conditions, or of any law of this commonwealth, rendered the
permit void. The same is true under the Statutes of 1895, chap-
ter 504. And the provisions as to the return of the holder of a
permit which has been revoked or has become void are the same
in the Statutes of 1895, chapter 504, as in the Statutes of 1884,
chapter 152, except that the latter contains a provision that the
order for the arrest and return of the convict may be served by
any officer authorized to serve civil or criminal process in any
county in the commonwealth which is omitted from the Statutes
Jan. 1899.] Murphy v. Commonwealth. 277
of 1895, chapter 504. So far, therefore, as revocation and the
results which follow it, and violation of the terms and condi-
tions of the permit, or of any law of the commonwealth, and the
results which follow that are concerned, there would seem to be
nothing in the statute of 1895 which as compared with the laws
in force when the offense was committed changes the situation
of the petitioner for the worse.
The petitioner further contends that, independently of the
effect of the statute upon his right to deductions for good be-
havior and to a permit to be at liberty, the statute is inoperative
as an ex post facto act because it renders the duration of his
^''^ sentence uncertain, and gives tq the prison commissioners
the power to fix the term of his imprisonment. But there is
no uncertainty in the sentence itself. That, it has been held, is
in effect for the maximum term: Oliver v. Oliver, 169 Mass.
592, and Commonwealth v. Brown, 167 Mass. 144; People v.
Illinois State Keformatory, 148 111. 413; State v. Peters, 43 Ohio
St. 629. The convict may be released before its expiration,
either by an absolute or conditional pardon from the governor
(Public Statutes, c. 218, sees. 12 et seq.), or after the ex-
piration of the minimum term by a permit from the commis-
sioners approved by the governor and council. In the latter
case, he is under sentence till the expiration of the maximum
term: Oliver v. Oliver, 169 Mass. 592. It is as correct, it seems
to us, to say that the duration of his sentence is uncertain be-
cause the governor may pardon him absolutely or conditionally
at any time, as it is to say that it is uncertain because after tho
expiration of the minimum term the commissioners may release
him before the expiration of the maximum term on a permit
approved by the governor and council, and as correct to say that
in case of a pardon the governor fixes the term of imprisonment,
as to say that in case of release upon a permit the commissioners
fix it. Moreover, "the form of sentence," as was said in Com-
monwealth V. Brown, 167 Mass. 144, " is made to recognize and
carry out a policy familiar to our legislation and acted on here-
tofore without question." In no just sense can it be said, we
think, that the duration of his sentence is uncertain, or that the
determination of the term of the imprisonment is taken from
the courts where it belongs, and left to the prison commission-
ers: See People v, Illinois State Eeformatory, 148 111. 413;
George v. People, 167 111. 447; State v. Peters, 43 Ohio St. 629;
^Miller v. State, 149 Ind. 607; contra, People v. Cummings, 88
Mich. 249.
278 Murphy v. Commonwealth. [Mass.
The petitioner also insists that requiring the approval of the
governor and council to a permit is a serious interference with
his rights, and without anything more would render the statute
void as an ex post facto law. But we think that the provision
does not afTect any substantial right to which the petitioner was
entitled when the offenses were committed, but relates rather to
a matter of procedure.
There can be no doubt, we think, that in the matter of per-
mits, -'* the legislature could have substituted some other
tribunal for the prison commissioners, or could have added to
the number of the commissioners on the same principle that it
could have abolished the court which existed when the offenses
were committed, and have created another court for the trial of
such offenses, or have added to the number of the Judges of the
existing court. If this had been the only change, the effect of it
would have been merely to require that so many more persona
chould act in regard to the matter of permits. The petitioner
would have still been entitled to deductions for good behavior,
and to a' permit to be at liberty during the time of such deduc-
tions, and there would have been no increase in the penalty for
the offense or other change to his disadvantage. It is not con-
tended that the terms and conditions of permits issued when
the offense was committed, or the rules of government of the
prison then in force, must remain the same.
By the Statutes of 1898, chapter 371, which is in amendment
of and in substitution for the Statutes of 1895, chapter 504, and
which went into effect since the indictment was found in this
ease, it is now provided that a convict who has faithfully ob-
served all the rules, and has not been subjected to punishment,
shall be entitled to release at the expiration of the minimum
term, and shall be given a permit to be at liberty during the un-
expired portion of the maximum term, which permit shall be
issued by the commissioners of prisons. The approval of the
governor and council is no longer required, and the permit is no
longer to be issued at the will and pleasure of the commissioners.
We think, therefore, that the statute of 1895 could not be
declared unconstitutional as an ex post facto act because it re-
quires the approval of the governor and council to permits to
be at liberty, or because it renders the duration of the sentence
uncertain, or gives the prison commissioners power to fix the
term of imprisonment; but we think that, as the law stood
when the offense was committed, the petitioner was entitled to
Jan. 1899.] Murphy v. Commonwealth. 279
a deduction for good behavior, and to a permit to be at liberty
for the time thus deducted, on such terms as the prison commis-
sioners should fix, and subject to revocation by them, and if sen-
tenced under the statute of 1895, this right might be interfered
with to his disadvantage, and that the S'tatute is therefore inop-
erative ^'^'^ and void as an ex post facto law. We do not see
how the statute can be construed as merely a measure of prison
discipline or regulation, and therefore liable to change from
time to time as the legislature may see fit without interfering
with any rights on the part of the convict.
"We have assumed thus far that the act of 1895 applied to all
oases of convicts sentenced to the state prison after it took
effect, except such as are sentenced for life or as habitual crimi-
nals. But we think that it is doubtful, notwithstanding the
generality of the language, whether it should be so construed.
It is manifest that convicts sentenced under the statutes of 1895
are not entitled to the benefits of the Public Statutes, chapter
228, section 20. The sentence is intended to be different in
character from that referred to in section 20, and the provisions
of that section in regard to deduction for good behavior could
not be applied to a sentence under the statute of 1895. Section
20 of the Public Statutes, chapter 222, so far as it relates to
convicts sentenced to the state prison, is not repealed in terms
by that statute. To hold that that statute operates by necessary
implication as a repeal of it to that extent, as it would seem that
we should be obliged to do if the statute of 1895 is construed to
apply to all sentences to state prison after it took effect, whether-
the offenses occurred before or after it went into operation
(Flaherty v, Thomas, 12 Allen, 428; Commonwealth v. McDon-
ough, 13 Allen, 581), would result in the discharge of all persona
who might have been sentenced under it to the state prison for
offenses committed before it took effect. On the other hand, by
constniing it, as we think properly may be done pursuant to the
general rule that statutes are to be construed prospectively, to
apply to sentences for offenses committed after it took effect,
this difficulty will be avoided : See Pub. Stats., c. 3, sec. 3, els.
1, 2; Commonwealth v. Sullivan, 150 Mass. 315; Commonwealth
V. Desmond, 123 Mass. 407; King v. Tirrell, 2 Gray, 331; North
Bridgewater Bank v. Copeland, 7 Allen, 139; Gardner v. Lucas,
L. R. 3 App. Cas. 528, 590 ; Lambard, Appellant, 88 Me. 587.
The result is, that the only error being an error in the sen-
tence, and the superior court having jurisdiction to impose such
280 Telegram etc. Co. v. Commonwealth. [Mass.
sentence as should be imposed, the sentence in question, in the-
opinion of a majority of the court, must be reversed, and th&
case ^'^^ remanded to that court for sentence according to the-
law as it was at the time when the offenses were committed be-
fore the passage of the Statutes of 1895, chapter 504: Jacquins
V. Commonwealth, 9 Cush. 279; Pub. Stats., c. 187, sec. 13.
So ordered.
STATUTES— EX POST FACTO LAWS— APPLICATION OF—
PROCEDURE.— An ex post facto law is one enacted after the of-
fense has been committed, and which, in relation to it or its conse-
quences, alters the situation of the accused to his disadvantage.
The term relates to criminal and not to civil proceedings: State v.
Caldwell, 50 La. Ann. 6G6, 69 Am. St. Rep. 465, and note, showing
that a law changing a remedy is not ex post facto. No statute
which modifies the rigor of the criminal law is regarded as an ex-
post facto law: People v. Hayes, 140 N. Y. 4&4, 37 Am. St. Rep.
572. It has been held that a statute, providing that a convict whO'
shall be serving a second term in prison shall be entitled to a less
favorable credit for good behavior than first termers, is not ex post
facto legislation: In re Miller, 110 Mich. 676, 64 Am. St. Rep. 376.
STATUTES.— THE UNCONSTITUTIONALITY OP ONE POR-
TION of a statute cannot defeat other portions unless the nature of
the unconstitutional provision is such as to render it of vital impor-
tance to the whole statute: Note to Chicago etc. R. R. Co. v. Jones»
41 Am. St. Rep. 303.
Telegram Newspaper Company v. Commonwealth
[172 MASa\CHUSKTTS 294.]
CONTEMPT — CORPORATION — LIABILITY. — An intent
may be Imputed to a corporation in criminal proceedings, and it
may, therefore, be held answerable for a criminal contempt of court.
CONTEMPT— CORPORATION— NEWSPAPER PUBLICA-
TION.—The publication of an article in a newspaper, printed by a
corporation and circulated in the place where a trial is had, pending
the trial, which concerns the cause on trial and which is calculated
to prejudice the jury in the cause a:nd prevent a fair trial, is a
criminal contempt of the court trying the cause, for which the cor-
poration may be held answerable.
CONTEMPT— INSTITUTION OF PROCEEDINGS FOR BY
COURT-NEWSPAPER PUBLICATIONS.— When it comes, in any
manner, to the knowledge of the presiding justice of a court that
articles are published in a newspaper circulated In a place where
the court is held, which are calculated to prevent a fair trial of a
cause then on trial before the court, the court, of Its own motion^
can institute proceedings for contempt
CONTEMPT— CORPORATION— NEWSPAPER PUBLICA-
TION OF FACTS.— It is a contempt of court for a newspaper^
printed by a corporation and circulated in the place where a trial is
Jan. 1899.] Telegram etc. Co. Commonwealth. 281
had, pending the trial, to publish statements of facts, evidence of
which is not competent at the trial, and which is not introducer^
thereon, if they are so made that it is liiiely that the presiding Jus-
tice and the jurors will read them during the trial, and their natural
and probable effect will be to improperly influence the justice and
the jury in the determination of the cause.
CONTEMPT— CORPORATION — FINE— EXECUTION.— The
proper method of collecting a fine imposed upon a corporation for a
contempt of court is by a levy of an execution issued by the court.
P. P. Goulding and W. C. Mellish, for the plaintiffs in error,
H. Parker, district attorney, and G. S. Taft, assistant district
attorney, for the commonwealth.
206 FIELD, C. J. These are two writs of error, and, al-
though the pleadings may possibly, raise issues of fact as well as
issues of law, the cases were entered without objection on*the.
part of any of the parties upon the docket of the full court, and
each case was heard upon the plea in nullo est erratum. Tho
Telegram Newspaper Company is a Massachusetts corporation,,
having its usual place of business in Worcester and publishing
there a daily newspaper. The Gazette Company is a corpora-
tion established under the laws of the state of Maine, having its-
usual place of business in Worcester, and publishing there a
daily newspaper. It is understood that it had complied with
the Statutes of 1884, chapter 330, and had made the commis-
sioner of corporations its attorney, upon whom legal process^
might be served. The record in the cases recites that the corpo-
rations respectively appeared in the superior court, with counsel,^
in obedience to the summons of that court to show cause why
they should not be adjudged in contempt for publishing cer-
tain articles in their newspapers of the dates of January 13 and
14 respectively of the year 1898, which articles dealt with and
discussed the matter of the trial before said court of the action
or petition of Silas H. Loring against the town of Holden, and
that the corporations appearea and were heard, so that any
question of due service of the summons upon the foreign corpo-
ration has become immaterial.
At the time of the publication of the articles in the news-
papers, the petition of Silas H. Loring against the town of
Holden was on trial before the superior court sitting at Worces-
ter, and it was for the assessment of damages suffered by the tak-
ing of land of the petitioner for the abolition of a grade crossing
of the Fitchburg Eailroad Company. The portion of the articles
*** published which the court found was calculated to obstruct
282 Telegram etc. Co. v. Commonwealth. [Mass.
the course of justice in said court and prevent a fair trial of said
petition was, after describing the petition of Loring against the
town of Holden, the following: "The town offered Loring
•eighty dollars at the time of the taking, but he demanded two
hundred and fifty dollars, and, not getting it, went to law,'*
which appeared in the "Worcester Daily Telegram"; and "The
town .offered the plaintiff eighty dollars, but he wanted two
hundred and fifty dollars," which appeared in the "Worcester
Evening Gazette." Whether there is any truth in these state-
ments does not appear. The facts stated, even if they were
true, were not admissible in evidence at the trial of the petition
before the superior court, and, so far as appearb', they were no
part of the proceedings at the trial, and, if they were brought to
the*knowledge of the jurors 'before they rendered their verdict,
were calculated to influence them upon the amount of the
damages to be given by their verdict. The newspapers were
published and circulated in Worcester, and it was not improba-
ble at the time of publication that the articles would be read
by some of the jurors before the trial of the petition was fin-
ished.
The record before us, in each case, after setting out the
whole of the articles published, and the summons, service, and
appearance of the corporation and the hearing, concludes as fol-
lows: "When, after hearing all matters and things concerning
said publication by said respondents, it appearing to said court
that said article was calculated to obstruct the course of justice
in said court and prevent a fair trial of said case, and that it was
a contempt of said court for said corporation to publish the said
article during the said trial, it was therefore ordered by said
court that said respondent corporation be adjudged guilty of
contempt of said court for said publication of said article, and
it was thereupon ordered by said court that said respondent
corporation pay a fine of one hundred dollars, and it was further
■ordered that, if said fine be not paid, within twenty-four hours,
an execution be issued against said respondent corporation for
the collection of said fine by a levy on its property."
It is contended that a corporation cannot be guilty of a crimi-
nal contempt of court, although it may be fined for what is
called a civil contempt. It is said that an intent cannot be im-
puted to a corporation in criminal proceedings. It has been
decided in **'' this commonwealth that a corporation may be
liable civilly for a libel or a malicious prosecution: Fogg v.
Jan. 1899.] Telegram etc. Co. v. Commonwe vlth. 283
Boston etc. R. R. Co., 148 Mass. 513> 12 Am. St. Eep. 583;
Reed v. Home Sav. Bank, 130 Mass. 443, 39 Am. Rep. 468, We
think that a corporation may be liable criminally for certain
offens'es of which a specific intent may be a necessary element.
There is no more difficulty in imputing to a corporation a specific
intent in criminal proceedings than in civil. A corporation
cannot be arrested and imprisoned in eitlaer civil or criminal
proceedings, but its property may be taken either as compensa-
tion for a private wrong or as punishment for a public wrong.
In most of the states of this country corporations may be formed
under general laws for the purpose of doing almost any kind of
business as easily as partnerships, and many of the newspapers
are published By corporations. Although natural persons who
publish or assist in publishing a libel in a newspaper owned by
a corporation may be punished criminally by fine or imprison-
ment, or both, yet, if the corporation cannot be punished by a
fine, it will escape all criminal liability. The authors of libel's
are often irresponsible persons, and the remedy by private action
against corporations for the publishing of libelous statements is
often inadequate. That a corporation may be indicted for a
misfeasance as well as for a nonfeasance has been decided in this
commonwealth: Commonwealth v. New Bedford Bridge, 2
Gray, 339; see The Queen v. Great North etc. Ry. Co., 9 Q. B.
315, 326. A corporation may be indicted for a libel: State v.
Atchison, 3 Lea, 729, 31 Am. Rep. 663, and note; Brennan v.
Tracy, 2 Mo. App. 540; Pharmaceutical Soc. v. London etc.
Supply Assn., 5 App. Cas. 857, 869, 870; 2 Bishop's New Crimi-
nal Law, sec. 935; Newell on Slander and Libel, 2d ed., 362,
363; Odgers on Libel and Slander, 3d ed., 436; Thompson on
Corporations, sees, 6418 et seq.
The publication of an article in a newspaper which is printed
and circulated in the place where a trial is had pending the
trial, and which concerns the cause on trial and is calculated to
prejudice the jury in the cause and prevent a fair trial, often has
been held to be a criminal contempt of the court trying the
cause: O'Shea v. O'Shea, L, R. 15 P, D. 59; Ex parte Green, 7
Times L, R, 411; Daw v, Eley, L, R, 7 Eq, 49, 55; Ramsbotham
2»8 V, Senior, L, R. 8 Eq. 575; People v. Wilson, 64 111. 195, 16
Am. Rep. 528; In re Sturoc, 48 N. H. 428, 97 Am. Dec. 626;
In re Cheeseman, 49 N. J. L. 115, 137, 60 Am. Rep. 596; State
V. Frew, 24 W. Va. 416, 49 Am. Rep. 257: Oswald on Contempt
of Court, 2d ed., 58 et seq.; 7 Am. & Eng. Ency. of Law, 2d ed.,
59. If a corporation publishes the article, we see no reason why
234 Telegram etc. Co. d. Commonwealth. [Mass.
it should not he held liable for a criminal contempt: Thompson
on Corporations, sees. 6448 et seq. ; 7 Am. & Eng, Ency . of Law,
2d ed., 847, and cases cited.
There are no statutes in this commonwealth regulating the
proceedings in the trial and punishment of contempt of court.
"The summary power to commit and punish for contempts
tending to obstruct or degrade the administration of justice is
inherent in courts of chancery and other superior courts, as
essential to the execution of their powers and to the mainte-
nance of their authority, and is part of the law of the land, within
the meaning of Magna Charta and of the twelfth article of our
declaration of rights": Cartwright's case, 114 Mass. 230, 238.
See Tinsley v. Anderson, 171 U. S. 101.
In the present cases, it was not necessary that a formal com»
plaint should first have been made to the court. The contempt,
if there was one, was not, strictly speaking, committed in the
presence of the court, but it related to a trial tiaen proceeding
before the court. In each case a summons to the plaintiffs in
error was issued by the court, of its own motion and without
complaint made, to show cause why the corporations should not
be adjudged in contempt for publishing an article dealing with a
matter on trial before the court. When it come in any manner
to the knowledge of the presidi;ig justice of a court that articles
are published in a newspaper circulated in the place where the
court is held which are calculated to prevent a fair trial of a
cause then on trial before the court, the court, of its own motion,
can institute proceedings for contempt. Such a power in the
court is necessary for its own protection against an improper
interference with the due administration of justice, and it is not
dependent upon the complaint of any of the parties litigant. If
the publication amounts to a contempt of court, because it in-
terferes with the due administration of justice in a cause before
the court, the contempt is analogous to a contempt committed
in the presence of the court. The proceedings in the present
^^^ cases after the service of process show that the plaintiffs in
error were specifically informed of the nature of the charge
against them, and were given a full opportunity to be heard
with the aid of counsel.
The most important question is, whether the publication of
these articles, under the circumstances stated, could be adjudged
a contempt. The articles published were not defamatory, either
as regards the presiding justice of the court or the jurors before
whom the cause referred to was being tried, or the parties to
Jan. 1899.] Telegram etc. Co. v. Commonwealth. 235
the cause. In one case the court discharged the treasurer and
manager of the new&paper, and in the other the editor and the
publisher, on the ground that they were not shown to be directly
responsible for the publications. It is probable, although
this does not expressly appear in the papers before us, that the
person or persons employed to report for each newspaper the
proceedings of the court wrote the articles and caused them to
be published. The superior court "has not found that there was
an intent to influence the trial of the cause referred to on the
part of anybody. The articles are objectionable only because
they purport to state the amount of money which the town
offered to pay the plaintiff, and the amount the plaintiff de-
manded before the petition was brought. The law encourages
attempts to settle or compromise disputes without subjecting
the parties to any liability, if the attempts fail, of having any
concessions therein made to avoid litigation put in evidence
against them in the subsequent litigation: Upton v. South
Eeading Branch E. R. Co., 8 Gush, 600; Harrington v. Lincoln,
4 Gray, 563, 64 Am. Dec. 95; Gay v. Bates, 99 Mass. 263;
Draper v. Hatfield, 124 Mass. 53. We are content to assume
that the person or persons who wrote and caused the articles to
be published did not know this rule of law, and acted without
any intent to pervert the course of justice. As the only intent
which can be imputed to the corporations is the intent of its
officers or agents, the question is, whether the publication of
these articles without any intent to pervert the course of justice
can be adjudged a contempt. In Metropolitan Music Hall Co.
V. Lake, 58 L. J. Ch., N". S., 513, it is said that it must be shown
that the articles were published with knowledge of the pending
cause, and that appears in the present cases.
*^ In Cartwright's case, 114 Mass. 230, it is said by the
court: "But the jurisdiction and power of the court do not de-
pend upon the question whether the offense might or might not
be punished by indictment 'As regards the question
whether a contempt has or has not been committed, it does not
depend upon the intention of the party, but upon the act he has
done.' By Taney, C. J., in Wartman v. Wartman, Taney, 3G<},
370." If a person talk with or send a statement to a juror
about a cause, during the trial of it, in such a manner that it
may cause prejudice or bias in the cause, although the intent
with which the person acted may affect the amount of his pun-
ishment, he cannot justify his conduct by showing that he had
no evil intent, and knew no better.
286 Telegram etc. Co. v. Commonwealth. [Mass*
It was not necessary that the auperior court should find that
the articles published actually had been read by some of th©
jurors while trying the cause to which the articles referred.
They plainly had been read by the presiding justice during the
trial, and it was likely that they had been read by some of the
jurors. The intention of the publisher of a newspaper is that it
should be bought and read by persons within the place wher&
it circulates. Cases before a court should be determined on
evidence presented in court. It is an inevitable perversion of
the proper administration of justice to attempt to influence the
judge or jury in the determination of a cause pending before
them by statements outside of the courtroom, and not in the
presence of the parties, which may be false, and even if they are
true are in law not admissible as evidence.
We cannot say that it appears that the superior court erred
in adjudging that the publication of these articles, under the
circumstances stated, was a contempt of that court, and it was
for that court to determine whether it was necessary to institute
proceedings for contempt in order to vindicate its authority to
secure the due administration of justice in a cause pending
before it. The publications contain statements of facts, evi-
dence of which was not competent at the trial and was not
introduced at the trial, and they were so made that it was likely
that the presiding justice and the jurors would read them dur-
ing the trial, and the natural and probable effect of them would
be improperly to influence the justice and the jury in the deter-
mination of the cause.
*®i The proper method of collecting a fine imposed upon a
corporation is by a levy of an execution issued by the court:
The King v. Woolf, 2 Barn. & Aid. 609; 1 Chitty, 583; Huddle-
eon V. Ruffin, 6 Ohio St. 604; 1 Chitty on Criminal Law, 2d ed,,
811; 1 Bishop's ^ew Criminal Procedure, sees. 1303 et seq.
Judgments affirmed.
CONTEMPT— NEWSPAPER PUBLICATIONS.— A criminal con-
tempt Is any act done to obstruct the course of justice or to preju-
dice the trial of any action or proceeding then pending in court:
State V. Circuit Court, 97 Wis. 1, 65 Am. St. Rep. 90. Any publica-
tion relating to a cause pending in court, tending to prejudice the
public as to Its merits, and to corrupt or embarrass the aii ministra-
tion of justice, or reflecting on the tribunal or its proceedings, or on
the parties, jurorB, witnesses, or counsel, may be punished as a con-
tempt: Peraival v. State, 46 Neb. 741, 50 Am. St. Rep, 568, and
monographic note thereto on contempts of court by libelous news-
paper publicatlonsi.
Jan. 1899.] Pain v. Societb St. Jean Baptiste. 287
CONTEMPT.— COURTS HAVE INHERENT POWER to protect
themselves and the administration of justice by the punishment of
those who commit a contempt: Note to Peiclval v. State, 50 Am.
St. Rep. 573.
CONTEMPT.— CORPORATIONS can only be punished for con-
tempt through their officers or those acting in aid of such corpora-
tions: Sercomb v. Catlin, 128 111. 556, 15 Am. St Rep. 147.
Pain v. Societe St. Jean Baptists.
[172 MASSACBrSETTS, 319.]
ASSOCIATIONS — BENEFIT SOCIETIES — POWER TO
AMEND BY-LAWS.— An incorporated beneficiary association has
power to so amend its by-laws as to deprive a member of his right
to future benefits, under a disability existing at the time of tho
amendment, where it has, without limitation or restriction, reserved
the power to amend its by-laws.
ASSOCIATIONS — BENEFIT SOCIETIES —AMENDMENT
OF BY-LAWS APPLIES TO WHAT MEMBERS.— If a by-law of
an incorporated beneficiary association, which allows every member
a right to five dollars a week if he becomes disabled during ii
period of not exceeding thirteen weeks in each year, is amended
so as to limit his benefits to one dollar per week, for thirteen weeks
of each year, during a period of five years, after he has received
thirty-nine weeks of sick benefits, such amendment applies to Ji
member who, at the time of its adoption, was under a disability,
and had been paid benefits for thirty-nine weeks.
Contract, to recover the amount of benefits alleged to he due
to the plaintiff as a member of the defendant society. There
was a judgment for the defendant, and the plaintiff appealed.
L. E. Wood and A. G. Weeks, for the plaintiff.
H. A. Dubuque, for the defendant.
"*" HAMMOND, J. The defendant society is a beneficiary
organization, chartered in 1884, under the Public Statutes,
chapter 115, and ever since its incorporation the plaintiff has
been a member in good standing. In June, 1890, the plaintiff,
by reason of sickness, became unable to work, and has so con-
tinued to the present time, and ^^^ during that time he has re-
ceived benefits at the rate of five dollars per week for thirteen
weeks of each year down to July 7, 1896; and since the latter
date he has received benefits at the rate of only one dollar per
week for thirteen weeks of each year. This suit is brought to
recover the additional four dollars per week for a period of nine
weeks.
288 Pain v. Societe St. Jean Baptiste. [Mass.
Whether the plaintiff can recover depends upon the construc-
tion and effect of the amendment of the hy-laws which was
passed on July 7, 1896. If it is applicable to him, he cannot
recover, if not, he can.
The by-law of 1893, which, so far as the plaintiff is concerned,
was not materially different from that of 1889, under which the
plaintiff was receiving aid at the time of the amendment in
question, was as follows: ''Every member who shall belong to
the society for twelve consecutive months, who has paid his dues,
contributions, fines, or other sums assessed by vote or by-law of
the society, shall have a right to five dollars per week if he be-
comes unable to work, in consequence of sickness or accident,
during a period not exceeding thirteen weeks in each year, be-
ginning from the date of the first application for benefits." And
the amendment of July 7, 1896, was as follows: "Provided that
when a member has received thirty-nine weeks of sick benefits,
or one hundred ninety-five dollars, for the same or a different
period of disability, then he shall not hereafter receive more
than one dollar per week, instead of five dollars, . for thirteen
weeks of each year, if his sickness shall so long continue, and
that during a period of five years, aggregating sixty-five dollars
of benefits. Each year reckons from the date of the first ap-
plication for benefits. If after that period of five years he is still
unable to work, he is then entitled to five dollars a week for
thirteen weeks of eacb year for three years, as at first. This
partial suspension of benefits is established so as to allow as
much as possible all the members to share more equitably in the
disability funds."
The plaintiff concedes that the amendment was duly passed,
but in his brief contends, in the first place, that "the defendant
society cannot, by such an amendment, under the circumstances
of this case, so change its obligation to the plaintiff," because
his "originally contingent right to receive benefits as stated be-
came vested upon the happening of the contingency, 1. e., his
disability ^^^ to work, June 7, 1890, and from that time no act
of the society, by amendment to its by-laws, could divest him
of that right"; and in the second place, that even if his rights
"were not vested and could be taken away by amendment of
the by-laws, such amendment could have no retroactive force,"
and that "to hold that payments of benefits made before the
adoption of the amendment can be applied to benefits accruing
under the amendment will make such amendment retroactive
in force, and will place the plaintiff in a worse position than
Jan. 1899.] Pain v. Societe St. Jean Baptiste. 289
the other members of the society at the time of the adoption
of the amendment."
The plaintiffs contention, more briefly expressed, is that the
defendant had no power to amend its by-laws so as to affect hia
rights to future benefits under a disability then existing, and,
€ven if it has such power, this amendment, fairly construed, does
not affect such rights. The rights of the plaintiff are deter-
mined by the nature of the contract between him and the soci-
ety, as interpreted by the by-laws under which it was made and
in the light of the surrounding circumstances. The general
purpose of the society was to give pecuniary aid to its sick or
disabled, and, in case of the death of a member, to provide for the
relief of his family. The fund for this purpose was to be raised
by monthly dues, and, in case of death, by an assessment upon
the survivors. Of course, the amount of benefits which the so-
ciety, with due regard to the interest of the sick as well as that
of the other members, could properly pay depended upon many
circumstances, such as the number of its members, the actual
or relative number of the sick, the promptness with which dues
were paid, and others of similar nature; and, as these various
circumstances might and probably would change from time to
time, it might be regarded not only as prudent, but as neces-
sary, for the successful management of the society, that there
should exist the power to make such corersponding changes in
the by-laws as the circumstances for the time being might seem
to require.
The power to amend the by-laws was reserved, and there ia
no limit to the reservation. After certain preliminary proceed-
ings, its by-laws could be amended at any time and in any rea-
sonable way. All this the plaintiff well knew from the first,
and he was present at the meeting of July 7, 1896, and spoke
against the adoption of the amendment.
322 There being a power of amendment reserved, the contract
between the plaintiff and the society was liable to changes with
regard to future benefits to which a disabled member might be
entitled, as well as in other matters, and the plaintiff had agreed
that these changes, duly made in compliance with the rules of
the society, should be binding upon him, not as a new contract,
but as a part of the old contract and under its provisions.
But the plaintiff contends that there is an implied limitation
to this power of amendment, that it cannot be made so as to
deprive him of a vested right, and that his right to the benefit
AM. Br. BXP.. You LXX.— 19
Pain v, Societe St. Jean Baptiste. [Mass*
became fixed by his disability, and can never be changed during
that disability. But how does the right become fixed? There
is no such restriction contained in the words expressing the
power of amendment. To thus restrict the power would be to-
divide the society into two classes, one comprising those like the-
plaintiff, who could not be affected by any reduction of future
benefits, and the second comprising the well members, who-
would be affected by such reduction. And no matter how many
of these preferred pensioners there might be, this society, whose
right to graduate payment according to varying circumstances-
has been reserved so carefully, and in language so general and
comprehensive, and which is so plainly necessary to the pur-
poses for which it was incorporated, is powerless to do what
might be necessary even to its own existence. There can be no
• right to future benefits vested in one member more than in an-
other. The right of a sick member to future benefits which be-
comes vested in the plaintiff at the time of the disability is not
a right to receive, so long as such disability continues, the future
benefits provided by the by-law existing at the time the disabil-
ity begins, but simply a right to receive them subject to such
changes as may be made by the society, and it is no violation of
such a vested right to make the changes at any time. Such a
change is not a repudiation of the terms of the contract, but,
on the contrary, is in accordance with them.
As was said in Smith v. Galloway (1898), 1 Q. B. 71, 77:
"Where .... the original contract .... provides for altera-
tion of the rules, he is bound by any subsequent alteration that
may be made within the power of alteration, whatever the ex-
tent of that alteration may be." Such an interpretation of the
contract ^^^ seems to be in accordance with the provisions for
amendments, and to be the only one reasonably calculated to
subserve the interests of all, and to enable the society to accom-
plish the objects for which it was incorporated.
We are aware that the doctrine herein enunciated is incon-
fcistent with some decisions in other states, but we are satisfied
that it is sustained by the better reasoning and the weight of
authority: Smith v. Galloway (1898), 1 Q. B. 71; Stohr v. San
Francisco Musical Fund Soc., 82 Cal. 557; Poultney v. Baoh-
man, 31 Hun, 49; Bowie v. Grand Lodge, 99 Cal. 398; Fugure
y. Mutual Soc. of St. Joseph, 46 Vt. 363; Supreme Lodge K.
of P. V. Knight, 117 Ind. 489; 3 L. R. A. 409, and note. Su-
preme Commandery v. Ainsworth, 71 Ala. 436, 449, 46 Am.
Eep. 332; Loeffler t. Modem Woodmen of America, 100 Wis,
Jan. 1899.] Pain v. Societe St. Jean Baptiste. 291
79; Borgards v. Farmers' Ins. Co., 79 Jlich. 440; Moore v. Union
Fraternal Ace. Assn., 103 Iowa, 424; Carpenter v. Knapp, 101
Iowa, 712; Hughes v. Wisconsin Odd Fellows' etc. Ins. Co., 98
Wis. 292; Catholic Knights of America v. Morrison, 16 R. I.
468.
Of course, no amendment could change the amount of any
benefit which under any by-law has passed from a possible to
WaX of a future benefit and has become a debt. The right be-
comes vested absolutely as the time expires for which the benefit
is granted.
As to the second contention of the plaintiff, it is sufficient to
say that we think the by-law applies to the case of the plaintiff.
The language is broad enough to cover his case. The plaintiff
had received more than "thirty-nine weeks of sick benefits," and
it was provided that such a person shall "not hereafter receive
more than one dollar per week." We have no doubt the con-
struction put upon the amendment by the officers of the society
was the one intended and justified by the language.
Judgment affirmed.
MUTUAL BENEFIT ASSOCIATIONS— BY-LAWS— RErSERVED
POWER TO AMEND.— If a mutual benefit association expressly re-
serves the right to amend its by-laws, and the member makes him-
self subject to whatever change the association may make in the
contract, he Is bound by the rules "now in force or which may here-
after be enacted," and must take notice of the existence and efifect
of such reserved power: See monographic note to Lake v. Minne-
sota etc. Assn., 52 Am. St. Rep. 557. on features of the law specially
applicable to mutual or membership life or accident insurance. But
while a mutual benefit society has the power to make, alter, abro-
gate, or amend its by-laws, it cannot so exercise this right that it
will operate as a repudiation of its obligations, or to work a for-
feiture of rights previously vested in its members: See notes to Rox-
bury Lodge v. Hocking. 64 Am. St. Rep. 600; Starling v. Supreme
Council, 62 Am. St. Rep. 712.
292 Haediman t;. Whollky. [Mass.
Hardiman v. W'hollet.
[172 Massachusetts, 41L]
ANIMALS— KICK FROM A HORSE UPON THE SIDE-
WALK—OWNER'S LIABILITY.— A person who has heen kicked
and Injured by a horse temporarily standing upon a sidewalk, where
It ought not to be, is entitled to recover therefor without proof
that the animal was vicious, and that the owner know it, particu-
larly where the horse was In an exceptionally nervous condition in
consequence of the driver's treatment. In such a case, it is, there-
fore, correct to refuse to direct a verdict for the defendant.
Tort for personal injuries occasioned to the plaintiff by the
kick of a horse. There was a verdict for the plaintiff, and the
defendant alleged exceptions.
H. S. Stearns, for the plaintiff.
F. J. Keleher, for the defendant.
■*** HOLMES, J. This is an action to recover for personal
injuries caused by the kick of a horse. The wagon to which
the horse was attached had stuck in the mud half an hour be-
fore the accident, and this hors^e and another had been unhitched
and were feeding out of feed-bags attached to their heads. There
was evidence that this horse had been made nervous by the ef-
fort to pull the wagon out, and by being brutally beaten, and
that he was standing partially on the sidewalk. He was stand-
ing at right angles to it, and, as the plaintiff approached, sud-
denly whirled round and kicked him. The case is here upon an
exception to the refusal to direct a verdict for the defendant.
The refusal was right. It used to be said in England, under
the rule requiring notice of the habits of an animal, that every
dog was entitled to one worry, but it is noi universally true
that every horse id entitled to one kick. In England, if the
horse is a trespasser and kicks another, the kick will enhance
the damages without proof that the animal was vicious and that
the owner knew it: Lee v. ^*2 j^^ey, 18 Com. B., N. S., 722.
See Lyons v. Merrick, 105 Mass. 71, 76. So, in this common-
wealth, going further, it would seem, than the English law, a
kick by a horse wrongfully at large upon the highway can be
recovered for without proof that it was vicious: Barnes v.
Chapin, 4 Allen, 444, 81 Am. Dec. 710; Marsland v. Murray,
148 Mass. 91, 12 Am. St. Rep. 520; Dickson v. McCoy, 39 N. Y.
400, 401. See Cox v. Burbidge, 13 Com. B., N. S., 430. The
same law naturally would be applied to a horse upon a sidewalk
where it ought not to be (see Mercer v. Corbin, 117 Ind. 450,
Jan. 1899.] Coupe v. Platt. 293
454, 10 Am. St. Eep. 76), and in this case there was evidence
of the further fact that the horse was in an exceptionally ner-
vous condition in consequence of the driver's treatment.
Exceptions overruled.
ANIMALS— INJURIES BY— LIABILITY OF OWNER— The
owner of au animal, not naturally vicious, is not answerable for an
injury done by it in the place whore it belongs, unless it was In fact
vicious, and the owner knew it: Clowdis v. Fresno etc. Irr. Co., 118
Cal. 315, 62 Am. St. Hep. 238; but if the animal Is wrongfully In
the place where It does the mischief, the owner is liable, though
he had no notice that It was accustomed to do so before: Reed v.
Southern E,xp. Co., 95 Ga. 108, 51 Am. St Rep. 62. A party In-
jured by a vicious horse may recover damages of the owner; Note
to Fake v. Addlcks. 22 Am. St Rep. 719.
Coupe v, Platt.
[172 Massachusetts, 458.]
LANDLORD AND TENANT-DEFECTIVE PREMISES-
LANDLORD'S LIABILITY TO TENANT'S GUESTS.— If a land-
lord maintains outside steps and a platform for the use in common
of tenants of different parts of the building, and a visitor to one
of the tenants, expressly Invited by the tenant to come on a par-
ticular day for a particular purpose, is injured by a defect In the
platform while passing over it, the landlord is answerable, for the
visitor was using the platform In the tenant's right
Tort for personal injuries. There was a verdict for the plain-
tiff, and the defendant alleged exceptions.
M. R. Hitch, for the plain-tiff.
R. F. Raymond, for the defendant.
*»» KNOWLTON, J. The question how far a host is liable
to his guest for the unsafe condition of his premises, when he
is visited upon an invitation, express or implied, merely in a
social way, from considerations of friendship or for pleasure, is
not raised by this bill of exceptions. The judge assumed in
favor of the defendant that the law of this commonwealth is
like that of England, where it is held that, in the absence of
traps, neither the poor nor the rich are bound to change the con-
ditions in which they are accustomed to live in order to furnish
for their friends or guests, recipients of their gratuitous hospi-
tality, safer or more comfortable surroundings than they have
for themselves and their families. The English law on this sub-
ject was somewhat considered in Hart v. Cole, 156 Mass. 475,
294 Coupe v. Platt. [Mass.
478, and in Plummer v. Dill, 156 Mass. 426, 32 Am. St. Eep.
463, but whether it is to be followed in this commonwealth
has never been decided.
The question in -this case is different. The defendant was a
landlord who maintained outside steps and a platform for the
use in common of tenants of different parts of her building.
The plaintiff was injured by a defect in the platform wliile
passing over it on a visit to one of the tenants, made on his
express invitation to come on a particular day for a particular
purpose. The duty of the defendant to keep the platform safe
for the tenant, and for those claiming under him, grew out of
the contract of hiring. It was a part of the contract that the
platform should be kept reasonably safe for the tenant for use in
connection with his tenement. The contract impliedly in-
cluded, not only the tenant himself, but the m^embers of his
family, and his servants and agents who might rightfully occupy
and use the tenement with him. It included boarders and
lodgers, if, in a proper use of the tenement, such persons might
be received there by the tenant. It included all persons who, in
connection with the use of the tenement by the tenant, might
properly pass over the platform under the express authority of
the tenant, and in his right. To all such persons, by virtue of her
contract with the tenant, the landlord owed the same duty that
she owed to the tenant personally, to keep the platform reason-
ably safe. Whether the tenant would or would not have been liable
to the plaintiff for an injury received from an unsafe condition
of the tenement which he occupied, he expressly authorized the
plaintiff "**** to pass over the platform in the exercise of his
rights under the contract with the defendant, and the defendant
owed the plaintiff the duty which arose from the contract in fa-
vor of those who were acting by express authority of the tenant
in the tenant's right: Wilcox v. Zane, 167 Mass. 302.
Exceptions overruled.
LANDLORD AND TENANT— COMMON STAIRWAY-LAND-
LORD'S DUTY AND LIABILITY— TENANTS GUESTS.— If rooms
or portions of the same building are let to different tenants, the
bnlhllng having a common stairway for the use of all, the landlord
Is bound to keep It in reasonable repair, and is liable for a failure
to do so, where the tenant's guests, or strangers rightfully on the
premises, are Injured In consequence of the defective condition of
the stairway: Sawyer v. McGilllcuddy, 81 Me. 318, 10 Am. St. Rep.
2(50, and note; note to Llndsey v. Leighton, 15 Am. St. Rep. 201,
notes to Poor v. Sears, 2(5 Am. St Rep. 278; Nalley v. Hartford Car-
pet Co., 50 Am. Rep. 53.
Jan. 1899.] Hayd£n v. Babreit. 295
Hayden v. Barrett.
[172 Massachusetts, 472.]
DESCENT— ILLEGITIMATE CHILD AS AN HEIR.— Under
the statutory law of Massachusetts, an illegitimate child is the heir
of his mother; but at common law he could not be an heir, even of
his mother.
WILLS— ILLEGITIMATE CHILD AS AN "HEIR BY
BLOOD."— An illegitimate child Is the "heir by blood" of his mother
within the meaning of a will wherein the term "heirs by blood" is
used, where it plainly appears that the testator intended by the use
■of that term to indicate those persons whose relationship was by
some tie of consanguinity; and to exclude all others, such as hus-
band, wife, or adopted children.
Bill in equity, brought by trustees, Hayden and another,
against Barrett and others, for instructions as to the construc-
tion of the following portion of the will of Sidney B. Morse:
"I give, devise, and bequeath all the rest, residue, and remainder
of my property and estate, real, personal, and mixed .... to
.... trustees .... to pay the net income, rents, and profits
thereof to my beloved wife, Mary Ann Morse, during her life,
.... and upon her decease to continue to hold .... the
€ame during the term of ten years from said time ; .... 5. To
pay three-tenths of the income thereof to the children of my
brother, George H. Morse, viz., Mary Ann Morse, Fannie E.
Barrett, wife of Frank S. Barrett, and Roswell M. Morse, to be
equally divided among them, the portion payable to females to
be so paid upon their sole receipt and free from the control
or interference of any husbands they may have, or, in case one
or more of them decease prior to the expiration of said ten
years, to pay the income due to such one or more to his or her
or their respective heirs by blood, and, at the expiration of said
ten years, to transfer, pay over, and convey one of said ten parts
80 divided as hereinbefore provided to the said Mary Ann Morse,
one of said ten parts to the said Fannie E. Barrett, and one of
said ten parts to the said Eoswell M. Morse; or, in case one
or more of them are not then living, to transfer, pay over, and •
convey such part or portion to his or her or their respective
heirs by blood." Mary Ann Morse, the widow of the testator,
died on or about July 11, 1895, and his niece, Mary Ann Morse,
died on or about November 25, 1895. The respondent, Fannie
E. Barrett, was the sister, and the respondent, Horace E. Morse,
was the son, of a pre-deceased brother of the niece, Mary Ann
Morse. This niece was never married, and the respondent,
Ernest L. Morse, was her illegitimate child. She left no father
296 Hayden v. Barrett. [Mass.
or mother, and no issue, brother or sister, or descendant of any
deceased brother or sister, other than the respondents. It wa&
alleged in the bill that a certain portion of the income in the
hands of the trustees was payable by the terms of the fifth clause
above-mentioned, and that a like portion of the income to accrue-
during the period of ten years from the death of the testator'a
widow, and also of the principal of the trust fund at the expi-
ration of the ten years would be payable to the "heirs by blood"
of the niece, Mary Ann Morse, deceased. The justice who heard
the bill was of the opinion that Ernest L. Morse was entitled
to the portion of the fund in controversy, but, at the request
of the other respondents, reported the case for the considera-
tion of the full court.
C. P. Lincoln, for the petitioners.
W. Sullivan, for the respondent, Ernest L. Morse.
E. G. Mclnnes and C. A. Whittemore, for the other re-
Bpondenta.
'*'''* HAMMOND, J. The single question is, whether under
the fifth clause of the tenth item of this will the illegitimate
eon of Mary Ann Morse takes as her "heir by blood."
By the common law of England and of this commonwealth a
bastard in all matters relating to the inheritance of property wa*
nobody's child, and as to such matters his existence was there-
fore ignored: Cooley v. Dewey, 4 Pick. 93, 16 Am. Dec. 326; 2
Dane's Abridgment, 622, and cases therein cited; Pratt v. At-
wood, 108 Mass. 40.
And accordingly it is also well settled that, in the absence of
any language clearly expressing the contrary, all general words
in the statutes of distribution, such as "child," "children," "next
of kin," and similar words descriptive of classes who are to in-
herit, do not include illegitimate children: Kent v. Barker, 2
Gray, 535, and cases therein cited. And so of similar expres-
Bions in a Massachusetts will: Kent v. Barker, 2 Gray, 535;
Adams v. Adams, 154 Mass. 290; Haraden v. Larrabee, 113 Mass.
430.
If, therefore, the rights of the'illegitimate son of Mary Ann
Morse depended upon the common law, the decision must be
against him. But for two generations and more it has been the
statute law of this commonwealth that an illegitimate child
shall be the heir of his mother, and the tendency of legislation
Jan. 1899. J Hayden v. Barrett. 297
as shown by an amendment to the statute seems to be growing
in the direction of change in the common law in this respect
more favorable to him. By our statute^ Ernest L. Morse was
the heir of his mother, and of any maternal ancestor, and, if
the mother died intestate, he, being the only child, was her sole
heir as to all her property: See Pub. Statutes, c. 125, sec. 3.
By the will the property at her death goes to the "heirs by
blood." The illegitimate son, it is true, does not take it by de-
scent from his mother, but, if at all, as the person designated by
the will.
^''*^ In Larery v. Egan, 143 Mass. 389, 392, where real estate
had been devised to a person for life, with contingent remainder
to her heirs, it was decided that the husband of the life tenant
took as her heir under the Statutes of 1880, chapter 211, section
1, which provides that in certain cases a husband shall take in
fee the real estate of his deceased wife to an amount not ex-
ceeding five thousand dollars in value. In giving the opinion
Mr. Justice Field says: "Although in the case at bar the heirs
of ... . [the life tenant] do not take from her by inheritance,
but take as persons designated by the will, yet we know of no
way of determining the persons intended by the will, except
by ascertaining the persons who by law would have inherited
the estate from her if she had died seised of it and intestate.*'
Applying that principle to this case, we have no doubt that,
within the meaning of the will as interpreted in the light of the
statute, the illegitimate child was the heir of his mother, and
it only remains to be considered whether he was her heir **by
blood" within the meaning of the will.
The expression 'Tieirs by blood" occurs several times in the
will. In the first clause of this tenth item the trustees are di-
rected to pay certain income "to my niece Helen E. Howland,
daughter of my said sister Caroline Ware Morris, upon her sole
receipt and free from the control or interference of any hus-
band she may have, and in case of her death prior to the ex-
piration of said ten years to pay said balance, if any, to her heirs
by blood." And the second clause of said item is as follows: "To
pay one-tenth of the income thereof to my niece Caroline E.
Button upon her sole receipt, free from the control or inter-
ference of any husband she may have, and, in case of her death
prior to the expiration of said ten years, then to pay the said
income to her heirs by blood, and at the expiration of said ten
years to transfer, pay over, and convey one of said ten parts
HQS Spade v. Lynn & Boston R. R. Co. [Mass.
80 divided as hereinbefore provided to tlie said Caroline E. But-
ton, or, in case she is not then living, to her heirs by blood."
And the same language is used with reference to the legacies
to the other nieces and to his nephew, in the same iteai of the
will. All the way through this item the testator was bearing
constantly in mind the husbands of these various nieces, and he
desired that there should be no control or interference on the
'*''^ part of any such husband during the life of the niece, and
then in the same general line of thought uses language which
finally excludes the husband from having any share in the prop-
erty after the decease of the niece.
It is plain, we think, that the testator intended by the use of
the term **heirs by blood" to indicate those persons whose re-
lationship was by some tie of consanguinity, and to exclude all
others, such as husband, wife, or adopted children. He in-
tended to keep the property in the family and within the tie of
consanguinity, but otherwise was content that the law should
determine who should be the heir to any niece.
Within the meaning of the will, Ernest L. Morse was the "heir
by blood" of his mother.
Decree accordingly.
ILLEGITIMATE CHILD AS AN HEIII.-A bastard could not In-
herit even from Its mother by the common law, but this rule has
been changed by statute in some of the states: McDonald v. Pitts-
burg etc. Ry. Co., 144 Ind. 459, 55 Am. St. Rep. 185, and note. See,
also, the monographic note to Simmons v. Bull. 50 Am. Dec. 263, on
the policy of the ancient common law toward bastards, and rights
of, generally.
Spade v. Lynn and Boston Railroad Company.
[172 Massachtjsbtts, ■188.]
RAILROADS-STREET-CARS— RISK ASSUMED BY PAS-
SENGER-EXPELLING DRUNKEN MAN.— A passsenger upon a
street-oar assumes the risls, when he talcea passage, of the conse-
qucnr-es of a lawful and reasonable act of the conductor in expelling
a drunken man from the car.
RAILROADS — STREET-CARS —UNAVOIDABLE ACCI-
DENT TO PASSENGER IN EJECTING DRUNKEN MAN-
RIGHT OF ACn'ION.— If due care is used in expelling a drunken
man from a street-car, an unavoidable battery committed on a pas-
senger's person, during the process, by the conductor's jostlinc: an-
other drunken man, who falls upon the passenger, seems not to be
actionable.
R.AILROADS— STREET-CARS— DAMAGES FOR FRI^'HT
CAUSED BY EJECTING DRUNKEN PASSENGER.— If the con-
Jan. 1899.] Spade v. Lynn & Boston R. R. Co. 299
ductor of a street-car. In ejecting a drunken man therefrom, Jostles
against another drunken man, who falls upon a lady passenger,
and the injury from the fall is slight, though she suffers physical
Injury from fright caused by the fall and the rest of the occurrences,
she can recover. If at all, only for the fright caused by the Inad-
vertent battery, and not for that attributable to the general disturb-
ance.
RAILROADS— STREET-GARS— OBLIGATION TO NERV-
OUS PASSENGERS.— The obligation of a street railway company
toward a passenger cannot be increased simply by his notifying the
conductor that he has unstable nerves.
ASSAULT— BATTERY UPON PERSON OF UNSTABLE
NERVES— DAMAGES.— If a street-car conductor commits an un-
justifiable battery upon the person of a lady passenger, who has
unstable nerves, the company must answer for the actual conse-
quences of the wrong to her as she Is, and the damages cannot be
cut down by showing that the efCect would have been less upon a
normal person.
Tort, for personal injuries sustained by the plaintiff, while a
passenger on the defendant's car, through the company's alleged
negligence. There was a verdict for the plaintiff, and the de-
fendant alleged exceptions.
S. L. Whipple and W. R. Sears, for the plaintiflC
C. K. Cobb, for the defendant.
*®® HOLMES, J. This is an action for personal injuries
which already has been before the court: Spade v. Lynn etc.
E. R. Co., 168 Mass. 285, 60 Am. St. Rep. 393. At the second
trial the evidence was that the defendant's conductor in remov-
ing a drunken man from a car jostled another drunken man
who was standing in front of the plaintiff, and threw him upon
her. The fall upon her seems to have been a trifling matter,
taken by itself, but the fright caused by that and the rest of
the occurrences in the car resulted in physical injury. The case
comes up again upon exceptions.
The judge was asked to direct a verdicf for the defendant.
We find some difficulty in seeing upon what ground the jury
were warranted in finding for the plaintiff. So far as appears,
the conductor was acting rightly in putting the drunken man
"*** off the car. As against the plaintiff, he was doing one of the
things which she had to contemplate as liable to happen when
she got into the car. We all know that, if people are standing
in the passageway of a street-car, you cannot remove a man
forcibly through the passageway without more or less contact.
If the fall upon the plaintiff was the necessary consequence of
a lawful and reasonable act, then it was one of the risks which
ehe assumed when she took her passage.
800 Spade v. Lynn & Boston R. R. Co. [Maes".
It is a question which deserves more discussion than it haa
received, whether a man is answerable for an injury inflicted
upon an innocent stranger knowingly, or with sufficient notico
of the danger, if the injury is an unavoidable incident of lawful
self protection. It might be said, and it has been held, when it
is a question of paying damages, that a man cannot shift his
misfortunes to his neighbor's shoulders: Gilbert v. Stone,
Aleyn, 35, Style, 72; Scott v. Shepard, 2 W. Black, 892, 896;
Cooley on Torts, 115; see McLeod v. Jones, 1(75 Mass. 403, 405,
7 Am. Eep. 539; Miller v. Horton, 152 Mass. 540, 547, 23 Am.
St. Eep. 850; Pierce v. Cunard S. S. Co., 153 Mass. 87, 90;
Whalley v. Lancashire etc. Ey., 13 Q. B. Div. 131. And com^
pare the rule as to duress in contracts and conveyances: Fair-
banks v. Snow, 145 Mass. 153, 155, 1 Am. St. Eep. 44(j. On
the other hand, the contrary has been intimated in a case of
shooting in self-defense, the injury to the third person being
treated on the footing of accident: Morris v. Piatt, 32 Conn.
75, 84. See Bacon's Maxims, Eeg. V. & VI.; Addison on
Torts, 6th ed., 380, 383. And the right to pull down a house
when the destruction is necessary to stop a fire, as it usually is
stated, looks the same way: See Taylor v. Plymouth, 8 Met.
462, 465; American Print Works v. Lawrence, 23 K J. L. 590,
613, 57 Am. Dee. 420. The alleged immunity for the necessary
destruction of a building suggests that perhaps the question
cannot be answered in general terms, and that one possible dis-
tinction may be found where the parties have a common inter-
est, even though the act done in furtherance of it may cause
more harm than good to the plaintiff. Perhaps it would be un-
safe to find any countenance to such a distinction in decisions
as to the rights of landowners or officials in diking against
water when it appears as a common enemy : The King v. Sewer
Commrs., 8 Barn. & C. 355; Nield v. London etc. ^'^» Ey.,
L. R. 10 Ex. 4. Compare Whalley v. Lancashire etc. Ey., 13
Q. B. Div. 131. But when we go a step further, and take a case
like the present, where all parties concerned are in a conveyance,
and to maintain order and keep the car clear of obnoxious per-
sons is the defendant's right, and its duty to the plaintiff and
the other passengers, no passenger can complain of any conse-
quence which the performance of that duty necessarily entails.
We assume, for present purposes, that carriers of passengers
owe the same degree of care in respect of such matters as they
owe in respect of the construction and management of their
vehicles; but if that care is shown, probably the injury must be
Jan. 1899.] Spadb v. Lynn & Boston R. R. Co. 301
regarded as an inevitable accident. As to whether there was
any negligence in the manner of expelling the drunken man, or
otherwise, we will go no further than to say that it has not been
pointed out to us. We need not decide the question, as there
must be a new trial for another reason.
A ruling was asked to the effect that the plaintiff could re-
cover only for the pain and fright caused by the contact with
her person and not for such mental disturbance and injury as
were caused by other acts of the conductor and the general dis-
turbance in the cap. This was refused, and the jury were in-
structed that, if there was a physical injury and accompanied
by it there was fright which operated to her injury in body or
mind, she could recover for the damage caused by the fright,
and the jury were told that they might take all that happened
as one whole. The effect of the refusal and the instructions ap-
pears to us to have been that, when once a battery of the plain-
tiff was proved, the defendant became or might be found liable
for all the consequences of the disturbance in the car and of the
plaintiff's fright, however caused. We do not so understand
the law. By something of an anomaly, consequences of the de-
fendant's conduct which would not of themselves constitute a
cause of action may at times enhance the damages, if the con-
duet has some other consequence for which an action lies.
But this further liability is not for all consequences of the de-
fendant's conduct, but for consequences of the defendant's
wrong to the plaintiff. The wrong to the plaintiff, if any, be-
gan with the battery, and it is for the consequences of the bat-
tery only '*®* that the defendant is liable, not for all the con-
sequences of the drunken man's presence in the car or of the
defendant's attempt to remove him. We are perfectly aware of
the difficulty of discriminating. But it seems quite possible in
this case that the plaintiff's trouble was due in substance to the
disturbance as a whole, although it may be that the jury would
be warranted in finding that the impact upon her person gave
the detonating spark without which she would not have col-
lapsed. It is unnecessary to express an opinion whether the
evidence in this case warranted the latter feeling.
We may add a word with reference to a suggestion made on
behalf of the plaintiff, and having some bearing u|>on the eighth
instruction asked and the instructions given. It is argued that,
because the conductor had known the plaintiff for several years,
the defendant's obligations to her were increased, if the jury
believed that she was a particularly sensitive person and that
302 Spade v. Lynn & Boston R. R. Co. [Mass.
the conductor must have known it. "We regard such an argu-
ment even to the jury as wholly inadmissible. Ordinary street-
cars must be run with reference to ordinary susceptibilities, and
the liability oJ their proprietors cannot be increased simply by
a passenger's notifying the conductor that ho has unstable
nerves. In this case it will be left to the jury to say whether
there was anything that called for special attention to the plain-
tiff beyond what was due to other women. Nothing is pointed
out to us as a basis for such increased obligation except the con-
ductor's acquaintance with the plaintiff, and that laid no
foundation for it. We should add, however, to avoid being
misunderstood and with reference to the plaintiff's tenth re-
quest, that if the defendant's servant did commit an unjusti-
fiable battery on the plaintiff's person, the defendant must an-
swer for the actual consequences of that wrong to her as she
was, and cannot cut down her damages by showing that the
effect would have been less upon a normal person: Braithwaite
V. Hall, 168 Mass. 38, 40. The measure of the defendant's
duty in determining whether a wrong has been committed is
one thing, the measure of liability when a wrong has been com-
mitted is another.
Exceptions sustained.
RAILROADS— EXPULSION FROM STREET-CARS-LIABII^
ITY FOR NEGLIGENT EXECUTION OF LAWFUL ACT.— An
obnoxious passenger may be lawfully expelled from a street-car:
Vinton V. Middlesex R. R. Co., 11 Allen, 304, 87 Am. Dec. 714; Le-
mont V. Washington etc. R. R. Co., 1 Mackey, 180, 47 Am. Rep. 238;
but a railroad company is answerable where its employ^ performs
an act incident to his employment so unslcillfuUy, negligently, reck-
lessly, or wantonly, as to injure persons who are without fault:
Toledo etc. R. R. Co. v. Harmon, 47 111. 298, 95 Am. Dec. 489.
DAMAGES FOR FRIGHT OCCASIONED BY NEGLIGENCE.
In an action to recover damages for an injury sustained through
the negligence of another, there can be no recovery for a bodily
Injury caused by mere fright: Spade v. Lynn etc. R. R. Co., KiS
Mass. 285, 60 Am. St. Rep. 393. If there is no immediate personal
injury to a plaintiff from tlie negligence of another, she cannot
recover for injury occasioned by her fright arising from the negli-
gent act, though in consequence' of the fright she became uncon-
scious, and had a miscarriage: Mitchell v. Rochester Ry. Co., 151
N. Y. 107, 50 Am. St. Rep. GOt. On the other hand, that railroad
companies are answerable in damages for mental suffering or pliys-
Ical injury arising from fright caused by their negligence, see Mack
V. South Bound R. R. Co., 52 S. C. 323, 08 Am. St. Rep. 913.
ASSAULT AND BATTERY-UNINTENTIONAL IN.IURY TO
THIRD PERSON.— An Intention to do harm is of the essence of
assault, hence a defendant is not answerable for an accidental casu-
alty, but, if he Intends to harm a person by his act, and uninten-
tionally injures a third person, he is liable for an assault and bat-
tery: Peterson v. UaCfner, 59 Ind. 130, 20 Am. Rep. 81, and note.
Feb. 1899.] Grafton National Bank v. Wing. 303
Gbapton National Bank v. "Wing. Geafton
Savings Bank v. Wing.
[172 MA88ACHUSETTS, 513.]
NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS— WHAT WORDS DO NOT
BIND ONE AS AN INDORSER.— The words, "Estate of Jona. D.
Wheeler, Henry P. Wing, Executor," indorsed on a promissory note^
mean "Estate of Wheeler by Wing," and do not bind Wing by con-
tract. Wing's estate is not, therefore, liable upon such an indorse^
ment
Contract upon promissory notes made by the Wheeler Cotton,
Mills. Henry F. Wing, the defendant's intestate, was the treas-
urer of the Wheeler Cotton Mills, and also executor of Jonathan
1). Wheeler's will. The plaintiff in each case had received a
part payment under a compromise agreement with the Wheeler
Cotton lilills, and the plaintiffs sought to hold Henry F. Wing's
estate on the ground that he was personally liable. The notes
were again given in renewal of former notes, similarly indorsed,
and which had been originally indorsed by Jonathan D.
Wheeler, in his lifetime. The defendant, Oliver M. Wing, re-
quested the judge to rule that the actions could not be main-
tained, but he refused to do so and found for the plaintiff ia
each case. The defendant alleged exceptions.
F. P. Goulding and W. C. Mellish, for the plaintiffs.
J. B. Scott and T. H. Gage, Jr., for the defendant.
^^^ HOLMES, J. These are two actions of contract against
the administrator of the estate of Henry F. Wing, seeking to
hold him upon two indorsements made by Henry F. Wing a»
executor of the will of Jonathan D. Wheeler. The indorse-
ments were in the following form: "Estate of Jona. D. Wheeler,.
Henry F. Wing, Executor."
A majority of the court are of opinion that these words mean
'^Estate of Wheeler by Wing," and therefore that at least they
failed to bind Wing by contract. It is quite true that the law
does not know the estate of a dead man as a contractor, and
that, unless the fact that these indorsements were the renewal
of indorsements by Wheeler in his lifetime makes a difference^
they did not bind the estate. But that merely shows that the
indorsements were made by Wing under a mistake of law, as the
testimony also proves to have been a fact. But the presence of
S04 Van Norman v. Gordon. [Mass.
Wing's name upon the paper and his failure to bind his sup-
posed principal are not enough to make the contract his own:
Jefts V. York, 4 Cush. 371, 50 Am. Dec. 791; 10 Gush. 392,
395, 396; Abbey v. Chase, 6 Cush. 54, 56, 57; Taylor v. Shel-
•ton, 30 Conn. 122. If a man does not purport to be a party
to negotiable paper, he is not a party to it : See, further, 1 Daniel
on Negotiable Instruments, 4th ed., sees. 30G-308; Bartlett v.
Tucker, 104 Mass. 336, 6 Am. Eep. 240. It is true that it is
suggested by Mr. Daniel that in such cases an ambiguous ex-
pression may be interpreted to bind the agent, but neither that
suggestion nor a presumption that the agent knew the law can
pervert words from their meaning if the meaning is plain. The
so-called presumption is a requirement, not a presumption of
fact, and has no bearing or weight upon the construction of
instruments.
We are of opinion that the court should have ruled that the
defendant was not liable.
Exceptions sustained.
NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS.— INDORSING AS AGENT Is
equivalent to a declaration that the indorser will not be personally
liable: Mott v. Hicks, 1 Cow. 513. 13 Am. Dec. 550.
Van Norman v. Gordon.
[172 Massachusetts, 576.]
JUDGMENT, THOUGH CONFESSED UNDER WARRANT
OF ATTORNEY, IS ENTITLED TO "FAITH AND CREDIT" IN
ANOTHER STATE.— A judgment of a court of one state Is entitled
to full faith and credit In other states where the court which ren-
dered It had jurisdiction to render such a judgment. If it had,
then the fact that It is a juQgment by confession, under a warrant
■of attorney, Is Immaterial. Such judgments, when rendered by
courts having jurisdiction of the cause and the parties, have all the
qualities, Incidents, and attributes of other judgments.
COURTS -TRESUMPTION AS TO JURISDICTION.-A
county court, with a clerk and seal, is a court of record. Hence, If
it enters a Judgment upon a warrant of attorney to confess judg-
ment, upon which an action is brought in another state, such court
■will there be presumed to have been a court of general Jurisdiction.
JUDGMENT OF SISTER STATE— ACTION UrON— PRE-
•SUMPTIONS.— In an action upon a judgment of a sister state, en-
tered upon a warrant of attorney to confess judgment, the pre-
sumption is, that the court had jurisdiction to enter It, and that the
proceedings were regular and according to the laws of that state.
JUDGMENT CONFESSED UNDER WARRANT OF AT-
TORNEY-ILLUSTRATION—"FAITH AND CREDIT" IN AN-
May, 1899.] Van Nobman v. Gordon. 806
OTHER STATE.— If a person signs a promissory note, executing,
at the same time, a warrant of attorney to confess Judgment, and a
judgment of a court of record in an action upon the note Is entered,
under such warrant by the confession of an attorney of such court,
who was requested to appear by the attorney named In the war-
rant, such Judgment Is entitled to full faith and credit in another
st;ite, if an action Is brought upon It, though such appearance In the
former state was really in the plaintiflf's Interest, where there is no
charge of fraud, no appearance of Irregularity, and what was done
in confessing judgment came within the terms of the warrant of at-
torney.
Contract upon a judgment rendered by a county court of the
state of Wisconsin. The action was brought by the plaintiff.
Van Norman, against the defendant, Gordon. The plaintiff
had recovered a judgment against the defendant, in Wisconsin,
upon a promissory note. At the time that the defendant made
the note, he executed a warrant of attorney in which he ap-
pointed E. H. Bottum, "or any attorney of any court of record,'*
his attorney to waive service of process and confess judgment
in favor of Van Norman upon the note. Annexed to the
declaration in this case was a copy of the record of the court in
which the judgment was entered, which set out the "complaint,"
reciting the making and delivery of the note, and demanding
judgment for the amount due, by "Winkler, Flanders, Smith,
Bottum, and Vilas, plaintiff's attorneys." The answer showed
that Ogden & Hunter, defendant's attorneys, appeared, waived
service, and confessed judgment for the defendant. An execu-
tion was returned unsatisfied, and the papers were authenticated
by the clerk of the court, with the seal affixed. In Massachu-
setts, the superior court rendered a judgment for the defend-
ant, and, on appeal, it was agreed that the defendant signed
the note, on which suit was brought, in Wisconsin; that he
also signed the warrant of attorney to confess judgment, on
which judgment was confessed, in Wisconsin; that at the time
he signed the note and warrant of attorney, he was in and was
a resident of that state; that no personal service was made on
the defendant in the Wisconsin suit; that the defendant never
authorized Ogden and Hunter to appear or act for him in the
suit except as they may have been authorized so to do by the
warrant of attorney to confess judgment; that the judgment
was entered as set forth in the declaration and the record there-
to annexed, and had never been vacated or satisfied in any part;
and that the said Ogden and Hunter were attorneys of a court
of record.
AM. ST. Rbp.. You LXX.-aO
806 Van Norman v. Gordon. [Ma8».
C. H. Sprague, for the plaintiff.
G. B. Upham, for the defendant.
«78 MORTON, J. The question is, whether the judgment
which the plaintiff seeks to enforce is entitled to full faith and
credit. The answer depends on whether the court which ren-
dered it had jurisdiction to render such a judgment: Board of
Puhlic Works v. Columbia College, 17 Wall. 521. If it had,
then the fact that it is a judgment by confession under a war-
rant of attorney is immaterial. Such judgments, when ren-
dered by courts having jurisdiction of the cause and the parties^
have all the qualities, incidents, and attributes of other judg-
ments: Teel V. Yost, 128 N. Y. 387; see Henry v. Estes, 127
Mass. 474.
It does not appear from the facts that are agreed whether the
laws of Wisconsin in force at the time authorized the entry of
'^''* judgments pursuant to powers of attorney to confess judg-
ment, or if so, under what circumstances, or whether the court
which rendered the judgment was a court of record or of general
jurisdiction, or, if that is material, whether the defendant was a
resident of Wisconsin when the judgment was rendered and the
proceedings were instituted. No objection has been made, how-
ever, in respect to these -matters, and the copy of the record^
which has been submitted to us, shows that the court was a
county court, with a clerk and seal, and was therefore a court
of record, and may be presumed to have been a court of general
jurisdiction: Knapp v. Abell, 10 Allen, 485, 489; Pringle v»
Woolworth, 90 N. Y. 502.
And in view of the further considerations that every pre-
sumption is to be made in favor of the regularity of the pro-
ceedings, that it is not now contended that the court had not jur-
isdiction to enter judgment pursuant to a warrant of attorney
to confess judgment, and that such proceedings are well known
at common law and in many states, we think that it may also be
presumed that the court had jurisdiction to enter judgment
upon a warrant of attorney to confess judgment, and that the
proceedings were regular, and according to the laws of Wiscon-
sin: McMahon v. Eagle Life Assn., 169 Mass. 539, 61 Am. St.
Rep. 306, and cases cited; Wright v. Andrews, 130 Mass. 149;
Stockwell V. McCracken, 109 Mass. 84; Bissell v. Wheelock, 11
Gush. 277; Galpin v. Page, 18 Wall. 350.
The attorneys who appeared and acted for the defendant
May, 1899.] Van Norman v. Gordon. 307
never were authorized to appear for him and confess judgment,
except as they were authorized to do so by the warrant of at-
torney. It is agreed that they were attorneys of a court of
record — in Wisconsin, we assume. We assume also that they
were requested to appear by the attorney named in the warrant,
or his firm, and that their appearance was really in the plain-
tiff's interest. That naturally would be so, and must have been
expected when the power of attorney was given. There is no
charge of fraud, or that judgment was entered for more than
was due, or before the note was due, which would have been
contrary to the power of attorney. The record shows that
judgment was not entered till seventeen or eighteen months
after the note was due. The note and warrant of attorney were
****^ both signed in Wisconsin, where the defendant, and, as we
infer, the plaintiff resided at the time, and the note was payable
in Wisconsin, where the plaintiff has his place of business, if
not his home.
What waa done in confessing judgment came within the terms
of the warrant of attorney. Unless, therefore, the warrant of
attorney purported to give an authority which it did not, or
was for some reason invalid, we see no ground on which the
judgment can be called in question. Assuming that we could
refuse full faith to the judgment if we thought that there was
an error of law in it (see contra, Laing v. Eigney, 160 U. S. 531,
Carpenter v. Strange, 141 U. S. 87, and Eichards v. Barlow, 140
Mass. 218), we find nothing which would justify such a conclu-
sion. The warrant well might be held valid in Wisconsin,
though adjudged invalid in another state. According to Mr.
Dicey and Mr. Freeman, however, a warrant of attorney may be
60 drawn as to authorize a confession of judgment in a foreign
state: Dicey on Conflict of Laws, 377; Freeman on Judgments,
sec, 545.
Lord Blackburn went so far in one case as to suggest that:
**If at the time when the obligation was contracted the defend-
ants were within the foreign country, but left it before the suit
was instituted, we should be inclined to think the laws of that
country bound them": Schibsby v. Westenholz, L. E. 6 Q. B,
155, 161, He was overruled, however, in Sirdar Gurdyal Singh
V. Eajah of Faridkote (1894), App. Cas. 670, 685, 686,
In Eichards v. Barlow, 140*Mas8. 218, no objection seems to
have been taken because the warrant authorized an appearance
'Tdv any attorney of any court of record"; See, also, First. 'N'at.
Bank v. Garland, 109 Mich. 615, 63 Am, St. Rep. 597; Teel v.
308 Van Norman v. Gordon. [Mass.
Yost, 128 N. Y. 387. And in Pirie v. Stem, 97 Wis. 150, 65
Am. St. Eep. 103, it was held that a power authorizing a con-
fession of judgment "in any court of record" could be executed
in any state in the Union, disapproving, as does also the court
in Michigan in First Nat. Bank v. Garland, 109 Mich. 515, 63
Am. St. Rep. 597, the cases in Ohio and Tennessee on which
the defendant relies. In Blanck v. Medley, 63 111. App. 211,
it was held that a warrant of attorney authorizing "any attorney
of any court of record" to confess judgment could be executed
by an attorney in partnership with the attorney who signed
the declaration for the holder of the note: See, also, Mikeska
V. Blum, 63 Tex. 4-4.
681 -^g think, therefore, that the judgment must be regarded
as rendered by consent of the defendant, that it was such a
judgment as the court which rendered it had jurisdiction to
render, and that it is entitled to full faith and credit.
Judgment for the plaintiff.
JUDGMENT BY CONFESSION— WARRANT OF ATTORNEY-
"FAITH AND CREDIT."— A judgment on a promissory note, en-
tered in one state by confession under a warrant of attorney, is
valid in a sister state: Kitchen v. Belief ontaine Nat. Bank, 53 Kan.
242, 42 Am. St. Rep. 282; note to Pirie v. Stern, 65 Am. St. Rep.
106. Under the constitution of the United States, the judgment
of a sister state must be accorded in this state the same "faith and
credit" which it has in the state where it was rendered: Crumlish
V. Central Imp. Co., 38 W. Va. 390, 4o Am. St. Rep. 872. That there
may be a confession of judgment in one state upon a power of at-
torney executed in another, see Pirie v. Stern, 97 Wis. 150, 65 Am.
St. Rep. 103.
JUDGMENTS OF SISTER STATES— PRESUMPTION OF JUR-
ISDICTION.—In the absence of contradictory evidence there is a
legal presumption in favor of the jurisdiction of a court of record
of another state which has assumed jurisdiction over the subject
matter in controversy between parties residing there: Note to Kelley
V. Kelley, 42 Am. St Rep. 398.
CASES
IN THB
SUPREME COURT
.MINNESOTA.
Dorr v. Life Insurance Clearing Company.
[71 Minnesota, 38.]
CORPORATIONS— STATUTORY LIEN ON STOCK.— When,
by general law, a lien Is given to a corporation upon the stocli of
a stockholder in the corporation for his indebtedness to It, that
lien is valid and enforceable against all the world, unless it has
been waived, surrendered, or lost in some sufficient manner.
CORPORATIONS— ASSIGNMENT OF STOCK— EFFECT
ON LIEN OF THE CORPORATION.— An assignment or sale of cor-
poration stock, to a person ignorant of a statutory lien thereon held
by the corporation, will not discharge the lien.
CORPORATIONS— NOTICE— KNOWLEDGE OF PRESI-
DENT.—A corporation cannot be charged with the knowledge of
its president, when such knowledge was obtained before he be-
came president, or when he is acting In his own interest and behalf.
William G. White, for the appellant.
Munn & Thygeson, for the respondent,
^ COLLINS, J. This was an action to establish a lien
claimed by plaintiff upon twenty-nine shares of defendant's
capital stock, the certificates therefor having been executed,
issued, and delivered to one Eussell R. Dorr as an original
subscriber for stock shares in defendant corporation. It was
plaintiff's claim that Dorr had pledged these stock shares to her
to secure an indebtedness for money borrowed with which to
pay for them when issued. The defendant corporation as-
serted a lien upon the shares, alleged to be superior and para-
mount, for and on account of an indebtedness due to it from
Dorr arising out of his failure to pay for his stock shares. The
cause was tried below with that of St. Paul Nat. Bank v. Life
(809)
310 DoRE V. Life Ins. Cleartno Co. [Minn.
Ins. etc. Co., 71 Minn. 123, in which the same kind of relief
was demanded, and is closely connected with it, althoupjh the
facts here are much less complicated.
From the findings it appears that, prior to the incorporation
of defendant. Dorr borrowed three thousand dollars of plaintiff
for the purpose of paying for stock shares then subscribed for,
agreeing to secure the loan by pledging the shares so paid for
as collateral security. After the incorporation he made an
arrangement with the defendant by which it agreed to accept
his notes, secured by real estate mortgages, in part or in full
payment for these and other stock shares, but, to evade the
statutory regulation requiring payment in cash, defendant, by
its board of directors, voted a nominal loan to Dorr for the
amount of his notes. This part of the transaction was in form,
but not in fact, a loan to Dorr. Defendant then accepted the
notes and mortgages and issued and delivered to Dorr the certif-
icates, three in number, representing the twenty-nine shares
of stock, and he, in accordance with his agreement with plain-
tiff, assigned and delivered the same to her as collateral security.
Until shortly prior to the commencement of this action, de-
fendant corporation had no notice or knowledge of this trans-
action between plaintiff and Dorr, Later, under some arrange-
ment for reducing defendant's capital stock, Dorr returned these
tliree certificates for surrender and cancellation. In lieu there-
of another ■*** certificate for a less number of shares was exe-
cuted by defendant to Dorr, and issued and delivered to one
William E. Dorr, acting as agent for plaintiff and Eussell E.
Dorr. This certificate was accepted in lieu of the others. At
the time of this transaction defendant had no notice or know-
ledge of plaintiff's interest in these stock shares, or that the
same had been assigned to her, or that Wiliam E. Dorr was act-
ing as her agent in the matter. Dorr defaulted in the pay-
ment of his notes secured by the mortgages, and this action was
the immediate result of defendant's attempt to foreclose its
alleged lien by a sale of the stock shares at public auction.
Four points are made in the brief of counsel for plaintiff
(appellant): 1. That the stock in question was "full paid," what-
ever that may mean; 2. That as between plaintiff and defend-
ant the latter had allowed the former to believe that the stock
shares were fully paid for, and is now estopped from asserting
a claim that they were not; 3. That, if defendant ever had any
lien upon these stock shares, it has been waived as to plaintiff;
Jan. 1898.] Dobb v. Life Ins. Clearing Co. 311
and 4. That as Dorr, who became president of defendant cor-
poration at its organization, had knowledge of the entire affair
with plaintiff, his knowledge must be imputed to defendant,
and the findings in respect to its want of notice or knowledge
until just prior to the commencement of this action were there-
fore unsupported by the evidence.
We need not take up these points in detail. The General
Statutes of 1894, section 2799, provides that the stock of a cor-
poration of this character shall be transferable only on the books
of the corporation in such form as the directors prescribe, and
that the "corporation shall at all times have a lien upon the
stock or property of its members invested therein, for all the
debts due from them to such corporation, which may be en-
forced" by sale.
There was no controversy over the fact that Dorr had not
paid his notes, and, with this admitted, it is obvious that he
was indebted to the defendant, for which indebtedness it had
the right to enforce the statutory lien. The statute is notice
to everyone of the right of a corporation to a superior and
paramount lien on stock shares for the indebtedness of a. stock-
holder. Its operation ^* is very comprehensive. The assignee
or pledgee of the stock takes it subject to the statutory right
of the corporation. He cannot acquire any greater rights than
had the stockholder himself.
When, by general law, a lien is given to a corporation upon
the stock of a stockholder in the corporation for his indebtedness
to it, that lien is valid and enforceable against all the world,
unless it has been waived, surrendered, or lost in some sufficient
manner. An assignment or sale of the stock to a person ig-
norant of the lien will not discharge it. The authorities seem
to be uniform upon this subject: Cook on Stock and Stock-
holders, sec. 532; 23 Am. & Eng. Ency. of Law, 695, and cases
cited in notes. See, also Schmidt v. Hennepin etc. Co., 35
Minn. 511.
There was no waiver, or surrender, or loss of this lien shown
in this case. The findings as to defendant's want or lack of
notice or knowledge of the transaction between plaintiff and
Dorr were fully sustained by the evidence, and, with these
findings unassailable, there is nothing left of the contention
of counsel as to the remaining points.
Even if it should be held that notice or knowledge of the
transaction between Dorr and plaintiff, whereby he secured the
312 Merrill v. Security Trust Co. [Minn.
loan upon a promise to pledge the stock shares subscribed as
collateral, could be material or effectual as to defendant cor-
poration, there are two good reasons why such notice or know-
ledge cannot be imputed to it: 1. When the loan was made and
the money obtained. Dorr was not its president, for it had not
then been organized; 2. Had he been president at the time, he
was acting in his own interest and behalf. Under such cir-
cumstances the defendant corporation could not be charged
with the knowledg'e of its presiding officer: Bang v, Brett, 62"
Minn, 4.
Order aflSrmed.
CORPORATIONS — LIEN ON STOCK — ASSIGNMENT Ta
THIRD PARTY.— If a lien on stock is given by statute for indebt-
edness to ttie corporation, owing by a stocliliolder, a transfer of the
stock; to a person ignorant of the lien does not discharge it, nor
authorize the purchaser to demand and receive a transfer of it so
discharged: See monographic note to Victor G. Bloede Co. v.
Bloede, 57 Am. St. Rep. 394. A lien merely created by a by-law is
void as against an innocent holder for value: Bank of Atchison
County V. Durfee, 118 Mo. 431, 40 Am. St. Rep. 396.
CORPORATIONS— NOTICE TO PRESIDENT.— Notice to the
president of a corporation is not notice to the corporation, where
the president is acting in his own interests and against those of
the corporation: Seaverns v. Presbyterian Hospital, 173 111. 414, &i
Am. St. Rep. 125, and note; Franklin Min. Co. v. O'Brien, 22 Colo.
129, 55 Am. St. Rep. 118, and note. See Bank v. Sneed, 07 Tenn^
120, 56 Am. St Bep. 788.
Merrill ?;. Security Trust Company.
[71 Minnesota, 6].]
DOWER— ASSIGNMENT FOR BENEFIT OF CREDITORS.
Where a married man executes, under the insolvent law, an as-
signment of all his nonexempt property for the benefit of credit-
ors (his wife not joining), the assignee's title to the real estate
assigned Is not subject to the wife's inchoate right.
DOWER, STATUTORY— WHEN SUBJECT TO PAYMENT
OF HUSBAND'S DEBTS.— In Minnesota, the widow's statutory
one-third In the real estate of her husband is "subject. In Its just
proportion with the other real estate, to the payment of such debts
of the deceased as are not paid from the personal estate."
Edmund S. Durment, for the appellant.
M. L. Countryman, for the respondent.
«» MITCHELL, J. In 1893 D. D. Merrill (a married man),,
being insolvent, executed to the defendant pursuant to the in-^
Jan. 1898.] Merrill v. Security Trust Co. 815
solvent law of 1881 (Gen. Stats. 1894, sees. 4240-4252) an as-
signment of all his nonexempt property for the benefit of his
creditors. Included in the assigned property was a large amount
of real estate, which the defendant still holds for the purpose*
of the trust. Mrs. Merrill did not join with her husband in the
execution of the assignment. Merrill died in 1896, and the
plaintiff, his widow, brings this action against the defendant
for a partition of the real estate, claiming that, under the
statute, she is now the absolute owner of one undivided third
of it, free from the payment of any part of the debts of her
deceased husband. Aside from certain question of practice,
not necessary to be considered, the only question presented by
this appeal is whether this claim on part of the widow is correct.
Owing to their early professional education, lawyers may be
liable to enter upon the consideration of this question with
certain preconceived impressions, derived from the doctrines
relating to common-law dower (which was not subject to the
payment of the husband's debts), and to fail to give due weight
to the fact that with us the widow's statutory one-third in the
real estate of her husband is "subject, in its just proportion with
the other real estate, to the payment of such debts of the de-
ceased as are not paid from the personal estate."
Some things which this court has said, if not decided, will
show that our minds have not always been entirely free from
these preconceived impressions. In view of the plain provi-
sions of the statute ** there can be no question that, when
the husband's estate is administered in the probate court, the
widow's third in his real estate is subject to the payment of
its just proportion of his debts. Sales of real estate by the
personal representative for the payment of debts are not sub-
ject to the widovsr* right, but convey a complete title. All that
the widow gets in such a case is a third of the real estate which
is left after the debts are paid.
Every reason for this applies with equal or greater force
where the husband's entire nonexempt estate is administered
by the district court in bankruptcy. In the latter case, al-
though not physically dead, he is financially so. If, after his
discharge, he acquires property, it is by virtue of what may be
termed a "new financial birth," as of the date of his discharge.
In bankruptcy, as in probate, his entire nonexempt estate is
in court for purposes of administration and distribution; and
in the one case as in the other all his creditors are or may
become parties to the proceedings. The insolvent law contains
314 Meerill v. Security Trust Co. [Minn.
no provision that the assignment by the husband shall be sub-
ject to the wife's inchoate right in his real estate; and, in our
opinion, the provisions of statute requiring the wife's assent in
writing to conveyances by the husband, in order to bar her
inchoate interest in the property conveyed, have no application
to a general assignment under the insolvency law for the benefit
of creditors. It would result in an anomalous state of things
if the wife is held to have greater rights when her husband's
€sta)te is administered in bankruptcy than when it is adminis-
tered in probate.
Take the present case for example. If plaintiff's contention is
correct, she is entitled to an absolute one-third of her husband's
estate, regardless of the amount of his debts; and yet, if he had
happened to die without making this assignment, and the. estate
had been administered by the probate court, she would, in all
probability, hare been entitled to nothing except the homestead,
if there was one. Any such rule would be attended with grave
practical evils, and would tend to defeat to a great extent the
purposes of the insolvency law. It is a well known fact that
property sold subject to the wife's inchoate interest will not
usually bring anything like its full value. The result would
be that the land would be disposed ^^ of without either debtor
or creditors getting the benefit of its full value, and that, too,
without the wife deriving anything but a very remtdte and
contingent advantage from the sacrifice of the property.
"We are referred to Dayton v. Corser, 51 Minn. 406, as being
in conflict with these views. In that case we held that the
sale of the land of one spouse, on execution founded upon a
judgment against the owner, did not divest the inchoate interest
of the other spouse. "Whatever might be said of the decision
if the question was res Integra, we are not disposed to overrule
or modify it. But that case and the present one are not at all
analogous. In the case of sale on execution, the estate of the
debtor is not in court for administration. No property is af-
fected except the particular tract or tracts sold. Neither are
his creditors 'n court or parties to the proceeding. There is no
way of determining who his creditors are, or how much his debts
amount to. Hence there is no way by which it can be deter-
mined what would be the just proportion of his debts to which
the wife's inchoate interest in the particular tract should be
subjected.
Goodwin v. Kumm, 43 "Minn. 403, is also relied on by plain-
tiff's counsel. That case was rightly decided on the ground
Jan. 1898.] Wolfobd v. Cook. 815
that the husband oanno-t, hy his convenants of title against the
inchoate interest of his wife in the deed of conveyance, create
by their breach a debt which will indirectly hare the effect of
devesting the wife's inchoate interest in the property conveyed.
If the opinion had put the decision of the case on that ground
alone, it would have been entirely sound; but it proceeded obiter
to announce certain other propositions, some of which are prob-
ably incorrect.
The order overruling the demurrer is reversed.
DOWER-NOT LIABLE FOR HUSBAND'S DEBTS AT COM-
MON LAW— STATUTORY CHANGES.— A sale made by an admin-
trator under an order of court of his Intestate's lands to pay or-
dinary unsecured debts proved against his estate does not bar tho
widow of the Intestate from dower: Motley v. Motley, 53 Neb. 375,
€8 Am. St. Rep. G08. Dower, provided by law in behalf of the
widow, Is paramount to all conveyances, contracts, encumbrances,
debts, or liabiltles of the husband executed or incurred by him dur-
ing coverture: Higginbotham v. Cornwell, 8 Gratt. 83, 56 Am. Dec.
130; Combs v. Young, 4 Terg. 218, 26 Am. Dec. 225. In some states
the common-law rule has been changed. For example. In North
Carolina, the sale of land under execution divests the defendant's
estate, and bars the dower of his wife, though the deed be not exe-
cuted until after the assignment of the dower: Den v. Frew, 3 Dev.
8, 22 Am. Dec. 708, and note thereto.
WoLFOED V. Cook,
171 Minnesota, 77. ]
LIMITATIONS OF ACTIONS.— PART PAYMENT OF A
DEBT, In order to take a case out of the statute, must be made
voluntarily by the debtor sought to be charged with the effect of it,
or by some one authorized by hira to make a new promise on his
behalf.
LIMITATIONS OF ACTIONS-PART PAYMENT— CREDI-
TOR AS AGENT OF DEBTOR.— A creditor cannot be made the
agent of the debtor to such an extent as to make an act done by him
operate as a new promise to himself.
LIMITATIONS OF ACTIONS— PART PAYMENT-PRO-
CEEDS OF COLLATERAL SECURITIES.— Whore collateral secu-
rity has been given by a debtor to his creditor, under an agreement
that, if necessary, the creditor sliould sell the collateral and apiJy
the proceeds on liis debt, the subsequent sale of such collateral ar.d
the application of the proceeds on the debt, to which the debtor
made no objection, will not operate as a part payment at the date
of the receipt of such proceeds, so as to interrupt the operation of
the statute of litnitatlons.
LIMITATIONS OF ACTIONS— PART PAYMENT— GIVING
ADDITIONAL SECURITY.— If a debtor, in the absence of any
circumstiinccs tending to rebut the inference of an implied prom-
ise to pay the whole debt, gives new and additional security fop
316 WoLFORD V. Cook. [Minn.
tlie payment of the debt, the proceeds of which when collected ta
be applied on the debt, it will operate as a part payment suflacient
to take it out of the statute.
LIMITATIONS OF ACTIONS-PART PAYMENT-PAY-
MENT IN GOODS.— It is not necessary, for the purpose of inter-
nipting the statute, that the part payment should be in actual
money. A payment in goods may be sufficient for that purpose.
Armstrong Taylor, for the appellants.
Jacob H. Cook and Welch, Hayne & Hubachek. for the res-
pondent.
'■** MITCHELL, J. This action was brought in February,
1897, by the legatees under the will of Peter Wolford, deceased,
to recover a balance claimed to be due on a promissory note
dated March 9, 1889, and payable seven months after date. It
is conceded that the note was ban-ed by the statute of limita-
tions, unless the running of the statute had been interrupted
by partial payments. The plaintiffs rely upon two alleged pay-
ments as having that effect. These we will consider separately.
1. Contemporaneously with the execution of the note in suit,
and as part of the same transaction, the defendant assigned to
Peter Wolford and the plaintiffs, as collateral security, certain
notes and mortgages against third parties under an agreement
that, if Wolford or the plaintiffs had to foreclose the mortgages,
they should bid in the mortgaged premises for the full amounts
due thereon, and, if no redemption was made from the sales
within the year, they should then credit defendant on his note
with the amounts for which the property was sold. These
collateral mortgages were foreclosed, and the premises bid in
by Wolford and the plaintiffs on February 17, 1890, and one
year thereafter Wolford applied the amount on defendant's note,
and subsequently sent him a statement showing that credit and
the balance due on the note, to which the defendant never made
any objection.
The principle upon which part payment of a debt will take
a case out of the statute is that such payment amounts to an
acknowledgment of the existence of the debt, from which the
law implies a new promise to pay the balance. To have that
effect, the payment must be voluntarily made by the debtor in
person who is sought to be charged with the effect of it, or by
6ome one authoriz^ed by him to make a new promise on his be-
half. It has been held, or at least intimated, in some cases, that
a sale of collaterals made within a reasonable time after they
Jan. 1898.] WoLFORD v. Cook. 317
are deposited with the creditor, and the applioation of the pro-
ceeds on the debt, will operate as a part payment at the date
of the receipt of such proceeds, so as to interrupt '"* the opera-
tion of the statute. This doctrine rests upon the mistaken
idea that the creditor is thereby made the agent of the debtor
for the collection or sale of the collaterals, ignoring the fact
that the creditor cannot be made the agent of the debtor to
such an extent as to make an act done by him operate as a new
promise to himself, without which element a payment can never
operate to remove the bar of the statute: Wood on Limitation
of Actions, sec. 101.
Wolford's right to receive the proceeds of the collateral mort-
gages, and apply them in part payment of defendant's note,
was acquired under and by virtue of the contract made at the
time the collaterals were transferred to him. His subsequent
exercise of that right was not a voluntary payment made by the
defendant from which a promise to pay the residue can be in-
ferred. The defendant had done nothing since he transferred
the collaterals to Wolford in March, 1889. The fact that he
made no objection when informed by Wolford that he had ap-
plied the proceeds of these collaterals on his note could not take
the case out of the statute. He had no reason to object, and,
if he had done so, it would have been futile. Wolford had mere-
ly exercised a contract right which he acquired in 1889. De-
fendant's passive acquiescence in the exercise of that right con-
stituted neither a voluntary payment as of that date, nor a new
promise in writing to pay the balance of the debt: Harper v.
Fairley, 53 K Y. 442; Smith v. Ryan, 66 N. Y. 352, 23 Am.
Rep. 60; Brown v. Latham, 58 N. H. 30, 42 Am. Rep. 568.
Some of the cases may be misleading, for the reason that they
seem to lay some stress on the fact that the debtor never knew
of, and consequently never assented to, the application by the
creditor of the proceeds of the collaterals. If the debtor had
any option in the matter, or any power to object effectively to
the application, there would be some force in the suggestion
that his assent to it amounted to a voluntary payment by him
as of that date. But this cannot be so where the creditor is
merely exercising an absolute legal right under the original
contract.
2. At the time the note in suit was executed, and as part of
the same transaction, the defendant, as additional collateral se-
curity for its payment, procured to be conveyed certain im-
318 WoLFORD V. Cook. [Minn.
proved real estate to Peter Wolford. While this conveyance was
in form an ®^ absolute deed, it is conceded that it was in fact
merely a mortgage, and created between the parties the relation
of mortgagor and mortgagee. The defendant remained in pos-
eession of the property, and in the receipt of the rents, until
in 1893, when the plaintiffs claimed and took possession, col-
lected the rents, and applied them upon the note in suit.
The evidence bearing on this branch of the case is very indefi-
nite and unsatisfactory, and very little attention is paid to it
in the briefs of counsel. There is evidence tending to show that
"Wolford and the plaintiffs claimed the right to collect the rents
and apply the proceeds on the note by virtue of some agreement
between them and the defendant, made contemporaneously with
the execution of the mortgage. If so, the agreement was not
enforceable: Cullen v. Minnesota Loan etc. Co., 60 Minn. 6.
But there is also evidence tending to show that the defendant
voluntarily let the plaintiffs into possession for the purpose of
collecting the rents and applying them on the note, thus placing
them in the position of mortgagee in possession. This would
amount to the giving of new and additional security for the
payment of the debt. It is not necessary, for the purpose of in-
terrupting the statute, that the part payment should be in actual
money. A payment in goods may be sufficient for tHat purpose.
So, the indorsement and delivery by the debtor of the note of
a third party as collateral security for his indebtedness to an-
other, the proceeds when collected to be applied on the debt,
may operate as a payment sufficient to take it out of the statute:
Wood on Limitation of Actions, sec. 112.
Hence, if the defendant voluntarily and in the absence of any
circumstances tending to rebut the inference of an implied
promise to pay the whole debt, turned over the rents and profits
of the mortgaged premises to Wolford and the plaintiffs, to be
by them applied, when collected, on the note in suit, this would,
in law, amount to such a part payment as would interrupt the
statute. As alreadly suggested, circumstances might rebut the
inference of any implied promise to pay the balance of the debt,
as, for example, if the defendant was merely submitting to the
exercise by Wolford and the plaintiffs of an enforceable legal
right acquired under a prior contract, or if Wolford and the
plaintiffs were asserting and ®* claiming such a right, and the
defendant yielded to the claim honestly believing that they had
Buch a right, to which he was legally compelled to submit. The
Jan. 1898.] MoFFETT v. Parker. 319
evidence on this branch of the case should have been submitted
to the jury under proper instructions. On the first branch of
the case there was nothing to submit to them.
Order reversed.
LIMITATIONS OF ACTIONS— WHAT CONSTITUTES PART
PAYMENT.— Part payment, iu ordor to arrest the ruuuing of tlie
statute of limitations, is a voluntary payment, made by the debtor
himself, or by some one authorized by him to make the payment:
Moffitt V. Carr, 48 Neb. 403, 58 Am. St. Rep. GOG. '
LIMITATIONS OF ACTIONS— PART PAYMENT— ASSIGNEE.
AS AGENT.— The payment of a dividend by the assignee of an in-
solvent debtor will not tal<e the debt out of the statute of limita-
tions as against the debtor: Whitney v. Chambers, 17 Neb. 90, 52
Am. Rep. 398, and monographic note thereto.
LIMITATIONS OF ACTIONS— PART PAYMENT— GIVING AD-
DITIONAL SECURITY— PROCEEDS OF COLLATERAL SECU-
RITY.—The delivery of the promissory note to a third person i»
sufficient to suspend the operation of the statute of limitations from
the date of delivery, but not from the date of actual payment of
the note: Smith v. Ryan, G6 N. Y. 352, 23 Am. Rep. 60. Where the
maker of a note has placed personal property In the hands of the
payee as collateral security, the payee's application thereof, with-
out notice to the debtor and his assent, will not constitute a pay-
ment warranting the inference of a new promise: Brown v, Latham»
58 N. H. 30, 42 Am. Rep. 568.
MoFFETT V. Parker.
[71 Minnesota, 139.]
MORTGAGES -RIGHTS OF ASSIGNEE - EQUITIES OP
THIRD PARTIES.— A mortgage has none of the privileges of ne-
gotiable paper, but is a mere chose in action. Hence, au assignee
thereof takes it subject to any defense that exists between the origi-
nal parties, unless they are equitably estopped by their acts, or
otherwise, from asserting it as against the assignee; but the as-
signee does not take it subject to any equities of thii-d parties of
which he has no notice.
MORTGAGES — DEFENSE AGAINST MORTGAGEE.- A
mortgagor in a real estate mortgage, given without consideration
to defraud creditors, may enjoin its foreclosure by the mortgagee.
MORTGAGE GIVEN WITHOUT CONSIDERATION TO DE-
FRAUD CREDITORS— RIGHTS OF ASSIGNEE.— Where a moit-
gage Is given without consideration, to defraud creditors, ihe
dishonest mortgagor is equitably estopped from claiming that there
was no consideration for the mortgage, as against a purchaser la
good faith, for value, and without notice.
ESTOPPEIi.— Where one, by his willful or fraudulent con-
duct, causes another to believe in the existence of certain facts»
who is thereby Induced to act on the belief, and does so In good
faith, and parts with his money in reliance Tuereon, the former
U estopped from denying the existence of such facts.
320 MoFFETT V. Parker. [Minn.
James I. Best and Eugene N". Best, far the appellants.
Albert G. Broker, for the respondents.
140 START C. J. Action by plaintiffs, as judgment cred-
itors of the defendants Samson and Hannah R. Parker, to have
canceled the mortgages hereinafter referred to, with the records
thereof, given by them upon the premises described in the com-
plaint. Judgment (from which the plaintiffs appealed) was ren-
dered in their favor, for the relief prayed, upon condition that
they first pay to the defendant Broker, as trustee of the Mer-
chants' National Bank of Wadena, $3,500 and interest.
The facts as found by the trial court are: On July 8, 1896,
the plaintiffs, upon an indebtedness which accrued December 15,
1893, ^*^ recovered and docketed a judgment against the
Parkers, each of whom is insolvent, for $1,239.11, upon which
an execution has been returned wholly unsatisfied. On Decem-
ber 27, 1895, James J. Lee held a mortgage on the premises,
"which was duly recorded, for $800, made by the Parkers to
him, which they then paid; but, for the purpose of continuing
the mortgage on the premises with the intent of hindering and
<lelaying the plaintiffs in the collection of their demand, they
caused the mortgage to be assigned by Lee to their son, Warren
E. Parker, and the assignment was recorded January 2, 1896.
On February 26, 1896, the Parkers also gave to Warren E.
Parker a mortgage on the premises for $4,000, and on the same
day they caused it to be duly recorded. This mortgage was exe-
cuted without any adequate consideration, to secure a pretended
indebtedness of $4,000, and with intent on the part of the mort-
gagors and the mortgagee to defraud creditors, and particularly
the plaintiffs, by creating an apparent lien on the premises.
Before the plaintiffs recovered their judgment, and on May
22, 1896, Warren E. Parker borrowed $3,500 from the Mer-
chants' National Bank of Wadena, and, for the purpose of pro-
curing and securing such loan, duly assigned the two mortgages
to the defendant Broker, to be held in trust for the bank, as
security for the money eo borrowed. This assignment was duly
recorded May 29, 1896. Neither Broker nor the bank then had
■any knowledge or notice of the frauds in connection with the
mortgages, or either of them, but they took such assignment
and received the mortgages as such collateral security in good
faith and without notice.
1. The correctness of the findings of fact is not challenged.
9
Jan. 1898.] Moffett v. Parkeb. 321
except in two particulars. It is claimed : 1. That the trial court
erred in not finding that the $4,000 mortgage was given without
any consideration. The finding is, that it was given without
any adequate consideration, which is, we assume for the purposes
of this appeal, the equivalent of a finding that the mortgage was
made without any consideration ; and 2. That the finding to the
effect Broker, as the trustee of the bank, was in fact a purchaser
of the mortgages in good faith for value, without notice, is not
supported by the evidence. The burden of establishing the fact
was upon Broker and the bank. The point is made that tho
evidence *'*^ received in support of the finding was not admis-
sible under the pleadings. No such objection was made at tho
trial, but simply the objection that the evidence was immaterial,
which was insufficient to call the court's attention to the plead-
ings. Besides, the record shows no exception to the ruling of
the court. We have considered the evidence, and hold it suffi-
cient to support the finding in question.
2. The remaining assignments of error are to the effect that
the trial court erred in its conclusion of law that Broker, for the
bank, was entitled to a lien on the premises by virtue of the
assignment of the mortgages to him, to the extent of $3,500 and
interest, which was superior to th$ lien of the plaintiffs' judg-
ment; or, in other words, that the judgment, in so far as it re-
quires the payment by the plaintiffs to the bank of the amount
of its loan, as a condition of having the mortgages canceled as
to it, is not supported by the facts found.
The real question is, then, whether the bank is equitably en-
titled to hold as against the plaintiffs the $4,000 mortgage to se-
cure its loan of $3,500. If it is, then it is wholly immaterial
whether it is entitled so to hold the $800 mortgage; for, if it
be conceded that it is not, still the fact remains that the $4,000
mortgage exceeds the bank's claim, and the cancellation of the
$800 mortgage would not affect its lien for the full amount of
its claim, or subordinate its lien to that of the plaintiffs' judg-
ment. It would seem, however, that the $800 mortgage, having
been assigned and delivered to Warren E. Parker at the request
of the mortgagors, for the purpose of continuing it as a mort-
gage on the premises to defraud creditors, should be treated
as a mortgage made to him without consideration, to defraud
creditors. Be this as it may, the conclusion we have reached
renders it unnecessary to refer further to the $800 mortgage.
It is the settled law of this state that a mortgage has none
AM. 81. REP.. Vol. LXX.— 21
322 MoFFETT V. Parker. [Mini>.
of tlie privileges of negotiable paper, but is a mere chose in
action; hence an assignee thereof takes it subject to any defens'e
that exists between the original parties, unless they are equitably
estopped by their acts, or otherwise, from asserting it as against
the assignee. But it does not follow from this preposition that
the plaintiffs ^^^ have any equity superior to the bank to have
the mortgage canceled, for it is equally well settled, at least in
this state, that the assignee of a mere chose in action or of past
due negotiable paper, takes it subject to the equities of the orig-
inal parties thereto, but not as to any equities of third parties
of which he has no notice: Newton v. Newton, 46 Minn. 33;
Plymouth Cordage Co. v. Seymour, G7 Minn. 311.
Now, the plaintiffs had the equitable right to subject the
premises in question to the payment of their claim against the
mortgagors, and to have the mortgage canceled as against the
mortgagee. But this was an equity external to the mortgage.
They were not parties to it, and the bank parted with its money
in reliance upon the mortgage and the assignment thereof in
good faith, without any notice of the equity of the plaintiffs.
Therefore the equity of the former as between it and the plain-
tiffs is the superior. But the plaintiffs' equity against the mort-
gagors and mortgagee is clear, and if the bank cannot retain
and enforce the $4,000 mortgage, to the extent of the loan
against the mortgagors, the plaintiffs are also entitled to have
the mortgage canceled as to the bank as well, for, if the bank
has no equity as against the mortgagors which it can enforce,,
then the cancellation of the mortgage cannot injure it.
This brings us to the pivotal question in this case: Has the
bank the equitable right to enforce this mortgage to the extent
of its loan against the mortgagors. It must be conceded that, if
the mortgagee had attempted to enforce this mortgage, the
mortgagors could defeat his action by showing want of consid-
eration, although the mortgage was executed for the purpose of
defrauding their creditors. It was held in Bickford v. Johnson,
36 Minn. 123, that a mortgagee in a chattel mortgage given
without consideration, for the purpose of defrauding the cred-
itors of the mortgagor, could not enforce his mortgage. The
case of Stevens v. McMillin, 37 Minn. 509, seems to introduce
a discordant note, and to hold to the contrary; but the matter
was fully and finally considered in Devlin v. Quigg, 44 Minn.
634, 20 Am. St. Rep. 592, and the conclusion reached that a
mortgagor in a real estate mortgage given without consideration,
to defraud creditors, might *** enjoin its foreclosure by the mort-
Jan. 1898.] Moffett v. Parker. 323
gagee. In so deciding the court did not disregard the rule tliat
courts will not exert their powers to extricate parties from the
consequences of their dishonesty. On the contrary, the decision
rests upon the principle that parties to a contract will not be
permitted to show its dishonest character as between themselves.
Neither will be allowed to prove his own turpitude for the pur-
pose of cheating the other. So when the mortgagor, in an action
by the mortgagee to foreclose the mortgage, establishes the fact
that there was no consideration for the mortgage, the mortgagee
cannot be permitted to rebut this defense by showing that the
mortgage was made and received for the purpose of defrauding
creditors.
The reasons why a fraudulent mortgagee may not enforce a
mortgage given without consideration to defraud creditors do
not apply to a bona fide assignee without notice, who has parted
with his money for the mortgage. It will not do to group the
general rules we have referred to in the form of a syllogism, and
reason thus: The assignee of a mortgage takes it subject to any
defense existing between the original parties. The mortgagor
who gives a mortgage without consideration, to defraud his cred-
itors, may plead and prove, as against the mortgagee, the want
of consideration as a defense. Therefore the assignee (the bank
in this case) cannot enforce this mortgage against the mort-
gagors for any amount.
The defect in this logic is, that it is not always true that the
assignee of a mortgage takes it subject to defenses between the
original parties. The conduct and acts of a mortgagor may be
such as equitably to estop him from asserting a defense against
the assignee which would be open to him as against the
mortgagee. Where one, by hiy willful or fraudulent conduct,
causes another to believe in the existence of certain facts,
who is thereby induced to act .on the belief, and does so in good
faith, and parts with his money in reliance thereon, the former
is estopped from denying the existence of such facts: Tousley
V. Board of Education, 39 Minn. 419.
Now, in this case, if the bank brings an action against the
mortgagors to enforce this mortgage, if they answer that the
mortgage was given without consideration, the bank will not
be in the position *** of the fraudulent mortgagee, who would
not be permitted to show the real transaction, because it would
be alleging and proving his own turpitude, but the bank may,
in rebuttal, allege and prove the facts as to the making of the
mortgage and its purchase of it, as found by the trial court.
324 MoFFETT V. Parker. [Minn.
The whole dishonest transaction may be given in evidence.
Such facts show, upon the plainest principles of morals and
equity — they are identical — that the mortgagors are equitably
estopped from claiming, as against the bank, that there was no
consideration for the mortgage given to defraud their creditors.
We are not dealing with a case where the maker of a note
or mortgage has, through no fault of his own, been induced to
give it without any consideration. In such a case, he is not
estopped, by a recital under his hand and seal, that the instru-
ment was given for a valuable consideration, to show that such
was not the fact. But we are dealing with a case where the
mortgagors, for the dishonest purpose of defrauding their cred-
itors, willfully and fraudulently represented, under their hands
and seals, that they owed the mortgagee $4,000, and that they
gave him a lien on their real estate to secure its payment. And,
further, for the purpose of making it appear to the world that
such indebtedness and lien in fact did exist, they, as the trial
court found, themselves caused this representation to be spread
upon the public records, there to remain a continuing declara-
tion that it was an honest mortgage. They also delivered this
solemn and formal representation to the mortgagee, for the pur-
pose of furthering their design of defrauding their creditors.
For this dishonest purpose they put it in his power to cheat
honest men. The bank, in reliance upon these representations,
the mortgage and its record, in good faith and without notice
parted with $3,500.
Shall the honest assignee of this mortgage or the dishonest
mortgagors suffer this loss? Our answer is, the mortgagors. Tt
would be a reproach to the administration of justice to hold
otherwise. They are estopped as against the assignee from as-
serting the defense that the mortgage was executed without con-
sideration, in order to defraud their creditors. In so holding,,
we do not *^^ impinge upon the rule that a mortgage is a non-
negotiable chose in action.
So far as we are advised, there are but few adjudged cases upon
this question. We have not been referred to any opposed to the
conclusion reached. The case of Bloomer v. Henderson, 8 Mich.
395, 77 Am. Dec. 453, was one where an action was brought
against the mortgagor, mortgagee, and assignee to set aside a real
estate mortgage, on the ground that it was given to defraud the
plaintiff, and without consideration. It did not appear that there
was any negotiable note connected with the mortgage, and it
was treated as a chose in action, and held that the assignee took
Jan. 1898.] Moffett v. Parker. 826
the mortgage subject to all equities existing between the mort-
gagor and the mortgagee, but not as to any equities of the plain-
tiff; and, further, that the mortgagor could not set up, as against
the assignee in good' faith, that the mortgage was given to de-
fraud creditors, and without consideration, Christiancy, J.,
speaking for the court, said, at page 404: "He [the mortgagor],
at least, cannot be heard to complain if an assignee has chosen
to act upon the presumption that it was executed for an honest
purpose, and by an honest man. To hold otherwise would be to
encourage fraud, rather than to suppress it."
The case cited is not directly in point, as it was also disposed
of upon the further ground that it was intended by the mort-
gagor that the mortgagee should sell the mortgage. See, also,
the case of Sleeper v. Chapman, 121 Mass. 404, wherein it was
held that the assignee, without notice, of a mortgage given in
fraud of creditors, acquires a good title against the creditors of
the mortgagor. The bank, having the equitable right to enforce
the mortgage against the mortgagors to the extent of its lo^n,
and its equity being superior to that of the plaintiffs to have
it set aside, it follows that the judgment must be affirmed.
So ordered.
MORTGAGES — RIGHTS OF ASSIGNEE — EQUITIES OF
THIRD PARTIES AGAINST ASSIGNOR.— The general rule, as
stated broadly, is that the assignee of a mortgage takes it subject
to all equities in favor of the mortgngor existing at the time of the
assignment: Horstman v. Gerlver, 49 Pa. St. 282, 88 Am. Dec. 501.
But this general rule is subject to the exception noted in the prin-
cipal case, that the mortgagor may be estopped from setting up
any equities that may exist in his favor: Wilson v. Ott, 173 Pa.
St. 253, 51 Am. St. Rep. 767. But an assignee. Without notice, does
not talve the mortgage subject to any equity of a third person
against the assignor: Mott v. Clarlj, 9 Pa. St. 309, 49 Am. Dee. 5GG;
James v. Morey, 2 Cow. 246, 14 Am. Dec. 475. And where the mort-
gage is accompanied by a negotiable note, which is assigned be-
fore maturity and for a valuable consideration, the assignee talies
the securities free of any equities existing between the original pT-
ties of which he had no notice: Williams v. Keyes, 90 Mich. 290,
30 Am. St Rep. 438; Webb v. Hoselton, 4 Neb. 308, 19 Am. Rep. 038.
But see the note to James v. Morey, 14 Am. Dec. 514.
ESTOPPEL.— For the requisite to constitute an estoppel, see
Blodgett v. Perry, 97 Mo. 263. 10 Am. St Rep. 307; Sweeney v.
Pratt. 70 Conn. 274, 66 Am. St Rep. 101.
326 ScANLAN V. Grimmeb. [Minn.
SoANLAN V. Grimmer.
[71 Minnesota, 351.]
NAMES, CONTRACT UNDER ASSUMED— IDENTITY.— A
person, not engaged In a fraudulent or criminal purpose, may enter
into a contract under any name he may choose to assume. All that
the law looks to is the identity of the individual, and when that
is established the act will be binding upon him and upon others.
NAMES, CONTRACT UNDER ASSUMED-KNOWLEDGE
OP OTHER PARTI.— A contract entered into under an assumed
name is binding, even though the other parties thereto were in-
duced to believe that the assumed name was the person's real name,
and though such parties were opposed to entering into a transac-
tion with the person himself.
MORTGAGES--USURY— GRANTEE ASSUMING MORT-
GAGE—ESTOPPEL.— A vendee who accepts a conveyance of laud
subject to a mortgage thereon, and containing a covenant whereby
such vendee assumes and agrees to pay said mortgage, is estopped
from asserting that the obligation secured thereby is usurious.
S. L. Pierce, for the appellant.
J. A. Sawyer, for the respondent.
*^'* COLLINS, J. Action to determine adverse claims to
real property, the actual purpose being to set aside and cancjel
a mortgage thereon of date January 12, 1894, purporting to
have been executed and delivered to one John B. Alexander, as
mortgagee, to have been assigned to one Maggie A. Henningsen
by Sylvester Davis, as attorney in fact ^^^ for said Alexander,
and subsequently assigned by Henningsen to defendant Grim-
mer, who alone answered in the action.
The primary and principal question in the case grows out of
the fact that the money loaned to plaintiff's husband, Martin
Scanlan, who then owned the land, belonged to Davis himself,
and was furnished by him for the express purpose of making
the loan, under an agreement entered into by him with one Glea-
Bon, who was found by the court to have been his agent in the
matter, that, for all of the necessary purposes of the transaction,
Davis should assume the name of John B. Alexander, that the
moneyshould be loaned to Scanlan as belonging to a man bearing
that name, that the note should be made so payable, and that
John B. Alexander should be named as mortgagee in the mort-
gage. The agreement was carried out; the note and mortgage were
so written; Davis delivered the amount of the loan, two thou-
sand dollars, to Gleason in Scanlan's presence; and the former
paid out for the latter, and upon his authority, in liquidating
existing liens on the land, between eighteen hundred dollars and
Jan. 1898.] Scanlan v. Grimmeb. 327
nineteen hundred dollars. It appears that Gleason kept the
balance of the money for himself. The note and mortgage were
delivered to Davis, and by him the mortgage was put upon
record.
Subsequently Scanlan and his wife sold, and by warranty deed
conveyed, the premises to a son, Joseph Francis. The latter
€Oon afterward sold, and by warranty deed conveyed, the same to
another 8on,Patrick, and then he sold,and by warranty deed con-
veyed, the land to this plaintiff. Each of these deeds was in
the usual form, but to the covenant against encumbrances in
€ach was added this language: "Except a mortgage for two thou-
sand dollars to John B. Alexander, dated January 12, 1894,
which mortgage and interest the party of the s^econd part as-
sumes and agrees to pay."
In October, 1894, Davis, pretending to act by virtue of a
power of attorney and as the constituent of John B. Alexander,
in writing assigned the note and mortgage to Mrs. Henningsen.
The fact was that Davis' son signed the name of John B. Alex-
ander to the writing, purporting to be the power, at the instiga-
tion of his father and Gleason; the latter, as a notary public,
pretending to take and certifying ^^** to Alexander's acknowl-
edgment thereof. Of this Mrs. Henningsen was ignorant. She
was a bona fide purchaser, and paid to Davis two thousand dol-
lars in cash for the note and mortgage. She then sold, and in
writing assigned, the same, with a covenant as to the amount
clue thereon, to the defendant Grimmer, who was also a pur-
chaser in good faith, paying two thousand dollars in cash. Scan-
lan paid one year's interest upon the note — to whom does not
appear.
On its findings, in accordance with the above statement of
facts, the court below held, as conclusions of law, that the note
and mortgage were usurious, but that by reason of the assump-
tion clauses in the warranty deeds, whereby title to the premises
was rested in this plaintiff, the defense of usury was waived,
and that the latter was estopped from interposing such defense.
It also held that the mortgage, power of attorney, and assign-
ments were each absolutely null and void, and that plaintiff was
entitled to the relief demanded in her complaint as against de-
fendant Grimmer.
As stated at the outset, the main question here is the one
covered by the conclusion that the mortgage was and is void
because Davis, for the purposes of the transaction and for some
undisclosed reason, assumed the name of Alexander as mort-
328 ScANLAN V. Grimmer. [Mini*.
gagee. The court seems to have been of the opinion that be-
cause the mortgagors were misinformed and misled, and in-
tended to mortgage their land to Alexander, and not to Davis^
the instrument was absolutely void for want of necessary parties,
and therefore defendant Grimmer, an innocent purchaser, who
parted with his money in good faith, is to be deprived of his se-
curity, and probably made to lose his investment. Any rule or
doctrine which would result in such a gross injustice would have
to be exceedingly well settled before we could indorse and adopt
it.
Fortunately, we are not confronted with such a case. The court
below failed to apply the true and well-settled rule to the facts.
It overlooked the distinction between the assumed name of a
person actually identified and a wholly fictitious name without
an identified person behind it. The evidence, as well as the find-
ings of fact, conclusively shows that Davis assumed the name of
Alexander, and identified him as the real mortgagee under the
assumed name. In assuming this name in a business transaction,
Davis was ^"" not engaged in a fraudulent or criminal purpose,
and he could bind himself as well as other persons by its adop-
tion and use. In Wakefield v. Brown, 38 Minn. 361, 8 Am. St.
Rep. 671, it was held that, although a grantor of land executed
a conveyance thereof under an assumed name, such conveyance
would be effectual to convey title if the grantor was in fact the
true owner; and that in such a case evidence outside the in-
strument could be introduced to identify the actual grantor.
While not so stated, it is obvious that this conclusion was
founded upon the established rule of law that in business mat-
ters a contract or obligation may be entered into by a person
by any name he may choose to assume. All that the law looks
to is the identity of the individual, and, when that is ascer-
tained and clearly established, the act will be binding upon him
and upon others: Bell v. Sun Printing etc. Co., 10 Jones & S.
567; In re Snook, 2 Hilt, 566. See, also, Toole v. Peterson,.
31 N. C. 180; Thomas v. Wyatt, 31 Mo. 188, 77 Am. Dec. 640.
There is nothing in the contention of counsel, evidently quite
potent with the court below, that the mortgagors were induced
to believe that they were dealing with a person named Alexander
and that, according to their own testimony, they were opposed
to entering into such a transaction with Davis, of whom they
had heard "had reports": See Fellowes v. Lord Gwydyr, 1 Sim.
C3, 1 Russ. & M. 83. Their contract with the mortgagee was
with him and his assigns, as is usual in such transactions. They
expressly authorized an assignment of this instrument. Had the
Jan. 1898.] Scanlan v. Grimmer. 329
mortgagee actually borne the name of Alexander, he could have
at once assigned to Davis without consulting the mortgagors.
The point is too far-fetched and fanciful to be of value. The
trial court erred when finding that the mortgage lacked a mort-
gagee, and when holding it to be void.
There was no error in the conclusion of the trial court that •
the defense of usury was unavailing to plaintiff. In each of the
deeds whereby title to the mortgaged property was transferred
from plaintiff's husband to herself was the assumption clause
heretofore quoted. The land was conveyed to plaintiff, as it had
been to her immediate and remote grantors, subject to the
mortgage for two thousand dollars, which mortgage, with in-
terest, she as grantee assumed and agreed ^^^ to pay. This is
a covenant on which an action is ordinarily maintainable against
a vendee: Follansbee v. Johnson, 28 Minn. 311.
Of course, we do not decide that the defense of usury could
not be successfully interposed in such an action, for the ques-
tion is not in this case. A vendee who accepts a conveyance
of land subject to a mortgage thereon, and containing a cove-
nant whereby such vendee assumes and agrees to pay said mort-
gage, is estopped from asserting that the obligation secured
thereby is usurious. The whole title of such vendee rests upon
the conveyance, and the continued existence of the mortgage,
aa an encumbrance, forms a part of it. The conveyance is evi-
dence of title, and when proven, as such evidence, the existing
mortgage and the assumption thereof is also proven. A grantee
cannot be permitted to claim title *T)oth under and against the
same deed; to insist upon its efficacy to confer a benefit, and
repudiate a burden with which it has qualified it; to affirm a
part and reject a part." The proposition above laid down in
respect to the estoppel is more than supported by the authori-
ties: Calkins v. Copley, 29 Minn. 471; Parkinson v. Sherman,
74 K Y. 88, 30 Am. Rep. 268; Pidgeon v. Trustees of Schools,
44 111. 501; Gibson v. Lyon, 115 U. S. 439. See, also, 27 Am.
& Eng. Ency. of Law, 953, notes 1, 2.
Judgment reversed, and new trial ordered.
NAMES-CONTRACTS UNDER ASSUMED.— Where a party
adopts a name, he will be holden by contracts executed in such
name, whether the name so assumed be an artificial one or the
proper name of a living person: Pease v. Pease, 35 Conn. 131. 95
Am. Dec. 225. If the true owner conveys property by any name,
the conveyance as between the grantor and grantee will transfer
the title: Fallon v. Kehoe, 38 Cal. 44. 99 Am. Dec. 347, and noto
thereto. A chattel mortgage executed by a party under a floti lous
name is valid: Alexander v. Graves, 25 Neb. 453, 13 Am. St. Rep.
501.
330 Cooper v. Hayward. [Minn.
MORTGAGES— USURY.— AN ASSIGNEE OF THE MORT-
<5AGOR, standing In legal privity witli the mortgagor, may avoid
tlie contract for an excess of usury, and is entitled to the proper
reduction on the mortgage, to enable him to perform his contract,
and by payment to relieve the mortgaged premises from the en-
cumbrance, in favor of a purchaser from the mortgagor: Banks v.
McClellan, 24 Md. 62, 87 Am. Dec. 594.
Cooper v. Hayward.
[71 Minnesota, 374.]
EXECUTORS AND ADMINISTRATORS— CONTRACTS-
ACTION ON PROMISSORY NOTE FOR BENEFIT OF AN-
OTHER.— Where a promissory note is taken in the name of one
party for the benefit of another, the administrator of the payee may
maintain an action on it.
ESTATES OF DECEDENTS— ASSETS DISPOSED OF BY
SOLE HEIR— RECOVERY BY ADMINISTRATOR.— Where, be-
fore an administrator is appointed of an estate, agamst which
there are no debts proved or to be proved, a sole heir and distri-
butee makes an equitable assignment of all her interest and the
interest of the estate in certain personal property, such assign-
ment Is binding upon an administrator subsequently appointed on
the petition of such sole heir and distributee, and he cannot re-
cover the property disposed of.
RELEASE— IGNORANCE OF CLAIM.— A party cannot re-
lease a claim of which he had no knowledge, and of the existence
of which he had always been fraudulently kept in ignorance.
M. D. Taylor, for the appellants.
G. W. Stewart, for the respondent.
*''** CANTY, J. This is the second appeal in this action:
See Cooper v. Hayward, 67 Minn. 92. After the decision on
the former appeal, the case was again tried in the court helow,
and, at the close of the trial, the judge ordered a verdict for
plaintiff for the amount of the note and interest. From an
order denying a new trial defendant appeals.
It appears by the evidence that in 1887 defendant's brother,
"W. H. Ilayward, and his father, J. E. Hayward, were associated
together as partners in the lumber business, under the firm name
of W. H. Hayward & Co. ; that the brother had at that time but
little property of his own; that the father furnished all the capi-
tal for the business, and had besides a considerable amount of
individual property; and that the brother was manager of both
the partnership business and most of the father's individual
business, and had authority to draw checks on the partnership
Jan. ISiJS.J Cooper v. Hayward. 331
funds in the bank, and also to draw checks in his father's name
on the individual funds of the latter in the bank. At this time
defendant was financially embarrassed, and was about to lose
some of his property on chattel mortgages.
The evidence tends to prove that there had been some trouble
between him and his father, and he did not want the latter to
know that his property was mortgaged. So he applied to his
mother for ^"^^ assistance, and she requested her son, W. H.
Hayward, to draw checks on said partnership funds in payment
of defendant's debts. W. H. Hayward at first refused to do this,
as he feared the father would discover what he had done. There-
upon she told him that she would be responsible for it, and
would stand between him and his father, if the latter discovered
it. Then W. H. Hayward drew the checks in payment of de-
fendant's debts, either wholly on the partnership funds, or
partly on those funds and partly on the individual funds of the
father, and, when these debts were thus paid, defendant exe-
cuted to W. H. Hayward the note in suit for the amount of the
payments. W, H. Hayward died in 1890, and the father in
1895. The evidence also tends to prove that the father, dur-
ing his lifetime, never knew or discovered that any of his funds,
or the partnership funds, went to pay the debts of the defend-
ant, or that the latter had executed the note to his brother. On
these facts, it was held on the former appeal that there was a
good consideration for the note.
The note being taken in the name of W. H. Hayward, he
would, under section 5158 of the General Statutes of 1894, have
a right to maintain an action on it, even though he had no bene-
ficial interest in it at all. Under section 4297 of the General
Statutes of 1894, a trust estate does not, on the death of the
trustee, descend to his heirs or pass to his personal representa-
tives, as it did at common law, but the execution of the trust
vests in the district court, and it appoints a new trustee. But
we cannot hold that this statute applies to such a case as this,
where no trust appears on the face of the instrument, and it is
merely a case of a promissory note being taken in the name of
one party for the benefit of another. Then the administrator
of the payee of the note can maintain the action wfether the
amount recovered will be held for the estate of W. H. Hayward,
or the estate of his father, or partly for each estate. This is
what was held on the former appeal.
But some additional facts have since come into the case which
have been set out in plaintiff's supplemental complaint. It is
332 Cooper v, Hayward. [Minn.
alleged in this complaint, and admitted in the answer to it, that
the widow of W. H. Hayward is his sole heir and distributee.
It is alleged, and appears by the evidence given on the last trial,
that after his death, and before an administrator of his estate
was appointed *'''' she and the father entered into a contract,
by the terms of which, for a certain consideration, she assigned
to the father, and released to him, all her interest in the part-
nership property and assets, and the father released her and the
estate of W. H. Hayward from all debts due from the latter to
the father or to the partnership.
After the father's death his estate was administered in the
probate court, and on March 1, 1897, the decree of distribution
was entered, which, after assigning specific portions of the es-
tate to different heirs and distributees, assigned all the balance
of the estate of four certain distributees. On May 3, 1897,
these four distributees, by an instrument under seal, released
and discharged defendant from all claims which they may have
had on account of this note. Plaintiff admitted on the trial
that there were no debts proved, or to be proved, against the es-
tate of W. H. Hayward, and, as his widow was his sole heir and
distributee, it was competent for her to make an equitable as-
signment of all her interest and the interest of his estate in the
property and assets of the partnership, and the assignment
which she has so made to the father is binding on the plaintiff,
the administrator: See Vail v. Anderson, 61 Minn. 552; 1
Woemer's Am'erican Law of Administration, sec. 201 ; 2 Woer-
ner's American Law of Administration, sec. 566; Foote v.
Foote, 61 Mich. 181. In the case of Wiswell v. Wiswell, 35
Minn. 371, it did not appear that the widow who sold the horse
was the sole distributee, and that there were no debts proved
OT to be proved against the estate. In the case at bar, these
things appear conclusively. The plaintiff was appointed ad-
ministrator on the petition of the widow herself, more than five
years and a half after she had made said settlement with the
father as surviving partner. Then, if the beneficial interest in
the note in suit was in the father or in the partnership firm at
the time of the death of W. H. Hayward, such interest had
passed to the father by said assignment from the widow, has
been assigned to said four distributees by said residuary clause
in said decree of the probate court, and defendant has been re-
leased by them from liability.
Then, since the former appeal, it has become material to de-
termine whether, on the one hand, the whole beneficial interest
Jan. 1898.] . Cooper v. Ha\ward. 833
in this ^"^^ note was in W. H. Hayward at the time of hia
death, or whether, on the other hand, such interest was in his
father or in the partnership firm. The evidence tends to prove
that the consideration for this note came originally out of the
partnership funds or the individual funds of the father, or
partly from each. W. H. Hayward in his lifetime, and his es-
tate after his death, were liable to the father for the funds so
taken without the father's knowledge or consent; and it can-
not be held that by the release of all claims against the son's
estate, made by the father in his contract with the widow, he
released a claim of which he had no knowledge, and of the ex-
istence of which he had always been fraudulently kept in igno'
ranee. There is no evidence that W. H. Hayward accounted to
the father in any manner for the funds thus drawn out. He
might have accounted to the father for them as being funds
drawn out for his ovra use and benefit, without disclosing to the
father that they were applied to the payment of defendant's
debts, and, if he did so account, the beneficial interest in this
note would thereby have become vested in him. The partner-
ship contract provided that true books of account should be
kept, and, at least once in each year, there should be an account-
ing, the profits and losses ascertained, and the profits, if any,
divided. But it does not appear that any such books were ever
kept or any such accounting was ever had.
We are of the opinion that the evidence would warrant the
jury in finding that the funds which went to pay defendant's
debts were drawn out of the father's funds, or out of the funds
of the partnership, or partly out of each; that W. H. Hayward
never accounted to his father for the funds thus drawn out, but
that the loss of the same remained the loss of the father or of
the partnership, or partly of each, until after the death of W. H.
Hayward; and therefore the court erred in ordering a verdict
for plaintiff.
The order appealed from is reversed, and a new trial is
granted.
CONTRACTS MADE FOR BENEFIT OF THIRD PARTY-
RIGHT OF ACTION.— If a promise or contract has been made be-
tween two parties for the benefit of a third, an action will lie
thereon, at the instance and in the name of the party to be bene-
fited, although the promise or contract was made without his knowl-
edge, and without any consideration moving from him: Brown v.
Markland. 16 Utah, 360. 67 Am. St. Rep. 629. and note.
EXECUTORS AND ADMINISTRATORS— RIGHT TO SUE.— An
executor of a testator, having been clothed with commission of the
probate court, is vested with the title to all the movable property
334 Nicollet Nat. Bank v. Fuisk-Tukneii Co. [Minn.
and riglits of action which the deceased possessed at the instant of
his death: Peterson v. Cheniical Bank. 32 N. Y. 21, SS Am. Dec.
298. But see Horsliius v. Williamson, 1 T. U. P. Charlt. 145, 4 Am.
Dec. 703, where it was held that where a bond is made payable
to A, as the executor of B, and A dies, the right to sue upon the
bond was in the representative of A, and not B.
Nicollet National Bank v. Feirk-Turner Co.
[71 Minnesota, 413.]
CORPORATIONS— POWERS.— A corporation possesses only
those properties which the charter of its creation confers upon it,
either expressly, or as incidental to its very existence.
CORPORATIONS — DEFINITIONS. —"AN INCIDENTAL
POWER is one that is directly and immediately appropriate to the
execution of the specific power granted, and not one that has a
slight or i-emote relation to it."
CORPORATIONS— CONSTRUCTION OF ARTICLES OF IN-
CORPORATIONS—MANUFACTURING.— A corporation, whose ar-
ticles of incorporation state that "its business shall be the manu-
facturing of clothing of every description, and the sale of clothing
so mannfactiu'ed, and the transaction of all other business neces-
sary and incidental to such manvifacture and sale of clothing," is a
manufacturing corporation within the meaning of article 10, section
3, of the Minnesota constitution.
CORPORATIONS, MANUFACTURING -WHEN ARTICLES
OP INCORPORATION DO NOT AUTHORIZE THE CONDUCT-
ING OF A MERCANTILE BUSINESS.— The buying and selling of
ready-made clothing is purely a mercantile business, and is un-
authorized by the articles of Incorporation of a manufacturing cor-
poration permitting "the transaction of all other business necessary
and incidental to such manufacture and sale of clothing."
CORPORATIONS— POWERS— DIRTIES OF THIRD PER-
SONS.—Strangers or third persons are presumed to know the law of
the land, and are bound, when dealing with corporations, to know
the powers conferred by their chai'ters.
CORPORATIO:*S. CHARACTER OF — HOW DETER-
MINED.— At least in the absence of a fraudulent attempt to evade
the law, the articles of incorporation are themselves the sole cri-
terion to ascertain the purpose for which the corporation was
formed.
CORPORATIONS-BUSINESS NOT AUTHORIZED BY AR-
TICLES OP INCORPORATION— LIABILITY OF STOCKHOLD-
ERS.—The mere fact tliat a corporation has done some business
outside that authorized by its articles does not render the stock-
holders, as such, liable for Its corporate debts, to the amount of
stock owned or hold by them, although the stockholders would be
80 liable, under the state constitution, if such business had Ijeen au-
thorized by its articles.
A. B. Jackson, for the appellant.
Koon, Whelan & Bennett, Keith, Evans, Thompson & Fair-
child, Wilson & Van Derlip, C. J. Kockwood, and H. M. Farnam,
for the respondenta.
Feb. 1898.] Nicollet Nat. Bank t;. Frisk-Turner Co. 335
*^^ BUCK, J. The plaintiff bank recovered a judgment
against the Frisk-Turner Company on July 28, 1896, for the
sum of fourteen thousand four hundred and forty-three dollars
and sixteen cents, on which an execution was returned unsatis-
fied. On July 24, 1896, said company made an assignment,
under the insolvency laws of this state, to Willard T. Atwater,.
one of these defendants-. The total value of "^^^ the assets,
which came into the assignee's possession and control did not
exceed three thousand dollars. The plaintiff brought this ac-
tion, by supplemental complaint, to enforce the individual lia-
bility of the shareholders of the Frisk-Turner Company. The
receiver of the City Bank of Minneapolis filed an intervening^
complaint, asking permission to participate in the sum recov-
ered on a claim which said City Bank had against the Frisk-
Turner Company.
The question involved in this issue is, whether the stock-
holders of the Frisk-Turner Company are liable for the plain-
tiff's debt evidenced by the judgment so rendered against it.
The company was organized as a corporation under the laws of
this state, and the material article of the corporation is article
1, which reads as follows: "The name of the corporation shall
be Frisk-Turner Company, and the principal place of transact-
ing its business shall be at Minneapolis, in the state of Minne-
sota, and its business shall be the manufacturing of clothing of
every description, and the sale of clothing so manufactured, and
the transaction of all other business necessary and incidental to-
£uch manufacture and sale of clothing."
The corporation, after publishing its articles and completing-
its organization, began active business November 1, 1890. In ad-
dition to its own manufacture of men's and youth's clothing, and
the sale thereof, it, as part of its business, bought, handled, and
sold large invoices of children's manufactured ready-made
clothing. These ready-made goods were purchased and handled
by defendant in the ordinary course of jobbing business. The
ordinary jobber's profit was added to the cost price, and the
goods were then put on the market for sale. Defendant's sales-
men solicited orders for them, as well as for the goods manu-
factured by defendant, and sold these ready-made goods either
independently and separate from the goods of defeudant's manu-
facture, or in conjunction with the latter, as customers might
desire. They were not bought to fill orders previously received
from customers, but were bought and sold, for profit, inde-
pendently of the goods manufactured by defendant. The total
336 Nicollet Nat. Bank v. Frisk-Tubneb Co. [Minn.
sales made by defendant company while engaged in business
■aggregated about one million dollars. The sales of children's
clothing bought by *^'' defendant ready-made aggregated from
five to seven per cent of the total volume of sales, or from fifty
thousand dollars to seventy thousand dollars.
The defendants contend that, under these articles of incorpo^
ration, they are authorized to manufacture in part, and buy in
p&rt from other manufacturers, and to sell all the stock so ac-
quired, as ordinary jobbers or wholesalers, without incurring the
shareholder's liability which would have attached if they had
declared these double purposes plainly in their articles. On
the other hand, plaintiff alleges that this suit is brought upon
the ground that the corporation was in fact organized for mer-
cantile as well as manufacturing purposes, and depends wholly
on the provisions of the constitution, and that any competent
evidence to show that the defendant company was not organized
exclusively for manufacturing purposes, so as to come within
the exception to that provision, was admissible.
The constitution, article 10, section 3, provides that: "Each
fitockb older in any corporation (excepting those organized for
the purpose of carrying on any kind of manufacturing or me-
chanical business) shall be liable to the amount of stock held
or owned by him.'*
A corporation, being the mere creature of the law, "possesses
•only those properties which the charter of its creation confers
«pon it, either expressly, or as incidental to its very existence" :
Marshall, C. J., in Trustees v. Woodward, 4 Wheat. 518-636.
The articles of incorporation in question do not authorize the
Frisk-Turner Company to buy and sell clothing manufactured
by concei-ns other than its'elf. Such business would be a purely
^'mercantile business," and the latter words and "manufacturing
or mechanical business" are not interchangeable terms. Both
kinds of business might, under the constitution and laws, be car-
ried on in conjunction by one corporation, if the articles so
provided; but the liabilities of the stockholders would in such
case be different from those of a corporation organized to carry
on an exclusively manufacturing or mechanical business, under
article 10, section 3, of the constitution.
In the phrase, "the transaction of all other business neces-
sary and incidental to such manufacture and sale of clothing,'*
•we find **** no warrant for such corporation including in its
business a purely mercantile business, such as buying and gelling
ready-made clothing.
Feb. 1898.] Nicollet Nat. Bank v. Frisk-Tubnee Co. 337
"An incidental power is one that is directly and immediately
appropriate to the execution of the specific power granted, and
not one that has a slight or remote relation to it"; Hood v.
New York, 23 Conn. 1, 16.
The exercise of a power which might be beneficial to the prin-
cipal business is not necessarily incident to it. It might be the
€xercise of a power inhibited by the constitution, or one not
warranted by law, while the principal business might be per-
mitted by both. The constitution exempts the stockholders in
any corporation carrying on manufacturing or mechanical busi-
ness from liability to the amount of the stock held or owned
by him, and its purpose is self-evident. "That purpose was to
encourage manufacturing enterprises, by exempting those in-
vesting their capital in that business from personal liability**:
State V. Minnesota Thresher Mfg. Co., 40 Minn. 213, 222.
In this case if the buying and selling of ready-made cloth-
ing by virtue of its articles of incorporation is authorized
under the guise of being incidental to the manufacturing and
selling of its own manufactured clothing, it is difficult to see
just where the partition line may be found between the prin-
cipal business and that which is incidental to it. If the buy-
ing and selling of fifty thousand dollars to seventy thousand
dollars* of ready-made clothing in a business of one million
dollars is only incidental, who shall determine whether the buy-
ing and selling of half a million dollars' worth, more or less, of
ready-made clothing is not also merely incidental. If the di-
rectors, at their option or election, can thus shift the amount
and dividing line, that which is claimed to be incidental in the
articles of incorporation will become the principal, and the
original principal business merely incidental.
The liability of stockholders cannot rest upon any such un-
certain or transitory basis. The evidence of defendants tend-
ing to show that the buying and selling of children's ready-
made clothing by the corporation was necessary to the success-
ful manufacture and sale of its own clothing cannot change
the legal effect of the language used in its articles of incorpo-
ration; and the result of such business **® ending in insol-
vency, does not carry a very strong conviction that even the
buying and selling of ready-made clothing was a necessary in-
cident to the successful manufacture of its own clothing.
The sale of its own manufactured goods is within the con-
stitutional provision conferring the power to carry on the manu-
facturing business, because such business would become futile
AM. ST. Rkp., Vou LXX.-22
Nicollet Nat. Bank v. Frisk-Turner Co. [Minn»
if such products could not be disposed of with profit. So, also,
buying the raw material for the purpose of manufacturing it
into articles of commerce and selling the same would be within
the power conferred by the constitutional provision in question,,
and its articles of incorporation. It would enable it to carry
on the manufacturing business contemplated by the very lan-
guage of the constitution itself. But, as the buying and sell-
ing of ready-made clothing is purely a mercantile business, it
is unauthorized by the articles of incorporation.
This brings us to the question whether the fact that the cor-
poration exceeded its powers in buying and selling children'^
clothing already manufactured, coupled with the fact that
eeveral of the incorporators, with knowledge thereof on the part
of all the directors and stockholders, after the signing of the
articles, and before the commencement of the manufacturing-
business, purchased several hundred dollars' worth of manu-
factured children's clothing, with intent to sell the same, and
employed salesmen for that purpose, rendered the individual
stockholders liable.
While the evidence vras excluded as to the acts of said in-
corporators, we assume that such would have been the proven
fact, had not the objection to its admission been sustained.
The buying and selling such ready-made clothing by the cor-
poration, to the amount of fifty thousand dollars to seventy
thousand dollars was admitted, and that it was carried on for
a series of years, necessarily requiring the employment of clerks
and salesmen. Hence, we feel justified in assuming, for the
purpose of this decision, that the facts offered to be proven
were true. But do these facts alter the liability of the stock-
holders ?
This corporation was evidently organized under the Laws of
1873, chapter 11, and subsequent amendments, being the same-
as incorporated into the ■*^^ General Statutes of 1894, section
2805, and subsequent sections upon the same subject. Section
2807 of this statute provides that: "The purpose for which
every such corporation shall be established shall be distinctly
and definitely specified by the stockholders in their articles of
association, and it shall not be lawful for said corporation to
direct its operations or appropriate its funds to any other pur-
pose."
The articles in question were duly recorded in the office of
the register of deeds of Hennepin county, where the corporatioa
was located, and filed and recorded in the office of the secre-
tary of state, and published in a public newspaper, as required
Feb. 1898.] Nicollet Nat. Bank v. Frisk-Turnek Co. 339
by law. Strangers or third persons are presumed to know the
law of the land, and are bound, when dealing with corporations,
to know the powers conferred by their charters: Kraniger v.
People's Building Soc, 60 Minn. 94. The act of the corpora-
tion in buying and selling ready-made clothing was not only a
direct violation of the law above quoted, but a violation of the
articles of its incorporation. But this violation was well known
to the plaintiff, from actual knowledge received as to what the
corporation was doing and intended to do, as well as from its
presumptive knowledge of the contents of the articles so re-
corded and published, and the law above quoted. The repre-
sentation of the incorporators was not made upon an apparent
authority based upon private papers, to which strangers had no
access, but that they were buying and selling, and intended to
continue to buy and sell, ready-made clothing in violation of
law and their articles of incorporation, which plaintiff, knowing
such acts to be unlawful, had no right to rely upon.
What the result would be if it appeared that the whole
scheme ^as a fraudulent contrivance on the part of the corpo-
rators to evade their constitutional liability we need not con-
sider. There were not the slightest indicia of fraud in the
whole transaction. It was not alleged or proved, and was speci-
fically disclaimed by plaintiff's counsel on the argument of this
case. Nor were such representations the acts of the corpora-
tion. The charter was the measure of its power as to all parties
dealing with it. At least, in the absence of such fraudulent
attempt to evade the law, the articles of incorporation are them-
selves the sole criterion to ascertain the purpose '**^ for which
the corporation was formed. But the mere fact that, as in this
case, it had done some business outside that authorized by its
articles, does not render the stockholders, as such, liable for its
corporate debts, to the amount of stock owned or held by them.
There are no authorities in this court to the contrary of the
views herein expressed. In the case of Hastings Malting Co. v.
Iron Eange Brewing Co., 65 Minn. 28, it was held that the gen-
eral nature of the business of the corporation, as defined by its
articles of incorporation, was the manufacture or brewing of
lager beer, and selling and disposing of the same, together with
such other business as might be incidental thereto, and hence
that it was exclusively a manufacturing corporation, and its
stockholders not liable for the corporate debts, beyond the
amount due on their stock subscription. The liability of the
corporation for dealing in business outside of that authorized
by its articles was not involved. First Nat. Bank v. Winona
340 NicoLLBT Nat. Bank v. Fbisk-Tubner Co. [Minn.
Plow Co., 58 Minn. 167, was a case where it appeared from its
articles that it was not only formed for the manufacture and
eale of farm implements, hut for the purchase and sale of others
already manufactured; and it was held that it was not organized
for the purpose of carrying on an exclusively manufacturing
business, and its stockholders were held liable for its corporate
debts to the amount of their stock. Densmore v. Shepard, 46
Minn. 54, involved the construction of articles which provided
that the general nature of the business was to be **the manu-
facturing and sale of lime, quarrying stone for making lime
and for building and other purposes, digging and selling sand,
together with the buying and selling of lime, hair, sand, cement,
end like articles, and other building materials, and the doing of
all things necessary to carry on said business"; and it was held
that it was not organized exclusively for the purpose of carry-
ing on a manufacturing business. In other cases where the
Bame rule was applied, the articles themselves authorized the
carrying on or doing some kind of independent business in ad-
dition to that of manufacturing, and such cases have no con-
trolling influence on the question here involved. The power
to do such independent business was there given by the articles,
and, in going beyond the manufacturing business, the corpora-
tion still kept '^^ within the limits of its charter; but in so
doing the stockholders became liable, not because they had
violated the law, but because their articles authorized the cor-
poration to carry on a business other than that of manufactur-
ing, though in strict compliance with that authorized by the
articles themselves. The distinction is obvious.
What other remedies creditors may have against those in the
management or control of the affairs of a manufacturing cor-
poration, who have extended, or authorized the extension of,
its business beyond what was authorized by its articles, is a
question not now before us.
Order affirmed.
CORPORATIONS— POWERS.— A corporation possesses only such
powers as are expressly Riven It by law, and such Implied powers
as are necessary to enable It to exercise the express powers thus
plven: Franklin Nat. Bank v. Whitehead. 149 Ind. 560. O? Am. St.
Rep. 302, and note; Port of Mobile v. Louisville etc. R. R. Co., 84
Ala. 115. 5 Am. St. Rep. 342.
CORPORATIONS— AN INCIDENTAL POWER Is one that In di-
rectly and Immediately appropriate to the execution of the specific
power granted, and not one that has a sli.srht or remote relation to
It: People v. Chicago Gas Trust Co., 130 111. 2GS, 17 Am. St. Rep.
819.
Feb. 1898.] Fonda v. St. Paul City Ry. Co. 341
CORPORATIONS— POWERS-DUTIES OF THIRD PERSONS.—
lie who deals with a corporation Is chargeable with notice of Ita
powers and the purposes for which it was formed, and, when deal-
ing with its agents or officers, is bound to know the extent of their
powers and authority: Jemlson v. Citizens' Sav. Bank, 122 N. Y. 135,
19 Am. St. Rep. 482; Durkee v. People 155 111. 354, 46 Am. St Rep.
340; Franklin Nat. Bank v. Whitehead, 149 Ind. 5G0, 63 Am. St.
Rep. 302; Elevator Co. v. Memphis etc. K. R. Co., 85 Tenn. 703, 4
Am. St. Rep. 798.
CORPORATIONS— CHARACTER OF.— The character of a cor-
poration, whether public or private, depends upon the purposes for
which it was formed, and the powers conferred upon It, and not
upon the character of its stockholders: Bardstown etc. R. R. Co. v.
Metcalfe, 4 Met (Ky.) 199, 81 Am. Dec. 541.
Fonda v. St. Paul City Railway Company.
(71 MINN80TA, 438.]
STREET RAILWAYS— EVIDENCE— GENERAL INCOMPE-
TENCY OF MOTORMAN.— Evidence of the general incompetency
of a motorman, based on the observations of witnesses who had
seen him operate his car on prior occasions, is inadmissible to es-
tablish negligence at the time of the accident
STREET RAILWAYS— MASTER AND SERVANT— EVI-
DENCE—RULES OP COMPANY.— The private rules of a master
regulating the conduct of his servants in the management of his
own business, intended only for the guidance of his servants, al-
though designed for the protection of others, are not admissible in
evidence to establish negligence on the part of the master.
NEGLIGENCE— STANDARD OF DUTY.— A person cannot
by the adoption of private rules, fix the standard of his -duty to
others.
STREET RAILWAYS— CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE-
WANTON CONDUCT OF MOTORMAN.— A plaintiff may recover
of a street railway company, notwithstanding that he might have
negligently placed himself in a place of danger. If the conduct of
the motorman In running him down was wanton and willful, or if,
after discovering the plaintiff In a place of danger in time to have
prevented the injury by the exercise of reasonable care, he failed
to do so.
CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE— POWER OF DEFEND-
ANT TO AVOID CONSEQUENCES OF PLAINTIFF'S NEGLI-
GENCE.—The doctrine that a plaintiff may recover if the defend-
ant might, by the exercise of care, have avoided the consequences
of the plalntlCTs negligence, is only applicable to cases In which the
plaintiff's negligence preceded that of the defendant. But when
the negligence of the two persons is contemporaneous, and the fault
of each operates directly to cause the injury, neither can recover
from the other.
CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE— WILLFUL ACT OF DE-
FENDANT.—Where the defendant's acts are willful and inten-
tional, the negligence of the plaintiff. If any, is no longer deemed
In law a proximate cause of the Injury.
COMPARATIVE NEGLIGENCE.— The doctrine of compara-
tive negligence has never been recognized in Minnesota.
342 Fonda v. St. Paul City Ry. Co. [Minn.
PRESUMPTION — SUPPRESSION OF EVIDENCE. — The
presumption arising from the spoliation or suppression of evidence
that it would, if produced, be unfavorable to the party destroying
or suppressing it, is not limited to the case of documentary evi-
dence in the exclusive possession and control of the party.
WITNESS, FAILURE TO CALL — PRESUMPTION — IN-
STRUCTIONS.—The omission of the defendant to call its motorman
as a witness, though available, will justify the court in instructing
the jury that, in weighing the evidence introduced, they are at
liberty to indulge in the presumption that the testimony of the
motorman, if introduced, would not have been favorable to the de-
fendant's cause.
Munn & Thygeson, for the appellant.
Stevens, O'Brien, Cole & Albrecht, for the respondent.
'*43 MITCHELL, J. The plaintiff, a stranger to and not an
employe of, the defendant, recovered a verdict for personal in-
juries caused by the alleged negligence of defendant's servants;
and from an order denying its motion for Judgment, notwith-
standing the verdict, or for a new trial, the defendant appealed.
1. The first three assignments of error challenge the suffi-
ciency of the evidence to justify the verdict, for the reasons:
1. That it failed to establish any negligence on the part of the
defendant; and 2. That it conclusively appeared that the plain-
tiff himself was guilty of contributory negligence.
The accident occurred at or near the easterly intersection of
Walnut and Seventh streets, in the city of St. Paul. These
streets intersect each other at right angles, the course of Wal-
nut sfreet being northerly and southerly, and that of Seventh
street easterly and westerly. The width of Seventh street from
curb to curb is forty-six feet. Along the middle of this street
the defendant has two parallel tracks, the northerly track being
used by west-bound and the southerly by east-bound cars.
These tracks are four and three-quarters feet wide, and the
space between them is a little less than four feet — sufficient to
permit cars to pass each other in safety.
In the forenoon of the day of the accident, plaintiff had
traveled southerly, down Walnut street, to Seventh, for the
purpose of taking an east-bound car going down town. He had
reached the northeast corner of Walnut and Seventh, and then
started to cross the latter, for the purpose of getting on the
south side of the southerly track in order to take his car. His
testimony as to what occurred is as follows: "Just as I left the
sidewalk to cross Seventh street, I looked up, and looked both
ways. I saw a car approaching from the east over a block away,
and I also looked the other way toward the west, and there was
Feb. 1898.] Fonda v. St. Paul City Ry. Co. 848
a car coming from that way too; and I walked out on the rails,
and my intention was, as I walked out there, to *** get across
the rails, before the east-bound car got down there (the car I
was going to take). As I walked out on the track, that east-
bound car got down there, and I couldn't cross it. So I hesi-
tated a minute as the car got down by me. Then I started to
walk around the tail end. Just as I started to walk around
the tail end, and took a few steps, this west-bound car came
along, and struck me, and knocked me down."
Leaving out of consideration for the present plaintiff's state-
ment as to the distance of the west-bound car when he looked
eastward, this testimony photographs quite correctly the gene-
ral situation and manner in which the accident occurred. Evi-
dently, the plaintiff estimated that he had time to cross both
tracks before either car would reach the street crossing, but he
overestimated the length of time it would take the east-bound
car to arrive. Hence, whan he reached the space between the
two tracks, he found the east-bound car in too close proximity
to enable him to cross in front of it, and then hurriedly turned
to the west in order to go around the rear end of it. He tes-
tified that when he looked west, as he started to cross Seventh
street, the east-bound car was a little this side of the middle of
the block (that is, the block immediately west of Walnut street),
and was coming down a pretty good gait.
The testimony of other witnesses as to the respective dis-
tances of the two cars when plaintiff started to cross Seventh
street is conflicting. Plaintiff testified that he walked across
Seventh street at an ordinary gait, of three or four miles an
hour, until he turned to the west to pass around the end of the
€ast-bound car, when he increased his speed. After he looked
east, as he stepped from the curbstone to cross Seventh street,
he did not again look to see how far the west-bound car was from
him. Just as he stepped upon the northerly track, he signaled
the east-bound car to stop. He testified that he heard the gong
on the east-bound, but not on the west-bound, car. The other
evidence was conflicting as to whether any signal was given on
the latter of its approach to the street crossing.
The evidence as to the rate of speed of the west-bound car
when it reached the Walnut street crossing, and passed the
other car, varied from seven or eight miles up to fifteen or twenty
miles an hour. Other evidence in the case is, perhaps, con-
clusive that the latter is an overestimate; but the jury would
have been amply *^ justified in finding that it was consider-
ably more than seven or eight miles; also, that its previous rate
844 Fonda v. St. Paul City Ry. Co. [Minn.
of speed was not at all slackened as it approached tlie street
crossing. Approaching Walnut street from the east, Seventh
street is on a downgrade, and on that forenoon the rails of the
track were somewhat wet and slippery from recent rain. The
motorman on the west-bound car was not produced as a wit-
ness on the trial. There were numerous other facts and cir-
cumstances in evidence having more or less bearing upon th&
questions of defendant's negligence and of plaintiff's contribu-
tory negligence, but what has been stated will give a fairly cor-
rect and complete idea of the general drift of the evidence.
The conjuncture of circumstances was such as to require
peculiar caution on the part of the motorman on the west-
bound car. He was approaching the crossing of two much-
traveled- streets in a populous part of the city. He knew, or
ought to have known, that he was about to pass another car,
and that, too, on the side of the crossing where it was liable to
stop to let off or take an passengers — a place of peculiar danger.
The jury were abundantly justified in finding that he was guiltj
of negligence.
The question of plaintiff's contributory negligence was, under
the evidence, also a question for the jury. A court would not
be justified in holding, as a matter of law, that he was negligent.
The number of concurring circumstances that bear upon that
question makes the case peculiarly one for a jury.
The strongest argument that can be advanced against th©
plaintiff's conduct is that he did not continue to watch the west-
bound car after he left the curb to cross Seventh streeit. But
it must be remembered that the distance he had to travel waa
very short, and would occupy only a very few seconds. He would
apparently have crossed the north track in safety but for the
(to him) unanticipated arrival of the east-bound car. Doubt-
less, his attention was directed to that car, which was the one
he desired to board; but the situation was one which was calcu-
lated to distract his thoughts from the west-bound oar. He
was suddenly confronted with an unexpected emergency, with
little time to decide on his course of action. He had seen, as
the jury might have found, the west-bound car quite a distance
away when he started to cross Seventh street. He had '*'*^ no-
reason to anticipate that it would be run at any unlawful or
unusual rate of speed. On the contrary, he might reasonably
expect that it would, in accordance with what everyone knows
of the general custom, approach with caution and slackened
speed a street crossing, where another car going in the opposite
direction was about to stop to take on or let off passengers. Our
Feb. 1898.] Fonda v. St. Paul City Ry. Co. 345
conclusion is, that the evidence justified the verdict; but, for
errors of law occurring on the trial, there must be a reversal.
3. Upon the trial, the court, against the objection of defend-
ant, admitted evidence of the general incompetency of the
motorman, based on the observations of witnesses who had seen
him operate his car on prior occasions. We think this was error.
The defendant is liable, if at all, for the acts of its servant
upon the doctrine of respondeat superior. If the motorman
was negligent on this occasion, the defendant is liable, no matter
how competent he was or how habitually careful he had been on
other occasions. On the othei hand, if he was not negligent
on this occasion, the defendant is not liable, notwithstanding
that he may have been incompetent or habitually careless on
former occasions. The sole issue, aside from that as to plain-
tiff's contributory negligence, was whether or not the motor-
man was guilty of negligence at the time of the accident.
When the act or omission is proved, whether it be actionable
negligence is to be determined by the character of the act or
omission itself, and not by the character of prior acts of the
party committing it. If the plaintiff could offer testimony as
to the general incompetency or as to prior negligent acts or
omissions of the motorman, then with equal propriety the de-
fendant, upon the issue of contributory negligence, might offer
evidence of plaintiff's general carelessness, or of his negligent
acts on other occasions. Indeed, we do not see why plaintiff
would not, upon the same principle, have the right to introduce
evidence that he himself was an habitually careful and cautious
man. As the liability of a master for the acts of his servant
rests upon the doctrine of respondeat superior, it can mate no
difference as to the admissibility of such evidence whether the
alleged negligent act was committed by the servant or by the
master in person. Hence, if the offered evidence was admissible
'*^'" in tbis case, it would have been equally competent had the
defendant been a natural person, and operating the car himself,
to prove that he was incompetent to perform such work, or had
performed it negligently on former occasions.
There are some cases which hold that where the person in-
jured was killed, and there were no eyewitnesses of the occur-
rence, the general character of the deceased as a careful and
prudent man may be shown, for the purpose of raising a pre-
sumption that he was not negligent on the occasion in question.
But this rule is based upon the supposed necessities of the case,
and is repudiated by very eminent authorities. There is also
a line of authorities which holds that, where the issue is whether
346 Fonda v. St. Paul City Ry. Co. [Minn.
a particular act or a particular way of doing it is or is not negli-
gent, evidence is admissible to show that people generally under
similar circumstances do the act, or do it in the same way.
This is upon the ground that what men generally do under like
circumstances is some test of ordinary care. But the^e cases
have no bearing upon the question now under consideration.
Many of the authorities cited by plaintiff's counsel are cases
where a servant brought an action against his master for injuries
caused by the negligence of a fellow-servant. In such cases,
the doctrine of respondeat superior does not apply, the gist of
Action being the negligence of the master in employing or re-
taining an incompetent servant. A moment's reflection will
show that such cases are not at all in point. One or two of the
€ases cited by counsel were actions against the vendor for breach
of warranty as to the efficiency of a machine in certain particu^
lars going to its general mechanism, and where it was held that
it was competent to show that other machines of the same pat-
tern, made and sold by the same vendor, had been tried and
found defective in the same particulars. The principle upon
which these cases proceed is very apparent, and is the same upon
which, in "fire eases," it has been held that it is competent to
show that the locomotive alleged to have started the fire in
■question started other fires about the same time.
"We have examined all of the numerous cases cited on this
■question, and find that, aside from obiter remarks in one or
two of which ^^^ the question was not involved or not raised,
only the following at all tend to support plaintiff's contention,
viz.: Vicksburg etc. E. R. Co. v. Patton, 31 Miss. 156, %& Am.
Dec. 552; State v. Manchester, 52 N". H. 528; Craven v. Central
Pac. R. R. Co., 72 Cal. 345; State v. Boston etc. R. R. Co., 58
N. H. 410. But a careful examination of these cases shows that
all they hold (unless it is the first) is that when evidence is con-
flicting as to whether a person, in conducting his business or
performing his services, performed a particular act, or performed
it in a particular way, it is competent to show that he was in
the habit of performing the act or performing it in that particu-
lar way, not as evidence of character or of fitness or unfitness,
but simply as having some tendency to show that on the par-
ticular occasion in question he probably did the act, or did it in
a particular way, in accordance with his general habit or cus-
tom.
Whether this rule is corr et or incorrect, it falls short of sus-
taining tbe contention of plaintiff's conn<5el in the present case.
The evidence introduced was not directed or limited to showing
Feb. 1898.] Fonda v. St. Paul City Ry. Co. S47
that the motorman was in the habit of doing or omitting to do
some particular act which the other evidence tended to prove
that he did or omitted to do on the occasion in question. It
was to the effect that he was generally incompetent, as shown
in a variety of ways, by his method of managing his . car on
former occasions. In brief, the inference sought to be drawn
is, that if he was generally incompetent, it was more probably
that he operated the car improperly on this occasion. Such an
inference might at first blush seem to be a legitimate one, but
it is too remote and conjectural to be permissible. Any such
rule of evidence would drag innumerable collateral issues into
the trial of a case; for evidence of general incompetency would
necessarily result in the introduction of evidence of particular
acts.
3. The court also admitted in evidence, over defendant's ob-
jection, its rules intended only for the guidance of its own em-
ployes in the operation of its cars. We think this was error.
There was no evidence that the plaintiff had any knowledge of
the existence of these rules or of any custom, based upon them,
as to the manner of operating cars; hence his conduct could
not have been in any way affected or influenced by them. It
is not claimed that these ■*** rules require or permit anything
that is inconsistent with reasonable care. The theory upon which
they were offered was that they tended to show what duty the
defendant owed to the public in the operation of its cars, and
hence that a violation of any of them, being a breach of such
duty, constituted actionable negligence, or at least was evidence
of it.
Private rules of a master regulating the conduct of his ser-
vants in the management of his own business, although designed
for the protection of others, stand on an entirely different foot-
ing from statutes and municipal ordinances designed for the pro-
tection of the public. The latter, as far as they go, fix the
standard of duty toward those whom they were intended to
protect, and a violation of them is negligence in law or per se.
But a person cannot, by the adoption of private rules, fix the
standard of his duty to others. That is fixed by law, either statu-
tory or common. Such rules may require more, or they may
require less, than the law requires; and whether a certain course
of conduct is negligent, or the exercise of reasonable care, must
be determined by the standard fixed by law, without regard to
any private rules of the party.
Under some circumstances, such rules may become an im-
848 Fonda v. St. Padl City Ry. Co. [Minn,
portant factor in the application of legal principles to the con-
duct of a person; as, for example, where the rule was known
to him, and he governed, or had a right to govern, his conduct
accordingly. Such was the case of Smithson v. Chicago Great
Western, 71 Minn. 216. In that case the rule was known to,
and obligatory upon, both the party injured and the party
guilty of the alleged negligent act. Each was bound to know
that the other might and could regulate his own conduct on the
assumption that he would obey the rule. Some of the cases cited
by counsel come within this class, and hence have no applica-
tion here. Others were cases of servants against their masters,
in which the gist of the action was the failure of the master
to perform his absolute duty to his servants to make and pro-
mulgate rules which, if observed, would give reasonable protec-
tion to his employes. These cases are equally inapplicable. Some
are oases of municipal ordinances, which, for reasons already
given, are not in point.
There are a few cases which support plaintiff's contention,
but in ^^^ none of them is the question considered or discussed
at any length, and in some of them no reason whatever is given
for the decision. The only reason assigned in any of them why
such evidence is admissible is that it is in the nature of an
admission by the party promulgating the rule that reasonable
care required the exercise of all the precautions therein pre-
scribed: Georgia R. R. Co. v. Williams, 74 Ga. 723; Lake Shore
etc. Ry. Co. v. Ward, 135 111. 511. The fallaciousness and un-
fairness of any such doctrine ought to be apparent on a moment's
reflection. The effect of it is, that the more cautious and care-
ful a man is in the adoption of rules in the management of his
business in order to protect others, the worse he is off, and the
higher the degree of care he is bound to exercise. A person may,
out of abundant caution, adopt rules requiring of his employes
a much higher degree of care than the law imposes. This is
a practice that ought to be encouraged, and not discouraged.
But, if the adoption of such a course is to be used against him
as an admission, he would naturally find it to his interest not
to adopt any rules at all.
To treat the adoption of such rules as an admission against
the party would involve the same principle as treating repairs
or improvements made after an accident as an admission of prior
defects — a doctrine long since repudiated by this court, and now
repudiated by most of the courts of the country : Morse v. Minne-
apolis etc. Ry. Co., 30 Minn. 465. If we could hold, as a matter
of law, that these rules required nothing more than was required
Feb. 1898.] Fonda v. St. Paul City Ry. Co. 349
in the exercise of reasonable care, their admission would be error
without prejudice; but an examination of them satisfies us that
we cannot so hold.
4. The court instructed the jury, in substance, that the plain-
tiff might recover, notwithstanding that he might have negli-
gently placed himself in a place of danger, if they found that
the con-duct of the motorman in running him down was wanton
and willful, or if, after discovering the plaintiff in a place of dan-
ger in time to have prevented the injury by the exercise of
reasonable care, he failed to do so. Counsel do not dispute the
correctness of this instruction as an abstract proposition of law,
but contend that there was no evidence to justify the court in
submitting any such ■**** question to the jury. In this, we think,
they are right. The jury might have been justified in finding
that the motorman was grossly negligent, under the circum-
stances, in running his car at so high a rate of speed, and also
in failing to keep a proper lookout to discover people on the
track; but we do not think that there was any evidence that
would have justified them in finding that he wantonly and will-
fully injured the plaintiff, or that he discovered him in a place
of danger in time to have avoded the accident.
Counsel for plaintiff contend that it was not necessary, in order
to make the instructions applicable, that the motorman should
have actually seen the plaintiff in a place of danger in time to
have avoided the injury; that it waa sufiicient if, in the exercise
of due care, he ought to have discovered him. Any such rule in
cases of concurrent negligence proximately contributing to the
injury would practically do away with the doctrine of contribu-
tory negligence altogether.
It is sometimes said that the plaintiff may be entitled to re-
cover if the defendant might, by the exercise of care, have
avoided the consequences of the plaintiff's negligence. But this
doctrine is only applicable to cases in which the plaintiff's negli-
gence preceded that of the defendant. But when the negligence
of the two persons is contemporaneous, and the fault of each
operates directly to cause the injury, neither can recover from
the other: Bigelow on Torts, 311.
The true question in all eases is whether there was negligence
on part of the plaintiff contributing directly as a proximate cause
to the injury. If there was, he cannot recover. Where the de-
fendant's acts are willful and intentional, the negligence of the
plaintiff, if any, is no longer deemed in law a proximate cause
of the injury. In such cases the willful and intentional acts of
the defendant are deemed the sole proximate cause, and the neg-
350 Fonda v. St. Paul City Ry. Co. [Minn.
ligence of the plaintiff only the remote cause, or, more properly
speaking, the mere occasion, of the injury. The same is true
where, after discovery of plaintiff's negligence in time to avoid
injury to him, the defendant neglects to exercise due care to do
BO. Some confusion of ideas has arisen from the fact that courts,
especially in the older decisions, have frequently used the word
"gross'* as if synonymous with "willful" and "wanton," thereby
conveying the impression that ^''^ a plaintiff may recover, not-
withstanding his own contributory negligence, provided the neg-
ligence of the defendant was gross. This would be to adopt
the doctrine of comparative negligence, which has never been
recognized by this court.
5. The defendant did not call its motorman as a witness, al-
though it appeared that during the trial he was seen on one oc-
casion in conversation with its counsel, and on another at its
car barn in the city of St. Paul. In view of this fact, the court
instructed the jury that: 1. "If either party to this action has
failed to adduce evidence within its control which is reasonably
calculated to throw light upon the conduct and responsibility of
either party, such failure may be considered by the jury as tend-
ing to militate against the contention of such party with refer-
ence to the issue regarding which such evidence would have been
pertinent."
This is assigned as error. The presumption, arising from the
spoliation or suppression of evidence, that it would, if produced,
be unfavorable to the party destroying or suppressing it, obtains
with most force to the case of documentary evidence in the ex-
clusive possession and control of the party. But the presump'
tion is not necessarily limited to such cases. It is true that
no unfavorable inference arises in ordinary cases from the mere
failure to call as a witness one whom the other party had the
same opportunity of calling or one whose testimony would be
merely cumulative. There is also great danger of such a pre-
sumption being allowed to supersede the necessity of other evi-
dence, instead of being used merely as a means of weighing
the effect of the evidence actually produced applicable to the
subject in dispute. But here the motorman was presumably the
person, of all others, who could have fully and accurately in-
formed the jury just how he operated the car, and explained what
he did and what he saw. Instead of calling him, the defendant
contented itself with calling bystanders, passengers, and oth-
ers whose knowledge on the subject in dispute was pre-
sumably much less full and accurate. It is true, the plaintiff
might have procured his attendance by subpoena, and thus ob-
Feb. 1898.] Fonda v. St. Paul City Ry. Co. 351
tained his testimony; but he was not bound to do so. This would
have amounted substantially to going "into the enemy's camp'*
for evidence, and ^^^ calling the very man charged with the neg-
ligence which caused the injury.
Under the circumstances, we think the omission of the defend-
ant to call him as a witness would have been a legitimate subject
of comment to the jury by plamtiff's counsel, and that tliera
would iiave been no error in the court's instructing the jury that,,
in weighing the evidence introduced, they would be at liberty
to indulge in the presumption that the testimony of the motor-
man, if introduced, would not have been favorable to defend-
ant's cause: See 1 Jones on Evidence, sec. 16 et seq., and cases
cited.
But, for the errors already referred to, the order appealed from
must be reversed, and a new trial granted.
So ordered.
RAILROAD COMPANIES— EVIDENCE— HABITS OF CON-
DUCTOR.—Evidence of the habits and competency of a conductor
In the employ of a railroad company is admissible: Pennsylvania
R. R. Co. V. Books. 57 Pa. St. 339, 98 Am. Dec. 229. But see Ga-
hajran v. Boston etc. R. R. Co., 1 Allen, 187, 79 Am. Dec. 724, and
note.
RAIIiROAD COMPANIES.— BREACH OF RULES of a railroad
company by its employes does not necessarily raise an inference of
negligence: Philadelphia etc. R. R. Co. v. Spearen, 47 Pa. St. 300,.
86 Am. Dec. 544.
STREET RAILWAYS — CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE —
WILLFUL CONDUCT OF EMPLOYE.— Although a person with a
wagon drives incautiously upon a street railway track at a public
crossing, the company cannot recklessly run him down, and then
shield itself from liability on the ground that such person was negli-
gent in the first instance: Hall v. Ogden City etc. Ry. Co., 13 Utah,
243. 57 Am. St. Rep. 72G.
RAILROAD COMPANIES — NEGLIGENCE — WHERE BOTH
PARTIES ARE NEGLIGENT.— If both parties are negligent, the
true rule is, that the party who last has a clear opportunity to avoid
an accident, notwithstanding the negligence of his opponent. Is con-
sidered solely responsible for it: Thompson v. Salt Lake Rapid
Transit Co., 16 Utah. 281, 67 Am. St. Rep. 621; Keefe v. Chicago etc.
Ry. Co., 92 Iowa, 182, 54 Am. St. Rep. 542.
NEGLIGENCE— GOMPARATIVE.—The doctrine of comparative
negligence has never been recognized in Missouri: Hurt v. St. Louis
etc. Ry. Co., 94 Mo. 255, 4 Am. St. Rep. 374.
WITNESSES— FAILURE TO CALL.— It is the defendant's duty.
In an action for negligence, to call and examine a witness whose
fault caused the injury, and, if he fails to do so. all legal presump-
tions are unfavorable to his testimony: Barnes v. Shreveport City
L R. Co.. 47 La. Ann. 1218, 49 Am. St. Rep. 400.
S52 Mebcantu-e National Bank v. Macfarlane. [Minn,
Meeoantilb National Bank v. Macfarlane.
[71 Minnesota, 497.]
INSOLVENCY— CREDITOR— COLLATERAL. SECURITY.—
The rule that a creditor of an insolvent, having collateral suffi-
■cient to satisfy a part only of his debt, is entitled to prove the
whole of his claim, and cannot be required to allow credit for any
•collections made after the date of the insolvency, does not apply
where the Insolvent's liability is that of indorser upon negotiable
notes, which it discounted to a third party, his liability becoming
fixed subsequent to the insolvency, and where there is no indebt-
■edness indeijendent of the notes.
NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS — RELATION OF IN-
DORSER AND HOLDER.— The relation of an indorser and a holder
of negotiable paper is analogous to that of a principal and surety.
INSOLVENCY — NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS — CLAIM
OF HOLDER AGAINST INSOLVENT INDORSER.— Where the
holder of a bill or note applies to prove his debt against the estate
of an insolvent surety, any sum actually received in payment from
another party to the obligation must be deducted from the amount
to be proved. The sum actually remaining unpaid must be the basis
tipon which the dividend is to be computed.
INSOLVENCY— NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS— RIGHTS
OF HOLDER AGAINST INSOLVENT INDORSER.— The holder of
■& note or bill indorsed by an insolvent need not enforce its col-
lection, as against parties primarily liable, before he can make a
claim upon the Insolvent estate. Nor is he required to surrender
up the obligation as a condition to participating in dividends. In
the absence of statute he may proceed against the Insolvent estate,
And also against the other parties to the obligation, until his debt
is fully collected.
SUBROGATION— INSOLVENCY— RIGHT OF ACTION OF
RECEIVER.— The receiver of an insolvent Indorser has a right of
«,ction against the original obligors upon the paper, upon the pay-
ment of a dividend to the creditor holder; and upon full payment,
the estate of the insolvent la subrogated to all of the creditors'
rights as against prior parties.
INSOLVENCY— ATTACHMENT— EFFECT ON RIGHTS OF
•CREDITOR.— A proceeding in attachment, unnecessary to protect
the creditor as to money of an Insolvent debtor In the creditor's
liands, will not affect the creditor's right to prove the balance of
■his claim, and to share In the distribution of the Insolvent's estate.
William C. White, for the plaintiff.
Billson, Congdon & Dickinson, for the defendant.
*** COLLINS, J. Macfarlane became the duly appointed
and legally qualified receiver of the Security Bank of Duluth,
an insolvent, August 16, 1896, under the provisions of the Laws
of 1895, chapter 145. On that day, the claimant, a banking in-
stitution in New York City, held commercial paper and notes
previously discounted and indorsed by the insolvent, and not yet
due, to the amount of $62,600. The insolvent also had on de-
posit with claimant, in New York, a sum exceeding $19,000.
Feb. 1898.] Mercantile National Bank.t;. Macpablank. 353
Immediately after the insolvency, other creditors of the in-
flolvent instituted proceedings, and attached this deposit; where-
upon the claimant commenced action, attached the money on
deposit and also the notes before referred to, which it had already
discounted. Subsequently, by stipulation and an order of the
court, the receiver and claimant bank settled up and caused to
be released these attachments, and out of this settlement the
bank received nearly $13,000. It had also received, on account
of and as payments upon the indorsed paper, after the receiver
was appointed, and prior to the day this cause was submitted
to the court for its decision, nearly $18,000, so that there re-
mained due to it, upon the indorsement on the day last men-
tioned, July 13, 1897, the sum of $32,269.79.
In February, 1897, the bank filed its claim with the receiver,
alleging the amount due and unpaid on account of the indorse-
ments made by the insolvent to be $33,731.68, besides interest
and protest fees. On this claim the receiver allowed the sum of
$27,756.60, and no more. The claimant then appealed to the
district court, alleging in its complaint that the actual amount
due on ^®® its claims was erroneously and incorrectly stated when
presented to the receiver, and that it should have been $62,600,
besides certain protest fees. A trial resulted in findings of fact
to the effect, in addition to the facts above stated, that the bal-
ance due claimant bank on account of the indorsed paper on
said July 13, 1897, amounted to $32,269.79; that the bank still
retained possession of all of said indorsed notes, except such
thereof as had been fully paid by the makers; and that it as-
sumed to hold and enforce the remainder as against makers and
indorsers prior to the insolvent's indorsement.
The court found, as matters of law, that the claimant bank was
entitled to have been allowed, as a claim against the insolvent
estate, the sum last mentioned, subject, however, to the condi-
tion that, before being allowed to participate in any dividend
or dividends which had been theretofore or should be thereafter
declared, the claimant should be required to account to the re-
ceiver for all moneys paid as principal upon the notes held by
it subsequent to the date last mentioned, the amount thereof
to be deducted from the sum allowed as a claim, the unpaid
balance to be the sum or basis upon which dividends were to
be computed and paid to said claimant, such accounting and
deduction to be made as often as any dividend is declared in
which the claimant seeks to participate, and that claimant be
entitled to retain and collect all of such paper, subject to its
AM. St. Rkp., Vou LXX.— 28
854 Mercantile National Bank v. Macfarlanb. [Minn*
obligation to account for collections, when seeking to participate'
in dividends. Judgment was entered on these conclusions, and
cross appeals taken.
On claimant's appeal it is contended that the trial court erred
in not allowing as a claim against the estate, and as a basis for
the computation and allowance of dividends, the full sum of
the obligation as it originally existed — $63,600 — and also erred
when holding that claimant must account to the receiver for
any and all payments on the principal sums due, made subse-
quent to July 13, 1897, the unpaid balance to be the sum upon
which dividends are to be computed and paid, in case claimant
seeks to participate in dividends.
On the receiver's appeal it is claimed by his counsel that the
court was in error when it determined that the claimant could
retain ^^^ all of the note remaining unpaid on the day referred
■to and enforce collection thereof as against the makers and prior
indorsers, subject only to the obligation to account for the suma
paid thereon prior to the time of any distribution of the trust
funds by the receiver. It is further contended that the claim
should have been wholly rejected, because the claimant bank
had elected, before filing the same with the receiver, to proceed
by attachment in the state of New York, and to there pursue
to a successful termination a remedy directly opposed and hos-
tile to the law here being enforced, and the benefits of which
the claimant now invokes.
In Ueland v. Haugan, 70 Minn. 349, we held that the pro-
visions of the General Statutes of 1894, chapter 76, are appli-
cable where receivers have been appointed for insolvent banking
corporations, in accordance with the Laws ofrl895, chapter 145,.
section 20. The effect of that decision, in addition to supple-
menting the provisions of chapter 145 by those of the older
statute, was to ingraft upon all proceedings thereunder the rules-
of practice and the code of procedure which had been built up
by the courts for the government of cases arising under said
chapter 76. But in neither of these statutes is there any rule
prescribed for the allowance of claims, or for the distribution
of the trust funds among creditors. The only reference made
to the subject is the very general provision in section 20 of
the 1895 laws, for the payment of debts, "upon the order of the
court." That the mode of procedure and the rule of distribu-
tion must be certain and uniform in all cases is self-evident.
Counsel for the receiver argue that we should adopt and apply
in these proceedings the statutory requirements affecting cred-
Feb. 1898.] Mercantile National Bank v. Macparlane. 355
itors holding securities, found in the insolvency laws, because
the same express the general and settled policy of the state in
respect to the subject of the distribution of the assets of an in-
solvent; and they also argue that the statutory requirements are
nothing more than the equity rule applicable in the absence of
statutory regulations. We cannot now agree with counsel on
the first proposition; that is, we are not now willing to admit
that any of the various provisions of the insolvency laws can
be read into the 1895 law; and it is manifest that the equity
rule which they insist upon has no application to the facts be-
fore us, as will be shown hereinafter.
^^^ Counsel for the creditor contends that the rule which
should be applied in cases of this kind is that which prevails
in many of the states, to the effect that a creditor, having col-
lateral sufficient to satisfy a part only of his debt, is entitled
to prove the whole of his claim against assets in the hands of a
receiver, and cannot be required to allow credit for any collec-
tions or payments made after the date of the declared insol-
vency from collateral securities. Money received on the collat-
erals after declared insolvency is to be considered as still held as
collateral to the debt, and is not to be deemed a payment thereon.
Citing Gluck and Becker on Receivers, sec. 90; Chemical Nat.
Bank v. Armstrong, 8 C. C." A. 155, 59 Fed. Eep. 372, and other
authorities.
A most excellent reason for declining to apply this rule, even
if it is the law in a proper case, is that the facts here do not
present any question of collateral security at all. The liability
of the insolvent was that of indorser upon a number of negotiable
promissory notes, which it discounted to a third party, and up n
which its liability to the latter became fixed and certain by due
protest of the paper as it matured, subsequently to the declared
insolvency. There was no indebtedness independent of the
notes, and they were not held as collateral. The relations be-
tween the insolvent indorser and the claimant indorsee were sim-
ply analogous to those of a principal and surety, the suretyship
of the insolvent arising out of the indorsement of the notes;
and the case is to be determined with reference to this fact.
The settled rule, in the absence of a statute, is that where
the holder of a note or bill applies to prove his debt against
the estate of an insolvent surety, any sum actually received in
payment from another party to the obligation must be deducted
from the amount to be proved. The sum actually remaining un-
paid must be the basis upon which the dividend is to be com-
35G Mercantile National Bank v. Macfarlane. [Minn.
puted: In re Babcock, 3 Story, 393, Fed. Cas. No. 696; Sohier
V. Loring, 6 Cush, 537.
It is evident that no other rule oould be adopted in the ad-
ministration of the estate of an insolvent surety without wholly
ignoring his rights as such surety, as the same have been defi-
nitely settled by the courts. Nor is there any rule of law or
equity which requires that the holder of a note or bill indorsed
by an insolvent ®^^ must enforce its collection, as against parties
primarily liable, before he can make a claim upon the insolvent
estate. Nor is he required to surrender up the obligation as a
condition to participating in dividends. In the absence of a stat-
ute, he may proceed against the insolvent estate, and also against
the other parties to the obligation, until his dabt is fully col-
lected: See In re Babcock, 3 Story, 393. Immediately upon the
payment of a dividend to the creditor, the receiver can proceed
against the original obligors upon the paper, and as to them en-
force collection of the amount paid; and, upon full payment of
the obligation, the estate is subrogated to all of the creditors*
rights as against prior parties.
From the principles laid down in reference to the administra-
tion of the estate of insolvent sureties, it is clear that the conclu-
sions of law of the court below were correct, and that the order
appealed from must be affirmed.
A few words in reference to the contention of counsel for the
receiver that the claim against the estate should have been wholly
rejected, for reasons hereinbefore stated: When the debtor was
declared insolvent, the creditor had in its possession, on what is
knolen as a "general deposit account," a large sum of money. The
title of the receiver to this money, by virtue of his appointment
under the statute, would have been recognized and enforced in
the state of New York if no injustice to the citizens of that state
would have resulted, and if the rights of creditors were not there-
by prejudiced, provided such title was not in conflict with the
laws or public policy of that state. Subject to these conditions,
the receiver could have appeared in the courts of that state, and
have maintained an action for the recovery of the money: In re
Waite, 99 N. Y. 433. The same rule prevails here: Comstock
V. Frederickson, 51 Minn. 350.
It must stand admitted that the creditor had the legal right
to proceed by attachment as against the deposit account. But
should we hold that, by availing itself of this legal right, the
creditor claimant had barred itself from making any claim in
the insolvency proceeding under a law which it had disregarded
Feb. 1898.] Mercantile National Bank v. Macpablanb, 357
when preventing, by reason of its seizure of the money, an equal
distribution of the assets of the insolvent, we should be met by
the fact *^^^ that no attachment proceedings were necessary in
order to protect the creditor as to the money in its hands when
insolvency was declared. It had the right to retain the money
on general deposit, and to offset as against the same the amount
due from the depositor debtor on account of the indorsements.
Had it done this, instead of unnecessarily proceeding by attach-
ment, its right thereafter, and as to the balance due on the in*
dorsed obligations, to participate in dividends, could not well be
doubted. As it had the right to offset its notes to the 'extent
of the deposit, its proceeding by attachment cannot be said to
have materially affected the question of its right to prove the
balance of its claim, and to share in the distribution.
From the statement of facts it appears that, in accordance
with the provisions of the insolvency laws, this claim was origi-
nally presented and passed upon by the receiver. This was ir-
regular. The claim should have been exhibited to the court in
accordance with the chapter 76, section 5911, of the General
Statutes of 1894. But this irregularity is of no consequence,
and can have no bearing upon the present appeals.
Judgment affirmed.
INSOLVENCY — SECURED CREDITOR'S ENTIRE CLAIM
PROVABLE.— A creditor whose claim is secured by a mortgage may
prove the entire claim against the estate of an Insolvent debtor, and
Is entitled to a dividend ou. the face of such claim, without regard to
tlie value of the mortgaged property: Kellogg v. Miller, 22 Or. 406,
29 Am. St Rep. 618.
INSOLVENCY— NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS— CLAIM OP
HOLDER AGAINST INSOLVENT INDORSER AND MAKER.
Where the maker and the indorser of a promissory note made as-
signments for the benefit of their creditors, and each estate paid
a dividend, it was held that the holder of the note was entitled to
a dividend upon the whole amount of the note from each estate:
Miller's Estate, 82 Ta. St. 113, 22 Am. Rep. 754.
INSOLVENCY — ATTACHMENT IN ANOTHER STATE.— A
creditor who has In another state attached a debt due to his debtor
does not, by filing in this state a claim against such debtor In pro-
ceedings In insolvency, waive or abandon his attachment lien. The
amount he may receive under and by virtue of such lien may be de-
ducted from tiie amount of his claim, and the balance Is the true
amount of Indebtedness upon which he is entitled to dividends in
this state: Neuf elder v. North British etc. Ins. Co., 10 Wasb. 393,
45 Am. St. Rep. 793, and note.
358 Jacobson v, Wisconsin etc. R. R. Co. [Minn.
Jacobson V, Wisconsin, Minnesota & Paoipio
Eailroad Company.
[71 Minnesota, 619.]
INTERSTATE COMMERCE— JURISDICTION OF STATB
and FEDERAL COURTS-CONNEOTING RAILROADS.— Where
the putting in of a connecting switch at the intersection of two
railroads for the purpose of transferring cars from one road to the
other, is of some benefit both to interstate and state traffic, the
state and the federal courts have concurrent jurisdiction in the
matter, and, in disposing of the case, they may talce into considera-
tion the whole necessity resulting from the whole benefit which will
accrue to all classes of commerce.
BURDEN OF PROOF— PRESUMPTION.— Where a railroad
commission has taken any action under a statute, every presump-
tion is in favor of the action, and the burden is upon the party
complaining to show that such action was contrary to law.
RAILROAD COMPANIES— LEGISLATIVE POWER OVER
—REASONABLE REGULATION.— The property of a railroad com-
pany is dedicated to a public use, and the legislature has the power
to regulate that use in a reasonable manner, unless the charter of
the railroad company expressly protects it from such regulation.
The compelling of intersecting lines to put in a connecting switch
is a reasonable regulation,
RAILROAD COMPANIES — INCIDENTAL POWERS.— As
Incidental to the operation of its road, a railroad company has the
power to interchange cars with other connecting companies.
RAILROAD COMPANIES— LEGISLATIVE POWER OVER.
The legislature has the power to compel a common carrier to do
business in the ordinary and" usual way, and therefore may compel
such interchange of cars as incidental to the business for which
the company was chartered.
Albert E. Clarke and Wilbur P. Booth, for the appellant.
H. W. Childs and George B. Edgerton, for the respondent.
•^2« CANTY, J. The Willmar & Sioux Falls Railroad extends
from Willmar, in this state, in a southwesterly direction, to Sioux
Fells, in South Dakota, and is crossed nearly at right angles by
the Wisconsin, Minnesota & Pacific Railroad, near Hanley Falls,
in this state. The former railroad is a part of the Great North-
em system of railroads, and the latter is operated in connection
with the Minneapolis & St. Louis Railway, and as a part of the
same. The crossing near Hanley Falls is a grade crossing, and
there has never been any switch connecting the two railroads at
that point.
Chapter 10 of the Laws of 1887, as amended by chapter 91
of the Laws of 1895, provides:
"Sec. 3. (A) That all common carriers subject to the provi-
sions of this act shall provide, at all points of connection, cross-
ing, or intersection at grade where it is practicable and neces-
April, 1898.] Jacobson v. Wisconsin etc. R. R. Co. 359
aary for the interest of traffic, ample facilities by track connec-
tions for transferring any cars used in the regular business of
their respective lines of road from their lines or tracks to those
•of any other common carrier whose lines or track may connect
■with, cross, or intersect their own, and shall provide equal and
reasonable facilities for the interchange of cars and traffic be-
tween their respective lines, and for the receiving, forwarding,
And delivering of passengers, property, and cars to and from their
several lines and those of other common carriers connecting
therewith."
The act further provides that, on the application of any per-
€on interested, the state railroad and warehouse commission shall
■order connections to be made at such crossings, and this is con-
ceded by appellants. The commission did so order in this case
after notice, and a hearing had in the manner provided by the
statute. Both railroad companies appealed to the district court
from the order. On hearing had in the district court, the order
was affirmed, and the connection ordered to be made by a curved
switch, seven hundred and seventy-eight and six-tenths feet long,
and particularly described, just as the commission had ordered.
^^'^ From the judgment of the district court entered thereon,
hoth railroad companies appeal to this court. The Wisconsin,
Minnesota & Pacific I^ilroad Company has appeared and filed a
brief, but the other appellant has not argued the case or filed any
brief.
The connecting switch will, at the middle of the same, extend
outside of the right of way of each and either railroad, and it will
be necessary to condemn at that place a narrow strip of land, a
few hundred feet long, for the use of the switch. One of the
lines of the Great Northern system extends from Duluth south-
west to Willmar. Another extends from St. Paul and Minneap-
olis west to Willmar. These two lines pass through large areas
of wood land, the timber on which is available for fuel and fence
posts. Southwest of Willmar, and for many miles in all direc-
tions around Hanley Falls, the country is mostly prairie. Tim-
ber is scarce, and great quantities of cordwood and fence posts
are brought down on the Willmar & Sioux Falls Railroad from
said timbered regions and distributed along that road. Timber
is not so plentiful along the Minneapolis & St. Louis system.
For that reason cordwood and fence posts are much dearer at
the stations on the Wisconsin, Minnesota & Pacific Railroad, east
and west of Hanley Falls, than such wood is at that station and
the stations north and south of it on the Willmar & Sioux Falls
360 Jacobson v. Wisconsin etc. R. R. Co. [Minn,
Railroad. For this reason it is for the benefit of the people in
the territory tributary to the "Wisconsin, Minnesota & Pacifia
Railroad, but not tributary to Hanley Falls, that this connection
fihould be made, so as to enable them to have cars of wood trans-
ferred at that point from the Willmar & Sioux Falls Railroad ta
the Wisconsin, Minnesota & Pacific Railroad, and distributed at
the stations along the latter road. But this will deprive the
Wisconsin, Minnesota & Pacific Railroad Company of the benefit
of a much longer haul on dearer wood. The loss of revenue
which will result to it by reason thereof is one of the grounds
of its complaint here.
A large number of cattle are raised in the territory tributary
to the Wisconsin, Minnesota & Pacific Railroad west of Hanley
Falls. For such of these cattle as are fat enough for beef, Min-
neapolis and St. Paul are the best market, but, for the stockers
and feeders, '^^^ Sioux City or Omaha is the best market. But
there is no way of reaching Sioux City or Omaha with cars of
stock shipped from said territory over said last-named road, ex-
cept by running the cars first to Hopkins, within eight miles
of Minneapolis, and then transferring them to another railroad
with which the Minneapolis & St. Louis Railway Company has
traffic arrangements, and running the cars over such other road
to Sioux City or Omaha. The distance- from Hanley Falls to
Sioux City by this route is three hundred and eighty miles, while
the distance from Hanley Falls to Sioux City over the Willmar
& Sioux Falls Railroad is but one hundred and eighty-one miles.
Making the connection in question wll deprive the Wisconsin,
Minnesota & Pacific Railroad Company of the benefit of such
longer haul on such stockers and feeders, and the loss of revenue
which will result to it by reason thereof is another ground of
complaint.
1. Appellant Wisconsin, Minnesota & Pacific Railroad Com-
pany contends that, as the shipping of stock to Sioux City and
Omaha is interstate commerce, the state tribunals have no juris-
diction over it, and must not take into consideration the question
of transferring of cars of such stock when determining the neces-
sity of a connection at this crossing.
Conceding, without deciding, that the state tribunals would
have no jurisdiction to require the making of this connection for
the sole purpose of transferring cars engaged solely in the carry-
ing of interstate commerce, it does not follow that these tri-
bunals may not take into consideration the benefit to such com-
merce also, when determining the necessity of this connection..
Apiil, 1898.] Jacobson v. Wisconsin etc. R. R. Co. 361
The whole traffic to be benefited by the making of the connec-
tion may be amply sufficient to justify requiring the same to be
made; yet the part of such traffic commencing and ending in the
state may not be sufficient when taken alone, and the part which
consists of interstate commerce may not be sufficient when taken
alone. If appellant's position is correct, neither the state tri-
bunals nor the federal tribunals would have jurisdiction in such
a case. Clearly, such is not the law. In such a case, jurisdic-
tion is concurrent. If thefe is some necessity resulting from
the benefit which will accrue to exclusively state commerce by
reason of the putting in of the connection, this gives the state
tribunals jurisdiction: Munn v. Illinois, 94 U. S. 113, 126; *»=*»
and, in disposing of the case, they may take into consideration
the whole necessity resulting from the whole benefit which will
accrue to all classes of commerce.
But, even if this position was not correct, there is, in our
opinion, ample evidence in this case of necessity resulting from
the benefit which will accrue to exclusively state commerce, when
considered alone, to justify the ordering of the connection in
question.
"We will go further. Under the statute, every presumption
is in favor of the action of the commission, and the burden was
upon appellant to show that such action was contrary to law:
See Steenerson v. Great Northern Ry. Co., 69 Minn. 353, Ap-
pellant has totally failed to maintain that burden. No evidence
at all was offered by appellant in the district court as to the
want of necessity for the making of this connection, but it rested
its case wholly on the evidence of the witnesses called in behalf
of the petitioner. That evidence was not in appellant's favor,
and certainly did not show conclusively that there was no neces-
sity for this crossing.
2. Appellant further contends that said act of the legislature
is unconstitutional and void, and the judgment entered in this
case is erroneous, because they contravene numerous provisions
both of the state and federal constitutions. Said law and judg'
ment require appellant to exercise the power of eminent domain,
construct a railroad track, operate the same, and exchange busi-
ness with intersecting roads; and it is con-tended that all of this
is outside of and beyond what its charter requires, and that,
therefore, the law impairs the obligation of the charter contract
between appellant and the state, deprives appellant of the equal
protection of the laws, takes its private property without just
compensation, deprives it of the right to contract with reference
to its own business, et cetera.
362 Jacceson v. Wisconsin etc. R. R. Co. [Minn.
All of these constitutional objections may be considered to-
gether. These two railroads are public highways, and all of
these objections amount simply to this: It is wholly foreign to
the purpose of two public highways of the same character to re-
quire them to connect where they cross each other, so that pub-
lic traffic may pass from the one to the other. And, where a
private corporation has been chartered to construct, maintain,
and operate such public highway, with the right to charge rea-
sonable compensation for its services in ^^** so doing, it is a vio-
lation of its charter to compel it to connect its highway with
another intersecting highway of the same character, unless the
right to require the connection is expressly reserved in the
charter. We cannot so hold.
If appellant's position is correct, it has the constitutional
right to completely isolate its railroad at any time by cutting it
off from all connection with other railroads, unless the right to
compel connections is expressly reserved in its charter. Its road
■commences at the village of Morton, in this state (an unim-
portant station at the terminus of a branch of the Minneapolis
■& St. Louis Railway), and extends westerly to Watertown, in
South Dakota; so that it may at any time, and in spite of all
public authority, be very completely isolated and cut off from
all large commercial centers, if appellant sees fit so to cut it off.
The legislature chartered appellant to construct, maintain, and
operate a public highway, not a cul de sac, or something worse,
which has no connection with like highways either at its ends
or sides. A railroad is an improved highway, on which certain
modem appliances are used. It will not, as a general rule, serve
fully the purposes for which it was intended, unless the connec-
tions between it and other like highways which cross or touch
it are improved in like manner, and the same modern appliances
-are used in passing from one road to the other over those con-
nections.
Again, why is not the doctrine advanced by appellant a two-
€dged sword? If the legislature cannot compel the making of
such connections, because there is nothing in the charter ex-
pressly authorizing or requiring the making of them, why is it
not ultra vires under such a charter, and without express legis-
lative authority, to make such connections voluntarily? But
who will contend that a railroad company may not, without ex-
press authority, and as incidental to its general powers, connect
its irncks with the tracks of other railroads that extend to its
road at its ends, or intersect it at its sides?
April, 1898.] Jacobson v. Wisconsin etc. R. R. Co. 363
Appellant's property is dedicated to public use, "is affected
with a public interest," and the legislature certainly has the
power to regulate that use in a reasonable manner, unless appel-
lant's charter expressly protects it from such regulation: See
Munn V. Illinois, 94 *»3i xj. S. 113, 126; State v. Wabash etc.
Ry. Co., 83 Mo. 144; Allnutt v. Inglis, 12 East, 527; Lord Hale's
Treatise "De Jure Maris," 1 Harg. Law Tracts, 6.
Appellant was chartered to serve the public, within the scope
of its charter powers and franchises, in the best and most effi-
cient manner possible. It was not, as it seems to contend, char-
tered to obstruct public traffic or serve the public the least that
self-interest might dictate. Appellant cannot be allowed to
obstruct the course of public traffic under the claim that, by
putting in this connection and letting such traffic take its course,
appellant will lose a large amount of revenue which it would
otherwise earn. If, by reason of putting in the connection, its
revenues will be so reduced that it will not, on its whole busi-
ness, receive a reasonaole compensation for its services, its
remedy is by a readjustment of the whole or such part of its
schedule of rates and fares as, under the circumstances, ought
to be readjusted in order to enable it to earn such reasonable
compensation.
It is contended that, even if the connections were made,
neither railway company could be compelled to deliver its
loaded cars to the other, to be carried with their contents to
their destination over the road of such other; that to compel
appellant to deliver up its cars to be carried away from the line
of its road to distant points would be in violation of its charter
contract, and unconstitutional; that for this reason it is useless
to compel the making of the connection in question, and there-
fore the legislative act fails of its purpose, and is unconstitu-
tional and void.
Such interchange of cars between different railroads is a com-
mon and almost universal practice; yet there are few railroad
charters which expressly authorize this practice. It would
hardly be contended that such an act of interchange is ultra
vires on the part of a railroad company whose charter is silent
as to such authority. As incidental to the operation of its road,
a railroad company has the power to interchange cars with other
connecting companies, and this is the ordinary and usual way
of going business. We are clearly of the opinion that the legis-
lature has the power to compel a common carrier to do business
in the ordinary and usual way, and therefore may compel such
364 Jacobson v. Wisconsin etc. R. R. Co. [Minn,
interchange of cars as incidental to the ^^^ business for which
the company was chartered. The supreme court of Io\^a reached
the same conclusion in Burlington etc. Ey. Co. v. Dey, 83 Iowa,
312, 31 Am. St. Eep. 477. See, also, Atchison etc. R. E. Co. v.
Denver etc. R. R. Co., 110 U. S. 667; Peoria etc. Ry. Co. v. Chi-
cago etc. Ry. Co., 109 111. 135, 50 Am. Rep. 605; Michigan v.
Smithson, 45 Mich. 212; State v. Wabash etc. Ry. Co., 83 Mo.
144.
The statute provides : "In the event of that said railway com-
panies fail to establish through joint rates, or fail to establish
and charge reasonable rates for such through shipments, ....
it shall be the duty of the railroad and warehouse commission
of this state .... to establish reasonable joint rates for the
shipment of freight and cars over any two or more connecting
lines of railroad in this state, and to prescribe the reasonable
rules under which any such cars so transferred shall be re-
turned": Laws 1895, c. 91, sec. 3 (C).
Appellant suggests that cases may arise where it would be
compelled to deliver its cars to another carrier, who is insolvent,
or where the couplings, air-brakes, or other appliances of the
cars of one of the carriers will not match with those of the other,
aftd where it would be unsafe to haul such other cars. It is only
necessary to say that such cases can be disposed of when they
arise. There is no suggestion that this is any such case. Ap-
pellant seems to contend that this statute attempts to make the
two or more railroad companies partners for the purposes of such
a through shipment; that it attempts to compel the making of
a joint shipping contract, by which each company will be liable
for all the defaults of the others in the through shipment; and
that, therefore, the statute is unconstitutional and void. The
statute merely provides that, in case all the railroad companies
concerned in the through shipment fail to fix a reasonable total
sum for the total haul, the commission shall do so for them.
There is nothing in this which requires any company to assume
any liability beyond its own line for the acts of others in making
the haul.
There is nothing in the suggestion that the two appellants
are competing roads,, witliin the terms of subdivision F of sec-
tion 3 of said statute, at least as far as regards the traffic for
which the connection in question is required. This disposes of
the case, and the judgment appealed from is affirmed.
RAILROAD COMPANIES— LEGISLATIVE POWER OVER.—
The franchises of a railroad corporation are granted for the public
April, 1898.] Jacobson v. Wisconsin etc. R. R. Co. 365
^ood, and In exercising them the corporation Is largely subject to
the control and discretion of the legislature. The legislature may,
by statute, require a railway corporation to operate a public ferry
which constitutes part of its line, although such operation has be-
come unprofitable: Brownell v. Old Colony R. R, Co., 164 Mass. 29.
49 Am. St. Rep. 442. The legislature may, by general laws, impose
new burdens on railroad companies In addition to those Imposed by
their charters, when such burdens are conducive to the public in-
terests and safety: Nelson v. Vermont etc. R. R. Co., 26 Vt. 717, 62
Am. Dec. 614. See, also, Burdick t. People, 149 111. 600, 41 Am. St.
Rep. 329.
RAILROAD COMPANIES— LEGISLATIVE POWER OVER— IN-
TERSTATE COMMERCE.— Where a state statute required rail-
loads connecting with railroads outside the state to transfer freight
and passengers at a point within the state. It was held that the
statute was void as In conflict with the constitution of the United
State, giving to Congress the power to regulate commerce among
the states: Council Bluffs v. Kansas etc. R. R. Co., 45 Iowa, 338,
24 Am. Rep. 773. See the note to People r. Wemple. 27 Am. St Rep.
667. 668.
I
' CASES
IN THK
SUPREME COURT
ov
NEBRASKA.
MuNRO V. Callahan.
[55 Nebraska. 75.1
JUDGMENTS— RELIEF IN EQUITY.— If a Judgment Is
based upon perjured evidence of a successful party given at the
trial, while the defeated party has a good defense which he was
prevented from presenting by reason of such perjury, and without
being guilty of negligence has exhausted all his ordinary legal
remedies for vacating such judgment, equity, in a proper proceed-
ing, may vacate the judgment and grant the defeated party a new
trial.
JUDGMENTS— RELIEF IN EQUITY— FRAUD.— A court of
equity cannot vacate a judgment after the term at which it wa»
rendered, and grant the defeated party a new trial for fraud prac-
ticed upon him, except when such fraud was practiced in connec-
tion with the trial.
JUDGMENTS — RELIEF IN EQUITY — PERJURY — MIS-
TAKE.—A court of equity cannot vacate a judgment on account of
any innocent mistalte or want of recollection on the part of the
successful party or his witnesses, nor even on account of the per-
jury of other witnesses in the case.
J. F. Cromelien and W. F. Gurley, for the appellants.
J. H. Van Dusen and W. S. Summers, for the appellee.
^ RAGAIST, C. June 25, 1892, on the complaint of Delia A.
Callahan, George F. Munro was by the district court of Douglas
county adjudged to be the father of the former's illegitimate
child. From this judgment Munro prosecuted a proceeding in
error to this court, which affirmed the judgment of the district
court: Munro v. Callahan, 41 Neb. 849. Subsequently, on De-
cember 6, 1894, Munro filed a petition in the district court of
Douglas county against Callahan, reciting the record and pro-
(360)
May, 1898.] Munro v. Callahan, 367
ceedings of the former suit, and alleging, among other things,
that Callahan had procured said judgment by committing will-
ful and corrupt perjury on the trial of that case, and prayed th&
court to set such judgment aside, and to grant him, Munro, a
new trial. The district court, on hearing the action, set aside
the former judgment and granted Munro a new trial, from which
order Callahan has appealed. The bill of exceptions containing
the evidence offered on the trial of this case in the district court
has been quashed, and the sole question for our determination
is whether the pleadings in this case will support the decree-
rendered therein.
'''■ 1. To the petition filed by Munro on December 6, 1894,
an answer was filed on the 15th of said month, and subsequently,
on the 17th, an amended petition was filed. The record does
not disclose that an answer was filed to this amended petition,
but the case seems to have been tried on the amended petition.
The decree recites that the case was heard upon the pleadings^
filed by the parties and upon the evidence, and counsel for the
appellant have addressed their arguments to the sufficiency of
the allegations of the amended petition. We shall, therefore,
only inquire whether the allegations of the amended petition will
support the decree under review. This amended petition, among
other things, alleged: "Plaintiff further charges that said ver-
dict so rendered in said action was obtained on the false, fraudu-
lent, and perjured testimony of the said Delia A. Callahan; that
sai'd Delia A. Callahan on the said trial testified that the bastard
child, of which she charged this plaintiff as being the father,
was conceived on Easter Sunday, March 29, 1891, between the
hours of 2 and 5 o'clock of the afternoon of said day; that said
testimony was false and fraudulent; and said Delia A. Callahan,
at the time of giving the same, well knew it so to be. Plaintiff
alleges the fact to be that on the said Easter Sunday he did not
see the said Delia A. Callahan Plaintiff fm-ther charges-
the fact to be that while he well knew that the said Delia A.
Callahan had testified falsely on said trial, yet he did not, at the
time,know where he could obtain the testimony to show that th&
said Delia A. Callahan had sworn falsely for the purpose of ob-
taining an unjust verdict against him; that he had no knowledge
of where he could obtain the witnesses who knew and would
testify that said Delia A. Callahan had sworn falsely in said ac-
tion at law until long after the time had expired for filing a
motion for a new trial in said cause; that this plaintiff now has
«uch testimony and will produce the same in court." Since the
368 MuNRO V. Callahan. [Nebraska,
bill of exceptions has been quashed the judgment is to be consid-
ered as if "^^ it had been rendered by default, or on the dis-
trict court's overruling a demurrer interposed to the amended
petition by Callahan. In addition to certain special findings
the tenth finding of the district court is as follows: "The court
further finds that the general equities are with the plaintiff."
We take it that within this general finding are included findings
that Munro had a prima facie defense to the action brought
against him by Callahan; that the defeat suffered by him in that
-action was not the result of any negligence or laches on his part ;
and that he had diligently pursued and exhausted all ordinary
legal remedies provided by statute for obtsdning a new trial of
said action and for the vacation of said judgment. "We think
the petition sufficient to support these findings, as it s'ets out, in
addition to what we have quoted, the filing by Miss Callahan in
the district court of the complaint against Munro charging him
with being the father of her illegitimate child; thai he pleaded
not guilty of such charge; was tried to a jury and found guilty;
his filing of a motion for a new trial; the overruling of such
motion; the judgment upon the verdict of the jury; the error
proceeding to this court and the affirmance of the judgment of
the district court.
2. Assuming that the general finding of the district court
includes the finding that the judgment obtained by Miss Calla-
han against Munro was procured by her willful perjury, is the
petition in that respect sufficient to support the finding ? Is it
^ood against a demurrer? When the nature of the case in
which that judgment is rendered is considered, when it is re-
membered that the only issue in that case was whether Munro
was guilty of being the father of Callahan's illegitimate child,
that without her positive and unequivocal testimony that he was
her child's father, she could not have procured the judgment she
■did, and that she, and she alone, could positively and certainly
know who was the father of her child, we think the petition suffi-
cient. In other words, from the very nature of the case, a find-
ing that one is the ''" father of a bastard child rests, and must
rest, where the issue is litigated, upon the testimony of the
mother; and if this testimony is false and perjured, then a judg-
ment based on such a finding is one procured by fraud practiced
by the successful party. Section 602 of the Code of Civil Pro-
cedure provides that a district court shall have power to vacate
a judgment rendered by it, after the term at which it was ren-
dered, for fraud practiced by the successful party in obtaining
May, 1898.] Munro v. Callahan. 869
the judgment. Certainly, the obtaining of a judgment by will-
ful and corrupt perjury is obtaining it by fraud within the
meaning of this section of the code. But this statute is merely
a legislative adoption of the doctrine of the equity courts in
force when it was enacted. Long before this code was enacted
the setting aside of a judgment procured by the fraud of the
successful party and the granting the defeated party a new
trial were jurisdictions possessed and enforced by the courts of
equity when it appeared that the defeated party had a valid de-
fense which he had been prevented by the fraud of the success-
ful party from making out, and where he had been guilty of no
negligence or laches and had exhausted all his ordinary legal
remedies for obtaining a vacation of such judgment: 3 Pome-
ro/s Equity Jurisprudence, 2d ed., sec. 1364; 2 Freeman on
Judgments, 4th ed., sec. 489. Whether, then, this action is
based on section 602 of the Code of Civil Procedure, or whether
it be regarded as an independent suit in equity, the jurisdiction
and authority of the district court to grant Munro a new trial
of the law action are undoubted.
The cases are not numerous in which a judgment has been
vacated and the defeated party granted a new trial on the ground
that the judgment was obtained by the perjury of the successful
party; but this is perhaps because, from the very nature of the
ease, the existence of the fraud or perjury could not be estab-
lished otherwise than by trying anew the issue tried and deter-
mined in the action in which the new trial is sought; and neither
®* the equity rule nor the code authorizes the vacation of a
judgment after the term at which it was rendered and the
granting a defeated party a new trial for fraud practiced upon
him, save where the fraud was practiced in connection with the
trial.
In Laithe v. McDonald, 12 Kan. 340, Laithe brought an ac-
tion against McDonald for a failure to deliver goods which he
eharged were received by McDonald as a common carrier and
lost through his negligence. McDonald answered by a general
■denial and did not appear further in the case. On the trial
Laithe willfully, corruptly, and falsely swore that McDonald
was a common carrier; had received the goods in that capacity
and failed to deliver them; and that they were worth something
over five thousand dollars, for which sum he obtained a judg-
ment. The supreme court of Kansas affirmed a judgment of
the district court vacating the judgment in the law action on the
ground that Laithe obtained it by fraud, the fraud consisting
AX. ST. RXF., Vol. LXX.-24
870 MuNKO V. Callahan. [Nebraska^
of his perjury. The court held that a defendant was not en-
titled to have a judgment vacated on account of any innocent
mistake or want of recollection on the part of the plaintiff or
his witnesses, nor even on account of the perjury of other wit-
nesses in the case, but said that no party was bound to antici-
pate or suppose that the other party would commit willful and
corrupt perjury, and that no party was bound to the exercise-
of extraordinary diligence in preparing to meet such perjury. It
will be observed that in the case cited the judgment rested en-
tirely upon the perjured testimony of Laithe, just as, in the case
at bar, the judgment that Munro was the father of Callahan's
illegitimate child depended entirely for support upon Callahan's
evidence that he was the father of her child.
In Graver v. Faurot, 76 Fed. Eep. 257, the complainant
brought a suit in equity, in a state court, in which he charged
two defendants with fraudulently inducing him to purchase
some worthless shares of corporate stock, and, in accordance with
the old chancery practice, he ®* required the parties made de-
fendants to answer certain allegations or interrogatories in the
bill under oath. The parties made defendants answered. The
answers were false and perjured, and the complainant suffered
a defeat. He subsequently discovered that the answers made by
the defendants were false, and then brought suit to vacate the
judgment, and the court held that the making of the false an-
swers was a positive and actual fraud which vitiated the decree.
Here again the judgment complained of rested entirely upon the
perjured testimony of the two defendants in whose favor the
judgment was rendered. For a further discussion of the sub-
ject of the power of a court of equity to vacate a judgment ob-
tained by fraud practiced by the successful party at the trial of
the case in which it was rendered, see United States v. Throck-
morton, 98 U. S. 61; Ward v. Southfield, 102 N. Y. 293; As-
bury V. Frisz, 148 Ind. 513.
Our conclusion therefore is, that the petition charges that
Miss Callahan procured a judgment determining that Munro
was the father of her illegitimate child ; that she obtained such
judgment by her own false and perjured testimony, and that thi»
was a fraud practiced by her in and about the trial; and, from
the nature of the case, the judgment rests solely upon her evi-
dence and the petition sustains the decree of the district court
vacating that judgment, and such decree is accordingly affirmed.
Irvine, C, expresses no opinion.
May, 1898.] German Nat. Bane v. Kautter. 371
JUDGMENTS— RELIEF IN EQUITY.— Relief from a Judgment
will be decreed In equity, upon there appearing any fact clearly
proving that it is against conscience to execute the judgment, and
that the Injured party could not have availed himself of this fa?i
in the court of law, or if he could have so availed himself, that he
was prevented from doing so by fraud or accident, unmixed with
any fault or negligence in himself or his agents: Ilaudley v. Jack-
son, 31 Or. 552, 65 Am. St. Rep. 839. See the monographic note to
Little Rock etc. Ry. Co. v. Wells, 54 Am. St. Rep. 218-201.
JUDGMENTS— RELIEF IN EQUITY— FRAUD.— Equity has ju-
risdiction to set aside a former judgment or decree for perjury or
fraud only in those cases where the perjury or. fraud consists of ex-
trinsic, collateral acts, not examined and determined in the former
action: Friese v. Hummel, 26 Or. 145, 46 Am. St. Rep. 610.
JUDGMENTS— RELIEF IN EQUITY— PERJURY.— The rule es-
tablished by the weight of authority is that a court of equity will
not set aside a judgment at law because It was founded on a fraudu-
lent Instrument or perjured testimony, nor for any matter that
was actually presented and considered In the judgment assailed:
Camp V. Ward, 69 Vt. 286. 60 Am. St. Rep. 929, and note; Pico v.
Cohn, 91 Cal. 129, 25 Am. St. Rep. 159, and monographic note there-
to. Perjury may, however, be considered in connection with other
circumstances tending to disclose a f;*audulent schfeme on the part
of one party to put it out of the power of the other party to defend
the action: Colby v. Colby, 59 Minn. 432, 50 Am. St Rep. 420.
German National Bank v, Kautter.
[55 Nebraska, 108.]
ATTACHMENT— JUDGMENT BY CONSTRUCTIVE SER-
VICE—ATTACK UPON.— If plaintiff in attachment seizes a resi-
dent's property as that of a nonresident, and sells it under a judg-
ment rendered upon constructive service, the judgment defendant
may, In the absence of an appearance In that suit, attack such
judcmont in a subsequent suit by him, wherein the attachment
plaintiff Invokes such judgment as a defense, and show that It la
void for the reason that at the time of the Inception of the attach-
ment suit and judgment he was a resident of the state and then
therein. This may be done although the record in the attachment
suit is regular on its face.
ATTACHMENT — FALSE AFFIDAVIT. — An attachment
based on a false affidavit of the nonresidence of the debtor is void.
Boehmer & Rummons and Abbott, Selleck & Lane, for the ap-
pellants.
Norval Brothers, D. C. McKillip, and J. C. Johnston, for the
appellee.
1** HARRISON, C. J. In the petition filed in this action,
commenced for Ernest Boise in the district court of Seward
county, it waa pleaded that on February 27, 1889, he executed
372 German Nat. Bank v. Kautter. [Nebraska,
and delivered to John Kautter a promissory note in the sum of
$1,138.36, payable April 1, 1894, and he and his wife as security
for the payment of the note, at the same time executed and de-
livered to the said party a mortgage on certain land in Seward
county, Nebraska; that thereafter the note was by the payee
indorsed and transferred to the German National Bank of
Lincoln; that the petitioner paid at various dates the sums of
interest due on the note, and on May 3, 1894, paid to the bank
the whole amount ©f principal and interest then due and re-
ceived from it the note and mortgage, the note marked paid with
a stamp then in use by the bank for cancellation of paid instru-
ments of indebtedness; that the pleader had offered and ten-
dered payment of the fees and expenses of the execution, et
cetera, of a release of the mortgage, but had been by the bank
and other parties apparently interested in the matter refused the
satisfaction or release. He impleaded with the bank John
Kautter, Henry Schwake, George F. H. Schwake, George T.
Meier, and Frank A. Boehmer, as each having or asserting an
interest in the note and mortgage as assignee, purchaser, or
pledgee ^^^ thereof, or otherwise. He also stated that he had
sold the land described in the mortgage and could not complete
the sale by reason of the nonrelease of the mortgage. He
prayed that the parties named be ordered to release the mort-
gage of record or that it be decreed canceled. All the defend-
ants except Kautter filed a joint answer, in which they dis-
claimed any interest in or to the real estate described in the
petition or to the stated mortgage thereon.
For Kautter an answer was filed, and subsequently an an-
swer and cross-petition.- His first answer was, during the course
of the proceedings, on motion of some of the parties to the ac-
tion, stricken from the files. In the answer and cross-petition
Kautter both admitted and pleaded affirmatively the execution,
et cetera, of the note and mortgage referred to in the petition ;
also admitted that the mortgage was unreleased of record. It
was further pleaded in such cross-petition that the note and
mortgage were by Kautter delivered to the bank as collateral
security for the payment of his indebtedness thereto. This was
for moneys loaned to him at different times, in the aggregate
$238. That at some date in the month of March or April, 1891,
he gave to the bank a promissory note for the total sum of the
loans, due three months after date, and the bank retained the
collaterals, and, soon after, he went to the state of Kansas to
attend to some business; that he was not again at the bank
May, 1898.] German Nat. Banc v. Kautteb. 878
until June, 1893, at which time he asked to settle his mdehted-
ness and that he receive the Boise note and mortgage and the
bank account for the interest, if any, collected thereon. (The
interest on the Boise note was payable annually.) He was then
informed by the bank that the Boise note and mortgage had
been sold and the proceeds of the sale applied in payment of the
indebtedness — the $238. He further pleaded that on or about
December 9, 1891, the bank made a pretended sale and transfer
of the note and mortgage; that the same was done with the
intent to cheat and defraud him and to wrongfully and fraudu-
lently deprive **** him of his interest in xhe note and mortgage;
that Frank A. Boehmer, Henry Schwake, George F. H. Schwake,
and George T. Meier, who each during the life of the mortgage
had appeared of record as an assignee and apparent purchaser
thereof, had none of them paid any consideration for the note
and mortgage, but had figured as such purchasers pursuant to
an agreement and intent to aid the bank in its fraudulent pur-
pose relative to the pleader's rights in the instruments appar-
ently transferred. He alleged further that if Boise had paid
the amount due on the note for $1,138.36 to the bank, it was
done with a full knowledge of Kautter's continued interest or
right -thereto and therein, and also of the sale by the bank of
the note and mortgage and its purpose with which it made the
transfer. The prayer of the cross-petition was that the amount
due on the note and mortgage might be ascertained, and after
a deduction therefrom of the sum of the pleader's indebtedness
to the bank, the balance be adjudged a first lien against the
land described in the petition in the action; that if it should
appear that the money due on the note and mortgage had been
paid to the bank, a judgment be accorded the cross-petitionet
against the bank for the amount his due, and also against any
other of defendants who were shown to have participated with
the bank in the wrongful and fraudulent purposes and acts rela-
tive to the rights of the pleader.
To the extent the rights of Ernest Boise, the original plain-
tiff, were involved, the issues were tried and determined and the
cause was continued. Time was asked by and allowed to the
bank and others, against whom the cross-petition declared and
demanded af?irmative relief, to answer its allegations. The
bank, in answer to the cross-petition, admitted the creation and
existence of the note and mortgage by Boise in favor of the
cross-petitioner and alleged that the latter, on March 16, 1890,
executed and delivered to the bank a promissory note in the
374 German Nat. Bank v. Kauttee. [Nebraska,
Bum of $340.75, due June 16, 1890, which was not paid at *<""
its maturity and was unpaid on August 3, 1891; that on the
last-mentioned date the bank caused an action to be commenced
in the .county court of Lancaster county to recover the amount
due it, the indebtedness evidenced by the note to which we have
last referred, and also caused a writ of attachment to issue in
said action on the ground that John Kautter was a nonresident
of the state of Nebraska; that the writ of attachment was levied
on the note and mortgage of Boise to the defendant in the at-
tachment suit; that such action proceeded regularly as provided
by law to its termination, inclusive of a public sale of the note
and mortgage under order of the court and the application of
the proceeds to the payment of the note on which the attach-
ment cause was predicated. It was further answered that no
proceeding had been had or taken to modify, reverse, change, or
annul the adjudication of the county court. Frank A. Boehmer,
in answer to the cross-petition, admitted the execution and de-
livery of the $1,138.36 note, and its accompanying mortgage by
Boise to Kautter; alleged his purchase thereof in good faith at
the sale by the ofBcer, and denied generally all other allegation?
of such pleading. Henry Schwake, George F. H. Schwake, and
George T. Meier each admitted the $1,138.36 note and mortgage
as pleaded, and alleged its bona fide purchase for a valuable
consideration, and its ownership for a time; and for further
answer denied the other statements of the cross-petition.
For the cross-petitioner there was filed a reply to the answer
of the bank, in which it was stated that the bank and the other
parties, who, during the life of the $1,138.36 note, became ap-
parently its owners and holders, and who were either officers or
employes of the bank or were of its stockholders, combined or
planned to cheat or defraud the cross-petitioner and used the
suit by attachment as a means through which to effect the pur-
pose, and thereby procured a sale of the note and mortgage to
be made, at which a purchas'e thereof was effected for the bank
for ***** the sum of $322, when their value was more than
$1,300; that at the time the attachment suit was begun and dur-
ing its progress, the pleader was a resident of Seward county,
Nebraska, which fact and his whereabouts at the time were well
known to the bank and the other parties interested, but they
purposely avoided any notice to him of the action, attachment,
and sale thereunder, and he had no notice thereof, and that the
county court was without jurisdiction to act in the suit.
A jury was waived, and there was a trial of the issues to the
May, 1898.] German Nat. Bank v. Kauttbb. 875
court. The court determined as matters of fact that Kautter
borrowed of the bank the sum of $340.75 on March 16, 1890,
and as evidence of the indebtedness so created, executed, and de-
livered to it a promissory note, also turned over to it the
^1,138.36 note and mortgage as collateral security for the pay-
ment of his debt; that several sums at different times were paid
by Ernest Boise to the bank on the mortgage note, and the bal-
ance due thereof, $1,224, was paid May 3, 1894, to the bank;
that at the time of the suit and attachment and the pretended
sale of the note and mortgage under order of the court in such
suit "the said cross-petitioner, John Kautter, was an actual bona
£de resident of Seward county, Nebraska, and still resides there-
in, and that he had no notice whatever of the pendency of said
-action, and that no notice or summons was served upon him in
said action; and the court further finds that said pretended ac-
tion and attachment, and the pretended sale of said note, was
colla'^ive and fraudulent and was made for the purpose of cheat-
ing and defrauding said cross-petitioner, John Kautter, out of
said note and mortgage."
Judgment was rendered against the bank and George F. H.
Schwake for $1,198. 6G and costs, to reverse which is the purpose
of the present proceeding in this court.
We deem it proper here to notice some of the facts in con-
nection with the findings of the court relative thereto. There
was ample evidence of the fact that the note and mortgage were
in the possession of the bank as collateral **^ security for the
payment of the indebtedness of the payee thereof to the bank.
Of the testimony relative to the residence of John Kautter, it
may be said to have been established that he was an unmarried
man and during several years prior to the sale of his farm in
Seward county to Boise, lived thereon; after the sale he kept
his trunk, some of his belongings and effects .at the house of
Frank Thomas, in Seward county, this state; that he had some
business interests or affairs in Kansas, and would go there and
stay during some months of probably each year; that at one
time when in Kansas he voted at a presidential election; that he
always returned to Seward county as his home and was ihere
several months of each year, with the exception possibly of one;
that at the time of the commencement and pendency of the at-
tachment suit in Lancaster county he was in Seward county.
All the facts and attendant circumstances considered, there waa
sufficient testimony to sustain the finding of the court that the
oross-petitioner was a resident of Seward county. There was no
376 German Nat. Bank v. Kautter. [Nebraska,
other than constructive service in the attachment suit. There
was also testimony in support of a determination that the mort-
gage note was at the time of its sale in the attachment proceed-
ings of the value of the amount shown on its face. It was also of
the testimony that the attorney who commenced and prosecuted
the action and attachment for the bank then had the mortgage
note in his possession for collection and that it was levied on in
his office; that he purchased it at the sale for $322 and held it
thereafter for thirty or sixty days; then, as he states, he needed
some money and turned it back to the bank and received of the
bank $322, the same amount he paid for it at the sale. The
foregoing statements in relation to the evidence and facts of the
case we deem sufficient, except to the extent they may be fur-
ther noticed in discusssion of the points of the arguments made
by counsel for the parties.
It is contended for the plaintiffs in error that the demand
for relief by the cross-petitioner involves a collateral **® at-
tack on a domestic judgment or adjudication, the judgment in
the attachment suit; and, while it was in form a personal judg-
ment against John Kautter, it must be regarded as but an ad-
judication by -which the property attached was subjected to the
payment of the debt in suit, and so considered was authorized
if jurisdiction of the res had been obtained. It is of the conten-
tion that such an attack is not allowable where the record dis-
closes, as did that of the county court in the attachment suit,
the performance of all acts and the existence of all facts neces-
sary to confer jurisdiction and its due exercise; and further,,
in this connection, that the defendant in error, not having at-
tacked the judgment in the county court in any of the methods,
of which there were several afforded him by law, could not be
heard to urge its invalidity in the present action. This suit, as
instituted by Boise, directly involved the rights of John Kaut-
ter to the note and mortgage and asked that he be deprived
thereof, and the reason, if tenable, for the relief against him
had its origin in what he asserted in his answer and cross-peti-
tion were the wrongful acts of the bank and other parties to the
suit in respect to some of the subject matters of the action re-
lative to his rights thereto or therein. Tn answer to this, such
parties pleaded the attachment proceedings and adjudication,
and he replied facts to show its invalidity. In this state, where-
under the code there is but one — a civil — action in which mat-
ters which may be denominated legal or equitable may be liti-
gated, the cross-petitioner could be heard in defense to the suit
May, 1898.] German Nat. Bank v. Kautteb. 377
of Boise; also in the cross-action against the bank and other
parties, to assert and show the invalidity of the adjudication
in the attachment suit. It is true that the record of the attach-
ment case, on its face, disclosed that the county court had Jur-
isdiction to proceed as it did; but the affidavit which gave it
jurisdiction to entertain the suit, which became one against tho
thing attached, and not against the person of the debtor — for
of the person there was no jurisdiction — contained in the state-
ment, the *** groundwork of the jurisdiction, that the debtor
was a nonresident of the state and this was not true. Unless
it was a fact his property could not be reached in the suit, and
as it was not a fact, the adjudication by which his property was
appropriated was void. Whether the debtor would be allowed
to assert its invalidity and show the facts not apparent of record
in litigation between him and some third person we need not
and do not decade, but in a contest between him and the bank,
the plaintiff in the attachment suit, we think it was competent
and allowable. This view has in its support the argument that
when the bank was called to account by the allegations and de-
mands of the cross-petition, it invoked in its aid as a defense
the adjudication in the attachment suit, and thus, it may be said,
placed such proceedings and adjudication in issue.
The circumstances of this case as to the question now under
consideration bring it within the principle of the rule announced
by this court in Eayrs v. Nason, 54 Neb. 143, wherein it was
stated: "1. Though the record in which a judgment is pro-
nounced discloses upon its face that the court had jurisdiction
both of the subject matter of the suit and of the parties thereto,
still, a party made liable by such a judgment, who has never
appeared in the action, and who was never given legal notice
of the pendency of such action, may, in a proper proceeding,
either as a cause of action or defense, show that the recitals
of the record that he was served with the process of the court
are false; 2. Suit was brought to foreclose a real estate mort-
gage, the owner of the equity of redemption of the land involved
made defendant thereto, and constructive service had on him by
publication, he being at the time a resident of the state and ac-
tually present therein. He did not appear in the action per-
sonally or by attorney. After the decree the defendant died.
Held, that in a suit brought by his heir against the purchaser
of the land at the sale under the foreclosure decree, to quiet
the heir's title and redeem from the mortgage, *** that the
heir might show that the averments of the affidavit filed to
S78 German Nat. Bank v. Kautteb. [Nebraska,
procure constructive service upon his ancestor, that he was then
& nonresident of the state and that service of summons could
not be made on him in the state, was false": See also Mastin v.
Gray, 19 Kan. 458, 27 Am. Eep. 149; McNeill v. Edie, 24 Kan.
108; Norwood v. Cobb, 15 Tex. 500; Goudy v. Hall, 30 111. 109;
Garleton v. Bickford, 13 Gray, 591, 74 Am. Dec. 652; Needham
V. Thayer, 147 Mass. 536; Dozier v. Eichardson, 25 Ga. 90.
The ground for the issuance of the writ has no existence
•and the attachment was wrongful (Stiff v. Fisher, 85 Tex. 556;
McLaughlin v. Davis, 14 Kan. 168; Connelly v. Woods, 31 Kan.
559; Mayer v. Zingre, 18 Neb. 458), and afforded no forceful
defense for the bank against Kautter's demand for his col-
laterals or the value thereof.
It is urged that the cross-petition was insufficient and the
relief afforded was not warranted or supported by the pleading
of the prayer thereof. The cross-petition was not the subject
of an attack for insufficiency of allegations until at the time
of the trial. The question was raised by a demurrer ore tenus.
It was also of the subject matter of the motion for a new trial.
The cross-petition, we think, was sufficient in its allegation to
warrant the relief given, especially construed favorably as is the
rule when the demurrer is delayed, as was this, until the incep-
i;ion of the introduction of evidence. There are some other
points made in argument for plaintiffs in error which refer to the
admission of evidence. The trial was to the court without a jury.
That improper evidence was admitted is not in and of itself
ground for reversal. There was evidence to sustain the find-
ings of the court: Tolerton v. McClure, 45 Neb. 368.
It is also asserted that the trial court erred in allowing a
designated line of interrogatories to be asked of two of the wit-
nesses during their cross-examination. There were but few ob-
jections interposed to any portions of the cross-examination to
which this complaint refers, and the **^ testimony elicited by
the questions to which objections were made was either imma-
terial or, for other reasons, wholly without prejudice to the
Tights of the complainants.
It is argued that it was error to allow F. C. Thomas and
Frank Thonms to testify on rebuttal in regard to the place of
residence of John Kautter. Of this argument it may be said
that Frank Thomas was not called and did not testify in re-
buttal. "When F. C. Thomas was called to testify in rebuttal,
there was no objection that it would be improper that he should
give testimony at that stage of the trial, nor was his testimony
May, 1898.] Brown v. Bose. 379
objected to as a wHole. Of a few questions asked of him it was
made of record that they called for improper rebuttal testi-
mony, and the court was asked to reject it, but the testimony
allowed to be given in such instances was either immaterial or
nonprejudicial; hence the assignments are without force.
Of the judgment as against the plaintiff in error, George
F. H. Schwake, we must say that it is, in our view of the cause,
without proof to sustain it. Anything he did was in his capacity
as employe of the bank and not personally, unless it was his pur-
chase of the note and mortgage, and we do not believe from the
€vidence that this portion of the affair was of such a nature
as to render him personally liable to the cross-petitioner. The
judgment against the bank is affirmed, and as to George F. H.
Schwake it is reversed.
Judgment accordingly.
Nerval, J., offered no opinion.
ATTACHMENT PROCEEDINGS AGAINST NONRESIDENTS
are regulated and governed by statute, and such statutory provisions
must be strictly adhered to: Note to Mudge v. Steinhart, 12 Am.
St. Rep. 22.
ATTACHMENT— FALSE AFFIDAVIT.— If an attachment Is pro-
•cured by the plaintiff's filing an affidavit that the debt upon which
he sues is not secured, and a bond is given to release property from
a levy made under such attachment, the obligors in the bond may
successfully resist the action against them thereon by establishing
the falsity of such affidavit: Murphy v. Montandon, 2 Idaho, 1(HS, 33
Am. St. Rep. 279.
Brown' v. Boss.
[55 Nebraska, 200.]
ATTACHMENT SALES— TITLE OF PURCHASER— COL-
LATERAL ATTACK.— A purchaser at execution sale of the real
property of a nonresident defendant taken under attachment ae-
<iuire8 a title not subject to collateral attack In another action,
although the publication of notice preceding the Judgment in the
attachment proceeding was irregular and might have been attacked
therein.
C. F. Tuttle, W. D. Beckett, and D. F. Hayden, for the appel-
lants.
J. C. Watson, for the appellees.
200 RYAN, C. This was an action of ejectment in which
there was final judgment in favor of the defendants in the dis-
380 Brown v. Bose. [Nebraska,
trict court of Otoe county. The trial was to the court with-
out a jury, and the correctness of its conclusion depends upon
a single question, which is presented by the following facts:
Previous to March 14, 1890, the real property in controversy
was owned by the ancestor of the plaintiffs in error. On that
day there were two petitions and other proper showings for an
attachment, which issued against said owner of the real prop-
erty in dispute in as many actions. The attachment defend-
ant, at the time of all the transactions herein referred to, was
a nonresident of this state. The levies of the writs of attach-
ment were made respectively, on March 20, ^^^ 1890, and March
25, 1890. The publications of notice to the nonresident defend-
ant were made March 14, March 21, March 28, April 4 and April
11, 1890. By stipulation on the trial of this case it was admitted
that the two above-mentioned actions were begun against the de-
fendant Brown to cause to be sold the premises in dispute for the
payment of debts owing by him; that said property was purchased
at sheriff's sale, and that through the purchaser at said sale the
defendant in the district court, as an innocent purchaser, derived
his title, under which, at the time of the commencement of the
action, he was in possession. The contention of plaintiffs in
error is, that no publication could properly be made of the
notice to the nonresident defendant until after a levy of attach-
ment; that after such levy there were not four publications of
the notice, and consequently the court, at the time it directed
a sale of the property, had no Jurisdiction to order a sale there-
of, from which premises it is argued that the sale pursuant to
such order was not effective to vest title.
In Darnell v. Mack, 46 Neb. 740, this exact question wai
not involved, but arguendo there were cited several cases in
support of the proposition that jurisdiction to order a sale de-
pends upon the lawful seizure of the property, and that subse-
quent defects may render the judgment erroneous, but not void.
We have again examined these cases and find that they sustain
the proposition in support of which they were cited: Cooper v.
Reynolds, 10 Wall. 308; Paine v. Mooreland, 15 Ohio 435, 45
Am. Dec. 585; In re Clark, 3 Denio, 167; Beech v. Abbott, 6
Vt. 586; Williams v. Stewart, 3 Wis. 678, *773; Field v. Dortcli,
34 Ark. 339; Hardin v. Lee, 51 Mo. 241. We could add nothing
of value by going over the propositions considered in Darnell v.
Mack, 46 Neb. 740, and hence refrain from any attempts in
that direction. The reasoning meets our approval, as appiicd
to the facts of this case, and it is necessary merely to refe; to
May, 1893.] Bloomfield State Bank v. Miller, 881
that reasoning for a discussion of the pivotal question with
which we are dealing.
^"^ The irregularities complained of by plaintiffs in error
were of such a nature that, possibly, they might have been
available in the actions in which they occurred. They can-
not now be invoked to sustain a collateral attack upon the judg-
ments rendered in those actions and upon the proceedings after-
ward had for the enforcement of said judgments. There is
found no error in the record and the judgment of the district
court is affirmed.
ATTACHMENT— COLLATERAL ATTACK ON JUDGMENT.
A court acquires jurisdiction In attachment by Issuing process and
attacliing the property, and If, after acquiring jurisdiction, It ren-
ders judgment without the publication of notice required by law,
such judgment Is irregular only, and cannot be attacked collaterally,
but can only be corrected by writ of error: Paine v. Mooreland, 15
Ohio, 435. 45 Am. Dec. 585. But see German Nat. Bank v. Kautter,
55 Neb. 103, ante, p. 371, where a judgment against a supposed non-
resident was attacked collaterally.
Bloomfield State Bank v. Milleb.
[55 Nebraska, 243.]
MORTGAGES— DEPOSIT OP TITLE DEEDS.— A mortgage
cannot be created by the deposit of title deeds without a writing, as
«uoh mortgage is contrary to the statute of frauds and the recording
acts.
STATUTE OP PRAUDS.— An exception to the statute of
frauds taking out of its operation estates arising by act or opera-
tion of law does not include a case where the creation of the estate
depends solelv upon the Intention of the parties to a contract.
STATUTE OP PRAUDS — ORAL CONTRACT.— A court of
oqulty cannot make valid a contract .void under the statute of
frauds, under pretense of aiding an Imp'erfect attempt to execute a
contract.
MORTGAGES— DEPOSIT OP TITLE DEEDS.— A mortgage
attempted to be made by the deposit of title deeds cannot be en-
forced, although the loan secured by such deposit has been actually
received by the depositor.
A. A. "Welch, for the appellant.
Carter & Brown, for the appellee.
«*» IRVINE, C. D. C. Main held a contract with th^ state
for the purchase of the northwest quarter of section 32, town-
ship 32 north, of range 3 west, in Knox county, eaid land be-
ing state educational land. He also held a number of leases of
382 Bloomfield State Bank v. Millek. [Nebraska^
other educational land in the vicinity. In 1892 he entered into-
contracts with H. N. Miller, which had for their effect the
transfer to Miller of Main's rights to the land, payment of the
consideration or a part thereof being deferred. The contract
first referred to, and out of which this action arises, was as-
signed to Miller by a separate instrument. January 20, 1893,
Miller made his note to the Bloomfield State Bank for five
hundred dollars, representing in part an overdraft and in part
a loan made at that time by the bank to Miller. At the same
time Miller wrote his name on the back of the assignment from
Main to himself, and delivered the assignment in that condi-
tion to the bank, intending thereby to have it operate as security
for the note. Prior thereto he had, by formal written assign-
ments, transferred his rights to the other lands to French, to
secure a debt he owed the latter. In April or May, 1893, find-
ing that he would be unable to meet the payments to Main, Mil-
ler negotiated for the sale of his rights to Sexton, Comstock
& Co. Sexton, Comstock & Co. not being prepared or not desir-
ing to make immediate payment to Main, an arrangement was
made among Miller, Main, French, and Sexton, Comstock &
Co., evidenced by a preliminary memorandum agreement, ^^®
two formal contracts, and certain letters. No single contract
wa5 joined in by all the parties to the transaction, but the
nature of the arrangement is made plain by a comparison of
the different documents. Its precise nature is not material;
its general object was to procure contracts of purchase in lieu
of the leases, to pass all rights eventually to Sexton, Comstock
& Co., and to this end that French should pay to Main all moneys
accruing to him under his contracts with Miller, obtain the as-
signed contracts from Main and hold them until Sexton, Com-
stock & Co. should repay French his advances to Miller and to
Main, when he should assign them to Sexton, Comstock & Co.
Accordingly, French paid Main what was due him, including
the money due on the contract first mentioned. Down to this
point neither Main, French, nor Sexton, Comstock & Co. knew
of the transactions between Miller and the bank. Learning
thereof, Main refused to transfer the contract with the state
to French. The bank on its part, learning of the other trans-
actions, wrote above Miller's signature on the assignment an
assignment thereof to itself. Then it began this action against
Miller, Main, and French, alleging in its petition the debt to
the bank and that to secure the payment thereof Miller agreed
to assign the contract with Main, that he wrote his name on
May, 1898.] Bloom field State Bank v, Millee. 385
the back thereof and delivered it to the hank with authority
to fill in above the signature a formal assignment. It prayed
a foreclosure. Miller made default. French answered, deny-
ing all the material averments of the petition and alleging
that, for the purpose of securing title and conveying to Sexton,
Comstock & Co. in accordance with his contract obligations, he
had bought the land of Main and paid him therefor, all in
ignorance of any claim by plaintiff. By way of cross-petitioa
he prayed that Main be required to assign tne contract to him.
Main in his answer pleaded his good faith and offered to assign
to whomsoever the court might determine, and to refund to
French what he had paid if the court should so order. **'' The-
findings were against the plaintiff, and the court ordered a
conveyance by Main to French. Plaintiff alone appeals. •
By comparing the statement of facts with the issues, it will
be seen that neither of the contesting parties succeeded in
establishing the facts precisely as he pleaded them. The bank
wholly failed to show that it had any authority to write the-
assignment over Miller's signature, or that the signature was
placed there for such a purposie. Even if there had been such,
authority, the assignment was not written until after French's-
rights had accrued in his ignorance of the bank's. The bank,
therefore, can claim nothing under the written assignment. On
the other hand, French pleaded only an assignment from Main.
Main had already assigned to Miller, so that under that plead-
ing French could claim only a subrogation to Main's right to
the unpaid purchase money, provided the bank had any right
derived from Miller, although under the evidence French, or
Sexton, Comstock & Co., whom" he represented, was shown to
have acquired Miller's rights also. If the bank obtained no
right, then it cannot complain of the decree between the other
parties. If it did obtain any right from Miller, then the decree
must at least be modified. The proof showing that the written
assignment to the bank was unavailing, but also showing that
the contract between Main and Miller was by the latter deposited
with the bank with the clear intention on the part of both that
it should stand as security for a debt in part then contracted,
we have thus distinctly presented for the first time in this stata
the question whether the doctrine of an equitable mortgage by
a deposit of title deeds is sound.
It is unnecessary to review the English cases. When the
doctrine was there first announced it provoked much opposi-
tion, being justly considered a further invasion of the statute
584 Bloomfield State Bank v. Milleb. [Nebraska,
■of frauds. Lord Eldon expressed his emphatic disapproval
of it, but considered the rule too well fixed in his time to justify
its overthrow. It must therefore ^'*^ be accepted as the estab-
lished doctrine of the English courts, and as a part of the law of
England. The common law is not with us an estate by in-
heritance, but one by purchase. It is here in force by virtue
of statute, which provides: "So much of the common law of
England as is applicable and not inconsistent with the constitu-
tion of the United States, with the organic law of this territory,
or with any law passed or to be passed by the legislature of this
territory" is adapted and declared to be law within said terri-
tory: Comp. Stats., c. 15, sec. 1. No one would assert
that the phrase "common law" was there used in contradistinc-
tion to the rules of equity; it undoubtedly includes the law de-
rived from the English court of chancery. On the other hand,
it was not the whole body of the English law which was adopted,
but only so much thereof as is applicable (to the nature of our
institutions), and is not inconsistent with the constitutions or
statutes, past or future. There is certainly nothing in the con-
stitution which conflicts with the doctrine of parol mortgages,
hut when we examine the statutes the question assumes a dif-
ferent aspect. We have a statute of frauds in the main follow-
lowing the outline of the famous statute of Charles II. By this
"No estate or interest in lands, other than leases for a term not
exceeding one year, nor any trust or power over or concerning
lands, or in any manner relating thereto, shall hereafter be cre-
ated, granted, assigned, or surrendered or declared, unless by act
or operation of law, or by a deed or conveyance in writing, sub-
scribed by the party creating, granting, assigning, surrendering,
or declaring the same": Comp. Stat., c. 32, sec. 3. By section 4
of the same chapter, section 3 shall not be construed "to prevent
any trust from rising or being extinguished by implication or
operation of law." By section 5 every contract for the sale of
lands or any interest in lands shall be void unless the contract
or some note or memorandum be in writing and signed by the
party by whom the sale is made. By section 23 the term "estate
^'^^ and interest in lands" shall be construed to embrace every
•estate and interest, freehold and chattel, legal and equitable,
present and future, vested and contingent. The language of
these sections is so clear that it would be immediately conclu-
sive against the theory of parol liens, were it not for the fact
that much of the language is taken from the English statute,
which, in spite of its plain provisions, the English courts
May, 1898.] Bloomfield State Bank v. Milleb. 885
straiglitway set themselves to evade and fritter away by a process
of misconstruotion as systematic as it was ingenious. For years
the mischief of that policy has been realized and the danger of
further pursuing it has been by most courts carefully avoided.
The spirit of the statute should certainly be preserved so far
as possible. Its purpose and policy, no doubt, is to prevent the
creation or transfer of estates in or liens upon lands, except
by -wrriting definite and complete in its terms. To en-
force a mortgage created by the mere deposit of title deeds is
:ji the plainest violation of such purpose and policy. It directly
■offends the very letter of the law.
Again, in this state we have created by statute a system wliere-
by conveyances, including mortgages, must be registered in a
public office. The purpose of this system is to afford security to
titles by a public record which parties dealing with land may,
and for their own protection must, examine, and on which they
may rely. Secret transfers and liens are sought thereby to be
prevented. A mortgage by deposit of title deeds tends to defeat
this purpos:e. The recording acts have another bearing on the
question. In England title deeds followed the land. The evi-
dence of title lay not only in the delivery of a deed, but in its
continued possession by the grantee. When, therefore, the
owner parted with his muniments of title he parted with the
means of disposing of the land. When the deposit was by way
of pledge, the pledgee, by his manual possession of the deeds,
had the effective power to prevent an untoward disposition of
the land, either such as would defraud him or such as would
defraud ^'*** others ignorant of his rights. But under our sys-
tem it is not usual to consult or even to inquire about the origi-
nal conveyances. They have performed their chief office when
they have been recorded. Thenceforth the records become the
practical evidence of title. By a deposit of the deeds the pledgee
does not obtain that effective control over the thing pledged
which is essential to such a security when not evidenced by writ-
ing, whether that thing be real or personal.
For the reasons above stated this court has held that the ven-
dor of land, who delivers to his vendee a deed absolute, does
not retain a lien thereon for the unpaid purchase money: Ed-
minster V. Higgins, 6 'Neb. 265; Ansley v. Pasahro, 22 Neb.
€62. In Folsom v. McCague, 29 Neb. 124, Judge Nerval, speak-
ing of an assignment of a land contract where the place for the
vendee's name was left blank, said : **To make a valid assignment
Ail 8r. Rep.. You LXX.— 2»
386 Bloomfield State Bank v. Miller. [Nebraska^
of tliese coiitracts,it was as necessaryto hare an assignee as it was
the signature of the assignor. Until some one's name was filled
in these blanks as assignee the appellees appeared to be and
were the real owners These assignments of the contracts
in blank were in violation of the statute of frauds and void.'*
"While none of these cases is decisive of that before us, they all
recognize the principles already stated. We would, in the ab-
sence of authority elsewhere, say without hesitation that the
doctrine of equitable mortgages by the deposit of title deeds^
although a part of the law of England, is not here applicable,.
is contrary to our statutes, and was, therefore, not adopted by
the legislature of the territory. This conclusion is reinforced
by an examination of the decisions in other states, where by cus-
tom or by statute the common law hai been acquired. For
some or all of the reasons suggested the doctrine has been re-
pudiated in the following cases: Probasco v. Johnson, 2 Disn.
96; Lehman v. Collins, 69 Ala. 127; Bower v. Oyster, 3 Penr.
& W. 239; Vanmeter v. McFaddin, 8 B. Mon. 435; Bicknell
V. Bicknell, 31 Vt. 498; Meador v. Meador, 3 Heisk. 562; Goth-
ard v. Flynn, 25 Miss. 58.
^'^^ While the courts of many states have to some extent in-
timated an adherence to the English rule, it has always been
on a citation of the English cases, without any discussion on
principle of the objections to the "enforcement of that rule in
this country. Moreover, these cases are by no means so formid-
able as their bare citation in digests and text-books would in-
dicate. New York invariably leads the list of states in these
compilations, and the first case cited isJacksonv.Dunlap,lJohns.
Cas. 114, 1 Am. Dec. 100. There land had been sold; the deed
had not been delivered, but was retained by the grantor as se-
curity for the purchase money. Four judges held that there had
been no delivery and that title had never passed. Kent alone
thought that title had passed, but that an equitable mortgage
had been created. He does not discuss the question and his
opinion was a dissent, but the case is cited as upholding the
English rule. Jackson v. Parkhurst, 4 Wend. 369, merely holds
that an equitable mortgage is not available as a defense in eject-
ment. The validity of such a mortgage for other purposes was
not involved in the case. Rockwell v. Hobby, 2 Sand. Oh. 10,
was a case where a son had paid his mother's mortgage and
retained an unrecorded deed to her. It was there held that
the retention of the deed made an equitable mortgage, but the
case loses force from the further holding that, independently
May, 1898.] Bloomfield State Bank v. Miller. 887
of the deed, the son was suhrogated to the rights of the mort-
gagee whom he had paid. Chase v. Peck, 21 N. Y. 581, was a
case of a deed absolute; the remarks about deposits of title deeda
were obiter.
In New Jersey a very peculiar thing has occurred. Griffin
V. Griffin, 18 N". J. Eq. 104, was a bill to compel the defendant
to surrender to plaintiff deeds to plaintiff's ancestor of land
in New York. It appeared that -they had been deposited as
security. The court, citing the New York cases we have men-
tioned, took them as indicating that such a deposit operated
in New York as a mortgage, and therefore very properly re-
fused to decree ^^^ their surrender, without any reference to
the New Jersey law on the subject. But in Gale v. Morris, 29
N. J. Eq. 222, the court announced the English rule as in force
in New Jersey and cited Griffin v. Griffin, 18 N. J. Eq. 104, and
also Brewer v. Marshall, 19 N. J. Eq. 637, 97 Am. Dec. 679, a
case where the doctrine was not involved, but mentioned by way
of remote illustration of a general equitable principle. More-
over, even Gale v. Morris, 29 N. J. Eq. 222, did not require a
decision of the question. That was a suit to reform a mortgage
on a life estate so as to embrace the fee; the mistake as between
the parties was admitted, and the issue was whether a subse-
quent mortgagee was charged with noitice so that the reforma-
tion could cut him out as to the reversion.
Hackett v. Eeynolds, 4 E. I. 612, enforces such a mortgage
in a hard case, with the preliminary observation that the fraudu-
lent design of the debtors was so transparent "that a court of
equity would be disposed to find or to make a way to thwart
them.*' From a peculiarly apologetic tone in the opinion it is
evident that the court realized tha;t it was making a way.
Hutzler v. Phillips, 26 S. C. 136, 4 Am. St. Rep. 687, often
cited as sustaining the rule, holds distinctly that the case was
not within it. There was a dissent to the intimation that the
rule might be in force.
The following cases, frequently cited, will be found on in-
vestigation to involve no such question, and the remarks of the
judges on the subject either to be obiter or made for the purpose
of excluding the question from the case: Mowry v. Wood, 12
Wis. (*413) 460; Jarvis v. Butcher, 16 Wis. (*307) 326; Abbott
V. Godfroy, 1 Mich. 179; Peckham v. Haddock, 36 111. 38; Rob-
erts V. Richards, 36 111. 339; Carpenter v. Black Hawk Gold
Min. Co., 65 N. Y. 43; Hall v. McDuff, 24 Me. 311; Wright
V. Troutman, 81 111. 374.
388 Bloomfield State Bank v. Miller. [Nebraska,
Williams v. Stratton, 10 Smedes & M. 418, says: "Such a
mortgage is in direct opposition to the statute of frauds, in re-
gard to which we have said that we will create no exceptions
not found in the statute."
^^ Mandeville v. Welch, 5 Wheat, 277, does not sustain the
doctrine. Judge Story merely says in that case: "It may he
admitted that according to the course of the authorities in Eng-
land, and as applicable to the state of land titles there," a de-
posit of title deeds creates a mortgage. Whatever inference
might be drawn from that language as to the position of the
supreme court of the United States is dispelled by the emphatic
words of Justice Campbell in Williams v. Hill, 19 How. 246:
"ISTor can the real property conveyed in the deed be retained as
security for advances or debts subsequently made, on the strength
of a parol engagement."
The case of First Nat. Bank v. Caldwell, 4 Dill. 314, is en-
titled to more than passing consideration, not only from the
eminent ability of the judge who decided it, but as being a case
from this federal district and to which the law of Nebraska was
applicable. There certain railroad coupons were held as a
pledge. They were exchangeable for land, and, by arrangement
of the debtor and creditor, they were exchanged, land contracts
being issued in the name of the debtor but delivered to the cred-
itor. The court held that the pledgee had a lien superior to
that of a judgment creditor. Judge Dillon, however, declined
to pass on the question whether a lien could be created by the
mere deposit of title deeds. The fact that there they stood in
lieu of coupons held in perfect pledge was the controlling fact
in his mind. Giving, however, due weight to his apparent
opinion in favor of the English rule, we do not feel that we can
adopt it in the face of what seems to us the overwhelming rea-
son and weight of authority against it.
The plaintiff argues that so far as the reasons urged for de-
nying the lien are founded on the statute of frauds they are
of no force, because our statute excepts from its operation es-
tates arising by act or operation of law. This phrase occurs twice
in the statute — once in section 3, already quoted, and again in
section 4, with reference to trusts: Comp. Stats., c. 32, The
phrase is ^* twice found in the statute of 29 Charles II, chapter
3, and in the same connection; in section 3 in very similar words
to our section 3; in section 8 with regard to trusts: Section 8
of the English statute excepts trusts arising by implication or
construction of law and extinguishments or transfers by act or
May, 1898.] Bloomfield State Bank v. Miller, 389
operation of law, while our section 4 excepts trusts arising or
extinguished by implication or operation of law. It is nianifest
from the closeness of context that the phrase was used in our
statute in the English sense. We have not found any exact
definition thereof. Chancellor Kent, in Simonds v. Catlin, Cole.
& C. Cas. 346, said : "These words are strictly technical, and refer
to certain definite estates, such as those by curtesy and dower
and those created by remittitur." In Bouvier's Law Dictionary
it is said that the term indicates the manner in which a party
acquires rights without any act of his own. There can be no
doubt that parliament intended no more than these statements
imply, at least in the third section of the statute. In the eighth
section trusts were involved, and the object of the exception
seems to have been to avoid the destruction of the ingenious
method of conveyancing derived from the doctrine of trusts and
the construction which had been placed on the statute of uses,
and to preserve resulting and constructive trusts. Whatever
may have been the precise idea in the legislative mind, it is clear
that the exception was not meant to give effect to contracts
which the parties had failed to express in the form required by
the statute. Such an interpretation would render the exception
wholly destructive of the statute. Yet it requires that interpre-
tation to bring this case within the exception. The lien here
arises if at all solely from the contract of the parties. It is not
a result flowing by law independent of their contract or even
derivative from any valid contract which they made.
Finally, it is insisted that a court of equity will enforce the
lien as the result of an imperfect attempt to *^** create a legal
mortgage. Certain California cases are cited in support of the
argument. The power of equity is frequently asserted to reform
instruments and to compel their execution under certain circum-
stances. But neither the petition nor the evidence presents a
case for the reformation of an instrument or the specific per-
formance of a contract. There is not made out, as suggested,
a ease for the specific performance of an oral contract on the
ground of part performance. The plaintiff has not altered its
position except by paying the consideration, and that alone is
not such a part performance as will take a case out of the statute
of frauds. Moreover, there was no contract to specifically
enforce. Miller did not promise to execute a mortgage. He
indorsed the contract and delivered it, which was all that his
contract contemplated. Nothing more could be required, at
least where the rights of third persons have intervened. In no
390 United States Nat. Bank v. Geeb. [Nebraska,
way can the Lank be given any relief except by giving effect to
a transaction which the law has denounced as void.
Affirmed.
MORTGAGES— DEPOSIT OF TITLE DEEDS.— Where title
deeds are deposited as present security, and with Intent thereby to
create a lien upon the land therein conveyed, an equitable mort-
gage is created, notwithstanding the statute of frauds. But an
equitable mortgage is not created by the deposit of title deeds in
pursuance of a parol agreement to make a mortgage: Hutzler v.
Phillips, 26 S. C. 136, 4 Am. St. Eep. 687, and especially see the
monographic note thereto.
STATUTE OF FRAUDS— PAROL AGREEMENT— COURTS OF
EQUITY.— Equity will at all times lend its aid to defeat fraud, not-
withstanding the statute of frauds: Ryan v. Dox, 34 N. Y. 307, 90
Am. Dec. 696. But no case can be found where a. contract has been
taken out of the statute in favor of a party who had no existing
Interest in the property, Avho had done no act of part performance,
who had parted with nothing under the contract, simply upon the
ground that the other party was guilty of a fraud in refusing to
perform his verbal agreement: See the note to Ryan v. Dox, 90 Am.
Dec. 709.
United States National Bank v, Geeb.
[55 NKBRilSKA, 462.]
NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS — INDORSEMENT — EVI-
DENCE.—If commercial paper is indorsed in blank, parol evidence
Is admissible to show that the terms of the agreement between the
parties are other and different from those which arise by presump-
tion of law.
NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS — INDORSEMENT — EVI-
DENCE.—A restrictive indorsement to commercial paper unam-
biguous In Its terms, cannot be contradicted or explained by parol
evidence.
NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS — INDORSEMENT — EVI-
DENCE.—A certificate of deposit indorsed for collection for the
account of the indorser is a restrictive indorsement which vests no
general property In the paper in the indorsee, but makes him merely
a collection agent; and pai'ol evidence is not admissible to show that
the transfer of the title was intended to be absolute.
J. C. Cowin and "W. D. McHugh, for the appellant.
O. H. Scott and Cobb & Harvey, for the appellee.
*03 NORVAL and SULLIVAN, JJ. At the last term of
this court a decision was entered in this case reversing the judg-
ment of the trial court. Upon a proper application a rehearing
was granted, and the cause has been a second time submitted
for our consideration. The issues involved and the essential
June, 1898.] United States Nat. Bank v. Geer. 391
facts of the case are stated with suflBcient accuracy in the for-
mer decision reported in United States Nat. Bank v. Geer, 53
Neb. 67. In reversing the judgment below we proceeded upon
the theory that the form of the indorsement of the certificate
of deposit was ambiguous and not conclusive as to the inten-
tions of the parties; that it was permissible to show by parol
evidence the exact nature of the contract, and that the only
inference to be drawn from the proofs established a sale of
the draft and not a bailment for collection. A careful re-
examination of the record and questions thereby presented,
assisted by the able argument of counsel, has convinced us
that the former decision was erroneous. In the opinion it
was said: "Whatever may be the law elsewhere, it is the
law of this state that as between the immediate parties the
true relationship may be shown, notwithstanding the form or
terms of the indorsement itself": Citing Roberts v. Snow, 27
Neb. 425; Dusenbury v. Albright, 31 Neb. 345; Salisbury v.
First Nat. Bank, 37 Neb. 872, 40 Am. St. Eep. 527; Holmes v.
First Nat. Bank, 38 Neb. 326, 41 Am. St. Rep. 733; Corbett
V. Fetzer, 47 Neb. 269. The adjudications of this court do not
warrant the statement of the rule as broadly as above indicated,
nor do the decisions elsewhere support such a doctrine. The
general rule is, and it has been frequently asserted by this court,
that the terms of a written contract cannot be contradicted,
varied, or explained by parol evidence of a prior or contempo-
raneous oral agreement between the parties : Hamilton v. Thrall,
7 Neb. 210; Dodge v. Kiene, 28 Neb. 216; Watson v. Roode,
30 Neb. 264; Kaserman v. Fries, 33 Neb. 427; Mattison v.
Chicago etc. R. R. Co., 42 Neb. 545; Clarke v. Kelsey, 41 Neb.i
766; Maxwell v. Burr, 44 *** Neb. 31; Commercial State Bank
V. Antelope County, 48 Neb. 496; Waddle v. Owen, 43 Neb.
489; Nebraska Exposition Assn. v. Townley, 46 Neb. 893. It
is true this court has more than once decided that when the
rights of bona fide purchasers of negotiable paper for value be-
fore maturity are not involved, it is competent to show by parol
evidence, in cases of indorsement in blank of such paper, that
the terms of the agreement between the parties were other and
different from those which arise by presumption of law: Holmes
V. First Nat. Bank, 38 Neb. 326, 41 Am. St. Rep. 733; Corbett
y. Fetzer, 47 Neb. 269. The principle underlying these cases
does not contravene the general rule, recognized and applied
by this and other courts, that parol contemporaneous evidence
cannot be received to contradict or vary the terms of a written
892 United States Nat. Bank v. Geer. [Nebraska^
instrument, for the obvious reason that the contract of a blank
indorsement is not expressed in writing, but rests in legal im-
plications, and this prima facie presumption of law may h&
overthrown, as between the original parties to such an indorse-
ment, by the admission of competent parol evidence establish-
ing the real terms of the agreement. If the law conclusively
presumed the liability created by an iridorsement in blank of
commercial paper, then, of course, the actual terms of the
contract would not be a proper subject of inquiry, and neither
party would be permitted to show by parol the true agreement.
But the presumption of liability arising from such an indorse-
ment is prima facie merely, and not conclusive; hence, as against
all except bona fide holders for value, the true terms of the con-
tract may be shown by evidence resting in parol. The indorse-
ment of the Hebron bank on the certificate of deposit involved
herein was an express written contract, not open to contradic-
tion or explanation by proof of extrinsic facts, and conclusively
proves an agency merely, and that the title and ownership of
the paper never passed to the Capital National Bank. This
doctrine is sustained by an unbroken line of authorities.
In First Nat. Bank v. Eeno County Bank, 3 ^^^ ped. Eep.
257, it was distinctly decided that an indorsement of a bill of
exchange directing the drawee to pay to another "on account |
of* the indorser, or "for collection," is a restrictive indorse-
ment carrying with it notice that the indorser did not there-
by part with title to the paper or to its proceeds when collected.
To the same effect are Beal v. Somerville, 60 Fed. Eep. 647;
Hoffman v. First Nat. Bank, 46 N. J. L. 605; Cecil Bank v.
Farmers Bank, 22 Md. 148; 1 Morse on Banks and Banking,
see. 217; Blaine v. Bourne, 11 E. I. 119, 23 Am. Eep. 429;
Sweeny v. Easter, 1 Wall. 166; Balbach v. Frelinghuysen, 15
Fed. Eep. 675; First Nat. Bank of Crown Point v. First Nat.
Bank of Eichmond, 76 Ind. 561, 40 Am. Eep. 261; White v.
Miners Nat. Bank, 102 U. S. 658.
Leaxy v. Blan chard, 48 Me. 269, was an action upon a prom-
issory note indorsed by the payee, "Pay to Arthur Leary, or
order, for account of the Atlas Mutual Insurance Co." It was
ruled that the indorsement was restrictive and parol evidence
was inadmissible to show that the transfer was absolute.
A draft bore the following indorsement: *Tay Penn Bank,,
or order, for account of People's Bank, McKeesport, Pa. C.
R. Stuckslager, Cashier. D. Gardner, As. Cash." This indorse-
ment was before the court for consideration in Freeman's Nat..
June, 1898.] United States Nat. Bank v. Gees. 305
Bank v. National Tube Works Co., 151 Mass. 413, 21 Am. St.
Eep. 461, and it was held to be restrictive for collection, merely
giving notice that the title and ownership of the paper had not
passed from the indorser.
Third Nat. Bank v. Clark, 23 Minn. 263, was an action on a .
promissory note made payable to the order of the Williams
Mower & Reaper Company and indorsed by the payee to the
Third National Bank of Syracuse, or order, for collection. It
was adjudicated in that case that the indorsement was restric-
tive and that parol evidence was not admissible to prove it
absolute: Eock County Nat. Bank v, HoUister, 21 Minn. 385.
In Armour Bros. Banking Co. v. Eiley County Bank, 30 Kan.
163, there was involved the scope and effect of the "^^^ follow-
ing indorsement on a draft : "Pay W. H. Wynants, Esq., Cashier,
or order, for account of the Eiley County Bank of Manhattan,
Kansas. J. K. Winchip, Cashier.** Parol evidence was offered
to contradict the indorsement, which, upon objection, was ex-
cluded by the trial court. Brewer, J., in delivering the opinion
of the court on review, used this language: "The ruling of the
district court was founded upon the idea that this indorsement «
is a restrictive indorsement, defining the rights and title of
the indorsee, and not open to contradiction or explanation by
parol testimony. In other words, this indorsement is a writ-
ten contract, conclusive as against any parol testimony, and
which shows absolutely that the plaintiff was not the owner,
the real property in interest, but only held the draft as agent,
and for the purposes of collection. That this is a restrictive
indorsement, and that it operated to transfer the draft to the
plaintiff only as agent for purposes of collection, cannot be
doubted: Byles on Bills, 152; 1 Daniel on Negotiable Instru-
ments, sec. 698; Blaine v. Bourne, 11 E. IT 119, 23 Am. Eep.
429, and cases cited in the opinion. In this latter case, speak-
ing of an indorsement almost identical with the one at bar, the
court says: *The indorsee is rather an agent of the indorser with
power of substitution, and the bill is still in the possession of
the indorser by his agent.' And again : *The words are notice
that the restricted indorsee has no property in the bill.* It will
be perceived that this is not a mere blank indorsement, but one
in which the contract is written out in full, and, therefore, like
any other written contract, not to be contradicted or varied by
parol evidence: Greenleaf on Evidence, sees. 277, 281, 282; 1
Daniel on Negotiable Instruments, sec. 717; so that upon the
394 United States Nat. Bank v. Geeb. [Nebraska,
face of the paper it appears affirmatively that the plaintiff is
not the owner, but only an agent for collection."
No case has come within the range of our vision which is in
conflict with the adjudications already mentioned, nor is it be-
lieved that any decision can be found which lends support to
the doctrine that it is competent to ^'' prove, in case of a re-
strictive indorsement like the one before us, that the actual
contract was different from the one expressed in writing on the
back of the certificate of deposit.
It is argued by counsel for plaintiff in error that the con-
tractual rights of the parties are not expressed in the indorse-
ment in question; that the law infers a contract therefrom. "We
quote from the brief :"When one writes upon the back of a
negotiable instrument 'pay to the order of A. B., for account
of,' and signs it, his contract is not set forth in the writing.
His obligations under this indorsement, and the rights and
duties of the indorsee under this enforcement, are not in any-
wise set forth in the indorsement. It is not a written contract
statiug the mutual rights and obligations of the parties. The
law merchant in the case of this indorsement, as in the case of
one in blank, infers from the indorsement a certain contract,
and it is this inferred contract which the law enforces when
it holds the signer to the usual obligations. From a restrictive
indorsement the law infers a certain contract. From an un-
restricted indorsement the law infers a certain other contract.
In both cases, it must be clear the contract is inferred, and in
no sense written." In this contention counsel are in error.
This indorsement, in unequivocal language, shows that the title
to the paper, except for the purposes of collection, was to remain
in the Hebron bank, and that the indorsee, the Capital National
Bank, was agent merely for collection. The rights of the par-
ties, under this indorsement, do not rest upon any implication
of law, but are determined by the contract of the parties as
expressed in the indorsement. And to permit oral evidence to
be received to show the agreement was different from that in-
dicated by the language used would be in violation of the prin-
ciple that a written contract may not be varied by parol. The
same result would be reached whether the indorsement be re-
garded the entire contract or said indorsement and letter trans-
mitting the certificate of deposit be construed '***® together.
The letter of transmittal states that the certificate was "for col-
lection and credit." These words clearly indicate that the trans-
mission was for the purpose of collection, and when collected
June, 1898.] United States Nat. Bank v. Geeb. 895
the proceeds were to be credited to the transmitting bank. Un-
til the collection was made the relation of debtor and creditor
•was not to exist. To hold otherwise would disregard the mean-
ing of the word "collection." In Branch v. United States Nat.
Bank, 50 Neb. 470, it was decided that the legal title of com-
mercial paper indorsed "for collection" rests in the indorsee
only to the extent of authorizing him to demand and enforce
payment, and that the true owner of the paper so indorsed
may control the same until paid in full, and may intercept the
proceeds thereof in the hands of an intermediate agent.
The writlen contract is unambiguous, and it is unnecessary
to resort to parol evidence to ascertain the true intention of
the parties. An explicit written agreement cannot be con-
tradicted or qualified by proof of any usage, custom, or course
of dealing, while proof thereof is permissible in cases of doubt
where the contract is expressed in vague and ambiguous lan-
guage. The indorsement in question and the letter of transmit-
tal, neither singly nor when considered together, show that the
Hebron bank was divested of its title to the certificate of deposit
in question. This is conceded by counsel for plaintiff in error,
but they rely upon the prior course of dealing and the acts and
conduct of the parties to overthrow the plain and unambiguous
written contract of the parties and to establish a transfer of
title to the paper. As we have seen, evidence of such matters
is not admissible. The fact that the Hebron bank repeatedly
cent remittances to the Capital National Bank, the paper con-
taining restrictive indorsements the same as this, and from time
to time drew against its remittances and was allowed interest
from the Capital National Bank on its average balances, is
insufficient to establish that the transfer of this paper was ab-
solute: Scott V. Ocean Bank, 23 N. Y. 289; Fifth Nat. Bank
V. Armstrong, 40 Fed. Eep. 46.
*** Upon principle and authority we are fully persuaded that
the court below did not err in finding that the Hebron bank
never parted with its title to this certificate of deposit. The
judgment of reversal entered herein is vacated, and the judg-
ment of the district court is affirmed.
MR. CHIEF JUSTICE HARRISON AND JUSTICES RYAN AND
IRVINE dissented and adhered to their former opinion, and Mr.
Justice Irvine, who wrote the dissenting opinion. In the course of
his remarks, said that: "To show- that the reasons for allowlnj;
€xtrlnslc evidence, as between the parties, apply as well to re-
fitrictive as to general Indorsements, the followng language from
396 United States Nat. Bank v. Geer. [Nebraska,
Dye V. Scott, 35 Ohio St. 194, 35 Am. Eep. 604, which has been
quoted with approval by this court in Holmes v. First Nat. Banli, 3&
Neb. 326, 41 Am. St. Rep. 733, is pertinent: 'If there was a contem-
poraneous contract between the parties upon which the indorse-
ment was made, both reason and justice require that, as between
themselves, the actual and not the presumed contract should be en-
forced; and, as between them, oral testimony should be admissible
to prove the contemporaneous contract. This will not necessarily,
or even probably, impair currency or credit of the instrument as
commercial paper. Prior parties to it will not be affected, nor will
the rights of subsequent indorsees without notice be impaired or
limited in any degree."
NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS — INDORSEMENTS — PAROL
EVIDENCE TO VARY.— The authorities seem to be divided upon
the question whether parol evidence is admissible to vary the legal
effect of an indorsement by showing an agreement, contemporane-
ously made, varying the liability created by law. That parol evi-
dence is not admissible, see Alabama Nat. Banlj v. Rivers, 116 Ala.
1, 67 Am. St. Rep. 95; Ewan v. Brooks-Waterfield Co., 55 Ohio St.
596, 60 Am. St. Rep. 719, and note. The rule in the principal case,
that parol evidence is admissible, is supported by Roads v. Webb,
91 Me. 406, 64 Am. St. Rep. 246, and note; Cools v. Brown, 62 Midi.
473, 4 Am. St. Rep. 870. Some courts seem to draw the distinction
that as between the parties to a negotiable instrument parol evi-
dence is admissible, but where the instrument has been transferred,
before due, to a bona fide holder in the due course of business, a
blank indorsement establishes a liability which cannot be varied by
parol evidence: Holmes v. First Nat. Bank, 38 Neb. 326, 41 Am. St.
Rep. 733, and note. A restrictive indorsement, such as an indorse-
ment "without recourse," creates an express and complete contract,
which cannot be varied or contradicted by parol evidence of a con-
temporaneous agreement: Youngberg v. Nelson, 51 Minn. 172, 38 Am.
St. Rep. 497, and note.
NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS-INDORSEMENT FOR COL-
LECTION.—An indorsement for collection does not pass the title
or the right to the proceeds of the property, but It makes the in-
dorsee a collecting agent or trustee of the holder: Moore v. Louisi-
ana Nat. Bank, 44 La. Ann. 99, 32 Am. St. Rep. 332, and note;
Poonie's Bank v. Jefferson County Sav. Bank, 106 Ala. 524, 54 Am.
St. Rep. 59.
CERTIFICATE OF DEPOSIT.— PAROL EVIDENCE cannot be
Introduced to explain or vary a certificate of deposit: Bickley ▼.
Ck)mmercial Bank, 89 S. O. 281, 39 Am. St. Rep. 721.
June, 1698.1 Wehn v. Pall. 397
Wehn v. Fall.
[56 ^EBBA8KA, 647.]
JUDGMENTS— LIEN OP— VENDOR AND VENDEE— AP-
PLICATION OP PAYMENTS.— A judgment against a vendor of
land, who retains the legal title under a contract of sale, attaches as
a lien to such land, and, as against the vendee in possession with
actual notice, may be enforced to the extent of the unpaid pur-
'Chase money.
JUDGMENTS— LIEN OP— VENDOR AND VENDEES-AP-
PLICATION OP PAYMENTS.— The mere docketing of a judgment
against the vendor of land is not notice of the lien to a purchaser
in possession under a contract of sale, and payments subsequently
made by him to the judgment debtor, pursuant to the contract,
without actual notice of the judgment, are valid as against Its lien
upon the land.
CORPORATIONS — LIABILITY OP STOCKHOLDERS —
COUNTERCLAIM.— In an action by a stockholder of an insolvent
corporation to enjoin an execution sale of real estate which has
been purchased by him from the members of a firm against whom
the defendant has recovered the judgment on which the execution
Issued, an answer charging that all the stockholders of such cor-
poration are liable for the payment of the debt on which the judg-
ment is based and asking that they be brought in and required
to pay does not set up a counterclaim.
CORPORATIONS — INSOLVENCY — LIEN OP CREDITOR
ON ASSETS.— A creditor of an Insolvent corporation does not ac-
quire any specific Hen on its assets, and cannot proceed against one
having possession of such assets without first reducing his claim to
judgment.
CORPORATIONS— INSOLVENCY.— CREDITORS of an in-
solvent corporation must first obtain judgment on their claims be-
fore attempting to reach property transferred by the corporation
in fraud of their rights.
CORPORATIONS— INSOLVENCY— RIGHTS OP CREDIT-
ORS—lilARILITY OP STOCKHOLDERS.— A creditor of an insol-
vent and dissolved corporation must first exhaust his legal rem-
edy against it. before he can sue to obtain satisfaction of his claim
against a stockholder who has come into possession of corporate as-
sets.
Hainer & Smith, for the appellants.
A. W. Agee and H. M. Kellogg, for the appellee.
«»*» SULLIVAN, J. In January, 1888, the Phillipe Biiild-
ing & Loan Association drew a check on the Bank of Phillips
in favor of Samuel Spanogle for four hundred and ninety-five
dollars. Spanogle indorsed the check to Jerome H. Smith,
who deposited it for collection with the First National Bank
of Aurora. In due time the Aurora hank presented it for pay-
ment to the Phillips bank, which, being then unable to meet
its obligations, was compelled to refuse payment. Smith there-
upon sued John Fonner, A. J. Spanogle, Samuel Spanogle, and
398 Wehn v. Fall. [Nebraska,
Charles L. Crane, as members of the firm of John Fonner &
Co. and owners of the Bank of Phillips. This suit ripened into
a judgment in the district court of Hamilton county on the
twelfth day of February, 1889. On January ^"^^ 30, 1888, the
firm of John Fonner & Co. suspended its banking business at
Phillips and turned orer its entire assets to Chris Schlotfeldt,.
of Grand Island, with written authority to sell the same and
apply the proceeds in payment of the partnership indebtedness.
Schlotfeldt accepted the trust or agency, and, on March 9, 1888,
contracted with the plaintiff, John W. Wehn, Jr., to sell him
the real estate in controversy, being a town lot in the village
of Phillips, in Hamilton county. Wehn was given immediate
possession of the property, but did not obtain a deed therefor
nor pay any part of the purchase price until after Smith had
recovered his judgment against the members of the firm of
John Fonner & Co. Upon this judgment an execution was
issued, and Fall, as sheriff of Hamilton county, was proceed-
ing thereunder to sell the real estate in question when this
action was commenced to enjoin the sale. A temporary injunc-
tion was granted and on the final hearing made perpetual.
It is first insisted on behalf of the appellants that the instru-
ment executed by John Fonner & Co. was an irreguJar assign-
ment and of no validity. Whether or not it was intended as
an assignment is quite immaterial. Between the parties to the
transaction it was valid. It conferred on Schlotfeldt power
to take possession of the assets of the bank and sell the same.
Consequently, the contract made with Wehn for the sale of the
lot in Phillips was within the soope of his authority and was a
binding contract. It thus appears that Wehn was a purchaser
of the lot and in possession of the same without having paid
any part of the purchase price when Smith's judgment at-
tached as a lien. Under these circumstances. Smith became
entitled to intercept the purchase money and have the same ap-
plied in satisfaction of his judgment upon giving Wehn notice
of his rights. It is not claimed that there was any actual
notice, and constructive notice from the docketing of the judg-
ment, we think, was not sufficient. In Courtnay v. Parker, 16
Neb. 311, it is said: "Where a judgment is recovered against one
who has **°** agreed to sell land, but made no deed nor received
the whole of the. purchase money, it is a lien on the vendor's in-
terest in the land, and a purchaser under the judgment is en-
tilled to the mbney remaining unpaid." Neither the question
of notice or possession was considered in that case. In Olander
June, 1898.] Wehn v. Fall. 899
v. Tighe, 43 Neb. 344, the rule on this subject is stated in the
syllabus as follows: A judgment recovered in the district court
against the vendor of land which is situate in the county in and
for which the court is held, who has not, at the time of the re-
covery of the judgment, executed and delivered a deed for the
land or received all the purchase money, is a lien upon the in-
terest of the vendor in the land, viz., the unpaid purchase
money; and a levy of an execution issued upon such judgment
on the land, and a sale thereunder, will pass to the purchaser
the interest of the vendor." In this case it was held that the
rights of the judgment creditor were superior to the rights of
a vendee in possession who had paid a portion of the purchase
price after the recovery of the judgment; but it does not ap-
pear from the statement of facts that the purchaser was without
actual notice, and the question of notice is not considered or
discussed. The question was, however, very thoroughly con-
sidered in the case of Filley v. Duncan, 1 Neb. 134, 93 Am. Dec.
337, and the conclusion reached that while a judgment recov-
ered against the vendor of lands is a lien to the extent of the
unpaid purchase price due from the vendee in possession, "the
entry of such judgment will not, of itself, compel the vendee
in possession under contract to make subsequent payments ta
the creditor," Discussing this question, Mr. Freeman, in his
work on Judgments, fourth edition, section 364, says: "While
it is everywhere conceded that a judgment lien accruing against
a vendor after the making of the contract of sale extends to all
his interest remaining in the land, and entitles the purchaser
at the sale to all sums still to be paid by the vendee, yet it is
well settled that the latter, if in possession of the lands sold, is
not bound to ascertain, before making each payment, ^^^ that
no judgment has been obtained against his vendor. Whoever
takes and keeps possession of land, by these acts of ownership
gives such notice of his rights to the whole world that no one
can safely assume to act in ignorance of them. He is so far
exempted from the operation of the registry acts that a deed
made by his grantor can in no event prejudice his interests; and
so far exempted from the operation of the law charging all per-
sons with notice of the lien arising from the docketing of a
judgment that such docketing, while he is in possession of the
land, is not notice to him of the charge thereby created on the
purchase money remaining unpaid. He may, therefore, from
time to time, pay to this vendor such sums as fall due; and he
will always be entitled to the benefit of such payments, unless
400 Wehn v. Fall. [Nebraska,
it can he shown that they were made with actual knowledge of
s. lien on the vendor's interest in the land. This construction
■of the law seems to have been dictated by a consideration of the
hardship to be inflicted on the vendee in possession by estab-
lishing a different rule/' In support of the rule thus announced
the author cites Filley v. Duncan, 1 Neb. 134, 93 Am. Dec. 337;
Parks V. Jackson, 11 Wend. 442, 25 Am. Dec. 656; Moyer v.
Hinman, 13 N. Y. 180; Hampson v. Bdelen, 2 Har. & J. 64,
-3 Am. Dec. 530. No case is cited as holding a contrary doc-
trine. In section 438 of 1 Black on Judgments it is said: "At
^ny rate, it appears to be well settled that the docketing of the
judgment is not notice of the lien to the purchaser in posses-
sion, since, after he has taken his contract for the purchase, ho
is not bound to keep the run of the dockets; and payments
subsequently made by him to the judgment debtor, pursuant to
the contract, without actual notice of the judgment, are valid
■as against its lien upon the land" : See, also, to the same effect,
12 Am. & Eng. Ency. of Law, 1st ed., 113.
There is another question in the case. The appellant Smith
in his answer alleged that the Phillips Building & Loan Asso-
ciation was indebted to him as drawer of the check on which
his judgment against the members of the '^^^ firm of John
Eonner & Co. is based; that said association has dissolved and
divided its entire assets among the stockholders; that "Wehn
and a number of other persons named in the answer were stock-
holders at the time of the dissolution and received some portion
of the corporate property. There was a prayer that the persons
alleged to be stockholders be made parties to the action and re-
quired to pay the amount due on the check. Proceedings were
afterward had in the case which resulted in a trial of issues
formed by said stockholders pleading to the matters contained
in Smith's answer. The findings and judgment of the court
were in favor of the stopkholders. The only question presented
for decision by the petition was whether Smith's judgment was
a lien on Wehn's real estate. The primary and controlling
question presented by the answer was whether the loan associa-
tion was under a contractual liability as drawer of the check.
Between these questions there was no such legal relationship as
to justify their trial in the same action. But the court having
tried them together and found in favor of the stockholders, we
will inquire whether the conclusion reached on the merits was
•correct. The assets of a corporation, which, of course, includes
tmpaid stock subscriptions, constitute a fund to which creditors
June, 1898.] Wehn v. Fall. 401
may resort for the satisfaction of their claims. But to reach
assets in the hands of stockholder creditors must pursue the
remedy prescribed by law. By section 4, article 11 (miscel-
laneous corporations), of our constitution it is provided: 'In all
cases of claims against corporations and joint stock associations,
the exact amount justly due shall be first ascertained, and after
the corporate property shall have been exhausted, the original
subscribers thereof shall be individually liable to the extent of
their unpaid subscription, and the liability for the unpaid sub-
scription shall follow the stock." Of this provision of the con-
stitution it was said by Kagan, C, delivering the opinion of the
oourt in Globe Pub. Co. v. State Bank, 41 Neb. 175: **We think,
therefore, that the ^'^ creditors of a de jure corporation have
no right of action against the stockholders thereof until they
have reduced their claims against the corporation to judgment,
and until an execution issued upon such judgment has been re-
turned wholly or in part unsatisfied." But it is contended that
the constitutional provision above quoted isnot applicable to this
case, for the reason that, the corporation being insolvent and
having ceased to exist, the recovery of a judgment against it waa
neither necessary nor possible. A creditor of an insolvent cor-
poration does not acquire any specific lien on its assets, and no
sufficient reason is perceived for holding that he may proceed
against one having possession of snch assets without first reduc-
ing his claim to judgment. The reason for the rule which re-
quires the creditors of an insolvent individual to obtain judg-
ment on their claims before attempting to reach property trans-
ferred by him in fraud of their rights seems to be entirely ap-
plicable where the debtor is an insolvent corporation against
which a suit may be maintained: Hollins v. Brierfield Coal etc.
Co., 150 U. S. 371. There was in this case no impediment in
the way of a suit against the corporation. Section 68 of chapter
16 of the Compiled Statutes of 1897 provides for the bringing
of actions against dissolved corporations, and makes ample pro-
vision for the service of process upon them. What we conceive
to be the correct rule on this subject is stated in 3 Thompson
on Private Corporations, section 3355, as follows: **Where the
ordinary theory of equitable remedies prevails, under which it
is necessary, before resorting to a court of equity, for the com-
plainant to exhaust his remedies in a legal forum, the mere in-
aolvency of the corporation does not dispense with the necessity
of a creditor reducing his demand to a judgment at law against
it before bringing a suit in equity to charge its shareholders.
AM. St. Rkp., Vol. LXX.-26
402 Wehn v. Fall. [Nebraskaj
Kor will it "be any excuse for not obtaining such a Judgment at
law that the charter has expired by limitation, providing the
law govemng the corporation is such that this fact does not
prevent the '^^ obtaining of a judgment at law against it.
.... As has been said in a leading case, a judgment can no-
more be recovered against a dead corporation than against a
dead man. But according to the usual theory, a de facto dis-
solution of a corporation, which consists usually in a permanent
suspension of its business and abandonment of its franchises, by
reason of insolvency, is no obstruction to obtaining a judgment
at law against it, and therefore does not relieve the creditor of
the necessity of obtaining such a judgment before applying for
equitable relief." A recent case decided on facts almost identi-
cal with those in the case before us and fully sustaining Judge-
Thompson's statement of the rule is Lamar v. Allison, 101 Ga.
270. See, also. Swan Land etc. Co. v. Frank, 39 Fed. Eep.
456. Our conclusion is, that the answer of Smith did not state
a cause of action against the stockholders of the Phillips Build-
ing & Loan Association, and the entire judgment of the district
court is, therefore, affirmed.
JUDGMENTS— LIEN-VENDOR AND VENDEE.— A vendor's In-
terest In lands contracted to be sold Is bound by the lien of a judg-
ment recovered against him while the contract is unexecuted, to
the extent to which It Is unexecuted: Kinports v. Boynton, 120 Pa.
St. 306, 6 Am. St. Rep. 706. A judgment creditor has no lien UDon
purchase money due to the judgment debtor for lands sold by him
and which are subject to the judgment lien: Blal?emore v. Wise, 95
Va. 269, 64 Am. St. Rep. 781, and note; monographic note to Filley
V. Duncan, 93 Am. Dec. 353.
CORPORATIONS— INSOLVENCY— RIGHTS OF CREDITORS.
The creditors of a corporation have no lien upon its assets as a trust
fund held for their benefit: Ames v. Heslet, 19 Mont. 188, 61 Am.
St. Rep. 496. As between a corporation and Its creditors. It does
not hoid Its property In trust, or subject to a lien in favor of cred-
itors, In any other sense than does an individual debtor: First Nat.
Bank v. Dovetiiil etc. Co., 143 Ind. 550, 52 Am. St Rep. 435.
CORPORATIONS— INSOLVENCY — LIABILITY OF STOCK-
HOLDERS—RIGHTS OF CREDITORS.— The authorities are di-
vided upon the question whether the liability of a stockholder is
primary, or whether it Is subject to proceedings first taken against
the corporation: Monographic note to Thompson v. Reno Sav.
Bank, 3 Am. St. Rep. 850, where the opposing authorities are col-
lected. That the stockholder's liability Is primary, see McGowan
V. McDonald, 111 Cal. 57, 52 Am. St. Rp. 149. In Ohio, It Is held
that where a corporation continues to do business, a creditor must
first obtain judgment against it before he can proceed against the
stockholder. But where the corporation hns become wholly Insol-
vent, and has ceased to do business, and has made an assignment
of Its property for the benefit of Its creditors, a creditor may pro-
ceed directly and primarily against the stockholder: Barrick v. Gif-
ford, 47 Ohio St. 180, 21 Am. St. Rep. 798, and note.
June, 1898,] Latimer v. State. 403
Latimer v. State.
[55 NEBBA8KA 609.]
CEIMINAL LAW — PRELIMINARY EXAMINATION —
WAIVER.— If a person accused of crime, on being arrested and
brought before an examining magistrate, voluntarily pleads guilty,
he thereby waives his right to a preliminary examination.
CRIMINAL LAW— PRELIMINARY EXAMINATION;— DIS-
TRir/r COURTS ARE WITHOUT JURISDICTION to try, on in-
formation, one accused of crime, except he be a fugitive from jus-
tice, unless he has first been accorded the privilege of a prelimin-
ary examination or has waived that privilege.
CRIMINAL LAW.— A PRELIMINARY EXAMINATION ia
In no sense a trial of a person accused of crime. It is not even
necessary that the person charged with a crime, on being brought
before a magistrate, should be asked to plead, or that Le should
plead.
CRIMINAL LAW— PRELIMINARY EXAMINATION.— The
object of a preliminary examination Is to ascertain whether the
crime charged has been committed, and, If so, whether there is
probable cause to believe that the accused committed It.
CRIMINAL LAW.— A PRELIMINARY EXAMINATION Is a
right accorded and a privilege granted by law to everyone accused
of crime, but it is a privilege which the accused may waive.
CRIMINAL LAW— PRELIMINARY EXAMINATION— REC-
OGNIZANCE.—If an accused, on being brought before the examin-
ing magistrate, waives his right to a preliminary examination, or
pleads guilty to the crime with which he Is charged, the magis-
trate should recognize him to appear In the district court, and en-
ter upon his docket the proceedings that actually occur, and a duly
certified transcript of this record filed In the office of the clerk of
the district court Invests that court with jurisdiction to try the ac-
cused on information for the crime with which he was accused be-
fore the examining magistrate.
CRIMINAL LAW— DRUNKENNESS AS DEFENSE.— While
voluntary intoxication is not of itself a complete defense for one
who is charged with the commission of an 'offense, yet evidence
that the accused was Intoxicated when It is alleged he committed
the crime is admissible as a circumstance tending to show that the
act of the accused was not premeditated, and for the purpose of
ascertaining and determining the status and condition of his mind
at that time.
CRIMINAL LAW— DRUNKENNESS AS DEFENSE.— If an
accused was so drunk at the time he Is alleged to have committed
the crime charged as to render him unconscious of his act, incapa-
ble of controlling his will, and forming and entertaining a felonious
Intent, his Intoxication is a defense.
CRIMINAL LAW-EVIDENCE— GOOD CHARACTER— Pre-
vious good character of the accused in a criminal case Is a fact
which he Is entitled to have submitted for the consideration of the
jury, precisely as any other circumstance favorable to him, without
any disparagement by the court.
J. H. Brown and Brome & Burnett, for the appellant.
C. J. Smythe, attorney general, and E. P. Smith, assistant
attorney general, for the state.
404 Latimer v. State. [Nebraska,
®*® EAGAN, C. The prosecuting attorney of Stanton
county filed an information in the district court thereof in
which he charged Edwin Melick, James Latimer, and Eohert
Forsythe with having forcibly and violently assaulted one Louis
Mick, and with "forcibly and feloniously, and against his will,
taking from him the sum of thirty-eight dollars in money, with
the intent to feloniously steal the same. It seems that Melick
and Forsythe pleaded guilty to this information and were sen-
tenced to the penitentiary for six years, although this fact is
not disclosed by the record. Latimer pleaded not guilty to the
information, was tried by a jury, found guilty, and sentenced
to a term of seven and one-half years in the state penitentiary.
To review this judgment Latimer has filed in this court a peti-
tion in error.
®^* 1. To the information Latimer filed a plea in abatement,
alleging that he had not been accorded a preliminary examina-
tion of the crime with which he stood charged in the informa-
tion. To this plea the state filed a replication, and the issues
made by such plea and replication were tried to a jury, which
returned a verdict in favor of the state, upon which the district
court entered a judgment that the information be not abated.
It is not claimed by the prisoner that a complaint was not filed
against him before an examining magistrate charging him with
the identical offense with which he was charged in the informa-
tion; but the issue of fact raised by the plea in abatement and
the state's replication thereto was whether the prisoner had, in
fact, been accorded a preliminary examination. The evidence
shows without conti^diction that a complaint was filed before
the county judge of said county charging Forsythe, Melick, and
Latimer with having committed the crime of robbery, and that
the three parties were arrested on a proper warrant and brought
before the county judge. A transcript of the proceedings had
before that officer was put in evidence, and disclosed that the
three parties were asked by the county judge whether they were
guilty or not guilty of the crime charged in the complaint, and
that they then and there entered a plea of guilty. Whereupon
the magistrate adjudged that they enter into a recognizance for
their appearance before the district court in said county at the
first day of its next term to answer such charge.
The evidence on behalf of Latimer tended to show that
though he was arrested and brought before the county judge
with Forsythe and Melick, he was not asked whether he was
guilty or not guilty of the crime charged in the complaint, and
June, 1898.] Latimer v. State. 405
that he did not plead thereto. The evidence is undisputed that
no witnesses were sworn or examined before the comity judge.
In other words, that oflScer did not make any judicial inquiry
as to whether the crime of robbery Lad been committed and
whether **^ there was probable cause for believing the accused
committed it. We are of opinion that the evidence in the
record establishes, beyond all question, that Latimer, when
brought before the county judge, informed that officer that he
was guilty of the crime with which he stood charged in the com-
plaint.
The first question, then, is whether Latimer, by pleading
guilty before the county judge, waived a preliminary examina-
tion. The district court charged the jury trying the issues
made by the plea in abatement and the replication thereto that
if Latimer, when brought before the county judge, pleaded
guilty to the crime charged against him in the complaint, such
plea amounted to a waiver by Latimer of his right to a prelimin-
ary examination, and it was upon this instruction that the jury
found that Latimer had had a preliminary examination. . We
think the instruction of the district court was correct. Section
685 of the Criminal Code provides: **No information shall be
filed against any person for any offense until such person shall
have had a preliminary examination therefor as provided by law
before a justice of the peace or other examining magistrate or
officer, unless such person shall waive his right to such examina-
tion." Because of this provision of the Criminal Code the dis-
trict courts are without jurisdiction to try, on information, one
accused of crime, except he be a fugitive from justice, unless he
has been first accorded the privilege of a preliminary examina-
tion: White v. State, 28 Neb. 341; Coffield v. State, 44 Neb.
417.
But the preliminary examination provided for by said section
585 of the Criminal Code is in no sense a trial of a person ac-
cused of crime. It is not even necessary that the person
charged with having committed a crime, on being brought
before a magistrate, should be asked to plead or enter a plea of
guilty or not guilty to the complaint. The object of the pre-
liminary examination is to asceri;ain whether the crime charged
has been committed, and, if so, whether there is probable cause
to believe ^^^ that the acccused committed it: In re Garst, 10
Neb. 78; State v. Kobertson, 55 Neb. 41. The statute award-
ing one accused of crime the right to a preliminary examination
was enacted for the benefit of the accused. The preliminary
406 Latimer v. State. [Nebraska,
examination is a right accorded — a personal privilege granted
by law to everyone accused of crime — ^but it is a privilege which
the accused may waive: Coffield v. State, 44 Neb. 417.
In the case at bar Latimer was accorded the privilege — the
Tight — of a preliminary examination. He did not demand the
taking of evidence, and the judgment of the county judge as to
its effect; but upon inquiry as to whether he was guilty of the
crime with which he was charged in the complaint he volun-
tarily stated to the magistrate that he was guilty; and by so do-
ing he waived the swearing and examination of witnesses,
iivaived the right given him by statute to have the county judge
make judicial inquiry as to* whether the crime of robbery had
been committed, and as to whether the accused probably com-
mitted it.
2. But it is insisted that th'e district court erred in entering
a judgment that the information be not abated, as the court was
without jurisdiction to try the accused on that information, be-
cause the record of the examining magistrate certified to the
district court does n:ot recite that he found that the crime of
robbery had been committed and that there was probable cause
for believing that the accused committed such crime; in other
words, that in order to invest the district court with jurisdiction
to try the accused of a crime on information, the proceedings
of the examining magistrate certified to the district court must
contain a statement that that officer found that the crime
charged in the information had been committed and that there
was probable cause for believing that the accused committed it,
and that the magistrate reached such conclusions after the ex-
amination of witnesses. We cannot subscribe to this conten-
tion. In support of it counsel for Latimer have **'* cited U3|
to People V. Smith, 25 Mich. 497; People v. Chapman, 63 Mich.
280, 4 Am. St. Eep. 857, and People v. Evans, 72 Mich. 367.
None of these cases is in point here. A statute of Michigan
required the evidence taken on a preliminary examination to be
reduced to writing and signed by the witnesses, and the exam-
ining magistrate to transmit this evidence to the district court
with the proceedings had by him on the preliminary examina-
tion. In the Smith case cited by counsel, the information was
quaahed; but in that case the accused had not waived a pre-
liminary examination. One had been in fact held, and the court
quashed the information, not because the record of the examin-
ing magistrate did not contain a finding that a crime had been
committed and there was probable cause for believing the ac-
June, 1898.] Latimer v. State. 407
cused committed it, but because the depositions or evidence re-
duced to writing on the preliminary examination were not
fiigned by the witnesses as rec^uired by the Michigan statute.
In the Chapman case, the information was quashed because it
was filed before the filing in the district court of the depositions
of the witnesses who testified before the examining magistrate.
In the Evans case, a preliminary examination was held and the
proceedings certified to the circuit court by the examining mag-
istrate. An information was then filed against Evans, to which
he pleaded in abatement that the justice before whom the ex-
amination was held had not stated in his return that any offense,
not triable before a justice of the peace, had been committed;
nor had such justice, by said return, stated that there was prob-
able cause to believe the respondent guilty of the crime charged,
nor of any offense or crime; but that, on the contrary, said
justice expressly declared that he did not believe that said of-
fense had been committed or that respondent was guilty there-
of, and that he only required respondent to recognize to appear
for trial in the circuit court in deference to and by reason of the
intense public feeling in reference to and against respondent.
■On the day this plea ^^'^ was filed in the circuit court the ex-
amining magistrate filed an amended return of the proceedings
had before him, in which it was recited : 'It appeared to me that
an offense not cognizable by a justice of the peace had been
committed, and that there is prohable cause to believe the pris-
oner guilty thereof." When this amended return was filed in
the circuit court, that tribunal overruled the plea in abatement
interposed to the information. Evans was put upon trial and
convicted, and the supreme court held that the circuit court
erred in overruling the plea in abatement; and that the record
of an examining magistrate must show that a crime had been
■committed and that there was reasonable ground to believe that
the accused had committed it, in order to invest the circuit court
with jurisdiction to try the accused on information. But the
Evans case is not an authority for the contention of counsel here.
Evans did not waive a preliminary examination, and the case
does not decide — nor any other that I have been able to find —
that notwithstanding an accused waives a preliminary examina-
tion, still the record of the examining magistrate must disclose
that he examined witnesses and made a finding that the crime
charged had been committed and that there was probable cause
to believe the accused committed it, in order to invest the dis-
trict court with jurisdiction to try the accused for the crime on
408 Latimer v. State. [Nebraska,
information. If one is charged before a magistrate with the
commission of a felony, arrested and brought before this magis-
trate, and a preliminary examination is held, then it may be
that the district court has no jurisdiction to try the accused,,
on information for the crime with which he is charged, unlesa
the proceedings had before the examining magistrate disclose
that he found, after hearing the evidence produced on said ex-
amination, that a crime had been committed and that there was
probable cause for believing the accused committed it; but,
where the accused appears before the magistrate and expressly
waives his right to a preliminary examination, or voluntarily
*** says to the magistrate that he is guilty of the crime with
which he is charged, we know of no law which makes it the
duty of the magistrate to then proceed to call and examine wit-
nesses and make an inquiry as to whether a crime has been com-
mitted, and if so, whether the accused probably was .the guilty
party. If the accused, on being brought before the examining
magistrate, waives his right to a preliminary examination, or
pleads guilty of the crime with which he is charged, then the
magistrate should recognize him to appear in the district court
and enter upon his docket the proceedings that actually oc-
curred; and a duly certified transcript of this record filed in the
office of the clerk of the district court will invest that court
with jurisdiction to try the accused on information for the
crime with which he was accused before the examining magis-
trate: Hedges v. State, 18 Ohio St. 420; State v. Eitty, 23 Ohio
St. 562.
3. The evidence in this case tends to show that at the time
Latimer committed the crime with which he was convicted he
was intoxicated; but there is no evidence in the record which
tends to show that he formed the intention of committing this
robbery and then voluntarily became intoxicated. The court
gave to the jury the following instruction twice : "The jury are
instructed that voluntary intoxication or drunkenness is no
excuse for crime committed under its influence; nor in any
state of mind resulting from drunkenness short of actual in-
sanity or loss of reason any excuse for a criminal act." It is
the law that when one is charged with a crime he is not en-
titled to go acquit of the charge simply by showing that at the
time he committed the offense he was intoxicated; but we do
not understand that, though it appears that when one com-
mitted a crime he was intoxicated, the jury are not at liberty to
give any weight to this fact, unless it appears that the accused
June, 1898.] Latimer v. State. 40^
at the time was actually insane. One might be «o Jrunk as not
to be conscious of what he was doing, so drunk as to have no
•*'' control of his will, and yet not be actually insane. In the
case at bar, the accused was on trial for robbery; and the in-
tent with which he assaulted and took from the prosecuting
witness his money was an essential ingredient of the crime for
which the prisoner was on trial. The court, in effect, said ta
them that the evidence before them on the subject of the pris-
oner's intoxication should count for nothing, unless it estab-
lished that at the time of the assault the prisoner was actually
insane. The instruction given by the district court in this case
was given by the district couri; in O'Grady v. State, 36 Neb.
320, and the Judgment of the district couri; was reversed. Th©
feature of the instruction which we are discussing was not com-
mented on by the court in the opinion in that case; but the
judgment of the district court was reversed because the court
in the instruction also told the jury that if the prisoner's in-
toxication was voluntary, then evidence of his intoxication
could not be considered for the purpose of proving that he did
not premeditate or intend to commit the crime with which he
was charged. But the court did not approve of the other part
of the instruction which, in effect, forbade the jury to give any
weight to the evidence of intoxication, unless it established that
the prisoner, at the time he committed the offense, was, by rea-
son of such intoxication, actually insane. The doctrine of this
court is, that while voluntary intoxication is not of itself a com-
plete defense for one who is charged with the commission of a
crime, still the evidence that the accused was intoxicated when
it is alleged he committed the crime is admissible as a circum-
stance tending to show that the act of the accused was not pre-
meditated: Hill v. State, 42 Neb. 503; Head v. State, 43 Neb.
30; Debney v. State, 45 Neb. 856; Ford v. State, 46 Neb. 390.
In the case at bar, the prisoner was entitled to have the jury
consider the evidence which tended to show that he was intoxi-
cated at the time it was alleged he committed the crime, for
the purpose of ascertaining and determining the status and con-
dition "*^ of the prisoner's mind at that time. If he was so
drunk at that time that he was not conscious of what he was
doing, so drunk that he had no control of his will, and was in-
capable of forming and entertaining a felonious intent, then his
act did not render him guilty of robbery, and it was for the
jury to determine whether he was at the time so drunk as to
be unconscious of his act, incapable of controlling his will, and
410 Latimeb v. State. [Nebraska,
forming and entertaining a felonious intent; and though he
might have been by reason of his intoxication in such state of
mind, it does not follow that he was then actually insane. We
think the court erred in refusing to give the instruction asked
■and in giving the one quoted.
4. As this case is to be tried again, we have thought it our
•duty to call the attention of the district court to its charge on
the subject of the prisoner's good character. The prisoner pro-
•duced before the jury evidence of good character previous to the
time of the alleged commission of the crime for which he was
on trial. On this subject the district court gave to the jury
three instructions, as follows:
"3. The court instructs the jury that good character is no
€xcuse for crime; that it is only a circumstance bearing indi-
rectly upon the question of the guilt of the accused which you
•are to consider; and this you will consider in connection with
all the other facts and circumstances of this case; and if, not-
withstanding you believe from the evidence that the defendant
has proved a good character, you still believe beyond a reasonable
doubt, from the evidence, that the accused is guilty of the crime
charged in the information filed against him, then it is your
duty so to find and your verdict should be guilty.
"4. The court instructs the jury that good character raises
the presumption that the accused was not likely to have com-
mitted the crime with which he is charged; but the force of the
presumption depends upon the strength of the opposing evi-
dence to produce conviction ®*® of the truth of the charge. And
if the evidence establishing the charge is of such a nature as
not, upon principles of reason and good sense, to be overcome
by the fact of good character, then the fact that the defendant
may have proven himself to have had a good character will be
unavailing and immaterial."
"14. The court instructs the jury that evidence of a person's
^ood character is competent evidence in favor of the party ac-
cused, as tending to show that he would not be likely to commit
the crime charged against him. And in this case, if the jury
believes from the evidence that prior to the commission of the
alleged crime the defendant had always borne a good character
among his acquaintances and in the neighborhood where he
lives, then this is a fact proper to be considered by the jury,
with all the other evidence in the case, in determining the ques-
tion whether the witnesses who have testified to the fact tending
to criminate him have been mistaken or have testified falsely
June, 1898.] Latimer v. State. 411
or untruthfully; and if, after a careful consideration of all the
evidence in the case, including that bearing on his previous
good character, the jury entertain a reasonable doubt of the
-defendant's guilt, then it is their sworn duty to acquit him. If,
however, the jury believe from the evidence, beyond a reasonable
-doubt, that the defendant committed the crime in question
as charged in the information, it will be your sworn duty to
£nd the defendant guilty, even though the evidence may satisfy
your minds that the defendant, previous to the commission of
the crime, has sustained a good reputation and character."
When one is accused of crime, evidence of his previous good
character is admissible, in his behalf, upon the theory that, being
of good character, it is improbable that he would have committed
the crime with which he is charged; and it is for the jury to
■weigh and consider, and give such effect as they think it en-
titled, to this evidence, in considering and determining whether
the accused is guilty of the crime with which he is charged.
But this ^^^ evidence is not submitted to the consideration of
the jury for the purpose of enabling them to determine whether
witnesses who have testified for the state have been mistaken
or testified falsely, as the court told the jury in instruction No.
14. Another criticism of the instructions is that they savor
of argument in favor of the state, and their effect is to caution
the jury not to let the evidence of the accused's good character
have too much weight in their deliberations. "Good character
is an important fact with every man; and never more so than
when he is put on trial charged with an offense which is ren-
dered improbable in the last degree by a uniform course of life
wholly inconsistent with any such crime. There are cases when
it becomes a man's sole dependence, and yet may prove sufficient
to outweigh evidence of the most positive character": Judge
€ooley in People v. Garbutt, 17 Mich. 9, 97 Am. Dec. 163. In
the case at bar, there was before the jury evidence of the pris-
oner's good character, and it was the province of the jury to
■consider this evidence, as all the other evidence in the case, and
to give it such weight as they deemed it entitled, and they should
have been left free and untrammeled in this respect. In Johnson
v. State, 34 Neb. 257, it was distinctly ruled: *Trevious good
character of the accused in a criminal prosecution is a fact which
he is entitled to have submitted for the consideration of the
jury precisely as any other circumstance favorable to him, with-
out any disparagement by the court." To the same effect see
Vincent y. State, 37 Neb. 672.
412 Manfull v. Graham. [Nebraska^
The Judgment of the district court is reversed and the causo
remanded with instructions to grant the prisoner a new trial.
CRIMINAL LAW— DRUNKENNESS AS A DEFENSE— Volun-
tary drunkenness ordinarily constitutes no excuse for a crime com-
mitted under its influence, even though the intoxication is so extreme
as to make the person unconscious of what he is doing or as to
create a temporary insanity. If, however, the habit of drunkenness
has created a fixed frenzy or insanity, whether permanent or tem-
porary, as, for instance, delirium tremens, such frenzy or insanity
Is not deemed voluntary, and he who acts under its influence is
to be judged as if his condition had not been brought about by his
bad habits: State v. Kraemer, 49 La. Ann. 766, 62 Am. St. Rep. 664,
and note. Intoxication, to excuse cripie, must be of such a degree as
to render the offender incapable of entertaining an intent to com-
mit such crime. If it falls short of this it is worthless as a defense:
Warner v. State, 56 N. J. L. 686, 44 Am. St. Rep. 415, and note.
Temporary insanity produced by the recent use of ardent spirits
on the part of an accused at the time he commits a crime is not
ground for his acquittal, but may go in mitigation of Eis punish-
ment: Howard v. State, 37 Tex. Crim. Rep. 494, 66 Am. St. Rep. 812,
and note. If a person suffering under delirium tremens Is so far
insane as to be irresponsible, the law does not punish him for any
crime he may commit while in that state: Carter v. State, 12 Tex.
BOO, 62 Am. Dec. 539. But see State v. Kraemer, 49 La. Ann. 766,
62 Am. St Rep. 664.
Manfull v. Graham.
[55 Nebraska, 645.]
JUDGMENTS AGAINST INFANTS.— If infant defendants In
a case have been regularly summoned, the failure to appoint a
guardian ad litem is error only, and does not render void the judg-
ment entered.
JUDGMENTS AGAINST INFANTS— VACATING.— Under a
statute providing that "it shall not be necessary to reserve In a
Judgment or order, the rigjit of an infant to show cause against
It after his attaining full age, but in any case in which, but for
this section, such reservation would have been proper, the infant,
within one year after arriving at the age of twenty-one years, may
show cause against such judgment," the infant does not, on his
arriving at majority, have an absolute right to have the judgment
set aside, but only to show cause against it, and does not extend
that right beyond the cases mentioned, and under such statute an
Infant is not entitled to a day In court after reaching his majority
to show cause against a judgment ordering a sale of his lands.
JUDGMENTS AGAINST INFANTS-VACATING.— Under
section 602 of the code of Nebraska, an infant, against whom an
erroneous judgment has been entered, may have It set aside, pro-
vided his disability does not appear In the record nor the error In
the proceedings, but, If these facts appear, his remedy Is by writ
of error.
JUDICIAL SALES— TITLE OF PURCHASER.— The title of
a stranger derived through sale under judgment is not subject to
defeat by the subsequent vacation of such judgment.
Jane, 1898.] Manfull v. Graham. 418
JUDGMENTS AGAINST INFANTS— VACATING.— An origi-
nal action to vacate an erroneous judgment against an infant can-
not be maintained witliout showing a good defense to the first
action and judgment.
L. G. Hurd, for the appellant.
B. 0. Hostetler, for the appellee.
®*« IRVINE, C. Graham brought suit against Manfull and
his wife to foreclose a contract for the sale of land, alleging
that Manfull had failed to make the payments of purchase-
money as provided. A decree was rendered directing the sale
of the land to satisfy the amount found due under the contract.
It is conceded that Mrs. Manfull's interest is only such as re-
sults from the marital relation. The defense interposed by Man-
full was that Graham's contract required him to tender a good
title in fee simple, and that he was unable to do so because
he claimed under a purchaser at a sale foreclosing a mortgage,
and the foreclosure was ineffective. The defect in the fore-
closure proceedings was that an undivided half interest was in
certain minors and that no guardian ad litem had been ap-
pointed to represent them.
While the answer alleges a failure to serve process on the in-
fants, the stipulation of facts on which the case was tried dis-
closes no such defect. Where infants are ^^"^ regularly sum-
moned, the failure to appoint a guardian ad litem is an error
only and does not render void the judgment entered. Such has
been the rule with regard to insane defendants: McAlister v.
Lancaster County Bank, 15 Neb. 295; McOormick v. Paddock,
20 Neb. 486. In the former case, it was intimated that there
might be a distinction as to infants, but it was afterward held
that there is no such distinction, and that the rule as to infants
is the same: Parker v. Starr, 21 Neb. 680. Parker v. Starr, 21
Neb. 680, establishes a rule of property, and moreover is in ac-
cord with the best considered cases. It will not now be departed
from.
From the foregoing it follows that the sale made under the
foreclosure decree was not void, and that it passed title to the
purchaser. But it is said that the infant defendants have not
yet reached their majority and may still be heard to question
the regularity of the proceedings; that therefore the defendant
is not required to accept a title that may be so attacked. The
briefs do not indicate very clearly what procedure is still deemed
open to the infants. We can conceive of no possible remedy
which may remain open unless it be by virtue of section 443
414 Manfull v. Graham. [Nebraska,'*
or section 602 of the Code of Civil Procedure, by proceedings
in error, or by original action in the nature of a bill in equity.
Section 442 provides: "It shall not be necessary to reserve,
in a judgment or order, the right of an infant to show cause
against it after his attaining full age; but in any case in which,
but for this section, such reservation would have been proper,
the infant, within one year after arriving at the age of twenty-
one years, may show cause against such order or judgment." For
several reasons no right could be claimed by these infants under
that section. In the first place, the right there protected is not
an absolute right to have the judgment set aside, but it is only
to show cause against it. It is not here disclosed by pleading*
or by proof that any such cause exists. The failure to appoint
a guardian ad litem is not **^* such cause. The section quoted
recognizes the old chancery rule, based not on formal defects
in the proceedings, but on the theory that the infant was not
bound by the answer of the guardian ad litem, and might show
cause against a decree as well where he had been represented
by guardian as where he had not, and this by showing either
substantial error, or a defense which had not been interposed.
The relief accorded was entirely independent of representation
by guardian, and the fact that no guardian had been appointed
would be immaterial under this section. Again, it was not in
all cases that the infant was so accorded his day in court after
reaching his majority. The statute does not extend his former
rights in that respect, but merely makes it unnecessary to ex-
pressly reserved the right in the decree, and allows the right
to be asserted only in such cases as, according to the old practice,
such express reservation would be proper. Where the decree
directed the sale of the infant's lands, it was under the former
practice binding on the infant, and he had no day in court to
show cause against it: Booth v. Kich, 1 Vern !<i95; Mills v. Den-
nis, 3 Johns. Ch. 367. In this respect there was a distinction
between a decree ordering a sale and a strict foreclosure.
That portion of section 602 which might be applicable is as
follows: "A district court shall have power to vacate or modify
its own judgments or orders, after the term at which such judg-
ment or order was made 5. For erroneous proceedings
against an infant, married woman, or person of unsound mind,
where the condition of such defendant does not appear in the
record nor the error in the proceedings." It will be observed
that it is only where the condition of the defendant does not
appear of record nor the error in the proceedings that this sec-
June, 1898] Manfull v. Graham. 415
tion applies. The object of the exception is not at first mani-
fest. The supreme court of Ohio, construing a similar provi-
sion, said the reason seemed to be that if the defendant's con-
dition appeared of record it would attract the attention of the
court and so insure due scrutiny: ***** Carey v. Kemper, 45
Ohio St. 93. We think, however, that a better reason is, that
proceedings in error may be brought within one year after such
a disability is removed, and, if the condition of the defendant
and the error are disclosed by the record, such proceedings af-
ford a remedy. Otherwise section 602 becomes available. This-
seems to be the construction implied in Jennings v. Simpson,
12 Neb. 558, from the citation therein of Yaple v. Titus, 41 Pa-
st. 195, 80 Am. Dec. 604. In the present case, whether the
condition of the infants appeared of record is not disclosed, but
that fact is not material. If it was disclosed, and the foreclos-
ure decree should ultimately be reversed on error, the purchaser
would be protected by the express terms of section 508 of the-
Code of Civil Procedure: McAusland v. Pundt, 1 Neb. 211, 93-
Am. Dec. 358; Green v. Hall, 43 Neb. 275, 47 Am. St. Eep.
761. If, on the other hand, their condition did not appear of
record, we still think that section 508 applies, and that the title-
of the purchaser would not be defeated or affected by a subse-
quent vacation of the judgment. Vacating judgments under
section 602 is referred to under the title of "reversals" by the
court rendering the judgment, and we do not think that section
508, in using' the word "reversal," contemplated only a reversal
by an appellate court. It meant a reversal by any court author-
ized to set aside the judgment. Its policy was to protect pur-
chasers at sales under judgments which had been rendered by
courts of competent jurisdiction in the premises, no matter how
erroneous might be the proceedings leading to the judgment.
Independent of any statute, a title so derived is not defeated
by a subsequent vacation of the judgment: Allman v. Taylor,.
101 111. 185; England v. Garner, 90 N. C. 197.
A sufficient reason why the title is not hazarded by an original
action is that the defendant suggests no equity in favor of the-
minors or no defense to the foreclosure. This would be nec-
essary to maintain an original case, and it would indeed be nec-
essary to a proceeding under section 602.
**** As it was not shown that the plaintiff's title was defective
or even threatened, the judgment of the district court was
right.
Affirmed.
416 Welton v. Atkinson. [Nebraska,
JUDGMENTS AGAINST INFANTS.— An Infant Is bound by a de-
cree against him as much as a person of full age, and can impeach
it only upon grounds which would invalidate it if against an adult:
Harrison v. Wallton, 95 Va. 721, 64 Am. St. Rep. 830; Joyce y. Mc-
Avoy, 31 Cal. 273, 89 Am. Dec. 172, and monographic note.
JUDGMENTS AGAINST INFANTS WHERE NO GUARDIAN
AD LITEM.— A judgment against an infant duly served with sum-
mons, but without the appointment of a guardian ad litem, though
irregular and erroneous, is not void, and is not open to impeach-
ment on collateral attacli: Levystein v. O'Brien, 106 Ala. 352, 54
Am. St. Rep, 56, and note; Childs v. Lanterman. 103 Cal. 387. 42
Am. St. Rep. 121; note to Parker v. Parker, 42 Am. St. Rep. 55;
Brandon v. Carter, 119 Mo. 572, 41 Am. St. Rep. 673; Eisenmenger
T. Murphy, 42 Minn. 84, 18 Am. St. Rep. 493.
JUDICIAL SALES— TITLE OF PURCHASER.- If a judgment
and execution are void, no title passes to the purchaser thereunder,
and the defendant therein may replevin the property from such
purchaser: St. Louis etc. Ry. Co. v. Lowder, 138 Mo. 533, 60 Am. St.
505. Courts go very far in favoring and maintaining titles of pur-
chasers under judicial sales. Thus purchasers under subsisting
judgments and decrees acquire a good title, although such judg-
ments and decrees may afterward be reversed; and fraud on the
part of others will not affect or taint the title of an innocent pur-
chaser at a judicial sale: Wilson v. Miller. 30 Md. 82, 96 Am. Dec.
568; Sutton v. Schonwald, 86 N. C. 198, 41 Am. Rep. 455; Seguin v.
Maverick, 24 Tex. 526, 76 Am. Dec. 117, and note; Joyce v. McAvoy,
SI Cal. 273, 89 Am. Dec. 172. But though real estate sold under a
judgment has passed to third parties, this will not defeat the right
of the plaintiff to avoid such sales by showing want of jurisdiction
in the court entering such judgment: Great West Min. Co. v. Min-
ing Co., 12 Colo. 46, 13 Am. St. Rep. 204.
JUDGMENTS AGAINST INFANTS— "GIVING DAY."— The In-
sertion of a clause "giving day," et cetera, in a decree for convey-
ance by an infant of his estate was so strictly insisted upon in all
cases under the English equity practice that the omission of It was
-considered as error in the decree. Such omission, however, did not
make the decree void: Joyce v. McAvoy, 31 Cal. 273, 89 Am. Dec.
172. See Walsh v. Walsh, 116 Mass. 377, 17 Am. Rep. 162.
Welton v. Atkinson.
[S5 Nebraska, 674.]
EVIDENCE— PRESUMPTION AS TO LAW OF ANOTHER
€TATE.— The law of another state on a subject Involved In litigation
Is presumed to be the same as that of the state in which the litiga-
ftlon is being carried on.
NOTARIES PUBLIC— OFFICIAL SEAL.— A notary public la
required to attach his official seal to his official acts, and his certlfl-
•cate, unauthenticated by the Impression of such seal. Is void.
S. B, Pound, R. Pound, and A. N. Sullivan, for the appellant.
D. K. BaiT, G. W. Clark, Beeson & Boot, and Mockett &
Polk, for the appollee.
€ept 1898.] Welton v. Atkinson. 417
•'''* HARRISON, C. J. In error proceedings in tliis action
it is complained that the trial court refused, on motion of
plaintiff, to suppress certain depositions and, over objections,
admitted them in evidence. An examination of the transcript
inclusive of the correction thereof discloses, by fair reading,
that the motion to suppress the depositions was properly pre-
sented, both in point of manner and time. The addition to the
transcript allowed on motion of defendant was evidently made
with a purpose to make it appear that the motion for suppres-
sion of the depositions was not interposed until after the trial
had commenced, but we think a perusal of all the record which
refers to this subject leads to the conclusion we have heretofore
announced. The certificate attached to the depositions ^^
was signed, "D. Shafer, Notary Public," but there was no im-
pression of his official seal. At the close of the testimony of
each witness the name of each witness was written, and just
below there was a jurat which was signed officially by the notary
public, and in each of such places there was the impression of
the official seal of the notary; but these jurats were not nec-
essary, and possessed no significance relative to the authenticar
don of the depositions.
In the absence of proof to the contrary, it must be presumed
that the law of Arkansas — ^the state in which the depositions
were taken — in regard to notaries public is the same as this
state; and in this state it is provided, among other things, that
each notary public shall provide himself with an official seal,
.... with which seal, by impression, all his official acts shall
be authenticated: See Comp. Stats. 1897, c. 61, sec. 5. And
in section 384 of the Code of Civil Procedure it is provided:.
"Depositions taken pursuant to this article, by any judicial or
other officer herein authorized to take depositions, having a seal
of office, whether resident in this state or elsewhere, shall be
admitted in evidence on the certificate and signature of such
officer under the seal of the court of which he is an officer, or
his official seal, and no other or further act of authentication
shall be required." If an officer is required to attach his official
seal to his acts, a certificate unauthenticated by the impression
of such seal is invalid: Byrd v. Cochran, 39 Neb. 118; Neese v.
Farmers Ins. Co., 55 Iowa, 604; Hewitt v. Morgan, 88 Iowa,
468; De Graw v. King, 28 Minn. 118. The depositions were
not sufficiently authenticated and should not have been ad-
mitted : Neese v. Farmers Ins. Co., 55 Iowa, 604.
There were other assignments of error, but they were of mat-
Aif. St REP., Vol. LXX.— 27
418 In be Fanton. [Nebraska^
ters which we do not deem it necessary to discuss at presents
For the error hereinbefore indicated the judgment must be re-
versed and a new trial awarded, during ^''^ which, if it occurs,,
these further matters, if erroneous, will doubtless be corrected,
or not be again parts of the trial. The judgment is reversed
and the cause remanded.
EVIDENCE-PRESUMPTION AS TO LAW OF ANOTHER
STATE.— In the absence of an allegation to the contrary, a court
will assume that the law of another state is the same as the law of
this state: Schultz v. Howard, 63 Minn. 196, 56 Am. St. Rep. 470, and
note; Goodwin v. Provident Savings etc. Assn., 97 Iowa, 226, 59 Am.
St. Rep. 411; Peet v. Hatcher, 112 Ala. 514, 57 Am. St. Rep. 45. It
Is presumed that the common law prevails in a sister state: Bur-
diet V. Missouri Pac. Ry. Co., 123 Mo. 221, 45 Am. St. Rep. 528;
Myers v. Chicago etc. Ry. Co., 69 Minn. 476, 65 Am. St. Rep. 579.
But this applies only to states having a common origin or popu-
lated by citizens coming from states having a common origin: Peet
V. Hatcher, 112 Ala. 514, 57 Am. St. Rep. 45.
NOTARIES PUBLIC— OFFICIAL SEAL.— All official acts of a
notary public should be authenticated by his signature and official
seaL An affidavit is not proved to have been made unless the
jurat has been authenticated by both such seal and signature: Tunis
V. Withrow, 10 Iowa, 305, 77 Am. Dec. 117. But see Sonfield v.
Thompson, 42 Ark. 46, 48 Am. Rep. 49. An unsigned certificate of
acknowledgment by a notary public is void, though it is attested by
his seal: Clark v. Wilson, 127 111. 449, 11 Am. St. Rep. 143. But see
Lake Erie etc. R. E. Co. v. Whitham, 155 111. 514, 46 Am. St Eep»
855, and note.
In re Fanton.
[55 Nebraska, 703.]
HABEAS CORPUS-REVIEW OP BRRORS.-Habeas cor>
pus Is not an appropriate proceeding to review mere errors and Ir-
regularities in a judgment of an inferior court In a criminal case.
HABEAS CORPUS— VOID JUDGMENT.— If a person Is re-
strained of his liberty by virtue of an absolutely void judgment, he
may be discharged on habeas corpus, but the judgment must be
void and not merely erroneous.
HABEAS CORPUS.- AN EXCESSIVE SENTENCE imposed
by a court having jurisdiction Is merely erroneous and not void,
and habeas corpus does not lie on behalf of the convicted prisoner
to obtain relief therefrom. His remedy Is by writ of error.
R. R. Dickson and G. A. Day, for the petitioner.
C. J. Smyth, attorney general, and E, P. Smith, deputy attor-
ney general, for the state.
''*** NORVAL, J. An information was filed in the district
court of Holt county, charging "that one John Fanton, late of
Sept. 1898.] In rb Fanton. 419
the county aforesaid, on the twentieth day of December, 1895,
in the county of Holt and state of Nebraska aforesaid, the said
John Fanton then and there being, did unlawfully and feloni-
ously steal, take, and drive away eighteen (18) head of mixed
cattle, described as follows: .... All of said cattle being of
the value of three hundred dollars, and the personal property of
one Timothy Cross; contrary to the form of the statute in such
cases made and provided, and against the peace and dignity of
the state of Nebraska." A trial was had tljereunder, the accused
was found guilty as charged in the information, the value of
the property stolen was fixed by the jury at three hundred dol-
lars, and a sentence of eight years' imprisonment in the peni-
tentiary was imposed by the court. Error proceeding was prose-
cuted to this court, which resulted in the affirmance of the judg-
ment and sentence below: Fanton v. State, 50 Neb. 351. After-
ward this application was made for his discharge from imprison-
ment upon a writ of habeas corpus.
''**' It is insisted that the petitioner was prosecuted under
chapter 77 of the Session Laws of 1895 (Crim. Code, sec. 117a),
and that his conviction is illegal and void, because said chapter
failed to pass both branches of the state legislature. The chap-
ter assailed purports to make cattle-stealing a distinctive crime;
and whether such legislation was adopted in the constitutional
mode it is unnecessary to now determine, since it will be observed
that the information under which the conviction was obtained
alleged every ingredient of the crime of grand larceny, as de-
fined by section 114 of the Criminal Code. The district court
having jurisdiction of the crime charged, as well as over the
person of the petitioner, its judgment and sentence are not void :
In re Ream, 54 Neb. 667.
The maximum sentence authorized to be imposed by section
114 of the Criminal Code upon a conviction of grand larceny is
seven years* imprisonment, while the petitioner was adjudged
to be confined in the penitentitary for the term of eight years.
It is argued that the sentence of the court, being in excess of
the maximum limit authorized by law, is void. The soundness
of this contention depends upon the fact whether or not the de-
fect indicated constituted an error or irregularity merely, since
it is firmly established in this state that habeas corpus is not
the appropriate proceeding to review mere errors and irregulari-
ties in a judgment of an inferior court in a criminal case. The
writ of habeas corpus cannot operate as a proceeding in error:
Ex parte Fisher, 6 Neb. 309; In re Balcom, 12 Neb. 316;
420 In re Fanton. [Nebraska,
Buchanan v. Mallalieu, 25 Neb. 201; In re Betts, 36 Neb. 282;
State V. Crinklaw, 40 Neb. 759; In re McVey, 50 Neb. 481; In
re Eeam, 54 Neb. 667. If a person is restrained of his liberty
by virtue of an absolutely void judgment, he may be discharged
on habeas corpus. To obtain release by such a proceeding, the
judgment or sentence must be more than merely erroneous; it
must be an absolute nullity: In re Havlik, 45 Neb. 747.
Mr. Church, in his valuable treatise on Habeas Corpus, ''*'**
states: "The general rule is, that when a court has jurisdiction
by law of the offense charged, and of the party who is so
charged, its judgments are not nullities. It is only when the
court pronounces a judgment in a criminal case which is not
authorized by law, under any circumstances, in the particular
case made by the pleadings, whether the trial has proceeded
regularly or otherwise, that such judgment can be said to be
void so as to justify the discharge of the defendant held in cus-
tody by such judgment. Thus a judgment of conviction is not
void because of the failure to inform the accused of his right to
an appeal or because of the fact that there were gross irregulari-
ties committed during the trial, in the impaneling of the jury,
in the introduction of evidence, and in the rendition of the ver-
dict, or because an excessive punishment has been imposed —
except as to the excess": Church on Habeas Corpus, sec. 370.
And at section 373 the same author uses this language: "The
prevailing rule is, that an excessive sentence is merely erro-
neous and voidable; that the whole sentence is not illegal and
void because of the excess; that it is not void ab initio; and
that it is good on habeas corpus so far as the power of the court
extends, and invalid only as to the excess." Numerous decisions
are cited by the author which fully sustain the doctrine an-
nounced in the foregoing excerpts. The following are in point:
People V. Liscomb, 60 N. Y. 559, 19 Am. Kep. 211; People v.
Jacobs, 66 N. Y. 8; People v. Baker, 89 N. Y. 460; Ex parte Hen-
ehaw, 73 Cal. 486; In re Graham, 138 U. S. 461; In re Crandall,
34 Wis. 177; In re Graham, 74 Wis. 450, 17 Am. St. Rep. 174, 76
Wis. 366; In re Pikulik, 81 Wi8.158; Ex parte Mooney, 26 W.Va.
36, 53 Am. Rep. 59; Feeley's case, 12 Cush. 598; Ex parte
Crenshaw, 80 Mo. 447; People v. Markham, 7 Cal. 208; Ex
parte Shaw, 7 Ohio St. 81, 70 Am. Dec. 55; Ex parte Van
Hagan, 25 Ohio St. 427. A judgment imposing sentence to
imprisonment for a longer period than authorized by statute is
not void for want of jurisdiction, but erroneous merely. It is
the excessive portion of the sentence alone that is invalid, and
Sept 1898.] In be Fanton. 421
relief cannot be had therefrom ^**'' upon habeas oorpug until
the valid portion has been served.
In In re Graham, and in In re McDonald, 74 "Wis. 451, 17
Am. St. Eep. 174, the petitioners were convicted of a felonious
assault and robbery, and sentenced to the penitentiary for the
term of thirteen years each, while the maximum punishment
allowed by statute for that crime was ten years. They applied
for a writ of habeas corpus on the ground of excessive sentences.
The writ was denied, the court, through Cole, C. J., saying:
'*We deny the writs, for the reason that the error in the judg-
ments does not render them void, or the imprisonment under
them illegal, in that sense which entitles them to be discharged
on a writ of habeas corpus. The judgments are doubtless
erroneous, and would be reversed on a writ of error (Fitzgerald
V. State, 4 Wis. (*395) 412; Haney v. State, 5 Wis. 529; Bene-
dict V. State, 12 Wis. 314; Peglow v. State, 12 Wis. (*534)
595); but the judgments are not void: State v. Sloan, 65 Wis.
647. The court had jurisdiction of the persons and subject
matter or offense, but made a mistake in the judgment. For
mere error, no matter how flagrant, the remedy is not by habeas
corpus. The law is well settled in this court that on habeas
corpus only jurisdictional defects are inquired into. The writ
does not raise questions of errors in law, or irregularity in the
proceedings."
Ex parte Van Hagan, 25 Ohio St. 426, was an application for
discharge on habeas corpus, where an excessive sentence was
imposed. The court say: "The punishment inflicted by the
sentence, in excess of that prescribed by the law in force, was
erroneous and voidable, but not absolutely void. It follows that
a writ of error to reverse the proceedings or sentence is the
remedy that the relator should have resorted to in order to ob-
tain a discharge from illegal imprisonment, and not habeas
corpus, which is not the proper mode of redress where the relator
was convicted of a criminal offense, and erroneously sentenced to
excessive imprisonment therefor by a court of competent juris-
diction: Ex parte Shaw, 7 Ohio St. 81, 70 Am. Dec. 55, ap-
proved and followed on this point."
708 rpjjg (jefect in the sentence imposed on John Fanton was
not jurisdictional, but merely erroneous, since the district court
acquired jurisdiction over his person and of the subject matter,
and the judgment rendered was of the kind authorized by the
statute. In re McVey, 50 Neb. 481, is not in conflict with the
oonclusion reached herein, although there is to be found in the
422 In re Fanton. [Nebraska,
report of that case language apparently opposed to the doctrine
announced in the case at bar. In the McVey case it was asr
Berted that the court must possess jurisdiction to impose the
particular sentence adjudged, else the same will be void. When
that thought was expressed, the court did not have in mind,
or under consideration, a sentence inflicted in excess of the limit
authorized by the legislature. There the petitioner has been
found guilty of the statutory ofl;ense of breaking and entering
a building in the daytime, while the information under which
he was tried did not charge him with having committed that
crime, but did charge a burglary committed in the night season.
He was prosecuted for one offense, and convicted for another,
so that the court did not have jurisdiction of the subject matter,
or of the power to impose that particular sentence at that time
in that case, and the sentence was void. If, upon a conviction
for burglary, the court should sentence the accused to be hanged,
the judgment would be void for want of jurisdiction of the court
to impose a sentence of that kind in that case. But it would be
otherwise if the court should adjudge an imprisonment in the
penitentiary for a longer period than fixed by statute for the
crime of burglary. In the latter case, the sentence would be
erroneous merely, but not void. In the one case the court had
no jurisdiction to impose that particular kind of a sentence upon
conviction of burglary, w'hile in the other the statutory kind of
punishment was meted out, although the time of imprisonment
exceeded the statutory bounds. A sentence of a different char-
acter than that authorized by law to be imposed for the crime
of which the accused has been found guilty is void, while ''<*®
a sentence which imposes the statutory kind of punishment i3
not absolutely void, although excessive. In the former case,
the entire punishment is invalid, while as to the latter the ex-
cessive portion is alone erroneous, and not void in such a sense as
to be available on habeas corpus, at least until after the valid
portion of the judgment has been executed. The writ is de-
nied.
HABEAS CORPUS-REVIEW OF ERRORS.-If a court has
Jurisdiction over the subject matter, although its Judgment may be
erroneous, It is not void and cannot be reviewed on habeas corpus:
Ex parte Tinsley, 37 Tex. Grim. Rep. 517, 60 Am. St. Rep. 818. Ha-
beas corpus cannot be used as a writ of error to review proceedings
under which a party Is imprisoned for contempt of court: In re Co-
penhaver, 118 Mo. 377. 40 Am. St. Rep. 382, and note; Smith v.
Clausmeier. 136 Ind. 105. 43 Am. St Rep. 311; Ex parte Mitchell,
104 Mo. 121, 24 Am. St Rep. 324.
Sept. 1898.] In be Fanton. 428
HABEAS CORPUS-VOID PROCEEDINGS.— A writ of habeas
«orpu8 cannot reach errors or Irregularities which render proceed-
ings voidable merely, but only such defects In substance as renders
the process or judgment absolutely void: Barton v. Saunders, 16
Or. 51, 8 Am. St Rep. 261; Ex parte Keeler, 45 S. O. 537, 55 Am. St.
Bep. 785; State y. Klnmore, 54 Minn. 135, 40 Am. St Rep. 805.
HABEAS CORi^US— EXCESSIVE SENTENCE.— One Imprisoned
for violating an order or Judgment In excess of the Jurisdiction of
the court rendering It can be discharged by writ of habeas corpus:
Ex parte Arnold, 128 Mo. 256» 49 Am. St Rep. 557. A Judgment
sentencing a prisoner for a longer time than the statute warrants
Is erroneous, but not void, and he is not entitled to be discharged
on habeas corpus: In re Graham, 74 Wis. 460, 17 Am. St Rep. 174^
And not6b
CASES
IN THB
SUPKEME COURT
ov
NEW yore:
Steinbaok v. Diepenbrook.
(158 New Yobk, 24.]
INSUKANCB, IJFE— POLICY OF, MAY BE ASSIGNED TO
ONE HAVING NO INSURABLE INTEREST.— A valid policy of
life insurance is assignable. Hence, if a policy is, in good faith
and not for the purpose of assignment, taken out, either by the in-
sured himself, or by another, who has an insurable intei'est in his
life, it may be lawfully assigned to one who has no insurable in-
terest In the life of the insured, and the assignee may, therefore,
enforce collection of the full amount of the policy from the com-
pany, where the assignment is general and absolute.
INSURANCE, LIFE— CONTRACT OF, AND ITS ASSIGN-
MENT—CONSTRUCTION—INTENTION — WAGERING POLICY.
The Intention of the parties procuring a life Insurance determines;
its character. Hence, if one sLonld take out such a policy to him-
self, and at once assign It to a person having no insurable Interest
In his life, the courts would unhesitatingly declare In accordance
with the facts, reading the policy and the assignment together, as
forming part of one transaction, for the purpose of frustrating a
wagering policy.
INSURANCE, LIFE— POLICY OP— RIGHT TO ASSIGN-
FAILURE OF HEALTH.— A person whose life Is Insured is not
deprived of the right to realize on his policy, by Its assignment,
whenever his necessities press him, because of a falling condition
of health.
Action brought to recover the proceeds of a certain policy of
insurance for ten thousand dollars, issued on the life of Alois
Diepenbrock, appellant's testator. The amount due thereon
was claimed, on the one hand, by the plaintiff, Erwin Stein-
back, as assignee, and on the other hand by the defendant Louise
Diepenbrock, as executrix of the estate of Alois Diepenbrock,
deceased. Suit was brought against the insurance company to-
recover the amount due upon the policy, and the company ad-
mitted its liability to some one. The policy had been originalljj
Jan. 1899.] Steinback v. Diepenbrock. 425
assigned to "William Erdtmann, who had assigned it to the
plaintifif. The company, therefore, paid the money into court
and had the defendant Louise Diepenbrock, as executrix, and
William Erdtmann substituted as defendants. A judgment in
favor of the plaintiff and the defendant Erdtmann was aflfinned,
and the defendant Louise Diepenbrock appealed.
A. Edward Woodruff, William Phlippeau, and Max Meyer,
•for the appellant.
James Cowder Meyers, Louis C. Kaegener, and Thomas M.
Eowlette, for the respondents.
*« PARKER, C. J. The coung-el for the appellant in his
argument insisted with great earnestness and force that the posi-
tion several times asserted by this court in support of the
legality of the assignment of a policy of insurance to a person
having no insurable interest in the life of the insured is a mis-
taken one and in conflict with the decisions of the United
States supreme court and the court of last resort in many o#
the states.
Warnock v. Davis, 104 U. S. 775; Franklin Life Ins. Co. v.
Hazzard, 41 Ind. 116, 13 Am. Rep, 313; Missouri Co. v.
Sturges, 18 Kan. 93, 26 Am. Rep. 761; Schonfield v. Turner,
75 Tex. 324; Basye v. Adams, 81 Ky. 368, and Helmetag v.
Miller, 76 Ala. 183, 52 Am. Rep. 316, furnish support for his
assertion as to the rule in the United States supreme court and
in some of the other states. Supported by these authorities, the
counsel challenged the correctness of the rule that concededly
has been long acquiesced in in this state by the courts and the
profession. Indeed, Mr. Justice Field in his opinion in War-
nock V. Davis, 104 U. S. 775, stated the rule in this state to be
that a valid assignment of a policy of ^^ insurance could be
made to a person without interest in the insured. But the ap-
pellant contends that, while this may be the rule here, the de-
cisions in other jurisdictions demonstrate that our position is
wrong as a matter of sound public policy, and therefore the true
rule should be laid down, notwithstanding that expressions in-
ducing the belief that the above rule obtained may have been
made by our courts. It is urged that this task will not be a
difficult one, for the reason, as the appellant contends, that
there have been no cases in this state where the question was
necessarily up for decision, and therefore all that has been said
upon that subject by this court is mere dictum.
426 Steinback v. Diepenbrock. [New York,
In St. John y. American Mut. Life Ins. Co., 13 N". Y. 31, 64
Am. Dec. 529, a recovery in favor of the plaintiff against an in^
curance company was sustained where it appeared that one
Noyes had effected policies of insurance upon his own life and
shortly afterward assigned them to the plaintiff for a valuable
consideration. In the answer the defendant alleged, by way of
defense, that the plaintiff was entitled to recover only the
amount of money that he had advanced as a consideration of
the transfer .of the policy to him, and that if defendant was'
liable beyond such amount upon the policy, the personal repre^
centatives were interested in the excess, and therefore necessary
parties to the suit. And upon the close of the evidence the
counsel for the defendant pressed fhe point that the plaintiff
had no insurable interest in the life of the insured, and there-
fore was not entitled to judgment. The court regarded the
question as one necessary to be passed upon in the final disposi-
tion of the case, and, after considering it, held that the policies
in question were valid in their inception and that the assign-
ment of them to the plaintiff did not affect the liability of the
company, and that to entitle the assignee to a recovery it was
not necessary for him to have had an insurable interest in the
life of the insured.
The next case was Valton v. National etc. Assur. Co., 20 N.
Y. 32, where Schumacher obtained a policy on his life for ten
thousand dollars, and by his articles of copartnership agreed that
the plaintiff and another partner should become the owners of
the ^^ policy and all due thereon in the event of his death be-
fore the termination of the partnership. This contingency hap-
pened, and the court held that it operated to vest absolutely the
title to the policy in the plaintiff and his other partner, and a
recovery could be had thereon as against the defendants.
It will be observed that in the cases cited the contest was
between the assignee and the company issuing the policy, and
the question was not squarely presented whether, as between
the assignor and the assignee, the assignee would be entitled
to retain more than the sum actually invested by him, which
is the rule in some jurisdictions. But it necessarily was decided
that the policy was not rendered invalid by the assignment,
and further that the assignee acquired thereby the right to en-
force collection of the full amount of the policy from the com-
pany.
In Olmsted v. Keyes. 85 N. Y. 593, the plaintiff, havinsr ob-
tained the proceeds of a policy of life insurance, brought an
Jan. 1899.] Steinback v. Diepenbrock. 427
Action for the purpose of ascertaining and determining the
■conflicting claims of various defendants to the moneys paid on
the policy. It appeared that Keyes procured a policy of insur-
ance on his life, payable to the plaintiff as trustee for his wife
lluldah; Huldah died intestate a few years later; afterward
Iveyes married again, and thereupon the plaintiff for value as-
signed the policy to Keyes' second wife at his request. Keyea
subsequently died intestate, leaving him surviving his widow
-and one child by her £Lnd several children by his first wife. Ifc
was held that during the life of the first wife the policy was her
property; upon her death the title vested in her husband as
survivor, and he having caused it to be assigned to his second
wife, the assignment vested the title in her, and she alone was
entitled to the money due thereon. There was a difference of
view in the court as to the disposition of the case, and the argu-
ment that led to the decision considered with care the assigna-
bility of a policy of life insurance like any other contract; in
the course of the argument the court referred to and considered
many authorities in England and in this country, and **
reached the conclusion that while an insurable interest is nec-
essary to enable one to take out a policy of insurance on the
life of another, it is not necessary that the assignee of a policy
validly issued should have such an interest. After careful ex-
amination of tbat opinion we find it impossible to reach any
other conclusion than that it was intended to put at rest what-
ever controversy there may have been in this state touching
the assignability of a valid policy of insurance. The case at bap
is the only one we know of where the rule laid down in the case
last referred to has been seriously questioned, although it is
true that some discussion of the principle was had in Wright
V. Mutual etc. Assn., 118 N. Y. 237, 16 Am. St. Eep. 749, where
the defendant unsuccessfully challenged the right of the as-
signee to recover on the ground, among others, that the plain-
tiff had not an insurable interest in the life of the insured at
the time of the assignment; the court in its opinion cited the
case of Olmsted v. Keyes, 85 N. Y. 593. *
The result of our further examination persuades us that whit
has been understood to be the rule in this state is not only in
line with the authorities in most jurisdictions upon that sub-
ject, but is sound as a matter .of public policy. It was formerly
the rule in England that while a policy of insurance could not
be assigned at law it could in equity. By the act of 1807 (30
•& 31 Vict., c. 144) a policy of life insurance was made assigna-
428 Steinback v. Diepenbrock. [New York,
ble at law, and in some of the decisions it was said by the court
that the object of the statute was to enable the assignee to sue
in his own name; but it did not in any other way improve the
position of the assignee, who could before that secure the money
in equity: B. E. Ins. Co. v. G. W. K. Co., 38 L. J. Ch, 133; In
re Turcan, L. E. 40 Ch. Div. 5.
The rule asserted by this court has also been held to be the
law in many of our sister states in a number of cases where
the question has been raised either in actions brought by per-
sonal representatives of the assignor to recover the money re-
ceived by the assignee on a policy, or in suits brought by the
company issuing the policy for the purpose of determining
whether the personal representatives or the assignee were ^® en-
titled to the proceeds, all claimants being made parties defend-
ant: Mutual etc. Ins. Co. v. Allen, 138 Mass. 24, 52 Am. Kep.
245; Eckel v. Eenner, 41 Ohio St. 232; Martin v. Stubbings,
126 111. 387, 9 Am. St. Rep. 620; Eitzpatrick v. Hartford etc.
Ins. Co., 56 Conn. 116, 7 Am. St. Rep. 288; Clark v. Allen, 11
R. I. 439, 23 Am. Rep. 496; Murphy v. Red, 64 Miss. 614, 60
Am. Rep. 68; Rittler v. Smith, 70 Md. 261. These authorities
are, it seems to us, well grounded in principle. They recognize
not only the existence of, but the necessity for, the rule that
forbids any insurance upon the life of a person, in which the
person for whose benefit the insurance is made has no interest.
Such a policy constitutes what is termed a wager policy, or a
mere speculative contract upon the life of the insured, with
a direct interest in favor of its early termination. It is, in terms,
forbidden by statute in England (14 Geo. Ill, c. 48) and in
many other jurisdictions, including this state (Laws 1892, c.
690, sec. 55), and this court held in Ruse v. Mutual Benefit etc.
Ins. Co., 23 N. Y. 516, that such insurance is void at common
law, and that the English statute, in so far as it prohibits such
insurance, is merely a declaratory act. But the question we are
considering presupposes a valid contract of insurance, the policy
being issued either for the benefit of the assured personally,
or for the benefit of some one having an insurable interest in
the assured at the time of the taking out of the policy. Such
a policy constitutes a contract to pay a certain amount of money
to the payee on the death of the assured. It is a chose in
action with all the ordinary incidents belonging thereto, and as
such may be assigned either as collateral or absolutely, as the
payee may elect. While an insurable interest in the payee is
necessary, in the first instance, to the creation of a valid contract,
Jan. 1899.] Steinback «. Diepenbroce. 429
it is not necessary that such interest should continue. The
case of a wife divorced from her husband will serve as an illus-
tration. The policy taken out for her benefit during the exist-
ence of the married relation is not affected by a subsequent
severance of that relation through a decree of a court of compe-
tent jurisdiction by which she ceases to have an insurable in-
terest in his life: Connecticut Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Schaefer,
D4 U. S. 457. The ^^ materiality of the value of the interest
has relation to the question whether the policy is taken out
in good faith, and not as a gambling transaction. If it be taken
out in good faith, then a sound public policy would g^eem to
require that the payee should be permitted to treat it as he
may any other chose in action and go to the best market he
can find, either to e'en it or borrow money on it. It would sub-
stantially confine him to such terms as the company issuing the
policy should choose to make with him, if he should be limited in
his choice of a purchaser to the party having an interest in the
continuance of the life of the assured.
On the other hand, it is said that if the payee of a policy be
allowed to assign it, a safe and convenient method is provided
by which a wagering contract can be safely made. The insured,
instead of taking out a policy payable to a person having no
insurable interest in his life, can take it out to himself and at
once assign it to such person. But such an attempt would not
prove successful, for a policy issued and assigned under such
circumstances would be none the less a wagering policy because
of the form of it. The intention of the parties procuring the
policy would determine its character, which the courts would
unhesitatingly declare in accordance with the facts, reading the
policy and the assignment together, as forming part of one
transaction.
Cammack v. Lewis, 15 "Wall. 643, and "Wamock y. Davis, 104
TJ. S. 775, were cases where the policies were taken out in order
that they might be assigned to the assignees^, through their pro-
curement, under circumstances that might well be held to be
in evasion of the law prohibiting gaming policies.
In "Wamock's case, the agreement touching the procurement
of the policy and the use to be made of it, including the promise
to assign it, was in writing, and executed the very day the policy
was applied for, and the day following the assured executed an
assignment of the policy, which had in the meantime been is-
sued in pursuance of such an agreement. The insurance com-
pany paid over the money to the assignee, and the court held
430 Steinback v. Diepenbrock. [New York^
that tlie personal representatives of the assured ^^ were entitled
to receive from the assignees all the money except the sums ad-
vanced by them under the agreement, plus the sum paid by them
to the widow. In the opinion it is said that the assignment
of the policy to a party not having an insurable interest is as
objectionable as the taking out of a policy in his name. That
remark was clearly true as applied to the facts of that case, for
the policy was taken out in pursuance of an agreement to assign
it. It was, therefore, in fact a policy taken out for the benefit
of parties having no insurable interest, although in form issued
to the assured and by him assigned to such parties. In such
case, the court will always declare the fact to be as it is, without
regard to the effort of the parties to hide the truth and cheat
the law. But the language employed by the court, and evidently
advisedly, is broad enough to cover all assignments of policies
to parties not having an insurable interest, including as well
those taken out in good faith and kept up as long as the finan-
cial condition of the insured permits, as those deliberately taken
out for the purpose of speculation upon a life that the intended
beneficiar)', whether as payee in the policy or by assignment, has
no interest in prolonging. The point of actual separation be-
tween the cases asserting the assignability and those asserting
the nonassignability of policies of insurance to persons not in-
terested in the continuance of the life of the assured, s'eem*
to be that those asserting nonassignability proceed on the as-
sumption that the question is one of law, and that if a policy is
not assignable in one case, it cannot be in any case; while in
the other line of cases the underlying principle is that all valid
contracts are assignable, but that contracts are not necessarily
valid and free from the taint of gambling because upon their
face they appear to be regularly and properly issued. In order
to ascertain the truth, all the facts and circumstances may bo
proved, and if it then appear that the parties intended by the
contract to enable a third and uninterested party to speculate
upon the life of another, the court will declare such contract
invalid, not because of the assignment, but in spite of it.
''^ Warnock's case and this one are very wide apart in their
facts and serve very well to illustrate the necessity for the posi-
tion taken by the courts of this state upon this general subject.
In December, 1887, Alois Diepenbrock took out a policy of
insurance on his life in the Equitable Life Assurance Society.
He paid the premiums regularly down to December, 1892, a
period of about five years, at which time the surrender value of
Jan. 1899.] Steinback v. Diepenbrock. 431
the policy was about four hundred and eighty-five dollars. He
was pressed for money, and finally sold the policy to the de-
fendant Erdtmann for six hundred dollars, or something like
one hundred and fifteen dollars more than he would have re-
ceived by the surrender of the policy to the company. He had
paid a much larger sum in premiums, something over two thou-
sand dollars, and there seems to be no good reason why a person
owning such a policy, and obliged to sell it, should not be per-
mitted to get back as much as possible of the money that he
has paid out for insurance. His condition of health may have
changed very materially, of which fact the company can take
no advantage; for in its contract it made allowance for that pos-
sibility. There is no good reason for saying that an insured
person should not have the right, whenever his necessities press
him because of a failing condition of health that assures a speedy
death, to realize on his policy and obtain for it something like a
fair price, which may, perhaps, be almost equal to its face value.
The personal representatives of the assured contested the as-
signment also, on the ground that it was intended as collateral,
although in form a valid assignment, but the special term found
otherwise, and the appellate division approved that finding, so
that question is no longer open for consideration.
Other questions are presented by the appellant, but after &
careful examination of them we conclude that no error was com-
mitted below that will support a reversal of the judgment.
The judgment should be affirmed, with costs.
• All concur, except Martin, J., absent.
ASSIGNMENT OF IJFE INSURANCE POLICY TO ONE HAV-
ING NO INSURABLE INTEREST.— The assignee of a policy of life
insurance need not have an insurable interest in the life of the In-
oured In order to entitle him to recover the amount of the insurance:
Note to Cheeves v. Anders, 47 Am. St. Rep. 114, where authorities
fo the contrary are collected. Compare the extended note to Equi-
table Life Ins. Co. v. Hazlewood, 16 Am. St. Rep, 907, where the
subject is discussed. A man may insure his own life, payinisr the
premium himself, for the benefit of another, who has no insurable
Interest, as such a transaction is not a wagering contract: Hill v.
United Life Ins. Assn., 154 Pa. St 29, 35 Am. St Rep. 807.
432 Jackson etc. Works v. Hurlbut. [New York,
Jackson Arohiteotural Fron Works v. Hurlbut.
[158 New York, 34.]
A COMMON CARRIER IS ONE WHO, by virtue of his call-
ing, undertakes, for compensation, to transport personal property
from one place to another for all such as may choose to employ him,
and everyone who undertakes to carry for compensation the goods
•of all persons Indifferently is, as to liability, to be deemed a com-
mon carrier.
CARRIERS, COMMON— WHO ARE.— TRUCKMEN, wagon-
ers, cartmen, and porters who undertake to carry goods for hire as
a common employment in a city, or from one town to another, are
common carriers, although carrying is not the exclusive business
of the parties.
CARRIERS, COMMON— TRUCKMEN, WHO MOVE HEAVY
MACHINERY.- If persons advertise themselves as general truck-
men, their particular specialty being the moving of heavy machin-
ery, and they keep and maintain for this purpose a large number
•of trucks and horses, and the necessary help for the prosecution of
the business, there is, in an action against them for damages caused
by injury to such machinery, during its transportation, no error in
the refusal of the trial judge to instruct the jury that the defend-
ants are not common carriers. The circumstance that the defend-
ants have no regular tariff of charges for their work, birt that a
special price is fixed by agreement, does not change the relation.
The necessity for a different charge in each case arises, of course,
out of the difference in labor in handling articles of great bulk. The
charge in each case may be proportioned to the risk assumed and
•commensurate with the carrier's responsibility as such.
NEGLIGENCE— TRUCKMEN— MOVING OF HEAVY MA-
CHINERY— COMMON CARRIERS.— It is not material, in an action
against truckmen to recover damages for injuries to heavy ma-
chinery, which they have been employed to transport, whether the
defendants are answerable as common carriers, where the case is
tried and submitted to the jury, not upon the theory that the de-
fendants are liable as insurers of the safety of the property, but
tipon the theory that they were negligent in unloading the machine,
■a.ud thus caused the injuries. It was not, therefore, prejudicial to
the defendants for the trial court to refuse to charge that they were
■not common carriers.
NEGLIGENCE— TRUCKMEN— MOVING OP HEAVY MA-
CHINERY—LIABILITY.— If truckmen are employed to transport a
large and heavy planing machine, used for planing iron, they must
use, at least, ordiuaiT diligence and care, and are answerable if
they negligently break and seriously injure the machine while un-
loading it.
DAMAGES — INJURY TO HEAVY MACHINERY
THROUGH NEGLIGENCE OF TRUCKMEN— PUTTING IN CON-
DITION FOR USE.— If truckmen, In moving a large and heavy ma-
chine for planing iron, negligently break and Injure it, the expense
of restoring it to a condition for use is a proper element of damage,
in an action for such injury, for it Is plain that the machine is not
an article that tlie plaintiff can procure In the market at any time.
Hence, if that item of expense alone exceeds the verdict, it Is un-
necessary to consider or discuss other items admitted in evidence
<ipon the question of damages.
Jan. 1899.] Jackson etc. Works t;. Hurlbut. 433
Action to recover damages for the breaking of a planing ma-
chine belonging to the plaintiff while in the custody of de-
fendants, Hurlbut and others, for transportation to the plain-
tiff's factory. The defendants were truckmen of New York city.
There was a judgment for the plaintiff, and the defendants ap-
pealed.
Charles A. Collin, for the appellants.
Jesse Grant Rowe, for the respondent.
*^ O'BRIEN, J. The question in this case involved the re-
sponsibility of the defendants for an injury to property while it
was in their custody as bailees for hire or reward. They were
employed by the plaintiff in February, 1892, to transport a large
planing machine, used for planing iron, over thirty feet long and
weighing over ten tons, from the foot of Twenty-third street on
the North river to the plaintiff's factory at East Twenty-eighth
street in the city of New York. The agreed compensation for
•the service was sixty dollars. They undertook to perform the
work, and while unloading the machine at the factory it was
broken and seriously damaged, and hence it is alleged that they
failed to perform the service which they undertook to perform,
since they did not deliver the property according to the duty
imposed upon them by law. The plaintiff recovered a verdict
of five hundred dollars as damages for the injury to the machine
and for the loss of the use of it while it was being repaired,
and the judgment entered on the verdict has been affirmed at
the general term.
The principal question discussed in the case concerns the duty
or obligation which the law imposes upon the defendants when
they undertook to perform the service. The learned counsel for
the defendants contends that their responsibility was not that
of a common carrier, and that they were not subject to the strict
liability which is an incident of that relation. In other words,
that they were not insurers for the safe delivery of the machine
as a common carrier is for the delivery ^"^ of the goods or prop-
erty which he undertakes to carry and deliver. At the trial, the
court was requested in behalf of the defendants to instruct the
jury that they were in this transaction carriers for hire and not
common carriers. This request was refused and an exception
taken. It will be seen hereafter that it is not very important
to determine whether the defendants were common carrier?, or
merely engaged under a contract with the plaintiff to transport
Jlu. St. R«p., Vol. LXX.— 28
434 Jackson etc. Works v. Huelbut. [New York,
the macliine for a stipulated compensation. The question with
respect to the true legal relation in which the defendants stood
to the plaintiff, whether a common carrier or something else, is
an ahstract one. But since the defendants complain of the re-
fusal of the learned trial judge to give to the jury the instruction
requested, and insist that this error, if it be one, may have preju-
diced the defendants on the whole case, it may be proper to
examine it briefly in order to see how much of substance there is
in the exception. The defendants advertised themselves asgeneral
truckmen, their particular specialty being the moving of heavy
machinery. They kept and maintained for this purpose a largo
number of trucks and horses, and the necessary help for the
prosecution of this business. On this state of facts there was
no legal error in the refusal of the learned judge to instruct the
jury that the defendants were not common carriers.
Truckmen, wagoners, cartmen, and porters who undertake to
carry goods for hire as a common employment in a city or from
one town to another, are common carriers. It is not necessary
that the exclusive business of the parties shall be carrying.
"Where a person whose principal pursuit is farming solicits goods
to be carried to the market town in his wagon on certain oc-
casions, he makes himself a common carrier for those who "em-
ploy him. The circumstance that the defendants had no regular
tariff of charges for their work, but that a special price was fixed
by agreement, does not change the relation. The necessity for a
different charge in each case arises, of course, out of the differ-
ence in labor in handling articles of great bulk. The charge
in each case may be proportioned ^* to the risk assumed and
commensurate with the carrier's responsibility as such. A com-
mon carrier is one who, by virtue of his calling, undertakes, for
compensation, to transport personal property from one place to
another for all such as may choose to employ him, and everyone
who undertakes to carry for compensation the goods of all per-
sons indifferently is, as to liability, to be deemed a common car-
rier: Bank of Orange v. Brown, 3 Wend. 158; Schouler on Bail-
ments and Carriers, 2d ed., 351; Story on Bailments, sees. 495,
496; 2 Kent's Commentaries, 4th ed., 598, 599; 3 Parsons on
Contracts, 165, 175; Angell on Carriers, 870; Allen v. Sackrider,
37 N. Y. 341; Lough v. Outerbridge, 143 N. Y. 271, 42 Am.
St. Bep. 713. While, therefore, the question as to whether tho
defendants were subject to the responsibility of common carriers
was not very material in this case, yet we think it would be
diffcult to show that there was any legal error in the chargo
of the learned trial judge in that respect.
Jan. 1899.] Jackson etc. Wobks v. Hurlbut. 435
This was not an action against the defendants as common
•carriers. They were not held liable upon the ground that they
were insurers of the safety of the property which they undertook
to deliver, but on the ground of negligence. It must be, and
is, admitted that they were bound by their contract to exercise
at least reasonable care in the transportation and delivery of
the machine, and that they are liable for damages caused by
their negligence in the discharge of the duty which they under-
took to perform. The case was tried upon the theory that the
defendants failed to use reasonable care in unloading the ma-
-chine after it had reached its destination, and through this neg-
ligence the damage and injury occurred. In the complaint the
defendants are charged with negligence in the performance of
this duty, and this allegation was sustained by evidence at the
trial. At all "events, the evidence was sufficient to require its
fiubmission to the jury, and the finding on that question having
been in favor of the plaintiff, it is not open to question or
review here. All this is, we think, very clear from the charge
and requests made in behalf of the defendants. The court was
requested by the ^® defendants' counsel to charge that, as car-
riers for hire, they were not liable for loss or injury which could
not have been prevented by the use of ordinary diligence, and
that they were not liable for any loss or injury occasioned by
unavoidable accident. These propositions were charged as re-
quested, and, hence, it plainly appears that, although the court
refused to charge that the defendants were not common carriers,
yet he did charge that they were not liable for any loss or injury
which could not hare been prevented by ordinary diligence. So
the measure of liability which the defendants were held to was
that of ordinary diligence and care. This was certainly the
most favorable view of the case that the defendants had any
right to expect; and since the jury has found upon sufficient
evidence that they were wanting in the exercise of such care
in unloading the machine from the truck at the factory, the
merits of the controversy are not open to review in this court.
It is also urged that the plaintiff, through its servants or
employes, present at the time of the delivery of the machine,
was guilty of negligence contributing to the injury. It seems
that the truck with this machine arrived at the factory some
time after dark, and it is said that the defendants advised
against unloading such a heavy machine at that time, but that
the plaintiff's superintendent said that it could not remain oat
doors all night, and that it should be delivered; This is the
436 Jackson etc. Works v. Hurlbut. [New York>
interference on the part of the plaintiff's agents that is said to
constitute contributory negligence. It is quite sufficient to say,
with respect to that branch of the defense, that the evidence
was of such a character that required the court to submit it to
the jury, and it was submitted with instructions that, if it was
shown that the negligence of the plaintiff or its agents contrib-
uted in any way to the injury, there could be no recovery. So
the questions of negligence and contributory negligence have
been removed by the verdict of the jury from the domain of
controversy in this court.
There remains one other question to be considered, and that
arises upon an exception taken to the admission in behalf of the
plaintiff of certain evidence on the question of damages. ^^ It
is urged that the trial court admitted evidence on that subject
to show the loss of profits from inability to use the machine
after the injury and until repaired. But no evidence as to loss
of profits was given. Some proof was given that the plaintiff
was compelled, on account of the injury to the machine, to send
work out of the shop in order to complete contracts they had
on hand at the time of the breaking of the machine, and that
for such work they were compelled to pay a sum amounting
to four hundred and thirty-five dollars. This was not proof of
the loss of profits, but of the loss occasioned to the plaintiff by
inability to use the machine on account of the defendants' neg-
ligence. We are not prepared to say that this evidence was not
entirely competent under the circumstances of the case : Allen v.
Fox, 51 N. Y. 5G2, 10 Am. Rep. 641; Redmond v. American
Mfg. Co., 121 N. Y. 418. But it is not necessary to consider
that question, since it appears that the evidence was immaterial,
and could not very well have operated to the injury of the de-
fendants, even if not admissible. The verdict of the jury was
for five hundred dollars. The proof was substantially uncontra-
dicted that a new bed was absolutely necessary to repair the
machine and render it fit for use, and that the cost of this was
eight hundred and fifty-five dollars. It is plain that the machine
was not an article that the plaintiff could procure in the market
at any time, and hence the expense of restoring it to a condi*
tion for use was a proper element in the estimation of the dam-
ages, and that item of expense alone exceeds the verdict. The
defendants' counsel requested the court to charge the jury that
the measure of damage is that compensation which will fit the
actual loss sustained and which was the natural and proximate
consequence of the defendants' act. Also, that no damage*
Jan. 1899.] Culliford t;. Walser. 437
which might fairly be supposed not to have been the natural
and necessary consequence of the defendants' act could he re-
covered. These propositions were charged by the court as re-
quested. The item of the expense of restoring the machine
to a condition that would render it fit for use is certainly within
the principle of this request. The cost of procuring necessary
work to be done outside the factory in order to enable the plain-
tiff to fill ** its contracts resulting from inability to use the
machine, would seem to be within the same principle also. But
since proof of the first item is sufficient to sustain the verdict
rendered, the right to recover the other item need not be con-
sidered or discussed. On the whole case it is apparent that the
rulings at the trial and in the charge were quite as favorable
to the defendants as the law permits, and the amount of the
verdict was, under the circumstances, extremely moderate.
The judgment is right and should be affirmed, with costs. .
All concur (Vann, J., in result), except Martin, J., absent.
COMMON CARRIERS are persons who undertake for hire or re-
ward to transport the goods of such as choose to employ them from
place to place: Doty v. Strong, 1 Pin. 313, 40 Am. Dec. 773. A wag-
oner carrying goods for hire is a common carrier, though that is not
his principal business, but only an occasional and Incidental em-
ployment: Philleo v. Sanford, 17 Tex. 227, 67 Am. Dec. 654; Cheval-
lier v. Straham, 2 Tex. 115, 47 Am. Dec 639; Gordon v. Hutchinson,
I Watta & S. 285, 37 Am. Dec. 464.
Culliford v. Walseb.
[158 New York, 65.]
SURETIES— DIFFERENT SETS OF, INCLUDING BAII^
ORDER OF LIABILITY.— As between different sets of sureties
•Who undertake to secure the same debt, although In different stages
of legal proceedings, the primary liability rests ujlbn the last set;
and bail, belnsr sureties, are. therefore, within the same rule.
SURETIES— APPEAL BONDS AND BAII^PRIMARY LIA-
BILITY— ILLUSTRATION— RELEASE OF SURETIES— REIM-
BURSEMENT.—If the plaintiff in a civil action obtains an order
for the arrest of the defendant, who Is discharged upon giving bail,
and the action results In a judgment for the plaintiff, whereupon
undertakings on appeal are given, one to the general term, and the
other to the court of appeals, with conditions that the sureties in
oach case will pay the amount of the judgment and costs in the
event of an affirmance, the pl.iintlCf, in the event of an affirmance
at the general term and of a judgment for costs In the court of ap-
peals, cannot, where he collects from the general term sureties the
■whole amount due him, except on the judgment for costs In the
•court of appeals, recover thereafter from the ball, either for his
own benefit or that of a general term surety, anything more than
438 CuLLiFORD V. Walser. [New York^
the amount due on the judgment for costs In the court of appeals,
and not even that if he has released the court of appeals sureties;
and, if he recovers the amount of the judgment for costs in the
court of appeals, from the bail, the latter will have the right of re-
imbursement from the court of appeals sureties.
Action brought by Elizabeth A. Culliford to recover the sum
of one thousand dollars, with interest, upon an undertaking
given by defendants, as bail, to discharge one Montgomery Gadd
from arrest in an action instituted against him by the plaintift
in this case. A judgment in favor of the plaintiff was aflBrmed^
and the defendants appealed.
John A. Grow, for the appellants.
F. Spiegelberg and S. L. Wolff, for the respondent.
«« PARKEK, C. J. The facts, so far as they need be stated
in order to present the point we are to decide, are as follows:
Culliford, this plaintiff, in a civil action against Gadd, obtained
an order of arrest; to secure the latter's discharge therefrom
Walser and McHugh (these defendants) became bail in the ^'"
sum of one thousand dollars that Gadd would at all times ren-
der himself amenable to the process of the court during the
pendency of the action and to any mandate issued to enforce
the final judgment against him; the result of the action was a
judgment in favor of the plaintiff in the sum of one thirteen
hundred and thirty-eight dollars and ninety cents; from such
judgment an appeal was taken to the general term, upon which
an undertaking was given for the purpose of staying the judg-
ment, with Ellis and Wands as sureties, whereby they agreed
to pay the amount of such judgment and costs in case of the
affirmance thereof; the general term affirmed the judgment,
with costs, and thereafter executions were duly issued on the
judgment against Gadd to the sheriff, and by him returned un-
satisfied; Culliford then commenced an action against Ellis and
Wands as sureties upon the undertaking given on appeal to the
general term; the day following the commencement of such
action an appeal to the court of appeals was perfected, upon
which an undertaking was given by Gadd, with two sureties, to
pay the judgment and costs in the event of an affirmance; not-
withstanding this appeal judgment was taken by default in the
action brought against Ellis and Wands on the undertaking-
given upon the appeal to the general term, and an execution
was thereafter issued thereon to the sheriff, who levied upon
the real property of Ellis situated within the county. Ellis thea
Jan. 1899.] Cullifoed t>. Walseb. 439
paid to this plaintiff, Culliford, a sum equal to the amount of
the judgment recovered against him, an arrangement being made
between them that Culliiord should commence 'an action in her
own name, partly for her benefit, but mainly for the benefit
of Ellis, against these defendants, the bail of Gadd, and that
she should account to Ellis for all moneys received by her in
such action for his benefit ; hence this action, which has resulted
in a judgment at the trial term in favor of the plaintiff, in the
penal sum of the bond, with interest and costs and an affirmance
by the general term.
The plaintiff was entitled to but one satisfaction; she could
have collected the entire amount of the judgment from the ***
sureties on appeal to the court of appeals, or from the sureties
on the appeal to the general term, with the exception of the
judgment for costs entered in the court of appeals, which she
might have recovered from the sureties on the bond given to
perfect the appeal to that court, or she could have recovered
the sum of one thousand dollars from the bail, these defend-
ants, on their failure to cause Gadd to render himself amenable
to the mandate which the plaintiff caused to be issued against
him to enforce final judgment. The plaintiff chose to proceed
against Ellis and Wands, the sureties on the general term judg-
ment, and she has received from Ellis all that is her due, ex-
cept on the judgment for costs in the court of appeals. At the
time of the commencement of this action, therefore, the only
sum that she was personally entitled to recover against these
defendants was the sum due on the judgment for costs in the
court of appeals, which, at the time of the entry thereof, was
one hundred and ten dollars and thirty-four cents. She has been
allowed to recover, however, a judgment in the penal sum of the
bond, for the benefit of Ellis, who claims that the primary lia-
bility rests upon the bail, and hence that he is entitled to all
the rights that this plaintiff had as against them when she
elected to prosecute Ellis and "Wands on their undertaking.
These defendants challenge the position taken by the plaintiff
and Ellis, and insist that, as between the several sets of sureties,
the sureties upon the appeal to the court of appeals were pri-
marily liable, the sureties upon the undertaking to the general
term were secondarily liable, and these defendants were liable
last of all. So if the plaintiff had elected to collect of these
defendants in the first instance, they would have been entitled
to be reimbursed by the sureties on the bond upon the appeal
to the court of appeals, and if a sufficient amount could not
440 CuLLiFORD V, Walser. [New York,
have been collected from them, then the defendants could have
jesorted to the sureties on the hond upon the appeal to the
general term for the sum remaining unpaid.
In Hinckley v. Kreitz, 58 N. Y. 583, this court held that, as
"between the two sets of sureties upon appeals to the general ^'^
term and to the court of appeals, the primary liability rests upon
sureties on appeals to the latter court. In that case a judgment
creditor released the sureties upon appeal to the court of ap-
peals, and attempted to collect from the general term sureties
the amount of the judgment and costs, but the court held that
the effects of the release of the sureties upon the appeal to the
court of appeals was to discharge all liability upon the part of
the general term sureties upon the undertaking which they had
given to pay the judgment. In the course of the opinion the
court said : "We think, upon principle and authority, that the
later sureties are primarily liable as between them and the first
sureties, and it follows that the release of such later sureties by
the creditor discharging the defendants, because it deprived
them of a remedy to which they would otherwise have been en-
titled." That case has been recognized by the profession as es-
tablishing the rule which fixes the liability of different sets of
sureties as against each other, and it has not, so far as we have
observed, been departed from.
In Chester v. Broderick, 131 N. Y. 549, an appeal was taken
to the general term from a judgment of foreclosure and sale,
the amount of the bond to stay execution of the judgment on
appeal being fixed at seven thousand dollars. The judgment was
affirmed, and on appeal to the court of appeals the amount of
the bond was fixed at nine thousand dollars. The decree was
affirmed in this court and a sale of the property had, which re-
flulted in a deficiency of between eleven and twelve thousand
dollars. Thereupon the plaintiffs collected from the sureties on
the second or court of appeals bond the full amount thereof, and
then brought action against the sureties on the first or general
term bond for the deficiency, which was about two thousand five
hundred dollars. The defense interposed was that, by collect-
ing the full amount of the bond on appeal to the court of ap-
peals, the plaintiffs had exhausted the liability of the sureties
who were primarily liable for the debts secured by both bonds,
and thereby the sureties on the first bond were discharged. But
this position was ''** held by this court not well taken, and the
recovery had was sustained.
The rule then being settled that, as between different sets of
Jan. 1899.] Culliford r. Walseb. 441
sureties who undertake to secure the same debt, although in
different stages of legal proceedings, the primary liability rests
upon the last set, the inquiry next in order is whether bail are
sureties and, therefore, within the same rule.
In Rathbone v. "Warren, 10 Johns. 587, after judgment had
gone against the principal in a bail bond, his creditor agreed
with him not to issue the execution for several months, and
it was held that the agreement operated to discharge the bail,
who are by act and operation of law sureties and entitled
to the benefit of the general principles relative to sureties. In
that case, as in this, an effort was made to convince the court
that bail should not be so regarded, and Mr. A. Van Vechten,
the attorney general, insisted that the respondent did not stand
precisely in the light of a surety, and he advanced, among other
arguments, the proposition that the bail could exonerate him-
self from liability at any time by surrendering his principal,
while in cases of suretyship generally the surety has not the
power to relieve himself; but the court held otherwise.
In Melvill v.Glendining, 7 Taunt. 126, the bail asked the court
to be discharged because, as he claimed, the creditor had, for
a consideration, extended the time of the principal, and the
court asserted as applicable to that case the doctrine that where
a creditor gives time to the original debtor, the sureties will
be discharged, and stated that the principle underlying it was
that every -surety has the right to come into equity and sue
in the name of the original creditor, which he cannot do ef-
fectively if the creditor gives time to the original debtor.
In Toles v. Adee, 84 K Y. 222-238, the court, having under
consideration a bond accepted by the sheriff in discharge of the
defendant from arrest in a civil action, said: "Bail are sureties,
with the rights and remedies of sureties in other cases."
If authority then be needed to establish that bail are sureties,
^* and entitled to the benefit of the general principles appli-
cable to the relation which they bear toward their principal and
his creditor, as well as toward other sets of sureties, it is at
hand in this state, and thus they are brought necessarily within
the rule laid down in Hinckley v. Kreitz, 58 N. Y. 583, and it
is well that it is so, for the sake of uniformity and the necessary
avoidance of confusion incident to divergent rules in correspond-
ing relations. No good reason has been presented why bail
should constitute an exception to the general rule. An attempt
has been made to lay hold of the argument made by the court
in support of the rule established in Hinckley's case, to sustain
4.42 CuLLiFORD V. Walser. [New York,
the claim that the rule should not apply to hail, hecause some
of the reasoning that led to its adoption is not applicable. Fre-
quent attempts of this character are made to break down rule*
established by the courts for the guidance of the profession and
the public, but they should not be allowed to succeed unless
a substantial reason exists for the creation of an exception, and
no such reason exists in this case. Moreover, an examination
of the authorities considered in that case make it apparent that
the court was attempting to ascertain and establish the true rule
as to the primary liability of sureties where more than one set
is obligated to pay the same debt. Among the cases cited with
approval in support of the rule laid down by that case, in so
far at least as it treats of the superior obligation between two
sets of sureties to pay a debt, was Parsons v. Briddock, 2 Yern.
608.
Where the principal in a bond, upon which were sureties, was
sued and arrested and then gave bail, the sureties in the original
bond having been sued and paid the judgment, it was decreed
that they were entitled to an assignment of the judgment against
the bail to secure reimbursement for what they had paid.
The court next considered certain Pennsylvania cases which
arose under a suit authorizing a stay of execution for a year
upon giving security, it being there held that the surety for
the original debt upon payment was entitled to the remedy of
the creditor against the surety upon the stay: Burns v. '^''^
Huntingdon Bank, 1 Penr. & W. 395; Pott v. Nathans, 1 "Watts
& S. 155, 37 Am. Dec. 456; Schnitzel's Appeal, 49 Pa. St. 23.
Without further referring to the authorities considered by the
learned judge who wrote the opinion of the court, we observe
that he was without direct authority establishing the primary
liability as between two sets of sureties who have promised to
pay the same judgment, one set on one stay on an appeal to
the general term and the other on another stay on an appeal
to the court of appeals. He therefore presented some of the
authorities bearing upon the general subject affecting the ques-
tion of primary liability as between different sets of sureties,
to the end that the rule should be clearly pointed out, as well
as applied to the case in hand, thus preventing future legal con-
troversy by making it possible for wouUl-be sureties to be cor-
rectly advised of the character of their liability as between them-
selves and prior sureties.
This plaintiff, therefore, is not entitled to a recovery against
these defendants for anything more than the amount due od
Jan. 1899.] Culliford v. Walseb. 445
the judgment for costs in the court of appeals, and not even
to that if she has released the sureties on the court of appeals
bond, as these defendants claim. So far as we are advised by
the present record, we are inclined to the view that this claim
is not well founded, though we refrain from passing upon it, as
additional facts may, perhaps, be presented upon a new trial; but
if the amount of the judgment for costs in the court of appeals^
shall in this action be recovered of these defendants, they in
turn will have the right to reimbursement from the sureties on
appeal to the court of appeals.
The judgment should be reversed and a new trial granted to
defendants, with costs in this court and the court below.
All concur, except Gray and Martin, JJ., absent.
Liability as Between Different Sets of Sureties.*
Primary LiaMUty.—ks between different sets of sureties who un-
dertake to secure the same debt, although in different stages of
legal proceedings, the New Yorlc cases are clear that the "primary
liability" rests upon the last set: See principal case. And we un-
derstand that the one who is "primarily" liable upon an obligation is
the one who, in equity and good conscience, should be first called
upon to discharge it. See the principal case. Thus, If a new
undertaking is given in that state upon an appeal to the court
of appeals, for the judgment and costs, the "primary liability,"^
as between the two sets of sureties, rests upon the latter, and
If the Judgment creditor releases them, his act discharges the-
former sureties: Hinckley v. Kreltz, 58 N. Y. 583. If a sure-
ty becomes dissatisfied with his responsibility, and seeks tt>
be relieved, the court cannot substitute a new surety so as to
discharge the former from his contract. But there Is noth-
ing to forbid Its requiring a new security, which, as between
the sureties themselves, shall be the "primary" • one, leaving the
former only collateral: Glenn v. Wallace, 4 Strob. Eq. 149, 53 Am.
Dec. 657. Tlie doctrine of primary and secondary liability has been
applied to administration bonds, where more than one bond has
been given. "As a general principle," says Simpson, C. J., In Bobo
V. Vaiden, 20 S. C. 271, 278, "it has been settled that the second
bond becomes the primary security, and the first Is at least sus-
pended until the second Is exhausted. True, the first bond cannot
be entirely discharged, so far as the parties interested in the estate
are concerned; but as between the sureties to the two bonds, the
second stands in the front rank and must protect the first." Hence,
If a surety on an administration bond petitions for relief, and a new-
bond is required and given, the second bond becomes the primary
♦bkferenck to monographic notes
Right of one surety to enforce contribution from another, and the remedies for
Its enforcement: 10 Am. St. Rep. 639-647.
LiabUities of sureties oa appeal bunds: 88 Am. St Rep. 702-719l
444 CuLLiFORD V. Walseb. [New York,
security, not only as to the surety who petitioned, but also as to the
other sureties on the first bond: Bobo v. Vaiden, 20 S. C. 271. The
effect of releasing an administrator's sureties, who petition for re-
lease, is to malie the second set of sureties primarily liable to the ex-
tent of their bond. If they prove insufficient, the first sureties are
4inswerable to the date of their release. The second set must, it is
said, account, first, for any default' after their suretyship, and then
for any that may have occurred before: Morris y. Morris, 9 Heisk.
«14, 822.
Cosureties— Different Bonds- Contribution.— It is a general rule of
«fluity that all persons liable for the same debt, although by differ-
ent obligations, executed at different times, are regarded as co-
eureties, and will be compelled to contribute to the payment of any
loss that a cosurety may sustain by having discharged the debt.
In other words, the relation of cosuretyship may be said to exist
where it appears that there are two or more sureties for the same
principal debtor, and for the same debt or obligation, whether on
the same or on different Instruments. Nor does it alter the relation,
or affect the right to compel contribution, that the sureties are
Jointly or severally, or jointly and severally bound; nor that they
are boimd at different times and by different instruments. The
•duty of contribution among sureties results from equitable princi-
ples, and not from contract. Hence, it exists, whether they are
bound jointly or severally, by the same or different instruments,
4ind although one did not linow the other was bound with him; nor
is the order in which they become bound material, or the relative
number of sureties on the several different obligations or instru-
ments of any consequence. The only question as to such duty is,
whether they are, in fact, sureties for a common principal, in rela-
tion to one and the same obligation: Deering v. Earl of Winchelsea,
2 Bos. & P. 270, 1 Cox, 318; Snow v. Brown, 100 Ga, 117, 120;
Thompson v. Del<um, 32 Or. 506, 512; Kellar v. Williams, 10 Bush,
216; Whiting v. Burlie, L. R. 10 Eq. 539; Bosley v. Taylor, 5 Dana,
157, 30 Am. Dec. 677; Hutchison v. Roberts, 6 Del. Ch. 112; Norton
T. Coons, 3 Denio, 130; Wells v. Miller, 66 N. Y. 255; Mayhew v.
€rlcliett, 2 Swanst. 185, 1 Wils. Ch. 418; Pendlebury v. Walker, 4
Younge & C. 424; Harrison v. Lane, 5 Leigh, 414, 27 Am. Dec. 607;
Armltage v. Pulver, 37 N. Y. 494.
Thus, a bond given by an administrator, upon being ruled to give
Additional security. Is simply additional security. The sureties In
earh bond are, therefore, cosureties and may be compelled to con-
tribute: Cobb V. Haynes, 8 B. Mon. 137, 139. So, where successive
bonds, with the same penalties, given by an executor for the per-
formance of his duties, are cumulative security, the liability of the
sureties thereon, for contribution, is the same as if all had signed
the same bond: Thompson v. Dekum, 32 Or. 506, 513; and, where
successive bonds are given for the faithful discharge of a trust,
such as performing the duties of an administrator, all the bonds
given during the continuance of the office are cumulative, and the
«uretles on each bond stand In the relation of cosureties to the sure-
ties on all the other bonds: Pickens v. Miller, 83 N. 0. 543, 547.
Jan. 1899.] Culliford v. Walseb. 445
So, If an administrator gives two bonds, one when letters are Issned,
and the other when real estate is about to be sold, the sureties on
the two bonds are liable to contribution inter sese, where each
bond has the same condition, and the sureties have assumed
a common burden: Powell v. Powell, 48 Cal. 234. The
second bond of an administrator, being an additional and cu-
nnilative security for the faithful discharge of his duties, have been
held to be retrospective as to pre-existing and continuous breaches:
Picliens v. Miller, 83 N. C. 543, 547.
The same may be said of the bonds of a guardian. If he gives
several successive bonds for the faithful discharge of his trust, the
sureties on each bond stand in the relation of cosureties to the
sureties on every other bond: Jones v. Hays, 3 Ired. Eq. 502, 44 Am.
Dec. 78; Jones v. Blanton, 6 Ired. Eq. 115, 51 Am. Dec. 415; Loring v.
Bacon, 3 Cush. 4Go; State v. Fields, 53 Mo. 474. A surety on a guard-
ian's bond is not discharged from his liability by the guardian's giv-
ing a new bond with other sureties, whether the new bond is volun-
tary or given by order of the court: Jones v. Blanton, 6 Ired. Eq. 115,
51 Am. Dec. 415; Forbes v. Harrington, 171 Mass. 38G; Field v. Pelot,
McMull. Eq. 369; Loring v. Bacon, 3 Cush. 465. The court cannot
substitute a new surety so as to discharge the old one from his con-
tract: Field V. Pelot, McMull. Eq. 369. If a guardian, having given
a bond as such, with surety, afterward, on the death of the surety
and upon order of tlie court, gives an additional bond, with other
sureties, conditioned lilie the first, but with a larger penalty, the
sureties on both bonds are cosureties, and, as such, mutually liable
to contribution: Stevens v. Tuclier, 87 Ind. 109. If the sureties of a
guardian petition, under the statute, for relief, and the court orders
new sureties to be given, the obligation of the bond given by the
new sureties extends to the entire guardianship, retrospective as
well as prospective. Such a bond is, at least, an additional and
cumulative security for the ward: Bell v. Jasper, 2 Ired. Eq., 597;
Field V. Pelot, McMull, Eq. 369. If a guardian has given a bond
as such, but subsequently receives other funds, and Is afterward re-
quired to give an additional bond, the sureties upon the first and
second bonds are liable to pro rata contribution: Odom v. Owen, 2
Baxt 446.
If a slierlfC Is required, by statute, to renew his bond annually,
the sureties on his official bond, and the sureties on his additional
or renewal bond, are cosureties from the date of the execution of
the renewal bond, and are jointly bound to answer for the acts of
their principal. A surety on his renewal bond is, therefore, an-
swerable. In an action for contribution, to a surety on the sheriffs
oiliclal bond: Ketler v. Thompson, 13 Bush, 287. The sureties upon
the general tax bond of a sheriff are answerable for all taxes col-
lected by him, whether general or special. The sureties on his
general bond are answerable for any defalcation in the general
taxes, and are also answerable for a ratable share and share all^e
with the sureties on the sheriff's special tax bond, as If they had
signed it, for any defalcation in the special taxes: Cherry v. Wilson,
446 CuLLiFOBD V. Walser. [New York,
78 N. C. 164; but, if the entire defalcation as to the special taxes is
collected out of the sureties on the general bond, they are entitled
to contribution, share and share alilie, from the sureties on the
special tax bond, as if they had signed it: Cherry v. Wilson, 78 N.
C. 166. A surety who pays the whole amount for which he and
other sureties are bound to the same person, for the performance of
the same conditions, may compel contribution from such other sure-
ties, although they are not bound by the same bond: Bosley v. Tay-
lor, 5 Dana, 157, 30 Am. Dec. 677.
An examination of the principal case will show that where two
undertaliings on appeal in the same cause have been given in the
fitate of New Yorli, one on an appeal to the general term, and the
•oiher on an appeal to the court of appeals, both undertaliings being-
given to pay the judgment and costs, in the event of any affirmance,
the fact that the liability of the sureties, who are primarily liable
tor the judgment secured by both bonds, becomes exhausted, does
not discharge the sureties on the other or first bond; that the en-
tire amount of the judgment, in case of affirmance, may be col-
lected from the sureties on appeal to the court of appeals, or from
the sureties on the appeal to the general term, with the exception
of the judgment for costs entered in the court of appeals; and that,
if the amount of the judgment for costs in the court of appeals Is
recovered from the bail upon a discharge from an order of arrest,
the latter are entitled to reimbursement from the sureties on the ap-
peal to the court of appeals: See, also, Chester v. Brodericls;, 131
N. Y. 549, commented upon in the principal case. The liability of
sureties on appeal bonds is the subject of a monographic note to
Howell V. Alma Milling Co., 38 Am. St. Rep. 702-719.
A new probate bond given simply as an additional security does
not displace the original bond, without some action as to it, or as
to the lial)ility of the sureties thereon, notwithstanding a misap-
prehension of the judge and of the parties as to the reason for filing
it. Both bonds are valid, and the sureties on each, after a breach
thereof, are answerable in proportion to the several liabilities as-
sumed by them: Broolcs v. Whitmore, 142 Mass. 399.
If a judgment is enjoined by the principal debtor, who executes
an injunction bond, with a third person as surety, the surety, upon
a dissolution of the Injunction, is answerable for the debt enjoined
before the surety In the judgment, where the latter was not a party
to the injunction; but, where the surety on the Injunction bond is
adjudged Insufficient, and another bond Is executed with other sure-
ties, the sureties on both bonds, upon a dissolution of the injunc-
tion, are equally answ( rable: Bentley v. Harris, 2 Gratt. 357. Com-
pare Harnsberger v. Yancey, 33 Gratt. 527, 540.
The original sureties on an Instrument are sometimes expressly
released by statute whore a new obligation Is given. Thus, by ex-
pre.ss provisions of the statute of Virginia, a new bond given by ad-
Bfiinistrators relates bade to the time of the qualification of the ad-
ministrators, and binds the obligors therein for the faithful dis-
charge of the duties of their office, from t^at time, as efCectually as
Jan. 1899.] Culliford v. Walser. 447
it tlie new bond had then been executed: Llngle v. Cook, 32 Gratt
262. So where the statute, In terms, renders the sureties on the
new bond liable for all of the administrators, from the date of the
grant of their letters, this seems clearly to manifest an intention to
release the securities on the original bond, by the execution of the
«ew one, not only from subsequent, but from all past acts, of their
principals. The evident design of such a statute is to render the
first bond as inoperative as though It had never been given, and to
transfer the liability to the new sureties: People v. Lett, 27 111.
215, 223.
Who are not Cosiirctiea— Contribution.— While It Is true that. If there
are two or more sureties for the same principal debtor, and for
the same debt or obligation, whether on the same or on different
instruments, and one of them has actually paid or satisfied more
than his proportionate share of the debt or obligation, he Is entitled
to a contribution from each and all his cosureties, In order to re-
imburse him for the excess paid over his share, and thus to equalize
their common burdens, this doctrine does not apply where the debt
or obligation, for which there are two or more sureties for the same
principal debtor, is not the same: Hutchison v. Roberts, 6 Del. Ch.
112; Rosenbaum v. Goodman, 78 Va. 121; Harrison v. Lane, 5 Leigh,
414, 27 Am. Dec. G07; Langford v. Perrin, 5 Leigh, 552. Thus, the
rule does not apply to a case where some are sureties on a replevin,
and others on a supersedeas, bond, as the liabilities Imposed by the
respective bonds are of different natures: Kellar v. Williams, 10
Bush, 216. So a surety on a replevin bond is not a cosurety with
a surety on an injunction bond, and Is not answei-able by way of
contribution to him: Brandenburg v. Flynn, 12 B. Mon. 397, 398.
So, a surety upon a guardian's bond, after obtaining his discharge
under section 1S17 of the Code of Georgia, "although liable to the
ward for any past default of the guardian, is not liable to a surety
of the guardian upon a second bond who has answered for that
default In consequence of his own statutory liability upon the sec-
ond bond. This liability of the second surety is primary, as be-
tween himself and the first surety, and he has no right either of
Indemnity or of contribution from the latter": Tittle v. Bennett,
94 Ga. 405. And a surety on a second bond given by the guardian
under the provisions of section 2533 of the Civil Code of that state,
after making good a devastavit of the guardian which occurred
prior to the release of a surety on the first bond executed, Is not
•entitled to contribution from such first surety on account of such
•devastavit: Snow v. Brown, 100 Ga. 117, 119.
In this case. Little, J, In rendering the opinion of the court, said:
*'In view of the fact that, under our statute, section 2533 of the
Oivil Code, the surety on the first bond who applies for his release
is not and could not legally be released from any liability arising
from a breach of the bond anterior to such release, so far as the
rights of the obligee In the bond are concerned, and that the surety
on the second bond, by the terms thereof. Is made liable likewise
for any devastavit occurring while the first bond was in force and
448 CuLLiFOED V. Walsee. [New York
prior to the release of the surety on the latter, it might be ar-
gued, plausibly, that as to such a devastavit there is a common lia-
bility, relatively to the obligee of the respective bonds, as between
the first and second surety; that the first surety being still bound
for all breaches occurring prior to his release, and the obligatioQ
of the second surety relating bacli so as to embrace liability also
for such breaches, there is established a several liability, as be-
tween the first and second surety, springing from the same princi-
pal and growing out of the same transactions; and therefore as to all
such transactions the relation of cosurety would exist. As a gen-
eral proposition, we are inclined to the opinion that, under such
a state of facts, the doctrine would be applicable. The rule
cannot, in reason, be limited to a case where the liability of
each surety is equal as to amount and equally comprehensive
as to the subject matter upon which the suretyship operates.
The liability may be common as to a given transaction and
separate and distinct as to others. It maizes no difference that
they are bound in different sums, except that contribution could not
be required beyond the sum for which they had become bound:
Craythorne v. Swinburne, 14 Ves. 160, 169; Mayhew v. Cricliett, 2
Swanst. 185, 192; Stirling v. Forrester, 3 Bligh, 575, 59G. The fact
that the obligations of the second surety embrace transactions
which are distinct and foreign to the liability of the first surety
does not render the liability, rela'tively to the obligee in the re-
spective bonds, for which the first surety is held liable, any the
less common to the first and second surety. The first and second
sureties are severally liable for all defalcations prior to the release
of the first surety, and the second surety separately liable for all
defalcations occurring after such release. But for our statute, we
should be Inclined to hold that, as to a devastavit occurring prior
to the release of the first surety, the first and second sureties were
cosureties and hence entitled to contribution between themselves.
However, under our interpretation of the statute, we feel con-
strained to hold the converse of the proposition. It is clearly the
purpose of the statute to release the outgoing surety as far as
possible. It is obvious that, as between himself and the obligee
of the bond, he cannot be released from liabilities springing from
breaches of the bond occurring before his release; but whenever
such circumstances exist as will allow him to be released from
further liability, he is entitled to as full protection as Is obtainable
at the time of his release. The privilege to the guardian to con-
tinue his trust by giving another bond and surety has the effect
to postpone the right of the first surety to have an accounting from
his principal, and thus possibly deprive him of means and meas-
ures of protection afterward lost. The original bond being, pre-
sumably at least, ample to protect the obligee thereof for all
devastavit occurring while it is of force, It could not be said that
It was the pui-pose of the statute, In making the second surety lia-
ble for past waste, to alone protect the Interests of the obligee of
the respective bonds, but the principal object sought to be accom-
Jan. 1899.] Culliford v. Walseb. 449
pllshed by this retroactive feature of the second bond Is to afford
to the released surely as much Indemnity as possible, In view of the
disadvantages to him attendant upon the postponing of his right
to have his principal brought to an accounting. The release of
the first surety could not operate to exonerate him from liability
to the obligee of the bond for breaches made prior to such release,
for the rights and liabilities of the respective parties were then
fired and vested, but there Is no legal obstacle to imposing upon a
4surety, who voluntarily assumes liability under a second bond, a
primary liabilivy, as between himself and the first surety, for all
past as well as future waste. Such a construction has heretofore
been placed on the statute now under review, by this court, In the
<;ase of Sutton v. Williams, 77 Ga. 570, In which It was held that
'where a guardian was appointed and gave bond, and subsequently
one of the sureties, upon application, was released and discharged,
and the guardian was required to give a new surety, which he
did, on a subsequent proceeding by bill in equity on behalf of the
%vards, to recover from all the sureties for a devastavit of the
guardian, the liability of the discharged surety and the second
surety was not joint, but several, both being primarily liable to
the wards, and, as between themselves, the last surety being first
bound.' In commenting upon the statute. Justice Blandford says:
'It Is manifest that the last surety shall be liable first for any
waste of the guardian, and while the sureties on both bonds are
liable to the wards severally, primarily, as between themselves,
the last sureties on the bond are first bound It Is apparent,
therefore, not only that the first and last sureties are not cosure-
ties, but that the bond of the last surety stands as an Indemnity
to the first surety, and that. If the latter is forced to pay off and
■discharge -any devastavit of the guardian occurring before his re-
lease, he is entitled to recover the same of the second surety. Of
course. If it should* appear that fraud or deceit In concealing a past
devastavit had been practiced by the first surety upon the last
surety, a different question would arise": Snow v. Browii, 100 Ga.
117.
If two parties are bound as principal and surety for a debt or
other engagement, and a third afterward, at the request of the
principal, binds himself as surety for such debt or engagement,
the two sureties. In the absence of any agreement to the contrary,
become cosureties of the same principal and for the same debt or
engagement. "But, where there is a judgment or decree against
a principal debtor and his surety, and a third party, at the in-
stance of the principal and for his sole benefit, and without the
assent of the surety, enters as surety for the principal In an ob-
ligation, the effect of which Is to suspend the execution of the
judgment or decree and thus prejudice the rights of the first surety,
the equity of the latter is superior; and It seems to be well settled
that. In such case, the second surety would not be entitled to con-
tribution from the first, and there Is much authority for the propo-
filtion that the first would be entitled to Indemnity from the sec-
AM. ST. Kkp., you l.vx..— 2a
450 CuLLiFORD V. Walser. [NewYork^
ond. This principle has been applied to Injunction bonds, bail
bonds, prison-bounds bonds, forthcoming bonds, and appeal bonds":
Harnsberger v, Yancey, 33 Gratt. 527, 540.
Where the obligations of the different classes of sureties are
for wholly distinct things, and have no relation to, nor operation
upon one another, though they may arise out of the same princi-
pal indebtedness, there is no claim from one class upon the other
either for contribution or indemnity: Rosenbaum v. Goodman, 7S
Va. 121, 127. So, if sureties are bound by different instrument*
for equal portions of a debt due from the same principal, and tho
Buretyshlp of each is a separate and distinct transaction, there ia-
no liability for contribution between them: Coope v. Troynam, 1
Turn. & R, 426.
Controlling Liability by Contract.— It several persons are sureties
for the payment of one sum of money, though by distinct instru-
ments, and one pays more than an equal share of that sum, he
may have contribution from his cosureties; but the sureties may
arrange their liabilities and priorities as they will, and they may,
by contract, arrange that each surety shall be answerable only for
a given portion of one sum of money. In such a case there is no
liability of contribution between them: Pendlebury v. Walker, 4
Younge & C. 424; Glenn v. Wallace, 4 Strob. Eq. 149, 53 Am. Dec»
G57. A surety may stand upon the express terms of his contract.
Note to Howell v. Alma Milling Co., 38 Am. St. Rep. 703; and the
liability of contribution among cosureties is limited by the extent
of their respective contracts; as, where they are for different sums:
Craythorne v. Swinburne, 14 Ves. 160, 165. Sureties may, by agree-
ment among themselves, so far sever their unity of interest and
obligation as to terminate the right of contribution: Robertson v.
Deatherage, 82 111. 511. A second surety may qualify his obliga-
tion in such a manner as not to be liable to the first; but then, If
he has the debt to pay, he cannot call upon the others: Norton v.
Coons, 3 Denio, 130. So a surety on one bond is not entitled to
contribution from a surety on another. If the latter bond was not to
be pursued, unless the principal could not obtain payment from the
sureties on the former: Harrison v. Lane, 5 Leigh, 414, 27 Am. Dec.
607.
Contribution— Basis of Riffht and Liability— General Principles.— The
right to contribution between cosureties depends upon principles of
equity rather than upon contract: White v. Banljs, 21 Ala. 705, 5&
Am. Dec. 283; McBride v. Potter-Lovell Co., 169 Mass. 7, 61 Am. St.
Hep. 265; and the foundation of the doctrine is the fact that one
has paid more, and another less, than his share: Wells v. Miller^
66 N. Y. 255; Gross v. Davis, 87 Tenn. 226, 10 Am. St. Rep. 635; and
monographic note thereto on the right of one surety to enforce con-
tribution from another, and the remedies for its enforcement. A
surety's right to contribution from his cosurety Is an equity whicl*
springs up where the relation is created, and is fully consummated
when the surety pays the debt: Wayland v. Tucker, 4 Gratt. 267,
60 Am. Dec. 76; Nally v. Long, 56 Md. 567; Chenault v. Bush. 84
Jan. 1899.] Culliford v. Walser. 461
Ky. 528. A surety's right of action for contribution against his
cosurety does not accrue until he has paid In excess of his propor-
tionate share of liability: Magruder v. Admire, 4 Mo. App. 13.3; Tay-
lor V. Reynolds, 53 Cal. 686. A surety upon an official bond may
pay a judgment thereon without compulsion, and at once sue his
cosurety for contribution without demand or notice: Mason v. Pier-
ron, 69 Wis. 585. So, in an action for contribution by a surety
against four different guardian bonds, with different penalties anj
different sureties, some solvent and others insolvent, prior notice fa
unnecessary: Bright v. Lennon, 83 N. C. 183. The estate of a de-
ceased surety is liable to contribute in a suit by a cosurety: Johnson
V. Harvey, 84 N. Y. 3(53. 38 Am. Rep. 515; Camp v. Bostwick, 20 Ohio
St. 337, 5 Am. Rep. 669; Conover v. Hill, 76 111. 342; and a bill may
be filed against his administrator and heirs: Stephens v. Meek, 6
Lea, 226; and a surety may maintain a bill In equity against his
cosurety for contribution, notwithstanding the fact that a court of
law would grant similar relief. The jurisdictions are simply concur-
rent: Broughton v. Wimberly, 65 Ala. 549. The principles above
stated in this subdivision directly concern sureties on one instru-
ment only, but they are applicable to cases where two or more in-
struments, with sureties, have been given to the same person, for
the performance of the same conditions, for we have shown that the
sureties, in such cases, are cosureties.
Amount of Liahilitp.— It Is admitted that sureties for the same debt
or obligation must divide the loss between themselves, though they
are liable on obligations of different dates and with different pen-
alties, even though one bond was given without the knowledge of
the sureties on the other bond and the authorities show that the
right of contribution between cosureties Is limited by the extent of
their contract, and is not to be extended beyond it: Craythorne v.
Swinburne, 14 Ves. 160, 165; Stull v. Hance, 62 111. 52; United States
V. Boyd, 15 Pet 187; United States v. Hough, 103 U. S. 71,73; that the
rights and obligations of sureties, Inter sese, are the same, where
they undertake to secure the same debt, whether they are bound In
one or several like obligations: and that where there are several
distinct bonds, in different penalties, they are bound to contribute
• in proportion to the amount of the penalties of their respective
'bonds; or, as some of the cases say, they are liable "only for their
I proportion of the debt," or "for the amount of their respective
bonds": Armitage v. Pulver, 37 N. Y. 494; Smith v. State, 46 Md.
617, 619; Jones v. Hays, 3 Ired. Eq. 502, 44 Am. Dec. 78; Jones v.
Blanton. 6 Ired. Eq. 115, 51 Am. Dec. 415; Loring v. Bacon, 3 Gush.
465; Stirling v. Forrester, 3 Bligh, 575, 591; White v. Banks, 21 Ala.
705, 56 Am. Dec. 283. The contract of a surety Is the measure and
limit of his liability: Getty v. Binnsse, 49 N. Y. 385, 10 Am. Rep. 379;
and. If sureties are answerable on dlfTerent and separate penal
bonds, each set of sureties is answerable in proportion to tho
amount of the penalties of the respective bonds: Bell v. Jasper, 2
Ired. Eq. 597. But a surety cannot be made to pay more than the
penalty of his bond: Leggett y. Humphreys, 21 How. 66; Clark
452 CuLLiFORD V. Walser. [New York,
V. Bush, 3 Cow. 151; Fairlie v. Lawson, 5 Cow. 424; Rayner v. Clark,
7 Barb. 581. The penalty only can be recovered of sureties on appeal
bonds: Note to Howell v. Alma Milling Co., 38 Am. St. Rep. 715.
Where the right to contribution exists between the sureties on a
sheriff's official bond and those on his bond as tax collector, the
sureties on either bond should contribute equally for the default
to the extent of the lesser penalty, and, after that is exhausted,
the excess must be settled between the sureties on the larger bond:
Burnett v. Millsaps, 59 Miss. 333, 337. Compare Cherry v. Wilson,
78 N. C. 164, 1G6.
If the penalties of several bonds are the same, the obligation of
the sureties, as between themselves, is the same as if all were bound
by the same instrument: Deering v. Earl of Winchelsea, 2 Bos. &
r. 270; Thompson v. Dekum, 32 Or. 506, 513; and this is true of
official bonds. When a bond given by an official is regarded as
inadequate in amount, he is sometimes required to give, and does
give, what is commonly known as an "additional bond," in such
further amount as may be required by competent authority. The
liability of the sureties on this "additional bond" does not extend
to any defalcation committed by their principal prior to its date,
nor does it release the sureties on the prior bond given by him from
liability for any of his defalcations, past or future. If moneys
have been collected prior to the execution of the additional bond,
and the principal converts them afterward, the sureties upon the
additional, as well as those upon the original, bond are liable for
such conversion. The additional bond and that previously existing
become concurrent securities for the faithful discharge of the official
duties of the principal after the giving of the last bond. The term
•'additional bond" must not be understood as indicating that it is
a bond to which resort can be had only after the remedies under
the previous bond have been exhausted. On the contrary, the lia-
bility o'f the sureties on the two bonds is, with respect t6 matters
occurring after giving the last bond, the same as though they had
become sureties for their principal at one time and by one bond:
Note to Crawn v. Commonwealth, 10 Am. St. Rep. 860.
The obligation of one of two cosureties is to pay the whole debt.
If he does so, he is entitled to demand contribution from the others
for whatever he has paid more than his aliquot part. In other
words, if he pays the wGole debt, he may recover one-half from his
cosurety, or the whole from the principal: Aiken v. Peay, 5 Strob.
15, 53 Am. Dec. 684; Morgan v. Smith, 70 N. Y. 537, 541. But If he
pays loss than the whole debt, he cannot recover from his cosurety,
though he may from the principal, more than the amount which he
has paid In excess of the moiety which, as between him and his
cosurety, it was his duty to pay: Morgan v. Smith, 70 N. Y. 537, 542.
Insolvency.— At common law, the liability of a surety, where his
cosurety had paid the debt, was his aliquot or proportional part of
the payment thus made, ascertained by the number of sureties;
and this was the sole measure of recovery, notwithstanding the
death or insolvency of one or more of the sureties, as this did not
Jan. 1899.] Cdlliford v. Walseb. 463
enlarge the other's liabilities: Powell v. Matthls, 4 Ired. 83, 40 Am.
Dec. 427; Stothofif v. Dunham, 19 N. J. L. 181, 185; Van Petten v.
Kichardson, 08 Mo. 379, 381; Browne v. Lee, 6 Barn. & C. 689. 9
Dowl. & R. 700. In some of the states, a surety could not formerly
maintain an action against a cosurety at law: Powell v. Matthis, 4
Ired. 83, 40 Am. Dec. 427; but now, if one of two sureties pays the
whole debt, he can, either at law or in equity, call upon the other
for contribution, and thus recover a half of what he has paid:
Moore v. Baker, 34 Fed. Rep. 1, 4. Thus, where one of three sure-
ties is Insolvent, and another pays the whole debt, he may recover
at law one- half thereof from the third surety: Henderson v. Mc-
Duffee, 5 N. H. 38, 20 Am. Dec. 557. The jurisdiction now assumed
by courts of law to enforce contribution in some cases does not
affect the jurisdiction belonging, originally, to courts of equity:
Wayland v. Tucker, 4 Gratt. 267, 50 Am. Dec. 76. In some cases,
however, the remedy at law Is utterly Inadequate; as, if there are
several sureties, and one Is Insolvent, and another pays the debt,
he can, at law, recover from the other solvent sureties only the same
share as he could if all were solvent. Thus, If there are four sure-
ties, and one is insolvent, a solvent surety who pays the whole debt
can recover only one-fourth part thereof, and not a third part,
aorainst the other two solvent parties. But, in a court of equity he
will be entitled to recover one-third part of the debt against each
of them; for In equity the insolvent's share is apportioned among
all the other solvent sureties: Moore v. Baker, 34 Fed. Rep. 1. 4.
Contribution, In equity, Is based upon the number of solvent cosure-
ties. In other words, the insolvent ones are to be excluded, and the
burden must be distributed equally between those who are solvent:
Smith V. Mason, 44 Neb. 610, 016; Bosley v. Taylor, 5 Dana, 157, 30
Am. Dec. 677; Van Petten v. Richardson, 68 Mo. 379; Cobb v.
Haynes, 8 B. Mon. 137, 140; Henderson v. McDuffee, 5 N. H. 38, 20
Am. Dec. 557; Hitchman v. Stewart, 3 Drew. 271; Burroughs v. Lott,
19 Cal. 120; Morrison v. Poyntz, 7 Dana, 307, 32 Am. Dec. 92; Acers
V. Curtis, 68 Tex. 423; Liddell v. Wiswell, 59 Vt. 365; Young v.
Lyons, 8 Gill, 162. Compare Whiting v. Burke, L. R. 10 Eq. 539— L.
R. 6 Ch. App. 342. It Is evident that a cosurety, in equity, is bound
to contribute more than an aliquot portion of the debt, regard be-
ing had to the number of sureties, wherever one or more of the
sureties happens to be Insolvent. The engagement of each surety
Is for the whole debt, and, as each may be made liable for the
whole, it Is for this reason that a court of equity Insists, when one
surety has paid, that he may recover from such of his cosureties
as are solvent that proportion of the sum paid as will establish a
perfect equality between the solvent sureties, and distribute the
l>urden between them. Independently of any contract to that ef-
fect: Young V. Clark, 2 Ala. 264.
The cases above cited In this subdivision do not directly concern
sureties to the same person on separate Instruments for the same
debt, but the principles stated are applicable to such cases. Thus,
in Whiting y. Burke, L. B. 6 Ch. App. 842, a bond was executed
454 Buchanan v. Tilden. [New York,
by a principal and two sureties, with a stipulation tliat the sure*
ties should not be discharged by any new arrangement between
the creditor and the principal. One of the sureties did compound
with his creditors, and, by the terms of the bond, the moneys se-
Bured became immediately payable. Subsequently, the plaintiff
signed a separate bond to become answerable for the entire amount.
The principal became insolvent, the creditor sued the plaintiff, and
obtained payment of the amount due. The plaintiff then filed his
bill against the solvent surety in the first bond for contribution,
and it was held, affirming Whiting v. Burke, L. R. 10 Eq. 539, that
the plaintiff was entitled to contribution from the defendant. If
one surety pays the debt, all others who are bound to the same
party for the performance of the same conditions, whether by the
same or different bonds, are liable for contribution; and if two
bonds have been given to the same party for the performance of
the same conditions those of the sureties in each bond who are
solvent must equally bear the burden: Bosley v. Taylor, 5 Dana,
157, 30 Am. Dec. 677; Breckinridge v. Taylor, 5 Dana, 110. The
proper method of compelling contribution among sureties in a suit in
equity, where more than one of the sureties have made payments on
the joint Indebtedness, is to add all payments together and divide
the aggregate among the solvent sureties. It must be observed,
however, that while a plaintiff surety, who has overpaid his share,
may recover the excess of his cosureties equally, there being no in-
tervening equity, if it does not subject any of them to the payment
of more than his proper share of the entire joint liability, a surety
who has paid less than his ratable share of the joint liability cannot
enforce contribution, even against cosureties wno have paid nothing:
Gross V. Davis, 87 Tenn. 226, 10 Am. St. Rep. 635. The right of con-
tribution in equity exists between cosureties, when the principal Is
Insolvent, and that, whether they are so by separate Instruments,
or by the same Instrument: Bell v. Jasper, 2 Ired. Eq. 597. A surety
suing in equity for contribution must sustain his proportion of the
loss resulting from insolvency: Acers v. Curtis, 68 Tex. 423.
Buchanan v. Tilden.
[168 Nkw York, 109.]
HUSBAND AND WIFE— CONSIDERATION FOR COVE-
NANT ON BEHALF OF WIFE.— It is not the full measure of the
legal and moral obligations imposed upon a husband by the com-
mon law simply to provide for his wife the necessaries of life, such
as food, raiment and shelter, but it Is his duty, If opportunity offers,
to ninke provision for her against that day when he may be In-
capac-Itated by disease or removed by death; and this obligation is
one that a court will recognize as a sufficient consideration to sup-
port a covenant on her behalf.
HUSBAND AND WIFE— UNITY OF. TO AID ENFORCE.
MENT OF COVENANT FOR WIFE'S BENEFIT.— The common-
Jan. 1S99.] Buchanan v. Tilden. 456
law unity of husband and wife survives for the purpose of aiding
the wife to enforce a covenant for her benefit made by her hus-
band, and which equity and good conscience approve.
HUSBAND AND WIPli-PROMISE TO HIM FOR HEH
BENEFIT— WIFE'S RIGHT OF ACTION ON.— If an heir-at-law
and next of kin of one who died testate desires to contest a be-
quest, in the will, of a large amount of property, which, if Invalid,
would fall to the next of kin, but has no means to conduct the liti-
gation, and obtains a loan of money, for the purpose, from a man
whose wife has an equitable interest in the suit, by reason of her
>adoption by a relative of the testator, upon a promise to the hus-
band that. In case of success, the contestant will pay to the wife
the sum of fifty thousand dollars, the wife is entitled to recover
on the contract, where the contestant succeeds in obtaining the
fund for the next of kin, whether the mere relation of husband
and wife would alone constitute a sufficient consideration to en-
able her to maintain the action, for her equities are such, when
considered in connection with the duty of her husband to provide
for her future, and with the fact that, with that purpose in view,
the money was procured for the contestant to institute and pur-
«ue the necessary litigation to secure the fund to which her equities
related, that, all taken together, they are sufficient to sustain her
action.
Action on contract. The defendant, George H. Tilden, needed
money in order to prosecute an action to set aside certain pro-
visions of the will of Samuel J. Tilden, deceased. He applied
to the plaintiff's husband for that purpose, and the latter pro-
<;ured a man named Dun to advance the money. The agree-
ment between the defendant and the plaintiff's husband was
that, in the event of the success of the action, in view of the
assistance rendered by the latter, as well as by Dun, the defend-
ant would become responsible for the payment to the plaintiff,
Adelaide E. T. Buchanan, of the sum of fifty thousand dollars.
The action was successful, and the defendant repaid the money
loaned. In addition, he gave to the plaintiff a snm of eight
thousand five hundred dollars, but she brought this action to
compel the payment by the defendant of the whole sum men-
tioned in the agreement. A judgment for the plaintiff, for fifty-
four thousand, four hundred and twenty-one dollars and eigh-
teen cents, entered upon a directed verdict, was reversed by the
court below, and the plaintiff appealed.
Louis S. Phillips and William B. McNiece, for the appellant.
Delos McCurdy, for the respondent.
"* BARTLETT, J. At the close of plaintiff's case both
parties moved for a directed verdict, and neither asked to go
to the jury on any question.
**^ The trial judge thereupon directed a verdict for the plain-
tiff. The appellate division, with a divided court, reversed the
456 Buchanan v. Tilden. [New Yorky
Judgment in plaintiff's favor entered upon the verdict and or-
dered a new trial. The plaintiff has appealed from that order,
stipulating for judgment absolute in case of affirmance, and pre-
sents for our determination a single question of law arising
upon undisputed facts.
Before stating that question reference will be made to the
material facts. The plaintiff is the adopted daughter of Moses
Y. Tilden, a brother of the late Samuel J. Tilden. The defend-
ant is an heir-at-law and next of kin of Samuel J. Tilden.
On the twentieth day of October, 1886, the defendant began
an action against the executors of the estate of Samuel J. Tilden
and others, praying judgment that the thirty-fifth article of
Mr. Tilden's will be adjudged void, and that the property there-
in mentioned be declared undisposed of by any provision thereof.
The defendant, being without means to prosecute this action,
applied to Robert D. Buchanan, the husband of the plaintiff, for
assistance in raising the funds necessary to carry on the litiga-
tion. Buchanan expressed his willingness to aid defendant if
certain arrangements were made, and said that his uncle, Robert
G. Dun, might be willing to advance the money required.
The defendant expressed himself as willing "to do anything
in the world to raise the money — to make any arrangement that
was reasonable,*' and said to Buchanan that if the contest was
successful Mrs. Buchanan "should come in share alike with the
rest of them." It was evidently within the contemplation of
the parties that if this action of the defendant was successful
the result would be that as to a very large part of his estate
Mr. Tilden died intestate, and that while the plaintiff, as an
adopted child of Moses Y. Tilden and not of Samuel J. Tilden'a
blood, might take no part thereof, yet there were the strongest
moral and family reasons why she should be regarded as an heir-
at-law and next of kin.
^^^ Buchanan induced Dun to make certain necessary ad-
vances to the extent of five thousand dollars, and Dun consented
to do so solely on the ground that plaintiff was to share the fruits
of a successful contest, he being unacquainted with the de-
fendant.
This portion of the money was advanced by Dun about the
time defendant began his action, and he was then presented to-
Dun and repeated to him the promise in regard to plaintiff shar-
ing alike with the rest of the heirs that he had made to her
husband. In February, 1887, the defendant asked Buchanan if
be could raise more money.
Jan. 1899.J Buchanan v, Tilden, 457
Buchanan testified that in response to this application, 'T. told
him that I thought before any more money was talked about
that the arrangement that had been talked about had better be
whipped into line, .... and he said they Were all perfectly
■willing to share and share alike in that matter. I said that does
not satisfy me; that is not what I want; I want some positive
agreement. After considerable further talk he said that his
brothers and sisters were scattered; that he could not get it
into shape Just then, but that he had to have some more money
and had to have it right away, and in order to get the money
and have it right away he, on his own personal behalf, having
nothing to do with his brothers or sisters in any sense, would
obligate himself to pay personally fifty thousand dollars." There-
upon defendant and Buchanan went to the office of counsel,
where the following letter was drawn up, signed by defendant,
and delivered by Buchanan to Dun:
"New York, February 19, 1887.
"Robert G. Dun, Esq., No. 314 B'way, N. Y. City.
"^ly Dear Sir: It is understood between Mr. E. D. Buchanan
and myself that in the event of the success of the proceedings
now pending, or any which may be taken, to practically set
aside the thirty-fifth section of the will of my late uncle, Samuel
J. Tilden, in view of the assistance looking ^^* to that end, which
has been and may be rendered by Mr. Buchanan, as well as by
yourself, that I will, and hereby do, become responsible for the
payment to Mrs. Adelaide E. Buchanan, or her order, of the
sum of fifty thousand dollars.
"It is further understood between us that, while I am not
strictly authorized to speak in behalf of ray brothers and sisters
in that respect, that from what has already transpired between
me and them, in the event of such success they will be disposed
to act generously with Mrs. Buchanan in the premises.
'TTours very resp'y,
"GEORGE H. TILDEN."
It will be observed that this letter, while charging defendant
in a fijxed sum, leaves open the general adjustment between
plaintiff and defendant's brothers and sisters. After receivinpf
this written declaration of the defendant. Dun continued his
advances until they aggregated over twenty thousand dollars.
A long contest followed in the courts; defendant succeeded in
his action, and he and others became entitled to a very large
sum of money that the late Samuel J. Tilden supposed he had
dedicated to public uses under the thirty-fifth article of his will.
458 Buchanan v. Tildkn. [New York,
Dun testified that the defendant had repaid his advances; that
they were collected through his attorney, but he thought an ac-
tion was brought against him. Defendant paid plaintiff eight
thousand one hundred and fifty dollars on account of the fifty
thousand dollars under the letter of February 19, 1887. As
nothing more was paid, and plaintiff received no recognition
from the heirs-at-law and next of kin of Mr. Tilden, she brought
this action to recover the balance of the fifty thousand dollars
^nd interest.
One of the learned judges of the appellate division thus states
the question of law presented in this case: "Can a wife enforce
payment in her own name where the husband renders valuable
services and stipulates with the person to whom the ^^^ same
Are rendered that compensation therefor shall be made, not to
Jiim, but to her?" In answering this question in the negative,
the main positions of the court below may be briefly stated.
While admitting that there is a distinct class of cases where
promises have been made to a father, or other near relative for
the benefit of a child, or other dependent relative, in which the
person for whose benefit the promise was made has been per-
mitted to maintain an action for the breach of it, and further
-admitting, for argument's sake, that the duty and obligation
•of the husband to the wife is, as a consideration, quite equal
to the duty and obligation of the father to the child, yet the
fact still remains in the case at bar that this is not a contract
looking toward the discharge of the obligation which the hus-
band owed to support the wife, and must, therefore, be sup-
ported, if at all, upon the mere relation of husband and wife.
The learned court then states that it has found no authority
for holding that a promise made to the husband by a third
person for the benefit of his wife, which was not intended to
provide for her support, or to discharge the husband's duty in
that regard, could be enforced by the wife.
It is also intimated that there is no disposition to extend the
principle of some of the cases relating to father and child to
«ny other relationship. As to this latter suggestion we do not
think it will be seriously questioned, on principle, that the rela-
tion of husband and wife is fully equal to that of parent and
■child as a consideration to support a promise.
Before discussing this appeal in the light of the authorities,
we have to say that, in our judgment, the learned appellate di-
vision have failed to give due weight to certain controlling fea-
tures of this case. In the first place, the question formulated
Jan. 1899.] Buchanan v. Tilden. 459
ty the court below does not contain what we regard as one of
the most important points disclosed by the evidence, to wit, the
large equitable interest the plaintiff had in this scheme to at-
tack **" the will under the provisions of the agreement made to
raise funds for that purpose. This is not the case simply of
a husband rendering valuable services to a third party upon the
latter's promise to pay the compensation, not to him, but to
his wife. While this case embraces that feature it involves the
further element of the wife's joint interest in the scheme to
attack the will.
It may fairly be inferred from this record that the defend-
ant was powerless to conduct the action he had begun unless
some one furnished him the funds. This assistance was ren-
dered by Buchanan and Dun, upon the express agreement and
understanding that the plaintiff should receive, in case of suc-
cess, fifty thousand dollars from defendant as part of her share
■of the estate, and generous treatment from his brothers and
listers. Plaintiff, in equity and good conscience, as an adopted
child of Moses Y. Tilden, was entitled to come in and share
with the other heirs and next of kin the large fund that had
been freed from the provisions of the will. When this equitable
right, or interest, is coupled with the relation of husband and
wife, we have presented a situation that affords ample con-
sideration for the contract sued upon — ^a situation that dis-
tinguishes this action from any of the cases where the party
suing upon a promise rests exclusively upon a debt or duty
owed him by the promisee.
Another general feature of this case, to which we think the
court below has failed to give due prominence, is the extent
of the legal and moral obligation resting upon a husband to
support and provide for his wife.
A brief quotation from one of the opinions below will make
ibis point clear. The court says: "It is quite true that the
husband is under an obligation to support the wife, and it may
be that any contract which he makes with a third party, having
for its object the carrying out of that obligation, would be en-
forced in the courts.'*
Then coming to the case at bar the court continues: "There
*'^'' is no obligation, legal or equitable, here on the part of the
husband toward the wife to entitle her to the performance of
this contract. This was not a contract for her support, nor
was it one to do anything which, under any circumstances, the
husband could be compelled to do. It was simply an obliga-
460 Buchanan v. Tilden. [New York,
tion on the part of the defendant to pay the plaintiff a sum of
money, as an independent fortune for her separate estate, in
case the husband rendered some service to him. So far as the
plaintiff and her husband were concerned, as to this contract
there were no legal relations between them; they occupied no
different relations from that of any other man and woman,'*
et cetera.
It seems to us that this is an entire misconception of the
duties and relations existing between man and wife. It is, in
effect, said that it is only the duty of bare maintenance that
is a consideration sufficient to support the promise of a third
party. We are of the opinion that a husband rests under other
and far higher moral and legal obligations that the law will
recognize as a sufficient consideration to support a convenant
in favor of the wife.
There is no evidence in this case to bear out the statement
that this was not a contract for the wife's support; but assum-
ing that she had food, raiment, and shelter — the necessaries
of life — can it be said that these represent the full measure
of the moral and legal obligations imposed upon a husband by
the common law? Is it not his bounden duty, if opportunity
offers, to provide for his wife against that day when he may be
incapacitated by disease or removed by death. If, as in the
case at bar, the husband seeks to provide for his wife, beyond
the duty of furnishing food and shelter, by securing a fund to
which she is equitably entitled, that may perpetuate his pro-
tecting care after he has departed this life, shall it be said that
this is not an obligation that a court can recognize as a sufficient
consideration to support a covenant on her behalf? We are
of opinion that this broader view of the duties and obligations
of ^^^ a husband is to be invoked in determining the rights of
this plaintiff.
We come then to a consideration of this case in the light of
precedent. The court below recognized the strong equities of
the plaintiff's case and expressed regret that the action is not
sustainable in her behalf. Our full discussion of the facts and
the position of the court below discloses, we think, a very strong
case in favor of the plaintiff maintaining this action.
While it is true that for more than two hundred years the
courts of England and this country have been discussing the
vexed question of when a party may sue upon a promise made
for his benefit to a third party, yet we are of opinion that,
nnder the peculiar facts of this case, the plaintiff can recover by
Jan. 1899.] Buchanan v. Tilden. 461
invoking legal principles that are well established by authority.
In order to maintain the plaintiil's cause of action, it is not
necessary to invoke the principle established by Lawrence v.
Fox, 20 N. y. 268, and the cases that have followed it in this
state, to the effect that an action lies on a promise made by the
defendant upon valid consideration to a third person for the
benefit of the plaintiff, although the latter was not privy to il.
It will be recalled in that, case one Holly loaned the defendant
Fox money, stating at the same time that he owed the amount
to the plaintiff Lawrence for money borrowed which he had
agreed to pay the then next day; the defendant, in considera-
tion of the loan to him, agreed to pay plaintiff the then next day.
This court, in holding that the plaintiff Lawrence could en-
force that promise in an action at law, established a legal prin-
ciple that the courts of England have never recognized.
The plaintiff in the case at bar, if driven to it, might doubt-
less derive aid and comfort from the doctrine laid down in
Lawrence v. Fox, 20 N. Y. 268, by parity of reasoning, but we
think her case rests upon very different principles.
The first case to be considered is Button v. Poole, 1 Vent.,
318-333, decided in England in the reign of Charles II. The
plaintiff declared in assumpsit that his wife's father being seised
of certain lands now descended to the defendant, **® and be-
ing about to cut a thousand pounds* worth of timber to raise a
portion for his daughter, the defendant promised to the father,
in consideration that he would forbear to fell the timber, that
he would pay the daughter one thousand pounds.
After verdict for the plaintiff on nonassumpsit, it was moved
in arrest of judgment that the father ought to have brought
the action, and not the husband and wife. The court said:
*'It might have been another case if the money bad been to have
been paid to a stranger; but there is such a nearness of relation
between the father and the child, and 'tis a kind of debt to the
child to be provided for, that the plaintiff is plainly concerned."
The judgment was affirmed in the exchequer: Dut^ton v. Poole,
2 Lev. 212, Eaym. 302.
In one of the opinions of the appellaite division in the case
at bar, it is stated that Button v. Poole, 1 Vent. 318, has been
repudiated by the English courts in Tweddle v. Atkinson, 101
Eng. C. L. K. 393. A careful examination of this latter case
shows that Justice Blackburn, while attacking Button v. Poole,
1 Vent. 318, says: ""We cannot overrule a decision of the
exchequer chamber." Lord Mansfield said of Button y. Poole,
462 Buchanan v. Tilden. [New York^
1 Vent. 318, a hundred years later, that it was difficult to con-
ceive how a doubt could have been entertained about the case:
Martyn v. Hind, Cowp. 443, Doug. 142. It has also been
repeatedly followed in this state.
The learned counsel for the defendant, in an able and com-
prehensive brief, complains that Dutton v. Poole, 1 Vent. 318^
has on several occasions been cited to sustain the broad doctrine
that a stranger to the consideration and to the promise may
maintain an action on a contract. He points out that such an
alleged erroneous citation appears in Schermerhorn v. Vander-
heyden, 1 Johns. 139, 3 Am. Dec. 304, and that it has led to
confusion in subsequent cases. We are not concerned at thia
time whether this is a just criticism or not, as there can be no
doubt that Dutton v. Poole, 1 Vent. 318, rests upon the nearness
of the relation between father and child, and to this extent ia
undoubted authority.
^o In Shepard v. Shepard, 7 Johns. Ch. 57, 11 Am. Dec.
396, Dutton v. Poole, 1 Vent. 318, is approved and followed,
and Chancellor Kent al&o recognizes the principle contended
for in this case, that the consideration of natural affection, and
to make sure the maintenance of a wife in case she survived
her husband, is "very meritorious."
There were two principal points decided by Chancellor Kent
in this case — ^the first being that although a deed from a hus-
band directly to his wife is void in law, yet, where the con-
veyance of the husband is for the purpose of making a suitable
provision for the wife "in case she should survive him," equity
will lend its aid to enforce its provisions. The second point
held that where a husband conveyed land to his son, for a
nominal sum, on his covenanting to pay an annuity to his.
mother during her widowhood, that the wife could sue on thi»
covenant so made for her benefit, and that an attempted release
of the son from the covenant by the husband, in his lifetime,
was fraudulent and void.
The learned chancellor said: "But if the deed of 1808 was
out of the question, I should then have no difficulty in declar-
ing that the defendant was bound to pay her the stipulated
annuity, or the gross sum of four hundred dollars in lieu of it,
on her releasing," et cetera. "The relationship between hus-
band and wife was sufficient to entitle the plaintiff to her action
upon the covenant to her husband, and which was made for her
benefit. The consideration inured from the husband, and arose
from the obligations of that relation," et cetera.
Jan. 1899.] Buchanan v. Tilden. 463
The chancellor then comments approvingly and at length
upon Button v. Poole, 1 Vent. 318, points out the subsequent
commendation of it by Lord Mansfield, and concludes by say*
ing: "The same doctrine appears in the more early case of
Starkey v. Mill, Style, 29G, and it has had the sanction also of
Mr. Justice Buller in Marchington v. Vernon, 1 Bos. & P. 101,
in notes, but it is quite unnecessary to dwell longer on thi*
second point."
*^* "While the chancellor allowed relief to the plaintiff by en-
forcing her deed in equity, yet he distinctly held that she had
the additional remedy of an action on the covenant between
her husband and the son if there were no deed, by reason of thd^
relations and obligations of husband and wife, resting his deci-
sion squarely on the case of Dutton v. Poole, 1 Vent. 318.
With this case approved by Lord Mansfield, Justice Buller,.
and Chancellor Kent, and followed in this state, it is not of
controlling importance that the doctrine of this and other early
cases is said to be questioned in England at the present day.
In a jurisdiction where the doctrine of Lawrence v. Fox, 20
N. Y. 268, is the settled law, there is no difficulty in sustaining
both in law and equity the kindred principle announced in Dut-
ton V. Poole, 1 Vent. 318.
It is quite impossible to follow the learned counsel on both
sides of this case in the exceedingly interesting and exhaustive
discussion of the questions involved, as the limits of an ordi-
nary opinion forbid it.
We shall content ourselves with the citation of but one more
case. In Todd v. Weber, 95 N. Y. 181, 47 Am. Rep. 20, this-
court held that the relation of parent and child, even between
a father and his illegitimate daughter, was a sufficient consid-
eration for a contract made by him with the relatives of his un-
fortunate child to pay for her support and maintenance, and
that she could enforce it by action. The learned judge writing
for the court in that case, in an opinion that does honor to hi&
heart as well as his intellect, quotes with approval Dutton t.
Poole, 1 Vent. 318.
We see no valid distinction in principle between the relation
of parent and child and husband and wife as affording an ample
consideration for covenants inuring to the benefit of the child
or wife. The relation of husband and wife has been twice
recognized in this state in cases just cited as a sufficient con-
sideration for supporting a covenant in the wife's favor, anci
amply sustains the plaintiff's cause of action in the case at bar.
464 Buchanan t;. Tilden. [New York,
This court has recently held that while the common-law rule
that husband and wife are one has been to some extent abro-
gated *^^ by special legislation, yet there are situations where
that unity still exists: Wetmore v. "Wetmore, 149 N". Y. 530,
529, 52 Am. St. Eep. 752; Bertles v. Kunan, 92 K Y. 152, 44
Am. Eep. 361.
The case before us illustrates a situation where that unity
survives for the purpose of aiding the wife to enforce a cove-
nant for her benefit made by her husband, and which equity
and good conscience approve.
The appellate division refer to Durnherr v. Rau, 135 N. Y.
219, as "a ca&e while not directly in point is in its controlling
principles adverse to the plaintiff's right to maintain this ac-
tion."
We think that case has no application to the one before us.
The husband of plaintiff conveyed to the defendant certain
premises, the latter covenanting to pay all encumbrances on
the premises '^y mortgage or otherwise.'*
The deed declared that the wife (the plaintiff) reserved her
right of dower. By the foreclosure of mortgages on the prem-
ises, existing at the time of the conveyance and in which the
wife joined, her dower interest was extinguished. The wife
sued on the defendant's covenant in the deed to pay all encum-
brances, and sought to recover the value of her dower interest
cut off by the foreclosure. This court held that the covenant
was with the husband alone, as the wife was not bound to pay
the mortgages, and that the joinder of the wife in the mort-
gages was a voluntary surrender of her right of dower for the
benefit of the husband, and bound her interest to the extent
necessary to protect the securities.
It is perfectly clear under this state of facts that the hus-
band rested under no duty to protect the wife's dower interest.
There was no legal or equitable obligation which the wife could
lay hold of to enable her to sue on the covenant. The court
points out that it is not sufficient that the performance of a
covenant may benefit a third person, but it must have been
entered into for his benefit.
The case at bar is decided upon its peculiar facts. We do
not hold that the mere relation of husband and wife alone con-
-gtituted a sufficient consideration to enable the plaintiff to *^*
maintain this action. We deem it unnecessary to decide that
<luestion at this time. What we do hold is, that the equities
of the plaintiff were such that when considered in connection
Jan. 1899.] Buchanan v. Tilden. 465
with the duty of her husband to provide for her future, and
with that purpose in view, the money was procured for the de-
fendant to institute and pursue the necessary litigation to se-
cure the fund to which her equities related, all taken together,
were sufficient to sustain the plaintiff's action.
The order of the appellate division granting a new trial and
the judgment entered thereon should be reversed and the
original judgment in favor of the plaintiff and against the de-
fendant affirmed, with costs in all the courts.
GRAY, .T., dissented. He thought that the order appealed from
should be affirmed, and that any other doctrine than that laid down
by the appellate division would be without support In principle,
or in the cases. "The question is," he said, "whether the plaintiff
had a cause of action upon the contract It seems to me that this
case Is not brought within that class of cases wherein a third
person Is entitled to enforce a promise which has been made by one
person to another, because of the absence of the essential element
thaf some liability or duty must exist frotn the promisee to such
third person in connection therewith. As it was held In Durnherr
T. Ran, 135 N. Y. 219, the rule is that to permit a third party to en-
force such a promise, the promisee must have a legal Interest that
the covenant be performed in favor of the party claiming per-
formance. How was that the case here? Could It be because of
the general obligation on the part of the plaintiff's husband to
support and maintain her? That, of course, is a well-recognized
obligation In the law; but did the contract in question have that
for Its object? I cannot so regard It. It related solely to the pay-
ment of a large sum of money contingently upon the success of
s. certain litigation, of which the defendant was the promoter, and
promised a reward or compensation to the party with whom made
for his aid in furnishing the needed moneys. It is perfectly clear
that this contract was not based upon marital obligations; but
that It was simply a mode, suggested by the husband and adopted
by both parties, for the payment, by the defendant, of the consld-
■eration for his, the plaintiff's husband's, services In the matter. It
<ioes not appear that the plaintiff's cause of action has any other
basis than the mere fact of the marital relation. While that re-
lation Imposes strong legal and moral obligations upon the hus-
band, it Is difficult to see that they Involve a liability on his part
to provide a separate estate for his wife, and yet, if there Is not
that liability, what liability was there toward ihe plaintiff, which
furnished the element required to exist in order that the third per-
son, the plaintiff here, might claim the right to enforce the prom-
ise? It Is not necessary that the wife should be privy to the con-
sideration of the promise; but it is necessary that the promisee,
tier husband, should owe some debt or duty to her, in connection
with the promise, to enable her to sue upon it.
AM. ST. RKP., \ oL. Lxx.— ao
466 Fall Brook Coal Co. v. Hewson. [New York,
"I think that the insuperable legal objection to the plaintiff'*
cause of action is, that the contract in question was not on*
which looked toward the discharge of any obligation owing by him.
to her, and, therefore, is not enforceable upon the doctrine which
underlies the cases where, as in the relation of parent and child,
the promisee owed a duty which the contract was supposed to
meet. I am prepared to admit, as it is argued, that we should
recognize the obligation of the husband to support the wife to be-
as meritorious as the obligation of the parent to support the child,,
and, if this contract could be regarded in that light, I might be
prepared to extend to the present case the principle of the case»
referred to. But, as previously suggested, the relationship betweea
the parties here does not help us out in endeavoring to find sup-
port for the plaintiff's cause of action, for the reason that the con-
tract which is sought to be enforced does not bear upon the hus-
band's obligation and is not connected with it, but simply provide*
for the payment of a sum of money as a compensation for his ser-
vices in the event of success."
CONTRACT FOK BENEFIT OF THIRD PERSON— ACTION.-^
A person for whose benefit an express promise is made in a valid
contract between others may maintain an action thereon in his owo
name, although made without his knowledge and without any
consideration moving from him: Brown v. Markland, 16 Utah, 360,.
67 Am. St. Rep. 629, and note. Compare Jefferson v. Asch, 53
Minn. 446. 39 Am. St. Rep. 618; Hicks v. Hamilton, 144 Mo. 495»
66 Am. St. Rep. 431; and see monographic note to Linnerman v.
Moross, 39 Am. St. Hep. 531-535, on promise for the benefit of a
third person.
Fall Beook Coal Company v. Hewson.
[158 New Yoek, 160.]
WITNESSES— IMPEACHING ONE'S OWN.— A party caiinot
Bhow inconsistent statements made by his own witness for the pur-
pose of impeaching him.
WITNESSES— OFFER OF— WHEN COMPLETE.- A persott
is not made a witness so as to burden the party calling him with
the necessity of supporting his character to the end of the trials
until he is called, sworn, and some material question is asked and
answered.
WITNESSES-OFFER OF— IMPEACHMENT.— If a party
calls a witness, but excuses him after he is sworn, but before any
material question is asked, he is not afterward precluded from Im-
peaching his credibility by contradicting him, where the witness-
gives material testimony for the other side.
APPEAL—EXCEPTION TO PART OF CHARGE.— An ex-
ception to part of a charge cannot be made to apply to any other
portion than that to which it apparently relates.
Action to recover money alleged to be due for cold storage^
service rendered by the plaintiff company to the defendants
Feb. 1899.] Fall Brook Coal Co. v. Hewson. 467
As a counterclaim, the defendant interposed that the services
rendered were worthless because of the plaintiff's neglect, and
that he had been damaged to the amount of two thousand dol-
lars, for which he demanded an affirmative judgment. There
was a judgment below for the defendant, and the company ap-
pealed.
Albert H, Harris, for the appellant.
C. W. Kimball, for the respondent.
i«* PARKER, C. J. The defendant called as a witness one
Wilson, who, after being sworn, testified as follows: "I reside
in Penn Yan. I know the defendant. I did not work for him
in the spring of 1893; I was at the cold storage at that time
about ten minutes in the fore part of April." No other ques-
tions were asked him, nor did he give any further testimony,
and the testimony quoted had no bearing whatever upon the
issues on trial. It is suggested that he was called under a mis-
apprehension, but be that as it may, we shall assume merely
in passiDg on the question growing out of his being called and
Bwom, that before any material question was asked, the party
calling the witness excused him from the witness stand. When
the plaintiil came to present evidence in rebuttal of the testi-
mony adduced on the part of the defendant, it ^^^ called Wil-
son to the stand, and he gave material testimony in favor of the
plaintiff. The defendant, claiming the right to cross-examine
liim, asked him whether he had not, at specified times and
places, made to other persons statements tending to contradict^
the testimony given by him upon the plaintiff's examination.
Wilson denied having made them, and the defendant afterward
called witnesses who testified that Wilson had made the con-
tradictory statements that he specifically denied having made;
to this evidence the plaintiff objected, upon the ground that it
was incompeent, in that the defendant, having first sworn and
examined Wilson as a witness in his own behalf, could not be
allowed to discredit him by giving testimony that he had made
statements out of court differing from his statements as a wit-
ness in court. The exception to the ruling of the court admit-
ting the evidence notwithstanding the objection, presents one
of the opinions which, on this review, it is urged, call for a re-
versal of the judgment. Upon a motion for a new trial, this
question was very carefully considered by Mr. Justice Rumsey,
who reached the conclusion that no error had been committed,
and the general term has affirmed the position thus taken.
468 Fall Brook Coal Co. v. Hewson. [New York,
As the question is a novel one, we shall briefly state the rea-
sons that persuade us that the view taken by the learned court
was the correct one.
The rule is well settled in this state that a party cannot show
inconsistent statements made by his own witness for the pur-
pose, of impeaching him : Coulter v. American etc. Ex. Co., 56
K Y. 585; Nichols v. White, 85 N. Y. 531; Hankinson v.
Vantine, 152 N. Y. 20, 27. This rule, which was originally es-
tablished by authority, came to us from England, where, as in
some of our sister states, it has since been either abrogated or
modified by statute: Stephen on Evidence, Chase's ed., 329,
note; Selover v. Bryant, 54 Minn. 434, 40 Am. St. Rep. 349,
21 L. E. A. 418, note; 2 American Law Review, 261. Green-
leaf on Evidence, volume 1, section 442, states the reason for
the rule as follows: "When a party offers a witness in proof of
his cause he thereby, in general, represents him as worthy of
belief. He is presumed *'*'* to know the character of the wit-
nesses he adduces; and having thus presented them to the
court the law will not permit the party afterward to impeach
their general reputation for truth, or to impugn their credibility
by general evidence tending to show them to be unworthy of be-
lief. For this would enable him to destroy the witness if he
spoke against him, and to make him a good witness if he spoke
for him, with the means in his hand of destroying his credit if
he spoke against him": See, also, Wharton on Evidence, sec.
549. The rule being established beyond change, save by legis-
lative enactment, that one cannot impeach his own witness, the
question presented here is, whether Wilson became the defend-
ant's witness within the meaning of the rule. Would he have
become such had his name been simply called without admin-
istering the oath ? If not, would he have become such through
the additional act of administering the oath ? If the propound-
ing of questions be also necessary, would an inquiry as to his
name and residence have made him the party's witness in such
a sense that he would be bound to support his character from
the beginning to the end of the trial, or would that have hap-
pened only upon some questions being asked him material to
the issues on trial?
It often happens that a witness is intentionally but unad-
visedly called, the counsel for the moment laboring under the
impression that the witness has knowledge of some fact it is
desirable to establish, but before his examination has proceeded
far enough to bring about an inquiry touching any material
Feb. 1899.] Fall Brook Coal Co. v. Hewson. 469
fact to the controversy, counsel is advised by an associate, op
by the party, that the wrong witness has been called, and that
some other person is possessed of the information he desires to
have given to the court. In such a case it would clearly seem
to be a hardship that an error thus committed, which quite
frequently happens, in the press of trial, should burden a party
with the responsibility of having the person called treated as
a witness for that purpose throughout the trial.
So far as the diligence of the counsel and our examination
have disclosed, this precise question has not been before the
**^ court of last resort in any of the states except Connecticut,
where, many years ago, in the case of Bebee v. Tinker, 2 Root,
160, a witness was called and sworn; as to the point regarding
which the plaintiff had called him to testify, the court ruled
that it was not relevant to the issue, and thereupon the defend-
ant took the witness and asked him several questions, the an-
swers made by him being against the plaintiff. Thereupon the
plaintiff offered to introduce witnesses to impeach, which was
objected to on the ground that he was the plaintiff's witness.
The report of the case concludes with: "The court admitted
the witnesses to impeach his character, on the ground that, al-
though the plaintiff introduced him, yet as the defendant only
improved him, in that respect he was to be considered as the
defendant's witness."
In England, where the rule originated, the tendency of the
courts seems to have been not to apply it unless the party has
proceeded so far with the witness as to ask him some question
bearing upon the issues on trial. In Creevy v. Carr, 7 Carr.
& P. 64, a witness was called for the defendant and asked:
"Are you the landlord of the house at which the fire occurred ?'*
The witness answered: "I am, sir." Thereupon the court
asked the defendant's counsel: "What do you propose to prove
more?" and he replied: "My lord, I will close my case here."
The counsel for the plaintiff said: "I wish to cross-examine
the landlord"; and the court said: "Oh, no, I stopped his evi-
dence." Counsel: "He was asked a question and he answered
it, and I have, therefore, a right to cross-examine him." The
court: "Not where the witness, as here, has only been asked
an immaterial question and his evidence is stopped by the
judge."
In "Wood v. Mackinson, 2 Moody & R. 273, a witness was
called for the plaintiff and sworn in the usual way, but before
he had put any questions to the witness, counsel stated that he
470 Fall Brook Coal Co. v. Hewson. [New York,
had been misinstructed as to what the witness was ahle to
prove, and he should not examine him at all. The witness
being about to retire, counsel for the defendant claimed the
right to cross-examine him, but the court said: "Here the ^^^
learned counsel explains that there has been a mistake, which
consisted in this, that the witness is found not to be able to
speak at all as to the transaction which was supposed to be
within his knowledge. This is, I think, such a mistake as en-
titles the party calling the witness to withdraw him without his
being subject to cross-examination."
In Bracegirdle v. Bailey, 1 Fost. & F. 636, the plaintiff was
sworn and tendered as a witness for cross-examination, but was
not examined in chief. The defendant's counsel asked several
questions touching his conduct and life; but the court ruled
that these questions could not be asked, inasmuch as he has
proved nothing "that you could cross-examine him on to dis-
credit him."
In Eush V. Smith, 1 Cromp., M. & R. 94, it was held that
a witness called to produce documents, and sworn by mistake,
and a question put to'him that he does not answer, does not en-
title the opposite party to cross-examine him.
■The general view upon which these cases proceeded is that
a party does not necessarily make a person his witness by
merely calling and swearing him, and we are not able to dis-
cover any good reason for disagreeing with them. On the con-
trary, it seems to us that the rule is not properly applicable,
save in cases where a party attempts to elicit from a witness
called to the stand, testimony material to the issues upon trial ;
that until such an attempt is made, the party has done nothing
that can by any possibility affect the trial either to his own
benefit or to the harm of his opponent, and, therefore, he has
not offered a witness in proof of his cause and is not within
the reason of the rule that burdens him with the necessity of
supporting the character of the witness to the end of the trial.
His mistake, however caused, has not harmed the other party,
and the interests of justice can in nowise be promoted by per-
mitting that other party to take such advantage of the mistake
as will fasten upon his opponent the responsibility of vouching
for the character of a witness actually hostile and from whom
he has not attempted to secure any proof in the cause.
150 rpj^g learned counsel for the appellant urges that his ex-
ception taken to that portion of the charge in which the court
stated "that the plaintiff was not entitled to recover if the
Feb. 1899.] Fall Brook Coal Co. v. Hewson, 471
plant was not properly run," calls for a reversal of the judg-
ment. The defendant admitted the making of the contract
upon which the plaintiff sued, but alleged that the contract
had not been properly performed by the plaintiff and sought
to recover his damages. In the charge to the jury the oourt
did say that the plaintiff could not recover for the services
unless it convinced the jury by a fair preponderance of evidence
that it did keep the apples in proper cold storage, et cetera.
But as we read the exception it was not intended to have, nor
is it likely it had, the effect of calling the attention of the court
to the fact that the counsel for the plaintiff claimed that there
was error in the charge as to the burden of proof. The lan-
guage of the exception apparently related solely to another
portion of the charge, in which the court said that if the jury
should find "that the rotting was the result of the plant hav-
ing been improperly run, it follows that the plaintiff has not
performed its contract; it also follows that whatever damage
has been thus caused to the defendant, he should be compen-
sated for in this action." This portion of the charge was not
■error, and the exception to which our attention is called pointed
to this and to no other part of the charge.
The judgment should be affirmed with costs.
All concur.
WITNESS— IMPEACHMENT BY PARTY CALLING.— A wltneM
<;annot be impeached by the party calling him, but such party may
prove the truth by other witnesses, even though they contradict the
vfitness first called: Blackwell v. Wright, 27 Neb. 2G9, 20 Am. St.
Rep. 062: notes to Phoenix Assur. Co. v. McAuthor, 67 Am. St. Rep.
156; Selover v. Bryant, 40 Am. St. Rep. 353.
WITNESSES — IMPEACHMENT — MATERIALITY OF TESTI-
MONY.—After a witness is sworn and testifies, the adverse party
is entitled to impeach his general reputation for truth, without ref-
erence to the materiality of his testimony: Davis v. Commonwealth,
95 Ky. 19, 44 Am. St Rep. 201.
EXCEPTIONS ON APPEAL must be specific, pointed, and ex-
plicit; and, if indefinite, cannot be considered: Atkins t. Field, 8ft
Me. 2S1, 56 Am. St. Rep. 424.
472 Weston v. Sybacusb, [New^York,
Weston v. Syracuse.
[158 New York. 274.]
MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS — SEWER CONTRACT —
POWER OF CITY COUNCIL TO WAIVE COMPLIANCE WITH.
If the charter of a city does not make all details in the construc-
tion of sewei-8 the basis of the consent of property owners, but
leaves such details to the common council, that body has power to
waive the performance of any of the requirements of a sewer con-
tract. Hence, after part of the work under a sewer contract has
been done, but not in conformity with the contract, the common,
council may, before the completion of the work, so modify the con-
tract as to make it conform with the work already done, leaving-
the remaining portion of the work to be constructed according tO'
the terms of the original contract, without modification.
MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS — SEWER CONTRACT —
CERTIFICATE OF CITY ENGINEER— SUFFICIENCY OF.-If
part of the work under a sewer contract has been done, but not in
conformity with the specifications, and the city council passes a
resolution modifying the contract so as to make it conform to the
work already done, a requirement in the contract that the con-
tractor shall obtain the city engineer's certificate of compliance
with the contract as a prerequisite to payment, is satisfied by a
certificate that the work done before the resolution complies with
the contract as modified, while the remainder complies with it, as
unmodified.
PAYMENT— EFFECT OF PRESCRIBING WAY OF.— If a
way of payment is prescribed by statute, or by contract, that way
must be strictly pursued.
MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS — SEWER CONTRACT
WITH— REMEDIES TO ENFORCE PAYMENT.— If a city con-
tracts for the construction of a sewer, or other local improvement,,
and the only way provided for payment is through a special as-
sessment, it is the duty of the city to collect the assessment and
turn over the proceeds to the contractor; and, if It does not pro-
ceed with reasonable diligence to do so, he may and should pro-
ceed by mandamus to compel such action on its part; but, if the
city disables itself from performing the contract by some act which
renders the assessment void and uncollectible, or if it refuses to
perform the contract, then the contractor's remedy against the city
Is by action for breach of the contract.
MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS — SEWER CONTRACT —
CONTRACTOR'S RIGHT OF ACTION FOR BREACH OF.— If a
city contracts for the construction of a sewer, or other local im-
provement, provision being made in the contract that no payment
shall be made until the cost has been collected by a special assess-
ment, and the work Is done according to the contract as originally
executed, or as lawfully modified, the contractor Is entitled to main-
tain an action against the cily for breach of contract where the
latter Ignores the plaintiff's rights In the premises, not only by re-
fusing to make the assessment, but by repudiating the contract^
and entering into an agreement with others for reconstructing a
portion of the sewer.
MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS — SEWER CONTRACT —
WHAT ACT IS ADMINISTRATIVE AND NOT LEGISLATIVE-
POWER OP COURTS.— If a contract for the construction of a
fiewer is modified by a city council, by resolution, the action takea
Feb. 1899.] Weston v. Syracuse. 473
by sucB resolution Is not a legislative act, but an administrative
one, and is not free from direct review or collateral attacl^ in tli»
courts.
MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS — SEWER CONTRACT —
RESOLUTION MODIFYING IS VITIATED BY FRAUD AND
CORRUPTION— INVALIDITY OF, AS A DEFENSE.— A resolutloa
passed by a city council, modifying a contract for the construc-
tion of a sewer can, if adopted by means of fraud and corruption,
be declared of no effect by tlie courts; and the invalidity of the-
resolution is a good defense, on the part of the city, to an action
brought by the contractor, especially if he was a guilty participant
in the fraud.
MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS — DEFENSE TO CON-
TRACTOR'S SUIT— WHAT MAY BE INTERPOSED.— That which
a taxpayer can accomplish for the protection of a city, by a suit
under the "taxpayer's act," the officers of the city, whose duty it
is to protect its property from waste and Injury, may bring about
by a defense to an action brought by a contractor to recover on a
contract for the construction of a sewer, or other local inprovement.
ESTOPPEL AGAINST CITY— SEWER CONTRACT— BRIB-
ERY—KNOWLEDGE OF OFFICERS.— A city is not estopped by
the conduct of its officers from denying the validity of a resolu-
tion passed by the city council, modifying a contract for the con-
struction of a sewer, alleged to have been brought about by bribery^
where it does not appear that the officers of the city knew of the
alleged bribery at the time of the several acts which the plaintiff
relies upon to create an estoppel.
Action brought by John "Weston, the survivor of his dcceasecl
partner, Charles Utting, to recover a balance alleged to be due
upon a contract entered into between the firm of Weston &
Utting and the city of Syracuse for the construction of the
Kennedy street sewer. Shortly after the contract was entered
into, about fourteen hundred and fifty-three feet of the sewer
were constructed, and a change in the city government took
place, which resulted in a change of city engineers, and the
new engineer, after some investigation, reported to the common
council that the sewer was not being constructed in accordance
with the contract. The council suspended the work, and, after
investigation, passed, on July 29, 1890, a resolution amending
the contract for the work so as to make it conform to the work
already done, but leaving the remaining portion of the sewer te
be constructed in accordance with the terms of the contract as
it originally stood. The nature of the certificate required of
the engineer appears in the opinion. The other part of the
sewer, it was conceded on all sides, was completed in accordance
with the terms of the contract, but the city failed to levy and
collect an assessment to pay for the work, and it was resolved
by the city council on December 12, 1892, that the contractors,
having failed, upon notice, "to take the necessary steps within
three days to put their work in a condition to fulfill the term»
474 Weston v. Syeacusb. [New York,
of their contract/' had abandoned the contract. The city au-
thorities not only refused to accept the contract as completed,
but formally declared it not completed. The court decided
that, as to the variations in the construction of the sewer re-
ferred to in the resolution of July 29, the common council had
waived strict performance and modified the contract to that ex-
tent, and that they had also waived such defects as had come
to the knowlege of the common council before passing this reso-
lution, although the defects were not mentioned therein, and
he submitted to the jury the question whether in all other re-
spects there was a substantial performance of the contract by
the contractors, and the verdict in favor of the plaintiff con-
stituted an affirmative answer to that question. The judgment
thereon was affirmed at the general term, and the city appealed.
Charles E. Ide, for the appellant.
■George H. Sears, for the respondent.
281 PARKER, C. J. On this review it must be taken as
established by the verdict of the jury that the plaintiffs sub-
stantially performed their contract with the defendant, ex-
cept as to the construction of the first fourteen hundred and
fifty-three feet of the sewer, the work upon which was done
prior to the investigation by the common council. That in-
vestigation resulted in a resolution waiving performance so far
as the work done was not in conformity with the plans and
specifications, and modifying the contract to the extent that it
should be in conformity with the work already done. The
trial court decided that the resolution of July 29, 1890, ef-
fected that result. The appellant concedes that such was the
purpose of the common council, but nevertheless insists that it
was beyond the power of that body to waive performance of any
of the requirements of the contract or specifications, and that in
holding otherwise error was committed.
2®^ The result of our examination of the charter of the city
of Syracuse lead« us to the conclusion that it does not place any
limitations upon the powers of the common council in respect
to such acts as the common council undertook to perform by
means of the resolution in question. Aside from certain limi-
tations that we need not specify, all details are left to the com-
mon council, and not made the basis of the consent of the prop-
erty owners. The modification attempted, therefore, was within
the power of the common council under the ruling of this court
Feb. 1899.] Weston v. Syracuse. 476
in Meech v. Buffalo, 29 N. Y. 198; Moore v. Albany, 98 K Y.
396; and Voght v. Buffalo, 133 N. Y. 463.
The appellant next contends that the failure to obtain the
certificate of the engineer entitled the defendant to a dismissal
of the complaint. \Ve think the certificate obtained was in com-
pliance with the contract as modified by the resolution of July
^9, 1890. The engineer could not certify that the work was
performed in accordance with the original contract and specifi-
cations, because such was not the fact, but he did certify in
effect that the work done after the twenty-ninth day of July,
1890, was in accordance with the contract and specifications,
while the work done prior to that date was in conformity with
the resolution adopted by the common council, by which an at-
tempt was made to modify the contract. It was, in effect, there-
fore, a certificate that the work had been performed in accord-
ance with the original contract as modified by the resolution of
July 29, 1890, and was sufficient.
The appellant also insists that the action was prematurely
brought, because no part of the contract price has been assessed
or collected. The contract provides: "No payment shall be
made to the party of the first part under this contract, until
the cost of such work shall have been ascertained and assessed
upon and collected from the taxpayers liable to local taxation
for the same .... and as soon thereafter as the costs of said
work shall have been collected from said taxpayers, the party
of the first part shall be entitled to receive the amount due
on said final account." This clause *®^ in the contract is
not an unusual one, nor is it, or at least an equivalent provision,
a stranger to the courts. As long ago as the action of Hunt v.
TJtica, 18 N. Y. 442, the court had under consideration a con-
tract of this character. After its completion, and on the six-
teenth day of November, the claim for compensation was al-
lowed by the common council, "payable when collected by as-
sessment.'* On the 7th of December following, the common
council made the necessary assessment, and directed that meas-
ures be taken for the collection thereof. On January 26th the
cissignee of the contractor commenced an action to recover the
contract price. At that time no part of the assessment had
been paid, but five days later the treasurer issued a warrant for
its collection, which was in the hands of the collector at the
time of the commencement of the action. It was held that the
plaintiff could not recover. The decision of the court in that
case has not been questioned in any subsequent case, and the de-
476 Weston v. Syracuse. [NewYork^
cision of many succeeding cases has been governed by the prin-
ciple enunciated in that case, viz., that where a way of payment
is prescribed by statute or by contract that way must be strictly
pursued: People v. Mayor etc., 144 N. Y. 63; Swift v. Mayor
etc., 83 N. Y. 528, 533; Howell v. Buffalo, 15 N. Y. 513, 519 i
Baldwin v. Oswego, 1 Abb. App. Dec. 62, 68; Beard v. Brooklyn,
31 Barb. 142, 149; Dannat v. Mayor etc., 66 N. Y. 585.
Such a provision as to work of this character is usual and
reasonable, for, as the municipal ^ authorities have no right to
make such improvements at the expense of the taxpayers gen-
erally, it follows: 1. That no money is raised by general tax-
ation that is available for the payment of such expenses; and
2. That it is necessary to make the avails of the special assess-
ment meet the obligations of the city under the contract. All
this is known to the contractor when he makes his bid and enters
into the contract, and presumably he has provided suitable com-
pensation to himself for the loss of the use of the sums due
under his contract until a reasonable time shall have ^***
elapsed in which to levy the assessment and make collection. If
he finds, as in the case of People v. Mayor etc., 144 N. Y. 63,
that the city has not proceeded with reasonable diligence to
collect the assessment and turn over the proceeds to him, he
may and should proceed by mandamus to compel such action
on its part. But where a municipality disables itself from per-
forming the contract by such action on its part as makes void
and, therefore, uncollectible, an assessment for the purpose of
providing compensation, or refuses to perform the contract on
its part, as in Reilly v. Albany, 112 N. Y. 30, then an action
against the city for the damages sustained by reason of its fail-
ure to perform the contract on its part may be maintained.
It has been suggested that the two cases last referred to are in
conflict, but they are not. The Eeady case points out that prior
to the breach of the contract by the municipality the contract-
or's remedy is to apply for a mandamus to hasten municipal
action in the absence of due diligence; while the Eeilly case,
with equal clearness, marks out the path to be pursued by the
contractor, where the other party, to wit, the municipality,
either designedly or accidentally puts itself in a position where
it will not or cannot perform the contract on its part. In such
a case, the remedy is against the city for breach of the contract.
As we must regard the facts as found by the verdict of the
jury, this case comes under the rule in Eeilly's case, for the
plaintiffs have fully performed the contract as modified by the
Feb. 1899.] Weston v. Syracuse. 477
resolution of July 29, 1890, and are entitled to compensation
therefor. But the defendant, instead of recognizing the plain-
tiffs' rights in the premises and proceeding with reasonable
diligence to levy the assessment, collect and turn it over to the
plaintiffs, has declared, by resolution, that the contractors have
not only not performed, but have abandoned the contract, has
let to other contractors the rebuilding of a portion of the sewer
constructed by these plaintiffs, and has refused to take any steps
looking to the making of an assessment upon the property
benefited for the purpose of raising the ^®* money with which
to pay the plaintiffs, as provided by the contract. The plain-
tiffs' right, therefore, to pursue the defendant for a breach of
the contract is established.
( We are thus brought to the last, "but not the least, of the
interesting questions presented by the appellant, which is that
the court ought to have permitted the defendant to prove that
the passage of the resolution of July 29, 1890, was corruptly
procured. The importance of this question in this particular
case is readily apparent. It is not pretended that the contract
was substantially performed as to the construction of the first
fourteen hundred and fifty-three feet of the sewer. The certi-
ficate of the engineer, which the contract says must be given in
order to entitle the plaintiffs to the compensation provided for by
the contract, does not assert that as to the portion of the sewer
above referred to the contract was performed. On the contrary,
the certificate is to the effect that performance in that respect
is in accordance with the contract as modified by the resolution
of July 29, 1890. If that resolution be void and of no effect,
then the plaintiffs have not established their right to recover in
this action, for they have not only failed to prove the making of
the necessary certificate by the engineer, but they have failed
to prove substantial performance on their part.
The question is also an important one in its public aspects,
for, so far as we have observed, it has seldom been brought to
the attention of the courts. The counsel for the respondent
insists that the question was not before the court in such a
manner as required it to pass upon the point involved. Let us
inquire of the record whether he is right or not. The answer
alleges, among other things, "that the said resolution, purport-
ing to modify said contract, passed by the common council on
the twenty-ninth day of July, 1890, as set forth in said com-
plaint, was passed collusively, corruptly, and fraudulently, and
is the result of a corrupt bargain, in and by which it was agreed
478 Weston v. Syracuse. [New York^
that a large stun of money should he paid hy said contractors
for a vote in favor of said resolution, which said money was paid,
and that said resolution by reason thereof is null and void and
of no effect as a modification of said contract."
***** During the progress of the trial the counsel for the cor-
poration asked several questions which brought to the atten-
tion of the court and the counsel for the plaintiffs the defense
relied upon by the city, and which we have in part quoted.
The court was inclined to the view that the resolution was
a legislative act and could not be thus attacked, whereupon
the defendant's counsel, for the purpose of raising the question
in the briefest form, said: "I desire to show that Mr. Weston
(plaintiff) procured a vote of one member of the common
council by corrupt means ; that a sum of money was paid by the
plaintiff and accepted by a member of the common council in
consideration of his vote for the adoption of that resolution, and
that the vote of such member was obtained and cast by him in
consideration of the payment of such sum of money." This
offer was denied and the evidence excluded by the court, the
defendant excepting. It is not, of course, claimed that if the
resolution was in fact procured to be passed by bribery, it would
nevertheless constitute a valid and effective modification of the
contract. That it would be void as against public policy is toe
clear to admit of discussion; but tbe contention rather is that
the courts are without power to inquire into the matter. The
reason assigned is that the act of the common council in passing
this resolution was legislative in character, and hence the
motives that induced the members to vote for its passage,
whether honest or corrupt, are not the subject of judicial inves-
tigation. It is true that the legislative department of the state
government is sovereign, and hence the motives that induce its
action cannot be the subject of judicial investigation. The
constitution also empowers the legislature by general laws to
confer upon boards of supervisors of the counties of the state
such powers of local legislation and administration as the legis-
lature may, from time to time, deem expedient: Const., art. 3,
sec. 27. It has been held that the action of a board of super-
visors, in undertaking to establish a fire district in a town under
section 37 of the county law, is legislative in character, and
therefore not subject to review by certiorari, because the affi-
davits verifying ***'' the petition did not state that the petition
complied with the requirements of the statute: People v. Super-
Tisors, 153 N. Y. 370.
Feb. 1899.] Weston v. Syracuse. 479
In People v. Mclntyre, 154 N. Y. 628, it was held that withia
the limits of the power delegated to supervisors by the legisla-
ture under the authority conferred upon it by the section referred
to, each board of supervisors is clothed with the sovereignty of
the state to legislate as to all details, precisely the same as the^
legislature might have done in the premises. While that is so,
there are many duties devolved upon boards of supervisors by
the legislature which are not legislative in character, but are
administrative, and in some instances quasi judicial in nature
and not at all impressed with the character of sovereignty.
Among other duties they are required to audit and allow claima^
against the county. If they arbitrarily refuse to audit a claim,
the court may, by mandamus, require them to take action
thereon: People v. Supervisors of Delaware Co., 45 N. Y. 196,
199, So, where the board of supervisors audit and allow to a.
public officer a sum in excess of that legally due him, the court
will, by mandamus, and upon the application of a taxpayer, re-
quire the board to reconsider, revoke, and annul the audit as to^
such excess: People v. Supervisors, 73 N. Y. 173.
While the acts of boards of supervisors, or boards of town
auditors, in auditing the accounts within their jurisdiction, are,,
in the absence of fraud and collusion, final and conclusive and
not the subject of attack in a collateral proceeding, they may,,
nevertheless, be attacked in such a proceeding in an action
brought by a taxpayer under chapter 161 of the Laws of 1872 :;
Osterhoudt v. Eigney, 98 N. Y. 222.
Many cases might be cited where boards of supervisors have-
been compelled to act by mandamus, where they have failed to-
perform the duties which the law enjoined upon them, as well
as cases where their action, involving legal errors as distin-
guished from discretionary matters, have been reviewed by cer-
tiorari, and also where the audit has been attacked in a collateral
action brought under the taxpayers' *®® statute, so called..
But it would serve no good purpose, as the cases already cited
are sufficient to call attention to the fact that there are many
administrative duties of boards of supervisors that are not im-
pressed with the character of sovereignty. So, too, the legis-
lature may confer upon common councils of cities authority to
pass municipal ordinances. Such as are passed in pursuance of
such authority have the force of law, and are as obligatory as if
enacted by the legislature itself : Buffalo v. New York etc. E. E.
Co., 152 N. Y. 276. But, like boards of supervisors, a common
council has many administrative duties that are not legislative
480 Weston v. Syracuse. [New York,
in character, performance of wliicli, at times, has to be compelled
by the courts. Not infrequently, in the case of special assess-
ments for local improvements, such as the case at bar, actions
-are successfully prosecuted by taxpayers to set aside assessments
against property on the ground that the assessments are illegal
-and void. In Miller v. Amsterdam, 149 N. Y. 288, in pursu-
•ance of legislative authority, the common council undertook to,
«,nd did, pave a certain street, and to defray the expense thereof
made an assessment against the property specially benefited,
hut the statute under which the common council attempted to
act provided that the street could be paved only upon a petition
therefor of the owners of a majority of the lineal feet fronting
■on the street. The petition presented, and upon which the com-
mon council acted, turned out not to have the requisite number
•of consents. This court held that the action of the common
^council was without jurisdiction, and affirmed the judgment
netting aside the assessment against the property of the plain-
tiff, upon the ground that it was void.
If the common council in Miller's case, in the institution of
proceedings to pave the street, had been acting in a legislative
capacity, and was sovereign in that which it did, then, neces-
sarily, it would not have been open for inquiry by the courts
whether it had acquired jurisdiction to legislate at all by the
petition of the requisite number of lotowners. But it was not
sovereign. It had no authority to act at all in the absence of
a petition signed by the owners of a majority of the ^^* lineal
■feet fronting on the street, and therefore its proceedings were
not in accordance with the directions of the charter; and, in
attempting to act as it did, its proceedings were the subject of
-direct review by certiorari or to attack in a collateral action such
as was made. If the action taken by a common council under
the statute to pave a street be not sovereign and free from direct
review or collateral attack in the courts, no more is the action of
•a common council, under a similar statute, to build a sewer; and
it is yet more absurd to claim that the resolution by which the
<;ommon council undertook to effect a compromise and settle-
ment with a contractor to whom something was equitably due,
"though, perhaps, nothing legally, because of his failure to per-
•form the contract in all respects, constituted a legislative act.
Having established by authority, to which very many cita-
tions in point in this state might be added, that the resolution
in question constituted a part of the administrative duties of
the common council, we come next to the question whether
Feb. 1899.] Wbston v. Syracuse. ^Sl
such a resolution, if passed by means of fraud and corruption,
can be declared of no effect by the courts. This question is
answered in the affirmative by Talcott v. Buffalo, 125 N. Y. 280.
That was an action by a taxpayer to prevent waste of or injury
to the property of the municipality, the claim being that the
common council of the city of Buffalo had passed the resolution
over the mayor's veto, providing for the substitution of electric
lights for gas, and that in pursuance of it the proper officers
had entered into a contract with the electric light company, by
which it had been agreed to pay an exorbitant price, and it was
charged that the acts of the common council and its officers in'
the matter were illegal. The court held that, inasmuch as the
action taken by the common council was clearly within its power
and discretion, such an action could not be maintained without
any charge or allegation of fraud, collusion, corruption, or bad
faith. "While upon this proposition there was a dissent, all were
agreed that, under the taxpayers' act, so called, the complaint
would not have been demurrable had it alleged that the acts
complained **® of were without power, or that they were the
result of corruption, fraud, or bad faith amounting to fraud.
That action, it is true, was brought under and by virtue of the
provision of the statute giving to taxpayers the right by action
in a proper case to interfere with the conduct of municipal
officers. The title of the act first passed (Laws 1872, c. 161)
was, "An act for the protection of taxpayers against the frauds,
embezzlements, and wrongful acts of public officers and agents.'*
It has since been amended and supplemented by various enact-
ments, which need not now be referred to. This statute did not
take away any right of action that the municipality had; and
to avoid any possible opportunity for such a suggestion, the
last sentence of the statute provided that it should not be so
construed as to take away any right of action from any county,
town, or municipal corporation. The history attending the
passage of this act, and of chapter 49 of the Laws of 1875, is a
matter of common knowledge, and was well stated by Judge
Andrews in People v. New York etc. Ry. Co., 84 N". Y. 565, 569,
«8 follows: It "was passed in view of the fact that the city of
New York had been grossly defrauded by the acts of municipal
officers and others acting in collusion with them, and that large
sums had been taken from the municipal treasury in the perpe-
tration of the frauds committed. These sums the city or
<^ounty, one or both of them, might sue for and recover, but re-
AM. St. Rkp., Vol. LXX.— 81
482 Weston v. Syracuse. [New York,
Bort to this remedy was embarrassed by the fact that the city
and county governments were to a considerable extent under the
control of the guilty participants in the fraud."
The effect of the legislation is to enable a taxpayer of the
municipality, threatened with injury from its ofificers, and In
certain cases the state, to accomplish by action not more than
the proper municipal authorities can at all times accomplish,,
but such results as the municipal authorities can and should,,
but because of carelessness or willful purpose will not.
If it be the fact that the passage of this resolution wa»
brought about by bribery of the members of the common
council, a taxpayer, under the authority of Talcott's case ^'^^
could have maintained a suit against the city to enjoin it from
paying to the contractors the amount claimed by them to be
due under their contracts, for the reason that the statute confers
upon him the authority to thus interfere for the protection of
the municipal corporation, and that which he can accomplish by
such a suit, the officers of the municipal corporation, whose
duty it is to protect the corporate property from waste and in-
jury, may bring about by a defense to an action brought by th^>
contractor. It is urged by the respondent that the defendant is
estopped by the conduct of its officers subsequent to the discov-
ery i)y the common council of the alleged acts of bribery. ' But
the difficulty with this contention is that it does not appear that
the officers of the defendant knew of the alleged bribery at the
time of the several acts which the plaintiffs rely upon to create
an estoppel. It does appear that before the commission of some
of the acts the common council caused an investigation of the
charge of corruption to be made, but it is not shown that one
of the outcomes of the investigation was the disclosure of the
alleged acts of bribery that the defendant upon the trial offered
to prove, and therefore it cannot be said that the action taken
by the common council was with full knowledge of the situation.
The judgment should be reversed and a new trial granted^
with costs to abide the event.
All concur, except Bartlett, J., dissenting, and Martin and
Vann, JJ., not sitting.
MTTNICIPAL CORPORATIONS — REVOCATION OF CON-
TRACT—FRAUD— BRIBERY.— A municipal corporation has a right
to revoke a contract Into which It has entered, where It act3> upott
cause, In good faith, and without any fraud or collusion: Note to
Schenley v. Commonwealth, 78 Am. Dec. 371; but fraud vitiates all
Feb. 1899.] Perkins v. Heest. 483
transactions Into which It enters: Fleming v. Townsend, 6 Ga. 103,
50 Am. Dec. 318; and a contract growing out of an illegal act will .
not be enforced. Hence, a contract procured by the bribery of an
officer will not be enforced against a contractor nor against a muni-
cipal corporation represented by him: Honaker v. Board of Edu-
cation, 42 W. Va. 170, 67 Am. St. Rep. 847.
MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS— MANDAMUS.— The duty of a
city to provide for the payment of a debt becomes perfect, when
the creditor obtains a Judgment, and then. If the Judgment can be
paid In no other way, it must be done by levy and collection of a
tax for that purpose, and this duty will be enforced by mandamus:
See extended note to Coy v. City Council, 85 Am. Dec. 544, dis-
cussing the subject.
MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS— POWER OF COURTS OVER
PROCEEDINGS OF.— A subordinate municipal body, although
clothed to some extent with legislative and even political poweis,
is nevertheless, in the exercise of all Its powers, just as subject to
the authority and control of courts of Justice as any other body or
person, natural or artificial: Spring Valley Water Works v. San
Francisco, 82 Cal. 286, 16 Am. St. Rep. 116.
ESTOPPEI^MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS.— The doctrTne of
estoppel has been extended to municipal corporations: Hutchinson
etc. R. R. Co. V. Board of Commrs., 48 Kan. 70, 30 Am. St. Rep.
273; but to create an estoppel, in any case, the facts which give rise
to it must be such as to make it unjust and Inequitable to allow
the party estopped to assert what would otherwise be his right, or
to make proof of matters tending to establish such right: Gillett
V. WUey, 126 lU. 310, 9 Am. St. Rep. 687.
Perkins v. Heeet.
[168 New Yobk, 306.]
STATUTES-GENERAL LAW— ILLUSTRATION— WORK-
MEN'S UNION LABEL ACT.— An "act for the better protection
of skilled labor, and for the registration of labels, marks, names,
brands, or devices covering the products of such labor of associa-
tions or unions of workingmen or women," where there is nothlngf
in it limiting its provisions to any particular locality of the state,
or to any designated association or union of workingmen or
women. Is not a local or private law, but a general one, and does
not, therefore, contravene a constitutional provision that the legis-
lature shall not pass a private or local bill granting any exclusive
privilege or franchise.
STATUTES— ACT HAVING BUT ONE SUBJECT EX-
PRESSED IN ITS TITLE— ILLUSTRATION.— One subject only is
mentioned in the title of an act entitled, "An act for the better
protection of skilled labor, and for the registration of labels, marks,
names, brands, or devices covering the products of such labor of
associations or unions of workingmen or women," and that is the
better protection of skilled labor by the registration of labels, et
cetera, covering the products of such labor.
STATUTES NOT CONTRARY TO PUBLIC POLICY—
WORKMEN'S UNION LABEL ACT— CONSTITUTIONALITY.—
484 Perkins v. Heert. [New York,
An "act for the better protection of skilled labor, and for the regis-
tration of labels, marks, names, brands, or devices covering the pro-
ducts of such labor of associations or unions of vporkingmen or
women" is not unconstitutional and void, for the reason that it is
contrary to public policy, in that it unjustly discriminates m favor
of the labor of members of associations or unions as against that of
nonunion workmen.
STATUTES— GRANT OF EXCLUSIVE PRIVILEGE UINl/ER
GENERAL LAW.— An exclusive privilege or franchise is author-
ized, if obtained under general laws, where the state constitution
authorizes the legislature to pass general laws, under which such
a privilege or franchise may be granted.
STATUTES- GRANT OP EXCLUSIVE PRIVILEGE —
STATE POLICY.— If a state constilution authorizes a grant, through
legislative action, of an exclusive privilege, it must be deemed to
be in accord with the policy of the state.
Action brought by the plaintiff, Perkins, against Heert and
Ehlen, for an injunction, which was awarded, with damages and
costs, and the defendants appealed.
John A. Straley and Morris S. Wise, for the appellants.
Antonio Knauth and Tracy C. Becker, for the respondents.
308 HAIGHT, J. This action was brought by the plaintiff,
as president of the Cigar Makers' International Union of Amer-
ica, under the provisions of chapter 385 of the Laws of 1889, for
an injunction to restrain the defendants from using an alleged
imitation of the union's label, a copy of which had been filed in
the office of the secretary of state under the provisions of that
law, and also for an accounting for profits.
The Ciger Makers' International Union of America is a vol-
untary unincorporated association, consisting of a large number
of persons who are practical cigar makers residing in the
United States, with its principal office located at Buffalo. The
purpose of their organization is the promoting of the mental,
moral, and physical welfare of its members by assisting them to
obtain labor at remunerative wages and by affording them pecu-
niary aid in case of sickness, and generally to maintain a high
standard of workmanship. They adopted a label upon blue
paper with an ornamental border, containing the following:
8«» "Sept., 1880.
"Issued by authority of the Cigar Makers' International Union
of America. Union Made Cigars, This certifies that the cigars
contained in this box have been made by a first class workman,
a member of the Cigar Makers' International Union of America,
an organization opposed to inferior ratshop, coolie, prison, or
filthy tenement-house workmanship. Therefore, we recom-
Feb. 1899.] Perkins v. Heert. 485
mend these Cigars to all smokers throughout the world. All
infringements upon this label will be punished according to law.
"G. W. PERKINS,
'Tresident C. M. I. U. of America."
On one end was a copy of the seal of the union, and on the
other end a place was reserved for a local stamp. After the
passage of the act in question, they caused a copy of this label
to be filed in the office of the secretary of state.
The defendants are cigar manufacturers in the city of New
York, and are not members of the union. They caused to be
printed counterfeits of the blue label adopted by the union,
and pasted it upon boxes containing the cigars manufactured
by them, and then, through their agents, sold their cigars to
the public with the intent, as has been found, to defraud the
union and the purchasers and to impose upon the public.
The case was tried before the court without a jury, and a
decision was rendered in favor of the plaintiff, awarding a
perpetual injunction against the defendants and for damages
and costs.
It is claimed on behalf of the appellants that the label had
been abandoned by the union; that it contained matter libelous
and defamatory, which a court of equity would not protect, and
that the statute in question had been repealed. These questions
were fully considered by the learned appellate division, and we
fully concur with the views of that court, as expressed in the
prevailing opinion, with reference thereto. The only questions
which we deem it necessary to here consider are those raised
with reference to the constitutionality of the act.
»io The statute is as follows: "Sec. 1. Every union or asso-
ciation of workingraen or women, adopting a label, mark, name,
brand, or device, intended to designate the products of the labor
of members of such union or association of workingmen or
women, shall, in order to obtain the benefits of this act, file
duplicate copies of such label, mark, name, brand, or device in
the office of the secretary of state, who shall, under his hand and
seal, deliver to the party filing or registering the same a certified
copy and a certificate of the filing thereof, for which he shall
receive a fee of one dollar. Sec. 2. Every union or association
of workingmen or women adopting such label, mark, name,
brand, or device, and filing the same, as specified in the first
section of this act, may proceed, by suit in any of the courts of
record of the state, to enjoin the manufacture, use, display, or
48S Perkins v. Heebt. [New York,
sale of counterfeits or colorable . imitations of such label,"
et cetera.
It is claimed that the act in question is void, for the reason
that it grants an exclusive privilege to a private association in
contravention of the provisions of the constitution: Const., art.
3, sec. 18. That section of the constitution, so far as material,
provides as follows: "The legislature shall not pass a private or
local bill in any of the following cases, .... granting to any
private corporation, association, or individual any exclusive privi-
lege, or franchise whatever The legislature shall pass
general laws providing for the cases enumerated in this section,
and for all other cases which in its judgment may be provided
for by general laws."
It will be observed that the prohibition contained in this pro-
vision of the constitution has reference to private or local bills,
and that it requires the legislature to pass general laws provid-
ing for the cases in which private and local bills are prohibited.
The question, therefore, arises as to whether the act in question
is a general law or a private and local bill. It is entitled, "An
act for the better protection of skilled labor, and for the regis-
tration of labels, marks, names, brands, or devices covering the
products of such labor of associations or unions of workingmen
or women." There is nothing in the ^^* title or the provisions
of the act that in any manner limits its provisions to any par-
ticular locality of the state or to any designated association or
union of workingmen or women. Instead, the provisions are all
general, including every locality in the entire state, and em-
bracing every association or union of workingmen or women
existing or that may be thereafter organized. It is in no sense
local or private, but is in every sense a general law.
Again, it is claimed that the act is within the condemnation
of section 16, article 3, of the constitution, which provides that
"no private or local bills, which may be passed by the legislature,
shall embrace more than one subject, and that shall be expressed
in the title." We have already shown that the act is a general
law, and not a private nor local bill. It, consequently, is not
brought in conflict with this provision. Furthermore, we think
but one subject is mentioned in the title, and that is the better
protection of skilled labor by the registration of labels, et cetera,
covering the products of such labor.
Finally, it is insisted that the act is unconstitutional and
Toid, for the reason that it is contrary to public policy, in that
Feb. 1899.] Perkins v. Heert. 487
it unjustly discriminates in favor of the labor of members of
associations or unions as against that of nonunion workmen.
The questions arising under this contention are more serious
-and require deliberate consideration. While private and local
hills, granting to a private corporation, association, or individual
any exclusive privilege, immunity, or franchise whatever is pro-
hibited, the constitution authorizes the legislature to pass general
laws under which grants may be made to corporations, associa-
tions, or individuals of an exclusive privilege, immunity, or
franchise. An exclusive privilege or franchise is, therefore,
authorized if obtained under general laws. Among the exclu-
€ive privileges and franchises which have been made the subject
of grants to private corporations, and with which we are all
familiar, are those made by municipal governments under the
authority of general laws of the right to occupy streets or high-
ways for the construction and operation of street railroads. ^*^
In all of these grants there is, of necessity, discrimination.
Some particular corporation is singled out, to which the grant
is given, and which, thereafter, enjoys the exclusive privilege of
operating its railroad through the streets or highways specified
in the grant ; but the grant being authorized, the discrimination
is not unlawful. It is not contrary to public policy, for the
reason that the constitution is the foundation upon which thq
public policy of the state is based. It embodies the policy of oup
government. It authorizes that which is politic and prohibits
that which is deemed impolitic. "Where, therefore, the consti-
tution grants or authorizes a grant through legislative action of
an exclusive privilege, it must be deemed to be in accord with
the policy of the state. As we have seen, the label authorized
was by a general and not a local act. No particular association
or union has been given the exclusive privilege of adopting a
label, but every association or union of every kind of working-
men or women is given the right to adopt its own label, which
may indicate its own workmanship. It consequently follows-
that whatever discrimination there may be is authorized, and
therefore not unjust, and that the privilege granted under the
general law is in accord with public policy.
"We are aware that the courts of sister states have had trouble
with similar legislation in their states; that very much has been
written upon the subject, and that the conclusions reached by
the courts in the different states have widely differed. "V\^e have
not thought it profitable to enter upon an elaborate discussion
of these cases. The questions here presented arise under oxa
488 Perkins v. Heebt. [New York^
own constitution and are confined within narrow limits. We-
have not overlooked the intimation that the passage of this act
was procured for the purpose of enabling union labor organiza-
tions to boycott nonunion laborers and to deprive them of the
legitimate fruits of their labors. "We cannot, however, assume
that such was the purpose and intent of the legislature, or that
the association of which the plaintiff is president will resort ta
acts which are unlawful and criminal. The act allows the mem-
bers of the ^*^ union to send the products of their labors intO'
the markets of the country marked in such a way as to indicate
the character of their workmanship. This is legitimate and
proper. It is a right that the law accords to every manufac-
turer. We must assume, therefore, that the legislature, in pass-
ing the act, had in view the lawful and legitimate purpose, and
that they did not contemplate that the provisions of the act
might be used for illegitimate purposes. These views render it
unnecessary to consider the question as to whether the label waa
a valid trade-mark at common law.
No question is raised as to the right of the plaintiff to prose-
cute the action as president of the association.
The judgment should be affirmed, with costs.
All concur.
STATUTES— GENERAL AND LOCAL LAWS.— A general law»
as distinguisBed from a special or local law, is a law that embracer
a class of subjects, or places, and does not omit any subject, or
place, naturally belonging to such class. The test of the generality
of a iaw is that it shall embrace all and exclude none whose con-
ditions and wants render such legislation equally appropriate ta
them as a class: Wanser v. Hoos, 60 N. J. L. 482, 64 Am. St. Rep.
600; note to State v. Bargus, 53 Am. St. Rep. 632. The legislature
may enact general laws, which, from their nature, will be capa-
ble of enforcement in particular portions of the state only; and
the fact that an act is applicable to the conditions existing in a
single city in the state will not necessarily render it local or spec-
ial legislation: Note to Wanser v. Hoos, 64 Am. St. Rep. 615. A
statute which relates to persons or things as a class is a general
law, while one that relates to particular things or persons of a
class Is spocial: See monographic note to State v. Ellet, 21 Am.
St. Rep. 781, on what is a general law. A law Is unconstitutional
and void where It is, In fact, local In Its application, though gen-
eral In form: State v. Ellet, 47 Ohio St. 90, 21 Am. St Rep. 772,
and note at 788.
STATUTES — CONSTITUTIONALITY — GRANT OP EXCLU-
SIVE PRIVILEGE— WORKMEN'S UNION LABEL ACT.— A Stat-
ute authorizing a union or association of workmen to adopt a trade-
mark or label, to be used only on goods prepared by members of
that association, does not conflict with the provisions of the state
constitution Inhll)itlng the granting to any corporation, association^
or Individual of any special or exclusive right, privilege, or Immun-
April, 1899.] Matter op Strykeb. 48^
Ity: state v. Bishop, 12S Mo. 373, 49 Am. St Rep. 569, and note,
showing that a statute entitled, "An act to protect associations,
unions of workmen, and persons in their labels, trademarlis, and
forms of advertising," does not violate a constitutional provision
prohibiting the passage of local or special laws and the granting of
special privileges.
STATUTES— SUFFICIENCY OF TITLE.— The title of an act is
sufficient where it declares the general purpose of the statute, and
the provisions of the act are germane to the purpose expressed In
the title: See monographic note to Bobel v. People, 64 Am. St Rep.
75, on the sufficiency of the title to a statute.
Matter op Strykeb.
[168 NEW York, 626.]
STATUTES — CONSTRUCTION — ANALOGOUS WORDS. —
When two or more words of analogous meaning are employed to-
gether in a statute, they are understood to be used in their cognate
sense, to express the same relations and to give color and expression
to each other.
WAGES— PREFERENCE TO CLAIMS FOR— LIMITATION
UPON WORD "EMPLOYES."— In determining what claims shall be
preferred, under a statute which gives a preference to "the wages
of the employes, operatives, and laborers" of corporations In the
hands of a receiver, the general and comprehensive word "employes'*
must be limited by the more specific words, "operatives and labor-
ers."
WAGES— PREFERENCE TO CLAIMS FOR— CONSTRUC-
TION OF STATUTE.— A statute giving a preference to "the wages
of the employes, operatives, and laborers" of corporations In the
hands of a receiver Is intended to limit the preference to the par-
ticular class whose claims would be properly expressed by the use
of the word "wages."
WAGES— APPLICATION OF TERM— SALARY— FEE.— The
word "wages" is applied, in common parlance, specifically to the
payment made for manual labor, or other labor of a menial or me-
chanical kind, as distinguished from salary, and from fee, each of
which denotes compensation paid to professional men,
WAGES— PREFERENCE TO CLAIMS FOR— CONSTRUC-
TION OF STATUTP:- SALARY.— The word "wages," in a statute
giving a preference to "the wages of the employes, operatives, and
laborers" In the hands of a receiver, conveys the idea, in its appli-
cation to laborers and employes, of subordinate occupation which
Is not very remunerative. Such a statute Is not, therefore, designed
to give a preference to the salaries and compensation due to officers
and employSs of a corporation occupying superior positions of trust
or nrofit.
WAGES— PREFERENCE TO CLAIMS FOR— SALARIED
PERSONS WHO CANNOT CLAIM.— Under a statute which gives
a preference to "the wages of the employe's, operatives, and labor-
ers" of corporations in the hands of a receiver, the claims of those in
the employ of an insolvent manufacturing company, such as a clerk
and bookkeeper, the superintendent, shop foreman, and a draftsman.
490 Matter op Stryker. [New York,
all under salaries ranging from one hundred to two hundred and
twenty-five dollars per month, are not entitled to preference as
<daims for wages.
Petition to have certain claims paid as claims for wages. The
nature of these claims appear in the opinion. An order was
made directing the receivers of the New York Locomotive
'Works not to pay these claims as preferred claims, and not to
treat them as claims for wages. The applicants appealed.
Charles Carmichael, for the appellants.
Leslie W. Kernan, for the respondents.
Bair O'BRIEN, J. The courts below have determined, hy the
•order appealed from, that four different and distinct claims
presented to the receivers were not entitled to the preference
provided by chapter 376 of the Laws of 1885. One of the claims
was presented by a clerk and bookkeeper, who had been em-
ployed in the office of the corporation at a salary of one hundred
-dollars a month, payable at the end of each month. Another by
the superintendent of the corporation, who had been employed
at a salary of one hundred and twenty-five dollars a month.
Another by a draftsman employed in the office of the corpora-
tion at a salary of one hundred and twenty -five dollars a month,
and the other claim was made by two foremen employed by the
corporation, one of the boiler shop at a salary of two hundred
and twenty-five dollars a month, and the other in some other
department at a salary of one hiindred and twenty-five dollars
■a month.
The question is, whether these claims were entitled to a pref-
erence under the provisions of the statute which reads as fol-
lows: "Where a receiver of a corporation created or organized
^^^ under the laws of this state and doing business therein ....
shall be appointed, the wages of the employes, operatives, and
laborers thereof shall be preferred to every other debt or claim
against such corporation, and shall be paid by the receiver from
the moneys of such corporation which shall first come to his
hands." It is said that the applicants were employes of the cor-
poration, and doubtless that assertion is correct. But the word
**employe" would include every person in the service of the cor-
poration, without regard to his grade or rank, or the nature of
his duties. If preference should be given to the claims of
these parties on the ground that they were employes of the
corporation, we would necessarily have to exclude the other
April, 1899] Matter of Stryker. ' 491
words, "operatives and laborers." When two or more words of
Analogous meaning are employed together, they are under-
fitood to be used in their cognate sense, to express the same rela-
tions and give color and expression to each other. Hence, al-
though the word "employe" is general and comprehensive, it
must be limited by the more specific words, "operatives and
laborers," which are found in the statute: Wakefield v. Fargo,
SO K Y. 218; People v. Board of Police, 75 K Y. 44.
The most important word in the statute is the word "wages."
It was wages that the legislature intended to prefer in the dis-
tribution of the assets of the insolvent corporation, not sala-
ries, nor earnings, nor compensation. It was not intended to
prefer the claims of all employes, but it was manifestly in-
tended to limit the preference to the particular class whose
claims would be properly expressed by the use of the word
wages. This word is applied in common parlance specifically
to the payment made for manual labor, or other labor of
menial or mechanical kind, as distinguished from salary and
from fee, which denotes compensation paid to professional men :
Century Dictionary. In its application to laborers and em-
ployes it conveys the idea of subordinate occupation which ia
not very remunerative, of not much independent responsibility,
but rather subject to immediate supervision. This was the
construction which this court placed upon the statute in '*^"*
the case of People v. Remington, 45 Hun, 338; affirmed here on
the opinion below, 109 N. Y. 631. It was said in that case that
the statute was designed to secure the prompt payment of the
wages of persons who, as a class, are dependent upon their earn-
ings for the support of themselves and their families, and it was
not designed to give a preference to the salaries and compensa-
tion due to officers and employes of a corporation occupying
superior positions of trust or profit. I cannot doubt that this
is a correct interpretation of the statute which conforms to the
purpose which the legislature evidently had in view in its enact-
ment. In order to give the preference provided by the statute,
the claim must be for wages in the ordinary sense of that term.
It was not, we think, the purpose of the statute to secure a
preference for claims due to the clerical force engaged in trans-
acting the business, nor to the superintendent, foremen, or offi-
cers of the corporation who are compensated by a fixed yearly
salary. Although the word "employes" is used, yet the purpose
of the statute was to protect mechanics, operatives, or laborers
from loss of their wages in the event of the insolvency of the
492 * Mattbr of Stryker. [New York^
corporation. It is significant to note tliat insurance and mon-
eyed corporations are excepted from the operation of the stat-
ute. There was no reason for excepting these corporations but
for the fact, well known, that they do not employ labor, in the
ordinary sense of that word. The conduct of the business of
these corporations requires a large clerical force, graded and
organized according to the extent and necessities of the 'busi-
ness. If it was intended to protect the claims of this class of
employes, there was no reason why all corporations should not
be included within the scope of the statute. But it evidently
was not. It was supposed that that class of employes could pro-
tect themselves, whereas the common laborer, operative, or
mechanic would be left by the failure of the business in a much
more helpless condition. The wages of laborers, mechanics, and
domestic servants has in modern times become the subject of
protective legislation in this and many other countries, and
whenever the law has been extended °^® beyond these classes,
60 as to include the claims of parties performing clerical duties
or work of a like character, it was by judicial construction based
upon language much broader than is to be found in the enact-
ment in question. As was observed in the case of People v,
Remington, 109 N. Y. 631, 45 Hun, 338, legislation of this char-
acter confers upon a class of persons, having a specific con-
tractual relation with corporations, new and unusual privileges
and securities at the expense of other creditors whose distribu-
tive share of the assets is diminished. It is in derogation of
the common law, and should not be extended to cases not within
the reason as well as within the words of the statute. In the
distribution of the assets of an insolvent corporation by courts
of equity, the maxim that equality is equity is a fundamental
rule, and it is only by force of legislation that this principle can
be departed from, and then only in favor of the class of creditors
that come within the scope of the statute when fairly and rea-
sonably interpreted. In a very recent case we were required to
pass upon the claim of an attorney at law which it was con-
tended was entitled to preference under the terms of the stat-
ute. In a general sense, it might well be said that he was an
employ^ since he was retained or employed in the business of
the corporation, but it was held that he was not a laborer or
servant within the scope or policy of the statute: Bristor v.
Smith, 158 N". Y. 157. While the claim in that case was not
based upon tbe statute in question, but upon another of a kin-
dred nature, the reasoning applies to the claims in question.
April, 1899.] Matter op Strykeb. 493
We adhere to the doctrine there announced in the opinion of
Judge Gray as a correct interpretation of the statute.
These views are not in conflict with the case of Palmer v.
Van Santvoord, 153 N. Y. 612. The claimant in that case
was not a superintendent, or foreman, or bookkeeper, or clerk.
The courts below had held that he was a laborer or operative
within the meaning of the statute, and this court affirmed the
decision. It will be seen by a careful reading of the facts
that the duties performed by the person who presented the
claim in that case were those of a mechanic or laborer, and '''^*-
while it appears that he sometimes solicited and made sales of
the machines manufactured by the company, yet that was
merely incidental to his other duties. He was employed to go
from place to place and set up mowing machines for farmers
to whom they had been sold. He was required to unpack the
machines and repack them, and ship to the company when nec-
€8sary. He was required to put the machines together and fit
them for operation. All this was mechanical and manual labor,
and hence his claim was within the scope of the statute. His
claim differed from those of the other laborers and mechanics
in the employ of- the company only in the circumstance that his
compensation was measured by the month instead of the day,
and the fact that he sometimes acted as a salesman was regarded
as a mere incident of the principal employment, and hence not
affecting his right to the preference secured by the statute.
We think that the case was correctly decided below, and
that the order should be affirmed, but since the question seems
to have been presented in the first instance at least by the peti-
tion of the receivers themselves, no costs are awarded either
party.
GRAY, J. The reasoning in Palmer v. Van Santvoord, 153
N. Y. 612, in my opinion, embarrasses, not a little, the deci-
sion of this case, inasmuch as Chief Judge Andrews attributed
a larger import to the word "employ^" than to the words "op-
eratives and laborers,'* which follow it, and he thought that it
should not be confined to those persons who performed manual
labor only. He, also, held that this act proceeded upon a
broader legislative policy, as to the persons to be protected, than
did the act of 1848, which imposed a certain liability upon
stockholders of corporations for debts due to employes. I
think that his opinion conflicts somewhat with the case of
People v. Remington, 109 N. Y. 631, affirming 46 Hun, 338,
494 Matter of Stryker. [New York,
on the opinion there, and, if the opinion is followed, it might
compel a reversal of the judgment. I did not take part in the
decision of the case of ^^^ Palmer v. Santvoord, 153 N. Y. 613,
which, on its facts, I regard as having been correct, and I shall
concur with Judge O'Brien in his conclusion, for the affirmance
of this judgment, because the construction of this statute as
therein given accords with my views.
I have some doubt as to the cases of the foremen in the ma^
chine shops, who are shown to have performed the manual labor
of mechanics, although holding position^ as foremen and being
paid b}'- the month. But I am willing to waive the doubt m
favor of a more restricted construction of a statute, which create*
an exception in the equal distribution of the assets of an in-
solvent corporation.
All concur (Gra}^, J., in memorandum, and Bartlett, J., in
result) except Haight, J., who concurs except as to the book«
keeper and draftsman, as to whom he favors a reversal on the
authority of Palmer v. Van Santvoord, 153 N. Y. 613.
WAGES— PREFERENCE IN FAVOR OF EMPLOYES— LABOR-
ERS.—The term "employes" embraces laborers and servants, and
those occupying Inferior positions: Johnston v. Barrills, 27 Or. 251,
50 Am. St. Rep. 717, and note, showing that "laborers" are those
■who earn a livelihood by their own manual labor. See monographic
note to Oliver v. Macon Hardware Co., 58 Am. St. Rep. 303, on who
are laborers. Under a statute making debts for labor preferred
claims against the estate of an insolvent, a debt due from an in-
solvent newspaper corporation to a mailing clerk, for mechanical
and manual work, is a debt due for labor. A claim for labor, at
least within the meaning of exemption and lien laws, has reference-
to manual labor, and clerks, agents, and like employSs, whose em-
plo^'ment is associated with mental labor and skill, are not deemed
laborers: Michigan Trust Co. v. Grand Rapids Democrat, 113 Mich.
615, G7 Am. St. Rep. 48G, and note. As to what wages are not sub-
ject to garnishment or execution, see note to Abrahams v. Anderson^
12 Am. St Rep. 276.
April, 1899.J People v. Fielding. 495
People v. Fielding.
[168 New York, 6I2.]
TRIAT^CRIMINAL CASES— ARGUMENT— PROSECUTIxa
ATTORNEY— DUTY OF —The prosecuting attorney, in a criminal
case, represents tlie majesty of the people, and, having no respon-
Blbillty, except fairly to discharge his duty, should put himself un-
der proper restraint, and should not, in his remarks before the jury^
go beyond the evidence or the bounds of a reasonable moderation.
If he lays aside the impartiality that should characterize his official
action to become a heated partisan, and by vituperation of the pris-
oner and appeals to prejudice seeks to procure a conviction at all
hazards, he ceases to properly represent the public interest.
APPEAI^CRIMINAL CASES-IMPROPER APPEAL TO-
JURY— REVERSAL OF CONVICTION.— If a conviction in a crim-
inal case follows an improper and dangerous appeal to the prejudice
of the jurors, made by the prosecuting attorney, and it is reason-
ably certain that his course brought about such result, the judgment
•will be reversed for such error whenever it is raised by a proper
exception.
EVIDENCE>-RBASONABLB CERTAINTY— STRONG PROB-
ABILITIES.—A proposition is reasonably certain when It is sup-
ported by the strong probabilities.
TRIALr-IMPIlOPER APPEAL TO JURY— CURING OP"
ERROR.— INSTRUCTIONS to the jury do not always neutralize,
either as a matter of law or fact, the effect of improper remarks in-
their presence.
APPEAL— CRIMINAL CASES-IMPROPER APPEAL TO
JURY-ILLUSTRATION— REVERSAL OF CONVICTION.— When.
a city officer is being prosecuted for conniving at the allowance of a
fraudulent claim against the city, and the prosecuting attorney,
in summing up, makes harsh and unjust statements to the jury,
not founded upon evidence, but resting wholly on his unsupported-
declarations; draws vivid pictures of suffering and want, of wrongs-
done to widows and their broods of little children, with "pinched
and hagfiard" faces, by the defendant, and of a multitude of peop'e
waiting outside the courthouse for his conviction; depicts the hard-
ships of small taxpayers; urges the privations of the poor and the
overwhelming influence of public opinion against the defendant;
describes him as a thief, living in a palace on the proceeds of public
plunder; and even attempts to intimidate the jury by telling them
that they will commit "the unpardonable sin" unless they convict
him, there is, in case of conviction, presented a situation In which,
there should be a reversal, particularly where the record shows that
such statements were persisted in after repeated objections, under
the claim, sustained by the trial court, that it was ri£;ht to make
them.
TRIAL— CRIMINAL CASES-OBJECTION TO GENERAL.
COURSE PURSUED BY PROSECUTING ATTORNEY.— If a prose-
cuting attorney, in a criminal case, persists, after repeated objec-
tions, in making improper statements during his address to the
Jury, and such objections go to the general course pursued by him.
no further objection or exception is necessary after the court sanc-
tions such course, pronouncing it "perfectly proper."
TRIAL— CRIMINAL CASES— IMPROPER APPEAL TO
JURY-CORRECTION OF ERROR.— When a prosecuting attorney,
in a criminal case makes improper statements in his address to-
49 G People v. Fielding. [New York,
the jury, and the court seeks to correct them, the correction should
be as broad as the error, and cover substantially the same ground.
It should be clear and specific enough to repel the presumption of
iujury. Otherwise, the error is not cured.
The defendant was convicted of the crime of consenting to,
and conniving at, the auditing or allowance of a false or fraudu-
lent bill or claim against the city of Brooklyn, in violation of
-section 165 of the Penal Code, he being at the time deputy
■commissioner of city works of that city.
Charles J. Patterson, for the appellant.
Hiram R. Steele, for the respondent.
®** VANN", J. We think that the record before us is free
from reversible error, except as to a single question which is
raised by the following extract from the appeal book, transcribed
literally so that it may speak for itself.
The district attorney, in summing up, said: '^Defendant
<;hanged his style of living from a frame house on Prospect
avenue to a palatial residence on Eighth avenue, whicli every
man knows cannot be maintained in the style of that neigh-
borhood for less than ten thousand dollars a year." Objected
to. The court: "There is no evidence of that." By the dis-
trict attorney : "I appeal to the common sense of the jury."
The court: "There is no other comment required than the *''**
statement of the fact that there is no evidence in the case as
to how much it cost to maintain an establishment on Eighth
-avenue." By the district attorney: "There is no evidence, but
you will not prohibit their using their experience, et cetera."
In further summing up, he said: "Go and spend an hour in
the tax collector's office the day after the tax levy is confirmed,
and look at the long line — " Objected to by the defendant.
The court: "I do not think this interruption is called for."
By defendant's counsel : "I will take an exception if your honor
will permit him to proceed on that line." The court: " I will
hear what he says first." By defendant's counsel: "I ask to
have it taken down. I ask you to stop him at this point, and
take an exception." The court: "1 cannot do both; I cannot
have it taken down and have him stopped also. Proceed."
By the district attorney: "I say, visit the tax office on the day
after the annual taxes are confirmed, and look at the long line,
that stretches out into and down the street, of people that aro
"willing to stand there all day in order to save the little rebate
tphich early payment secures. Those people are the victims of
April, 1899.] Pkople v. Fieldinq, 497
the defendant's fraud." By defendant's counsel: 'T)oe8 your
honor permit him to proceed in this fashion?" The court:
■'^Yes." By defendant's counsel: "I will take an exception."
By the district attorney: "This interruption is outrageous.
Counsel should he instructed to take his exception when I have
finished." By defendant's counsel : "Have I right to take it — "
The court: "I do not think it is called for; that is all I can
say. I can only say that I do not think these continual inter-
ruptions are called for." By defendant's counsel: "I have a
right to take an exception." The court : 'TTes, you have." By
the district attorney: "But at a later time." By defendant's
counsel: "I think not." By the district attorney: "The pur-
pose is to break the effect of anything I may say to you. He
knows it is improper." By defendant's attorney: "I do not." By
the district attorney: "I say the people that you will find there
in a line on that day are the victims of the defendant's crime.
You will find there the widow, that has ^^^^ starved her brood of
little children and seen their faces get pinched and haggard, in
order that she might be sure that tax day should not find her
with empty hands. It is that woman's money, coined out of her
blood and the blood of her children, that the defendant has stolen
and squandered. If you will indulge the pitiful sentiments of
your hearts, think of her. Oh, there are unwritten tragedies of
that sort enacted, not in the luxurious habitations of Eighth ave-
nue, but behind the shabby front doors of poor neighborhoods.
Look at the old man, standing in line, clutching in his knotted
fingers his last year's receipt — " By the defendant's counsel:
"'*T)oes your honor permit this? Is this in your ruling?" The
•court: "I am going to permit him to sum up his case." By
defendant's counsel : " I ask you to stop him at this point about
the deseri{)tion8 of the old man with the knotted fingers." The
•court: 'Troceed." By defendant's counsel: "I will take an
exception." By the district attorney: "You ought to be
ashamed." By defendant's counsel : 'TTou ought to be ashamed
-of yourself to talk to a jury like this." The court: **I think
it is perfectly proper, but there is nothing I can do to compel
the attorney of the defendant to take the ruling of the court.'*
By defendant's counsel : "Let him go on. I shall not interrupt
liim with another word. Let him describe all the knotted
fingers in the land." By the district attorney : "And the claque
that stands behind the rail — " The court: "Proceed," By the
district attorney: **! say you will see old men in that line
An. St. £kp.. Vol. LXX.— 32
498 People v. Fielding. [New York,
clutching in their knotted fingers rolls of dirty one-dollar bills-
Look at their worn and shabby garments; look at the marks of
painful labor written all over their aged and clumsy limbs; it
is the money of these people which the defendant has stolen and
squandered. These are the people whose cause I plead. These-
are the victims of the defendant's crime. These are the people-
who now, by tens of thousands, are waiting outside for your
verdict. Will you do them justice, or will you not? If you
shall let this man, loaded with his guilty plunder, escape, then*
I say you have committed the unpardonable sin."
***** It did not appear that the defendant's counsel, by his^
method of summing up, incited these remarks on the part of the-
district attorney.
In charging the jury the court said : "Some things have beei>
said about the newspapers, about a popular clamor, and about the
burden of the taxpayers. Those are considerations which are-
not to control or influence you in deciding this case. What
the clamor may be, I do not know; I have never heard of it.
What the newspapers may have said, I do not care; I have
never read it. How much the people may or may not be bur-
dened, no matter. If the times were prosperous, a public offi-
cial has no right to make an assault upon, the public treasury
or to aid others in doing so, and he must be tried only for the
crime he has committed, if he has committed one, and it.
would be wrong in the extreme to assume anything and allow
it to weigh against this defendant because of hard times, or
because of difficulties which the people who pay money into
the city treasury may or may not have in acquiring the mean*
of making the payment." Upon the request of the defendant
he further charged: "That there is no evidence in the case
which would justify the jury in finding that it was more expen-
sive to live upon Eighth avenue than in Prospect avenue," and
"they are not to consider any facts but those which have been
proven by the witnesses or the exhibits."
We do not wish to express any views which would restrict
counsel in fair argument, comment, or appeal. We object, how-
ever, to the assertion by the learned district attorney of facta
not proved, to his inflammatory appeals to passion and preju-
dice, and to his threat to the jury of popular denunciation, all
under the sanction of the trial court. If the record in this case
is sustained by the deliberate judgment of the court of last re-
sort, it is difficult to see the limit to intemperate language, un*
April, 1899.] People v. Fielding. 499
proved assertion, or pernicious appeals on the part of counsel
for the prosecution, except their own sense of propriety. The
law, in our judgment, does not thus leave an accused person,
presumed to be innocent until proved to be guilty, bound and
helpless in the hands of his accuser.
'*'*'' Even in a civil action, when counsel are permitted, under
objection and exception, while summing up, to read to the jury
an abstract from a pamphlet or newspaper, or to exhibit a
cartoon, not in evidence, it is good ground for reversal: Koel-
ges V. Guardian Life Ins. Co., 57 N. Y. 638; Williams v. Brook-
lyn Elevated R. R. Co., 126 N. Y. 96; McKeever v. Weyer, 11
Week. Dig. 258. So statements made by counsel, outside of the
evidence and subject to objection, which strongly tend to arouse
sympathy, prejudice, or resentment in the minds of the jury,
require a new trial, even if the court charges that they have
nothing to do with the case, and must be disregarded: Halpem
V. Nassau etc. R. R. Co., 16 App. Div. 90; Bagully v. Morning
Journal Assn., 38 App. Div. 522.
Language which might be permitted to counsel in summing
up a civil action cannot, with propriety, be used by a public
prosecutor, who is a quasi judicial officer, representing the
people of the state, and presumed to act impartially in the in-
terest only of justice. If he lays aside the impartiality that
should characterize his official action to become a heated par-
tisan, and by vituperation of the prisoner and appeals to preju-
dice seeks to procure a conviction at all hazards, he ceases to
properly represent the public interest, which demands no vic-
tim, and asks no conviction through the aid of passion, sjrm-
pathy, or resentment. By such a course, in the long run, he
throws away much of his strength because his violent and repre-
hensible language betrays his bias and finally weakens his in-
fluence with the jury. As was said by Judge Earl in People v.
Green wall, 115 N". Y. 520, 526, "the district attorney, represent-
ing the majesty of the people, and having no responsibility, ex-
cept fairly to discharge his duty, should put himself under
proper restraint, and should not, in his remarks, in the hearing
of the jury, go beyond the evidence or the bounds of a reasonable
moderation." Neither in that case nor in People v. Brooks, 131
N. Y. 321, 329, was any objection made or exception taken.
In the former, which was a capital case, the court was not bound
to interfere, while in the latter, *** which was an appeal from
the general term, it had no power to interfere without an ex-
500 People v. Fielding. [New York,
ception. As the admonition of the court has not proved suffi-
cient to prevent improper and dangerous appeals to the preju-
dice of jurors, it has become necessary, as we think, to rigidly
enforce the general rule of this and many other states that re-
quires a reversal whenever the error is raised by a proper ex-
ception.
Abuse of the defendant by the prosecuting officer in his ad-
dress to the jury, which was calculated to arouse their passions
against him and materially prejudice him in tlie trial, has been
held such error as would, of itself, cause a reversal: Stone v.
State, 23* Tex. Ct. App. 185. Where the prosecuting attorney
was permitted to comment on the personal appearance of the
defendant, not as a witness, nor on account of his manner and
bearing as such, but as indicating a probability of guilt, it was
deemed sufficient to reverse a judgment of conviction: Bessette
V. State, 101 Ind. 85.
In Tucker v. Henniker, 41 N. H. 317, 323, the court said:
'It would seem utterly vain and quite useless to caution jurors,
in the progress of a trial, against listening to conversations out
of the courtroom in regard to the merits of a cause, if they
are to be permitted to listen in the jury box to statements of
facts calculated to have a bearing upon their judgment, enforced
and illustrated by all the eloquence and ability of learned,
zealous, and interested counsel Statements of facts not
proved and comments thereon are outside of a cause; they stand
legally irrelevant to the matter in question, and are, therefore,
hot pertinent. If not pertinent, they are not within the privi-
lege of counsel.''
In Laubach v. State, 12 Tex. Ct. App. 583, the prosecuting
attorney, when commenting upon the evidence in his closing
argument, was interrupled by the defendant in person with the
statement that if he had certain absent witnesses he could show
a different state of facts. Thereupon the attorney, addressing
the jury, stated that a brother of the absent witnesses told him
that they, if present, would testify against the defendant. Ob-
jection was promptly made to this remark, and '*'*® the district
attorney at once told the jury not to regard anything he or de-
fendant had said. The judgment was reversed upon the ground,
among others, that the remark was unwarranted by the law or
the facts and was calculated to injure the rights of the defend-
ant by prejudicing his case in the minds of the jury.
In Brown v. Swineford, 44 Wis. 282, 292, 28 Am. Rep. 582,
counsel, in summing up, commented upon the appellant's connec-
April, 1899.] People v. Fielding. 601
tion with a railroad company and his ability on that account to
pay any judgment which might be rendered against him. The
court reversed the judgment and after referring to the adjudged
cases remarked, "All of them support the rule now adopted by
this court, that it is error sufficient to reverse a judgment for
counsel, against objection, to state facts pertinent to the issue
and not in evidence, or to assume arguendo such facts to be in
the case when they are not."
In State v. Smith, 75 K C. 306, the prosecuting attorney,
addressing the jury, said: "The defendant was such a scoun-
drel that he was compelled to move his trial from Jones county
to a county where he was not known." The conviction was
reversed and the court said that "the purpose and natural effect
of such language was to create a prejudice against the defend-
ant not arising out of any legal evidence before them, for the
jury were precluded from inquiry into the causes or motives for
moving the trial and even from the knowledge whether the trial
was moved by the state or the defendant."
In Kea v. Harrington, 58 Vt. 181, 190, 56 Am. Rep. 561, the
court said: "It has been repeatedly held in other jurisdictions,
and recently in this, that when counsel persistently travel out of
the record, basing arguments on facts not appearing and appeal-
ing to prejudice, irrelevant to the case and outside of the proof,
it not only merits the severe censure of the court, but is valid
ground for exception."
In Newton v. State, 21 Fla. 63, it was held that where coun«.
sel for the prosecution, upon the trial of a cause before a jury,
abusing his privilege to the manifest prejudice of the ^^^ de-
fendant, makes statements with regard to evidence being ad-
duced not pertinent and, therefore, not within his privilege, it
becomes the duty of the judge to stop him at once, and if he
fails to do so and the impropriety is great it is ground for a new
trial upon appeal.
In Moore v. State, 21 Tex. Ct. App. 666, the district attorney,
in his address to the jury, said that the defendant had been con-
victed of the offense for which he was on trial "upon a former
and previous indictment," and upon appeal it was reversed on
a trifling technicality in drawing the indictment, and he urged
the jury to give him such a term in the penitentiary as would
make up for the great expense he had caused upon a mere
technicality. The court, in reversing the judgment, said: "In
many decisions this court has urged upon counsel, whose duty
502 People v. Fieldinq. [New York,
it is to prosecute the pleas of the state, to refrain from inject-
ing into trials of cases of this kind any matter calculated to
inflame the minds or excite the prejudice of the jury. If we
could add anything to what has heen said, or could use any
language calculated to reach the minds and consciences of those
to whom such admonitions are addressed, we would avail our-
selves of the present occasion to do so. As we cannot, we can
only reverse and remand the case, in the hope that the accused
may secure a fair and impartial trial, according to law and ac-
cording to those methods alike ancient and honorable which
still obtain in all enlightened courts/' See, also, as to the effect
of a departure from legitimate course of argument, the follow-
ing cases: Rudolph v. Landwerlen, 92 Ind. 34; School Town
of Eochester v. Shaw, 100 Ind. 268; Hall v. Wolff, 61 Iowa, 559;
Bremmer v. Green Bay etc. R. E. Co., 61 "Wis. 114.
In a case that is free from doubt upon the merits, the appel-
late courts disregard errors of the trial court, even in a criminal
ease, when it is reasonably certain that they could not have
affected the result. A proposition is reasonably certain when
it is supported by the strong probabilities, but here the strong
probabilities are that the errors did affect the result. The ®^*
average man cannot read the eloquent but inflammatory lan-
guage of the district attorney without being impressed by it,
and it is safe to presume that the effect would be heightened
by hearing those words spoken with animation and enthusiasm
under the exciting circumstances surrounding an important
criminal trial. The jury might be told by the court to forget
them, but could they forget them? They might be told to dis-
regard them, but how can we be certain that they did disregard
them? Moreover, some of the most objectionable language
was not alluded to by the court in its charge, and instructions
to the jury do not always neutralize, either as a matter of law
or fact, the effect of improper remarks in their presence: People
V. Corey, 157 N. Y. 332, 346; Brooks v. Rochester Ry. Co., 156
K Y. 244, 252; People v. Hill, 37 App. Div. 327; Swan v.
Keongh, 35 App. Div. 80.
From our observation of jurymen we think the language
under consideration would be apt to turn their minds against
the defendant, divert their attention from the evidence, and
prevent the exercise of sound and dispassionate judgment upon
the merits. It brought before them vivid pictures of suffering
and want, of wrongs done to the widow and orphan by the de-
fendant, and of a multitude of people waiting outside the court-
April, 1899.] People v. Fielding. 503
house for his conviction. The hardships of small taxpayers, the
privations of the poor, and the overwhelming influence of pub-
lic opinion were urged against him, and he was described as a
thief, living in a palace on the proceeds of public plunder.
There was even an attempt to intimidate the jury by telling
them that they would commit "the unpardonable sin" unless
they convicted him. The cause of complaint by the appellant
is not a single, inadvertent remark, which might well be over-
looked, but, after repeated objections, improper statements were
persisted in under the claim, sustained by the court, that it waa
right to make them.
The harsh and unjust statements of the district attorney were
not founded upon evidence, but rested wholly on his unsup-
ported declarations. The most of them would have been ruled
out as immaterial or incompetent if evidence had *"*^ been of-
fered to show that they were true. They violated the reason
upon which the law of evidence is founded by spreading facts
before the jury without any proof, and virtually, also, the rule
of evidence which prohibits immaterial and incompetent facts
from being proved. There was no evidence that it cost ten
thousand dollars a year to live in the style of Eighth avenue,
•where the defendant resided, and when the point was raised the
•court so ruled. The district attorney, however, in disregard
of the ruling, appealed to the common sense of the jury, and
the court very properly tried to check him, but he was allowed
to appeal to their experience without rebuke. After that he
met with no attempt at restraint by the court. Whatever ho
said, whether it was about the widow starving her little children
until their faces got pinched and haggard in order that she
might pay the taxes stolen by the defendant, or about aged men,
deformed by painful labor, whose money the defendant had
squandered, met with the approval of the court. Instead of re-
pressing these unfounded and dangerous assertions, when re-
peatedly requested to, at first he condemned the efforts of the
defendant's counsel to prevent them, and finally pronounced the
course of the district attorney "perfectly proper," and expressed
regret that his ruling to that effect was not acquiesced to.
Even the threat of popular denunciation and the attempt to
frighten the jury by declaring that they would commit the un-
pardonable sin if they found for the defendant met with neither
remonstrance nor reproof. The language of the prosecuting ol-
ficer, thus indorsed by the highest authority known to the jury,
must have gone home to their minds with powerful and con-
504 People v. Fielding. [New York,
vincing effect, while the counsel for the defendant was left in
the attitude of a wrongdoer, trying to disturb the proceedings
of the court. After persisting in his efforts to protect his client
until the court held that he was out of order, he was not obliged
to run the risk of punishment for contempt by continuing ta
object, for all that was said by the district attorney after the
court had taken this position should be held subject to the ex-
ceptions already interposed. The court should even allow an
exception **^^ upon appeal where counsel were prevented from
excepting at the trial. Moreover, the objections taken were to
the general course pursued by the district attorney, and when
the court had sanctioned this, no further objection or exception
was necessary. This method of summing up should have been
sternly interrupted by the court of its own motion, so as to ex-
clude improper statements and comments from the consideration
of the jury, for objections made after the district attorney had
said what he wanted to were objections made after the harm
was done.
After what took place during the summing up, how can we
be sure that the general and placid language of the charge wholly
counteracted the pointed and vigorous words of the district at-
torney, indorsed as they had been by the court itself? When
improper evidence has been received or improper statements
made in the presence of the jury, if the court seeks to correct
them, the correction should be as broad as the error, and cover
substantially the same ground, as was the case in Cole v. Fall
Brook Coal Co., 159 N. Y. 59, decided at the present term. The
court in its charge said nothing about the improper appeals to
sympathy, prejudice, or passion, the starvation of children by
their widowed mothers, the knotted fingers and bent forms of
old men, the denunciation of the defendant as a thief, or the
bugbear of the unpardonable sin held up before the jury so forci-
bly. The correction did not cure the errors, because it did not
go far enough and was not sufficiently clear and specific. It
did not repel the presumption of injury: Coleman v. People, 5&
N. Y. 555, 561; People v. Fernandez, 35 N. Y. 49, 59.
Whether the defendant be innocent or guilty, in our opinion
he has not been adjudged guilty in accordance with law be-
cause he has not had the fair and impartial trial which the law
prescribes for a person charged with crime. If wo disregard
a sound and well established rule in his case because we think
he is guilty, we tear down one of the safeguards provided by
Bocicty for the protection of its citizens, and the ^'^ precedent
April, 1899.] People v. Fielding. 505
may, at some time, aid in depriving an innocent man of his
liberty or his life.
The judgment should be reversed and a new trial ordered.
HAIGHT, J., Dissented, upon the one question only which he
thought it his duty to consider, namely, that pertaining to the re-
marlvs of the district attorney who tried the case, and which are
quoted In the prevailing opinion. He referred to the monographic
notes to Martin v. State, 56 Am. Rep. 814, and to McConnell v.
State, 58 Am. Rep. (548, as ones in which many cases concerning the
privilege of counsel, and improper comments by them In addressing
a jury, are collected. But he specifically referred to, and quoted
from, Williams v. Brooklyn Elevated R. R. Co.. 126 N. Y. 96, 102, as
expressing his views upon the subject. "In that case, Andrews, J.,
In delivering t"he opinion of the court, says: 'It is the privilege of
counsel, In addressing a jury, to comment upon every pertinent mat-
ter of fact bearing upon the questions which the jury have to de-
cide. This privilege it is most important to preserve, and it ought
not to be narrowed by any close construction, but should be Inter-
preted In the largest sense. The right of counsel to address the
jury upon the facts is of public as well as private consequence, for
its exercise has always proved one of the most effective aids in the
ascertainment of truth by juries in courts of justice, and this con-
cerns the very highest interest of the state. The jury system would
fail much more frequently than it now does If freedom of advocacy
should be unduly h.impered and counsel should be prevented from
exercising within the four corners of the evidence the widest lati-
tude by way of comment, denunciation, or appeal, In advocating his
cause. This privilege is not beyond regrulation by the court. It is
subject to be controlled by the trial judge In the exercise of a sound
discretion, to prevent undue prolixity, waste of time, or unseemly
criticism. The privilege of counsel, however, does not justify the
Introduction in his summing up of matters wholly immaterial and
Irrelevant to the matter to be decided, and which the jury have no
right to consider in arriving at their verdict. The jury are sworn
to render their verdict upon the evidence. The law sedulously
guards against the introduction of Irrelevant or incompetent evi-
dence, by which the rights of a party may be prejudiced. The pur-
pose of these salutary rules might be defeated if jurors were allowed
to consider facts not in evidence, and the privilege of counsel can
never operate as a license to state to a jury facts not in evidence,
or to present considerations which have no legitimate bearing upon
the case and which the jury would have no right to consider.
"Where counsel. In summing up, proceeds to dilate upon facts not in
evidence, or to press upon the jury considerations which the jury
would have no right to regard. It Is, we conceive, the plain duty of
the court, upon objection made, to Interpose, and a refusal of the
court to Interpose, where otherwise the right of the party would be
prejudiced, would be legal error.'
€06 People v. Fielding. [New York,
"The district attorney," the learned Justice Halght continued, "Is
«, high public officer, representing the state, which seeks equal and
impartial justice, and it is as much his duty to see that no innocent
man suffers as it is to see that no guilty man escapes. In the djs-
<;harge of these most important duties he commands the respect of
the people of the county and usually exercises a great influence upon
jurors. In discussing the evidence, he is, as we have seen in the
■case alluded to, given the widest latitude within the four corners of
the evidence by way of comment, denunciation, or appeal, but he
•has no right to call to the attention of the jury matters or considera-
tions which the jurors have no right to consider. Verdicts obtained
through duress, bias, or prejudice, are illegal, and will be set aside.
This is also true with reference to verdicts based upon popular
■clamor."
I'he comments of the prosecuting attorney were then referred to,
and the dissenting justice thought that they went too far and could
not be approved. "He departed from his line of duty, which was
a, discussion of the evidence and a demand of a conviction based
thereon, and appealed to the jury for a conviction upon considera-
tions which had no legitimate bearing upon the case, and which
the jury had no right to consider." He was inclined to the view,
however, that a new trial was not required. "Under the constitu-
tion," he said, "we are limited in our review to questions of law.
The defendant's counsel took a number of exceptions to the state-
ments made by the district attorney, but when he came to his last
«nd final statement, in which the real vice occurred, the defendant 8
counsel neglected to take an exception. That which preceded the
final remarks of the district attorney may not have been In good
taste, but we do not regSrd it, standing plone, to be such a departure
from the line of discussion permissible within the privilege of the
■district attorney as to warrant a reversal." He regarded the ques-
tion as very much relieved by the charge of the court, given in the
opinion, and which he quoted. "Under section 542 of the Code of
Criminal Procedure," he said, "we are required to give judgment
without regard to technical errors or defects, or to exceptions which
do not aflFect the substantial rights of the parties. Under the circ im-
stances, therefore, we think the Judgment and conviction should be
•affirmed."
TIIIAI/-APPEAD-IMPROPER REMARKS OP COUNSEL-
CRIMINAL LAW.— Prosecuting officers should avoid remarks or
arguments which are calculated to improperly Influence juries to go
outside the evidence and instructions: State v, Warford, 106 Mo.
55. 27 Am. St. Rep. 322, and note, showing that Inflammatory and
inipropor language hy tlie prosecuting officer during the trial of a
<:rlinlnal offense will cause a conviction to be set aside. Langunge
usod by counsel which evinces a studied purpose to arouse the preju-
dice of the jury, based upon facts not in the case, is ground for
reversal of the verdict and judgment: Cluett v. Rosenthal, lOO
Mich. 193, 43 Am. St. Rep. 446. Comments of counsel In arguing a
April, lby9.] VViTHEROw v. Slayback. 507
case before a jury are controllable in the discretion of the trial court.
This discretion is subject to review, and when counsel makes mate-
rial statements, outside the evideuce, liliely to do the accused an in-
jury, it is deemed an abuse of discretion when not stopped J)y the
court on objection made at the time: Notes to Kearny v. State, 65
Am. St Rep. 349; Cluett v. Kosenthal, 43 Am. St. Rep. 452. But, to be
reviewable on appeal, though such comments are excepted to when
made, the court must have been requested to take some action, and
have erred in granting or refusing the request: Note to Kearney v.
State, 65 Am. St. Rep. 349; Illinois Cent. R. R. Co. v. Beebe, 174
111. 13. 66 Am. St. Rep. 253; note to Murray v. Doud, 59 Am. St.
Rep. 301. In order to save any question In relation to the miscon-
duct of counsel during the progress of the trial, the court must be
<jalled upon to correct the injury done; if the court refuses to do
so, the injured party may then except, and thus save the question
involved for the consideration of the appellate court: Chicago etc.
K. R. Co. V. Champion, 9 Ind. App. 510, 53 Am. St. Rep. 357. As to
improper remarks of counsel, generally, compare Olfermann v.
Union Depot R. R. Co., 125 Mo. 408, 46 Am. St. Rep. 483; Monmouth
Min. etc. Co. v. Erling, 148 111. 521, 39 Am. St Rep. 187; Cheatham
V. State, 67 Miss. 335, 19 Am. St. Rep. 310. As to when the mis-
conduct of counsel in argument is so seriously Improper as to call
for a reversal of judgment, see the monographic note to McDonald
V. People, 9 Am. St. Rep. 559-570, devoted to that subject.
WiTHERow V. Slayback.
[158 New Yoek, 649.]
APPEAL — DISMISSAL OF COMPLAINT— RIGHTS OP
PLAINTIFF.— If the question as to whether a corporation Is an-
swerable upon a promissory note, payable to the plaintiff's order,
otherwise than as an indorser, is raised by the pleadings and proofs
In a suit upon the note, and the complaint Is dismissed at the close
of the plaintiff's case, and an exception taken, the question as to
whether the i)laintiff, upon his proofs, was entitled to go to the
jury, is open for review on appeal, although It was not urged on the
motion to dismiss.
CORPORATIONS— STATUTORY ACTION TO RECOVER
DEBT OP DIRECTORS WHERE COMPANY FAILS TO FILE AN
ANNUAL REPORT.— In a suit wherein It is sought to charge tlie
defendants, as directors of a corporation, by virtue of the provisions
of a statute, which provides that, in case of failure to tile an annual
report, "all the directors thereof shall be jointly and severally liable
for all the debts of the corporation then existing, and for all that
shall be contracted before such report shall be made," the plaintiff
must, in order to succeed, prove either that, at the time of default
!n filing the annual report, the debt in suit existed, or that it was
contracted before the report was filed.
EVIDENCE — CONTRACT OF INDORSEMENT— INTEN-
TION.—PAROL EVIDENCE is admissible, as between the immedi-
ate parties to a contract of Indorsement, to ascortaiu their intendon;
all the facts and circumstances which took place at the time of the
transaction may thus be shown.
EVIDENCE— NOTE INDORSED BY CORPORATION-HIS-
TORY OF INDEBTEDNESS— PAROL.— If the plaintiff, in a suit on
508 WiTHEROW V. Slayback. [New York^
a promissory note, of which he is the payee, seeks to charge the
directors of a corporation upon a contract of Indorsement made
Ijy the corporation when the note was executed, parol evidence of
the history of the indebtedness, which resulted in the note, should
"be received and submitted to the jury.
EVIDENCE — NOTE INDORSED BY CORPORATION—
PAROL PROOB^ THAT COMPANY IS PRINCIPAL DEBTOR.
The plaintiff, in a suit on a promissory note, of which he is the
payee, and which is indorsed by a corporation, through its treas-
urer, has a right to show, if he can, by parol evidence, to the satis-
faction of a jury, that the corporation is really his principal debtor
In the transaction.
CORPORATIONS— FAILURE TO FILE ANNUAL REPORT
—DIRECTOR'S LIABILITY— INDORSEMENT OF NOTE BY COR-
PORATION AND PAROL PROOF OF COMPANY'S LIABILITY.
If the superintendent and an officer of an incorporated company
signs a promissory note given in payment of a preceding indebted-
ness due by the company, which, by its treasurer, indorses the note,
and the payee seelis to charge the directors of the corporation with
the debt for having failed to file an annual report, under a statute
which malies them answerable for all debts existing or contracted
before the annual report is made, and the directors seek to avoid
liability by standing on a strict contract of indorsement, and insist-
ing that they are only contingently answerable when the note is
due and the indorser charged, and that protest was after the time
of the filing of the report, the plaintiff should be permitted to
show, by parol evidence, the real transaction— that the corporation
was, in reality, the principal debtor, and that the company was,
therefore, answerable to the plaintiff before the default in filing the
report was cured.
CORPORATIONS— FAILURE TO FILE ANNUAL REPORT
—ACTION FOR DEBT— ABANDONMENT OF BUSINESS AS A
DEFENSE.— If a statute makes the directors of a corporation an-
swerable for its existing debts, and those contracted before the com-
pany makes an annual report, it is no defense to an action brought
to charge them with corporate debts by virtue of the company's
failure to file a report that the company had ceased to exist, by
abandoning its business and turning over its property to its cred-
itors, before the time for filing the report, if it is shown that such
transfer did not embrace all of its property, and that the company
continued to exercise acts of absolute ownership over other omitted
property, and subsequently filed a report of full payment of its cap-
ital stock, as well as two annual reports.
Appeal from a judgment affirming a judgment dismissing the
complaint at the close of the plaintiff's case. The action wa»
brought by Witherow against Slayback and others.
Edward C. Perkins, for the appellant.
Henry Bacon and Charles Strauss, for the respondents.
««» BARTLETT, J. This action is brought against three of
the directors of the Port Henry Steel & Iron Company, Limited,
to charge them with a debt of the corporation for having failed,
as such directors, to file an annual report in January 1886, and
in January, 1887. These two defaults are stated, respectively.
April, 1899.] Witherow v. Slayback. 509
in the first and second causes of action. The complaint contains
five causes of action, but on this appeal only the first and second
are involved.
The debt which the plaintiff in this action seeks to collect of
defendants is represented by a promissory note, dated October
6, 1886, made by T. F. Witherbee to the plaintiff's order for
■eleven thousand and seventy-two dollars and sixty-eight cents,
payable six months after date, and indorsed by the Port Henry
Steel & Iron Company through its treasurer, Andrew Dickey. This
note was a renewal of a similar note dated six months earlier,
to wit, April 3, 1886. The report due January, 1886, was not
filed. The report that was due January, 1887, was filed on Feb-
ruary 16, 1887.
The Port Henry Steel & Iron Company was incorporated un-
der the Laws of 1875, chapter 611, and it is sought to charge
the defendants, as directors, by virtue of the provisions of sec-
tion 18, which provides, in case of failure to file the annual re-
port, that "all the directors thereof shall be jointly and severally'
liable for all the debts of the corporation then existing, and for
all that shall be contracted before such report shall be made.'*
If the plaintiff is to succeed in this action, he is bound to
prove either that, at the time of default in filing the annual
report, the debt in suit existed, or that it was contracted before
the overdue report was filed. The default continued from Janu-
ary, 1886, to February 16, 1887.
^* The position of the defendants is, that whatever obliga-
tion was assumed by the Port Henry Steel & Iron Company is
expressed by the indorsement on the back of the note, and the
relation of the company to the debt is thereby fixed; that, in
order to make the company liable upon this contract, it was
necessary that the note should become due; that the maker
should refuse to pay it; that payment of it should be demanded
and the note duly protested; that, as protest was not made until
April 9, 1887, no debt of the corporation existed, or was con-
tracted, during the period of default in filing the annual report.
The position of the plaintiff is, that when the original note
and the renewal note were given by T. F. Witherbee, he was the
superintendent and an officer of the company, and that the note
was indorsed, delivered, and accepted in payment for a balance
due plaintiff for material furnished and labor done prior .to De-
cember 12, 18^5, in constructing a steel plant for the manufac-
ture of steel and iron on the land of the corporation under a
contract with Witherbee; that the plant was intended for and
510 WiTHEROW V. Slayback. [New York,
was used by the corporation; that the contract was adopted by
it; that it made various payments to the plaintiff on account^
and that it indorsed the note in suit, intending to become surety
for its payment and to procure credit for Witherbee and itselL
The pleadings and the proofs will be examined more in detail
later.
The case was tried at a jury term, and the plaintiff gave evi-
dence tending to prove the position already outlined. At the
close of plaintiff's case, the counsel for defendants moved
to dismiss the complaint on a number of grounds covering the
five separate causes of action. As to the first and second causes
of action, the only ones involved on this appeal, the court
granted the motion on the ground that during the period of
default in filing the annual report the liability of the corpora-
tion to the plaintiff was merely contingent, and did not ripen
into a debt until the protest of the note in April, 1887, when the
default no longer existed.
G34 q^ij^g plaintiff duly excepted to this ruling, and the general
term of the superior court of the city of New York affirmed
the judgment entered at the trial. A preliminary point is taken
here by defendants, that the question whether the corpora-
tion is liable otherwise than as an indorser is not open on this
appeal, as it was not urged on the motion to dismiss.
The question is raised by the pleadings and the proofs, and
the exception to the ruling dismissing the complaint calls upon
us to determine whetlier, upon the plaintiff's proofs, he was
entitled to go to the jury: First Nat. Bank v. Dana, 7 N. Y.
108; East Hampton v. Kirk, 68 N. Y. 459; Frecking v. Rolland,.
53 N. Y. 424; Stone v. Flower, 47 N. Y. 566.
It becomes necessary to examine the issues and the evidence
more in detail. The complaint avers as to the first and second
causes of action as follows: "That said Port Henry Steel & Iron
Company, Limited, by its treasurer, or agent, thereto duly au-
thorized, with the intent and purpose of becoming surety for
the payment of said note, and with the intent and purpose of
inducing this plaintiff to give credit to said Witherbee and to
said corporation, and to forbear action against them, and each
of them, upon said indebtedness, duly indorsed said note at or
before the delivery thereof to this plaintiff, intending that this
plaintiff should accept the same upon the strength of said in-
dorsement. That this plaintiff, upon the strength of said in-
dorsement, did accept said note, and gave credit to said Wither-
bee and said corporation, and forebore action upon such indebt-
April, 1899.] Witherow v. Slayback. 611
edness against them, and each of them, as is hereinafter stated/*
The answer denies these allegations of the complaint, and at
the trial the plaintiff offered proof tending to sustain them.
It appears that the case contains all the evidence and that plain-
tiff's proofs were admitted without ohjection.
The salient facts established by the plaintiff are as follows^
viz, : The Port Henry Steel & Iron Company, Limited, was not
fully organized until the latter part of May, 1885, and ^^^ earliel^
in that month a proposition was drawn by plaintiff and ad-
dressed to the company offering to deliver to the latter its steel
plant for twenty-one thousand, four hundred and fifty dollars.
This proposition was accepted by T. F. Witherbee as super-
intendent of the company. It was then discovered that this
contract antedated the formation of the company, and there-
upon a second proposition was made out, being like the former
one, except it was addressed to T. F. Witherbee individually,
and was subsequently accepted by him in that capacity. The
plaintiff went on and erected this steel plant on the premises
leased by the company for the transaction of its business, and
Witherbee never paid anything on the contract, but several pay-
ments were made by the company, reducing the indebtedness
to the amount of the note referred to in the complaint, which
is the balance due plaintiff.
Plaintiff, about April, 1886, was pressing for his money, and
it was finally arranged that Witherbee should give him his note,,
which was dated April 3, 1886, indorsed by the company. At
or about this time Witherbee assigned to the company his con-
tract with plaintiff to furnish the steel plant.
Mr. Dickey, the treasurer of the company, testified: "I told
Witherbee that we had paid about half the price of the plant,
that we gave a note for the balance or indorsement on the
note for the balance, and we must have the plant for security
for that, and Witherbee agreed to do so — to transfer it, to make
such transfer — which he did. I think it was a few days before-
I indorsed that note that I obtained this transfer. The company
was then in possession of this plant, and continued in possession
of it until some time in August, 1886; it was operating the plant
up to that time, At the time this note was indorsed that plant
was the only plant the company had for manufacturing steel,,
and the only one they ever had, to my knowledge.
Witherbee refused to give the original note of April 3, 1886,
to plaintiff unless it was indorsed by the company, as he had
no interest in the transaction.
612 WiTHERow V. Slayback. [New York,
*^^ Witherbee swears that he made out the note of April 3,
1886, and the renewal thereof October 6, 1886, upon the di-
rection of the treasurer of the company, and that he never re-
■ceived any consideration therefor.
The company used this steel plant as its own from the time
it was delivered, and, when financially involved, executed a mort-
gage thereon to its creditors before the first note matured. The
■company seems to have exercised exclusive dominion over the
property in every way.
The plaintiff and appellant now insists that, in this condition
of the record, it was error to have dismissed the complaint.
While the question now presented is somewhat novel and not
without its difficulties, we are of opinion that, in accordance
■with well-settled general principles, parol evidence, as between
the original parties, was admissible to show the real transaction.
"The liability of the defendant directors depends upon what the
real relations of the company are to this matter. The issues in-
volve the entire history of this transaction between the original
parties — no rights of third persons have intervened.
Mr. Daniel, in his work on Negotiable Instruments, section
710, in commenting on the general admissibility of parol evi-
•dence to ascertain intention as between immediate parties, uses
this language: "When the note is negotiable, the quipstion is
by no means capable of such easy and satisfactory solution; but
■whatever diversities of interpretation may be found in the au-
thorities on the subject, they very generally concur, though not
with entire unanimity, that, as between the immediate parties,
the interpretation ought to be in every case such as will carry
their intention into effect, and that their intention may be made
■out by parol proof of the facts and circumstances which took
place at the time of the transaction."
In section 711 the same writer says: "The ground upon which
parol proof of intention and agreement in such cases is *'''' ad-
mitted is that the position of the name upon the paper is one
of ambiguity in itself — that it is not a complete contract as in
the case of indorsement by the payee, which imports a distinct
and certain liability; but rather evidence of authority to write
over it the contract that was entered into, and that parol proof
merely discloses and brings to light the terms of the unwritten
■contract that was made beween the parties."
A large number of cases in this state have recognized the above
principle, and the contract of indorsement haw been varied and
<jualified by parol evidence.
April, 1899.] Witherow v. Slayback. 613
In Moore v. Cross, 19 N. Y. 227, 75 Am. Dec. 326, it was
held that one who, for the acommodation of the maker, indorses
his note payable to a third person, is liable thereon to such payee
as indorser. The plaintiff alleged in his complaint and proved
at the trial that the note and indorsement were made with full
knowledge that plaintiff took it in payment for coal sold and
delivered to the maker.
In Bank of Genesee v. Patchin Bank, 19 N. Y. 312, S. B. S.,
a cashier, sent to the plaintiff to be discounted a bill of ex-
change of S. B. S., Cash., indorsed by him, with the same addi-
tion to his signature, and inclosed in a letter dated at the bank-
ing house, and signed S. B. S., Cash.
It was held, after receiving parol evidence of the entire trans-
action, that the circumstances imported that the indorsement
was that of the bank in the regular course of business, and not
that of S. B. S. individually.
In Meyer v. Hibsher, 47 N. Y. 265, the action was upon a
promissory note brought by the payee against the indorser; the
complaint alleged that the note was executed and indorsed as a
condition of a loan by the payee to the makers, and as security
for the payment thereof, and then set out the note which, by
its terms, was given "for value received."
This court held that the averments were sufBcient to author-
ize evidence of the indorser's privity with the negotiation, and
that if he indorsed with full knowledge of the facts, he was
placed in the same condition to the payee as though it had been
done by agreement.
«S8 In Coulter v. Richmond, 59 N. Y. 478, it was held that
the presumption that one who has indorsed a promissory note
in blank, before the delivery to the payee, intended to become
liable simply as second indorser and so not liable to the payee,
may be rebutted by parol proof that the indorsement was made
to give the maker credit with the payee. To the same effect
are Jaffray v. Brown, 74 N. Y. 393; Good v. Martin, 95 TJ. S.
90; Patch v. Washburn, 16 Gray, 82. The same principle is
recognized in the following cases: Phelps v. Vischer, 50 N. Y.
69, 10 Am. Rep. 433; Clothier v. Adriance, 51 N". Y. 322; Hub-
bard V. Matthews, 54 N. Y. 43, 13 Am. Rep. 562; Hubbard v.
Gurney, 64 K Y. 457; Breneman v. Fumiss, 90 Pa. St. 186, 35
Am. Rep. 651.
We thus see that betweon the original parties the apparent
rights of the indorser on the face of the note and contract of
AM. St. Rep., Vol. LXX.-83
514 WiTHEBow V, Slayback. [New York,
indorsement are constantly qualified and changed by parol evi-
dence.
In the case at bar, the plaintiff seeks to charge the directors
of a corporation, and the latter. endeavor to avoid liability, by
insisting that on the face of the note and indorsement the cor-
poration is a strict indorser, only contingently liable when the
paper is due and the company is charged; also that protest was
after annual report filed.
This plaintiff, payee, urges that both on principle and au-
thority he should be allowed to show the real transaction, the
true situation, in order to establish that this corporation was
privy to the consideration of the note, and was on the facts
liable to the plaintiff, and that its directors cannot shield them-
selves behind the technical defense of the strict contract of in-
dorsement.
We are of opinion that the parol evidence showing the history
of the indebtedness which resulted in the notes in question was
properly received and should have been submitted to the jury.
The defendants' counsel has cited the case of Hall v. New-
comb, 3 Hill, 233, 7 Hill, 416, 42 Am. Dec. 82, as a controlling
authority ^^^ against the plaintiff on this appeal. The question
in that case was whether a person who puts his name in blank
upon the back of a negotiable note, which is drawn in such
form that he may be charged as indorser in the usual mode, if a
demand is made and notice of nonpayment given, can be charged
as a general surety, without such demand and notice by parol
evidence merely. It appeared that the holder of the note had
neglected to make demand and give notice of nonpayment to tlie
indorser, and then sought to hold him, after he was discharged,
by showing a different contract.
On the special facts of that case it was well decided and is
not in conflict with plaintiff's position here, or the cases to which
reference has already been made.
In the case at bar, the note was duly protested, and the ques-
tion here does not concern protest, but is one between the plain-
tiff and the directors of the corporation, based on the real re-
lations of the corporation to the plaintiff's claim.
In Hall V. Newcomb, 3 Hill, 233, 7 Hill, 416, 42 Am. Dec. 82,
no such question arose as is here presented. It was not claimed
that Newcomb had received the consideration of the debt — was,
in fact, the debtor. It was an effort to hold him as guarantor
when, under the facts, he was a strict indorser. Spies v. Gil-
more, 1 N. Y. 321, is to same effect.
April, 1899.] Withebow v. Slayback. 515
The counsel for the plaintiff has -Bought, on this appeal, to
maintain two distinct propositions, among others, viz. : The first
one is that the ordinary contract of indorsement creates a debt
when entered into without regard to the subsequent maturity
of the note, demand and due protest.
The case of Barclay y. Weaver, 19 Pa. St. 396, 57 Am. Dec.
661, and other cases in foreign jurisdictions, are cited to the
«ffect that demand and notice are no part of the contract,
but only steps in the legal remedy upon it. We express no
opinion on this proposition as to its correctness, or whether it ia
an open question in this state.
The other proposition is, in substance, that if, as between
the parties, the indorser is shown to be the principal debtor,
the note having been made for his accommodation, or, in ®***
other words, that he has no recourse against the maker, then de-
mand and notice were not necessary; that it was not the strict
•contract of indorsement.
In Commercial Bank v. Hughes, 17 Wend. 94, Judge Cowen
says: "Where the indorser or drawer has plainly suffered noth-
ing, and can sustain no mischief for want of demand and notice,
none need be made or given; and it accords with the true and
only reason why such demand and notice are called for. The
question seems to be merely one of evidence. The drawer or
indorser is presumed to have been injured by the omission, until
the plaintiff, by proof on his side, remove all chance of damage."
In Mechanics' Bank v. Griswold, 7 Wend. 168, Judge Nelson,
in speaking of when notice to the indorser is not necessary, goes
on to say: "Thus, where the indorser is himself the debtor, as
where the note is discounted fof his accommorldtion, and the
money raised upon it is received by him, and therefore he ulti-
mately holden to pay it, it is obvious that the reason of the rule
cannot apply": See, also, Eay v. Smith, 17 Wall. 415; Story on
Promissory Notes, sees. 268, 357.
The plaintiff's counsel bases on this second proposition the ar-
gument that if he succeeds in establishing a state of facts that
shows the indorser was himself the debtor and not entitled to
due notice of protest, then the debt that is sought to be collected
of the defendants, as directors of the corporation, was either
contracted when the first note was given, April 3, 1886, or was
at that time an existing debt, having its origin when the steel
plant was delivered by plaintiff to the corporation.
We are of opinion that this is a question that the plaintiff
is entitled to litigate on a new trial, and if he succeeds in show-
516 WiTHEBOw V. Slayback. [New York,
ing to the satisfaction of a jury that the corporation is really
the principal debtor of the plaintiff in this transaction, then
the debt did not arise at the time of due notice of protest, but
existed when the original note was given on the third of Aprils
1886.
6G1 ijijjQ defendants raised the point at general term and
again urge it here, that the plaintiff is not entitled to recover
under the second cause of action, to wit, the failure to file a
report within twenty days after the first day of January, 1887,
for the reason that in August, 1886, the company abandoned
its business and franchises, and turned over all its property ta
its creditors.
It is sufficient answer to this point that the plaintiff's debt,
if this action is to be maintained, was contracted and existed
prior to August, 1886, when it is alleged that the corporation
ceased to exist. As the record now stands, however, it is quite
clear that the corporation did not cease to exist in August, 1886.
On August 13, 1886, the corporation released and surrendered
to certain creditors property described, in consideration of ex-
tending payment of its indebtedness, with covenant on part of
creditors that they would return the property to the corpora-
tion at any time prior to January 1, 1887, on conditions named.
On the twenty-fourth day of August, 1886, the corporation mort-
gaged certain personal property to the same creditors.
It was proved that these transfers did not embrace all of the
property of the corporation, and some of the omitted portion was
hypothecated to secure other creditors. The real significance
of these transactions consists in the fact that the company ex-
ercised acts of absolute ownership and dominion over certain of
the property involved in this action.
In addition to this the record discloses that the corporation
filed in the office of the secretary of state on the twenty-eighth
day of January, 1887, a certificate of payment of the entire capi-
tal stock of the company, and that on the eighteenth day of
February, 1887, and in January, 1888, filed in the same office its
annual reports. It thus appears that the company did not cease
to exist in August, 1886.
The counsel for the appellant argues one exception to the re-
jection of evidence. **** The deposition of the makers of the note
was read on the trial and the witness was asked this question: "Q.
T)id the company agree to relieve you from the payments which
youwere to make?" Thiswas objected to as immaterial, irrelevant^
April, 1899.] Hebteb v. Mullen, 517
and incompetent, because it is not the best evidence. Thero
was no evidence that the agreement referred to was in writing.
The proper objection to the question was that it called for a
conclusion as to the nature of the agreement. As the error in
this ruling was at best technical the plaintiff is not in a position
to urge his exception. The information sought for was relevant
under a proper form of question.
The judgment appealed from should be reversed and a new
trial granted, and with costs to the plaintiff in all the courts
to abide the event.
All concur, except Parker, C. J., and O'Brien, J., not voting.
NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS — OORPORATIONS-PABOL
EVIDENCE TO VARY CONTRACT OF INDORSEMENT.— Parol
evidence is always competent to show the real agreement and re-
lations of the parties to a note. If the Indorsement upon the bacls
of it is in blanlv, or the names of the parties are so placed upon it,
or the contract is so ambiguous upon its face, as to leave it doubtful
what the real intention of the parties is, parol testimony may be
resorted to in order to establish the true relation of the parties to
•the note and to each other: Notes to Ewan v. Brooks- Waterfield Co.,
60 Am. St Rep. 727; Kulenkamp v. Groflf, 15 Am. St. Rep. 287, 288.
■Compare note to Drennan v. Bunn, 7 Am. St. Rep. 366. As between
the parties to a negotiable instrument, a blank indorsement may be
modified by parol evidence, and the entire transaction may be thus
shown, although resting partly in writing and partly in parol:
Holmes v. First Nat. Bank, 38 Neb. 326, 41 Am. St. Rep. 733. A
negotiable note given by a corporation Is binding: Mott v. Hicks, 1
Oow. 513, 13 Am. Dec. 550; but whether a corporation alone Is bound
by a writing signed by its officers, or whether the latter incur per-
sonal liability. Is a question of intention to be determined from what
appears on the face of the writing: Yowell v. Dodd, 3 Bush, 581, 96
Am. Dec. 266.
Herter V. Mullen.
[169 New Yokk, 28.]
LANDLORD AND TENANT-HOLDING OVER— WHAT
NECESSARY TO CONSTITUTE.— A holding over by a tenant after
the expiration of his lease for a year, so as to render him liable for
another year's rent, must be by such voluntary act that the law im-
plies a contract on his part, or leasing of the premises for another
year. Such implication does not arise from his act due to any stress
of circumstances which involves peril to his life, or that of some
member of his family.
LANDLORD AND TENANT-HOLDING OVER-RETEN-
TION OF POSSESSION CAUSED BY SICKNESS.— If a tenant
t)y the year, intending to surrender the premises at the end of his
term. Is obliged to retain a room in the leased house for a short
period of time after his lease expires in order to avoid the peril of
«xpo8lng a sick member of his family to danger or death, this Is not
518 Herter v. Mullen. [New York,
a Lolding over within the meaning of the rule that if the tenant
holds over the landlord may continue the lease and recover rent for
another year.
LANDLORD AND TENANT— HOLDING OVER— OMISSION
TO SURRENDER PREMISES, WHAT EXCUSES.— The failure or
the tenant to surrender the premises upon the expiration of his term
is excused when rendered impossible by act of God, unavoidable
accident, or stress of circumstances imperiling his life, or that of
some member of his family, so far as his liability to pay rent for
another term is involved by his holding over under such circum-
stances.
B, J. Tinney, for the appellants.
G. P. Smith, for the respondent.
^® O'BKIEISr, J. The plaintiff's action was to recover rent
alleged to be due upon the lease of certain premises for the
month of May, 1895, and the six following months of that year.
The lease was executed in March, 1894, and was to terminate in
one year from the 1st of May following. The defendants, who
were the tenants under the lease, vacated the premises on May
15, 1895, but as it was claimed that they held over after the
expiration of the lease for fifteen days, it was held that they
were liable for the rent for another year, and the plaintiff re-
covered for the seven months of the year that had elapsed before
the commencement of the action. The rent, by the terms of
the lease, was payable monthly, and the court directed a verdict
for the plaintiff for five hundred and fifty-eight dollars and six-
ty-three cents, being the stipulated rent for the seven months^
with interest.
The complaint alleged the making of the lease, the possession
thereunder by the defendants, and that they had continued in
possession until the time of the commencement of the action.
The defendants, in their answer, allege that they surrendered
possession of the premises to the plaintiff on May 15, 1895, and
that he accepted such surrender; that they had notified him in
the month of February preceding that they would not take or
keep the house for another year after May 1, 1895, when the
term fixed by the lease expired; ^* that after this notice the
plaintiff was permitted to show the premises to persons wishing
to hire or purchase them, and to place upon the house the usual
notice that it was to let; that the defendants moved from the
house with all their property and belongings, and that of the fam-
ily, on the first day of May, 1895, before the lease expired, ex-
cept from the bedroom where their mother was confined by a
dangerous illness until the 15th of May following, when she
April, 1899.] Herter v. Mullen. 519
was removed and the premises wholly vacated, and that they
were forbidden by the physician in charge from moving or dis-
turbing the mother during the fifteen days, and were informed
by him that it would imperil her life if an attempt was made
to remove her. These affirmative allegations in the answer were
pleaded together as a single defense. On the trial it was con-
ceded that the defendants had the affirmative of the issues, since
the written lease was produced and admitted by the pleadings
and the possession under it.
It appears from the record that the defendants' counsel then
proceeded to open the case to the jury, and at the close of the
opening the court suggested that the controversy would resolve
itself into a pure question of law, and that the facts should be
agreed upon. The plaintiff's counsel then admitted that the
notice from the tenants of their intention to surrender up the
premises on the 1st of May had been given in February, as al-
leged in the answer. The defendants' counsel then stated that
the reason for holding over after the expiration of the lease
was the sickness of the defendants' mother, she then being a
member of their family, and he stated that unless he could have
it admitted as it is pleaded that he wanted no admission what-
ever. The plaintiff's counsel then admitted that fact, as set
forth in the answer. The last clause of the answer contained
an allegation that the holding over was with the knowledge
and permission of the plaintiff, the landlord, and at the sug-
gestion of the plaintiff's counsel this allegation was withdrawn.
The case then states that upon the record and the defendants*
counsel's opening, the court, at the request of the plaintiff's
counsel, directed a verdict against the defendants ^^ for five
hundred and fifty-eight dollars and sixty-three cents, and that
the defendants excepted to this direction.
It is somewhat difficult to ascertain from the record just what
questions were passed upon by the court at the trial. It is clear
enough that he held that the defendants were liable for an-
other year's rent from the 1st of May, 1895, notwithstanding
the facts alleged in the answer in respect to the illness of the
defendants' mother, and the impossibility of her removal with-
out endangering her life.
The learned court must also have held that the other allega-
tions of the answer pleaded in connection with the fact just
referred to, that upon the removal of the mother on the fifteenth
day of May, 1895, the defendants surrendered the premises to
the plaintiff, and that the latter accepted such surrender, waa
520 Herter v. Mullen. [New York,
•
not available as a defense. In view of the fact that the defend-
ants were requested to withdraw a particular clause in the an-
srer, which was complied with, and of the further fact that the
case states that a verdict was directed upon the record and the
opening of the defendants' counsel, it must, I think, be as-
sumed that the decision was that the answer contained no de-
fense after the allegation had been withdrawn, which stated that
the holding over was with the consent of the landlord. After
the defendants' counsel had withdrawn this allegation he stated
that he desired to have the other facts admitted just as he had
pleaded them, and this request was complied with. The admis-
sion, therefore, must be held to cover all the facts affirmatively
pleaded in the answer, except the particular allegation which
had been withdrawn. After verdict was directed against the
defendants it would not be a fair construction of what took place
at the trial to hold that the admission applied only to the single
fact of holding over on account of the sickness of the motiier.
It must, think, be held that it was an admission of all the facts
affirmatively pleaded, except the single allegation which the
plaintiff's counsel requested to be withdrawn. The direction
having been made upon the opening of the plaintiff's counsel,
which does not appear in the case, and upon the record, the
fair construction is that a verdict ^** was directed upon the an-
swer, after modification by the withdrawal of the allegation re-
ferred to and upon the opening of counsel. The record in this
connection must mean the pleadings in the case : Kley v. Healy,
127 K Y. 555.
It was, therefore, admitted by the plaintiff's counsel that fif-
teen days after the expiration of the term provided by the lease
the tenants surrendered the premises to the landlord and that
the latter accepted tlie surrender. After the surrender there
could be no recovery of rent, since the landlord could not have
the use of the premises and the stipulated rent at the same time.
When a landlord accepts a surrender of the premises, this act
operates to discharge the tenant from all liability for rent in the
future, and if the construction of the proceedings at the trial
suggested be the correct one, then the direction of a verdict
against the defendants was error.
But perhaps the most important question in the case arises
upon the facts and circumstances which it is claimed constitute
a holding over by the tenant after the expiration of the term
epecificd in the lease. For every purpose necessary to the deter-
mination of that question we must assume that the facts are as
April, 1899.] Hebter v. Mullen. 521
alleged in the answer, since it must have been upon that assump-
iion that the verdict was directed. There can be no doubt that
the rule of law is settled beyond debate or controversy which
permits the landlord, at his election, to treat the tenant as hold-
ing for another year when the latter remains in possession after
the expiration of the term. When the demise is for a definite
term of one year at a fixed rent and the tenant holds over after
that term expires, the landlord may treat him as a tenant for
another year and collect rent accordingly: Haynes v. Aldrich,
133 N. Y. 287, 28 Am. St. Rep. G36; Adams v. Cohoes, 127 K
Y. 182. But the question is whether the tenant did in fact hold
over after the expiration of the term, within the meaning of
that rule. If it is an arbitrary one, applicable under all circum-
stances and conditions, and to be enforced in every case without
regard to the reason upon ^* which it is founded, it may be said
that in a strict sense there was a holding over in this case. But
this rule that obtains in the relation of landlord and tenant
is a part of the common law, the chief merit of which is sup-
posed to consist in its adaptability to changing circumstances
and new conditions as developed in the progress of time. It is
not an unchangeable code, like that of the Medes and Persians,
but a system that has grown up with the growth of civiliza-
tion, and is capable of being molded to meet the wants of society
in every stage of its progress. _ From the facts disclosed by the
answer in this case the tenant vacated the house at the expira-
tion of the term, except one bedroom in which a member of his
family was confined by illness so serious that he was warned
by the physician that any attempt to remove her would imperil
her life. The decision of the learned trial court in the case vir-
tually holds that on the last day of the tenant's term he was
placed in a position where he must either pay rent for another
year for a house that he did not intend to occupy, or to take
the risk of becoming, in a certain sense, responsible for the
death of his mother by attempting to remove her from a sickroom
against the protest of a physician. This would seem to be push-
ing a rule of law applicable to the relation of landlord and
tenant to a point which makes it very unreasonable, if not ab-
surd, and, before assenting to such an application of it, we are
naturally forced to inquire whether there was in fact any such
holding over by the tenant in this case as the rule fairly con-
templates. Does a tenant who, on the last day of the term is
upon his deathbed, or is quarantined in his house by the pub-
lic authorities to prevent the spread of some dangerous or in-
522 Herteb v. Mullen. [New York,
fectious disease, or is insane or compelled to remain in the house
against his will by some superior force or stress of circumstances^
hold over within the meaning of the law, or in the sense that
permits the landlord to treat him as a tenant for another year ?
The principle upon which the rule is founded is that the hold-
ing over is such an act of the tenant that the law implies a
contract on his part, or leasing of the premises for another year.
But whenever the law ^^ implies a contract from the act or con-
duct of the party, the act itself, whatever it may be, must b&
voluntary. The law does not imply a contract or obligation from
an act of the party which proceeds from mistake or fraud, or
which results from force or coercion of any kind, or is due to
any stress of circumstances which involves peril to his life or
that of some member of his family. To infer a promise or con-
tract from any act plainly resulting from such causes would
manifestly be contrary to reason and justice. The question,
therefore, occurs whether the tenant in this case, by failing to
remove his mother from the bedroom in the house, or by her
presence there during the fifteen days after the expiration of the
term, should be held for another year's rent, on the principle
that an agreement to hold for another year is to be implied
by law from his conduct under the circumstances. If this ques-
tion must necessarily be answered in the affirmative, there would
be no grounds for any further discussion. But it seems to me
that, upon reason and all the analogies of the law, a hiring foi
another year cannot and should not be implied against the ten-
ant under such circumstances. The case is not within the rea-
son of the rule, and, therefore, is not governed By it. While this
court has firmly adhered to the principle that the landlord is
entitled to treat the tenant who holds over as lessee for another
year, it is plain, from what was said in one of the most recent
cases, that the rule was not considered an arbitrary one. On
the contrary, it is intimated that it was not so rigid that it could
not properly be made to bend in exceptional and peculiar cases:
Haynes v. Aldrich, 133 N'. Y. 287, 28 Am. St. Kep. G36. Where
the holding over is wrongful or voluntary, and not unavoidable
in the strictest sense, the rule must be permitted to have full
application. But where the tenant, as in this case, is obliged
to retain a room in the house for a short period of time in order
to avoid the peril of exposing a member of his family to danger
and death, it cannot properly be said that it is a holding over
within the meaning of the law. Where a party acts under such
a stress of circumstances, the act cannot be said to proceed from
April, 1899.] IIerter v. Mullen. 625
his own volition any more than if he '** had been detained in
the house by the police under the direction of the health au-
thorities.
In Haynes v. Aldrich, 133 K Y. 287, 28 Am. St. Eep. 636^
this court enforced the rule in a case where the facts were quitt*^
different from those appearing in the record now before us. In
that case, however, the learned judge who spoke for the court
evidently had in mind some case which might be considered an
exception to the rule. That is the plain inference from the fol-
lowing paragraph of the opinion: "I do not mean to say that
whether there has been a holding over at all may not some times^
be 80 doubtful upon the facts as to require a submission to the-
jury. I mean to say that there is no such doubt in the present
case. I reserve the question, also, whether there might not be-
an unavoidable delay, in no manner the fault of the tenant,
directly or indirectly, which would serve as a valid excuse. It is-
enough that here was a holding over not unavoidable, which
might have been provided against, and where the chief difficulty
grew directly out of the tenant's own wrongful act." In Jones
V. Shears, 4 Ad. & E. 832, the defendants had rented a coal mine-
for twenty-one years, with the proviso that they migftt terminate
the tenancy at any time by giving a previous notice to that ef-
fect. The term commenced in April, 1825, and four years
thereafter the defendants gave the notice provided for. Tlrey^
however, continued in possession for two months after the expi-
ration of the time limited by the notice, working the mine. The
landlord brought an action for the rent, claiming that the hold-
ing over gave him the right to treat them as tenants at the
former rent. The defendants claimed that this holding over
was not with any intent to waive the notice and renew the ten-
ancy, and that they had the right to show the circumstances
under which they so held over. Upon this question of intent
they, therefore, proposed to show that the coal worked by them
during those two months was taken from pillars of coal which-
supported the roof of the mine, and that it was customary for
the tenant, on leaving the mine, to cut away as much coal as
could with safety be removed. This evidence "was allowed, and
Coleridge, J., left ^"^ it to the jury to say whether, under the
circumstances, the defendants held over with the intent to waive
the notice and continue the tenancy or not. The jury found a
verdict for the defendants, and a subsequent motion for a new
trial was denied. Upon appeal to the king's bench, the ruling
at the trial was affirmed, Lord Denman, chief justice, saying r
£24 Herter v. Mullen. [New York,
''It was impossible upon this issue not to leave the question to
the jury, and it was for them to decide whether the parties, by
their mode of continuing in possession, showed an intention to
waive their notice to quit and to remain tenants as before."
Littledale, J., also said: "I do not know that where a tenant
holds over he is always to be considered as bound to hold upon
the same terms as far as they are applicable Here, how-
ever, the question was not whether the parties held over on the
terms of the original tenancy, but whether they held over as ten-
-ants at all. It was for the jury to say whether the defendants
intended to avail themselves of their notice to quit, or whether
the acts done by them amounted to a waiver of such notice." In
dhitty on Contracts, eighth American edition, pages 286, 287,
^fter discussing the effect of the receipt by the landlord of rent
after the expiration of the term, and a holding over by the ten-
ant, the learned author adds: "And both the fact of holding
over and the payment of rent may be explained so as to rebut
the presumption that the parties intended thereby to create a
tenancy from year to year." The law in many cases excuses a
party from the performance of a contract or some other act when
-disabled by sickness. Such was the decision of this court in a
•case where a party had contracted to render personal services for
a specified time, but after a partial performance was disabled by
sickness. It was held that, notwithstanding the nonperform-
ance by reason of this disability, the person rendering the ser-
vices was entitled to recover upon a quantum meruit: Wolfe v.
Howes, 20 N. Y. 197, 75 Am. Dec. 388. The disability of a
party to do the particular tb".ng, or to perform tbe contract by
reason of sickness is held to be a disability by the act of God.
So it has been held that sureties upon a recognizance to secure
the ^** attendance of the principal at court to answer to a crim-
inal charge may, when sued upon the recognizance, defend upon
the ground that the principal was disabled from attending by
reason of sickness: People v. Tubbs, 37 N. Y. 686. The gen-
■eral rule is, that where the performance of a duty or charge cre-
ated by law is prevented by unavoidable accident without the
fault of the party, he will be excused : Dexter v. Norton, 47 N.
Y. 62, 7 Am. Hep. 415; Mill Dam t'oundry v. Hovey, 21 Pick.
441.
It is important to note with more distinctness the wide dif-
ference between this case and Haynes v. Aldrich, 133 N. Y. 287,
28 Am. St. Pep. 636. In that case, the tenant violated one of
the covenants of the lease by subletting the premises. The sub-
April, 1899.] Heetee v. Mullen. 625
tenant held over after the expiration of the term, and the tenant
was sued for rent upon the principle that the holding over cre-
ated a tenancy for another year. The tenant sought to excuse
the holding over by the allegation that a distant relative of th&
subtenant, who was in possession, was detained in the house after
the expiration of the term by sickness. This court held that in-
asmuch .as the subletting was in violation of the lease and was a
wrongful act on the part of the tenant, that he could not be ex-
cused by a situation which was plainly the result, of his own vio-
lation of a covenant of the lease. It is plain that the situation
which it was claimed excused the tenant was of his own creation
by putting another party in possession of the premises. The
holding over in that case was very properly attributed to the
wrongful act of the tenant in putting a stranger into possession
of the demised premises.
When a tenant for a year actually holds over after the expira-
tion of the term, the legal consequences which follow are well
settled and understood. The landlord may, at his election, treat
him either as a trespasser or a tenant for another year, but in
any case the fact of holding over must be established. The
landlord cannot treat him as a tenant and collect the rent for
another year, unless the facts are such as to justify him in pro-
ceeding against him as a trespasser. An act which might ordi-
narily constitute a trespass, when done or committed ^® inten-
tionally or voluntarily, cannot always be such when done or com-
mitted involuntarily: Moak's Underbill on Torts, 10, 15. The
mere fact that the tenant or some member of his family is
■obliged to remain in a room in the house after the expiration of
the demised term may not necessarily amount to a trespass.
Whether it does or not must depend upon circumstances. If he
is detained there by the act of God or of some superior legal
power, or some unavoidable necessity, he is not ordinarily
deemed to be a trespasser. A trespass presupposes some wrong-
ful act toward the person or property of another. If the ten-
ant in this case actually held over, the plaintiff could maintain
ejectment against him; but since his intention to remove on the
day the lease expired is clear, and this purpose was defeated
only by the dangerous illness of a member of his family, it would
would, I think, be difficult to say that he had such a possession
of the house as would support an action of ejectment, and the
same facts and circumstances that would protect him from such
an action would also defeat the present claim, which is based
upon the theory of an implied agreement to lease for an'olher
526 Herteb v. Mullen. [New York,
jear. I do not mean to say that the facts stated in the answer
would be a defense to an action by the landlord for damages
based upon the breach of the covenant in the lease to surrender
the demised premises at the expiration of the term. A duty or
•obligation imposed by law and one created by contract or cove-
nant stand upon different grounds when the party seeks to be
■excused by the act of God or unavoidable accident, or stress of
circumstances. But in this case the right of the landlord to
-collect rent for the second year does not depend upon any ex-
press contract or covenant. It rests wholly upon the legal im-
plication derived from the wrongful act of the tenant in hold-
ing over, and if that act was not in fact wrongful, but, under
the circumstances, excusable, then there is no basis for any im-
plied promise or agreement. I assume that if the tenant, or
«ome member of his family, should die on the last day of the
term, that no one would then contend that the continued occu-
pation of the house for a few '*® days during the funeral would
;amount to a wrongful holding over within the meaning of the
law. Such an interpretation of a principle of the common law
would shock not only our sense of justice, but every feeling of
•decency and humanity. The case before us differs from that
•only in degree. Both cases must be governed by a common
principle. It is obvious that in the application of the rule now
under consideration to the relation of landlord and tenant there
must be a point beyond which we cannot go, and that point is
reached when the alleged holding over cannot be attributed di-
rectly or indirectly to some fault on the part of the tenant.
There may be cases in which the occupation of a room in a house
after the lease has terminated will not amount to a trespass or
warrant the implication of a lease for another year. Since a
party cannot, as a general rule, commit a trespass or make a con-
tract without some effort of volition on his part, an act due to
unavoidable accident or resulting from some overruling neces-
sity or stress of circumstances can form no basis for imputing a
wrong or inferring a contract. It is reasonable, therefore, to
conclude from the facts and circumstances stated in the answer
that the defendant was not a trespasser during the fifteen days
that his mother occupied the room in the house and could not be
removed without endangering her life, nor a tenant for another
year. It follows, therefore, that the plaintiff was not entitled
to recover rent from the time when the house was completelj
vacated.
April, 1899.] Hebteb v. Mullen. 627
It may be said that this conclusion is a departure from prece-
dent, but it is not easy to see how it is. No case has been cited
«nd none has been found where it was held that such a state of
facts, or such a situation as is disclosed by the answer, amounted
to a holding over by the tenant within the meaning of the rule
that is invoked by the landlord to sustain this action. Legal
rules may sometimes be pushed to a point where they accomplish
the grossest injustice, and it then becomes the duly of the courts
to limit their application to cases that are within their true
€Cope and fair meaning. We go no further than to say that,
upon the facts stated in the "** answer, if conceded or estab-
lished, there was no holding over by the tenant within any fair
or reasonable meaning of the rule which permits the landlord
to continue the lease for another year.
The judgment should be reversed and a new trial granted,
•with costs to abide the event.
MARTIN, J. This action was to recover seven months' rent
of a dwelling-house situated upon Madison avenue in the city of
New York. There was a lease between the parties by which the
defendants rented the premises from May 1, 1894, for the period
of one year, the rent payable in monthly installments in ad-
vance. The rent for that term has been paid. By this action
the plaintiff seeks to recover rent for a portion of the succeed-
ing year, on the ground that the defendants held over after the
expiration of their term, and thus became liable for the rent of
the premises for that time.
The facts are undisputed. The defendants alleged as a de-
fense to the action the making of the contract or lease with the
plaintiff; that in the month of February, 1895, before the expi-
ration of their term, they notified the plaintiff that they would
not retain the premises for another year, and that after such
notice the plaintiff and his agents were permitted to show the
premises and to place the usual notice "To Let" upon them,
which remained during the balance of the term. The defend-
ants then specially alleged that on May 1, 1895, the defendants
were prevented from yielding up the possession of the premises
by the act of God in afflicting their mother, who was a member
of their family, with a disease which, at that time, previously
and subsequently, including May 15th. confined her to her bed
60 that it would have endangered her life to take her from the
house; that for that reason and no other, of which the plaintiff
had full knowledge and notice, the defendants were obliged to
528 Hebter v. Mullen. [New York,
and did occupy a small portion of the premises until May 15tlij
that all their property, furniture and belongings and their fam-
ily were removed from the premises, and every part thereof on
May 1, 1895, except *^ from the sickroom in which their
mother was confined, and that they were forbidden by the phy-
sician in charge to remove her until May 15th, when she was at
once removed.
Upon the trial it was admitted that upon the 1st of February^
1895, the defendants notified the plaintiff that on the 1st of
May they would give up and surrender the possession of the
premises. That they were occupied under the lease was ad-
mitted, also the rate of rent, and the fact that the defendants
from necessity held over after the expiration of the lease some
fifteen days. The plaintiff then admitted the facts set up in the
answer as to the impossibility of the defendants' surrendering
possession at the expiration of the year, so that the question
presented is whether, notwithstanding the facts alleged in the
answer, the plaintiff was entitled, as a matter of law, to recover
rent for the succeeding year, upon the ground that the defend-
ants held over after the expiration of their term.
The admission of the plaintiff amounts to a concession that
by reason of the sickness of the defendants' mother it was im-
possible for them to surrender up the possession of the premises
to the plaintiff; that so far as it was possible they did so; and
hence that their retention was wholly involuntary. If there
was any doubt as to the question of impossibility, it should have
been submitted to the jury, and the defendants' exception to the
direction of a verdict was well taken. Thus, in a word, the ques-
tion is whether that impossibility justified the defendants*
action, or whether, although it was impossible to surrender the
entire premises, the holding of a small part for a few days im-
posed upon them a liability for rent for the succeeding year.
It is well settled that where a tenant voluntarily holds over
after the expiration of his term, he may be held as upon an
agreement to hold for a year upon the terms of the prior lease:
Conway v. Starkweather, 1 Denio, 114; Commissioners of Pilots
V. Clark, 33 IST. Y. 251; Haynes v. Aldrich, 133 N. Y. 287, 289,
28 Am. St. Rep. 636.
The basis of this liability is often said to be an implied agree-
ment *^ upon the part of the tenant to hold for another year.
"While I doubt, as I always have, the propriety of calling this
class of oblifrations implied contracts, but think they are to be
regarded as duties which the law imposes, yet, whether they bo
April, 1899.] Hebteb v. Mullen. 529
denominated implied contracts or duties created by law, in either
case the right arises upon an implication of law and in no sense
upon an express or absolute contract.
It is also well settled that where a duty or charge is created by
law, and the performance is prevented by inevitable accident or
the act of God, without fault of the party sought to be charged,
lie will be excused, but where a person absolutely and by express
•contract binds himself to do a particular thing which is not at
the time impossible or unlawful, he will not be excused, unless
through the fault of the other party. The reason given for the
latter portion of this rule is that he might have provided by his
contract against inevitable accident or the act of God : Harmony
V. Bingham, 12 N. Y. 99, 62 Am. Dec. 142; Tompkins v. Dud-
ley, 25 N. Y. 272, 82 Am. Dec. 349; Dexter v. Norton, 47 N. Y.
€2, 7 Am. Eep. 415.
Thus the most that can be said of the obligation that arises
from the relation of landlord and tenant and follows by a gen-
eral lease, is that the tenant is charged with the duty of vacat-
ing the premises at the end of his term. If he fails, it is a
breach of his duty, and ordinarily the law implies or creates a,
liability on his part for another year's rent. This being a duty
implied or created by law and not by an express or absolute
agreement, it falls within the first part of the foregoing rule,
and hence it is obvious that if the tenant's removal was ren-
dered impossible by inevitable accident or the act of God, he
is excused for his omission to surrender the premises, at least
€0 far as it creates a liability for a* year's rent which is implied
by law.
The reason for the distinction between the effect of impossi-
bility of performance, occasioned by inevitable accident or the
act of God, upon an obligation created by express contract, and
upon an obligation which the law implies, has been held to rest
""upon the unwillingness of the law to at once ■** create, impose,
and exact the performance of an obligation forbidden or ren-
dered impracticable by the interposition of Providence": School
Dist. V. Dauchy, 25 Conn. 530, 68 Am. Dec. 371. Under the
principle of the authorities relating to this subject, I think it is
clear that, as the obligation sought to be enforced was one cre-
ated by law and not by the agreement of the parties, impossi-
bility of performance was a valid excuse, and the defendants
cannot be held for the rent for the subsequent year.
Moreover, the same result may be reached upon another
Ax. St. Rkp., Vol. LXX.— 84
630 Herteb v. Mullen [New Yorky
ground. There are many cases where the courts have implied'
a condition in a contract to the effect that a party is relieved
from its terms where its performance has, without his fault, be-
come impossible. The principle upon which those cases are-
based is that, when the contract was made, the parties contem-
plated that the condition which subsequently existed might
arise and render performance impossible, and that the implied
condition is to be construed as a part of the existing contract,
and thus relieves the party from liability in case that condition
arises: Dexter v. Norton, 47 N. Y, 62, 7 Am. Eep. 415; Loril-
lard V. Clyde, 142 N. Y. 456, 462; Stewart v. Stone, 127 N. Y.
507; Spalding v. Eosa, 71 N. Y. 40, 44, 27 Am. Eep. 7; Taylof
V. Caldwell, 3 Best & S. 826; Eobinson v. Davison, L. E. 6 Ex,
269; Kein v. Tupper, 52 N. Y. 650, 555; Dolan v. Eodgers, 149-
N. Y. 489, 492.
To hold in this case that this agreement was made upon an
implied condition that the defendants should not be required
to vacate the premises at the expiration of their term in the
event that it was rendered impossible by inevitable accident or
the act of God is quite within the principle of the authorities
cited. But be this as it may, it is manifest that the charge or
liability which the plaintiff seeks to enforce was created by law
and not by agreement, and that as its performance was pre-
vented without the defendants' fault, they were excused from
the onerous liability which the plaintiff now seeks to enforce.
It may well be, and doubtless is, true that the plaintiff may
recover "** for the time the premises were occupied by the de-
fendants, or, if by reason of their failure to surrender up the
premises additional damages follow, that they may be recovered
in a proper action so that all damages caused by the defendants*"
misfortune would be borne by them, but that he cannot recover
the rent for the subsequent year upon the implied contract op
duty imposed by law, seems to me clear.
These considerations lead me to the conclusion that the judg-
ment in this action should be reversed and a new trial ordered,^
with costs to abide the event.
MR. JUSTICE GRAY dissented and maintained that the present
case should form no exception to the rule that where there Is a
holding over by a tenant after the expiration of his lease for a year;,
the law implies an agreement to hold for another year upon the
terms of the prior lease. Such rule cannot "be affected by the fact
that the holding over by the defendants was by reason of the Illness-
of their mother, as a member of the family, and, therefore. In that
April, 1899.] IIerter «. Mullen. 531
sense, Involuntary. The doctrine has been long a settled one In this
state that a tenant who holds over his term, either Is a trespasser,
or continues to be a tenant, at the sole election of the landlord, and
that, in the latter case, the legal implication Is that he holds at the
former rent. As this appeal should be disposed of upon authority,
1 shall advert to a few cases and to the opinions which have been
expressed. The question was early discussed in what may be re-
garded as the leading case of Conway v. Starkweather, 1 Denio,
113, where the tenant held over his term for the period of two
weeks. Bronson, C. J., In his opinion, laid down the rule with con-
siderable pertinency and said that 'the tenant has no such election
as that which belongs to the landlord. If he holds over, though for
a very short period, without any unequivocal act at the time to give
his holding the character of a trespass, he is not afterward at lib-
erty to deny that he Is In as a tenant, if the landlord chooses to
hold him to that relation. If the tenant may hold over for two
weeks and then say he is not a tenant, I see no reason why he may
not give the same answer after holding over as many months or
years. The plaintiff's counSel regards the holding over as only pre-
sumptive evidence of the continuance of the tenancy, which would
have been sufficiently rebutted by the offered proof that the plaintiff,
before his term ended, refused to keep the property another year,
even at a reduced rent. But such are not my views. I do not
think this a case for balancing presumptions; but one where the act
of the plaintiff In holding over has given the defendants a legal
right to treat him as tenant; and that It Is not In his power to throw
off that character, however onerous it may be.' A number of years
later, in the case of Schuyler v. Smith, 51 N. Y. 309, 10 Am. Rep.
609, the defendants had held over for the period of three weeks
after the expiration of the lease and they opposed the claim of the
plaintiff to hold them as tenants for the whole year upon the ground
that they had given him notice, before the expiration of the term,
that they did not Intend to keep the premises for another year, and,
wifh his knowledge, had made arrangements to occupy other prem-
ises. Judire Earl, relying on the rule of law as settled by Conway
V. Starkweather, 1 Denio, 113, and since recognized by other cases,
that where a tenant holds over after the expiration of his term
the law will imply an agreement to hold for a year upon the terms
of the prior lease, overruled their contention and said: 'The safe
and just rule I believe to be the one established by authority, that
a tenant holds over the term at his peril; and the owner of the
premises may treat him as a trespasser or as a tenant for another
year upon the terms of the prior lease, so far as applicable.' Still
later, In Adams v. Cohoes, 127 N. Y. 175, Judge Potter, delivering
the opinion of this court, in the second division, discussed this ques-
tion In the light of the authorities, and observed that, 'so absolute
is the implication from holding over for a few days only, of a hiring
for another year, that the tenant will not be excused from the pay-
532 Herteb v. Mullen. [New York,
ment of rent, even where he gave the landlord notice before the
end of the term that he did not intend to hire for another year,
and had hired other premises which would be ready for his occu-
pancy in a few days.' Finally, we have the case of Haynes v.
Aldrich, 133 N. Y. 287, 28 Am. St. Kep. 636, where the holding ovet
by the defendant was from the 1st to the 4th of May, and it was
sought to be excused upon these facts, viz., that the first day of May
was a holiday; that on the second day of May there was difficulty
in engaging trucks, and that a sick boarder could not be moved with
safety until the fourth day. Judge Finch discusses, in his opinion,
the efficacy of such a defense somewhat elaborately, and, referring
to the rule as well settled by authority that, where there is a holding
over by the tenant, the law will imply an agreement to hold for a
year upon the terms of the prior lease, makes the following observa-
tions upon the argument of the appellant: 'The appellant does not
deny the rule, but seeks to qualify it so as to mean that it is only
when the tenant holds over voluntarily and for his own convenience
that the landlord's right arises, and that it does not so arise when
the tenant holds over involuntarily, not for his own convenience,
but because he cannot help it. I am averse to any such qualifica-
tion. It would introduce an uncertainty into a rule whose chief
value lies in its certainty. The consequent confusion would be very
great. Excuses would always be forthcoming, and their sufficiency
be subject to the doubtful conclusions of a jury, and no lessor would
ever know when he could safely promise possession to a new ten-
ant.' Again, he says that, 'if the rule in this case seems to involve
a hardship, that is sometimes true of every general rule, however
just and wise, but does not justify its abrogation. To sustain this
defense would open the door to a destruction of the settled doctrine
and tend to involve the rights of both lessor and lessee in uncer-
tainty and confusion.' This is pretty strong language; but the ap-
pellants, nevertheless, seek to distinguish the case as an authority;
because there is was a subtenant, w'hose illness prevented the sur-
render of possession, and the question was reserved whether there
might not be an inevitable delay, in no manner the fault of the
tenant, which would serve as a valid excuse. It Is true that there
Is that much of a distinction between the two cases; but I think the
distinction to be somewhat shadowy, so far as the excuse for not
yielding tip the premises promptly Is concerned, and I agree with
the reasoning of the opinion at the appellate division in the present
case, that 'no such qualification should be, or could safely be, im-
ported into the absolute rule of law. It would make the landlord
rather than the tenant suffer by reason of a misfortune to the tenant,
which he, and not the landlord, should bear the burden of.' " Mr.
Justice Gray also cited as supporting his view: Clinton Wire Cloth
Co. V. Cnrdner. 99 111. lf>l; Moore v. Beasley, 3 Oliio. 294; Vrooraan
V. McKalg, 4 Md. 4ij0, 50 Am. Dec. 88; Bacon v. Brown, 9 Conn. 3.34;
Hemphill v. Flynn, 2 Ta. St. 144; Wolffe v. WolCfe, 69 Ala. 549, 44
Am. Dec. 526.
April, 1899.] IIerier v, Mullen. 633
Mr. Justice Bartlett and Mr. Justice Yann concurred In the dis-
senting opinion.
liandlord and Tenant— Holdine: Over. Tenant, When Guilty of.
It is a universal rule that if premibes are let for a year, or from
year to year, and the tenant holds over, the landlord may elect to
treat him as a tenant from year to year, or, when the renting Is
for a shorter period, and the tenant holds over, he may be deemed
to hold upon the terms upon which he entered, and the landlord
may recover rent of him according to the terms of the original
contract or lease: Noel v. McCrory, 7 Cold. 623; Hall v. Myers, 43
Md. 446; Burbanli v. Dyer, 54 Ind. 392; Parker v. Hollis, 50 Ala. 411;
Usher v. Moss, 50 Miss. 208; Gardner v. Commissioners, 21 Minn.
33; Bacon v. Brown, 9 Conn. 334; Quinette v. Carpenter, 35 Mo. 502;
Laguerenne v. Dougherty, 35 Pa. St. 45; Schuyler v. Smith, 51 N. Y.
309. 10 Am. Rep. 609; Hayes v. Aldrich, 133 N. Y. 287, 28 Am. St.
Rop. 636; Adams v. Cohoes, 127 N. Y. 182. Or the landlord may, at
his election, treat the tenant holding over as a trespasser, and may
bring ejectment against him without any previous notice, unless the
holding over has been such that It may be presumed that the land-
lord has assented thereto: Smith v. Littlefield, 51 N. Y. 539; Blain r.
Everitt, 36 Md. 73; Hemphill v. Flynn, 2 Pa. St. 144; Jackson v.
Salmon, 4 Wend. 327; Brown v. Kellar, 32 111. 151, 83 Am. Dec. 258;
Crommelin v. Theiss, 31 Ala. 412, 70 Am. Dec. 499; Schuyler v.
Smith, 51 N. Y. 300, 10 Am. Rep. 609.
These rules being settled, it sometimes becomes a very Interest-
ing question as to whether the tenant has been guilty of such a
holding over as to bring him within their operation. Upon this
topic there is some difference of opinion. In a case very similar to
that of the principal case, a contrary rule was maintained In Michi-
gan. In that case. Mason v. Wierengo, 113 Mich. 152, It appeared
that the plaintiff, being the owner of a building, leased It for a term
of years, at an annual rental, to Wierengo, who occupied It as a
store. A short time before the expiration of the lease Wierengo
rented another building and informed plaintiff that he would vacate
the building owned by him at the expiration of the lease.
Preparation for removal began September 19th, and actual re-
moval began before September 26th. Counsel for the defendant
claimed that the lease expired October 1st at midnight. On Sep-
tember 26th, after the removal began, Wierengo was taken sick.
The work of removal was continued by his clerks, but, because of
his continued iUuess, It was not completed until October 11th.
Wierengo died October 6th. Counsel for the defense claimed that
the presumption of a renting for another year was rebutted by tfie
circumstances, and that it was made impossible for Wierengo to
vacate by the act of God.
In delivering the opinion of the court, Mr. Justice Hooker said:
"If it Is contended that the act of God excuses one from the per-
formance of his express contract to yield possession at the expira-
534 Herteb t;. Mullen. [New York,
tlon of his lease, we are unable to acquiesce in the contention. It
is only in those contracts which the act of God renders impossible
of performance, as where the subject matter of the contract dies,
or is destroyed, or where personal labor is contracted for, and the
person dies or becomes incapacitated through the act of God, that
a party is excused from performance. If, therefore, the sicliness of
Mr. Wierengo has any bearing upon the case, it is as a circumstance
bearing upon the question of the rebuttal of the presumption. Coun-
sel urge strenuously that the presumption of an intention to renew
the lease for a year arising from a holding over is not conclusive,
and that it may be rebutted. As a matter of fact, undoubtedly It
may be, but it is not so clear that It would constitute a defense
against the claim of the landlord who should acquiesce and elect to
treat the holding over as a renewal of the lease for a year, rather
than as a trespass. In the absence of qualifying circumstances im-
plying consent to a holding over under some new arrangement, the
holding over is a legal trespass, and does not depend upon the In-
tention of the tenant. It is a wrongful holding, whatever the cause,
though perhaps not culpable In a moral sense, and the rights of the
landlord are definitely fixed by the law. We thinli that there is a
uniformity in the decisions against the contention that the inten-
tion to vacate as soon as possible can affect the right of the land-
lord to elect to treat the holding over as a renewal of the lease for a
year. It requires some express or implied consent upon his part to
a holding over upon other conditions. This is wanting here. Coun-
sel urge the hardship of the application of the rule In this case, but
we cannot say that there is or is not hardship, or that we would be
justified in Imposing a burden upon the plaintiff to relieve the de-
fendant from a legal obligation. He appears to have tried to rent
the place, and has given defendant credit for what he has been able
to tlerive from the building. Had Wierengo lived, he might have
made the same claim if asl^ed to pay the rent for another year, but
it would not have relieved him. The situation, as It is, only differs
In the degree of Inconvenience, Intensified as It Is by the death of
Wierengo, and the change In his affairs naturally resulting. It is
unfortunate for his representatives that the store was not vacated,
but we discover no legal reason for lifting the burden of misfortune
from them, and Imposing It upon another, who Is in no way respon-
sible for it": Mason v. Wierengo, 113 Mich. 153.
In a case where the tenant went into, possession under a parol
lease of a brick yard and dwelling-house for one year, with the
privilege of four years at his option, and continued in possession
fur two years, It was held that, althougli the lease was void as to the
four years, yet, by the entry of the tenant and his holding over
after tlie first year. It became a lease from year to year, subject to
all the terms and conditions of the verbal lease, except as to the
ti'rm; and if. at the end of the second year, the tenant notifies the
landlord that he intends to leave and abandons the house and re-
April, 1899.] Herteb v. Mullen. 535
moves most of the brick, but leaves a portion of It In a shed which
he has erected upon the premises to protect the brick from the effects
of the weather, and does not remove it until some time afterward,
these facts, transpiring without the consent of the landlord, operate
as such a continuance of his tenancy as to enable the landlord to
treat him as a tenant for another year: Dorr v. Barney, 12 Ilun,
259. The New York cases, It seems to us, are, in principle at least,
•opposed to the ruling in the principal case. In the early case of
Conway v. Starkweather, 1 Denio, 113, the rule was announced that
if a tenant under a lease for a year or more, holds over after the end
of the term without any new agreement with the landlord, he may,
at the election of the latter, be treated either as a trespasser or as a
tenant holding upon the terms of the original lease, and that dis-
training for rent payable after the expiration of the original lease
is an election by the landlord to consider him a tenant. In this case
the court said: "The tenant has no such election as that which be-
longs to the landlord. If he holds over, though for a very short
period, without any unequivocal act at the time to give his holding
the character of a trespass, he Is not afterward at liberty to deny
that he is a tenant, if the landlord chooses to hold him to that rela-
tion. If the tenant may hold over for two weeks and then say that
he Is not a tenant, I see no reason why he may not give the same
-answer after holding over as many months or years. The plaiutiCf's
counsel regards the holding over as only presumptive evidence of tne
-continuance of tne tenancy, which would have been sufficiently re-
butted by the offer of proof that the plaintiff, before his term ended,
refused to keep the property for another year, even at a reduced
rent. But such are not my views. I do not think this is a case for
balancing presumptions; but one where the act of the plaintiff in
holding over has given the defendants a legal right to treat him as
a tenant; and that it is not In his power to throw off that character,
however onerous It may be": C!onway v. Starkweather, 1 DenIo,
115. In Schuyler v. Smith. 51 N. Y. 3C9, 10 Am. Rep. 009, It ap-
peared that the tenant* held over for three weeks after the expira-
tion of the lease, and then opposed the claim of the landlord to hold
them as tenants for the whole year, upon the ground that they had
given him notice, before the term expired, that they did not Intend
to keep the premises for another year, and, with his knowledge,
had made arrangements to occupy other premises. Mr. Justice
Earl, In delivering the opinion of the court reaffirming the de-
cision In Conway v. Starkweather, 1 Denio, 113, said: "The safe
and just rule I believe to be the one established by authority, that
a tenant holds over the term at his peril, and the owner of ih" prem-
ises may treat him as a trespasser or as a tenant for another year
upon the terms of the prior lease, so far as applicable": Schuyler v.
Smith, 51 N. Y. .^09. 10 Am. Rep. 609. Again In Adams v. Cohoes,
127 N. Y. 175, the court, through Potter, judge, said that: 'So ab-
solute Is the Implication from holding over for a few days only of a
536 Herter v. Mullen. [New York,
hiring for another year, that the tenant will not be excused from
the payment of rent, even where he gave the landlord notice before
the end of the term that he did not intend to hire for another year,
and had hired other premises which would be ready for his occu-
pancy in a few days." In Hayes v. Aldrich, 133 N. Y. 287, 28 Am.
St. Rep. 636, it appeared that the term of the tenant expired oa
May first, and before that time he notified the landlord that he did
not desire to renew his lease for another year. The 1st of May was
a holiday and possession was retained until May 4th, the excuse
being inability to get trucks to do the moving on the second day of
the month, and that, on the third one of the boarders was sicli and
could not then be moved with safety. On the afternoon of the 4th
of the month the lieys to the premises were tendered to the land-
lord, but refused, and, in an action to recover rent, it was held that
the landlord was entitled to consider the lease renewed for another
year. II a tenant, after the expiration of his term, supposing there
is no hurry in getting out, remains in possession of the leased prem-
ises four days after the expiration of his term, slowly removing his
goods to other premises previously hired by him, which could have
been removed in a much shorter time, but giving instructions to his
employes to move his goods at once if the landlord or his agent
asi^ed for the liey to the premises, the tenant is guilty of holding
over, and the landlord may elect to treat him as a tenant upon the
condiiicns of the first lease, although during negotiations for a new
term before the expiration of the lease he has posted a notice "Ta
Let" on the premises, and has allowed it to remain aftei' the expira-
tion of the term: Shanahan v. Shanahan, 23 Jones & S. 339.
A tenant for years who holds over only a few days may be treated
as a tenant for another year, the landlord having given him notice
to quit, although he has refused to renew the lease and has notified
tlie landlord that he has rented other premises, nor is he excused by
the fact that such other premises are not ready for his occupancy:
Wolffe V. Wolff, 69 Ala. 549, 44 Am. Rep. 526. A tenant from year
to year, who gives notice of his intention to terminate his tenancy
at the expiration of the current year, tendering the keys of the
premises to the landlord on the last day of that year, and, upon his
refusal to receive them, putting them into the doors of the buildings,
but who nevertheless continues for two weeks or more to use a por-
tion of the premises for storing some of his goods previously placed
thereon, and for delivering it to his customers by means of velilcles
of his own, loaded at the premises, and unloaded to customers at
other places, Is guilty of holding over so as to subject himself, at
the landlord's election, to be treated as taking the premises and be-
coming liable for rent at the prior contract rate for another year:
Cavanaugh v. Clinch, 88 Ga. 610.
Although the tenant gives notice prior to the termination of his
lease of his Intention to vacate, If he remains In possession after
the expiration of his term he becomes a tenant for another year,,
and liable as such under the terms of the old lease. "A tenant can-
p
April, 1899.] Hebteb v. Mullen. 637
not escape liability for the rent of another term by giving notlc»
that he Is going out at the end of his year, and then not going":
Graham v. Dempsey, 169 Pa. St. 460.
In Smith V. Snyder, 168 Pa. St. 541, It appeared that the tenant,
after giving notice of his Intention to quit the premises at the end
of his yearly term, Informed the agent of the landlord that he would
be willing to remain on the premises as tenant from month to month,
the agent informed him that he would communicate with the land-
lord and let him know before the expiration of the term. This he
failed to do. The tenant remained In possession for about a month
over his term, when he was Informed by the landlord that he would
not be accepted as a tenant from month to month, and It was held
that he was guilty of such a holding over as to create another ten-
ancy from year to year.
Although the rule is everywhere recognized that if a tenant for a
year or more holds over the term the landlord has the option to
treat him as a trespasser, or as a tenant for another year upon the
same terms as those of the original lease, some cases hold that
the above rule is only a rule of presumption, which may be rebutted
by proof of a different agreement or of facts Inconsistent with such
presumption, and that every continued occupjition of the premises
after the expiration of the term Is not a holding over within the
meaning of this rule. Thus, If, before the expiration of a lease for
a year the tenant Informs the landlord that he will not remain for
another year, but will remain for a short period, and pay rent at
t£e old rate for the length of time he remains In possession, and the
landlord acquiesces, and thereafter receives the rent, a tenancy
from year to year, or for another year. Is not created: Montgomery
v. Willis, 45 Neb. 434. And if the tenant, with the consent of the
landlord, remains over only pending negotiations for a new lease,
with the understanding that If a new lease Is not made the tenant
shall surrender the premises and not be liable for rent thereafter,
he cannot be held liable for another year's rent: Smith v.AUt, 7 Daly,
492, 4 Abb. N. C. 205. If a tenant talies a lease of other premises
from Tils landlord, he to take possession of them upon the expira-
tion of his present lease, and, they not then being ready for occu-
pancy, he surrenders his lease, but remains in possession of the old
premises for a few days over his term, when, upon receiving notice
from his landlord that he is regarded as holding over, he vacates
them, such holding over does not raise an implied tenancy for an-
other year, and the tenant Is liable for rent only for the time he
actually occupied the premises beyond his term: Wilcox v. Raddln,
7 111. App. 594. If a tenant, upon the expiration of his term, leaves
furniture and other property on the premises to be used by the ten-
ant succeeding him, under an agreement that It shall be returned
at the pleasure of the outgoing tenant, the landlord cannot, after
using such tenant's property for several months through 8ucc<'ed-
Ing tenancies, refuse to permit it* removal without the payment of
538 Bush t;. Board OF Supervisors OF Orange Co. [New York,
-a yearly rental of the premises. As there was no possession of any
part of the premises by the outgoing tenant, there was no holding
over by him from which a contract to pay the rent demanded could
be implied: Love v. Peirson, 10 Daly, 272. Under the Kentucky
statute, when the renting is for a year or more, to expire on a named
■day, the tenant may abandon the premises within ninety days next
succeeding the expiration of the term, and is not liable for a longer
period than he holds, unless by express contract he agrees to hold
the premises for a longer time: Mendel v. Hall, 13 Bush, 232.
UusH V, Board op Supervisors op Orange County.
[169 New York, 212.]
constitutional law— payments to drafted
MEN BY TAXATION.— A statute which empowers and directs the
supervisors of several counties, upon a petition of the majority of
the taxpayers, to raise by ordinary taxation the money needed to
pay to auy drafted man who served personally in the Civil War,
•or paid commutation money, or to his heirs a specified sum of money,
with interest for a period of years, is void as being beyond the tax-
ing power of the legislature, and as being in violation of a state
. constitution forbidding any coimty, city, town, or village to give
any money to or in aid of any individual, or to incur any indebted-
ness except for county, city, town, or village purposes.
F. E. Gilbert and W. Hull, for the appellants.
W. D. Guthrie and C. A. De Gersdorff, for the respondent.
^** PER CURIAM. This was a taxpayer's action to restrain
the board of supervisors from proceeding to levy a tax upon ono
of the towns of Orange county, in order to pay the claims of cer-
tain persons or their heirs, who were drafted into the military ser-
vice of the United States, or had commuted in lieu of such ser-
vice, under the act of Congress of March 3, 1803, entitled, "An
act for enrolling and calling out the national forces and for other
purposes." The parties seeking to enforce the claims proceeded
regularly under the provisions of chapter 664 of the Laws of
1892. It will be seen that under the provisions of this statute
the supervisors are directed to levy the tax in certain cases, and
upon due proof that certain conditions specified have been com-
plied with.
The courts below have sustained the action and restrained the
supervisors and the authorities of the town from proceeding
under the act. on the sole ground that the enactment in its en-
tire scope and purpose is in conflict with the constitution and
June, '99.] Bush v. Board of Supervisors of Orange Co. 539
therefore void. That is the only question necessary to consider
upon this appeal. The statute, in substance, empowers and di-
rects the supervisors of the several counties, upon a petition of
a majority of the taxpayers, to raise by ordinary taxation the
money needed to pay to any drafted man who served person-
ally in the Civil War, or paid commutation money, or to the
heirs of any such man, the sum of three hundred dollars, with
the interest thereon, for a period of about thirty years.
*^** Every government must possess the inherent right or
power to call upon its citizens to perform military duty in time
of war. The exercise of this power involves the right of self-
preservation, and that right in the government imposes upon
the citizen a corresponding duty to render such services when-
ever the emergency arises, and it is demanded of him. The gov-
ernment must necessarily be the judge of the necessity for re-
■quiring the performance of this duty. This power* was called
into action by the act of Congress referred to, since it provided
for a conscription to recruit the army. The individuals selected
in the manner provided by the act were under obligations to
serve, but they were permitted to commute such services, or pay,
in lieu thereof to the government, a specified sum of money.
The legislation which the courts below have condemned at-
tempted to authorize taxation for the purpose of refunding to
the person who paid, or his heirs, the moneys expended, with
interest, and to pay to the person who personally served under
the call, or to his heirs, a like sum, with interest.
The power to impose taxes, general or local, which rests witH
the legislature, is without much express restriction in the con-
stitution, and yet even this power cannot be said to be absolute.
On general principles, it has at least one limitation, and that is,
that the money to be raised must be required for some purpose
that in some sense, at least, can be said to be public. The legis-
lature cannot authorize taxation for the purpose of making gifts,
or paying gratuities to private individuals. It is quite clear
that this was the purpose of the act in question. The individ-
uals for whose benefit the tax was to be levied under the act, had
no claim, legal or equitable, against the town or county where the
money was to be raised by taxation. Those who actually served
tinder the conscription only discharged their obligations to the
g;eneral government. Those who commuted simply paid so
much money in order to be relieved from the obligation to ren-
der military service. In either case the individual did nothing
more than to discharge his obligations to the government as a
640 Bush v. Board of Supervisors of Orange Co. [New York>
citizen and ^^"^ hence he had no claim against the locality to
reimburse him for what he was obliged to do. The fact that a
majority of the taxpayers requested the supervisors to levy the
tax is of no importance. Majorities, however potent in many re-
spects, have no power to impose taxes upon the minority for the
purpose of raising money to be devoted to gifts or gratuities to
individuals. We think that under the general principles which
control the exercise of the power of taxation the legislature had
no power to pass the act in question.
It did not attempt to authorize taxation for any public pur-
pose, but was, in effect, a method of taking private property, not
for any public use, but for the benefit of private individuals.
Legislation of this character has often been questioned in the
courts and quite uniformly condemned : Taber v. Supervisors of
Erie Co., 131 N. Y. 432; Perkins v. Milford, 59 Me. 315; Moul-
ton V. Eaymond, 60 Me. 121; Freeland v. Hastings, 10 Allen,
570; Mead v. Acton, 13D Mass. 341; Kelly v. Marshall, 69 Pa. St.
319; Ferguson v. Landram, 1 Bush, 548.
The amendments to the constitution of this state, adopted in
1874, imposed an additional limitation upon the power of the
legislature to authorize taxation in counties or towns for pri-
vate or local purposes. By section 10, article 8, it was enacted
that no county, city, town, or village shall hereafter give any
money or property to or in aid of any individual, association, or
corporation. Nor shall any such county, city, town, or village
be allowed to incur any indebtedness except for county, city,
town, or village purposes. The statute in question provides for
the imposition of the tax upon the town to raise money for the
payment of claims which there was no legal or moral obligation
on the part of the town to pay, and hence it is in conflict with
the provision of the constitution above referred to which forbids
the town from giving any money to or in aid of an individual.
The action of the town authorities in auditing or recognizing
the claims as obligations to be paid by taxation, or similar action
by the supervisors, all of which is contemplated by the statute,
also violates the restriction *^^ against incurring obligations
for other than county or town purposes.
Whatever other merit these demands may have, it is quite
clear that money raised to pay them by taxation on the county
or town cannot, with any propriety, be said to be raised for a
county or town purpose.
So we think that the courts below were right in deciding that
Jane, 1899.] Stoddard v. Ldm. 541
the statute was violative of the constitution. The judgment
must, therefore, be affirmed, with costs.
All concur.
TAXATION— BOUNTIES FOR SOLDIERS-CONSTITUTIONAL
LAW.— The payment of bounties to volunteers to fill quotas and
avoid drafts is such a public purpose as will authorize state or
municipal taxation. The bounty is not a private transaction in
"Wliich the Individual alone is benefited. The object is not to obtain
money for the volunteer, but for the community which Is to be re-
lieved by the volunteer: Brodhead v. Milwaukee, 19 Wis. 624, 88
Am. Dec. 711; Kuukle v. Franklin, 13 Minn. 127, 97 Am. Dec. 226.
While the legislature may authorize a town to levy a tax to raise
money to pay for substitutes for drafted men, it cannot authorize
fiuch taxation to raise money to refund to individuals sums of money
paid by them for substitutes: See the note to Zigler v. Menges, 16
Am. St Rep. 36Q.
Stoddard v, Lum.
[159 New York, 266,]
' CORPORATIONS — STOCKHOLDERS LIABILITY —EN-
PORCEMENT OF IN ANOTHER STATE,— An assignee of an in-
solvent corporation of another state, appointed therein and author-
ized by the law thereof to maintain any suit which the corporation
could have maintained, may maintain an action in another state
against all the original stockholders residing therein to enforce their
common-law contractual liability to pay the subscription price of
their stock and to compel them to contribute their pro rata share of
the Indebtedness of tbe corporation to the extent of their unpaid
stock subscriptions. This remedy exists Independently of the pro-
visions of the statute of the former state.
W. C. Eamsdale, for the appellant.
Signor & Wage and Pitts & Sherwood, for the respondents.
*«« BARTLETT, J. This action is brought by the plaintiff,
as the general assignee for the benefit of creditors of the Sol-
diers' World's Fair Hotel Association, a corporation organized
under the laws of the state of Illinois, with a capital stock of
$200,000, divided into 2,000 shares of $100 each.
The following facts, among others, appear in the complaint:
The corporation became financially involved early in its history,
and on the fifth day of May, 1893, executed to the plaintiff a
general assignment for the benefit of creditors.
At the September, 1893, term of the Cook county court, hav-
ing jurisdiction of general assignment matters, it was found that
the corporation was indebted in the total sum of $9,973.19; that
the amount realized from the tangible assets was only $795.19,
542 Stoddard v. Ldm. [New York,
and that the assets of the corporation had been exhausted; that
the stockholders were still indebted in the sum of $36,407.15 on
their stock; that it was necessary that each stockholder should
be required to pay his pro rata share of the debts and liabilities.
It was then averred that these findings of the court were in
fact true. The court, by order, directed the plaintiff, as as-
signee, to bring suit in behalf of all the creditors of the corpora-
tion against all the stockholders who had not yet paid the entira
face of the stock.
It is further alleged that plaintiff, in compliance with this
order, brought an action in the superior court of Cook county
against. the stockholders for the purpose mentioned; that up ti>
the time of filing this complaint the suit in Illinois had realized
only $1,759.54, and that the necessary disbursements left a bal-
ance of $326.50; that at the time the decree was entered in the
Illinois suit the liabilities of the corporation amounted to $11,-
670.21, and that it was necessary to recover ^^^ this sum from
the stockholders in order to pay the debts of the company; that
only two stockholders in the state of Illinois proved to be solv-
ent, and that from them only $1,039.18 was collected; that there
is still unpaid to the creditors of the corporation the sum of $10,-
432.70.
The complaint then sets forth the names of some fifteen or
more stockholders residing in the state of New York and made
defendants in this action.
It is further averred that some of the New York stockholders
are solvent and some are not, but which of them are or which
are not, is unknown to plaintiff ; that all of the stockholders re-
siding outside of the states of Illinois and New York are in-
solvent.
It is also alleged that plaintiff made a report to the Cook
county court, and upon the same the court ordered that he in-
stitute a suit in the state of New York against the stockholders
of the corporation residing there, to recover the amount justly
due from them; that the plaintiff represents one hundred and
fifteen of the creditors of the corporation, and this suit is
brought on their behalf.
It is then alleged that in the suit in the superior court of
Cook county, the execution of one creditor on a judgment
against the corporation was returned wholly unsatisfied before
the institution of that action; that the corporation has ceased
doing business, being insolvent; that under the laws of the
stale of Illinois, a domestic corporation of that state may make
June, 1899.] Stoddard v. Ldm. 645
a general assignment for the benefit of its creditors, and that
the assignee thereunder may maintain any suit or action that
the insolvent debtor making the assignment could have main*
tained if such assignment had not been made.
There is annexed to the complaint a schedule marked "C/*"
which contains portions of the statutes of the state of Illinois^
dealing with the liabilities of stockholders of corporations or-
ganized under the laws of that state.
It is asked in the prayer for relief that the court determine
the amount of the liabilities of each defendant resident in tho
state of New York, by reason of the premises, and prays th&
appointment ^"^^ of a receiver in this state to aid him in the
carrying out of the decree of the court.
The complaint was demurred to on three grounds: that it
appears upon the face of the complaint the court has no juris-
diction of the subject matter of the action; that the complaint
does not state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action^
that plaintiff has no legal capacity to sue.
The demurrer was overruled at special term, the trial judge
holding that the action was well brought.
The appellate division reversed this interlocutory judgment
with a divided court, two of the learned justices dissenting.
The point presented by the demurrer is a very narrow one^
and is in substance this : that an action against these stockhold-
ers to recover a balance due on their subscriptions, or such pro
rata share of it as is necessary to pay the indebtedness of the
company, can only be maintained in the state of Illinois where
the corporation is located, as the laws of Illinois provide a special
and peculiar remedy which can be enforced only in that state.
Chapter 32 of the Revised Statutes of the state of Illinois con^
tains the provisions involved in this controversy. Section 8^
among other things, enacts that each "stockholder shall be lia-
ble for the debts of the corporation to the extent of the amount
that may be unpaid upon the stock held by him, to be collected
in the manner herein provided Whenever any action ia
brought to recover any indebtedness against a corporation, it
shall be competent to proceed against any one or more stock-
holders at the same time, to the extent of the balance unpaid by-
such stockholders upon the stock owned by them respectively^
whether called in or not, as in cases of garnishment." This ia
clearly an exclusive remedy available only in the state of Uli-
nois.
541 Stoddard v. Lum. [New York.
We then come to section 25 of this chapter, which is to be
read in connection with the fact that a corporation may make
^ general assignment for the benefit of its creditors in the state
of Illinois.
^''^ This section provides, among other things, that if a cor-
poration "shall dissolve or cease doing business leaving debts un-
paid, suits in equity may be brought against all persons who
were stockholders at the time, or liable in any way for the debts
of the corporation, by joining the corporation in such suit, and
each stockholder may be required to pay his pro rata share of
such debts or liabilities to the extent of the unpaid portion of
his stock after exhausting the assets of such corporation. And
if any stockholder shall not have property enough to satisfy his
portion of such debts or liabilities, then the amount shall be di-
Tided equally among all the remaining solvent stockholders/'
The balance of section 25 provides for the winding up of a
corporation by a court of equity and the appointment of a re-
ceiver, et cetera. This portion of the statute is not involved in
the present action.
It will thus be seen that the plaintiif in the case at bar,
■clothed with the ample powers of a general assignee for the
benefit of creditors, is duly authorized by the first portion of this
section to proceed against stockholders and all persons liable
in any way for the debts of the corporation in the interest of the
<;reditors, the corporation having ceased to do business and leav-
ing debts unpaid.
This provision of the statute evidently authorizes the general
assignee to bring an omnibus suit in the state of Illinois in the
interest of creditors against stockholders and others in any way
liable to contribute to the payment of the corporate debts. The
statutory limitation of recovery against a stockholder to his pro
rata share of the debts, if it be less than the amount unpaid upon
liis stock subscription, is merely stating the rule in equity when
marshalling the assets.
If a stockholder of an insolvent corporation owed a balance on
his stock subscription of five thousand dollars, and it was made
to appear that three thousand dollars was his pro rata share of
the indebtedness, judgment could only go against him for the
latter amount.
The liability now sought to be enforced does not rest npon
*'^* the provisions of the statutes cited, but is wholly contrac-
tual and has for its foundation the principles of the common law.
June. 1899.] Stoddard v. Lum. 645
We do not approve the position of appellant as set forth in
the complaint and his brief, that he depends to any extent upon
the Illinois statute cited in order to maintain this action.
The provisions of section 25 of the Illinois statute, above
■quoted, may be regarded,, as far as this action is concerned, as
enacting the existing rule of the common law as to the right
of a creditor, or his representative, in case of insolvency, to en-
force outstanding contracts, and also as putting into statutory
form these equitable principles applicable to a stockholder
whose unpaid subscription exceeds the pro rata amount due
from him in paying the debts of the corporation.
The fact that the corporation and its general assignee for the
benefit of its creditors are the creatures of the statute does not
<jualify the rule as stated. A corporation is a legal entity with
the unlimited right to sue and be sued within the lines of its
■charter powers.
An examination of the principles underlying this action and
those cases that are supposed to condemn it will lead to a
clearer apprehension of the present situation.
The demurrer to the complaint admits that these defendants,
residents of this state, are original subscribers to the stock of
this Illinois corporation, and that they are still indebted for
balance due on the subscription.
This is a contract liability pure and simple and one that the
corporation, if solvent, could have enforced in the courts ot
this state. This cause of action, in the event of corporate in-
«olvency, vests in the general assignee for the benefit of cred-
itors, or in a receiver duly appointed.
It has been held that a right of action to enforce a personal
liability of the stockholder for the debts of a corporation, given
and created only by the statutes of the state of the corpora^
tion's domicile, is not enforceable in another state where the
stockholder resides, upon any obligation of comity; but it has
frequently been adjudged that the contract obligation assumed
ty subscribing to the stock of a corporation can be ^'^^ thus en-
forced: Dayton v. Borst, 31 N". Y. 435, and cases cited.
Subscribers to the stock of a corporation incur a debt which
may be enforced by any common-law or equitable remedy:
Mann v. Cooke, 20 Conn. 178. The capital stock of a corpora-
tion is a fund set apart for the payment of its debts. It is a
substitute for the personal liability which subsists in private
copartnerships. The creditors have a lien upon it in equity.
Am. St. Rkp.. Vol. LXX.-35
546 Stoddard v. Lum. [NewYorky
TJnpaid stock is as much a part of this pledge and as much st
part of the assets of the company as the cash which has been
paid in upon it: Sanger v. Upton, Assignee, 91 U. S. 56.
At pages 60 and 61 of case last cited, the United States su-
preme court says, in speaking of unpaid stock subscriptions:
"Creditors have the same right to look to it as to anything else,-
and the same right to insist upon its payment as upon the pay-
ment of any other debt due to the company. As regards cred-
itors, there is no distinction between such a demand and any^
other asset which may from a part of the property and effects-
of the corporation": Citing many cases.
It would speak ill for state comity if a citizen of New York
could go to Illinois and in good faith subscribe to the capital
stock of a corporation and later repudiate his obligation to pay
a balance due on the subscription and yet not be liable to an
action at law or a suit in equity in our own courts in the name
of the corporation to compel him to perform his contract.
Fortunately for state comity and commercial integrity no
such rule of law exists, and a creditor whose rights rest in con-
tract may pursue his debtor into the courts of the latter's domi-
cile. Several cases are cited as holding that this action is not
maintainable, but that they are all clearly distinguishable.
In Marshall v. Sherman, 148 N. Y. 9, 51 Am. St. Kep. 654^
a creditor of a Kansas banking corporation brought an action at
law against a single stockholder, residing in this state, to en-
force a liability of defendant to plaintiff created by the constitu-
tion and statutes of Kansas, which imposed upon the stock-
holder a *'''* liability for the debts of the company, in addition
to his unpaid subscription, in an amount equal to the stock
owned by him. Judge O'Brien, in an exhaustive opinion, dealt
with this general question, expressing the unanimous opinion of
the court that the liability sought to be enforced was statutory
and not contractual and could only be enforced in the domi-
cile of the corporation.
It was also intimated that if the action was maintainable
under any circumstances it could not be instituted at law by a
single creditor against a single stockholder, but the proper
remedy would be a suit in equity on behalf of all the creditors
against all the stockholders.
In Barnes v. Wheaton, 80 Hun, 8, in which Mr. Justice
Martin, now a member of this court, wrote a carefully consid-
ered opinion, there is nothing that militates against the main-
tenance of this action. That action was brought by the plain-
June, 1899.] Btoddakd v. Lum. 647
tiff for the benefit of himself and the creditors of an Ohio cor-
poration to ascertain the pro rata share of the indebtedness of
the corporation for which the defendant was severally liable
and judgment was prayed for the amount.
The defendant's liability was not contractual, but imposed
by the constitution of Ohio, which provided that a stockholder
should be liable over and above the stock owned by him, and
any amount unpaid thereon, in a further sum, at least equal
in amount to such stock. It was held that this liability could
only be enforced in the courts of Ohio in an action conforming
to the provisions of the statute enacted to carry out the con-
stitutional provision creating it.
In Cleveland etc. Ey. Co. v. Kent, 87 Hun, 329, the action
was brought by the creditor of a corporation to enforce against
two New York stockholders the constitutional and statutory
liability existing in the state of Ohio as pointed out above in
Barnes v. Wheaton, 80 Hun, 8. The complaint was dismissed
upon demurrer and the judgment afiirmed on appeal.
Returning to the case at bar, we have, in brief, this situation
^""^ presented under the demurrer to the complaint: This ac-
tion is brought on behalf of all the creditors of the corporation,
who number one hundred and fifteen or more, and is against all
the original stockholders in this state, they being the only ones
now liable, as all stockholders residing in states other than Illi-
nois and New York are insolvent; the legal remedy has been
exhausted against the Illinois stockholders except that a por-
tion of the amount due from one defendant may be collected;
that some of the New York stockholders are solvent and some
are not, but which of them are, and which are not, is unknown
to the plaintiff; that the present indebtedness of the corpora-
tion, after crediting all amounts collected from stockholders,
has been ascertained in the Illinois proceedings; that under the
law of Illinois a domestic corporation may make an assignment
for the benefit of its creditors, and the assignee thereunder may
maintain any suit or action that the insolvent company making
the assignment could have maintained if such assignment had
not been made.
The sole question to be determined by ns at this time is
whether this action can be maintained, and we are not con-
cerned with the practical difficulties that plaintiff may en-
counter in establishing to the satisfaction of the trial court the
just pro rata share of the defendant stockholders in the pay-
ment of the indebtedness of this insolvent corporation.
548 Stoddard v. Lum, [New York,
We are of opinion that this action is clearly maintainable
upon principle and on authority. A subscription to the stock
of a corporation creates a debt enforceable at law, or in equity,
by the corporation or its legal representative : Sagory v. Dubois,
3 Sand. Ch. 466; Mann v. Pentz, 2 Sand. Ch. 257; Herkimer
etc. Co. V. Small, 2 Hill, 127; Troy etc. E. 11. Co. v. McChesney,
21 Wend. 296; Mann v. Cooke, 20 Conn. 178; Hartford etc
R. E. Co. V. Kennedy, 12 Conn. 499; Hartford etc. E. R. Co.
V. Boorman, 12 Conn. 530; Ward v. Griswoldville Mfg. Co., 16
Conn. 593.
The receivers and assignees of individuals and corporations
domiciled in another state are permitted under interstate ^''^
comity to enforce the contracts of such individuals and cor-
porations in the state of the debtor's residence.
In Dayton v. Borst, 31 N. Y. 435, this court held the capital
stock of a 'New Jersey bank a trust fund for the security of its
creditors and permitted the receiver of the bank, appointed in
Xew Jersey, to recover of a New York defendant the -amount
remaining unpaid of his subscription to the capital stock.
In Petersen v. Chemical Bank, 32 N. Y. 21, 88 Am. Dec. 298,
it was held that the assignee of a foreign executor may main-
tain an action in the courts of this state upon a chose trans-
ferred to the assignee by the executor; also that the title of the
foreign executor to the assets of the estate is perfect though
conferred by the law of the domicile. Judge Denio says at
page 43: "Foreign corporations may become parties to con-
tracts in this state, and may sue or be sued in our courts on
contracts made here or within the jurisdiction which created
them."
In Toronto General Trust Co. v. Chicago etc. R. R. Co., 123
N. Y. 37, it was held that a foreign testamentary trustee, hav-
ing title to the trust estate, may recover any portion thereof
that has been converted, or damages for the conversion, without
having the will admitted to probate here. Judge Earl pointed
out that the trustee stood on his legal title and his position
was to be distinguished from that of foreign executors or ad-
ministrators who cannot sue here for reasons of public policy,
as the courts will not aid them in the removal of the assets
from this state to the possible prejudice of domestic creditors.
In the very recent case of Mabon v. Ongley Electric Co., 156
N. Y. 196, this court held, Judge Vann writing the opinion,
that while a foreign receiver of a foreign corporation cannot
maintain an action in this state against the corporation as sole
June, 1899.] Stoddard v. Lum. 649
defendant for the sole purpose of procuring tlie appointment
in this state of an ancillary receiver, that notes and accounts
may be collected bjr the usual proceedings in our courts, which
regard a foreign receiver as representing the original owner,
and open their *'''" doors to him as they do to a domestic re-
ceiver. The learned judge cites, at page 201, Barth v. Backus,
140 K Y. 230, 37 Am. St. Rep. 545, Vanderpoel v. Gorman, 140
N. Y. 563, 37 Am. St. Ecp. 601, and many other cases sustain*
ing the point now considered.
In Mann v. Cooke, 20 Conn. 178, a New York receiver of an
insolvent corporation was permitted to sue in Connecticut for
balance due on a stock subscription.
In Cooke v. Orange, 48 Conn, 401, the receiver of an insol-
vent New Jersey corporation was allowed to complete the con-
tract of a manufacturing corporation he represented with the
town defendant and afterward to sue for work and materials
in the courts of Connecticut; also to attack the garnishee pro-
cess sued out by the creditors of the local defendant: Pond v.
Cooke, 45 Conn. 126, 29 Am. Eep. 668; Blake Crusher Co. v.
New Haven, 46 Conn. 473.
The case at bar is not to be distinguished in principle from
the authorities cited. The plaintiff, as the general assignee for
the benefit of creditors of an insolvent corporation, is vested
with the legal title of all its property and the power to reduce
its assets to possession, and his title is perfect, though con-
ferred by the law of the domicile: Petersen v. Chemical Bank,
32 N. Y. 21, 88 Am. Dec. 298.
If, as in Dayton v. Borst, 31 N. Y. 435, the receiver of a
bank in New Jersey was allowed to come into our court and
recover the amount remaining unpaid of a stock subscription,
why should not this plaintiff, as a general assignee, be permitted
to institute a similar action? Can it be said that there is any
legal distinction to be drawn between a receiver created by the
order of a foreign court and a general assignee created by a
foreign legislature? The plaintiff does not come here seeking
to remove assets from this state to the possible prejudice of
domestic creditors, but asks that he be permitted to enforce
against our own citizens the performance of contracts into which
they have entered in another jurisdiction.
Public policy and state comity both require that this request
should be granted.
^''^ The judgment appealed from should be reversed, that of
special term affirmed, with costs, and the questions certified
550 Garvey v. LoNa Island R. R. Co. [New York,
answered as follows : The first question is answered in the nega-
tive; the second question is answered in the afBrmative; the
third question is answered in the negative.
All concur, except Gray and Martin, JJ., not voting.
CORPORATIONS— STOCKHOLDER'S LIABILITY-ENFORCE-
MENT IN ANOTHER STATE.— If the liability imposed by statute
upon stockholders in a corporation is contractual, it may be enforced
outside the limits of the state: Gushing v. Perot, 175 Pa. St. 66, 52
Am. St. Rep. 835. Generally, if the liability of a stockholder is ab-
solute and unconditional, such liability may be enforced anywhere;
but if the statutory liability is penal, it is not enforceable outside
the state of incorporation: See the monographic note to Fowler v.
Lamson, 37 Am. St, Rep. 1G8. In Massachusetts, on the contrary,
the courts will generally refuse to enforce the individual liability
of a stockholder in a foreign corporation: Bank of North America v.
Rindge, 154 Mass. 203, 26 Am. St. Rep. 240; Post v. Toledo etc. R. R.
Co., 144 Mass. 341, 59 Am. Rep. 86. But if the laws of a state pro-
vide that a stockholder is liable to judgment creditors of the cor^
poration as upon a contract for an amount equal to the par value of
the stock owned by him, which is suable anywhere, such liability
may be enforced by an action brought in another state: Hancock
Nat. Bank v. Ellis, 166 Mass. 414, 55 Am. St. Rep. 414. See, also,
Aldrlch V. Anchor etc. Co., 24 Or. 32, 41 Am. St. Rep. 831.
Garvey v. Long Island Raileoad Company.
[159 New York, 823.]
EMINENT DOMAIN.— THE LEGISLATURE CANNOT AU-
THORIZE permanent and substantial injury to private property
•without making compensation.
RAILROAD COMPANIES— INJURY TO PRIVATE PROP-
EITTY- COMPENSATION.— If the convenience of a railroad com-
pany requires a change In Its terminal yard, so that what has been
flone In one part thereof with one kind of appliances without In-
jui-y to private property, when done In another part with another
kind. Inflicts serious injury upon the buildings on adjoining land, it
becomes the duty of the company to acquire the right to thus vir-
tually use the neighboring property either by purchase or through
the power of eminent domain.
RAILROAD COMPANIES— IN.TURY TO PRIVATE PROP-
ERTY—NUISANCE.— A statute simply authorizing a railroad com-
pany to construct and operate a steam surface railroad does not
confer power, either express or implied, to construct and use, with-
out making compensation, a turntable In Its terminal yard In the
Immediate vicinity of dwelling-houses on private property, so as to
seriously, continuously, and permanently Injure such premises and
Impair their enjoyment. Such construction and use of a turntable
Is a nuisance which may be enjoined.
TRESPASS- IN.7UNCTI0N AGAINST.— If strong and ag-
gravated instances of continuing trespass are shown, which must
June, 1899.] Gaevey v. Long Island R. R. Co. 661
necessarily result In substantial damages to plaintiCfs property that
are in no way offset by benefits, a permanent injunction may be
issued, although the amount of damages is not fixed.
Action to recover damages sustained by plaintiff as the owner
of a dwelling-house in the city of Brooklyn, on account of a
continuous nuisance committed by the defendant, a railroad
company, upon its premises immediately in the rear of those of
the plaintiff, and to restrain the further commission thereof.
The nuisance, as described in the complaint, consisted in the
fact that, 'locomotives enter, move about in, and leave the yard
to the number, during the summer, of about two hundred daily,
■each making its characteristic noises, such as the hissing and
pounding of escaping steam, the rumble of wheels, the clatter
of irons, the clanging of bells, and other irritating noises. Each
locomotive which enters the yard is run upon a turntable con-
structed in the immediate rear of plaintiff's house, making a
noise as it goes on like an explosion, and shaking and jarring
plaintiff's house. Steam, smoke, cinders, ashes, and noxious
and unwholesome gases are set free in the defendant's yard,
and cast upon the plaintiff's premises and into the plaintiff's
doors and windows." The defendant company claimed that tlie
acts complained of were done by it "lawfully, carefully, and for
the purposes of its incorporation only.'* Judgment for the
plaintiff, and the defendant appealed.
A. A. Gardner, for the appellant.
G. S. Billings, for the respondent.
838 VANN, J. From the evidence appearing in the record,
especially when it is amplified by the view of the premises taken
by the trial judge at the request of both parties, and from the
nature of the findings, which have the effect of a general verdict
for the plaintiff, we are compelled to assume, after affirmance
by the appellate division, the existence of a nuisance upon the
defendant's premises that seriously injures the premises of the
plaintiff: Amherst College v. Hitch, 151 K Y. 282, 320.
It is claimed that the judgment below cannot be sustained
because no property right of the plaintiff was invaded, inas-
much as the defendant had authority for what it did in the
statute which created it. That statute conferred no unusual
power upon the defendant, but simply authorized it to con»
struct and operate a steam surface railroad. It did not author-
ize it to construct this particular turntable, or to maintain thi»
552 Gabvey v. Long Island R. R. Co. [New York^
particular yard, or to concentrate the particular evils of iLs-
terminal station in the immediate vicinity of inhabited dwell-
ings. The implied powers springing from the express power
to maintain a railroad do not extend to the grievances com-
plained of by the plaintiff nor permit the ruin of his prop-
erty without compensation. While the welfare of the pub-
lic and the necessities of travel require that the plaintiff should
submit to annoyances caused by a reasonable use of the prop-
erty of the defendant, he is not obliged to submit to those caused
by an unreasonable use, all the circumstances being taken into
account. Slight injuries and annoyances to people living along
the line of a railroad are a necessary incident to its maintenance
and operation, but when the company ^^^ does, even upon its
own land, such acts as seriously impair the enjoyment of the^
adjoining land, to a certain extent it takes such land and must
discontinue the practice or make compensation: Pumpelly v.
Green Bay Co., 13 Wall. 166, "The legislature may authorize
small nuisances without compensation, but not great ones":
Bacon v. Boston, 154 Mass. 100. As the legislature cannot
authorize the total destruction of private property without mak-
ing compensation, so it cannot authorize permanent and sub-
stantial injury to such property without making compensation,
and it did not assume to do so in the statute upon which the
defendant relies. If the convenience of the defendant required
a change in its terminal yard, so that what had been done m
one part thereof with one kind of appliances without injury to
private property, when done in another part with another kind,
inflicted serious injury upon the buildings on adjoining land,
it became its duty to acquire the right to thus virtually use tho
neighboring property, either by purchase or through the power
of eminent domain. It could not so conduct its business as to
crack the walls and ceilings of adjoining houses, awaken people
from their sleep by shaking their beds, smoke them out of their
rooms, or injure their personal property kept on the premises
by easting dust, ashes, and cinders upon them, and appeal to
the statute for protection, "Where the legislature authorize!*
a thing to be done which can fairly be accomplished without
causing a nuisance, it will be assumed that the legislature in-
tends that it shall be done in that way" : Randolph on Eminent
Domain, sec. 140. The statute does not authorize acts that
amount to a partial appropriation of property without requiring
payment. The injuries complained of are not the natural or
unavoidable result of the exercise of the statutory authority.
June, 1899.] Gaevey v. Long Island R. R. Co. 565
and are outside of the line of legislative protection. Thus, an
engine-house, although a necessary incident to the operation of
a railroad, when so used as to cause smoke, soot, cinders, and
coal dust to necessarily damage a dwelling-house erected upon
an adjoining lot, was held a nuisance, and not within legisla-
tive sanction, and an action to recover damages and restrain
^'^^ the nuisance was upheld : Cogswell v. New York etc. R. R.
Co., 103 N. Y. 10, 57 Am. Rep. 701. It was further held in
that case that where the terms of a statute giving authority
to the corporation are not imperative but permissive, it does
not confer license to commit a nuisance, although what is con-
templated by the statute cannot be done without it.
So when general authority had been conferred upon a muni-
cipal corporation to build a pumping station as a part of an
extensive system to supply a city with water, but leaving the
site to the selection of the corporation, it was held not to con-
fer power, either express or implied, to construct it so near the
lands of another as to seriously affect the houses, subsequently
built thereon, through the vibrations and noise of machinery;
Morton v. Mayor etc., 140 N". Y. 207. In that case the court
said: "The legislature undoubtedly authorized the defendant to
construct a building, and to place in it the necessary machinery
to accomplish the purpose in view. Btlt that is not the act
complained of, or which produced the injury to the plaintiff's
property. The WTong consisted in placing the building and
machinery so near the adjoining property as to injuriously
affect it by the noise and vibration. The city has a right to
build upon its own land, but there was nothing in the statute
that required it to place the structure where it did. It could
perform every duty imposed by the statute by building the
pumping station at such distance from the adjoining houses as
to avoid the results of which the plaintiff justly complains. If
it was not possible or practicable to do that upon the land that
the defendant owned, then more could have been acquired for
the purpose."
The use by the defendant of its property to the injury of the
plaintiff was not temporary, for the purpose of adapting it to
its business, but regular, continuous, and in the nature of a
partial but permanent appropriation. The distinction between
a permanent invasion of land and a temporary annoyance, as
by blasting, was carefully pointed out in Booth v. Rome etc.
R. R. Co., 140 K Y. 267, 279, 37 Am. St. Rep. 552.
When the odor from gasworks was found to so pollute the
554 Garvey v. Long Island R. R. Co. [New York,
^^* air as to substantially render the plaintiff's property unfit
for comfortable enjoyment, it was held to be a nuisance, al-
though the acts complained of were inseparably connected with
the carrying on of the business itself, and that it was not essen-
tial to a right of action that the owner should be driven from
his dwelling: Bohan v. Port Jervis Gas Light Co., 122 N. Y.
18.
In Baltimore etc. R. R. Co. v. Fifth Baptist Church, 108
XT. S. 317, 328, the court said: "Plainly the engine house and
repair shop, as they were used by the railroad company, were
a nuisance in every sense of the term That is a nui-
sance which annoys and disturbs one in the possession of his
property, rendering its ordinary use or occupation physically
uncomfortable to him. For such annoyance and discomfort the
■courts of law will afford redress by giving damages against the
wrongdoer, and when the cause of the annoyance and discomfort
are continuous, courts of equity will interfere and restrain the
'nuisance It is no answer to the action of the plaintiff
that the railroad company was authorized by act of Congress to
bring its track within tbe limits of the city of Washington, and
to construct such works as were necessary and expedient for
the completion and maintenance of its road, and that the engine-
house and repair shop in question were thus necessary and ex-
pedient; that they are skillfully constructed; that the chim-
neys of the engine-house are higher than required by the build-
ing regulations of the city, and that as little smoke and noise
are caused as the nature of the business in them will permit.
.... The authority of the company to construct such works i
as it might deem necessary and expedient for the completion
and maintenance of its road did not authorize it to place them
wherever it might think proper in the city, without reference
to the property and rights of others. As well might it be con-
tended that the act permitted it to place them immediately in
front of the president's house or of the capitol, or in the most
densely populated locality Whatever the extent of the
authority conferred, it was accompanied with ^^^ this implied
qualification, that the works should not be so placed as by their
use to unreasonably interfere with and disturb the peaceful and
comfortable enjoyment of others in their property."
We close the discussion of the point under consideration by
repeating the language of Judge Finch in Hill v. Mayor etc.,
139 N. Y. 495, 505: "Obviously, the general doctrine which
levies upon individuals forced contributions for the benefit of
June, 1899.] Gabvey v. Long Island R. R. Co. 555
the public, and denies compensation for the injury done, is
vulnerable at two points. It is defeated sometimes by con-
€truing the harm inflicted into a taking of private property fop
■which compensation must be made, and sometimes by a rigid
construction of the authority claimed. Both methods indicate
a lurking doubt of the equity of the general doctrine and a dis-
position to narrow the field of its operation."
The defendant insists that its appeal should be sustained
because the trial court awarded no past damages to the plaintiff.
A court of equity has jurisdiction of an action to restrain
the commission of a continuing trespass, because the injunc-
tion prevents a multiplicity of actions at law, which is a griev-
ance to the parties and a burden upon the public: Corning v.
Troy Iron etc. Factory, 40 N. Y. 191; Williams v. New York
€tc. R. R. Co., 16 N. Y. 97, 111; 69 Am. Dec. 651; Henderson
V. New York Cent. R. R. Co., 78 N. Y. 423.
While in such an action the court may also render judg-
ment for the damages already sustained, that relief is. merely
incidental and is not an essential part of the main cause of ac-
tion for a permanent injunction. The party entitled to dama-
ges may waive them, if he chooses, by not furnishing evidence
to enable the court to measure them in money, which is an ad-
vantage to the defendant, but does not defeat the action. If
such substantial and continuous interference with the ordinary
enjoyment of property is shown as would, when properly meas-
ured by evidence, enable the court to fix the amount of the
damages, the injunction may be issued, although no damages
are awarded. The extent of the injury is important, ^^^ but
•whether the amount is admeasured in dollars and cents is un-
important, unless there are benefits to be offset against the
■damages.
When, as in certain actions against elevated railroads, a
"wrongful appropriation of easements appurtenant to abutting
property appears, but it also appears that the presence of the
road has so increased the va'ue of the property that the actual
■damages are only nominal, relief by way of injunction may bo
refused because the trespass is but technical and the real injury
unsubstantial: O'Reilly v. New York Elevated R. R. Co., 148
N. Y. 347. This is upon the ground that a court of equity '"'is
not bound to issue an injunction when it will produce great
public or private mischief merely for the purpose of protecting
a technical or unsubstantial right": Gray v. Manhattan Ry. Co.,
128 N. Y. 499, 509.
hbQ Gabvey v. Long Island R. R. Co. [New York,
This is not such a case, but one where the trespass was per-
manent, continuing, and grievous, and went to destroy the
value of the property of the owner with no compensating ad-
vantages. The decision of the trial justice established th&
plaintiff's right, the existence of the nuisance and its injurious
effect upon his property. The case was thus brought within
the sound discretion of the court, and after united action by
the courts below, we cannot interfere. The theory is not
tolerable that, although one party to an action may be gradually
demolishing the house of the other, the latter cannot have an
injunction to prevent its total destruction, because the amount
of the damages already sustained has not been admeasured in
money.
Our conclusion is, that where strong and aggravated instances
of continuing trespass are shown, which must necessarily result
in substantial damages to the plaintiff's property that are in no
way offset by benefits, a permanent injunction may be issued,
although the amount of the damages is not fixed.
The judgment should be affirmed, with costs.
All concur, except Parker, C. J,, and Haight, J., not voting.
EMINENT DOMAIN.— THE LEGISLATURE CANNOT, in the
exercise of the police power, take private property for a public use
without compensation, when such property can be condemned and
paid for under the power of eminent domain: People v. Elk River
etc. Co., 107 Cal. 221, 48 Am. St. Rep. 125; Welton v. Dickson, 38
Neb. 767, 41 Am. St. Rep. 771, and note.
RAILROADS— SPECIAL DAMAGES TO PRIVATE PROPERTY
—INJUNCTION.— Where a railroad company has obtained a deed
to a right of way under representations that it is to be used for
main line purposes alone, and it is afterward used for sidetracks,
such use will not be enjoined. The grantor is, however, entitled to
recover damages for the injury sustained in excess of those which
arise from the proper use of the principal line of the road: Donls-
thorpe V. Fremont etc. R. R. Co., 30 Neb. 142, 27 Am. St. Rep. 387,
Where a statute authorizes a railroad company to take property for
the purpose of running and operating its road, it may take prop-
erty for depot purposes: Matter of New York etc. R. R. Co. v. Kip,
46 N. Y. 546, 7 Am. Rep. 385.
TRESPASS— IN.TUNCTION AGAINST.-A trespass of an ordi-
nary character will not be enjoined. But where a trespass, or a
series of trespasses, operate in effect to destroy or seriously impair
the exercise of a franchise, a court of equity will not hesitate to in-
terpose to prevent the apprehended Injury by the aid of injunction:
Port of Mobile v. Louisville etc. R. R. Co., 84 Ala. 115, 5 Am. St.
Rep. 342. See, also, Lembeck v. Nye, 47 Ohio St. 336, 21 Am. St
Rep. 828. Injunctions in cases of trespass were not granted under
ancient doctrines of the court of chancery. Parties were left to
their legal remedy; but the more liberal practice now prevails of al-
lowing them whore the trespass presents a case of dostruction or
irreparable mischief: Burnley v. Oook, 13 Tex. .^)86, 61 Am. Dec. 79,
and note; Scudder v. Trenfon etc. Co., i N. J. Ea. 694. 23 Am. Dec
750.
June, 1899.] People v. Kennedy. 657
People v. Kennedy.
[1S9 New York, 346.]
HOMICIDE— SELF-DEFENSE.— Before one can justify the
taking of human life in self-defense he must show that there was
reasonable ground for believing that he was In great peril, that the
killing was necessary for his escape, and that no other safe means
was open to him. When one believes himself about to be attacked
by another, and to receive great bodily harm, it is his duty to avoid
the attack, if in his power to do so; and the right of attack for the
purpose of self-defense does not arise until he has done everything
In his power to avoid its necessity.
HOMICTDTl—MT-RDER— SUFFICIENCY OF EVIDENCE.—
If the evidence shows that, after an encounter between the deceased
and the defendant, the latter obtained a knife in a spirit of revenge,
and, after being warned not to return, did return with intent to
kill the deceased, and thereupon killed him, the Jury is justified in
finding that the killing was done with premeditation and delibera-
tion, and that the defendant is guilty of murder In the first degiee.
HOMICIDE-MURDER IN FIRST DEGREE.— A deliberate
and premeditated Intention to kill, followed by the killing of a hu-
man being, completes the crime of murder in the first degree.
HOMICIDE— MURDER— SUFFICIENCY OF PROOF.— If
the proof justifies a jury in finding that the homicide was inten-
tional and resulted from sufficient deliberation and premeditation
to warrant a verdict of murder in the first degree, the appellate
«ourt will not Interfere with the determination upon the facts.
HOMICIDE— MURDER— MOTIVE.— Evidence showing that
there had been a personal encounter between the deceased and the
defendant, and that the latter, humiliated by his defeat and in-
spired by a spirit of revenge, returned to the place of the first affray
and maue a second attack, which was fatal. Is sufiicient to justify
the jury in finding that the defendant had a motive for the com-
mission of the crime.
HOMICIDE— MURDER— REVIEW OF EVIDENCE.— It Is
not within the province of the appellate court. In reviewing a Judg-
ment of death, to review or determine controverted questions of fact
arising upon confiicting evidence. The Jury is the ultimate tribunal
in such cases, and with Its decision the appellate court may not in-
terfere, unless It reaches the conclusion that Justice has not been
done.
CRIMINAL LAW— CONFESSIONS.— TEST OF ADMISSI-
BILITY of the statement of a person accused of crime, whether
made In the course of Judicial proceedings or not, is whether It Is
made voluntarily, and that must be determined by Its nature and the
circumstances under which It Is made.
CRIMINAL LAW— CONFESSIONS— ADMISSIBILITY OF
VOLUNTARY STATEMENTS.— Voluntary statements made by a
man of ordinary intelligence and education to police officers after
his arrest, not as evidence nor as the result of an examination in a
Judicial proceeding, afthough reduced to writing and verified by him,
are admissible in evidence on the trial of the crime for which he was
arrested, If not induced by any promise, threat, or improper influ-
ence, although he was not Informed by those to whom he made the
statements that they might be used against him on his subsequent
trial.
558 People v. Kennedy. [New York,
CRIMINAL LAW — CONFESSIONS IMPROPERLY OB-
TAINED—ADMISSIBILITY.— If peace officers, by covert threats,
doubtful and uncertain promises, acts of intimidation, or other
questionable means, procure incriminating statements from persona
under arrest, and subsequently charged with crime, they are inad-
missible against them.
H. L. Taylor and H. D. Fitzgerald, for the appellant.
T. Penney, for the respondent.
348 MARTIN, J. That upon the ninth day of October,
1898, the defendant killed John Hummings by stabbing him
with a dirk or claspknife was plainly established and not denied.
The only question litigated upon the trial was whether the homi-
cide was committed under such circumstances as to constitute
a crime, or whether it was justifiable. The claim of the de-
fendant was that he was attacked by the decedent, and that
he killed him in the lawful defense of his own person. Upon
that issue the jury found against him.
Before a party can justify the taking of life in self-defense,
3"*^ he must show that there was reasonable ground for believ-
ing he was in great peril; that the killing was necessary for his
escape, and that no other safe means was open to him. When
one believes himself about to be attacked by another, and to
receive great bodily injury, it is his duty to avoid the attack
if in his power to do so, and the right of attack for the pur-
pose of self-defense does not arise until he has done everything
in his power to avoid its necessity: People v. Constantino, 153
N. Y. 24; People v. Johnson, 139 N. Y. 358, 363; People v.
Carlton, 115 N. Y. 618, 623; People v. Sullivan, 7 N. Y. 396.
Applying these rules to the proof in this case, it is evident that
the defendant's claim that the homicide was committed in his
own defense cannot be sustained, as it was, under the evidence,
at least a question of fact, and the finding of the jury is con-
clusive.
The first point presented by the learned counsel for the de-
fendant in his brief is that the evidence was insufficient to jus-
tify the jury in finding the defendant guilty of murder in the
first degree, because it failed to show any intent on the part
of the defendant to kill the decedent, or that the act was per-
formed with the premeditation and deliberation required to
constitute that crime. Hence, a brief epitome of the facts and
circumstances disclosed by the evidence seems necessary to tho
proper consideration of that question.
The record discloses that the defendant is a colored man, who.
June, 1899.] People v. Kennedy. 65^
at the time of the honucide, was living at No. 167 Elm street,
in the city of Buffalo. He was then twenty-seven or twenty-
eight years of age, a waiter by occupation, although he had
not been steadily employed for some months anterior to that
time. Between 8 and 9 o'clock on Sunday morning, the day
of the homicide, the defendant and a friend, Eeese Augustus,,
were engaged to some extent in drinking together. They then
went to several places in the neighborhood where they resided,.
and on their way each stopped at a laundry to obtain his linen
that had been left there. They then returned to the rooms they
occupied on Elm street, after which they had two more drinks
of whisky, and at ^® about 10 o'clock the defendant left to take
a walk in the neighborhood. After walking about two blocks
he met Nellie Davis, a colored woman of his acquaintance, who-
was on her way to a room or tenement known as No. 13 Gay
street, occupied by one Minnie Lewis. After a short conversa*
tion between the defendant and Nellie, the latter entered No.
13, and was followed by the defendant. In the room which
they entered there were the decedent and Minnie Lewis, who
were in bed together, a woman whose real name was Fannie-
Truss, William Harris, Spencer Quarrells, and Robert Green, all
of whom were colored. While there a dispute arose between
the defendant and one of the women, whereupon Minnie Lewia
asked him to leave and attempted to force him to do so. A
quarrel ensued and he left the house, but picked up a bottle^
and returned to the doorway. The decedent then arose from
the bed, put on a pair of trousers and came to the door, where-
upon a fight between him and the defendant commenced and
continued until some one called the police, when they separated.
During the encounter, the defendant struck the decedent with
the bottle, causing a slight wound upon his head. Although
neither party was seriously injured, the advantage of the con-
test seems to have rested with the decedent. When the parties
separated, the defendant went into Cotton's saloon, and from
there to Gay street, then down Michigan to Vine street, and
then to his room on Elm street. While there he changed his
clothing, and soon after returned to Gay street, where the affray
occurred. While returning he was warned not to go to the house
where the fight took place. He, however, disregarded the warn-
ing, continued his course, and entered the room occupied by
Minnie Lewis, where he found the decedent upon the bed, with
Minnie Lewis sitting by his side, and Fannie Truss, bathing hi»
head with witch hazel. When the defendant entered the dece-
560 People v. Kennedy. [New York,
dent arose, and another struggle followed. During the last en*
■counter the defendant drew a long dirk or claspknife he then
had, and struck the decedent repeatedly with it, inflicting sev-
■eral severe wounds, ^^* which caused his immediate death. The
defendant then left the house, wringing the blood from his
hands, went to a saloon on the corner of Elm and Church streets,
-where, while he was washing, he was arrested. The knife with
■which he stabbed the decedent was left in his body. A wound
was found upon the decedent's neck four inches in length, which
€evered several arteries, and which was of itself fatal. The de-
fendant's knife and hat were found near the body. He admitted
having killed the decedent, but claimed that when he returned
to Gay street he was in search of Nellie Davis; that he opened
the door and asked for her, whereupon the decedent jumped
•from the bed, declared that he would fix the defendant this time,
«nd struck at him, and that thereupon they clinched, and the
decedent attempted to strike him with a piece of iron, when
he drew his knife, struck blindly at him, and thus inflicted the
wounds which caused the decedent's death. Upon this evidence
the defendant based his claim that he acted only in self-de-
lense.
The testimony of the witnesses called by the people was to
the effect that the defendant entered the room with a rush,
inquired for the decedent in indecent terms, whereupon the par-
ties clinched, and very soon the defendant pushed the decedent
from him, when the latter staggered and fell to the floor, the
hlood spurting on to the defendant, and the decedent soon ex-
pired.
After the homicide, no marks of the struggle were found upon
the body of the defendant, except a slight scratch between the
thumb and index finger of his left hand. The knife with which
the decedent was slain belonged to Reese Augustus, from whom
the defendant borrowed it that day. Whether he obtained it
before the first encounter, or afterward, does not clearly appear
from the record. The evidence upon the part of the people
tended to show that it was procured &fter the first encounter,
-while the defendant claimed that it was obtained before that
time and for a legitimate purpose. We think the testimony
-was suflicient to warrant the jury in finding that it was procured
after his first difficulty ^^^ with the decedent. Under the evi-
dence given upon the trial, it is quite obvious that whether the
homicide was perpetrated under such circumstances as to con-
June, 1899,] People v. Kennedy. 661
fititute the crime of murder in the first degree was a question
of fact for the jury.
There was abundant evidence to justify the jury in finding
that after the first encounter, the defendant, in a spirit of re-
venge arising from chagrin or anger at his defeat, went to the
room of his friend, obtained the knife, and returned, intending
to kill the decedent. If, however, it be said that it is uncertain
whether he obtained the knife at that time, or had obtained it
previously for another purpose, still it is not very material, aa
in either event he had abundant opportunity between the first
occurrence and the time of the homicide to form a premeditated
and deliberate intent to commit the crime of which he was
convicted.
Moreover, he was cautioned by parties to whom he was known
not to return, thus showing that it was evident to them that he
was returning for the purpose of renewing his contest with the
decedent. The facts and circumstances bearing upon this ques-
tion were abundantly sufficient to justify the jury in finding
that the defendant not only intended to kill the decedent, but
that it was done with premeditation and deliberation.
The court has so often stated the rule as to the intent, pre-
meditation, and deliberation necessary to constitute the crime
of murder in the first degree, that it seems unnecessary to re-
state it at this time. If there was an intention to kill, which
was deliberate and premeditated, and the killing followed, the
crime was complete-: People v. Majone, 91 N. Y. 211; Leighton
V. People, 88 K Y. 117; People v. Beckwith, 103 N. Y. 361;
People V. Conroy, 97 N. Y. 76; People v. Hawkins, 109 N. Y.
408; People v. Johnson, 139 N. Y. 358; People v. Constantino,
153 N. Y. 24, 37; People v. Decker, 157 N. Y. 194.
Where the proof justifies a jury in finding that the homicide
was intentional, and resulted from sufficient deliberation and
premeditation to warrant a verdict of murder in the first ^'^
degree, this court will not interfere with the determination of
the jury upon the facts: People v. Sutherland, 154 N. Y. 346.
The proof in this case was §uch as to justify the verdict, and,
consequently, under the principle of its former decisions, this
court should not interfere upon the ground discussed.
The defendant also claims that the charge of the trial judgfc
was not impartial, but was highly prejudicial to him. "We have
examined the entire charge, but find in it nothing which would
justify us in disturbing the judgment below, or which requires
AM. St. Rep.. Vol. LXX,— 36
562 People v. Kennedy. [New York^
Bpecial discussion. The charge, when taken together, was fair,
impartial, and correct, both as to the law and facts, and was
as favorable to the defendant as he was entitled to under the
evidence. Under such circumstances, it is manifest that the-
defendant's claim in this respect cannot be upheld (People V.
Constantino, 153 K Y. 24), and that the judgment cannot be re-
versed on that ground. Moverover, we find no exceptions to the
charge, and, consequently, no question of law is presented for-
our determination.
The next ground of the defendant's appeal is that the evi-^
dence or motive was insufficient to justify the jury in finding^
him guilty of the crime charged. We think this claim cannot
be sustained. Although it may be conceded that evidence of
motive had an important bearing upon the question of the de-
fendant's guilt, yet the claim that no motive was proved does
not seem to be justified. There had been a personal encounter
between the defendant and decedent, in which the former had been
practically defeated, and the jury may well have found that,
humiliated by his defeat and inspired by a spirit of revenge,
he returned to the place of the first affray and made a second
attack. One of the usual incentives to the commission of crime
is the desire of revengino- real or fancied wrongs. We think the
evidence was sufficient to justify the jury in finding that th©
defendant had a motive for the commission of this offense.
The defendant also ^sks this court to grant a new trial ^^^
under the provisions of section 528 of the- Code of Criminal
Procedure, which provides that when the judgment is of death,
the court of appeals may order a new trial, if it be satisfied that
the verdict was against the weight of evidence or agaiust law,
or that justice requires a new trial, whether any exception shall
have been taken or not in the court below. This section has
often been considered by this court, and it has uniformly held
that it is not its province to review or determine controverted
questions of fact arising upon conflicting evidence, but that the
jury is the ultimate tribunal in such cases, and with its decision
this court may not interfere, unless it reaches the conclusion
that justice has not been done. We are unable to reach any
such conclusion in this case, and, hence, must decline to inter-
fere upon that ground.
The only other question raised by the defendant arises upon
his exceptions to the admission of statements previously made
by him, which were permitted to be proved upon the triaL
After his arrest he was taken to a police station, and in the
June, 1899.] People v. Kennedy, 669
afternoon of the day of the tragedy he was shown the knife with
which the decedent was killed, and asked by Sergeant Holmlund
if it was his, to which he replied it was. He was also shown
the hat found near the decedent's prostrate body, and asked if
it belonged to him, to which he answered in the affirmative.
He was then taken upstairs to the police headquarters, where
he was questioned and his statements written out by a type-
writer, signed by him, and verified by his affidavit. Upon the
next day he was again interrogated in regard to the transaction,
his answers were taken, committed to paper by a typewriter,
signed by the defendant and verified. These confessions sub-
stantially correspond with the testimony which was given upon
the trial, except as to the manner in which he obtained the
knife with which the homicide was committed.
When the defendant was upon the stand as a witness in his
own behalf, he was cross-examined by the district attorney as
to certain claimed discrepancies between the written statements
signed and verified by him, and his testimony given upon the
*""* direct examination. His verified statements were also of-
fered and admitted in evidence under his objections: "1. That
it is incompetent and improper, and was improperly and involun-
tarily obtained; that this defendant was in a state of great
mental disturbance and nervousness at this time, and was not
competent to give a statement voluntarily, 3. Under section 395
of the Code of Criminal Procedure, that this alleged statement
was made neither in the course of a judicial proceeding, nor to
a private person; 3. That section 395 of the Criminal Code is
unconstitutional in that it deprives this accused, or any accused,
of his rights, and unreasonably and unlawfully restricts them
under section 6 of article 1 of the state of New York, and the
fifth amendment to the United States constitution, which de-
clares that no man shall be compelled to give testimony against
himself in a criminal case." These objections were overruled
and an exception taken.
The defendant's testimony as to what occurred when these
statements were made was in substance that he was taken up-
stairs into a large room where a gentleman sat at the table
with his back to the window, and had a chair in front of him
in which the defendant sat; that one Haller was there; that
Holmlund sat by a window, and that a typewriter or stenog-
rapher was there, who commenced asking him questions, and
that Holmlund, during the second interview, said to him that
he could just as well tell him the truth, as it would save hiTn
564 People v. Kennedy. [New York,
(Holmlund) a lot of trouble; besides that, he could get twenty
people who saw the defendant run across Michigan street to
get his knife. He then testified that they questioned him until
he supposed they got what they wanted, and added: "I was glad
to tell them everything, because I had been bothered by people
coming downstairs." He was then asked: "What do you mean
by that? A. After I got there, news was brought to me I had
killed a man. Of course, I didn't feel good about that. I didn't
have any intention of killing anybody, and I was put in my cell,
and didn't have anything on besides a pair of pants and shoea,
and I tried to sleep; and, every time I laid down, there was some
one to see me on some '^^ pretense or other. If I was laying
down, they coiddn't see my face, and they would make a noiso
and rouse me and want to know how did I do it, and all that
kind of business. They kept me that way all that day, Sunday
and Sunday night, Monday, and partly Monday night." As-
suming the correctness of the defendant's testimony as to what
transpired when his statements were made, the question is pre*
sented whether they were properly permitted to be used as evi-
dence against him.
Although a difference has always existed between the civil and
the common law in regard to confessions made by persons
charged with crime, the former regarding them as well-nigh
conclusive, while the latter treats that species of evidence as
open to distrust, still, as the latter has been adopted by the
courts of this state, it is only the common law and statutes
that need be considered in determining their bearing upon the
question of the admissibility of the defendant's confessions in
this case.
The first case in this court, called to our attention, where the
question has arisen, is Hendrickson v. People, 10 N. Y. 13, 61
Am. Dec. 721. In that case, Parker, J., said: "The general rule
is, that all a party has said which is relevant to the questions
involved in the trial is admissible in evidence against him. The
exception to this rule are where the confession has been drawn
from the prisoner by means of a threat or a promise, or where
it is not voluntary, because obtained compulsorily or by improper
influence." There the defendant was on trial for murder, and it
was held that his stai(.monts as a witness at the coroner's in-
quest, made before he had been charged with the crime and
before it was-ascertained that a crime had been committed, was
admissible in evidence against him.
June, 1899.] People v. Kennedy. 566
In People v. McMahon, 15 X, Y. 384, where the defendant
was arrested by a constable without a warrant, on suspicion of
having murdered his wife, and was taken before the coroner
who was holding an inquest, and was sworn and examined as a
witness, it was held that the evidence thus given was not ad-
missible on the prisoner's trial for the murder.
^"^ People V. Wentz, 37 N. Y. 303, is to the effect that the
confessions of a prisoner voluntarily made are admissible as evi-
dence against him, although made to a policeman while the
prisoner was not in his custody, although arrested and confined
in jail.
In Teachout v. People, 41 N. Y. 7, it was decided that the
statements made by a prisoner under oath at a coroner's inquest
were admissible against him upon his trial for murder, although
he knew, at the time he was sworn, that the decedent was poi-
soned, that he would probably be arrested for the crime, was
informed that rumors implicated him, and that he had a right
to refuse to testify.
In Murphy v. People, 63 N". Y. 590, after the prisoner's arrest
and commitment to jail, he was brought to the sheriff's office
and made certain statements, as to which the witness was per-
mitted to testify under objection. It appeared that the prisoner
was asked by the officer making the arrest if he desired to make
any statement as to his whereabouts on the day of the murder;
the witness replied he did, and then made the statement testified
to. It was offered in evidence on his trial, and it was held
by this court that the statement was voluntary, the reception
thereof did not constitute error, and that a statement made by a
prisoner is not involuntary because made after his arrest and
while in the custody of the officer arresting him.
Cox V. People, 80 IT. Y. 500, is to the effect that evidence
of confessions made by a prisoner, after his arrest, to the police
officer making it, when not induced by any promise or threat,
and voluntary upon his part, is competent, and that it is not
sufficient to exclude a confession that the prisoner was under
arrest at the time, or that it was made to the officer in whose
custody he was, or in answer to questions put by him.
In People v. McGloin, 91 N". Y. 241, a statement or confession
made by the prisoner was offered in evidence on the part of
the prosecution. He was arrested by an inspector of police in
the city of New York, who informed him of the crime for
■uhich he was arrested, that be was an inspector of ***® police,
had been watching him since the homicide, told him of his hav-
566 People v. Kennedy, [New York,
ing tried to steal a barrel of whisky the night before, and about
pledging his pistol with which the murder was supposed to have
been committed, whereupon the prisoner said that he would
make a statement. A coroner was sent for, who came to police
headquarters where the prisoner was in custody, and a confes-
sion was made in the presence of the coroner, who acted as clerk
to take it down and prove it. It was there held that as the
evidence did not disclose any threat, nor authorize an inference
that the confession was made under any influence of fear, it
was not a compulsory statement and was properly received in
evidence, although sworn to by the accused.
In People v. Mondon, 103 N. Y. 211, 57 Am. Eep. 709, the
defendant, who was an ignorant Italian, unfamiliar with the
English language, was arrested, without warrant, as a suspected
murderer. While under arrest, he was taken before a coroner's
inquest, and, after proof of the homicide, was examined, on
oath, by the district attorney and the coroner as to circum-
stances tending to connect him with the crime. It did not ap-
pear that he was informed that he was not bound to answer
questions tending to criminate himself. On his trial for the
commission of the crime the prosecution was permitted to prove,
under objection and exception, the statements so made by the
prisoner. This was held error upon the ground that the evidence
sought to be excluded was not a confession, but an official ex-
amination on oath of the prisoner while in custody. Still, in
that case the doctrine of the Hendrickson, McMahon, and
Teachout cases was considered and practically reaffirmed.
The question again arose in People v. Chapleau, 121 N". Y.
2&6, where it was held that since the adoption of section 395
of the Code of Criminal Procedure, the test of admissibility
of the statement of a party accused of crime, whether made
in the course of judicial proceedings or not, is whether it was
voluntarily made, and that is to be determined by its nature and
the circumstances under which it was made. It was also held
that it is no ground for the exclusion of an ^'^ admission by a
prisoner charged with crime that it was made while he was under
arrest, if shown to have been made voluntarily and without in-
fluences of promises or threats. In that case the statement was
made before a coroner after the defendant was informed as to
his right to depose or not, and that the deposition might be used
flfrainst him. He was then sworn and made a statement, but
upon the following day denied having made it, and refused to
June, 1899.] People v. Kennedy. 667
«ign it. It was, however, received in evidence and held admis-
€ible.
In People v. Wright, 136 N. Y. 625, 632, it was held that,
under the recent decisions of this court, there was no error in
proving the defendant's declarations when examined before the
■coroner. This conclusion sems to have rested upon the Chapleau
case and the cases cited in the opinion therein.
In People v. Cassidy, 133 N. Y. 612, confessions by the de-
fendant were made, while he was under arrest to Inspector
Byrnes of the New York police force. The inspector and others
present testified that the confessions were voluntary. The de-
fendant testified that they were made under the influence of
fear produced by threats. The question whether they were vol-
untary and reliable was submitted to the jury by the court,
which found against the defendant, and it was held that they
were properly in the case and sufficient to justify the verdict.
In People v. ^McCallam, 3 N. Y. Crim. Rep. 189, after the
defendant knew she was suspected of the crime for which she was
tried, she was told by an officer that they had found enough
•to convict her and she might as well own up, it was held that
this declaration did not constitute a threat, and that the confes-
sion of the defendant was voluntary and admissible: People v,
Mackinder, 80 Hun, 40.
If the defendant supposed there was any conflict in the evi-
dence as to the circumstances under which his statements were
made, or as to whether they were voluntary or otherwise, he
should have requested the submission of that question to the
jury. No such request was made. We think, as the defendant's
counsel evidently did upon the trial, that no such ^®* conflict
existed, and the question whether the statements were voluntary
and admissible under the provisions of section 395 was for the
court and not for the jury.
When we test the question as it arises in this case by the
-authorities cited, it becomes quite manifest that the defendant's
exceptions were not well taken. Obviously, his statements were
admissible under the provisions of section 395, as there can be
no pretense or claim that they were made while the defendant
was under the influence of fear produced by threats, or upon
any stipulation by the district attorney that he should not be
prosecuted therefor. Moreover, there was no evidence that the
statements were in any degree compulsory, or that they were
induced by any improper influence whatsoever. Whil^ it is
:true that the defendant was under arrest when they were made.
568 People v. Kennedy. [New York^
still, they were not the result of an examination in any judicial
proceeding. Nor could he have supposed that he was required
to make any statement whatever, except such as was entirely
voluntary upon his part. It is true he- was not informed by
those interrogating him that what he said might be used against
him upon a subsequent trial, still, he must have understood
such to have been the case, as he was a man of ordinary intel-
ligence and education. Indeed, if we adopt his own version of
the circumstances under which his statements were made, we
find nothing in the nature of compulsion or improper influences,
or of a promise or threat by which they were induced. At the
second interview, Holmlund said to the defendant that he could
just as well tell the truth, as it would save him (Holmlund) a
lot of trouble, and, besides, he could get twenty people who saw
him run across Michigan street to get it, evidently referring
to the knife. This falls far short of constituting compulsion
or improper influences, or a threat or promise to the defendant.
There was in this statement nothing from which such a conclu-
sion could be drawn. Besides, the defendant, in substance, tes-
tified that he was glad to tell the officers everything, because
he had been bothered by the people, then explaining why he
was glad to give the ^*^ officers the information he did. Thus,
it is manifest that these statements were purely voluntary, and
procured by no means which would justify a determination that
they were involuntary, and, consequently, inadmissible.
This case is clearly distinguishable from the case of People
v. Mondon, 103 K Y. 211, 57 Am. Eep. 709, and other kindred
cases upon which the defendant relies. In those cases the con-
fessions or statements were obtained in a proceeding of a judi-
cial character, or where the defendant may well have under-
stood that he was required to testify and was not instructed
as to his right to decline an answer, or that his statements
might be used against him. Here they were statements made
to the officers having him in charge, were not given as evidence,
but were voluntary, and, although reduced to writing, signed
by him and verified, amounted at most to a mere admission upon
his part.
Under these circumstances, his statements, and the evidence
as to what he said, were, we think, clearly admissible under
the principle of the authorities to which we have referred.
While cases will doubtless arise in the future, as they have
in the past, where public officers, by inquisitorial and compul-
sory examination, may obtain from persons suspected of or charged
June, 1899.] People v, Kennedy, 66^
with crime, statements which it would be error to admit in evi-
dence against them, still this is not such a case, as there was
no proof that the defendant's statements were other than vol-
untar}', and made with a full understanding of his situation
and an exact comprehension of his rights. The proof is quite
to the contrary. In passing, it may be proper to observe that^
when officers charged with the enforcement of the law, through
undue zeal or an inordinate desire to obtain evidence to convict
by covert threats, doubtful and uncertain promises, acts of in-
timidation, or other questionable means, procure incriminating
statements from persons subsequently charged with crime, they
are inadmissible, as they would be regarded as involuntary and
not made without inducement or practical compulsion. The
reception in evidence of statements thus obtained might well
be a ground for reversal. Therefore, district attorneys and other
executive ^^'^ and administrative officers should remember that
to be admissible statements made by one charged with or sus-
pected of crime must be voluntary, fairly obtained, and not pro-
cured by inquisitorial compulsion or other improper means.
When properly procured they may be of value and employed
as evidence against the person making them, but if procured
otherwise they are not admissible, and a judgment influenced
by such evidence would require reversal.
Having thus examined all the exceptions to which our at-
tention has been called by the defendant, and finding none which
would justify a reversal, it follows that the judgment should
be affirmed.
All concur (Bartlett, J., in result).
HOMICIDE— SELF-DEFENSE — DUTY TO RETREAT.— Life
may be lawfully taken In self-defense, but It must appear thnt
he who takes It was in imminent danger of death or great bodilv
harm, and that no other way of escape from the danger was open
to him: Commonwealth v. Broyossee. 160 Pa. St. 451. 40 Am. St. R"p.
729. The accused must honestly believe, without fault or careless-
ness on his part, that the danger Is thus urgent: Smith v. State, 5l>
Ark. 132, 43 Am. St. Rep. 20. One who provokes a difficulty, and by
his own wrong contributes to a situation out of which arises a ne-
cessity to take the life of another to preserve his own, cannot In-
voke the doctrine of self-defense to justify a homicide committed
under such circumstances: Dabney v. State, 113 Ala. 38, 59 Am.
St. Rep. 92, and note. But the fact that one person with a grievance
arms himself, and seeks an interview with the man who wrongs
him, is not necessarily a provocation such as to deprive him of the
right of self-defense: Shannon v. State, 35 Tex. Crim. Rep. 2, 60
Am. St. Rep. 17. While the duty to retreat Is necessary in general,
It has been held that such a duty is not required of one who Is
not the aggressor: People v. Lewis, 117 Cal. 186, 59 Am. St. Rep.
570 De Camp v, Thomson. [New York,
167, ana note. And one Is not obliged to retreat If he is attacked
on his own premises: State Vi Gushing, 14 Wash. 527, 53 Am. St.
liep. 883, and note.
HOMICIDE— MURDER IN THE FIRST DEGREE.— One cannot
be guilty of murder in the first degree, unless the act was perpe-
trated not only with intent to kill, but also with deliberation and
premeditation; People v. Barberi, 149 N. Y. 256, 52 Am. St. Rep.
717; State v. Norwood, 115 N. O. 789, 44 Am. St, Rep. 498; Dabney
V. State, 113 Ala. 38, 59 Am. St. Rep. 92.
CRIMINAL LAW — CONFESSIONS — ADMISSIBILITY. — In
■criminal cases, confessions are prima facie inadmissible, and will
not be received in evidence until it is shown to the court that they
were voluntarily made, unless the objection Is waived: Bradford v.
State, 104 Ala. 68, 53 Am. St. Rep. 24, and note. See the mono-
graphic note to Daniels v. State, 6 Am. St. Rep. 242, for a dis-
cussion of the admissibility of confessions in evidence. The con-
fessions of a person made under oath at a coroner's inquest are
regarded as voluntary, and may be admitted in evidence: Wilson v.
State, 110 Ala. 1, 55 Am. St. Rep. 17.
Db Camp v, Thomson.
[159 New York, 444.]
JUDGMENTS— SETOFF OF.— A judgment, to be available as
a setoff, must be a valid subsisting obligation, final in its nature.
Hence, judgments cannot be set off against each other where one of
them has been appealed from and the appeal is still pending and
undetermined..
SETOFF— CLAIMS MUST BE MUTUAL AND DUE.— Claims
or demands sought to be set off must not only be mutual to the
extent that they are owing by each to the other, but they must
be due aud payable, and, therefore, a claim not due cannot be set
off against one that may be presently enforced.
SETOFF— DISCRETION OF COURT IN ALLOWING.— The
question whether a setoff should or should not be decreed, rests In
the discretion of the court to which the application is made, and
Is not subject to review. Such relief should be administered in
all cases upon such equitable terms as will promote substantial
justice, unless the absolute right is created by statute, or otherwise
tirmiy established.
C. D. Adams, for the appellant.
C. E. Snyder, for the respondents.
-**» MARTIN, J. On the twenty-ninth day of June, ^«!06,
the plaintiff recovered a judgment against the defendants Dix
and Thomson, which determined certain property rights then
at issue, and also awarded to the plaintiff eighteen hundred and
five dollars and thirty-four cents for his costs in that action.
From that judgment an appeal was taken to the appellate divi-
June, 1899.] Dk Camp v. Thomson. 671
fiion in the fourth department, where, on the twenty-third day
of May, 1897, it was affirmed, with costs, and a judgment of
Affirmance duly entered. From the last '**'' judgment the de-
fendants appealed to the court of appeals and gave the under-
taking required by section 1327 of the Code of Civil Trocedure, |
thereby staying execution until the decision of the court of
appeals. When the appeal in the present case was taken, and
also when it was argued, the appeal in that case had not been
decided.
On the 15th of April, 1897, a second action was commenced
by the plaintiff against the same defendants, a trial of which
resulted in a dismissal of the complaint, and judgment was duly
entered therein for costs amounting to three hundred and six
dollars and five cents. In the last action a temporary injunction
was issued, the plaintiff giving an undertaking in the sum of one
thousand dollars conditioned for the pa5Tnent to the defendants
of any damages they might sustain by reason thereof. Upon
the entry of judgment therein the injunction was dissolved.
From that judgment no appeal was taken, and the time within
which to appeal expired before the commencement of the present
action. Subsequently, the defendants Dix and Thomson caused
an execution to be issued upon the judgment in the second
action, delivered it to the defendant Eaton, as sheriff, and di-
rected hira to make it out of the property of the plaintiff, which
he was proceeding to do when the present suit was commenced.
The purpose of the present action was to compel the defend-
ants Dix and Thomson to set off their judgment for three hun-
dred and six dollars and five cents against the judgment for
eighteen hundred and five dollars and thirty-four cents pre-
viously obtained by the plaintiff, and also to restrain them from
collecting, or attempting to collect, the judgment in their favor,
or any part thereof.
In this action the trial court held that the judgment in favor
of the plaintiff was not due and payable at the time of the
trial, because of the pending appeal therefrom and the stay of
execution thereon, and that as the judgment of the defendants
against the plaintiff was then due and payable and the defend-
ants were entitled to immediate payment thereof, the plaintiff
was not entitled to the relief sought. It thereupon directed
a judgment in favor of the defendants, dismissing *^^ the com-
plaint, with costs. This judgment was unanimously aflBrmed by
the appellate division.
672 De Camp v. Thomson. [New York^
The first question presented for our consideration is, whether
notwithstanding the appeal in the first action and the stay of
execution upon the judgment therein, the plaintiff had an ab-
solute right to have the judgment against him set off against
the judgment from which such appeal was taken. The authorities
seem to be quite uniform to the effect that a judgment, to be
available as a setoff, must be a valid, subsisting obligation and
final in its nature, and hence that judgments cannot be set
off against each other where one of them has been appealed
from and the appeal is still pending and undetermined: De
Figaniere v. Young, 2 Eobt. 670; Terry v. Koberts, 15 How.
Pr. 65: Pierce v. Tuttle, 51 How. Pr. 193; Hardt v., Schulting,
24 Hun, 345; Matter of Kloster, 40 Hun, 374.
It seems quite obvious that the plaintiff, at the time of the
trial, had no absolute legal right to the setoff sought to be
enforced by this action. His judgment was not then, and in-
deed might never become, payable or enforceable. Whether it
would or not depended entirely upon the future action of the
court to which the appeal had been taken. Although it was in
form an absolute claim against the defendants, yet, in fact, it
was contingent, depending upon the action of the court to ren-
der it efficient and enforceable. Hence, we think the mutuality
necessary to authorize such a setoff did not exist.
The general rule relating to this subject is that claims or
demands sought to be set off must not only be mutual to the
extent that they are owing by each to the other, but they must
be due and payable, and, therefore, a claim not due cannot be
set off against one that may be presently enforced. To this
rule there are, perhaps, some exceptions, as in the case of the
insolvency of one of the parties, or where an assignment has
been made. And yet, even in those cases, the party claiming
the right of setoff is not entitled to such relief, unless his claim
has matured before the assignment or transfer: '*^® Martin v.
Kunzmuller, 37 N. Y. 396, 397; Jordan v. National etc. Bank, 74
N. Y. 467, 30 Am. Pep. 319; Fera v. Wickham, 135 N. Y. 223;
Matter of Hatch, 155 K Y. 401.
Moreover, to have one judgment set off against another is
not a matter of absolute right, but is within the equitable dis-
cretion of the court to which the application is made: Alexander
V. Durkee, 112 N. Y. 655; Baker v. Hoag, 6 How. Pr. 201; Zog-
baum v. Parker, 55 N. Y. 120, 121; Simson v. Hart, 14 Jonns.
63; Smith v. Lowden, 1 Sand. 696; Brown v. Hendrickson, 39
N. J. L. 23?;; Tolbert v. Harrison, 1 Bail. 599; Davidson v,
Geoghagan, 3 Bibb, 233; Makepeace v. Coates, 8 Mass. 451.
June, 1899.] De Camp v. Thomson. 673
In some of the cases relating to this subject it is at least inti-
mated that the question of discretion is, to some extent, con-
trolled by the procedure adopted by the party seeking the set-
off. While it may well be that the relief awarded or claimed
may in some particulars be influenced or even regulated by the
circumstances and the manner in which the question is pre-
sented, still, we think that, however it is presented, the deter-
mination of the question whether the setoff should, or not, be
decreed, rests in the discretion of the court to which the appli-
<'ation is made, and that such relief should be administered in
all cases upon such equitable terms as will promote substantial
justice, unless the absolute right is created by some statute, or
otherwise firmly established. We find no such law or principle
which is applicable to this case. Therefore, as this court can
review questions of law only, and may not review the discre-
tionary action of other courts, it follows that the question chiefly
argued cannot be reviewed by us.
We are of the opinion that the decision of the court below
was correct, and in view of the clear and satisfactory opinion
of the trial court, which was adopted by the learned appellate
division, we deem it unnecessary to further discuss the questions
so ably presented by the counsel for the resy^ective parties.
The judgment should be affirmed, with costs.
All concur.
J"CDGMENTS— SETOFF— MATTER OF GRACE.— A Judgment
which represents the proceeds of exempt property cannot be set off
on a judgment against the judgment creditor: Cleveland v. Mc-
Canna, 7 N. Dali. 455, 66 Am. St. Rep. 670, and note. On the
question of the setoff of mutual judgments, see the extended note
to Duncan v. Bloomstock, 13 Am. Dec. 729. The jurisdiction to
set off one judgmeut against another is equitable in its nature, and
the application therefor is addressed to the sound judicial discre-
tion of the court, in the exercise of which equitable rights of per-
t^ons not parties to the suit will be considered and protected: Sim-
mons V. Reid, 31 S. C. 389, 17 Am. St. Rep. 36; Thropp v. Susque-
hanna etc. Ins. Co., 125 Pa. St. 427, 11 Am. St. Rep. 909.
SETOFF— CLAIMS MUST BE MUTUAL AND DUE.— The pay-
ment of a claim not yet due cannot be enforced by way of setoff
until it is due: Hayes v. Hayes, 2 Del. Ch. 191. 73 Am. Dec. 709;
Hallecl£ V. Guy, 9 Cal. 181, 70 Am. Dec. 643; Spauldin^ v. Backus,
122 Mass. 553, 23 Am. Rep. 391; Ainsworth v. Bank of California,
119 Cal. 470, 63 Am. St. Rep. 135. In equity, as at law, setoff is
only allowed where there Is a mutuality in the demands, and the
amounts are liquidated and certain: Smith v. Washington etc. Co.,
31 Md. 12, 100 Am. Dec. 49; Trafford v. Hall, 7 R. I. 104, 82 Am.
Dec. 5SG; Annan v. Houck, 4 Gill, 325, 45 Am. Dec. 133; Gregg ▼.
James, Breese. 143, 12 Am. Dec 151, and monographic note thereto.
CASES
IN THK
SUPREME COURT
ov
NORTH CAROLINA.
JiRowN V. Brown.
[124 North Carolina, 19.]
HUSBAND AND WIFE— RIGHT OP PARENT TO ADVISB
MARRIED CHILD.— In cases of unhapplness and disagreements
between a married couple, the law recognizes the right of a parent
to advise the son or daughter; and when such advice is given in
good faith and results in a separation, the act does not give the
Injured party a right of action.
TORTS— MALICE— DEFINITION.— The term "malice," as
applied to torts, does not necessarily mean that which must pro-
ceed from a spiteful, malignant, or revengeful disposition, but a
conduct injurious to another, though proceeding from an ill-regu-
lated mind not sufficiently cautious before it occasions an tajury to
another.
HUSBAND AND WIFE— LIABILITY OF PARENT FOR
ADVISING MARRIED CHILD TO ABANDON HUSBAND OR
WIFE.— Before a parent can be held liable in damages for advis-
ing his married child to abandon his wife, or her husband, the con-
duct of tlie parent should be alleged and proved to be malicious.
HUSBAND AND WIFE— PARENT AND CHILD— ADVICE
TO CHILD— MALICE.— The malice necessary to be alleged and
proved against a parent for advising his married child to abandon
his wife or her husband, is not alone such malice as must proceed
from a malignant and revengeful disposition, but that it would be
sufficient to prove to the satisfaction of the jury that the parent's
action was taken without proper investigation of the facts, or where
the advice was given from reclilessness or dishonesty of purpose,
the law presuming malice from such conduct in actions of this
nature.
Civil action for damages.
G. W. Ward and Pruden & Pniden, for the appellant.
E. F. Aydlett, for the appellee.
(574)
Feb. 1899.] Brown v. Brown. 57S
^ MONTGOMEKY, J. The only question (raised by de-
murrer to the complaint) for decision when this case was her&
before (Brown v. Brown, 121 N. C. 8) was whether a married
woman, abandoned by her husband, could maintain, without the
joinder of her husband, an action in tort. The court held that
such an action could be maintained. The present appeal is be-
fore us on exceptions to the charge of his honor.
The complaint contains three alleged causes of action: 1.
That the defendant unlawfully, wrongfully, and wickedly in-
tending to injure the plaintiff and to deprive her of the society
and aid of her husband, destroyed the affection of her husband
toward her and caused him to leave and abandon her; 2. That
he commenced against her a false and malicious prosecution for
alleged assault and battery upon her *^ husband; and 3. For
the false arrest knd imprisonment of the plaintiff, based upoa
such charge.
The defendant is the father of the plaintiff's husband, and in
his answer there is a denial of the material allegations of the^
complaint.
The issues arising on the pleadings as to the last two causea^
of action were found in favor of the defendant, and therefore
do not concern the appeal. The first issue was in these words:
"Did defendants alienate the affection of the plaintiff's hus-
band and cause him to abandon her, as alleged in the com-
plaint ?" The second issue was : "If so, what damage has plain-
tiff sustained?" His honor, in substance, instructed the jury
that if they should find that the defendant willfully caused the
defendant's husband to forsake and abandon her, the plaintiff
would be entitled to recover, and the jury should answer the
first issue, **Yes." And as to the measure of damages, the court
charged the jury that if they should find that the defendant
caused the plaintiff's husband to willfully forsake and abandon
her, and that it was not done with malice, they should give
only such actual damages as the plaintiff had sustained.
There was error in those instructions. The complaint in sub-
stance alleged that the conduct of the defendant was malicious.
The charge of his honor was that, "if the jury should find that
the defendant willfully caused the husband to abandon the wife^
then the first issue (which raised the question of malice in the
defendant) should be answered in the affirmative. The word
'willfully* does not mean maliciously. 'Willfully' implies that
an act done in that spirit is done knowingly and obstinately and
676 Brown v. Brown. [N. Carolina,
persistently, "but not necessarily maliciously": State v. Massey,
97 N. C. 465.
It cannot be that the law disregards the tender relations of
Icinship and natural affection between parent and child ^^ and
the duties which such relations impose, even though the child
is married. In case of unhappiness and disagreements between
"the married couple, it is almost iippossible to conceive of the
indifference on the part of the parent to such conditions, and
■certain it is that the child naturally turns to the parent for
comfort and advice under such circumstances. There are laws
of natural affection and of natural duty, and municipal law will
not obstruct their free operation as long as they are not abused.
The presumption in fact and in law in all such cases must be,
and is, that the parent will act only for the best interest of
the child and for the honor of the family. In Keed v. Eeed,
■6 Ind. App. 317, 51 Am. St. Eep. 310, where the defendant was
the father of the plaintiff's husband, and the cause of action
the same as that in the case before this court, it was said: "The
law recognizes the right of the parent in such cases to advise
the son or daughter; and when such advice is given in good faith
and results in a separation, the act does not give the injured
party a right of action. In such a case, the motives of the pa-
rent are presumed good until the contrary is made to appear."
It was further said in that case that "These rules have been gene-
rally applied in cases where the suit was brought by the husband
for the alienation of his wife, and we see no reason why they
fihould not, with proper modifications, prevail when the wife
is the plaintiff." In Westlake v. Westlake, 34 Ohio St. 621, 33
Am. Eep. 397, the plaintiff was, as is tho case in this action, the
wife of the defendant's son, and the cause of action like the
•one alleged in the present case. The defendant there requested
the court to charge the jury that: "If you find that the de-
fendant caused the separation, yet you shall not render a verdict
for the plaintiff, unless you find the defendant maliciously
•caused the separation." The court refused to give the instruc-
tion, and upon the appeal of the defendant ^* the appellato
court said: "This charge ought to have been given." The term
"malice," as applied to torts, does not necessarily mean that
which must proceed from a spiteful, malignant, or revengeful
disposition, but a conduct injurious to another, though proceed-
ing from an ill-regulated mind not sufficiently cautious before
it occasions an injury to another: Weckerly v. Geyer, 11 Serg.
^ R. 39, 40. If the conduct of the defendant was unjustifiable
March, 1899.] Yancey's Case. 577
and actually caused the injury complained of by the plaintifT,
which was a question for the jury, malice in law would be im-
plied from such conduct, and the court should have so charged."
"We are of the opinion, after having given the matter the se-
rious consideration which it deserves, that, before a parent can
be held liable in damages for advising his married child to aban-
don his wife, or her husband, the conduct of the parent should
be alleged and proved to be malicious; that the willful advice
and action of the parent in such a case may not be necessarily
malicious, for the parent may be determined and persistent and
■obstinate in his purpose to cause the separation, and yet be en-
tirely free from malice — in fact, have in view the highest good
of his child. Our opinion, however, is that the malice neces-
sary to be alleged and proved is not alone such malice as must
proceed from a malignant and revengeful disposition, but that
it would be sufficient to prove to the satisfaction of the jury that
the parent's action was taken without proper investigation of
the facts, or where the advice was given from recklessness or
dishonesty of purpose — the law presuming malice from such con-
duct in actions of this nature.
Error.
HUSBAND AND WIFE^-RIGHT OP PARENT TO ADVISE
MARRIED CHILD— LIABILITY.— A father has the right to advise
bis son, and. If he acts with proper motives and In good faith in do-
inff so, cannot be regarded as an intermeddler; but a father who,
maliciously and with a view to separating his son and the latter's
wife, aids, advises, and assists, and, by promises or threats, pro-
■cures his son to leave his wife, Is liable to an action by her: Ger-
nerd v. Gernerd, 185 Pa. St. 233, 64 Am. St. Rep. 646, and note.
Monographic note to Clow v. Chapman, 46 Am. St. Rep. 477. Aliena-
tion of husband's affections by relatives generally: Price v. Price,
«1 Iowa, 693, 51 Am. St. Rep. 360.
Tanory's Case.
ri24 North Carolina, 161.1
DEVISE-REMAINDER TO PERSONS NOT IN ESSE—
JURISDICTION— SALE OF PROPERTY.— Where property Is de-
vised for life, with a remainder over to persons not In esse, the life
tenant still living, a court has no power to order a sale of the prop-
erty, because there can be no one before the court to represent the
interest of the remaindermen.
DEVISE— REMAINDER TO UNDETERMINED PERSONS-
JURISDICTION— SALE OF PROPERTY.— Where property is de-
Tised for life, with a remainder over to "such children aa should
Am. St. Kkp., You LXX.— 37
578 Yancey's Case. [N. Carolina,
be living at the death of the life tenant," a court has no power to
order a sale of the property, for until the death of the life tenant
it could not be known who would take.
DEVISE — GENERAL REMAINDER — REMAINDERMEN
BEFORE THE COURT— JURISDICTION— SALE OF PROPERTY.
Where property is devised for life, with a general remainder over
in which there is no element of survivorship, a court may order a
sale of the property where all the remaindermen living are before
it, since the remaindermen represent a class, and those who may
afterward be born are concluded by the action of the court upoa
those of the same class.
DEVISE — REMAINDERMEN — SALE OF PROPERTY-
TITLE OF PURCHASER.— When property, which is devised for
life with a general remainder over, is sold under an order of court,
all the remaindermen living being before the court, the purchaser
will acquire a good title against afterborn children of the life ten-
ant.
Petition, ex parte, for the sale of land for reinvestment.
There was an order of sale. One of the purchasers refused to
complete his purchase on the ground that he did not buy a good
title.
Shepherd & Busbee, for the appellees.
No counsel contra.
i«K» FAIECLOTH, C. J. N. S. Harp devised as follows: "All
the residue of my estate, real and personal and mixed, I give
and bequeath to my wife, Lucy H. Harp, duiing her natural
life, and then in remainder to my daughter, Elodia Benton Yan-
cey, wife of Thomas B. Yancey, during her natural life, and theiv
to her children." Elodia and her children, some of whom ar&
minors represented by their next friend, ask the court to order
a sale of the land, and that the proceeds be invested under the
direction of the court for their benefit. The purchaser of ono
lot declines to pay his bid, and raises the question whether th&
court has the power to order the sale, and that is the only ques-
tion.
"We are not considering whether Elodia acquired an estate in
fee or for life only. She and her children are asking for a sale.
The only suggested difficulty is that by possibility she may have
other children, whose interest cannot now be sold. We think
that appellant's contention is untenable. ^^^ When the life
tenant, still living, has no child, it has been held that the court
has no power to order a sale of land, where it is limited in re-
mainder to persons not in esse, because there can be no one be-
fore the court to represent their interest: Watson v. Watson, 5ft
N. C. 400; Justice v. Guion, 76 K C. 442.
March, 1893.] Yancey's Case. 579
So, also, if the devise was in remainder to such children as
should be living at the death of the life tenant the court could
not sell, for until that event it could not be known who would
take: Miller, Ex parte, 90 N. C. 625; Williams v. Hassell, 74
K C. 434.
But when all the remaindermen living are before the court,
they represent a class, and when the gift is general and there is
no element of survivorship in it, it is otherwise, and by repre-
sentation those who may afterward be born are concluded by the
action of the court upon those of the same class then before it,
and the purchaser at such sale will acquire a good title against
afterborn children of the same life tenant: Irvin y. Clark, 98
N. C. 437.
In Williams v. Hassell, 74 N. C. 434, the court said: "Sup-
pose in the case before us the devise had been to the first takers
for life, remainder to their children; that woidd take in all the
children, as well those bom after the death of the testator as
those born before, and in such case it may be that the born
child might be allowed to represent the class." That supposed
case is just what we now have before us.
The investment will be made as the court may direct, and the
cause is retained for further direction.
It is to the interest of our people that the title to property
should be clogged as little as possible with 'limitations,'*
"trusts," et cetera, and public policy requires that the alienation
of lan-d should be as free from such condition as any article of
traffic.
Affirmed.
DEVISE-REMAINDERS— SALE OP PROPERTY.— An order for
the sale of real estate of decedent is invalid, if persons in whom a
contingent remainder is vested by the will of the decedent are not
cited to appear, and given an opportunity to resist the granting of
such order. So held where the provisions of a will gave the use
of a farm to the testator's son for life, and at the son's death to
vest in his children, should he leave any; and in default of such
children, then to the issue of the testator's brothers and sisters;
and at the time of the proceedings for the order of sale, the sou
and four of his children were living, as well as a number of chil-
dren of the testator's brothers and sisters, who were not cited to
appear: Wilson v. White, 109 N. Y. 59, 4 Am. St Kep. 420. On the
sale of contingent remainder under execution, see Haward ".
Peavey. 128 111. 430, 15 Am. St. Rep. 120, and note. See the note
to Snelling t. Lamar, 17 Am. St Rep. 84a
580 Troxler v. Southern Railway Co. [N. Carolina,
Tboxler v. Southern Railway Company.
[124 North Carolina, 18S.]
MASTER AND SERVANT— DUTY OF MASTER— SAFE
APPLIANCES.— The duty to furnish proper and safe appliances is
that of the common master, and injury caused by their absence
cannot be attributed to the negligence of a fellow-servant.
RAILROAD COMPANIES— NEGLIGENCE PER SE— FAIL-
URE TO USE SELF-COUPLING DEVICES.— Failure of a railroad
company to equp its freight-cars with modern self-coupling devices
is negligence, per se.
RAILROAD COMPANIES — FAILURE TO USE SELF-
COUPLING DEVICES— NEGLIGENCE OF EMPLOYE.— Where a
railroad company fails to equip its freight-cars with modern self-
coupling devices, and an employ^ is injured in coupling cars by
hand, the company is liable, whether such employ^ was negligent
in the manner of making the coupling, or not.
MASTER AND SERVANT— CONTINUING NEGLIGENCE
OF MASTER— CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE OF SERVANT.—
Where the negligence of the defendant is a continuing negligence,
there can be no contributory negligence which will discharge the
master's liability.
MASTER AND SERVANT— NEGLIGENCE PER SE— FAIL-
URE TO USE SAFE APPLIANCES IN GENERAL USE.— When
safer appliances have been invented, tested, and have come into
general use, it is negligence per se for the master to expose his
servant to the hazard of life or limb from antiquated and defective
appliances which have been generally discarded by the intelligence
and humanity of other employers.
RAILROAD COMPANIES — SAFE APPLIANCES — DE-
FENSE OF POVERTY.— If an appliance is such that the railroads
should have it, the poverty of the company is no sufficient excuse
for not having it.
RAILROAD COMPANIES— DUTY TO USB SAFE APPLI-
ANCES IN GKNERAL USE.— The employes of a railroad company
and the traveling public alike have a right to be protected against
any dangers which can be avoided by the adoption of safety appli-
ances which have been tested by experience and which have come
into general use.
Civil action to recover damages for personal injuries, alleged
to have been occasioned by the defendant's negligence. The
plaintiff was a brakeman on the defendant's train, and by direc-
tion of the conductor undertook to couple two cars, which were
not furnished with automatic couplers. Plaintiff's hand was
injured.
F. H. Busbee, for the defendant.
C. M. Steadman and D. Schenck, Jr., for the plaintiff.
*** CLAEK, J. The plaintiff was injured in attempting to
couple cars of the defendant on which there were no automatic
March, 1899.] Tboxleb v. Southern Railway Co 581
car-couplers, *®* but in lieu thereof skeleton draw-heads of un-
equal height. The court below held that the absence of auto-
matic couplers, in general use, was negligence, per se, and re-
fused to submit an issue whether the injury was not caused by
the negligence of a fellow-servant, and refused to instruct the
jury, as prayed, that the plaintiff was guilty of contributory
negligence if he could by proper care have coupled the cars by
hand without accident.
The duty to furnish proper and safe appliances is that of the
common master, and injury caused by their absence cannot be
attributed to the negligence of a fellow-servant: Troxler t.
Southern Ey. Co., 122 N. C. 902; Wright v. Southern Ry. Co.,
122 N. C 959. It has been heretofore held in Greenlee \.
Southern Ry. Co., 122 N. C. 977, 65 Am. St. Rep. 734, that fail-
ure of a railroad company to equip its freight-cars with mod-
ern self-coupling devices is negligence, per se, continuing up to
the time of an injury sustained by an employe in coupling cars
by hand, and renders the company liable, whether such employe
was negligent in the manner of making the coupling, or not.
The same ruling had been previously made as to the duty of fur-
nishing automatic car-couplers on passenger trains in Mason v.
Richmond etc. R. R. Co., Ill N. C. 482, 32 Am. St. Rep. 814,
decided in 1892. Where the negligence of the defendant is a
continuing negligence (as the failure to furnish safe appliances
in general use, when the use of such appliances would have pre-
vented the possibility of the injury), there can be no contribu-
tory negligence which will discharge the master's liability.
This has been repeatedly held: Norton v. North Carolina R. R.
Co., 122 N. C. 911; McLamb v. Wilmington etc. R. R. Co., 122
N. C. 873; Cone v. Delaware etc. R. R., 81 N. Y. 206, 37 Am.
Rep. 491. The failure to provide the necessary appliances is
the causa causans. The defendant, however, frankly asks us
to reconsider and overrule Greenlee's case. That case was the
expression of no new doctrine, but the affirmation of one ^^^ as
old as the law, and founded on the soundest principles of justice
and reason, to wit: That when safer appliances have been in-
vented, tested, and have come into general use, it is negligence,
per se, for the master to expose his servant to the hazard of life
or limb from antiquated and defective appliances which have
been generally discarded by the intelligence and humanity of
other employers: Witsell v. West Asheville etc. Ry. Co., 120 N.
C. 557. This must be so, if masters owe any duties to their em-
582 Tboxleb v. Southern Railway Co. [N. Carolina,
ployes, and unless economy of expenditures on the part of the
railroad management is to be deemed superior to the conserva-
tion of the lives and limbs of those employed in their operation.
In the twelfth annual report of the interstate commerce com-
mission (1898), published by authority of the United States
government, upon returns made by the railroad companies them-
selves, it is stated (at page 88) : "Since the enactment of the law
in 1893 (requiring automatic couplers) there has been a decreas-
ing number of casualties. There were 1,034 fewer employes
killed and 14,062 fewer injured during the year ending June 30,
1897, than during the same period in 1893. The importance of
this subject will be realized when the yearly casualties to rail-
way employes are compared with those which occurred during
the recent war. In the Spanish-American War there were 298
killed and 1,645 wounded. In 1897 there were 1,693 men killed
and 27,667 injured from all causes in railway service. From
coupling and uncoupling cars alone 219 less were killed and
4,994 less were injured in 1897 than in 1893, when the law was
enacted. The number of such employes killed has been reduced
one-half, and the number of injured also practically reduced one-
half. The reduction in the number of accidents from all causes
largely exceeded (by nearly three to one) in a single year the
entire casualties resulting from the prosecution of the late war."
103 Thus in four years — from 1893 to 1897 — notwithstanding
the increase of thousands of miles of railways, and many thou-
sands of employes, and the further fact that the railroad corpo-
rations have been able to procure from the interstate commerce
commission an extension of the time at which the law of Con-
gress, imposing a penalty for operating any cars without self-
couplers, will come into force, the shadow of the law has pro-
cured so general an attachment of these self-couplers, that 5,213
fewer employes were killed and wounded in coupling and un-
coupling cars in 1897 than in 1893. Can it, therefore, be seri-
ously contended that the absence of such safety appliances is not
negligence per se, rendering the railroad company liable for
damages? As these appliances have been patented, and more
or less in use for over thirty years, it should not have required
an act of Congress to enforce their universal adoption. Failure
to adopt them, after being so long and widely known and used,
was negligence in the defendant, upon the principles of the
common law : Witsell v. West Asheville etc. Ey. Co., 120 N. C.
557. The act of Congress imposing a penalty for failure to add
March, 1899.] Troxleb v. Southern Railway Co. 583
the appliances after January 1, 1898, in no wise affected the
right of any employ^ to recover for damages, sustained by the
negligence of any railroad company to attach them. The action
of the interstate commerce commission, in extending the date
«t which such act should come into force (by virtue of authority
given in the act) could not set aside the principle of law that
failure to adopt such appliances was negligence per se, nor have
any other effect than to postpone the date at which the United
States government would impose the prescribed penalty upon
all railroads engaged in interstate commerce failing to equip all
their cars with automatic couplers, a penalty which is imposed
irrespective whether any accidents occur from such failure or
not.
i»4 rpjjg indifference of railroad companies shown in not
adopting these life and limb-saving appliances is all the greater,
fiince their cost is comparatively small. Indeed, the interstate
<K)mmerce commission, in the above-cited report (page 89), state
that, considering the less expense required in repairs, they are
an actual saving. They say: "Figures submitted by one of the
leading railroad companies indicate that the adoption of the au-
tomatic coupler will result in saving a very large sum annually,
in comparison with the expense incurred in former years, in ap-
plying and maintaining the link and pin type ; and this does not
take into account the reduced cost to the roads, which must re-
sult from fewer suits for damages by injured employes. And
further, that there being too much slack in the old pin and link
for the brake to act economically or successfully, the automatic
coupler makes the requirements of railroad operation better, aa
well as minimizes the danger to employes."
In Witsell v. West Asheville etc. Ry. Co., 120 N. C. 657, 562,
it is said: "If an appliance is such that the railroads should
have it, the poverty of the company is no sufficient excuse for
not having it.'* But not only, as above, the use of self-couplers
would be an actual economy to the defendant, but that it is
amply able to put on these appliances, if it were not, is shown
by the published report of the defendant company that its gross
earnings for the year 1895 (when this injury was inflicted) were
over $17,000,000, and its net earnings, over and above all ex-
penses, were more than $5,000,000 (Poor's Railroad Manual,
1898, 792) — figures which for the year just past have risen to
over $22,000,000 gross earnings and over $7,300,000 net earn-
ings.
534 Tkoxler v. Southern Railway Co. [N. Carolina^
"With such an array as above of the terrible cost of life and
limb by failure to use appliances to avoid coupling and un-
coupling ^®^ cars by hand (in doing which the plaintifE was
injured), and the small expense, nay, actual economy, of adopt-
ing them, and the ample means the defendant possesses, we can-
not reverse our ruling in Greenlee's case, that it is negligence
per se in any railroad company to cause one of its employes to
risk his life or limb in making couplings which can be made au-
tomatically without risk.
This matter of requiring these great corporations to protect
the traveling public, and their employes as well, by the adop-
tion of all safety appliances which have come into general use,
is so important that we have gone into the subject at this
length. Ordinarily owned by great syndicates out of the state
in which they operate, and their management at all events re-
moved from subjection to that sound public opinion which is so
great a check upon the conduct of individuals and of govern-
ment itself, the sole protection left to the traveler and the em-
ploye alike is the application of that law which is administered
impartially, and which can lay its hand fearlessly upon the most
powerful conbination and protect with its care the humblest
individual in the land.
The subject is one of transcendent importance, for notwith-
standing the partial adoption of these appliances and consequent
reduction in casualties, the twelfth interstate commerce com-
mission shows (page 77"^ that for the year ending June 30, 1897,
on the railroads engaged in interstate commerce (which alone
report to that commission), there were still 43,168 casualties, of
which 6,437 resulted in death. Of these 1,693 killed and 27,667
wounded were railroad employes, among whom 314 were killed
and 6,283 wounded in coupling or uncoupling cars. In our own
state, the report of the North Carolina railroad commission for
1898 (pages 250, 251) shows that for the year ending June 30,
1898, the railroads reported 879 persons killed and wounded (of
i»« whom 99 were killed) and of these, 23 of the killed and 599
of the wounded were employes — total, 622. As, of the 9,000
employes reported in this state, 4,000 (according to the usual
ratio) were employes engaged in the actual operation of the
trains, it follows that in this state one such employ^ in every 6^
was in that year injured or killed. In view of such mortality,
rivaling that of the bloodiest wars, this court cannot reverse its
declaration heretofore, which is sustained by every sentiment oi
March, 1899 ] Tboxleb v. Southern Railway Co. 585
justice and humanity, that where a life and limh-saving appli-
ance, like automatic car-couplers, has come into general use, and
its partial adoption has in four years, notwithstanding the in-
crease in railroad mileage and employes, decreased the injuries
and deaths from coupling cars one-half, that the failure to adopt
and use it is negligence per se.
Considering the economy in money of using such appliances,
as well as the ample revenues of the defendant, it is passing
strange that it (or any other railroad company) should have de-
layed till now, or even till 1895, to protect the lives and limbs
of their employes in this particular, or that there should have
been need of an act of Congress or the verdict of a jury to stimu-
late considerations of humanity toward their patrons and their
employes.
Counsel for defendant read, as part of his argument, a clip-
ping from a newspaper,- and repeats in his brief, that a noble
English lord, who was a railroad manager as well as an heredi-
tary member of Parliament, had changed his party affiliations
because the one to which he had belonged had advocated the
enforced adoption of self -couplers upon English railways. That
simply shows that one such manager, at least, possesses a lordly
^disregard for the thousands of deaths and injuries of employes
yearly, caused by the lack of safety appliances, and it may be
there are others who entertain sentiments ^^"^ of higher alle-
giance to the net earnings of the syndicates that employ them
than to those great principles which every political party pro-
fesses to advocate, as being for the best interests of the public.
But the hostility of one or more railway managers toward the
matter cannot affect the impartial enforcement of the sound
legal principle that employes and the traveling public alike have
a right to be protected against any -dangers which can be
avoided by the adoption of safety appliances which have been
tested by experience and which have come into general use.
In the present case, the defendant has the less excuse because
there was uncontradicted testimony not only that automatic car-
couplers were in general use at the time of the injurv (March,
1895), but that the skeleton draw-heads, in attempting to make
a coupling with which the plaintiff was injured, were defective
in that they were of different heights from the ground, and evi-
dence that the cars could not have been coupled with a stick or
in any other manner, except by hand.
586 Bear v. Commissioners. [N. Carolina,
MASTER AND SERVANT— DUTY OF MASTER TO FURNISH
SAFE Af PLIANCES.— It is the duty of the master to the servant
to furnish sufficient, properly constructed, and safe machinery, or
other materials or appliances, to be used by the servant in the
•course of his employment aud necessary for the service: Meador v.
Lake Shore etc. Ky. Co., 138 Ind. 2i)0, 46 Am, St. Rep. 384; Nord
Deutscher etc. Co. v. Ingebregsten, 57 N. J. L. 400, 51 Am. St. Rep.
€04.
RAILROAD OOMPANIES-SELF-COUPLERS— NEGLIGENCE.
The rule is well settled in North Carolina that the failure of a rail-
"svay company to equip its freight-cars with self-coupling devices
is negligence per se, for which it is liable in damages to an em-
ploy 6 who receives an injury while coupling cars by hand, whether
he is guilty of contributory negligence or not: Greenlee v. South-
ern Ry. Co., 122 N. C. 977, 65 Am. St. Rep. 734, and monographic
note thereto, in which it is shown that the North Carolina doctrine
is not supported by the weight of authority. A railroad company
need not furnish the best machinery: Mason v. Richmond etc. R. R.
■Co., Ill N. C. 482, 32 Am. St. Rep. 814. Neither is a railroad com-
pany required to adopt every appliance which even a majority of
the well-regulated roads have adopted: Louisville etc. R. R. Co. v.
Hall, 91 Ala. 112, 24 Am. St. Rep. 863. See the note to Chicago
«tc. E. E. Co. V. Swett, 92 Am. Dec. 213.
Bear v. Commissioners.
[124 North Carolina, 204. J
ESTOPPEL-NECESSITY TO PLEAD.— Where a party haa
an opportunity to plead an estoppel, and voluntarily omits to do so,
but goes to the issue on the facts, he thereby waives the estoppel,
and the jury Is at liberty to find according to the facts of the case.
ESTOPPEL— PLEADING— DEMURRER.— Where the advan-
tage might have been taken of an estoppel by means of a demurrer,
and the party fails to so take advantage of it, he will be held to
have waived the estoppel.
MANDAMUS— NATURE.— ]\landamus Is In the nature, both
of an execution and of a civil action.
MANDAMUS— NATURE-CIVIL ACTION.— Mandamus Is In
the nature of a civil action, and is commenced by summons, and
the pleadings and the practice are the same as are prescribed for
the conducting of civil actions.
SCHOOLS— SCHOOL FUNDS— LIABILITY OF COUNTY.- -
School orders issued by the school committee upon the treasurer of
the county board of education, under the North Carolina laws In
force in 18S6, were paj^able out of the school fund only, and were
not a valid charge upon the public funds of the county.
MANDAMUS TO COMPEL COUNTY COMMISPTOVPrS
TO LEVY TAX— CONSTITUTION.— Under a constitutional pro-
vision prohibiting any tax from being levied by any county, city,
or town, except for the necessary expenses thereof, uiiless by n vote
of the majority of the qualilied voters therein, before mandamus
can be issied to compel the board of commissioners of a co-iit- to
4evy a tax to pay a judgment against the commissioners, the plain-
March, 1899.] Bear v. Commissioners. 587
tiff— Judgment creditor— must show affirmatively by the record or
other competent evidence that the consideration of the debt, upon
which the judgment was obtained, was of such a character as to
fall under the head of ordinary or necessary county expenses.
E. K. Bryan and Frank McNeill, for the defendants.
J. D. Bellamy and Shepherd & Busbee, for the plaintiff.
20S MONTGOMERY, J. This case is before us on a peti-
tion to rehear, the first opinion having been filed at the spring
term, 1898, and published in Bear v. Board of Commrs., 122 N.
€. 434, 65 Am. St. Rep. 711. After further argument and a
closer investigation, we have arrived at the conclusion that there
was error in the former opinion in its reversal of the judgment
of the superior court. That judgment ought to have been af-
firmed.
The plaintiff in his complaint alleged that the defendants
were indebted to him in the sum of ... . dollars due by eight
judgments originally had in a court of a justice of the peace,
and afterward docketed by transcript in the office of the clerk of
the superior court of Brunswick county, and prayed judgment
that the defendants be compelled to levy a tax to pay the judg-
ments and costs. The defendants, in their answer, admitted
that the judgments were procured as alleged, but averred that
they were not valid and binding against the defendants, for the
reason that they were obtained against a former board of com-
missioners on school claims for which neither the defendants
nor their predecessors were liable in law. The defendants
further aver that the judgments were obtained on certain school
orders issued about the year 1886 by the school committeemen
of certain school districts of Brunswick county upon the treas-
urer of the county board of education, and that they were not
« valid charge against the defendants, the board of commission-
ers, or a charge upon the public funds of the county, or upon any
other ^**** fund except those expressly set apart for school pur-
poses. And for a further defense the defendants aver that sec-
tion 7, article 7, of the constitution of North Carolina prohibits
any tax from being collected or levied by any county, city, or
town, or other municipal corporation, except for the necessary
expenses thereof, unless by a vote of the majority of the quali-
fied voters therein; and the defendants aver that the considera-
tion upon which the judgments were had was not for the neces-
sary expenses of the county or for a debt contracted in the man-
ner provided bj the constitution.
688 Bear v. Commissioners. [N. Carolina,
When the case came on for trial a jury trial was waived, and
it was agreed that his honor who presided should find the facts,
and the case was heard by the court by the consent of counsel
of the plaintiff and of the defendants. "What facts could have
been in the minds of the counsel, except the facts connected
with the consideration of the claims on which the original judg-
ments were procured, and those connecting the judgments of
1894, docketed in the superior court by transcript, as being the
same judgments which were originally rendered by the justice of
the peace in 1888? No other facts could have been referred to,
for they were raised by the pleadings, and the defendants in
their answer had admitted that the judgments had been obtained
by the plaintiff, as set out in his complaint. The plaintiff, hav-
ing failed to plead his judgments in estoppel of the matter set
out in the answer, or to demur to the answer, waived his rights
as to any advantage which the law had given to his position, and
by his agreement to submit the facts to the finding of the court,
went to the hearing on the merits of the original consideration
upon which the judgments were granted. "Numerous decisions
in this country and England hold that where a party has an op-
portunity to plead an estoppel, and voluntarily ^^"^ omits to do
so, but goes to the issue on the facts, he thereby waives the es-
toppel, and the jury is at liberty to find according to the facts
of the case. So, where the advantage might have been taken of
an estoppel by means of a demurrer, and the party fails to so
take advantage of it, he will be held to have waived the estop-
pel": 8 Am. & Eng. Ency. of Law, 13, and cases there cited. If
the plaintiff intended to avail himself of the full benefit and ef-
fect of his judgments, it was incumbent on him to do so, by
some proper pleading because of the nature of defendant's an-
swer, for, though mandamus is in the nature of an execution,
yet it is in the nature of a civil action ; it is commenced by sum-
mons and the pleadings, and the practices are the same as are
prescribed for the conducting of civil actions: Code, sec. G23.
His honor found as a fact upon the evidence, none of which
was objected to, that the original judgments were obtained upon
certain school orders issued during the year 1886, and that the
judgments of 1894 in the superior court were the same judg-
ments which were obtained before the justice of the peace in
1888, and that there was nothing in the record or judgment of
1894 to show what the cause of action was, except that they were
brought on former judgments. Now, upon his honor's findings
March, 1899.] Beab v. Commissioners, 689
of fact, the legal question arises. Were school orders issued in
1886 a debt for which the county was liable, and for which the
board of commissioners could Jbe made to provide by taxation ?
We think not.
The law in force at the time when the school orders upon
which the plaintiff's action was brought were issued, was the
-code, chapter 15, volume 2, as amended by chapter 174 of the
acts of 1885. Section 2551 of the code provides that the county
board of education shall, on the first Monday in January ^*^ of
•each year, apportion among the several districts all school funds,
specifying how much of the same is apportioned to each race,
and give notice thereof to the school committees of the several
districts of the county. It is further provided in the same sec-
tion that the sums thus apportioned to the several districts shall
be subject to the orders of the school committees thereof, for
the payment of the school expenses authorized by law. In sec-
tion 2555 of the code it is provided that "all orders upon the
treasurer of the county board of education for school money for
the payment of teachers, duly countersigned by the county
superintendent of public instruction, and all orders for the pur-
chase of sites for schoolhouses, and for the costs of building, re-
pairing, and furnishing schoolhouses, shall be signed by the
school committee of the district in which the school is taught,
or in which the site or schoolhouse is situated, which orders,
duly indorsed by the person to whom the same are payable, shall
be the only valid vouchers in the hands of the treasurer of the
■county board of education, to be paid out of the funds appor-
tioned to the district in which the schoolhouse is erected."
The county treasurer of each county was required to receive
and disburse the public school funds, not under his general
bond, but under a separate bond conditioned for the faithful
performance of his duties as treasurer of the county board of
education. The county board of education were empowered, if
they deemed it necessary, to require the treasurer of the county
board of education to strengthen his bond, and for any breach
of that bond action was to be brought, not by the county com-
missioners, but by the county board of education: Code, sec.
2554.
The treasurer of the county board of education was required
to open accounts with each public school district, and report
yearly to each school committee the amount apportioned *®® to
the respective districts for the year, and to the county board of
t90 Beak d. Commissioners. [N. Carolina,
education the amoimts received froin all sources for public
school purposes.
From this review of the law in force when the school orders
were issued, upon which the plaintiff's judgments were obtained^
it appears that there was a complete separation of the school
funds from the general county fund upon the apportionment
being made, and from that time all control of the same by the
county commissioners ceased; that the funds were taken charge-
of by the treasurer of the board of education under a separate
bond; that the disbursements were made by that officer under
orders signed by the school committees; that the accounts of
the school fund were kept by that officer and the several school
committees, and a report, yearly, to the county board of edu-
cation, made of all receipts of school funds by him, and the
amount apportioned to each district was the fund out of which
school orders were to be paid.
The county, therefore, through the board of commissioners,
was not liable for the debt upon which those orders were issued.
If the amount apportioned to the district or districts upon
whose committee or committees the orders were drawn had been '
in the hands of the treasurer of the board of education, and he
had defaulted in their payment, then the law required action
for such defalcation to be instituted against that officer and his
bond. If there never had been in the treasurer's hands any
funds to meet those orders, because they were improperly issued,
then there was no liability on either the county or the treasurer.
But besides the view of this case, as expressed above, we are
of the opinion that before mandamus can be issued to compel
the board of commissioners of a county to levy a tax ^*** to pay
a judgment against the commissioners, the plaintiff — judgment
creditor — must show affirmatively by the record or other com-
petent evidence that the consideration of the debt, upon which
the judgment was obtained, was of such a character as to fall
under the head of ordinary or necessary county expenses. Any
other view of the law would enable a board of county commis-
sioners to levy a tax to pay a debt reduced to judgment by con-
fession or by default, which debt, under section 7 of article 7 of
the constitution, the county would be prohibited from contract-
ing, unless the question was submitted to a vote of the qualified
voters of the county. Such a course would, in effect, be a con-
venient method, whenever the county commissioners might
choose to do so, of destroying a most salutary provision of the
constitution. It would be equivalent to holding that, by a rule
March, 1899.] Beab v. Commissioners. 691
of pleading, a plain provision of the constitution can he ahol-
ished. No technical learning based on the rules of pleading caa
force us into such a conclusion.
The prayer of the petitioners must, therefore, be granted.
The case must be reheard, and the judgment of this court en-
tered therein at the spring term, 1898, must be set aside, and
judgment entered at this term affirming the judgment of the
superior court. Prayer of the petitioners granted.
FAIRCLOTH, 0. J., dissented, on the ground that the Judg-
ments, being based upon school claims, were a necessary expense,
aud that mandamus would lie. "We must consider whether the
expense of the public common county school system Is a necessary
expense. What is a necessary expense fs a question for the court,
whenever the question arises. It is necessary for the good, safety,.
and happiness of the whole people that certain benefits and Im-
provements shall be recognized as necessary expenses. The public-
school system tends to Improve the manners, morals, and material
condition of the people In the march of civilization. This court
has often said that the building of courthouses, public roads, and
bridges are necessary expenses: Vaughn v. Commissioners, 117
N. C. 434 Public education Is a cherished object of our con-
Btltution and of our legislature and people. It Is of vital importance-
to society and to the state. Is it less so than a public bridge across
a stream which can be crossed by a common ferry boat?" The dis-
senting opinion cites, also, the North Carolina constitution, article
1, section 27, and article IX, sections 2, 4, and 15; Lutterloh v. Com-
missioners, 65 N. C. 403.
ESTOPPEL— NECESSITY TO PLEAD.— Estoppels In pals must
be specially pleaded to be available as a defense: Coclirill v.
Hutchinson, 135 Mo. 67, 58 Am. St. Rep. 564, and note. An estop-
pel of record, to be effectual, must be pleaded, if there is an oppor-
tunity to plead it: Water Comrars. v. Cramer, 61 N. J. L. 270, 68
Am. St. Rep. 705. One who has an opportunity to plead an estop-
pel, but does not, thereby waives it: Niclium v. Burckhardt, 30 Or.
4(>4. 60 Am. St. Rep. 822. See the monographic note to Tyler v.
Hall, 27 Am. St. Rep. 344.
MANDAMUS— NATURE.— Mandamus is regarded. In modera
practice, as an action by the party on whose relation it is granted
to enforce a private right when the law affords no other adequate
means of redress: Arberry t. Beavers. 6 Tei. 457. 55 Am. Dec. 791.
See. also. Moody v. Fleming, 4 Ga. 115, 48 Am. Dec. 210; Swift ▼.
Richardson, 7 Houst. 338, 40 Am. St. Rep. 127.
MANDAMUS TO CXDMPEL LEVY OF TAX.— See, on this ques-
tion. Coy V. City Council, 17 Iowa, 1, 85 Am. Dec. 639, and note
thereto.
^92 Kei«drick v. Life Insurance Co. [N. Carolina,
Kbndeiok V. Life Insurance Company.
[124 North Caeolina, 815.]
INSURANCE— POSSESSION OF POLICY.— Possession of an
insurance policy, at the death of the insured, makes out a prima
facie case.
INSURANCE— PAYMENT OF PREMIUM— RECITALS IN
THE POLICY— ESTOPPEL —The acknowledgment in the policy of
the receipt of the premium estops the company to test the validity
■of the poMcy on the ground of nonpayment of the premium.
insurance— RECITALS OF PAYMENT IN THE POLICY
—WHEN A MERE RECEIPT.— In so far as a recital in an Insur-
-ance policy of the payment of premium is a mere receipt for money,
it is only prima facie like other receipts, and will not prevent an
action to recover the money if not in truth paid.
INSURANCE— RECITALS OF PAYMENT IN THE POL-
ICY—WHEN PART OF CONTRACT.— In so far as a recital in an
insurance policy of the payment of premium is a part of the con-
tract of insurance, it cannot be contradicted by parol to invalidate
the contract, in the absence of fraud in procuring the delivery of
the policy.
DEEDS— RECITALS IN AS TO PAYMENT— EVIDENCE TO
CONTRADICT.— Although it is always competent to contradict the
recital in a deed as to the amount paid, in an action Involving the
recovery of the purchase money, or as to the measure of dam-
ages in an action upon the covenants in the deed, it is not com-
petent to contradict the acknowledgment of a consideration paid,
in order to affect the validity of the deed in creating or passing a
title to the estate thereby granted.
INSURANCE— INSTRUCTIONS TO AGENTS— EVIDENCE
AGAINST THE COMPANY.— The instruction to agents that if the
premium was paid more than thirty days after due there must be a
health certificate is evidence against the company that credit or
indulgence of payment was allowable.
INSURANCE— INSTRUCTIONS TO AGENTS NOT BIND-
ING ON THE INSURED.— The instruction to agents that after
thirty days' delay in the payment of premium a health certificate
is required Is not binding on the insured, who may rely upon the
provision In the policy itself that the payment must be made "dur-
ing life."
INSURANCE— CONSTRUCTION OF POLICY.— The uniform
rule of construction of Insurance policies is, that if reasonably sus-
ceptible of two constructions, that one will be adopted whlcli is
more favorable to the Insured.
CONTRACTS— CONSTRUCTION OF PROMISES.— It Is a
rule of law, as well as of ethics, that where the language of a
promisor may be understood in more senses than one, it Is to be
Interpreted in the sense in which he had reason to suppose it was
understood by the promisee.
CONTRACTS— CONSTRUCTION OF.-If It be left In doubt
whether given words were used in an enlarged or a restricted sense,
•other things being equal, that construction should be adopted
wBicli Is most beneficial to the promisee.
TRIAI^REFUSAL OF -COURT TO SUBMIT ISSUES.—
Where every phase of a defendant's contention could be and waa
presented without prejudice under the issue submitted by the
court, the refusal to submit other issues, though asked, is not error.
April, 1899.] Kendrick v. Life Insurance Ca 698
Burwell, Walker & Cansler, for the defendant.
Jones & Tillett, for the plaintiff.
'** CLARK, J. John F. Kendrick applied for insurance on
liis life in the defendant company for the henefit of his wife,
the plaintiff, and on the 15th of July, 1897, the defendant issued
its policy in accordance with the terms of the application, which
was delivered hy its agent to him, a few days thereafter. He
was afterward taken ill with typhoid fever and died on the 15th
of September, 1897. The policy recited the payment of the
premium, though in fact it was not paid until a few hours be-
fore, and in fact, on the same day on which the insured died, the
payment being then made for him by a friend and accepted by
the local agent with full knowledge of Kendrick's critical con-
dition. This agent had theretofore indulged the payment, stat-
ing that it would be sufficient if the payment was made during
Kendrick's life. The policy contained a provision: "This pol-
icy does not take effect until the first premium shall have been
actually **'' paid during the lifetime of the insured." There
was in the instructions of the company, in the hands of its
•agents, a further provision, that: **When a premium is paid
more than thirty and within sixty days after due, a certificate
of good health, signed by the applicant, will be required." It
was not shown that John F. Kendrick had notice of this instruc-
tion.
These, in substance, were the facts. The plaintiff, to whom
the policy was payable, was in possession of the policy, and, the
death of the insured being admitted, this made out a prima facie
oase. In the absence of evidence, the policy is presumed to have
been delivered at the time it bears date : Meadows v. Cozart, 76
N. C. 450; Lyerly v. Wheeler, 34 N. C. 290. The authorities
are numerous and quite uniform that the acknowledgment in
the policy of the recipt of the premium estops the company to
test the validity of the policy on the ground of nonpayment of
the premium. In so far as it is a mere receipt for money, it is
only prima facie like other recipts, and will not prevent an
action to recover the money, if not in truth paid; but in so far
«s it is a part of the contract of insurance, it cannot be contra-
dicted by parol to invalidate the contract, in the absence of
fraud in procuring the delivery of the policy. The rule is thus
«tated in 2 Biddell on Insurance, section 1128: "As a general
rule, it has been held in the United States that while such a re-
Aic St. Rkp„ Vou LXX.— 38
594 Kea'DRIck v. Life Insurance Co. [N. Carolina^
ceipt will prevent the insurer from proving the premium was
unpaid in order to show the policy was void from its inception^
it may be contradicted in order to show, on a suit for premium,
that no payment had been made/' citing numerous cases in the
note. To same effect the law is summed up and stated in 1^
Am. & Eng. Ency. of Law, 1126; Basch v. Humboldt Ins. Co., 35
N. J. L. 429, in a very clear statement by Beasley, C. J., citing
Provident Ins. Co. v. Fennell, 49 111. 180; New ^^^ York Cent.
Ins. Co. V. National etc. Ins. Co., 20 Barb. 471. Chancellor
Kent says (3 Kent's Commentaries, 260) : "The receipt of the
premium in the policy is conclusive of payment and binds the
insurer unless there is a fraud on the part of the insured." Ta
like purport. Home Ins. Co. v. Oilman, 112 Ind. 7; Goit v. Na-
tional etc. Ins. Co., 25 Barb. 189, 192; Southern Life Ins. Co. v,
Booker, 9 Heisk. 606, 24 Am. Eep. 344; Illinois Cent. Ins.
Co. V. Wolf, 37 111. 354, 356, 87 Am. Dec. 251; Teutonia Ins.
Co. V. Mueller, 77 111. 22, 24; Phillips on Insurance, sees. 514,,
615; Farnum v. Phoenix Ins. Co., 83 Cal. 246, 17 Am. St.
Rep. 240; Michael v. Mutual Ins. Co., 10 La. Ann. 737; Con-
solidated etc. Ins. Co. v. Cashow, 41 Md. 60, 76. In striking
analogy is the same rule as to receipts in deeds. In 3 Wash-
burn on Eeal Property, 614, the fourth rule applying to re-
ceipts in deeds is as follows: "Although it is always compe-
tent to contradict the recital in the deed as to the amount paid,.
in an action involving the recovery of the purchase money,,
or as to the measure of damages, in an action upon the cove-
nants in the deed, it is not competent to contradict the ac-
knowledgment of a consideration paid, in order to affect the
validity of the deed in creating or passing a title to the estate
thereby granted.'* This is quoted and approved in Barbee
V. Barbee, 108 N. C. 584, and it may be said, in passing, that
the difficulty in reconciling opinions expressed in that case
was due to the failure to note the double aspect of a recital in a
deed of payment as being a mere receipt for money, and there-
fore only prima facie, in an action to recover the money, and as-
being sometimes also a part of the contract and therefore not
to be impeached, except for fraud, et cetera, when the validity
or effect of the contract depends on prepayment, a distinction
which is clearly pointed out by Ashe, J., in Harper t. Dail, 9^
N. C. 394, citing Wilson v. Derr, 69 N. C. 137.
The above proposition being true even when the policy is^
made payable to the estate of the insured, a fortiori the defend-
ant ^*® company is estopped when the beneficiary Ib a third
April, 1899.] Kbndrick v. Life Insurance Co. 695
party: Kline y. National Ben. Assn., Ill Ind. 462, 60 Am. Eep.
706.
Certainly, it is not the defendant who can except because the
court charged the jury: "If, when the policy was handed to
Kendrick by the agent, it was not the understanding that it
should then take effect as a policy, then Kendrick could not, by
sending this amount as a payment, create or put in force a con-
tract of insurance, although the agent during Kendrick's sick-
ness may have agreed and directed that he should do so. On
the other hand, although defendant may show that as a fact the
recital of the payment of premium was not true, yet if the pol-
icy was delivered to operate as a contract of insurance, it can-
not contend that the policy was invalid because the premium
was not paid" (at time of delivery). If it be conceded, contrary
to authorities above recited, that the proviso in the policy, that
it shall not be effective "unless the first premium shall have
been actually paid during the lifetime of the insured," removed
the estoppel arising from the acknowledgment of the receipt
of the money, the condition was complied with by the actual
payment of the money in the lifetime of the insured, which re-
lated back to the date of the policy. The instruction to agents,
as recited in the letter of the general agent, that if the premium
was paid more than thirty days after due there must be a health
certificate, is evidence against the company that credit or indul-
gence on payment was allowable, but the terms that, after thirty
days* delay, a health certificate is required is not binding on
the insured, who is not shown to have had knowledge of it, and
who (even if he had) might well rely upon the simple provision
in the policy itself that the payment must be made "during
life" and the assurance of the agent that if it was done it would
be sufficient: Horton v. Home Ins. Co., 122 K C. 498, 65 Am.
St. Rep. 717; Insurance Co. v. Wilkinson, 13 Wall. 222.
320 It is true in Whitley v. Piedmont etc. Ins. Co., 71 N. C.
480, it is held that the representation of good health con-
tinues up to the consummation of the contract. There, the
policy was not delivered till more than a month after the death
of the insured, and the agent was ignorant of the condition of
the insured. In the present case, the contract was consum-
mated by the unconditional delivery of the policy acknowledg-
ing receipt of payment, and if that acknowledgment can be
varied by the provision that the policy was not valid unless
the premium was "actually paid during life," this condition
was complied with. There was no suppression of information
696 Kbndrick v. Life Insurance Co. [N. Carolina,
or fraud, for the agent knew the condition of the insured when
he received the premium. The authorities cited in Whitley's
case, supra, do not support the construction sought to be placed
on that opinion by the defendant. It would be contrary to
every rule of construction to restrict the obligation of a prom-
isor beyond the plain meanings of his words. On the contrary,
the uniform rule of construction of insurance policies is that if
reasonably susceptible of two constructions, that one will be
adopted which is more favorable to the insured: National Bank
V. Ins. Co., 95 U. S. 673.
In Hoffman v. Aetna etc. Ins. Co., 33 N. Y. 413, 88 Am. Dec.
337, the rule is laid down by the New York court of appeals as
follows: "It is a rule of law, as well as of ethics, that where
the language of a promisor may be understood in more senses
than one, it is to be interpreted in the sense in which he had
reason to suppose it was understood by the promisee: Potter
V. Ontario etc. Ins. Co., 5 Hill, 147, 149; Barlow v. Scott, 24
N. Y. 40. It is also a familiar rule of law that if it be left
in doubt, in view of the general tenor of the instrument and
the relations of the contracting parties, whether given words
were used in an enlarged or a restricted sense, other things
being equal, that construction should be adopted which is most
beneficial tp the promisee: Coke on Littleton, 183; Bacon's ^-*
Law Maxims, Teg. 3; Doe v. Dixon, 9 East, 16; "Marvin v.
Stone, 2 Cow. 806. This rule has been very uniformly applied
to conditions and provisos in policies of insurance on the ground
that, though they are inserted for the benefit of the under-
writers, their office is to limit the force of the principal obliga-
tion."
In Goodwin v. Provident Assur. Soc, 97 Iowa, 226, 59 Am.
St. Rep. 411, the supreme court of Iowa states the rule as fol-
lows: "The tenets established for the guidance of the courts
in such matters are well understood, and no one is better estab-
lished than that in all cases the policy must be liberally con-
strued in favor of the assured, so as not to defeat, without a
clear necessity, his claim for indemnity. And when the words
used may, without violence, be given two interpretations, that
which will sustain the claim and cover the loss should be
adopted.'* The court cites a large number of authorities to
sustain the proposition, and indeed the authorities seem uni-
form.
Besides, the agent of the company put the same construc-
tion upon the policy and said that it would be sufficient if
April, 1899.] Kendrick v. Life Insurance Co. 697
the payment was made "during lifetime/' and if this had mis-
led the insured it would have heen fraud for the company to
avail itself of a forfeiture thus procured: McMaster v. New
York Life Ins. Co., 78 Fed. Kep. 36; Continental Ins. Co. v.
Chamherlain, 132 U. S. 304. The agent directed the "check
to be mailed," and the time of the mailing was the time of pay-
ment (the check being honored on presentation): Whitley v.
Piedmont etc. Ins. Co., 71 N. C. 480.
Every phase of the defendant's contention could be and was
presented without prejudice under the issue submitted by the
court, aiid therefore the refusal to submit other issues, though
asked, is not error: Pretzfelder y. Merchants' Ins. Co., 123 N. C.
164.
Afiirmed,
INSURANCE— RECITALS OF PAYMENT IN THE POLICY-
ESTOPPEL.— Where an insurance policy contains a formal receipt
of the premium, Its unconditional delivery is conclusive evidence
of payment so as to estop the company from denying the validity
of the policy, notwithstanding the declaration in it that it shall
not be binding until the premium is actually paid: Farnum v. Phoe-
nix Ins. Co., 83 Cal. 246, 17 Am. St. Rep. 233; Southern Life Ins.
Co. V. Booker, 9 Heisk. 606, 24 Am. Rep. 344; Kline v. National
Bon. Assn., Ill Ind. 462, 60 Am. Rep. 708. But see Sheldon v.
Atlantic etc. Ins. Co., 26 N. Y. 460. 84 Am. Dec. 213.
INSURANCE-POWERS OF AGENTS-INSTRUCTIONS TO
AGENTS.— Private Instructions to an agent limiting his autoorlty
cannot bind persons having no knowledge thereof: Brown v. Frank-
lin etc. Ins. Co., 105 Mass. 565, 52 Am. St. Rep. 534; California
Ins. Co. V. Gracey, 15 Colo. 70, 22 Am. St. Rep. 376. An insurance
company may limit the power of Its agent, and when such notice
as a prudent man is bound to regard Is brought home to the as-
sured, limiting the power of such agent, he relies upon any act In
excess of such limited power at his peril: Weldert v. State Ins.
Co., 19 Or. 261, 20 Am. St. Rep. 809. The Insured is bound by limi-
tations upon the power of the agent contained in his policy: Cleaver
V. Traders' Ins. Co., 65 Mich. 527, 8 Am. St. Rep. 908.
INSURANCE-CONSTRUCTION OF POLICY.— When the terms
of a policy permit more than one construction, that will be adopted
which will support its validity and favor the insured: Berliner v.
Travelers' Ins. Co., 121 Cal. 458, 66 Am. St. Rep. 49; Matthews v.
American etc. Ins. Co., 154 N. Y. 440, 61 Am. St Rep. 627; Good-
win v. Provident etc. Assur. Assn., 97 Iowa, 226, 59 Am. St. Rep.
411.
CONTRACTS— CONSTRUCTION OF.— If a written contract rea-
sonably admits of two constructions, that is to be adopted which
is least favorable to the party whose language it Is: Amory Mfg.
Co. V. Gulf etc. Ry. Co., 89 Tex. 419, 59 Am. St Rep. 65. If the
terms of an Instrument are not ambiguous, the testimony of the
parties as to how they understood it Is inadmissible: Pratt v.
Prouty, 104^ Iowa, 419, 65 Am. St Bep. 472.
598 GoEEELL V. Watee Supply Co. [N. Carolina,
GoEEELL V. Water Supply Company.
[124 NoETH Carolina, 328.]
CONTRACrr FOR BENEFIT OF THIRD PARTY— RIGHT
OF ACTION.— One not a party or privy to a contract, but who Is
a beneficiary tlaereof, is entitled to maintain an action for its
breach.
CONTRACT FOR BENEFIT OF THIRD PARTY— BENE-
FICIARY ONE OF A CLASS— AOTION.—One not a party to a con-
tract, but who is a beneficiary thereof, is entitled to maintain an
action for its breach, even when he is only one of a class of per-
sons, if the class is sufficiently designated.
WATER COMPANIES— BREACH OF CONTRACT— NATU-
RAL AND PROXIMATE RESULT— DAMAGE BY FIRE TO
TAXPAYER.— Where a party undertakes to furnish water in such
mode and quantity that it may be used to extinguish fires in the
city in which it is to be supplied, damages sustained by a citizen
and taxpayer by the destruction of buildings, by the failure to so
furnish water, is a natural and proximate consequence of such
breach of the undertaking.
CONTRACT FOR BENEFIT OF THIRD PARTY— RIGHT
OF ACTION FOR BREACH.— The beneficiaries of a contract, who
furnish the consideration money of the contract, can maintain an
action for damages caused by its breach.
DECISIONS OF SISTER STATES— WEIGHT OF.— In a case
of first impression in a state, the decisions in other states have
only persuasive authority, and the consideration to which the rea-
soning therein is entitled.
King & Kimball, for the defendant.
Boyd & Brooks, for the plaintifE.
*^® CLARK, J. This cause is presented npon complaint
and demurrer. The complaint avers authority conferred upon
Greensboro by its charter to provide water supplies, either by
erecting waterworks itself or by contract, and that, ^^® in pur-
suance thereof, the city contracted with the Greensboro Water
Company to furnish said city "with pure and wholesome water
for the use of its citizens and of force at all times sufficient to
protect the inhabitants of the city against loss by fire,'* giving
to said company exclusive rights of eminent domain over its
streets, alleys, sidewalks, and public grounds for the purpose
of laying and operating water mains, pipes, hydrants, stands,
€t cetera; that subsequently all the rights and property of said
water company passed by sale to the defendant, who at the same
time assumed all the duties and obligations imposed by the
aforesaid contract, and both the defendant and the city had
acquiesced in the same; that by virtue of said contract it was
stipulated and agreed inter alia that the water company should
April, 1899.] Gorrell v. Water Supply Co. 599
^'supply the city and inhabitants with pure, good, and whole-
some water, suitable for all domestic, sanitary, and fire purposes,
and for individual use"; should "erect and maintain settling
basins, filtering galleries, reservoirs, water towers, pump-houses
«nd other appurtenances and attachments necessary or expedi-
ent for the proper conducting and carrying on said waterworks,
so as to afford at all times the most adequate supply for all
domestic uses and the greatest protection against fire." The
remainder of the complaint is as follows:
8. That it was also stipulated and agreed by and under said
contract that the said water company should use only first-clasa
machinery, pipes, hydrants, valves, pumps, et cetera, in connec-
tion with said waterworks, and that the said works should be
complete in all its details with a capacity to furnish one and
« half million gallons of water every twenty-four hours against
a pressure of two hundred feet head. And should erect a stor-
age water tank whose top water level should be one hundred feet
above the surface of the ground at the center of the public square
and to be of a capacity of one hundred thousand ^** gallons of
water, and that the same shall be filled by the said water com-
pany to its top every day an hour before sundown. And for
the extinguishment of fire in said city the company shall erect
a pump-house and put therein a pumping engine, which shall
be kept ready at all times to supply the needed fire pressure.
9. That it was further stipulated and agreed by and under
^5aid contract that the said water company should erect and put
in seventy-five hydrants, at such places as the city might desig-
nate, and for the rents of which said city of Greensboro was
to pay them annually two thousand eight hundred and seventy-
five dollars. And in pursuance of such agreement and compli-
ance therewith on the part of the city, the water company did
■erect, and their successors, the Greensboro Water Supply Com-
pany, had in possession and use at the times hereinafter men-
tioned, two hydrants — one a hundred and the other about two
hundred feet distant from plaintiff's storehouses, which were
•destroyed by fire on the date hereinafter mentioned.
10. That by the terms of said contract it was further stipu-
lated and agreed that the said water company should keep a
pressure of water for fire purposes sufficient to throw six streams
-of water from six hydants, to a vertical height of one hundred
feet in still air, each stream being taken from one hydrant and
with one hundred feet of hose and a one-inch ring nozzle, and
600 GoEEELL V. Water Supply Co. [N. Carolina^
the said company shall constantly, day and night, except from
unavoidable accidents, keep all the said hydrants supplied with
water for fire service and shall keep them in good order for said
service.
11. That said contract was made with the said Greensboro
Water Company and extended to and acquiesced in by their
successors, the defendant Greensboro Water Supply Company,
for the use and benefit of all its property owners and inhabi-
tants— among which was the plaintiff, who was a ^"^^ property
owner in said city, at the times hereinafter referred to and for
several years prior thereto, in common with that of other citi-
zens of said city, which said property was taxed at its full value
to raise money with which to pay said hydrant rents.
12. That on the night of the day of June, 1897,
a fire broke out in a building some thirty feet distant from
plaintiff's storerooms on the south side of South Elm street in
said city; that the fire alarm was at once turned on, and in
less than ten minutes thereafter the Greensboro Fire Company
arrived at said fire with their hose, fire engine, and other ap-
purtenances necessary for the ready extinguishment of said fire.
That the said fire company attached its hose, which were in
every respect adequate and sufficient for the demands of the
occasion, as plaintiff is advised and believed, to the two hydrants
above mentioned, one one hundred feet from said storerooms
and the other about two hundred feet distant, each of which
said hydrants were sufficiently near to said store and lot to have
afforded water adequate for the ready extinguishment of said
fire, if the proper pressure had been on same.
13. That notwithstanding the promptness of the fire com-
pany in reaching said fire and the perfect sufficiency of its
equipments to convey the water to same, the defendant, as
plaintiff is advised and believes, persistently, carelessly, and
negligently refused to furnish said hydrants above described and
referred to with a sufficient pressure of water to extinguish said
fire, and by reason of such tortious and negligent conduct on
the part of the defendant the said fire spread from the building
in which it originated and ignited the storeroom of the plain-
tiff.
14. That after the fire had spread to and caught on flames
the building of the plaintiff, the said fire company, as plaintiff
is advised and believes, was still present with its hose, ladders,
buckets, engine, et cetera, ready to use its every effort to *^*
April, 1899.] Goreell v. Watee Supply Co. 601
extinguish Bame, and while the said fire company had its hose
attached to said hydrants sufficiently near, with the proper
pressure, to have quickly extinguished same and saved plain-
tiff's property from burning, the defendant persistently refused,
neglected, and omitted to have the fire pressure agreed to and
required by its contract, and only furnished pressure sufficient
to throw a stream ten feet from the end of said regulation hose,
by carelessly, negligently, and wrongfully failing to keep any
water in its water tank, or even its hydrants and pipes full,
and not having its pumping engine at work; by reason of which
negligent, wrongful, and tortious conduct on the part of the
defendant, the plaintiff's property was totally destroyed by fire,
and by reason of such loss she has been damaged in the sum of
five thousand dollars.
15. That the said fire originated in an adjacent building ta
plaintiff's, and that the destruction of her property by same
was not occasioned by any mistake, carelessness, or negligence
on her part, but solely on account of the careless, willful, and
wanton neglect on the part of the defendant to furnish the
hydrants above referred to with the water which they were re-
quired, and had obligated themselves to do, and upon their doing
of which plaintiff confidently relied.
16. That as plaintiff is advised and believes, defendant's fail-
ure to provide sufficient water for the extinguishing of said fire
was not occasioned by any unavoidable accident or lack of water
in the reservoir from which they originally take same, but was
the result of a wanton, careless, and willful neglect and dis-
regard for their duties and obligation contracted and owed to
the several inhabitants of the city of Greensboro, including the
plaintiff.
Wherefore plaintiff demands judgment against the said
Greensboro Water Supply Company for the sum of five thoti-
Band dollars damages and the cost of this action. And for such
other and further relief as the court may deem plaintiff entitled
to.
^^^ The demurrer admits the allegations of the complaint to
be true. Those grounds of demurrer which allege omission of
technical or formal averments in the complaint we deem not
well taken, and to require no discussion. The demurrer, so
far as it relates to the merits of the case is substantially that
the complaint has stated no cause of action: 1. Because the
plaintiff, though a citizen and taxpayer of Greensboro (as alleged
€02 GoRRELL V. Water Supply Co. [N. Carolina,
in tlie complaint), is neither a party nor privy to the contract,
the breach of which is the foundation of the action; 2. The
failure of the defendant to furnish water was not the proximate
cause of the plaintiff's loss.
It is true tlie plaintiff is neither a party nor privy to the
■contract, but it is impossible to read the same without seeing
that, in warp and woof, in thread and filling, the object is the
•comfort, ease, and security from fire of the people, the citizens
of Greensboro. This is alleged by the eleventh paragraph of
the complaint, and is admitted by the demurrer. The benefit
to the nominal contracting party, the city of Greensboro, as a
corporation, is small in comparison, and, taken alone, would
never have justified the grants, concessions, privileges, benefits,
and payments made to the water company. Upon the face of
the contract, the principal beneficiaries of the contract in con-
templation of both parties thereto were the water company on
the one hand and the individual citizens of Greensboro on the
other. The citizens were to pay the taxes to fulfill the money
consideration named, and furnishing the individual citizens
with adequate supply of water and the protection of their prop-
erty from fire was the largest duty assumed by the company.
One not a party or privy to the contract, but who is a bene-
ficiary thereof, is entitled to maintain an action for its breach.
This has been sustained by many decisions elsewhere: Ellis v.
Harrison, ^^ 104 Mo. 270; Lawrence v. Fox, 20 N". Y. 268;
Simson v. Brown, 68 N. Y. 355; Yrooman v. Turner, 69 N. Y.
280, 25 Am. Eep. 195; Wright v. Terry, 23 Fla. 160; Austin
V. Seligman, 18 Fed. Hep. 519; Burton v. Larkin, 36 Kan. 246,
59 Am. Rep. 641; and even when the beneficiary is only one
of a class of persons, if the class is sufficiently designated:
Johannes v. Phenix Ins. Co., 66 Wis. 50, 57 Am. Rep. 249. It
was considered, though without decision, by this court in Haun
V. Burrell, 119 N. C. 644, 548, and Sams v. Price, 119 N. C.
•572. Especially is this so when the beneficiaries are the citi-
zens of a municipality whose votes authorized the contract and
whose taxes discharge the financial burdens the contract entails.
The officials who execute the contract are technically the agents
of the corporation, but the corporation itself is the agent of the
people, who are thus effectively the principals of the contract.
The acceptance of the contract by the water company carries
with it the duty of supplying all persons along its mains: Griffin
V. Goldsboro Water Co., 122 N. C. 206; Haugen v. Albina Water
Co., 21 Or. 411.
April, 1899.] Gorrell v. Water Supply Co. 603
In Paducah Lumber Co. v. Paducah Water Supply Co. (1889),
€9 Ky. 340, 25 Am. St. Eep. 536, it is held: "If a water com-
pany enter into a contract with a municipal corporation
whereby the former agrees, in consideration of the grant of a
franchise and a promise to pay certain specified prices for the use ir
of hydrants, to construct waterworks of a specified character, >
force, and capacity, and to keep a supply of water required for
domestic, manufacturing, and fire protection purposes for all the
inhabitants and property of the city, a taxpayer of the city may
recover of the water company when, through a breach of its
contract, he is left without means of extinguishing fire and his
property is on that account destroyed," and it is therein further
held: "Where a party undertakes to furnish water in such mode
and quantity that it may be used to extinguish fires in the city
in which it is to be supplied, damages sustained by the destruc-
tion of buildings by the failure to so ^^^ furnish such water is a
natural and proximate consequence of such breach of the under-
taking." This opinion is based upon sound reason and is
adopted by us. It is conclusive of both points raised as to the
merits of the controversy by the demurrer. Indeed, it could not
be doubted that if the city buildings were destroyed by fire
through failure of the defendant to furnish water for their pro-
tection as provided by the contract, the city could recover: New
Orleans etc. Co. v. Meridian Waterworks, 72 Fed. Rep. 227. Be-
sides, the complaint, in paragraphs 13 and 14, alleges that the
•defendant's failure to furnish water as per contract was the
■direct and sole cause of the loss, and this is admitted by the
demurrer. This, the question really narrows down to the ques
tion whether the beneficiaries of a contract, who furnish the con
fiideration money of the contract, can maintain an action fo
■damages caused by its breach.
The case of Paducah Lumber Co. v. Paducah Water etc. Co.,
89 Ky. 340, 25 Am. St. Rep. 536, is exactly in point, was re-
affirmed on rehearing, and is followed by Duncan v. Owensboro
Water Co. (Ky., Dec. 10, 1889), in the same court, making three
■decisions altogether. The decisions, however (twelve in num^
ber), in other states where the question has been presented, aM
the other way. But this is a case of the first impression in thi i
state, and decisions in other states have only persuasive author''
ity. They have only the consideration to which the reasoning
therein is entitled. They are to be weighed, not counted. We
€hould adopt that line which is most consonant with justice and
the "reason of the thing."
604 GoRRELL V. Water Supply Co. [N. Carolina^
Did tHe people of Greensboro have just cause to believe that,
by virtue of that contract, they, as well as the corporation, were
guaranteed a sufficient quantity of water to protect their prop-
erty from fire, and did the water company understand it waa
agreeing, for the valuable considerations named, to furnish a
sufficient quantity of water to protect private as well as public
property from fire? The intent is to be '^'^^ drawn from the in-
strument itself, and on its face there can be no doubt it was con-
tracted that the water supply should be sufficient to protect
private as well as public property. If so, it follows that when,
by breach of that contract, private property is destroyed, the
owner thereof, one of the beneficiaries contemplated by the con-
tract, is the party in interest, and he, and he alone, can maintain
an action for his loss.
As is said by Judge Freeman, the learned annotator of the .
American State Reports, in commenting on the fact (Britton v.
Green Bay etc. W. W. Co., 29 Am. St. Eep. 863) that the major-
ity of decisions so far rendered were adverse to the position taken
in the Kentucky case above cited and approved by us: "As none
of the courts have fairly faced what seems to be the logical result
of these decisions, viz., that the injured person is left without
any remedy at all, it must be admitted that the subject is left
in an extremely unsatisfactory position. It seems to be uni-
versally agreed, and on the soundest reasoning, that the city
itself is not liable for failing to protect the property of taxpayers
from fire, unless made liable by express statutory provisions:
Wright V. Augusta, 78 Ga. 241, 6 Am. St. Rep. 256. And it
seems equally clear that the city would have no right of action
in such case in behalf of the taxpayer, for the basis of all the
[adverse] decisions is that there is no privity of contract between
the taxpayers, and the water companies. If the contract is not
made for the benefit of the taxpayers in such a sense that they
can sue upon it, it can hardly be maintained that the same con-
tract is made for one of those taxpayers in such a sense that the
city can recover damages in his name. ... If, then, neither the
taxpayer himself nor the city on his behalf can sue the company,
the conclusion seems to be that the loss by fire in these cases is
regarded by the law as damage for which there is no redress."
This is a complete reduction ad absurdum, and we prefer not
to ^^"^ concur in cases, however numerous — there are probably a
dozen scattered through half a dozen states — ^which lead to such
conclusion. All these cases (when not based on reference to the
April, 1899,] GoRUELL v. Water Supply Co. 606
others) rest upon the narrow technical basis that a citizen, he-
cause not a privy to the contract, cannot sue, whereas authorities
are numerous that a beneficiary of a contract, though not a party
or privy, may maintain an action for its breach: 7 Am. & Eng.
Ency. of Law, 2d ed., 105-108. Here, the water company con-
tracted with the city to furnish certain quantities of water for
the protection of the property of the citizens as well as of the
city, and receive full consideration, a large part of which comes
in the shape of taxation, paid annually by those citizens. On a
breach of the contract, whereby the property of a citizen is des-
troyed, he, as a beneficiary of the contract, is entitled to sue, and
under our code, requiring the party in interest to be plaintiff,
he is the only one who can.
Whether there was a breach of the contract, and whether it
was the proximate cause of the loss, regarded as matters of fact,
will be determined by the Jury, if, when the case goes back, the
defendant shall file an answer, as it has a right to do (Code, sec.
272) raising those issues. But in overruling the demurrer to the
complaint there was no error. As was said by the supreme court
of Kentucky, when affirming, on a petition to rehear, the deci-
sion in the Paducah case, supra: "The water company did not
covenant to prevent occurrence of fires nor that the quantity
of water agreed to be furnished would be a certain and effectual
protection against every fire, and consequently does not in any
sense occupy the attitude of an insurer; but it did undertake to
perform the plain and simple duty of keeping water up to a
designated height in the stand-pipe, and if it failed or refused to
comply with that undertaking, and such breach was the '*^**
proximate cause of destruction of the plaintiff's property, which
involves issues of fact for determination by a jury, there exists
no reason for its escape from answering in damages that would
not equally avail in case of any other breach of contract.**
Afl&rmed.
Faircloth, C. J., and Furches, J., dissent.
CONTRACT FOR BENEFIT OF THIRD PARTY-RIGHT OP
ACTION.— If a contract has been made between two parties for the
benefit of a third, an action will He thereon at the instance and
in the name of the party to be benefited, although the contract
was made without his knowledge, and without any consideration
moving from him: Brown v. Markland, 16 Utah, 360, 67 Am. St.
Rep. 629; St. Louis v. Von Phul, 133 Mo. 661, 64 Am. St Rep. 695.
and note.
WATER COMPANIES— BREACH OF CONTRACT— NATURAL
AND PROXIMATE RESULT.— Where a party undertakes to fur-
606 Balk v. Harris. [N. Carolina,
nish water in such mode and quantity that it may be used to ex-
tinguish fires in the city in which it is to be supplied, damages-
sustained by the destruction of buildings by the failure to so fur-
nish such water is a natural and proximate consequence of sucl>
breach of the undertaliing: Paducah Lumber Co. v. Paducah Water
etc. Co., 89 Ky. 340, 25 Am. St. Rep. 53(1.
WATER COMPANIES— CONTRACT WITH MUNICIPALITY-
TAXPAYER'S RIGHT OF AOTION.-If a contract is made be-
tween a municipality and a corporation that the latter will furnish,
water for the extinguishment of fires and other purposes, a pri-
vate citizen cannot recover of such corporation for damages sus-
tained by him for the breach of its contract with the city: Fitch v.
Seymour etc. Co., 139 Ind. 214, 47 Am. St. Rep. 258; Britton v. Greea
Bay etc. W. W. Co., 81 Wis. 48, 29 Am. St. Rep. 856, and especially
the note thereto; Howsmon v. Trenton etc. Co., 119 Mo. 304, 41 Am.
St. Rep. 654. and note. Contra, Paducah Lumber Co. v. Paducah.
Water etc. Co., 89 Ky. 340, 25 Am. St. Rep. 536.
Balk v. Harris.
[124 NoBTH Carolina, 467.]
TAXATION— SITUS OF A DEBT.— The situs of a debt for
purposes of taxation, and usually for all purposes. Is with the
creditor.
ATTACHMENT— GARNISHMENT— SITUS OF DEBT.— In
North Carolina, the situs of a debt for purposes of an attachment
Is where the debtor resides.
ATTACHMENT— NONRESIDENT GARNISHEE — JURIS-
DICTION.—As a general rule, the courts of a state cannot, by their
service of process upon an inhabitant of another state transiently
within their jurisdiction, charge such person as garnishee.
ATTACHMENT — WHEN NONRESIDENT MAY BB
CHARGED AS GARNISHEE— JURISDICTION.— The courts of a
state can charge a nonresident debtor, transiently within their
jurisdiction, as garnishee, if he has in his possession money or
property of the defendant, or if he has contracted to pay money
or deliver property within such jurisdiction.
ATTACHMENT — GARNISHMENT — JURISDICTION. — A
court entertaining a garnishment must have some jurisdiction over
the thing garnished, and where the garnishee is a nonresident, has
in his hands no property belonging to the principal debtor, and
owes him nothing payable within that state, the jurisdiction is de-
feated.
ATTACHMENT — GARNISHMENT — JURISDICTION OF
ACTION.— Since an attachment is in efiect a proceeding by the
principal debtor In tbe name of the plaintiff against the garnishee,
tlie action must be brought wiiere the garnishee resides, for it Is
there that his creditor must have sued him.
Charles F. Warren for the petitioner.
John H. Small, contra.
*^^ CLAKK, J. This is a petition to rehear the decision re-
ported in Balk t. Harris, 122 N. C. 64, The judgment of
April, 1899.] Balk v. Harris. 007
another state condemning the debt due by Harris to Balk can
only be recognized as valid here when that court acquired juris-
diction. It was not founded on personal services, but it is con-
tended that the Maryland court acquired jurisdiction by attach-
ing the debt due Balk by serving notice upon Harris, who was
transiently in the city of Baltimore. The situs of the debt for
purposes of taxation, and usually for all purposes, is with the-
creditor. But there are many states whose courts hold that for
the purposes of attachment the situs of the debt is at the resi-
dence or domicile of the debtor. The conflicting authorities
are summed up and arrayed in the notes to Hlinois Cent. K. R.
Co. V. Smith, 70 Miss. 344, 35 Am. St. Rep. 651, whose accom-
plished editor sums up a careful review of the authorities as-
follows: "The true doctrine seems to us to be that no jurisdic-
tion can be obtained to comdemn a debt due to a nonresident
unlesF jurisdiction of his person is obtained, that is, that the
situs of debt for the purpose of garnishment is at the residence
of the creditor. To hold that such situs is with the debtor
seems against reason because he has no property in the debt, and
because it allows a proceeding to condemn one's property to be
prosecuted without notice to him, or representation by anyone
who cares for the protection of his interests. Such a proceed-
ing seems unworthy to be called due process of law." There is
logic and force in these views if it were an open question with
us, but North Carolina is one of the states whose courts have
held that for purposes of an attachment the situs of a debt is
where the debtor resides: Cooper v. Adel Security Co., 122 N. C.
463; Winfree v. Bagley, 102 N. C. 515.
The apparent inconsistency or hardship of such ruling is
much lessened by the uniform holding by courts of that "***
line of thought that the attachment of the debt can only be
made where the debtor resides, and can have no validity if levied
upon him when only passing through or transiently in another
slate. It is thus stated in 8 American and English Encyclopedia
of Law, 1129, 1130: "Choses in action upon which the garnishee^
is liable are not to be considered as following the former wherever
he may be transiently found, to be there taken, at the will of a
third person, within a jurisdiction where neither such debtor nor
his creditor resides. As a general rule, therefore, the courts of
a state cannot, by their service of process upon an inhabitant of
another state transiently within their jurisdiction, charge such
person as garnishee. But if, when so served, the garnishee have-
in his possession, within the state, money or property of th»
60S Balk v. Harris. [N. Carolina,
defendant, or has contracted to pay money or deliver property
within such jurisdiction, he may he charged." This is sustained
hy uniform decisions (many of which are there stated in the
notes); among many others, Smith v. Eaton, 36 Me. 298, 58 Am.
Dec. 746; Lovejoy v. Albee, 33 Me. 415, 54 Am. Dec. 630; Saw-
jer V. Thompson, 24 N. H. 610; Baxter v. Vincent, 6 Vt. 614;
Ray V. Underwood, 3 Pick. 302; Hart v. Anthony, 15 Pick. 445;
•Cronin v. Foster, 13 R. I. 196. In the last case it is said: "When
a person transiently in another state is sued for his own debt, it
is a different case. But if a person by garnishment is compelled,
in order to satisfy a debt not his own, but due from one of his
-creditors, to pay his own debt in a mode very different from that
in which he would otherwise have paid it, it would be a hard-
ship." The court, proceeding, admits the recognized exceptions
above stated that the foreign court could acquire jurisdiction by
^€ervice upon a garnishee transiently within the state: 1. When
the garnishee has personal chattels of the debtor with him
^which usually could be attached without garnishment); and 2.
When the debt due by '*''® the garnishee is contracted to be
paid within the state. Among other cases to same effect, Wright
V. Chicago etc. R. R. Co., 19 Neb. 175, 56 Am. Rep. 747, in
which it is said: "The rule is well settled that garnishment
•served upon a nonresident of the state, but temporarily within
it, is not effectual as an attachment"; citing to same purpose
<Treen v. Farmers* etc. Bank, 25 Conn. 452; Casey v. Davis, 100
Mass. 124; Sawyer v. Thompson, 24 N. H. 510; Lawrence v.
Smith, 45 K H. 533, 86 Am. Dec. 183; Nye v. Liscombe, 21
Pick. 263; Tingley v. Bateman, 10 Mass. 343; Jones v. Winches-
ter, 6 N. H. 497; Mathews v. Smith, 13 Neb. 190; Danforth v.
Penny, 3 Met. 564; Gold v. Housatonic R. R. Co., 1 Gray, 424.
In Bush V. Nance, 61 Miss. 237, it is said that unless the debt of
the nonresident garnishee was payable in the state where gar-
nished, *Tie was not subject to garnishment in that state, and
the writ served on him there was a nullity, and this seems set-
tled law by the authorities. The reason is, that the court enter-
taining a garnishment must have some jurisdiction over the
thing garnished, and where the garnishee is a nonresident, has
in his hands no property belonging to the principal debtor, and
owes him nothing payable within that state, the jurisdiction is
defeated. Such is the well-settled law: Drake on Attachment,
-5th ed., sees. 474, 475, and cases there cited." This is sustained
hj reference to the citation from Drake on Attachment, and also
April, 1899.] Balk t;. HARRia 609
by Waples on Attachment, 228. There are many other cases to
same effect, among them Squair v. Shea, 26 Ohio St. 645; Mohile
€tc. II. R. Co. V. Barnhill, 91 Tenn. 395, 30 Am. St. Rep. 889;
Commercial Nat. Bank v. Chicago etc. R'y Co., 45 Wis. 172.
The defect being jurisdictional, the garnishee cannot waive it
^^because it is not with him a personal matter, and he has no
right to prejudice the defendant: Rindge v. Green, 52 Vt. 204;
Waples on Attachment, 228; Drake on Attachment, sec. 476.
*''* Inasmuch as an attachment is in effect a proceeding by
the principal debtor (the defendant in the action) in the name
of the plaintiff against the garnishee, it is thus properly held,
«ven in those courts which hold that the situs of a debt for this
purpose is with the debtor (garnishee), that the action must be
brought where he "resides" or "has his domicile," since it ia
there that his creditor must have sued him. One or two cases
•unguardedly say the action may be brought "wherever the debtor
^garnishee) may be found," but the context and the facts in
those eases show that they mean where he may be found "resi-
dent" or "domiciled" as it is expressly held in all cases where
the point is made. As, upon the uniform authorities above cited
and others not necessary to cite, the Maryland court acquired no
jurisdiction as against Balk by service of notice upon his debtor,
Harris, who had no tangible property of Balk's in his possession,
and was not resident in that state, we reaffirm our former deci-
sion, but after the benefit of the able and exhaustive argument
upon the rehearing, for an entirely different reason from that
given on the first hearing.
Petition dismissed.
ATTACHMENT— GARNISHMENT— SITUS OF DEBT.— A debt
lias no situs for the purpose of garnishment in a state of which
tlie plaintiff, flie defendant, and the garnishee are all nonresidents,
■although the latter Is a foreign corporation which, by general pro-
visions of a state statute, is subject to garnishment in such state:
Morawetz v. Sun Ins. Office, 96 Wis. 175, 65 Am. St Rep. 43. It
18 held in some Jurisdictions that garnishment proceedings must
l»e instituted in the state where the debt Is payable, or the property
is to be delivered, and a garnishment in one state of a debt due
and payable in another is void: American etc. Ins. Co. v. Hettler,
S7 Neb. 849, 40 Am. St. Rep. 522. In other jurisdictions it is held
that though the situs of intangible personalty may be at the domi-
-cile of the creditor for the purpose of taxation or distribution, yet
for the purpose of collecting a debt it is ambulatory, accompanying
the person of the debtor, and may be attached wherever he may
be found: Neuf elder v. German etc. Ins. Co., 6 Wash. 336, 30 Am.
fit. Rep. 166, and note; Wyeth etc. Cb. v. Lang, 127 Mo. 242. 48 Am.
fit Rep. 626. Under such holdings, a debtor may at the same
AM. ST. K«p., Vol. LXX —39
610 Broadfoot v. Fayetteville. [N. Carolina^
time be subject to garnishment in two or more states: Lancashire
Ins. Co. V. Corbetts, 165 111. 592, 56 Am. St. Rep. 275, and note. See
the monographic note to National Bank v. Furtick, 69 Am. St. Eep.
113.
Beoadpoot v. Fayetteville.
[124 North Carolina, 478.]
MUNICIPAL, CORPORATIONS-REPEAL OF CHARTER-
EFFECT ON DEBTS.— Debts due from a municipal corporation are-
not extinguished by the repeal of its charter, and still exist not-
withstanding that repeal.
MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS— WHEN A NEW CORPO-
RATION IS THE SUCCESSOR OF AN OLD ONE.— Where the old
charter of a municipal corporation has been repealed, and a new-
one, creating a new corporation, has been granted, the new cor-
poration, embracing the same territory, the same inhabitants and
the same taxable property, is considered as the successor of the old.
MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS— LIABILITY OP NEW COR-
PORATION FOR DEBTS OF OLD.— When the old charter of a
municipal corporation is repealed and a new one is granted, upon
which latter are bestowed by law asil the benefits and property of
the old, the burden of the old must be borne by the new; where the
benefits are taken, the burdens are assumed.
MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS— LIABILITY OF SUCCES-
SOR OF OLD CORPORATION— CONSIDERATION.— The founda-
tion on which the liability of a new municipal corporation for the-
debts of the old rests, is that the new corporation embraces the
Bame territory, the same corporators, the same taxable property^
and has received the property of the old corporation without con-
sideration; and for these benefits must, in return, bear the bur-
dens of the old corporation.
MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS— CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
—STATUTES PROHIBITING PAYMENT OF DEBTS OF OLD
CORPORATION.— A statute expressly prohibiting a municipal cor-
poration from assuming the debts of its predecessor, or from pay-
ing any part of them, is unconstitutional.
LEGISLATURE— POWER TO TAX— LIMITATION.— The
legislative power of taxation is subject to the qualification that it
must not be exercised to Impair the obligation of contracts.
MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS— REMEDIES OF CRED-
'ITORS— POWER OF LEGISLATURE.— The remedies of a creditor
for the enforcement of his debt assumed by a municipal corpora-
tion, which existed when the contract was made, must be left unim-
paired by the legislature; or, if they are changed, a substantial
equivalent must be provided.
MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS— BONDS-POWER TO TAX
FOR PAYMENT OF.— Where the resource for the payment of the
bonds of a municipal corporation is the power of taxation existing
when the bonds were issued, any law which withdraws or limits the
taxing power and leaves no adequate moans for the payment of the
boivis, is forbidden by the constitution of the United States, and i»
noU and void.
April, 1899.] Beoadfoot v. Fayetteville. 611
MUNICIPAL CORPORATION — BONDS — PAYMENT BY
NEW CORPORATION— STATUTE PROHIBITING.— Where a mu-
nicipal coi'poration has issued bonds, and before their payment its
charter has been repealed and a new corporation formed, a statute
which prohibits the levying of taxes for the payment of the bonds
by the new corporation is invalid and cannot be regarded.
MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS-TAXATION-MANDAMUS
TO COMPEL.— Where statutes have been passed, abrogating or re-
stricting the power of taxation delegated to a municipality upon the
faith of which coutracls were made with her, and upon the continu-
ance of which alone they can be enforced, a party interested may
by mandamus compel the exercise of that power as if no legrislaiion
had ever been attempted.
BONDS-COUPONS OR INTEREST— NATURE.— Coupo'is
attached to bonds, being for interest to become due on such bonds,
are a part of them and partake of their nature.
LIMITATIONS OP ACTIONS— COUPONS ATTACHED TO
BONDS.— The statute of limitations which applies to bonds applies
to coupons attached thereto, wnen such coupons are for interest
to become due on the bonds.
LIMITATIONS OF ACTIONS— WHAT WILL STOP RUN-
NING OF STATUTE.— The general rule is, that when the statute of
limitations once begins to run no subsequent happening or event
can obstruct its course.
LIMITATIONS OF ACTIONS— WHAT WILL STOP RUN-
NING OF STATUTE.— The statute of limitations ceases to run
against a claimant whose power to institute his suit has been taken
away by statute, whether such exception is contained in the act of
limitation or not.
N. W. Eay and H. McD. Eobinson, for the appellant;
E. P. Buxton and J. C. and S. H. MacEae, for the plaintiff.
*»3 MONTGOMEEY, J. Under the provisions of an act of
the general assembly of the session of 1881, the charter of the
town of Fayetteville was surrendered and repealed. At its ses-
sion in 1883 the general assembly created a taxing and police
district out of the territory included in the boundaries of the old
town of Fayetteville, the taxing and police district to be called
Fayetteville. Under the last-mentioned act, all of the property
of the former town of Fayetteville was transferred to the custody
and control of the board of commissioners appointed by the gen-
eral assembly. The public buildings, streets, and squares and
the policing of the same were placed under the charge of those
commissioners. Taxes were levied by the general assembly with
a specification as to the purposes to which they were to be ap-
plied. The general assembly, at its session of 1893, incorporated
the inhabitants within the old territory of the town of Fayette-
ville under the name of the city of Fayetteville.
The plaintiff in 1880 and 1881, being the owner of fifty-two
coupons cut from bonds executed by the town of Fayetteville,
612 Broadfoot v. Fayetteville. [N. Carolina,
presented the same for payment, and, upon payment being re-
fused, brought two actions against the town of Fayetteville to
recover the amounts due on the coupons. Judgments were
rendered at August term, 1882, of Cumberland superior court in
the two actions in favor of the plaintiff, but between the time of
action begun and judgment rendered the charter of the then
defendant, the town of Fayetteville, was surrendered and re-
pealed.
The complaint in the present action embraces three causes of
action. The first is founded upon the judgments procured in
1^82 by the plaintiff against the town of Fayetteville; the *»'*
second upon the coupons themselves, upon which the judgments
were procured, and the third upon the plaintiff's alleged right
to have the two cases against the town of Fayetteville, which
were pending in the superior court of Cumberland county, at its
August term, 1882, reinstated on the civil issue docket, brought
forward and consolidated into one action, and judgment rendered
therein for the amount due on the fifty-two coupons mentioned
in those actions. The plaintiff's allegations are that the judg-
ments against the town of Fayetteville, or the coupons, if the
judgments are invalid, are still due; that although the charter
of the old town of Fayetteville was repealed and surrendered
under the act of 1881, yet the act incorporating the city of
Fayetteville rehabilitated the old town of Fayetteville, and that
the city is the successor of the old town, and therefore liable to
the plaintiff for the amount of the coupons.
The defendant admits the repeal of the charter of the town of
Fayetteville, that the coupons have never been paid, that the
judgments were entered against the town of Fayetteville after its
charter had been surrendered, and that the inhabitants of the
old town have been incorporated by the act of 1893 under the
name of the city of Fayetteville. The defendant avers, how-
ever, that the judgments procured by the plaintiff against the
town of Fayetteville were void and denies that the city of Fay-
etteville is the successor of the old town of Fayetteville, or liable
on the coupons or on the judgments.
It is of the first importance then to consider whether the city
of Fayetteville, the new corporation, chartered by the act of
March, 1893, is so far the successor of the town of Fayetteville,
the old corporation, as to be liable for its debts. If this ques-
tion is answered in the affirmative, the statutes of limitation set
up in the answer, as a defense to the action, ^'"^ will then have
to be discussed and decided. This court at one time adopted the
April, 1899.] Bboadfoot v. Fayettevillb. 613
old common-law rule, that upon the civil death of a corporation,
the grantors of its real estate took it by reversion, and the debts
due to and from it were extinguished: Fox v. Horah, 36 N. C.
358, 36 Am. Dec. 48. This rule was changed by the court in
the case of Wilson v. L^ary, 120 N. C. 90, 58 Am. St. Rep.
778, and that of Fox v. Horah, 36 N. C. 358, 36 Am. Dec. 48,
was overruled. The debt then due to the plaintiff by the town
of Fayetteville was not extinguished by the repeal of its char-
ter, and still exists, notwithstanding that repeal: Meriwether v.
Garrett, 103 U. S. 472; Wolff v. New Orleans, 103 U. S. 358;
Mobile V. Watson, 116 IT. S. 289; O'Connor v. Memphis, 6 Lea,
730.
Apparently, each corporation created by a separate charter is
a distinct entity, and from this it may be argued with plausibil-
ity that no two successive corporations can be connected unless
they are connected by the terms of the act which created them.
But that view must be often only apparently true. If, in the
case of a municipal corporation, the old charter should be re-
pealed and a new one granted, and the new one should include
the same territory, substantially the same people, and the great
mass of the taxable property of the old corporation, and the
property of the old corporation used for public purposes be
passed over to the possession and control of the new corpora-
tion without consideration from the new corporation, it would be
difficult to appreciate how the property and the benefits of the
old corporation could be received by the new one without the
shouldering of its responsibility by the new one. It must be that
the creditors of a defunct municipal corporation, whose money
and property have helped to build up and improve the wealth
and influence of the old corporation (although they must sub-
mit when a charter is absolutely abolished, and while the old ter-
ritory and people remain unincorporated) have the right in
equity to have a new corporation, embracing the same terri-
tory and *®® the same inhabitants and the same taxable prop-
erty, considered as the successor of the old, at least so far as its
liabilities for the debts of the old corporation are concerned.
When the old charter is repealed and a new one is granted, upon
which latter are bestowed by law all the benefits and property of
the old, the burden of the old must be borne by the new; where
the benefits are taken, the burdens are assumed.
So strong has this view been impressed upon the courts that
in O'Conner v. Memphis, 6 Lea, 730, the court said: "But in
no case have the courts ever failed to declare the identity or sue-
614 Broadfoot v. Fayettevillb. [N.Carolina,
cession or continuity of the two corporations where the same
corporators and the same corporate property have passed to the
new corporation. The terms of the charter have in such cases
never been construed otherwise."
The same doctrine was laid down in Mount Pleasant v. Beck-
with, 100 U. S. 514; in Broughton v. Pensacola, 93 U. S. 266;
in Wolif v. New Orleans, 103 U. S. 358; and in Mobile v. Wat-
son, 116 U. S. 289. The acts of the legislature repealing the
old charters of the cities of Memphis and Mobile, and incorpo-
rating those cities, were passed on the same day, and it might
be inferred that these acts were considered as one and the same
in legislative intent. But in the case of Amy v. Selma, 77 Ala.
103, cited, indorsed and approved with high commendation by
the supreme court of the United States, in Mobile v. Watson,
116 U. S. 289, the acts were not simultaneously passed. The
repealing act was passed in December, 1882, and the reincorpo-
rating act in February, 1883. In that case the supreme court of
Alabama held that the act repealing the charter of the city of
Selma was without effect or operation upon the liabilities of the
city of Selma; that the act of February, incorporating the in-
habitants and territory formerly embraced within the limits of
the city of Selma, was a reorganization under the corporate
name of Selma, of the same corporators, and "^^"^ embraced sub-
stantially the same territory as the city of Selma; that Selma
was the successor of the city of Selma, and liable for the pay-
ment of its debts.
It appears also, in the case of Broughton v. Pensacola, 93 U. S.
266, that the repeal of the charter of Pensacola was under one
act and the reincorporation of the city under the same name
was under a different law.
In the case before us, twelve years elapsed between the repeal
of the charter of the town of Fayetteville and the incorporation
of the city of Fayetteville; but we cannot see how that can alter
the principle involved in the case. The foundation on which
the liability of the new corporation rests is that the new corpora-
tion embraces the same territory, the same corporators, the same
taxable property, and has received the property of the old corpo-
ration without consideration; and for these benefits must, in
return, bear the burdens of the old corporation. The liability
in such a case commences from the receiving of the benefits,
and whether those benefits were received one or ten years, or
more, from the repeal of the old charter, makes no difference.
But it is argued for the defendant that even if the act of
April, 1899.] Broadfoot v. Fayetteville. 615
1893 did have the effect to make the city of Fayetteville the
successor of the old town of Fayetteville, yet the new corpora-
tion was not liable for the debts of the old corporation, but, on
the other hand, was expressly prohibited from assuming the
debts of the old town or from paying any part of them, except
such as were provided for in the act of 1883, and the plaintifE
claimed no benefit under that act. The position was without
^my citation of authority to support it, and to us it did not seem
to be sound (and the authorities so far as they have been exam-
ined by us are all the other way). If the law was as is contended
for by the defendant, then it would be in the power of the legis-
lature to destroy the claims of creditors **** against municipal
corporations by simply repealing their charters on one day, and
on the next reincorporating the same inhabitants in the samo
territory, taking care to insert in the repealing acts a provision
to the effect that the new corporation should not be liable for
the debts of the old. Such legislation would be contrary to
every idea of justice and law, and obnoxious to the constitution
of the United States, and to that of our own state.
In Amy v. Selma, 77 Ala. 103, it appeared that the act incor-
porating Selma authorized the proper officials to levy taxes, but
declared that no funds derived by the corporation from the col-
lection of taxes or from any other source should be used for the
payment of any of the debts of the city of Selma, the old corpo-
ration; and, as we have seen, the supreme court of Alabama in
that case held that the provision was inoperative against the
debts and liabilities of the city of Selma, and the supreme court
of the United States, in Mobile v. Watson, 116 U. S. 289, cited
the decision with marked approval.
But the defendant further contends that even if it should be
held by this court that the debts against the town of Fayette-
ville were not extinguished by the repeal of the town charter,
and that they are valid and good against the city of Fayette-
ville, yet the officials of the new corporation are not only not
authorized to levy taxes to pay those debts, but are prohibited
from doing so by the very terms of the act of incorporation,
and that "the power of taxation is legislative, and cannot be
exercised otherwise than under the authority of the legislature,**
as was said in Merriwether v. Garrett, 102 U. S. 472. That ia
a good proposition of law, and it was applicable to the condition
of affairs which appeared in that case, as well as from the view
of the law which that court took of the effect of the repeal of
the charter of Memphis, and the one creating out of the same
616 Beoadfoot v. Fayetteville. [N. Carolina,
territory a taxing district. That court held '*®® that the char-
ter of Memphis was absolutely repealed, and treated the case of
Merriwether v. Garrett, 102 U. S. 472, upon that view. The
effect of the act creating the taxing district was not directly
before the court. We have seen that the supreme court of Ten-
nessee in Luehrman v. Taxing Dist., 2 Lea, 425, and O'Connor v.
Memphis, 6 Lea, 730, held that the taxing district was a reor-
ganization of the city of Memphis. But the act of the Tennes-
see legislature, creating the taxing district of Shelby, was a very
different act from the act of the North Carolina legislature-
which created the taxing district of Fayetteville. The former
conferred on the officers of the former extensive legislative and
judicial powers, and provided that at the end of two years the
district should be governed by officers of its own choice. No
Buch powers were conferred on the officers of the taxing district
of Fayetteville. But that the power of taxation which is vested
in the legislature is such a power as the defendant contends for
cannot be maintained. The power is subject to the qualification
which attends all state legislation, that is, that it must not be
exercised to impair the obligation of contracts, thereby conflict-
ing with the constitution of the United States and of North
Carolina. There is no doubt of the power of the legislature to
repeal, out and out, a municipal charter, and there is no doubt
that after the application of the property of the defunct corpo-
ration not necessary for public uses (public buildings, streets,
squares, parks, promenades, wharves, landing-places, fire engines,
hose and hose-carriages, engine-houses and engineering instru-
ments, being property necessary for public uses, as is held in
Merriwether v. Garrett, 102 TJ. S. 472, and not subject to the
demands of creditors of the corporation) toward the payment of
any remaining indebtedness, the debt cannot be enforced, al-
though it is not extinguished. But as long as the charter is not
repealed, or if repealed can be ^® rehabilitated so as to become
the successor of the old and liable for its debts, the taxing power
in the hands of the legislature cannot be used to decrease or im-
pair the rights of the creditor in the enforcement of the collec-
tion of the debt. In reference to this matter it was said in the
case of Wolff v. New Orleans, 103 U. S. 358: "This doctrine has
been repeatedly asserted by this court when attempts have been
made to limit the power of taxation of a municipal body, upon
the faith of which contracts have been made, and by means of
which alone they could be performed. So long as the corpora-
tion continues in existence, the court has said that the control
April, 1899.] Bboadfoot v. Faykttevillb. 617
of the legislature over the power of taxation, delegated to it, is
restrained to cases where such control does not impair the obli-
gation of contracts made upon a pledge expressly or im-
pliedly given that the power shall be exercised for their
fulfillment. However great the control of the legislature over
the corporation while it is in existence, it must be exercised
in subordination to the principle which secures the inviolability
of contracts." The same doctrine is declared in Mobile v. Wat-
son, 116 U. S. 289 (and many cases there cited), where it is said:
"But when (municipal corporations) empowered to take stock in
or otherwise aid a railroad company, and they issue their bonds
in payment of the stock taken, or to carry out any other author-
ized contract in aid of the railroad company, they are to that
extent to be deemed private corporations, and their obligations
are secured by all the guaranties which protect the engagements
of private individuals. Therefore, the remedies for the enforce-
ment of such obligations assumed by a municipal corporation,
which existed when the contract was made, must be left unim-
paired by the legislature; or, if they are changed, a substantial
equivalent must be provided. Where the resource for the pay-
ment of the bonds of a municipal corporation is the power of
taxation existing when the bonds were issued "*** any law which
withdraws or limits the taxing power and leaves no adequate
means for the payment of the bonds is forbidden by the consti-
tution of the United States, and is null and void."
Now, to apply the law as we have found it to be to the par-
ticulars of the case before us: Under what circumstances did
the debt of the plaintiff against the town of Fayetteville arise,
and what were the means provided at the time the debt was
contracted for its payment? ' The Western Eailroad was incor-
porated by the general assembly of North Carolina, at its session
of 1852, by chapter 147. By an act passed at the same session
(chapter 207), the town of Fayetteville was authorized to sub-
scribe for shares of stock in that railroad company, the shares
of stock to be held for the use and benefit of the town. To
meet the pa}Tnent of any subscriptions that might be made, the
town was authorized to issue and sell bonds bearing interest, and,
by section 4, to levy and collect taxes for the payment yearly
of the interest, and to create a sinking fund for the ultimate
payment of the debt, and to invest from time to time, in profita-
ble stock, the surplus of their taxes to meet the maturity of the
bonds. An election was held according to the provisions of the
act, and a majority of the qualified voters cast their ballots for
618 Broadfoot v. Fayetteville. [N. Carolina,
■^'subscription/' and the bonds were issued. On the 22d of
March, 1875, the general assembly of that year passed an act
{chapter 248), in which the town of Fayetteville was authorized
to fund the bonded debt of the town, contracted for stock of
the Western Eailroad Company by virtue of the act of 1853.
The debt was funded, and the coupons on which this suit was
brought are clipped from the bonds issued by the town under
the funding act of 1875. It appears, then, from the above state-
ment of the facts, that the bonds were originally issued by the
town with the express provision in the act which authorized ^'^^
their issue (1852) that the town authorities were to levy and
collect an annual tax upon the property and polls within the
town, with which to pay the interest (coupons), and in the same
way to raise a sinking fund to pay the bonds at maturity. The
act of 1875, authorizing the town to fund the original bonds,
provided for the payment of the new bonds in the same man-
ner and to the like extent as were the old bonds.
It follows, then, from the conclusion at which we have arrived,
aided as we have been by the decisions of other courts, that the
act of 1852 was the basis of a contract between the holders of
the bonds which were issued to buy the stock of the Western
Eailroad Company, and the town of Fayetteville, by which the
town authorities were to levy a tax upon the property and polls
of the town, with which to pay the coupons, and also to provide
a sinking fund with which to pay the bonds at maturity; that
the coupons upon which this suit was brought were clipped from
the bonds issued under the act of 1875, under which the old
bonds were funded; that the new bonds are of the same nature as
the old bonds and were invested with the same security for their
payment; that these bonds aro still in force, and that the obliga-
tion to pay the same, together with the coupons (the interest),
rests upon the city of Fayetteville as the legal successor of the
town of Fayetteville.
The provisions in the act of 1893 incorporating the city of
Fayetteville, which prohibit the levying of taxes for the pay-
ment of the bonds by the new corporation, are invalid and can-
not be regarded. In support of this position we refer to the
case of Mobile v. Watson, ll'i U. S. 289: "All laws passed since
the making of th'e contract whose purpose or effect is to take
from the city of Mobile, or its successor, the power to levy the
tax and pay the bonds, are invalid and ineffectual, and will be
disregarded; to Wolf v. New ('Means, 10^ U. S. 358. where the
*^^ court said: "The courts, therefore, treating as invalid and
April, 1899.] Broadfoot v. Fayetteville. 619
void the legislation abrogating or restricting the power of taxa-
tion delegated to the municipality, upon the faith of which con-
tracts were made with her, and upon the continuance of which
alone they can be enforced, can proceed, and by mandamus com-
pel, at the instance of parties interested, the exercise of that
power as if no legislation had ever been attempted."
The conclusion at which we have arrived as to the liability
of the city of Fayetteville, the new corporation, for the debts of
the town of Fayetteville, the old corporation, makes it neces-
€ary for us to discuss and decide the question of the statute of
limitations set up by the defendant in the answer as a bar to the
action. The coupons being for interest, to become due on the
bonds, are a part of the bonds and partake of their nature, and
the statute of limitations, therefore, which applies to the bonds
themselves must be the same statute which is applicable to the
•coupons. The bonds are specialties, and so are the coupons. The
ten years statute begins to run against coupons from the time of
their maturity: 8 Am. & Eng. Ency. of Law, 18; Clark v. Iowa
City, 20 Wall. 583; Amy v. Dubuque, 98 U. S. 470; Koshkonong
V. Burton, 104 U. S. 668. The coupons in this case became due
in 1881; the charter of the town of Fayetteville was repealed in
October, 1881; the city of Fayetteville was incorporated in
March, 1893, and this action was brought in 1894. If the time
which elapsed between the repeal of the charter of the town of
Fayetteville and the act of 1893 which incorporated the city of
Fayetteville, and during which time the territory was a taxing
district, is to be counted, then the statute of limitations (ten
years) will be a bar to the action; if that time is not to be
counted, then the statute will not be a bar to the action.
We are of the opinion that the time should not be counted.
In Lilly v. Taylor, 88 N. C. 489, it was held that as a re-
sult of ■**** the repeal of the charter of Fayetteville (and
that too after the court had taken official knowledge of the
act of 1883 creating the taxing district), the creditors of the
town had had all remedies for coercing the payment of their
•debts taken from them; and by the reference of the court to the
case of Merriwether v. Garrett, 102 U. S. 472, as decisive of the
case before them, the court could have had no other idea than
that the creation of the taxing district did not in any way or
for any purpose revive the old corporation.
But the defendant insists that the statute of limitations be-
gan to run against the coupons in 1881 when they fell due, and
that more than ten years elapsed between that time and the
620 Broadfoot v. Fayiettevillb. [N. Carolina,
time when this action was begun; and that when the statute
once begins to run no subsequent happening or event can ob-
Btruct its course. That, as a general proposition of law, is true,
and we have numerous decided cases in our own reports which
lay down that rule in the clearest language. In Hamilton v.
Shepperd, 7 N. C. 115, the plaintiff insisted that his action waa
not barred because there was fraud in the conduct of the defend-
ant, but the court said: "But it [the matter on which the plain-
tiff relied to take hi& case out of the operation of the statute]
is not in the act, nor is there anything like it, and we cannot put
it there. It is neither in its letter nor spirit.'* In Vance v.
Granger, 1 N, C. 804 (*'M) the court said: "The act of limitation
would amount to a general and positive bar, were not certain
exceptions contained in the proviso; we cannot add to these oth-
ers which the legislature has omitted.'* But we are satisfied
that when these decisions were made the court had in mind only
cases where the ability to bring suit on the part of the plaintiff,
or some one for him, had not been taken away by law — by stat-
ute— and where the courts were open for the hearing of all mat-
ters of which they had jurisdiction. Statutes of limitation are
founded on the idea that one who has a cause of action will un-
dertake to ■*'*** enforce it within a reasonable time if the courts
are open to him. To prevent confusion and to produce certainty
as to what is reasonable time, the law (the statutes of limitation)
has fixed the periods vsdthin which actions must be brought.
These views are so well expressed in the case of United States v.
Wiley, 11 Wall. 508, that we cannot do better than quote a part
of the opinion in that case: "But it is the loss of the ability to
sue, rather than the loss of the right, that stops the running of
the statute. The inability may arise from a suspension of right,
or from the closing of the courts; but, whatever the original
cause, the proximate and operative reason is that the claimant
is deprived of the power to institute his suit. Statutes of limita-
tion are indeed statutes of repose. They are enacted upon the
presumption that one having a well-founded claim will not de-
lay enforcing it beyond a reasonable time, if he has the power to
sue. Such reasonable time is therefore defined and allowed.
But the basis of the presumption is gone whenever the ability
to resort to the courts has been taken away. In such a case the
creditor has not the time within which to bring his suit that
the statute contemplated he should have.** This view of the
law is strengthened by what was said by the court in Hanger v.
Abbott, 6 Wall. 532: "They (the statutes of limitation) proceed
Ainil, 1899.] Broadfoot v. Fayettevillb. 621
also upon tlie presumption that claims are extinguished when-
€ver they are not litigated in the proper forum within the pre-
scribed period, and they take away all solid ground of complaint
because they rest on the negligence or laches of the party him-
self." These cases were approved in Braun v. Sauerwein, 10
Wall. 218, where it was said: "Similar decisions (referring to
Hanger v. Abbott, 6 Wall. 532) have been made in the state
-courts. They all rest on the ground that the creditor has been
■disabled to sue by a superior power, without any default of hia
■own, and therefore that none of the reasons, which "*®® induced
the enactments of the statutes, apply to his case; that unless
the statutes cease to run during the continuance of the super-
vening disability, he is deprived of a portion of the time within
which the law contemplated he might sue."
It is unnecessary to consider at any length the effect of the
judgment which was entered up against the town of Fayette-
ville after the charter of the town of Fayetteville had been re-
pealed. For the purposes of this case we will treat it as void,
as was contended by the defendant. The second cause of action
founded on the coupons is good.
In conclusion, we are of the opinion that the city of Fayette-
ville, the new corporation, is the successor of the town of Fay-
etteville, the old corporation; that the debts of the old corpora-
tion were not extinguished by the repeal of its charter; that the
same power to assess and collect taxes to pay the plaintiff's claim
which existed at the time that the bonds were issued is in the
new corporation, and has not been affected by the provision in
the act incorporating the city of Fayetteville, which prohibits
the collection of taxes for the payment of claims like those of
the plaintiff; that the statute of limitations did not run during
the time when the territory and inhabitants of the territory
formerly embraced in the town of Fayetteville was a taxing dis-
trict, and therefore is not a bar to this action; and that the
plaintiff is entitled to a peremptory mandamus requiring the
proper authorities of the city of Fayetteville to levy and collect
taxes upon property and polls within the city, with which to pay
the plaintiff's claim.
Affirmed.
MU«S'ICIPAL CORPORATIONS — INDEBTEDNESS — NEW
CHARTER— COUNTIES.— Indebtedness Incurred by an Incorpo-
rated town Is not extinguished by the change of the town into a city
by an act of the legislature: Olney v. Harvey. 50 111. 453, 99 Am.
Dec. 530, and note. But where a new county is formed out of the
622 Broadfcot v. Fayetteville. [N. Carolina-
territory of old counties, the new one is liable for no debts of the
old ones, unless the legislature imposes such liability: See the mono-
graphic note to State v. Clevenger, 20 Am. St, Rep. 677.
MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS— TAXATION— MANDAMUS.—
The levy by the council of a municipal corporation of a tax for the
payment of just debts, at a rate not exceeding the maximum limit
of its power of taxation, is not discretionary, so that they may
refuse to levy such tax for the payment of a judgment duly ren-
dered, upon which execution has been issued and returned nulla
bona, but is a duty the discharge of which may be enforced by man-
damus: Coy V. City Council, 17 Iowa, 1, 85 Am. Dec. 539, and note.
MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS— RESTRICTING POWER OP
TAXATION.— The obligations of a municipal corporation cannot be
impaired by restricting its power of taxation to the point of dis-
abling it from performance or by a repeal of the law under which
the obligation was to be enforced: People v. Buffalo, 140 N. Y. 300,
S7 Am. St. Rep. 563.
STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS— WHEN DOBS NOT RUN.— The
statute of limitations barring the right to sue does not run during^
the time of Civil War, where the courts are not open to suitors:
Caperton v. Martin, 4 W. Va. 138, 6 A"m. Rep. 270; Coleman v.
Holmes, 44 Ala. 124, 4 Am. Rep. 121; Perkins v. Rogers, 35 Ind. 124,
9 Am. Rep. 639. Contra, McKinzie v. Hill, 51 Mo. 303, 11 Am. Rep.
450. The Inability to sue will not prevent the running of prescript
tlon: Smith v. Stewart, 21 La. Ann. 67^ 99 Am. Dec. 700.
CASES
IN THB
SUPBEME COURT
ov
PENNSYLVANIA.
Enyard V, Enyard.
[190 Pennsylvania State, 114.]
DOWER— ESTATE OF— NATURE.— The statutory dower of
a widow is not treated as a lien upon laud, but as an interest in it.
It is an estate given by the intestate laws.
COTENANCY— RIGHTS OF WIDOW OF ONE COTENANT
—SECURING ADVERSE TITLE.— Where one of two cotenants
dies, the dower interest of his widow in the land of the cotenancy
brings her within the general rule that, where one is interested with
another in an estate, an implied obligation arises to sustain the
common interest, and she cannot acquire and set up an adverse title
to deprive the other cotenant of his interest as by purchasing the
property at a sheriff's sale had under proceedings to collect arrears
of ground rent.
De Forrest Ballou, for the appellant.
Charles Frances Gummey, Jr., for the appellee.
116 PELL, J. The plaintiff and his uncle, William Enyard,
owned by descent the real estate in question. William Enyard
died in April, 1897, and two days after his death his widow,
Catharine Enyard, purchased the property at sherlS's sale had
under proceedings to collect arrears of ground rent. The ad-
verse title thus acquired she sets up to defeat the plaintiff in
ejectment. It is conceded that where one is interested with
another in an estate, an implied obligation arises to sustain the
common interest, and that he cannot acquire and set up an ad-
verse title to deprive the other of his interest, but it is claimed
that the dower interest of the widow is not such an interest as
to prevent her from setting up the title she acquired at sheriff'^
sale. The general rule is stated in notes to Keeeh y. Sanford, 1
(68S)
624 Enyard v. Enyaed. [Penn.
Lead. Cas. Eq. 62, to be: "Whenever one person is placed in
€ueh relation to another, by the act or consent of that other, or
the act of a third person, or of the law, that he becomes inter-
•ested for him, or interested with him, in any subject of property
or business, he is prohibited from acquiring rights in that sub-
ject antagonistic to the person with whose interests he has be-
<5ome associated. If one comes into an interest by the permis-
sion of another, or accepts an interest with another by the act of
■a third person, or of the law, as in the case of tenants in com-
mon under the same will or descent, an implied obligation arises
to sustain the common interest into which he has been admitted;
^nd equity vindicates it in the form of a trust.'*
The statutory dower of a widow is not treated as a lien upon
land, but as an interest in it It is an estate given by the in-
testate laws: Schall's Appeal, 40 Pa. St. 170; Helfrich v. Weaver,
61 Pa. St. 385. In the opinion in McGowan v. Bailey, 179 Pa,
St. 470, it was said by our brother Dean that the widow's inter-
•€st in real estate of which her husband died seised, of which
there has been neither appraisement nor partition, is a freehold
*^^'' estate in the land. In Kunselman v. Stine, 183 Pa, St. 1,
it was held that the widow's interest in the real estate of her hus-
band is such an estate as can be sold only by a writ of venditioni
•exponas in the manner provided by the act of January 24, 1849.
In Weaver v. Wible, 25 Pa. St. 270, 64 Am. Dec. 696, a widow
who came into possession of land through her husband, and who
had a possible dower interest, was denied the right to acquire
title to the land to the prejudice of his heirs and creditors. The
•defendant in this case, while having a dower interest only, came
within the general rule, and being jointly interested with the
plaintiff in the land she could not acquire a title to his exclusion.
The verdict and judgment thereon establish only the plain-
tiff's title. Any right the defendant may have to contribution
for payments properly made for the benefit of the joint estate
<;an be adjusted in other proceedings.
The judgment is affirmed.
DOWER— ESTATE OF-NATURE.— Dower, until the death of the
4iU8band, is merely an inchoate Interest: Moore v. Mayor, 8 N. Y. 110,
50 Am. Dec. "573. Such inchoate right is a mere possibility, and not
an estate: Magee v. Young, 40 Miss. 164, 90 Am. Dec. 322. The In-
choate right of dower in the wife Is, however, a sufficient estate to
-entitle her to maintain a bill In equity to redeem lands from a mort-
gfige in which she had joined with her husband: Davis v. Wetherell,
13 Allen, 60, 90 Am. Dec. 177. In Porter v. Noyes, 2 Greenl. 22, 11
Am. Doc. 30, it was held tliat the Inchoate right of dower was an
existing encumbrance which would defeat a contract to convey an
Feb. 1899.] Commonwealth v. Wirebacz. 625
unencumbered title. And as opposed to the doctrine of the principal
-case, It has been held that the right of dower is an existing lien
or encumbance and not a mere possibility or contingency: Ficklin
v. Rixey, 89 Va. 832, 37 Am. St. Kep. 891.
COTENANCY — WHO ARE COTENANTS — SECURING AD-
VERSE TITLE.— A person regularly deriving title from one coten-
ant will be regarded as a tenant in common of the property with
the other cotenants: Dain v. Cowing, 22 Me. 347, 39 Am. Dec. 585.
See, generally, Metcalfe v. Miller, 96 Mich. 459, 35 Am. St. Rep. 617.
A cotenant, whether in or out of possession cannot buy and hold a
tax title against the other cotenants: Cohea t. Hemingway, 71 Miss.
22, 42 Am. St. Rep. 449.
Commonwealth v, Wibbbaok.
[190 Pennsylvania State, 138.]
WITNESSES— EXPERTS— QUESTION OF SANITY— PENI-
TENTIARY WARDEN.— Where the prisoner's Insanity Is set up in
■defense of a prosecution for homicide, and expert testimony is given
In support of such plea, .together with evidence of acts and declara-
tions of the defendant tending to show insanity, a penitentiary
warden who, through a long period of service, has had opportunity
to study criminals, is competent to testify that very many prisoners
feigned insanity and delusions, and that some had deceived him and
physicians.
HOMICIDE— EVIDENCE AS TO INSANITY— OPINION OF
WITNESSES.— The opinion of a witness as to the Insanity of the
<lefendant in a prosecution for homicide Is inadmissible, no founda-
tion therefor having been laid. But It Is competent for witnesses
who have stated their opportunities for observing defendant to tes-
tify whether or not they had noticed anything In his conduct or con-
versation indicating Insanity.
TRIAI^IMPANELING JURY-EXAMINATION ON VOIR
DIRE.— In impaneling a jury In a trial for homicide, defendant's
counsel should not be allowed, in the examination of jurors on their
voir dire, to ask them whether defendant's failure to testify in his
•own behalf would prejudice him in their minds.
APPEAL^EXAMINATION OF EXPERTS-HYPOTHETI-
CAL QUESTIONS.— Whether the hypothesis propounded to wit-
nesses include the material facts necessary to the formation of an
opinion, or whether facts are assumed which have no existence,
rests largely in the knowledge of the trial judge, and his rulings will
be held conclusive on appeal unless prejudicial error is afflrmativeiy
«hown.
HOMICIDE— DEFENSE OF INSANITY.— Whether the Insan-
Ity be general or partial. In order that it may excuse homicide, the
degree of it must be so great as to have controlled the will of its
subject and to have taken from him the freedom of moral action.
HOMICIDE— DEFENSE OF INSANITY.— MERE MORAL
OBX.IQUITY OF PERCEPTION does not constitute Insanity excus-
ing a person from punishment for his deliberate act, nor does a
mere perversion of the moral sense, nor does an individual belief as
to right and wrong, however sincere, constitute * delusion, or a
phase of insanity, excusing homicide.
AM. St. Kkp.. Vou LXX..—lti
626 Commonwealth v. Wireback. [Penn^
INSTRUCTIONS— REVIEW ON APPEAL.— In determining
whether an instruction given in a trial for homicide was erroneous-
aud prejudicial, it should be considered not only with what precedes-
and follows it, but in view of the idea being elucidated.
HOMICIDE — DEFENSE OF INSANITY— SANITY PRE-
SUMED.—If the defendant in a prosecution for homicide was sane
shortly before and shortly after the act of murder, the presumption
Is of sanity at the time of the act, which presumption could only be
rebutted by showing some special frenzy or madness, connected with
the act, which at the instant irresistibly impelled the defendant to-
commit it.
HOMICIDE— DEFENSE OF INSANITY— REQUISITE DE-
GREE OF PROOF.— If one accused of homicide alleges insanity as a
defense, he must establish It by a preponderance of evidence, or the
presumption of insanity which the law raises stands unshalien. The
law recognizes no middle ground of doubt of sanity reducing murder
otherwise in the first degree to murder in the second degree,
John M. GrofE and C. Eugene Montgomery, for the appellants
John A. Coyle, W. U. Hensel, George A. Lane and W. T^
Brown, district attorney, for the appellee.
*4i DEAN, J. Wireback, the defendant, was convicted of
murder of the first degree in the court below, and sentenced ta
be hanged; hence this appeal .
It appears from the evidence that he was forty-eight years of
age; was a manufacturer and vender of a patent medicine; in
conducting his business, he traveled over Lancaster and the ad-
joining counties; his place of business, however, was in Lancas-
ter city, where he made his home with his family, a wife and
two sons. They lived in a dwelling-house, the property of D. B.
Landis, a reputable and prominent resident of Lancaster. On
July 1, 1897, Landis leased to him by writing the house until
April 1, 1898, with the privilege of an extension for one year
after the expiration of the term, if he, Landis, did not in the
meantime sell the property. Landis did sell, about the last of
August, 1897, and Wireback had knowledge of the fact, and
also knew he must, by the contract, give up possession on April
1st, following. He continued, however, to pay his monthly
rental promptly, but, notwithstanding the unmistakable ***
terms of his contract, frequently complained to his neighbors
that his landlord, Landis, intended to wrong him by dispossess-
ing him, when he had a right to another year's occupancy; more
than once, when making known his alleged grievance, he used
threatening language, such as, that he would have vengeance
against anyone who came into the house, and that his principle
was "justice or death." About a week before April 1st, he went
to a store outside the city and purchased a breach-loading shot-
Feb. 1899.] Commonwealth v. Wireback. 627
gun, with some large ammunition, saying that he "was going to
have a fuss the let of April with a man about house rent." He
then bought cord wood and had it hauled to the house; with this
and other materials he barred the cellar door, and also, by like
methods, closed the other entrances on the first floor of the
house. As he refused to move on April 1st, Landis instituted
suit for possession before an alderman under the landlord and
tenant act, and, having obtained judgment, had issued thereon
to a constable the usual warrant for possession. On the morning
of April 7th, the constable, Graef, another constable, Price, D.
B. Landis and his son, with three other men employed by Landis,
seven in all, proceeded to the house to dispossess Wireback; find-
ing the doors barricaded, they broke open one or more of them,
and entered to the first floor, Wireback retreating upstairs to
the second; in that position there was a parley between him and
the officers; they asked him to come down; he refused, declar-
ing that they had come there to kill him; about that time Wire-
back requested to see D. B. Landis, the deceased, who, in re-
sponse, went up the stairs, and, on reaching the landing, dis-
covered that Wireback had fled to the garret; he went to the
foot of the garret stairs, and Wireback, who was behind a barri-
cade at the top, called out to him, "Mr. Landis, what do you
intend doing for me and my family?" Landis commenced to re-
ply, saying "I will — *' or "Well, I will — " when Wireback, from
behind the barricade, fired from the shotgun the charge which
struck Landis in the head and killed him instantly. Wireback
neither fled nor resisted arrest. There was no substantial dis-
pute as to the facts thus narrated. At the trial, the only defense
was insanity. The evidence tending to show unsoundness of
mind consisted mainly of a course of conduct distinct from and
at variance with that of his life before August, 1897, when he
learned of *'*^ the sale of the house. It was alleged, and the
evidence tended to show, that before that time he was a kind
husband and had led an orderly life; that commencing about
that date, and continuing down to the killing of Landis, he was
at times morose, was abusive toward his wife, had fits of jeal-
ousy, and showed a disposition to lewdness; there was also evi-
dence that he suffered from bodily disease, either real or imag-
inary, and had resort to childish and absurd methods of cure.
Further, there was evidence of insanity in near collateral rela-
tives of his father and mother. During the week preceding the
homicide he slept and ate but little. The theory of defendant's
counsel, very earnestly argued in the court below and here, is.
628 Commonwealth v. Wireback. [Penn.
that Wireback, about the time he learned that he must give up
the house, was diseased in body, and was severely pinched in
money affairs; the consequence was, his mind became disordered;
that this condition continued down to the time the attempt
was made to dispossess him; that then he firmly believed the
purpose of the officers, under the direction of Landis, was to at-
tack and kill him; and that, acting on a firm conviction that
this was their purpose, he resisted by opposing force to force
in defense of his life. That, although this was a delusion, yet
to him being a fact, the duty of defending his own life as he
did was to him imperative. There was evidence on the part of
members of his famil}'', and three medical experts. Doctors Mills,
Gerhart, and Diller, tending to sustain this theory. As opposed
to it, the commonwealth called a very large number of witnesses
who had known defendant for years, and down to the date of the
homicide had transacted more or less business with him, ^et had
never observed any indications of unsoundness of mind; besides
these, the keepers of the prison, who had every opportunity to
observe him after his arrest, for more than four months, testified
that during that time he gave no evidence of insanity. Physi-
cians, one of them, Dr. Chapin, an eminent specialist, were of
the opinion that, from the testimony as to defendant's conduct
immediately before and after the shooting, he could not have had
such frenzy or delusion at the moment the shot was fired, as
suggested by his counsel. The court submitted the somewhat
conflicting evidence on the question of sanity to the jury, who,
having found defendant guilty of murder of the first degree, he
was sentenced accordingly, and we now have this appeal, with
fifty assignments of error.
144 rpj^g |jj.g^ three and sixth to fifteenth, inclusive, allege er-
rors in the admission and rejection of evidence. Michael J.
Cassidy, warden of the eastern penitentiary, being called, testi-
fied that for thirty-eight years he had been an assistant and war-
den of that institution, and during that time had observation
of several thousand criminals; that, as a necessity in the perform-
ance of his duty, he had studied, from the conduct of the pris-
oners, real and feigned insanity; that very many prisoners
feigned insanity for the purpose of being removed to city hos-
pitals, whence they could more easily escape; that many of them
feigned delusions, as the most convenient method of deception.
And some had successfully deceived him and physicians. The
defendant objected to this testimony, as incompetent, because
the witness was not a physician, nor a graduate of any institu-
Fe'-. 1899.] Commonwealth v. Wireback. 629
tion of learning, and therefore not an expert whose opinion was
admissible. To sustain the objection Commonwealth v. Farrell,
187 Pa. St. 408, is cited, where the witness testified to a fact de-
pending largely on conclusions derived from scientific anatomi-
cal investigations; his opinion, derived wholly from his own ob-
servation of corpses, was ruled inadmissible, because of the
doubtfulness and sparseness of the facts on which it was based.
But Cassidy was not called as a scientific expert in diseases of
the mind, but to establish a fact observable by any intelligent
man with like opportunity. Tliat for thirty-eight years thou-
sands of prisoners had been under his care, and that many of
them feigned insanity and pretended delusions, he knew, be-
cause, when they failed to accomplish their purpose by the pre-
tense, it was abandoned, and they resumed the normal conduct
of sane men. The defendant, when charged with a high crime,
committed acts and made declarations which tended to show
aberration of the mind and delusions. The commonwealth an-
swered, that in these acts and declarations the accused might be
merely feigning insanity to escape punishment, and they called
one abundantly competent to testify that such conduct is com-
mon among criminals, and that at times it will deceive even
experts. This is one of the very facts on which scientific eX'
perts base their deductions, and it was proper for the considera-
tion of the jury in determining the value of defendant's expert
testimony as to his sanity.
The sixth assignment is to sustaining the objection of the
*"*•* commonwealth to the opinion of Mrs. Kate L. Shertzer, a
witness called by defendant. After stating that she was a
neighbor of Wireback, and had seen him often; that he was
nervous and excited, especially on April 1st; that he said he was
Avronged, but that Landis would do the right thing by him, she
was asked: "From what you saw of him, do you think he was of
sound or unsound mind?" This was objected to, because the
witness had stated no facts warranting an opinion. The court
properly sustained the objection; no foundation for an opinion
was laid; every act and declaration of the defendant testified
to by her was rational. If her opinion was, that defendant was
insane, it necessarily was based on facts other than those stated.
The seventh to sixteenth assignments complain that the court
erred in overruling objections to the admissibility of the opinion
of witnesses called by the commonwealth. Nine witnesses were
called, who testified to a personal acquaintance with defendant,
to having seen him, and to having transacted business with him.
630 CoMMoiswEALTH V. WiREBACK. [Penn.
some a short time before the homicide, others within three or
six months of it; all stated their opportunities for observation;
then, in substance, this question was put to each: "From the
conversation you had with the prisoner at the time you stated,
and from your observation of his conduct, manner, and appear-
ance, did you or did you not discover anything that would lead
you to beJieve he was of unsound mind?" Against defendant's
objection, the witness was permitted to answer. In this, there
was no error. The \^itnesses were not asked to give their opin-
ion affirmatively, as to whether the defendant was of sound
mind, for they had stated nothing to warrant such opinion; but
whether they had noticed anything in his conduct or conversa-
tion irrational or indicating insanity at the times they saw and
talked with him was clearly competent. The defendant alleged
that he gave evidence of insanity for a period of eight months
before the homicide; the commonwealth could answer it in no
other way than by calling those who had seen and conversed
with him during the same time to testify that they had noticed
nothing indicating unsoundness of mind. The defendant might
well argue that this negative, when compared with his affirma-
tive *^** testimony, was the weaker, but his objection to its ad-
missibility is not well founded.
The twenty-third to thirty-sixth assignments are to the re-
fusal of the court to permit this interrogatory by defendant's
counsel to jurors when called to the box: ''Would the neglect
or refusal of defendant to testify in his own behalf create any
presumption against him in your mind?'* The question was
wholly unwarranted; it reflected on the integrity of the juror.
He might as well have been asked whether, if sworn as a juror,
he would obey the law. No liberality of examination of jurors
on their voir dire, accorded to those ^accused of crime, author-
izes a question which, in its insinuation, must be an insult to
an honest man. The court properly disallowed it. ,
The forty-second to forty-eighth assignments inclusive are
to rulings on hypothetical questions to physicians and other wit-
nesses. "WTiether the hypothesis propounded to the witness in-
cluded the material facts necessary to the formation of an opin-
ion, or whether facts are assumed which have no existence, rests
largely in the knowledge of the trial judge, and necessarily must
control him in his rulings. The evidence, as before him, is sel-
dom 80 clearly before us. A careful inspection of the evidence,
the hypothetical questions, and the rulings connected therewith.
Feb. 1899.] Commonwealth v. Wibeback. 631
complained of in these assignments, fails to convince us that any
error was committed by the court.
The fourth, thirty-seventh, thirty-eighth, thirty-ninth, for-
tieth, and forty-first assignments all complain of errors of law
in the charge and answers to points. There is probably no fea-
ture of criminal law which has been so frequently the subject
of judicial consideration and opinion as that of insanity as an
excuse for crime. Text-writers on medical jurisprudence and
courts are, on some phases of the subject, at variance. The
•enunciation of the law in our own state, for many years at least,
has been consistent. While conceding the existence of differ-
ent types of insanity, we have persistently declined to refine upon
it with the specialists, and measure criminal responsibility ac-
cording to the exact degree of it. Any departure from the con-
■dition of a well-balanced mind is often pronounced insanity by
science. It has even been argued with plausibility by theorists
that all are insane on one or more subjects, or labor under some
delusion or other. But these speculations and ^^'^ refinements
help but little in the practical administration of justice; the
moral guilt of one man, by reason of vicious training or inferior-
ity of intellectual power, may be less than that of another, but
the law takes no note of this in fixing responsibility for crii^e;
nor dare it do so, if society is to be protected. Therefore, since
<Dommonwealth v. Hosier, 4 Pa. St. 264, decided more than a
half -century ago, it has been held in this state thus: "The law
is that, whether the insanity be general or partial, the degree
of it must be so great as to have controlled the will of its sub-
ject, and to have taken from him the freedom of moral action.**
Further in the same case, it is said: "A man may be mad on all
subjects; and then, though he may have glimmerings of reason^
he is not a responsible agent. This is general insanity
Partial insanity is confined to a particular subject, the man
being sane on every other. In that species of madness, it ia
plain that he is a responsible agent, if he were not instigated by
his madness to perpetrate the act. He continues to be a legiti-
mate subject of punishment, although he may have been labor-
ing under a moral obliquity of perception, as much as if he were
merely laboring under an obliquity of vision."
In Sayres v. Commonwealth, 88 Pa. St. 299, the court below
charged the jury thus: "Ji the prisoner, although he labors un-
der partial insanity, hallucination, or delusion, did understand
the nature and character of his acts, had a knowledge that it
was wrong and criminal, and mental power sufficient to appljj
632 Commonwealth v. Wireback, [Penn*
that knowledge to his own case, and knew if he did the act hd
would do wrong and would receive punishment; if, further, he
had sufficient power of memory to recollect the relation in which
he stood to others, and others stood to him, that the act in
question was contrary to the plain dictates of justice and right,.
injurious to others, and a violation of the dictates of duty, he-
would be responsible." This court, on appeal, approved this in-
struction, saying, "The case was treated with marked accuracy
and care by the learned judge of the court below."
In the same case, the court instructed the jury that if the
prisoner bona fide labored under a fixed belief that his assailant
was attempting to take his life, although such belief was a de-
lusion, and he killed him as he supposed in self-defense, he waa
exempt from punishment.
148 -^g jja,Ve very many reported cases involving the same
question, but in not one of them has there been any substan-
tial variation in the law as quoted from these two cases. Read-
ing carefully the charge, including the answers to defendant's
points, we think it was a correct enunciation of the law, and
entirely fair to the defendant. It was not pretended, nor could
it be on the evidence, that the killing of Landis was not con-
ceived by defendant weeks before, determined on, and the means
of accomplishing it provided when the gun and ammunition
were bought; then deliberately and methodically committed
when the looked-for opportunity occurred. His preceding con-
duct and preparation for the act evince mental soundness. Con-
cede that, in flagrant disregard of the terms of his contract, he
termed Landis a wrongdoer in attempting to dispossess him; this
proves nothing that warrants an inference of insanity. Observa-
tion teaches that men of crude ideas as to property rights, or
of vindictive dispositions, not seldom act as if wronged, when
called upon to pay an honest debt or perform an honest contract
obligation. He may have wrought himself into a belief that
Landis ought not to retake possession of his property; if so, it
was a mere perversion of the moral sense, prompting him to vio-
late a law of property because it seriously inconvenienced him;
then, but a step further in the same direction, in assumed self-
defense, he violated the law protecting the person of Landis.
The whole argument of appellant rests on an unsubstantial foun-
dation, to wit, that the individual belief of Wireback, as to
right and wrong, if sincere, constituted a delusion, or a phase
of insanity which as to him, at the time, excused his crime.
The same sort of delusion would excuse a Mormon elder who en-
Feb, 1899.] Commonwealth t;. Wireback. 63S
tered into plural marriage contracts in this state. He not onlj
believes his conduct not wrong, but that it is divinely enjoined.
But the law tolerates no mere individual opinion, however sin-
cere, as an excuse for breaking the law; itself establishes the
rule of conduct for the individual in his relations to society, en-
joins what it deems right and prohibits what it deems wrong,
and to this rule he must conform or take the consequences. The
whole evidence, in one view of it, tended to show that Wireback,
with full knowledge of the law, set up his own standard of right
and wrong with reference to his contract with Landis and their
***** respective duties under it, and followed that standard to the
end. To indiiterence to this distinction, the rule of action pre-
scribed by the law, and a rule of action violative of it prescribed
by Wireback for himself, is owing the burden of appellant's
complaint of the charge. The learned judge of the court below,
throughout, had it fully in view, and so declared the law that
the jury could not have failed to understand it. Defendant's
ninth point and the answer thereto really lay down the law as
his counsel requested, thus:
"9. If the jury believes that the reason, judgment, and un-
derstanding of the defendant were overthrown at the time of
the shooting, and he really did not know what he was doing,
the verdict must be not guilty, on the ground of insanity. An-
swer: This point is affirmed, provided the jury are satisfied from
a fair preponderance of the evidence that at the time of the
commission of the act the defendant had not, by reason of in-
sanity, the power or capacity to distinguish between right and
wrong at that time, in reference to the act he was about to and
actually did commit."
This point and answer, in connection with the instruction in
the general charge: "That no mere moral obliquity of percep-
tion will protect a person from punishment for his deliberate
act," presented both the defendants and the commonwealth's
legal contention perspicuously. The complaint that the court
erred in saying to the jury that, "an individual who has suffi-
cient intelligence to know that loading a pistol or gun, point-
ing it at a human being and pulling the trigger, are acts which
may or will cause death of the person against whom they are
directed, should not be acquitted on the ground of insanity,"
is error, if wrested from its connection, and treated as an iso-
lated sentence. But, to determine whether the jury could have
been misled, it must be considered, not only with what pre-
cedes and follows, but in view of the idea then being elucidated.
634 Commonwealth v. Wireback. [Penn.
Oounsel, as shown by their written point, contended that if, at
the time of the shooting, the reason of defendant was overthrown,
«o that he did not know what he was doing, he should be found
not guilty, on the ground of insanity, and this irrespective of the
soundness of mind immediately before and after the shooting. If
Wireback was sane immediately before and immediately after the
shooting, clearly the law would presume him ^°** sane when he
fired the shot, and this presumption could only be rebutted by
his showing some special frenzy or madness, connected with the
act, which at the instant irresistibly impelled him to commit
it. There was nothing in the act itself or the method of it
which tended to rebut the presumption. A previously prepared
loaded weapon in his hands, sheltering himself behind the bar-
ricade at the head of the stairs, luring Landis, the special object
of his animosity, to the foot of them, the assured aim at a
vital part of the body, all indicated intelligence and reasoning
power; certainly, if he were sane immediately before and imme-
diately after such acts, he should not, from any inference to be
drawn from them, be acquitted on the ground of insanity. As
«howing conclusively the meaning, the court below immediately
follows this remark by saying: "The doctrine that an individual
can be entirely sane immediately before and immediately after
such act was committed, and yet insane at the instant if was
committed, is contrary, as writers say, to every principle of sound
psychological science Our supreme court has said the
law presumes sanity if no insanity be shown, and if the person
was sane shortly before and shortly afterward the presumption
is of sanity at the time of the act.'* The meaning is further
shown by the instruction immediately preceding the sentence
complained of, as to an insane delusion that the of&cers had
come to kill him, and that self-defense was his right and duty,
thus: 'Ton will readily perceive, therefore, that a delusion, to
Tender a person irresponsible for an act which would otherwise
be criminal, must be a delusion that a state of facts exist which,
if really existing, would wholly excuse the act he was about to
commit." The court thus impressed upon the jury the dis-
tinction between a thoroughly tenable ground of defense, a bona
fide delusion as to a fact, to wit, that the purpose was to kill
him, and an untenable ground, with nothing in the evidence
to support it, to wit, from the act of shooting, itself, instanta-
neous and momentary frenzy which prompted the act. The
court did not, as argued, by this sentence sweep away the de-
fense that Wireback fired the shot under the delusion that he
Feb. 1899.] Commonwealth v. Wibeback. 635
was acting in defense of his life against those who unlawfully
€ought it. Defendant's first point, which raises the question,
is substantially affirmed. The jury was told that if defendant
*** committed the act under any delusion which controlled his
will and made the commission of the act a duty of overruling
necessity, the verdict should be not guilty on the ground of in-
sanity, but the court unnecessarily went further and added, if
the delusion deprived him of all freedom of agency, the verdict
should be not guilty on the ground of insanity. This addition
was not suggested by any evidence that we have discovered, and
left open to the jury a field for conjecture that certainly was not
prejudicial to defendant.
Defendant's seventh prayer for instruction was that: "The
jury need not be satisfied of the insanity of the defendant be-
yond a reasonable doubt, and must render a verdict of not
guilty on the ground of insanity if they have a reasonable
-doubt." To which the court answered: "The presumption is
that at the time of committing this crime Kalph W. Wireback
was sane, and the burden of proof of insanity being upon him,
the defendant, he must satisfy the jury by a fair preponderance
of the evidence submitted to them that, at the time he com-
mitted the act, he was insane to such an extent that insanity
controlled his will, and made the commission of the act he com-
mitted appear to him a duty of overruling necessity, or deprived
him of all freedom of agency. If he fail to do so — if the fair
preponderance of the testimony does not so satisfy the jury of
fiuch insanity, but only creates a doubt of his sanity, or reason-
able doubt of his sanity — ^it is insufficient to justify an acquittal,
and the jury should return a verdict of guilty in such case."
More than once we have attempted to settle the question
raised by the assignment of error to the answer to this point.
To convict of murder of the first degree, the commonwealth
must prove beyond a reasonable doubt the unlawful killing and
the fully formed purpose to kill; it need adduce no proof what-
ever of the sanity of the prisoner; the law presumes that, and
the presumption is conclusive, in the absence of evidence to
rebut it. If the accused alleges insanity, he must establish it
by fairly preponderating evidence, or the presumption of sanity
which the law raises stands unshaken: Coyle v. Commonwealth,
100 Pa. St. 578, 45 Am. Eep. 397; Commonwealth v. Gerade,
145 Pa. St. 289, 27 Am. St. Eep. 689; Commonwealth v. Wood-
ley, 166 Pa. St. 463. Either the jury remained convinced of
the prisoner's sanity, by the legal presumption against him, OT
636 Commonwealth v. Wireback. [Penn.
they are convinced of his insanity by the preponderance of evi-
dence ^*^^ in his favor; there is no middle ground which the
law recognizes; nor does a doubt of sanity reduce the grade of
the crime to murder of the second degree. From the very
nature of the mental disease, there can be no grading of it by
degrees so as to accord with a degree in crime. To say that a
man is insane to an extent which incapacitates him from fully
forming an intent to take life, yet enables him to fully and
maliciously form an intent to do great bodily harm without a
purpose to take life, is absurd, for the one involves the same
test of responsibility as the other — the ability to distinguish
between right and wrong. Either the offense of defendant is
wholly excused, because the jury is satisfied by the preponder-
ance of evidence of his irresponsibility, or he is guilty, because
the evidence fails to so satisfy them.
"We have thus gone over, very carefully, the evidence and
assignments of error, because the gravity of the judgment
against defendant seemed to demand it. We are convinced he
had a lawful and impartial trial, and that the evidence was
amply sufficient to warrant the verdict.
As to the objection to remarks of commonwealth's counsel to
the jury, the assignment of error is irregularly preferred here,
and we do not discuss it.
The judgment is affirmed, and it is ordered that the record
be remitted to the court of oyer and terminer of Lancaster
county, that the judgment may be carried into execution accord-
ing to law.
WITNESSES-EXPERTS — OPINIONS— SANITY.— A nonexpert
witness may be heard upon the question of insanity, but his compe-
tency to express an opinion must first appear, and whether he is
compotont or not is a question for the court: Grand Lodge I. O. M.
A. V. Wieting, 168 111. 408, Gl Am. St. Rep. 123, and note; Pidcock v.
Potter, C8 Pa. St. M2, 8 Am. Rep. 181, and monographic note thereto.
It is not error to exclude the opinion of a witness as to whether a
person acting imnaturally was feigning or not, where no prior ac-
quaintance between such person and the witness was shown: Bnos
V. St. Paul etc. Ins. Co., 4 S. Dak. 630, 46 Am. St. Rep. 796.
nOMICTDE— INSANITY AS A DEFENSE— TEST.— Insanity is
not available as a defense to an indictment for murder, if the ac-
cused, at the time of the killing, was capable of distinguishing be-
tween right and wrong with respect to that act, and was conscious
that the act was one which he ought not to have done, although he
might have been imnelled by an irresistible impulse to do it: Genz
V. State, no N. .T. L. 48**. 59 Am. St. Ren. (519. and note; Evers v. State,
31 Tex. Crlm. Rep. 318, 37 Am. St. Rep. 811. The test of responsl-
liility for criminal acts, where unsoundness of mind is set up as a de-
fense, is the capaeity of the defendant to distinguish between right
and wrong at the time of and with respect to the act which is the
March, 1899.] Swope v. Donnelly. 637
subject of the Inquiry: Flanngan v. People, 52 N. Y. 467, 11 Am. Rep.
731; Cunningham v. State, 56 Miss. 269, 31 Am. Rep. 360. See the
extended notes to Parsons v. State, 60 Am. Rep. 212-2^, and State
V. Marler, 36 Am. Dec. 402-411. As to when partial insanity Is a de-
fense to crime: C^irter v. State, 12 Tex. 500, 62 Am. Dec. 530; State v.
Shippey, 10 Minn. 223, 88 Am. Dec. 70; when it is not: Common-
wealth V. Rogers, 7 Met. 500, 41 Am. Dec. 458; Freeman v. People,
4 Denio, 9, 47 Am. Dec. 216.
HOMICIDE-DEFENSE OP INSANITY— MORAL INSANITY.
The defense of moral insanity in criminal cases is so peculiarly liable
to abuse that the utmost care and circumspection are required on
the part of the court in presenting to the jury the legal principles
relating to it: Scott v. Commonwealth, 4 Met 227, 83 Am. Dec. 461.
In South Carolina, moral insanity is not a defense against a charge
of crime: State v. Levelle, 34 S. C. 120. 27 Am. St. Rep. 799.
TRIAL — IMPANELING JURY — EXAMINATION ON VOIR
DIRE.— The examination of Jurors upon their voir dire Is not to be
confined strictly to the questions formulated in the statute, but
should be varied and elaborated as the circumstances seem to re-
quire, so as to obtain a fair and impartial Jury: Pinder v. State, 27
Fla. 370, 26 Am. St. Rep. 75, and note. That only statutory ques-
tions should be asked, see Monday v. State, 32 Ga. 672, 79 Am. Dec
314.
SwoPE V, Donnelly.
[190 Pennsylvania State, 417.]
WILLS— DECLARATIONS OP TESTATOR AS EVIDENCE.
Where a will is attaclied on the gi'ound of forgery, declarations of
the testator as to his intentions are admissible for the purpose of
corroboration, but such evidence Is not suflScient either to establish
the execution of the will or to overcome the testimony of the sub-
ecrioing witnesses.
WILLS— DECLARATIONS OP TESTATOR— NOT PROP-
ERLY ADMISSIBLE.— Where the Issue Is whether or not a will
purporting to have been executed on a certain day Is a forgery,
■declarations of the testator that a will with which he was satisfied
was in existence two months before that day, also an expression of
Infentlon made by him five years before that time, are irrelevant and
inadmissible.
APPEAL-INSUFFICIENT ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR.—
An assignment of error alleging error in the admission of evidence
will not be considered, where it fails to set forth the evidence.
A paper alleged to be the will of Mary R. Donnelly, who died
on December 25, 1893, and dated December 10, 1893, made
Xellie Swope and Monica Doorley the residuary legatees. The
decedent's husband, Patrick F. Donnelly, attacked the paper as
a forgery. Four witnesses testified to the execution of the
paper. Three assignments of error were made on appeal from
judgment for plaintiffs. Two are recited in the opinion, and
the third, which the court refused to consider, was in allowing
638 SwoPE V. Donnelly. [Penn.
plaintiffs to show declarations of Mary E. Donnelly, prior to the
date of the alleged will, as to her intended disposition of her
property.
C. Cooper Shapley, for the appellant.
Thomas James Meagher and Patrick Duffy, for the appellees.
'*2** FELL, J. On the questions of testamentary capacity
and fraud or undue influence in the procurement of a will, the
declarations of a testator, not a part of the res gestae, hut so
connected in point of time with the testamentary act as to
justify an inference that they indicate the state of the testator's
mind when the will was executed, are admissible in evidence.
Such declarations may he direct proof on the question of testa-
mentary capacity, but as tending to establish the fact of undue
influence they are hearsay merely, and without force. They are,
however, admissible on that question as tending to show the sus-
ceptibility of the testator's mind to the influences which sur-
rounded him: Herster v. Herster, 122 Pa. St. 239, 9 Am. St.
Eep. 95; Wharton on Evidence, sees. 1009-1012; 1 Redfield on
Wills, *551.
The proposition that the declarations of a testator as to his
intentions are admissible where the will is disputed on the
ground of fraud, circumvention, or forgery, has received the
general assent of text-writers on the subject; but the cases in
which such declarations have been admitted, where the only
question was that of forgery, are few. The trend of decision
seems to be very decidedly in favor of their admission in cor-
roboration of direct proof of the execution of the will, whether
made before or after its date. In Turner v. Hand, 3 Wall. Jr.
88, proof was admitted of conversations had with the decedent,,
both before and after the date of the alleged will, for the pur-
pose of showing, among other things, that the dispositions of
property contained in the paper were wholly at variance with
his often expressed testamentary intentions. In Tynan v. Pas-
chal, 27 **i Tex. 286, 84 Am. Dec. 619, declarations of the tes-
tator were said to be admissible to rebut the presumption of
cancellation or revocation of a will arising from its loss or de-
struction before his death, and as tending in some degree to
strengthen other proofs of its execution. The relevancy of
such declarations was recognized in Johnson v. Brown, 51 Tex.
65, in a contest as to the genuineness of a will; and the declara-
tions of a testator, made both before and after its date, expres-
March, 1899.] Swope v. Donnelly. 639
sive of ill-will or of kindness toward the beneficiaries, were ad-
mitted. In Hoppe V. Byers, 60 Md. 381, a very carefully con-
sidered case in which the authorities on the subject are reviewed,,
it was held that after the introduction of direct proof of the-
genuineness of the handwriting, met by direct proof to the con-
trary, declarations of the deceased corroborative of such direct
proofs were admissible in evidence. A like ruling was made ia
Taylor will case, 10 Abb. Pr., K S., 300.
In all of these cases it was said, in effect, that the proof of
declarations was not in itself sufficient either to establish the
execution of the will or to overcome the testimony of the sub-
scribing witnesses, and that it was admissible only for the pur-
pose of corroboration. In the opinion in Hoppe v. Byers, 60-
Md. 381, it was said: "But in thus sustaining the ruling ex-
cepted to, it must be distinctly understood that we hold that
such declarations would not be admissible if they stood alone,,
and had not been preceded by direct proof of witnesses to the
genuineness of the handwriting. They are not to be taken as
direct proof to establish the paper, but merely as corroborative-
of such direct proof, or as a circumstance in a case of this char-
acter, where such direct evidence has been first given, proper
for the consideration of the jury." At the best, this is a dan-
gerous class of testimony, and its admission shoidd be carefully-
guarded and its effect as corroborative only should be clearly
defined.
In this case the deceased, who was a married woman without
children, died on December 25, 1893. The writing offered for
probate is dated December 10, 1893, and by it all her property
is given to her sisters and nieces, to the exclusion of her hus-
band. The assignments of error are to the admission of declara-
tions of the deceased made to witnesses before the execution
of the writing as to the disposition which she intended to make-
'*^^ of her property. There was not the slightest limit as to-
the time when the declarations were made, and, under general
offers, the witnesses were allowed to testify to conversations had
at any time during the life of the deceased. This led to the
introduction of testimony which was clearly irrelevant. One
witness, Emma Witherspoon, testified to a conversation with the^
deceased in October precdfling her death, in which she said she
had executed a will, and then had it with her, in which she
had provided for one of her sisters, and that she wished her
husband to have only what the law would allow him. Another^
Mary Muldoon, testified that the deceased had said to her thai
€40 SwoPE V. Donnelly. [Penn.
€he wished her money to go to her people, and that she would
not leave a dollar to her husband if the law did not compel
her to do so; and that on one occasion she had gone with her
to see a lawyer about making her will. This was about five
years before her death. The writing in question, if genuine, was
prepared by the deceased in the house of her sister about fifteen
days before her death. Tlie testimony of one of the witnesses
tended to show that there had been a prior will, that of the
other an intention to make a will, and perhaps that of both a
general intent that her husband should receive only such share
of her estate as the law would give him. But upon the real
issue, whether a will had been executed in December, 1893, this
testimony threw a very uncertain light, and it was altogether too
Tague and remote to be considered as corroborative of the testi-
mony of the witnesses to the execution of the writing offered aa
s. will. The fact that a will with which the deceased was satis-
fied was in existence in October could not be corroborative of
testimony that another will had been executed in December, and
the mere expression of an intention to make a will five years
before would have no weight whatever.
In justice to the learned trial judge, it should be said that
many of the questions which elicited this irrelevant testimony
were not objected to at the time, and he may have considered
them as having been asked without objection. They came, how-
•ever, without specific objections, under the general rulings on
the subject, one of which was on the question, "What disposi-
tion did she* tell you she was going to make of her property?'*
And the other on an offer to prove declarations of the deceased
made at any time.
*^''* Leave was given at the argument to amend the first and
second assignments by adding thereto the testimony to the ad-
mission of which exceptions were taken at the trial. The third
-assignment is not in compliance with the rules of this court, and
will not be considered. The first and second assignments of
error are sustained, and the judgment is reversed with a renire
facias de novo.
WILLS-DECLARATTONS OF TESTATOR AS EVlDBNCBl
-Generally, the declarations of a testator are not competent evidence
to Impeach the validity of a will. And evidence that the deceased
had in his lifetime often declared his Ignorance of the existence of
a will executed by hhu is inadmissible: See the note to Roberts v.
Trawlcli, 52 Am. Dec. 108. Declarations of the ancestor, under
whom both parties claim, unaccompanied by any act, showing what
disposition be had made or Intended to make of his estate, are not
March, 1899.] Steinmeyeb v. Siebebt. 641
evidence: Chadwick v, Webber. 3 Greenl. 141, 14 Am. Dec. 222. A.
testator's declarations are admissible only for the purpose of show-
ing the state of his mind: Comstock v. Hadlyme Soc, 8 Conn. 254,
20 Am. Dec. 100; Waterman v. Whitney, 11 N. Y. 157, 62 Am. Dec.
71, and note thereto; Reynolds v. Adams, 90 111. 134, 32 Am. Rep. 15.
APPEALr-ASSIGNMENT OP ERROR.— An exception to the ad-
mission or rejection of evidence will not be considered by an appel-
late court when the record does not state what the evidence was:
Sanford v. Howard, 29 Ala. 684, 68 Am. Dec. 101; Harris v. Tyson,
24 Pa. St. 347, 64 Am. Dec. 661; Sewell v. Eaton, 6 Wis. 490, 70 Am.
Dec. 471; Burson v. Fire Assn., 136 Pa. St. 267, 20 Am. St. Rep. 919.
Steinmeyeb v. Siebeet.
(190 Pennsylvania Stats, 47L]
EQUITY— JURISDICTION— SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE.—
The rule that equity will not entertain jurisdiction to decree spe-
cific performance respecting goods, chattels, stocks, and other things
of a merely personal nature, is limited to cases where compensa-
tion in damages will furnish a complete remedy. Where the
wrong is a betrayal of confidence, equity will decree restitution,
which may be enforced specifically against the wrongdoer.
APPEAL— FINDINGS OF JUDGE SITTING AS CHANCEL-
LOR.—Findings of fact made by a judge sitting as chancellor will
not be disturbed on appeal except for error which clearly appears.
An apparent preponderance of testimony against them is not sufll-
cient to lead to a reversal, where there Is testimony which might
warrant them.
Bill in equity to compel the restitution of stock of a corpora-
tion. The stock in question was one hundred and forty-seven
shares of stock in the Ewalt Street Bridge Company, alleged by
plaintiff to belong to his testator, Christian Siebert, but which
purported to have been transferred to the defendant, P. W. Sie-
bert, a son of the testator, before the latter's death. The lower
court, sitting as a court of chancery, found as conclusions of fact
that the defendant stood in a relation of great confidence and
trust to his father as his confidential agent, and, in short, that
he had no right to any but twelve of the one hundred and forty-
fieven shares of stock mentioned above. In pursuance of the
findings, a decree was entered directing a transfer of one hun-
<dred and thirty-five shares of stock to the executor, and direct-
ing the defendant to pay over to the executor the amount of
dividends which he had received on the shares. Appeal from
this decree.
J. S. Ferguson and E. G. Ferguson, for the appellant.
AM. St. Est., Vol. LXX.-41
642 Steinmeyer v. Siebeet. [Penn»
W. B. Eodgers and J. R. Sterrett, for the appellees.
474 j^ELL, J. The contention that the plaintiff was not en-
titled to proceed in equity because he had an adequate remedy^
at law cannot be sustained. No contract in relation to the
stock of the Ewalt Bridge Company is set up by the bill, but it
is alleged therein that the defendant Siebert never had any right
to or interest in the stock, and that he obtained the legal title
thereto fraudulently and by the abuse of the relation of trust
and confidence in which he stood to the real owner. The
prayers of the bill were for discovery, an account, and for trans-
fer of the stock. The rule that jurisdiction in equity will not
be entertained to decree a specific performance respecting goods,,
chattels, stocks, and other things of a merely personal nature
is limited to cases where a compensation in damages will fur-
nish a complete remedy. Where the wrong is a betrayal of con-
fidence, equity will decree restitution, which may be enforced
specifically against the wrongdoer. In McGowin v. Remington,.
12 Pa. St. 56, 61 Am. Dec. 584, a clerk was compelled to sur-
render drafts, maps, plans, et cetera, which he had withheld
from his employer; in Abbott v. Reeves, 49 Pa. St. 494, 88 Am.
Dec. 510, persons who had borrowed stocks and bonds from an
executor were required to make restitution; in Pennsylvania ^"^^
Co. v. Franklin Fire Ins. Co., 181 Pa. St. 40, the defendant was
required to issue new certificates of stock to an owner whose
certificates had been transferred under forged powers of attor-
ney. In the case last cited, it was said by our brother Dean
that on the ground that an action at law would be an inade-
quate remedy "equitable jurisdiction in suits by shareholder*
against the corporation has, on like prayers, been frequently sus-
tained both in the English courts and our own."
The established rule under the former practice was that the
findings of a master on conflicting evidence, approved by the
court, would not be reversed except on clear evidence of mis-
take: Stocker v. Hutter, 134 Pa. St. 19; Brotherton v. Reynolds,
164 Pa. St. 134. The same rule applies to the findings of fact
of a judge sitting as a chancellor under the new equity rules;
his findings are not conclusive upon us, but they will not be
disturbed except for error which clearly appears. An apparent
preponderance of testimony against them is not sufficient to
lead to a reversal, if there is testimony which, if believed, will
warrant them. The credibility of witnesses, and in a large de-
gree the conclusions to be drawn from their testimony, which
March, 1899.] Steinmeyeb v. Siebebt. 643
depends upon their character, intelligence, and knowledge of
the subject, can be determined much better by the judge who
hears them than by us on appeal: Stockett v. Ryan, 176 Pa. St.
71; Commonwealth v, Stevens, 178 Pa. St. 543; Hancock v. Mel-
loy, 187 Pa. St. 371. We have referred' to this subject, n.ot
because we have entertained any doubt as to the correctness of
the conclusions reached in this case, but in order that it may
be better understood by the profession, as many cases came here
on appeal in which the real question, as in this, is one of fact
to be determined by the consideration of conflicting evidence.
The findings of fact of the learned judge are stated with clear-
ness and precision, and we have no hesitation in accepting them
as abundantly sustained by the testimony.
The decree is afl&rmed at the cost of the appellant.
EQUITY JURISDICTION— SPECIFIC PERFORMANCEJ-PER-
SONAL PROPERTY.— Specific performance of a contract respect-
ing personal property will not ordinarily be enforced In equity un-
less an adequate remedy at law cannot be had: Eckstein v. Down-
ing, 64 N. H. 248, 10 Am. St. Rep. 404, and note; Hissam v. Par-
rlsli, 41 W. Va. 686, 56 Am. St. Rep. 892; see the monographic note
to Anderson v. Green, 23 Am. Dec. 423. Equity will decree the
specific performance of a contract to convey personal property, If
like property cannot be obtained elsewhere, or if loss cannot be
adequately compensated by damages In an action at law: Manton
V. Ray, 18 R. I. 672, 49 Am. St. Rep. 811, and note.
APPEAI^FINDINGS OP JUDGE SITTING AS CHANCEL-
LOR.—An appeal may be taken In equity cases on questions of fact
as well as of law, and the appellate court may go behind the find-
ings, weigh all the evidence, and decide according to its preponder-
ance; but the findings of the court below will not be disturbed when
the evidence as to a fact is so evenly balanced, or the proof of it
BO unsatisfactory as to cause the mind to hesitate and pause as to
the side on which it preponderates, and to leave It In grave doubt:
North Point Irr. Co. v. Union etc. Canal Co.. 16 Utah, 246, 67 Am. St.
Rep. 607. The general rxile Is that findings will not be disturbed:
Shults V. Shults, 159 111. 654, 50 Am. St. Rep. 188; Pollock v. Caro-
lina etc. Assn., 51 S. C. 420, 64 Am. St Rep. G83; Holker t. Hennes>
sey, 141 Mo. 527, 64 Am. St Rep. 524.
644 Equitable Trust Co. v, Garis. [Penn.
Equitable Trust Company v. Garis.
[190 Pennsylvania State, 514.]
EQUITY— JURISDICTION— DISCOVERY OF LUNATIC'S
PROPERTY.— The committee of a lunatic is the proper party to
maintain a bill in equity against the lunatic's husband for the dis-
covery and delivery of possession of muniments of title, negotiable
securities, and personal property, belonging to the lunatic's estate
and in the possession of the husband, where the latter denies her
title, or there is reason to apprehend that he will treat such prop-
erty adversely to her interest.
CORPORATIONS— TRUST COMPANY— PRESUMPTION OP
CAPACITY.— In the absence of specific restriction in Its charter, a
trust company having general power to "execute trusts of every de-
scription" must be presumed to have corporate capacity to act as
committee of a lunatic.
INSANE PERSONS— POWERS OF COMMITTEE— EFFECT
OF APPEAL FROM ORDER OF COMMITMENT.- An appeal from
an order of commitment entered in lunacy proceedings does not
oust or suspend the committee of a lunatic from its functions, nor
relieve it of the duty to guard the lunatic's property. Such com-
mittee may stiil sue in equity for the discovery and deliverance of
property of the lunatic held by an unauthorized person.
EQUITY— DISCOVERY OP LUNATIC'S PROPERTY-
SCOPE OF PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION.— Under a bill in equity
brought by the committee of a lunatic against the latter's husband
for the discovery of property of the lunatic kept by the husband in
a box in a safe deposit company, a preliminary injunction should
go no farther than is necessary for the protection and enforcement
of the lunatic's rights to property in such box, and should not in-
fringe upon defendant's right to take therefrom property belong-
ing to him and not claimed by the committee.
INSANE PERSONS— ADMINISTRATION OF LUNATIC'S
ESTATE— DISBURSEMENTS— NOTICE TO NEXT OF KIN.-
Before ordering disbursements from a lunatic's estate upon peti-
tion of the committee, notice should be given to the next of kin, or
parties standing in close relation to the lunatic.
INSANE PERSONS— ADMINISTRATION OF ESTATES OF.
It is the duty of a court in administering the estate of an insane
person to keep expenses within reasonable bounds, to sacrifice the
estate only when all the circumstances of the case make it neces-
sary, and to see to it that the future comfort of the lunatic shall
be made as secure as possible.
Samuel M. Roberts and Allen H. Gangewer, for the appellant.
Dwight M. Lowrey, Alfred R. Haig, Henry C. Thompson, Jr.,
and William F. Harrity, for the appellee.
648 MITCHELL, J. This ease has been unfortunately con-
ducted from the outset. The extravagance of the appellant's
contentions has led to efforts to put a summary end to them by
irregular proceedings which cannot be sustained. For this rea-
son a commitment for contempt was reversed: In re Garis, 185
Pa. St. 497.
AprU, 1899.] Equitable Trust Co. v. Gabis. 645
Substantially, it is a contest between the committee of a
lunatic wife and the husband for certain property claimed by
both, and, in the form in which it is now before us, it is a bill
filed by the committee against the husband, setting forth on
information and belief tliat certain muniments of title, nego-
tiable securities, and personal property belonging to the luna-
tic's estate were in the possession of the husband, and that part
of them at least had by him been deposited in a private box in
the Columbia Avenue Trust Company. The latter was also
made a formal defendant. The bill prayed for discovery, deliv-
ery of the said property, and an injunction against the husband
from opening the said box, and against the trust company from
permitting him to have access to it.
The husband filed an answer, denying the essential averments
as to his possession of the property. The denial, however, was
purely formal, and as to matters which, if true, must be within
his personal knowledge, as, for example, the averments of the
fourth, seventh, tenth, eleventh, and twelfth items of the bill,
^^ the answer was clearly evasive and insufficient. The appel-
lant and his codefendant, the Columbia Avenue Trust Com-
pany, then put on record an agreed statement of facts, setting
forth the connection of the company with the matter, and the
appellant filed a cross-bill against the Equitable Trust Com-
pany denying its capacity to act as committee, its right to bring
suit against the husband of the lunatic, and raising questions
of law upon these and other matters appearing in the bill. The
court below, upon a preliminary hearing, issued an injunction,
which is the main subject of the present appeal. Before dis-
cussing its terms, it is desirable to clear away some of the pre-
liminary questions involved, so that the case may be put in posi-
tion to proceed regularly to final determination.
A bill in equity will lie in appropriate circumstances for dis-
covery and delivery of possession of deeds and other muniments
of title, certificates of stock, negotiable securities, and other
personal property having special and peculiar value which is not
adequately represented by market price. The committee of a
lunatic is the proper party to bring and maintain such bill for
the lunatic's property.
Such bill may be maintained by the committee against the
husband of the lunatic where he denies her title, or there is
reason to apprehend that he will deal with the property in any
way adversely to her interest.
In the absence of specific restriction in its charter, which
646 Equitable Trust Co. v. Garis. [Penn.
nowhere appears, the Equitable Trust Company, by virtue of its
general powers under the act of May 9, 1889 (Pub. Laws, 159),
to "execute trusts of every description," must be presumed to
have corporate capacity to act as committee of the lunatic.
The bill could be filed, notwithstanding the removal of the
record of the lunacy proceedings to this court by the appeal
from the order of commitment. That appeal did not oust or
suspend the committee from its functions, or its duty to secure
the property of the lunatic. The bill was filed in the same
court and of the same term and number as the lunacy proceed-
ings, but that was a mere incident arising from the rules of the
courts of Philadelphia county for the proper and convenient dis-
tribution of their business. Except for those rules it might
have been filed in a different court and have made part of a
different record.
650 rpj^g |j-j|^ therefore, was properly filed, but it must be
sustained in the regular way, and the defendant cannot be de-
prived of property, of which he is in possession under claim
of title, without hearing and competent evidence. The extrava-
gance of his claims cannot bar him from his actual rights. In
view, however, of the nature of the property in controversy and
the facility with which the purpose charged, to remove it from
the jurisdiction, might be carried out, the court was authorized
to grant a preliminary injunction to protect the lunatic's in-
terests, should her title be hereafter established.
This brings us to the consideration of the terms of the injunc-
tion. These are too broad. It appears by the agreed state-
ment of facts that the appellant deposited in the Columbia
Avenue Company in November, 1894, a tin box, containing
valuables not named, and in April, 1896, rented a safe in the
vaults of the said company, and deposited therein a number of
things also not specified. These acts were done in his own name,
and the later of them more than a year before the proceedings
in lunacy began, though the inquisition found that the lunacy
had extended back to February, 1896, thus antedating by two
months the renting of the safe. The presumption from these
facts is, that part at least of the property on deposit in the
Columbia Avenue Company is the appellant's own, and though
his failure to say so in explicit terms, and to specify the articles
he so claims, greatly weakens such presumption, yet he should
not be deprived of the property without a full opportunity to
defend his title.
The injunction is also somewhat carelessly worded, so that it
April, 1899.] Equitable Teust Co. v. Gabis» 647
appears to be inconsistent in requiring the "boxes to "be opened
by the Columbia Avenue Trust Company, without the presence
of the appellant, and in prohibiting him from opening them,
while at the same time requiring him to make a detailed in-
ventory of their contents. And the last paragraph is clearly;
•excessive, in requiring appellant to produce and deliver to the
■committee the bonds, mortgages, et cetera, including his own
note in his wife's favor, the title and even existence of which
have not yet been established. This order can only be made
on final hearing, the power of the court at present being limited
to the preservation of the existing status of the property until
the title to it is determined.
'^^ In the present position of the case the committee, plain- _
tiff, is entitled: 1. To discovery and inspection of the contents
of the box and safe in the vaults of the Columbia Avenue Trust
Company, to be made in the presence of both parties or their
attorneys; 2. To the immediate delivery of such of the contents
of said box and safe as are or may be admitted by the appellant
to be the property of the lunatic; 3. To an injunction until final
hearing or until further order of the court, restraining the ap-
pellant from selling, pledging, assigning, removing, or otherwise
interfering with such contents of the said box and safe, as may
be claimed by him, but also claimed by the committee as the
property of the lunatic; with leave, however, to the appellant
to apply at any time to the court for permission to resume the
possession and control of any of the said contents upon giving se-
curity that the same or the value thereof shall be forthcoming
to abide the final decree in the case; 4. The appellant to be at
liberty, in the presence of the proper attorneys or representa-
tives of the Equitable Trust Company and the Columbia Avenue
Trust Company, to remove such contents of the said box and
€afe as are not claimed by the committee as the property of the
lunatic; and after such removal the Columbia Avenue Trust
Company may be enjoined from permitting the appellant to
have access to the said box and safe, except in the presence of
the attorney or representative of the said committee. The in-
junction having been thus modified, the case should proceed
promptly to a final hearing and decree.
This disposes of the substantial controversy in the case, in its
present position. But the third assignment of error requires
notice of another matter. The court below, on petition of the
committee in July, 1897, ordered payment of certain expenses
for costs of inquisition, board of the lunatic, et cetera, out of
€48 Equitable Trust Co. v. Gams. [Penn^
the lunatic's estate, and tlie application of the income there-
after to her hoard from time to time. When the case was here
before, 185 Pa. St. 497, it was held that this could be done with-
out notice to the party instituting the proceedings. But it is
better practice to give notice to the next of kin, or parties stand-
ing in close relation to the lunatic. The danger of not doing
BO is illustrated ^^^ by the similar but more extensive order
made in July, 1898, whereby the committee was authorized, not
only to apply the balance of the income, but "so much of the
principal as may be necessary after the income is exhausted"
to the support of the lunatic. This was a highly improvident
order. The estate, as set forth in the petition of the committee,
amounted in 1898 to about nine thousand four hundred dollars,
yielding an income of six hundred and fifty dollars, which the
expenses of maintenance as at present conducted would exceed
by about one hundred and seventy-five dollars annually. The
situation, therefore, was one of annually decreasing principal
and increasing deficit, a situation calling for the utmost care
and discretion in administration. This discretion should not be
surrendered by the court to any other tribunal, and especially
not to the committee by any general order. The principal of
the estate should only be sacrificed to necessity, and such neces-
sity should be determined in each specific instance by the court
itself, having before it all the circumstances, including the
nature and value of the property, the age, condition of health
and situation in life of the lunatic, the effect of loss of accus-
tomed comforts, the prospect of increasing infirmities, et cetera.
It is the duty of the court to see that the future comfort of the
unfortunate shall be made as secure as the circumstances per-
mit, and for that purpose to keep present expenses within rea-
sonable bounds. As said by this court in Wier v. Myers, 34
Pa. St. 377, "all those expenses ought to be carefully supervised
by the court, and, considering the helpless condition of the luna-
tic, none ought to be allowed except such as are manifestly just
and moderate" Especially is it the duty of the court to see
that the estate is protected in the administration. Commis-
Bions, fees, and charges of all kinds should be allowed only on
the most moderate scale of compensation.
We have considered this case, as was our duty, in the light of
the appellant's legal rights. But we are not impressed with
the merits of his contention. Whatever claim or title he has
to any of the property in controversy he should show promptly
and clearly. As against the committee, he has no right of pos-
April, 1899. J Equitable Trust Co. v. Garis. 64^
session of any of his wife's property, and, in the language of the
chief justice when the case was here before, if he has any such
property in his possession he ought to turn it over to the com-
mittee and save further trouble.
The decree is reversed and the record is remitted, with direc-
tions ^^^ to amend the order of July 18, 1898, by striking out
the authorization of the application of any part of the principal
of the estate to the support of the lunatic without express direc-
tion of the court, and to reform the order and injunction of
November 15, 1898, in accordance with this opinion. The costs
of this appeal to abide the final result of the case.
INSANE PERSONS— EQUITY JURISDICTION— POWERS OF
COMMITTEE— SALE OP PROPERTY.— The exclusive care and
custody of the estate of idiots, lunatics, and habitual drunljards, as
well as of their persons, are vested by statute In the court of chan-
cery: L'Anioreux v. Crosby, 2 Paige, 422, 22 Am. Dec. 655. Lunacy
or mental unsoundness does not give a court of chancery jurisdiction
over the incompetent until after the inquisition of a jury adjudging
him to be non compos mentis: Hamilton v. Traber, 78 Md. 26, 44
Am. St. Rep. 258. It has been held that a court of equity has in-
herent power to order a sale of a lunatic's real estate: Dodge v.
Cole, 97 111. 338, 37 Am. Rep. 111. But this broad statement seems
to have some qualification, and the sale of the property of a lunatic
can be authorized by a court of chancery only when applied to by a
regularly constituted guardian, committee, or trustee, charged with
the duty of maintaining such lunatic and protecting and managing
his estate. A mere stranger to the lunatic's estate, though akin to
him by blood, cannot by his petition give the court jurisdiction:
Hamilton v. Traber, 78 Md. 26, 44 Am. St. Rep. 258. The power of
the committee of a lunatic to deal with" his estate was at common
law restricted to the preservation of the estate and the application
of the rents and income to his proper support and maintenance, to
the exclusion even of creditors, if necessary: Hamilton v. Traber,
78 Md. 26, 44 Am. St. Rep. 258. See generally on the question of the
expenditure of the income of the lunatic's estate, the monographic
note to Villard v. Robert, 49 Am. Dec. 657; Patton v. Thompson, 2
Jones Eq. 411, 67 Am. Dec. 222; Campbell's case, 2 Bland, 209, 20
Am, Dec. 360.
CORPORATIONS— POWERS.— A company may foster Its legiti-
mate business, whatever it is, by all the usual means, but It can go
no further: Northside Ry. Co. v. Worthington, 88 Tex. 602, 53 Am.
St. Rep. 778. A corporation, unless prohibited by Its charter or by
statute, has power to make all contracts requisite for the purpose
for which it was created. A corporation may act as an adminis-
trator when the law does not require the administrator to take an
oath, or to do any other act which a corporation is Incompetent to
perform: Deringer v. Derlnger, 5 Houst 416, 1 Am. St. Rep. 150.
CASES
INTHB
SUPREME COURT
TENNESSEE.
Clement v. Insurance Company.
[101 Tennkssbe, 22.]
INSURANCE— LIFE— INCONTESTABILITY.— Where a pol-
icy of life insurance provides tliat after one year from its inception
It shall be incontestable if the premiums are paid, such policy can-
not be contested by the insurer, after a year has elapsed, on the
ground of fraud in obtaining the policy, and it malses no difiCerence
whether suit is brought upon the policy by the assured's represen-
tatives or any bona tide assignee of the assured,
INSURANCE — LIFE-INCONTESTABILITY— FRAUD OP
ASSIGNEE.— Where a policy of life insurance provides that It
shall be incontestable by the company after one year if the. premi-
ums are paid, and suit Is brought thereon by a transferee of the
policy, after the lapse of such time, the premiums being paid, the
Insurer may, nevertheless, defend upon the ground that the plain-
tiflP is not a transferee in good faith, and that the transfer vras a
mere evasion of the rule against vragering policies, and evidence In
support of such defense Is admissible.
INSURANCE— LIFE— PAYMENT OF PREMIUMS TO
AGENT— PROOF.— Where a policy of life Insurance provides that
premiums thereon may be paid to an agent producing a receipt
therefor signed by the president or other named officers of the
company, the payment of premiums is sufficiently established In a
suit on the policy, by evidence that they were paid to one held out
as a general agent of the company who delivered a receipt signed
by the president when the payment was made.
INSURANCE-LIFE — INSURABLE INTEREST— WAGER-
ING POLICY.— One who takes out a policy upon the life of another
paying the premiums therefor himself must have an Insurable In-
terest In the life of that other, or the policy will be a mere wager
policy upon which the party to whom It was Issued cannot recover.
INSURANOE-LIFEJ-ASSIGNMENT— INSURABLE INI BR-
EST.—While, when a policy of life insurance has once been Issued
to a beneficiary legally entitled, he may assign or transfer it to an-
other who has no Insurable interest, the transfer or assignment
must be In good faith, and not a mere colorable evasion of the pro-
»660)
April, 1898.] Clement v. Insurance Co. 661
Tlslon In regard to wagering contracts and In order to validate or
legalize the same.
INSURANCE — LIFE — INCONTESTABLE CLAUSE— WA-
<JERING TRANSFER.— An Incontestable clause in a policy of life
insurance cannot be relied upon to aid a transferee thereof who, by
means of an unauthorized and illegal transfer, commenced before,
And consummated after, the policy issued, to recover thereon.
Such clause does not preclude inquiry into the transfer and the
right of the transferee to take under the policy, and if the transfer
is a wagering transfer the transferee cannot recover.
Caldwell & Lowe, for the appellant.
Turley & Wright and Moore & Wells, for the appellee.
** WILKES, J. This is an action upon a policy of insur-
ance for eight thousand dollars upon the life of Mattie Lee
Wright. The policy was issued on October 11, 1893, and was
payable to the executors, administrators, and assigns of the in-
fiured. On October 19, 1893, it was assigned to R. H. Clement
and W. B. Kerr, upon consideration that they pay the premiums
as they should accrue, as well as the premiums upon a policy
of two thousand dollars issued simultaneously by the assured
upon his life for the benefit of his wife, and the further consid-
eration of twenty-five dollars paid to the assured himself. The
assured died December 27, 1894, or one year, two months, and
sixteen days after the policy issued, he being about twenty-six
years of age. After his death, W. B. Kerr assigned two thou-
sand two hundred and twenty-eight dollars and ten cents of hia
part and interest in the policy to the Jerome Hill Cotton Com-
pany, to satisfy an attachment which had been levied upon it,
and afterward, but before this suit was instituted, assigned the
remainder of his interest under the policy to his two sons, the
complainants, W. A. and E. B. Kerr.
Upon the hearing of the cause in the court below, upon a
■voluminous record and a vast volume of proof, the chancellor
was of opinion that complainants were not entitled to recover
upon the policy, nor to any relief, and he dismissed the bill at
*' their cost, and they have appealed and assigned errors.
The learned chancellor, in his decree, set out in full his find-
ing of facts and conclusions of law thereon. We are satisfied,
from an examination of the entire record as it is presented, that
the chancellor was, in the main, correct in finding the facts as
follows:
When the policy was issued, the insured was not a fit and
€uitable subject for insurance, because of ill-health and bodily
infirmities of a serious character, which was well known to him.
652 Clement v. Insurance Co. [Tenn.
and concealed by him in making liis application, and lie pro-
cured the policy by fraudulent misrepresentations as to his
physical condition. It also appears that prior to the delivery
of the policy, and doubtless prior to the application, the said
E. H. Clement and W. B. Kerr had agreed with the insured,
that, for the consideration heretofore stated, he would transfer
the policy for eight thousand dollars to them, and the policy
was procured in conformity to, and in pursuance of, such agree-
ment, said Clement and Kerr paying the cash premium to the
agent, but not until after the transfer was made and policy de-
livered to them. The terms of the transfer recite that Clement
and Kerr were creditors of the insured, but such does not ap-
pear to be the fact from the record, except so far as that rela-
tion may be said to have arisen out of the agreement referred
to, nor were they in any way related to him, nor did they have
any insurable interest in the ^® life of the deceased, but had
knowledge of his physical condition. The chancellor was, there-
fore, of opinion that the transaction was a gambling or wager-
ing contract upon the life of the insured; that to recognize or
enforce it would be contrary to sound public policy, and that
the subassignees or transferees of W. B. Kerr could stand upon
no other or higher ground than he could.
Unquestionably, the findings of the chancellor are correct,
and his conclusions correct, upon the record as presented to us,
unless they are controlled and neutralized by the provisions of
the policy in regard to the right of the company to contest its
liability in case of death. The provision referred to is as fol-
lows:
'Incontestability. — After this policy shall have been in force
one full year, if it shall become a claim by death, the company
will not contest its payment, provided the conditions of the
policy as to payment of premiums have been observed."
The rights of tlie parties are thus made to turn upon the
force, effect, and extent of this provision in the policy. It must
be apparent from the outset that this provision was intended
to have some material effect, and was not inserted as a matter
of form. No more tempting provision to an applicant could
be introduced into a policy of life insurance than this one, which
guaranteed to the applicant that his policy should not be con-
tested after the expiration of one year, provided the premiums
were paid.
*'■ Premiums upon life policies are often paid at a great sacri-
fice, and one of the most disturbing and unsatisfactory features
April, 1898.] Clement v. Insurance Co. 653
of the insurance contract is tlie fact that, after these sacrifices
and payments have been made for a number of years, and the
insured has died, so that his testimony and perhaps that of
others has been rendered unavailable by the lapse of time and
the occurrence of death, instead of receiving the promised re-
ward, the beneficiary will be met with a contest and a lawsuit
to determine whether the insurance ever had any validity or
force. Hence it has become an almost universal practice with
insurance companies to provide against any contest or forfeiture
of their policies after a certain length of time, greater in some
oases and less in others.
The provision in this case is very broad in its terms. There
is only one condition upon which the validity of the policy can
be questioned, after the lapse of a year, and that is the nonpay-
ment of premiums. The meaning of the provision is, that if
the premiums are paid, the liability shall be absolute under the
policy, and that no question shall be made of its original validity.
No reasonable construction can be placed upon such provision
other than that the company reserves to itself the right to ascer-
tain all the facts and matters material to its risk, and the
validity of their contract for one year, and if, within that time,
it does not ascertain all the facts, and does not cancel and
rescind the ^"* contract, it may not do so afterward upon any
ground then in existence.
The practical and intended effect of the stipulation is to create
a short statute of limitation in favor of the insured, within
which limited period the insurer must, if ever, test the validity
of the policy.
It has been held that an agreement limiting the time within
which an action may be brought upon a policy of insurance by
the beneficiary is not against public policy, and may be enforced,
though less than the usual time imposed by law has been fixed.
If this be so, it is difficult to see why a similar limitation upon
the right of the insurer to contest should be against public pol-
icy, and why it should not be enforced by the courts.
It is said, however, that fraud appearing in the origin of the
contract must, as in any other case, render it null and void from
the beginning. It is true that fraud vitiates all agreements and
undertakings based upon it, and they may be set aside at the in-
stance of the party defrauded. So, in this case, fraud in obtain-
ing the policy would vitiate it at the option and upon the motion
of the party defrauded, but, under the provision in question, the
party must, within the year, exercise his right to repudiate and
654 Clement v. Insurance Co. [Tenn,
rescind it. The effect of this agreement not to contest is to put
the company in the attitude of being unable to set up any fraud
or false swearing in obtaining the policy, or any other defense
** to it, save the one excepted, so far as its original validity is
concerned. Unless the language be thus construed, it is imprac-
ticable to put any reasonable interpretation on it. Unless it is
the object and purpose of the provision to cut off all defenses
arising out of the false statements of the applicant to obtain it,,
it is difficult to see what practical benefit the insured is to derive
from it.
It has been well said: "The effect of the provision is to pre-
vent the insurer from interposing as a defense the falsity of the
representations of the insured, which is a fraud. But it does not
prevent abandonment, rescission, and cancellation of the con-
tract for such fraud, provided the action for that purpose is
brought within a year." It is virtually saying to the insured
that "I will take one year in which to ascertain whether your
representations are false or not, and whether you have been
guilty of any fraud in obtaining the contract, and if within that
period I cannot or do not detect such falsity and fraud, I will
obligate myself to make no further inquiry into these matters,
and to make no defense on account of them.'*
It has also been properly said: "Such a stipulation ought to be
an incentive to the insurer to exercise vigilance and good faith
in investigating the truth or falsity of the representations upon
which the policy issued, while the matter is fresh, and thus it
operates fairly between the parties. The witnesses are all alive,
and the exact truth can, if ever, ^® be ascertained, and the stipu-
lation prevents the insurer from laying by and receiving the
premiums during the life of the insured, and after his death,
when the good faith and the truth of his representations cannot
be supported by his own oath and strengthened by his own
efforts and superior knowledge, contesting the policy upon the
ground that the insured's representations were false. It is true
there is in the policy a stipulation that fraud shall vitiate it, but
this is not inconsistent with the further requirement that the
insurer must set up the fraud during the time limited": "Wright
V. Mutual Ben. Assn., 43 Hun, 61; Wood v. Dwarris, 11 Ex. 493;^
Wright V. Mutual Ben. Assn., 118 N. Y. 237, 16 Am. St. Rep.
749; Kline v. National Ben. Assn., Ill Ind. 462, 60 Am. Eep.
707.
Fraud is always required to be set up promptly when discov-
ered, or it may be treated as waived, and the effect of this stipu-
April, 1898.] Clement v» Insurance Co. 655
lation is that the insurer must exercise due diligence to dis-
cover such fraud within the year, and, if it fails to do so, it will
treat it as waived, and no inquiry will be made or allowed into
such matters. It clearly appears, from the record in this case,
that the company in one year could have discovered all the facta
now disclosed in the proof relating to this question.
Objection was made by the complainant to any testimony re-
lating to the truth or falsity of the representations made or fraud
practiced by the assured, ^* or the transferees in obtaining thi»
policy, but such objections were overruled, and much testimony
pro and con was taken on this point, and this is now assigned as
error. We are of opinion this would be error if the present suit
was being prosecuted by the assured's representatives or any
bona fide assignee of the assured. To give any effect to the
stipulation, if the suit were in the interest of the original bene-
ficiary or his bona fide assignee, the company must be estopped
from inquiring into any matter involved in the original validity
of the policy. But when the suit is brought by a transferee, and
the chancellor was of opinion that such transferee did not hold
in good faith, and that the transfer was but a mere evasion of the
rule against wagering policies, then the evidence was admissible
on the question of fraud or good faith on the part of the trans-
feree.
It is said by the defendant company there is no sufficient
proof that the premium due one year after the policy issued was
ever paid to the company.
The bill alleges that the premium was paid promptly when
due, and a receipt is filed for the same and made an exhibit to the
bill; and again that all premiums have been promptly paid on
the policy when due, and these payments were made under the
agreement by the assignees, E. H. Clement and W. B. Kerr.
The contest is not that the premium was not paid, but that
there is no evidence that such payment ** was made to the com-
pany or any authorized agent of the company. The answer
neither admits nor denies the payment, but calls for strict proof
of the same if deemed material. The alleged receipt, filed with
the bill as an exhibit, is in the words and figures following:
^56 Clement v. Insurance Co. [Tenn.
''New York Life Insurance Co.,
"346 & 348 Broadway, New York.
"Eeeeived $164, being the annual premium due October 11,
1894, upon policy No. 565,543.
"JOHN A. McCALL,
'Tresident.
"Countersigned by
"WM. H. WOOD,
"Cashier."
On the back of this receipt there is printed a "Notice to Policy
Holders," and one clause of the notice is as follows: '^AU pre-
miums are due and payable at the home office of the company
sinless otherwise agreed in writing, but any premium may be
.paid to an agent producing a receipt therefor signed by the presi-
dent, vice-president, second vice-president, actuary, or secretary,
-and countersigned by such agent." A similar provision is found
in the policy itself. William H. Wood was not examined, but
it was attempted to be shown that he stated that he was the gen-
-€ral agent of the company at Memphis, where it had a branch
office; that he was authorized to receive premiums and give re-
4;eipts; and that he did receive the premium as stated, and exe-
cuted the receipt. . This evidence was objected to ^^ on the
ground that agency cannot be proven by the statements of the
party assuming to act as such. The objection was overruled
hy the chancellor, and to his ruling exception was taken. It is
now assigned as error by the company that the chancellor im-
properly admitted this testimony, and the same should have
been excluded. We think there is ample evidence that Wood
was held out and recognized as the general agent of the com-
pany, and that he had in his possession the receipt of the com-
pany signed by its president, John A. McCall, and delivered this
when the payment was made.
In regard to the point made that the assignees, R. H. Clements
and W. B. Kerr, had no insurable interest in the life of the de-
-ceased, and the transaction as to them was invalid and void, it is
necessary to repeat that the policy was not made payable to them
when originally issued, but to the executors, administrators, and
assigns of the insured. Within a few days thereafter, it was
regularly assigned to said Clements and Kerr. The manner and
form prescribed by the policy, and the assignment or transfer
was made known to and recognized by the company by receiving
and retaining a copy of the transfer. A policy for ten thousand
•dollars had been previously procured in another company, pay-
April, 1898.] Clement v. Insurance Co. 657
able to Clements and Kerr, but in which the wife was to have a
beneficial interest to the extent of two thousand dollars; but this
policy was not acceptable to Clements and Kerr, and they de-
■clined to receive it, and the application *** was then made for
the present policy, payable to the assured, with an agreement
that he would transfer it to Clements and Kerr. The insured,
before his death, executed a last will and testament, in which he
recited that he was indebted to Clements and Kerr prior to Oc-
tober 1, 1893; that the policy had been issued to him and trans-
ferred to them on October 19, 1893, and the transfer accepted by
the company November 14, 1893; and in his last will he directs
that the proceeds of the policy be paid to them dn the event of
death.
As before stated, neither Clements nor Kerr were related in
any way to the insured, nor were they creditors, nor did they
give any consideration for the transfer, except the twenty-five
dollars paid the insured, and undertaking to pay the premiums
on the transferred policy, as well as the two-thousand-dollar
policy issued at the same time with the policy in controversy
upon the assured's life in favor of his wife, and they had knowl-
edge of the assured's physical condition. If this transfer is not
authorized by the policy or by any rule of law, or is opposed to
any sound ground of public policy, we cannot see that such in-
firmity can be in any way cured by the provision not to contest.
That provision relates to the issuance of the policy and the rep-
resentations made to obtain it, and not to any subsequent trans-
fer, disposition, or assignment of the policy. As to these
matters, the stipulation has no reference or effect. It relates
only to matters arising between the insurer ^^ and the insured,
and not to matters in which third persons are concerned. The
only provision in the policy as to assignments is the following:
"Any assignment of this policy must be made in duplicate, and
both copies must be sent to the home office, one of them to be
retained by the company. The company has no responsibility
for the validity of any assignment."
There is nothing in the policy as to who may be beneficiaries,
nor as to whom assignments and transfers may be made, but it is
clearly indicated that transfers and assignments may be made at
the risk of the parties. "We are, therefore, relegated to the gen-
eral law of insurance to determine whether such transfer and
assignment can be sustained. "We think there can be no ques-
tion but that the consideration for the transfer is sufficient as to
amount and value, if it can be sustained on other grounds, and
AM. ST. Rep., Vol. LXX.— 12
658 Clement v. Insurance Co. [Tenn-.
the only question is, whether such transfer to one or more third
persons, having no insurable interest, can be sustained under the
rules of law and upon grounds of sound public policy. While
the authorities are in hopeless conflict, the weight of authority
is that one who takes out a policy upon the life of another, pay-
ing the premiums therefor himself, must have an insurable in-
terest in the life of that other, or the policy will be a mere wager
policy, upon which the party to whom it was issued cannot
recover: See authorities collated in 3 Am. & Eng. Ency. of Law^
2d ed., 929.
^® But the weight of authority is that when the insured con-
tracts directly With the insurer, paying the premiums himself,
he may designate as beneficiary one who has no insurable interest
in his life: 3 Am. & Eng. Ency. of Law, 2d ed., 959.
So, also, the weight of authority is that when a policy has once
been issued to a beneficiary legally entitled, he may assign it to
another who has no insurable interest, either by a transfer in his
lifetime or by a last will and testament: 3 Am. & Eng. Ency. of
Law, 2d. ed., 1025.
But while this is true, the transfer and assignment must be
made in good faith, and not as a mere colorable evasion of the
provision in regard to wagering contracts and in order to validate
or legalize the same: 3 Am. & Eng. Ency. of Law, 2d ed., 1025,.
and notes; Mutual Protection Ins. Co. v. Hamilton, 5 Sneed, 269;.
Nye V. Grand Lodge, 9 Ind. App. 131; Eittler v. Smith, 70 Md.
261; Fairchild v. North Eastern Mut. Life Assn., 51 Vt. 613 j
Bursinger v. "Watertown Bank, 67 Wis. 75, 58 Am. Rep. 848;
Heinlein v. Imperial Life Ins. Co., 101 Mich. 250, 45 Am. St.
Rep. 409, 25 L. R. A. 627, note; Carpenter v. United States Life
Ins. Co., 161 Pa. St. 9, 41 Am. St. Rep. 880; Fitzpatrick v. Hart-
ford Life Ins. Co., 56 Conn. 116, 7 Am. St. Rep. 288; Olmstead
V. Keyes, 85 N. Y. 593; Clark v. Allen, 11 R. I. 439, 23 Am. Rep.
496.
We think the facts in this case show that, while this policy was
taken out by the assured, payable to his executors, et cetera, it
was done under a pre-existing agreement with Clement and Kerr
that they would pay the premiums and the other considerations-
named, and have the benefit of the policy, ^"^ and the assign-
ment to them was in furtherance of this agreement, and it was^
therefore a wagering policy. But it is said that if this be true,
still the complainants can take under the will of the assured.
It is doubtless true that anyone by will may bequeath the pro-
ceeds of a life policy, payable to himself or his executors or ad-
April, 1898.] Clement v. Insurance Co. 659
ministrators,to whom he pleases, and the fact that the legatee has
no insurable interest will not defeat his right to receive under
the will. But the parties complainant do not sue or seek to re-
cover in this case as legatees or under the will of the insured.
On the contrary, they expressly state, when asked the question,
in making proof of death, under what title they claim, that they
claim under the transfer and assignment. The provision in the
will appears clearly to be an afterthought, an act to strengthen,
consummate, and support the transfer, and was in furtherance of
the original fraudulent contrivance and agreement to vest an in-
terest in complainants. While we think the party procuring a
policy is entitled to rely upon a provision against contest, and
may transfer this right to anyone, whether having an insurable
interest or not, provided he takes in good faith, we can see no
reason for extending the benefit to one who, by fraud commenced
before and consummated after the policy issues (by means of an
unauthorized and illegal transfer), seeks to reap the same benefit.
This would be to allow an easy evasion of the rule against the
validity of wagering contracts: Heinlein ^* v. Imperial Life Ins.
Co., 101 Mich. 250, 45 Am. St. Eep. 409, 25 L. R. A. 628, note.
It is argued, however, that the clause agreeing not to contest
must have the effect to preclude any inquiry into the transfer
and also the right of the transferee to take under the policy. We
are of opinion, however, that the clause does not go to this ex-
tent and cannot have this effect. It is intended to cut off
inquiry into the truth of the statements made by the assured in
the application, and other matters going to the original validity
of the policy, but not to any subsequent disposition of the policy,
and the company expressly disclaims any responsibility for the
validity of any assignment. Tliere is nothing in this holding
inconsistent with the ruling in the case of Wright v. Mutual
Ben. Assn. of America, 118 N. Y. 237, 16 Am. St. Rep. 749.
In that case, Houghton, the original beneficiary, was a creditor
of Wright, and had, therefore, an insurable interest in his life,
and the policy was not, therefore, a wagering policy. After the
death he assigned and transferred his interest in the policy to the
widow of the insured, and the suit was brought in her name.
The court held that she might recover the entire amount of the
policy and adjust the rights of Houghton out of the proceeds,
and make such other payments as equity demanded out of the
proceeds. But there was no evidence of any fraud, either in the
original issuance of the policy or in ** its subsequent transfer,
and the whole matter appears to have been done in the utmost
660 Clement v. Insurance Co. [Tenn.
good faith and with no purpose of carrying out a wagering
policy.
While the court is disposed to give to the assured, and parties
taking under him in good faith, the full benefit and advantage
of the noncontestable clause, by shutting off inquiries into the
truth or falsity of the statements made in the application, and
this because of the contract between the parties, it can see no
reason why the like advantage and benefit should be extended to
one who has no insurable interest in the assured, who does not
take or claim in good faith, and whose entire connection with
the matter is shown to have been for a speculative and fraudu-
lent purpose, and no sound public policy can be subserved by so
holding, but, on the contrary, such holding would sanction
wagering insurance contracts, to the great detriment of the pub-
lic morals and public good. We are, therefore, of opinion the
decree of the chancellor is correct in its results, and it is affirmed,
and the bill dismissed at complainant's cost.
INSURANCE— LIFE— INCONTESTABILITY.— A stipulation In a
certificate of life insurance "tliat no question as to tlie validity of
the application or certificate of membersliip shall be raised, unless
such question be raised within the first two years after the date of
such certificate or membership and during the life of the member
therein named," is valid, and excludes both the defense of fraud
and the defense that the beneficiary had iJo insurable interest in the
life of the insured: Wright v. Mutual etc. Assn., 118 N. Y. 237, 10
Am. St. Rep. 749. That the insui-ance company is liable under a
clause of incontestability when the insured commits suicide, even
though the application stipulates that the insurer shall not assume
liability for the death of the Insured by his own hand, see Goodwin
V. Provident etc. Assn., 97 Iowa, 226, 59 Am. St. Rep. 411; Mareck
V. Mutual etc. Assn., 62 Minn. 39, 54 Am, St. Rep. 613.
INSURANCE-LIFE —WAGERING POLICY— ASSIGNMENT.—
A policy of Insurance on the life of another, taljen by one who had
an insurable interest in it, for the purpose of assigning It to a third
person who had no such insurable interest, is void as a wagering
policy in the hands of the assignee: Keystone etc. Ben. Assn. v. Nor-
ris, 115 Pa. St. 446, 2 Am. St. Rep. 572. See generally, on the val-
idity of assignment of life insurance to one who has no insurable
interest, the extended notes to Equitable Life Ins. Co. v. Hazlewood,
16 Am. St. Rep. 906; Currier v. Continental Life Ins. Co., 52 Am.
Rep. 143; Bursinger y. Bank. 58 Am. Rep. 852.
May, 1898.] Tubcott v. Railroad. 661
TuRCOTT V. Railroad.
[101 TENNE88EIC, 102.]
LIMITATIONS OP ACTIONS— ABSENCE FROM STATE-
CORPORATIONS.— A statute providing for the suspension of the
running of the statute of limitations during the absence of a 'per-
son" from the state applies to a corporation, and requires such ab-
sence as will prevent service of process.
CORPORATIONS.— THE RESIDENCE OP A CORPORA-
TION is in the state of its creation.
LIMITATIONS OP ACTIONS — ABSENCE PROM THE
STATE— FOREIGN CORPORATIONS.— A foreign corporation, do-
ing business within a state, and having there agents upon whom
process may be served, is not absent from the state within the mean-
ing of a statute suspending the running of the statute of limita-
tions in favor of a person out of the state, though it has failed to
file and register its charter as required of foreign corporations do-
ing business within the state before giving them the rights of do-
mestic corporations.
CORPOIL1TIONS-POREIGN— PILING OP CHARTER-
CONSTRUCTION OP STATUTE.— The purpose of a statute requir-
ing foreign corporations doing business within the state to file and
register their charters. Is to enable them to do business, own or
acquire property, and be enable to sue, but not to exempt them
from suit If they disregard the statute or to estop them from mak-
ing defense if so sued.
Carroll, Chalmers & McKellar, for the appellant.
Fentress & Cooper, for the appellee.
103 "WILKES, J. This is an action for damages for personal
injuries inflicted in the shops of the defendant company at
Vickshurg, Mississippi. The action was brought at Memphis,
Tennessee, May 25, 1895, about one and one-half years after the
injury was suffered. Demurrers were filed, and the declaration
was amended. To the declaration, as amended, pleas of not
guilty, contributory negligence, and the Tennessee statute of
limitation of one year for injuries to persons were filed. The
latter plea states in detail that the defendant company had been
operating its road through the state of Mississippi into and in
the state of Tennessee for fourteen years; that it had an oflBce
and agents in the city of Memphis, and on these agents service
at any time could have ^** been had, and that at no time had
there been any impediment or hindrance to the bringing of this,
or any other suit against it, or to the service of legal process
upon it.
To this plea there was a replication, in substance that the de-
fendant is a foreign corporation, organized and existing under
the laws of Mississippi, and that, at the time of the accrual of
662 TuRcoTT V, Railroad. [Tenn.
this cause of action, it had no corporate or legal existence in Ten-
nessee, because it had not complied with the requirements of the
acts of 1891, chapter 122, as to the filing and registration of its
charter, and, not having so complied until after the bringing of
this suit, it cannot plead the statute of limitations of one year
in bar of the suit. There was a demurrer to this replication,
and the demurrer was sustained.
The exact questions presented are whether foreign corpora-
tions can plead and rely upon this Tennessee statute of limita-
tion when they have offices and agents in the state subject to
continuous service of process, and whether the failure to file and
register its charter will deprive it of that right, if otherwise it
would be held to have it.
Under the statutes of Tennessee (Shannon's Comp. Stats.,
4469), it is provided, among other things, that actions for in-
juries to the person must be commenced within one year after
the cause of action accrues, or be barred.
Section 4455 of Shannon's Compiled Statutes provides: "If,
at any time, any cause of action shall accrue against any person
who shall be out of this state, the action ***** may be commenced
within the time limited therefor, after such person shall have
come into the state; and after any cause of action shall have
accrued, if the person against whom it has accrued shall be ab-
sent from, or reside out of the state, the time of his absence or
residence out of the state shall not be taken as any part of the
time limited for the commencement of the action."
The word "person" includes a "corporation": Shannon's
Comp. Stats., sec. 62. The exception made in this statute does
not apply to a natural person unless his absence from the state
is such as to prevent service of process: Taylor v. McGill, 6 Lea,
294, 301.
The statutes relating to service of process upon corporations
are as follows:
"Service of process on the president, or other head of a cor-
poration, or, in his absence, on the cashier, treasurer or secretary,
or, in the absence of such officers, on any director of such corpo-
ration shall be sufficient" : Shannon's Comp. Stats., sec. 4539.
"If neither the president, cashier, or secretary resides within
the state, service on the chief agent of the corporation residing
at the time in the county where the action is brought, shall be
deemed sufficient": Shannon's Comp. Stats., sec. 4540.
No question is made but that there was ample opportunity to
obtain service of process at any time on the defendant through
May, 1S98.] Turcott v. Railroad, 663
its officers and agents, nor that foreign corporations are liable to
service under these sections: Telephone Co. v. Turner, 88 Term.
266.
*®® But the contention is, that a foreign corporation is out
of the state, and resides out of the state, and so falls within the
exception before stated, and that, while process may be made
upon it, still it is optional with a party aggrieved whether and
when he will commence his suit, and the bar of the statute con-
not be set up if the suit is not brought within one year, and that
it does not come within the state in legal contemplation, till it
files and registers its charter. It appears that there is some con-
flict of decision upon the first question. The reason of the rule
of law is, that no person who is not and has not been subject to
service of process within the year, shall avail himself of its ex-
emption: Taylor v. McGill, 6 Lea, 294. Unquestionably , the
residence of a corporation is the state of its creation: Young y.
South Tredegar Iron Co., 85 Tenn. 189, 4 Am. St. Rep. 753.
And if we should give the statute a strict, literal construction,
it might be held that a foreign corporation was not entitled to
the benefit of the limitation. Still the courts will not permit
the literalism of the statute to thwart its obvious purpose, in-
tent, and meaning. A thing may be within the letter of the
statute, yet not within its operation if not so intended: Taylor
V. McGill, 6 Lea, 294.
We think the true rule is laid down in Murfree on Foreign
•Corporations, and that the rule as thus laid down is based on
sound reason and principle. In speaking of such foreign corpo-
ration pleading the ^^^ statute of limitations, it is said (Mur-
free on Foreign Corporations, sec. 248): "As to the question
whether a foreign corporation, when sued, can plead the bar of
the statute in defense, it may be said that the great weight of
Authority is in favor of the conclusion suggested above; that the
true test of the running of the statute is the liability of the party
invoking its bar to the service of process during the whole of the
period prescribed; that if the operations of the company within
the jurisdiction were such as to render it liable to suit, then it
may plead the statute. The principles upon which this doctrine
rests have nowhere been more effectively expressed than in the
decision of the Illinois appellate court, in Pennsylvania Co. v.
Sloan, 1 111. App. 364. Said Pleasants, J., who delivered the
opinion of the court, after referring to a number of cases holding
that a corporation must be considered an inhabitant of the state
lay which it is created: *We should have no hesitation in approY-
664 TuRCOTT V. Railroad. [Tenn^
ing these applications of the doctrine if there were no other ele-
ment in the cases bearing on the question than the origin and
nature of the corporation. For it is true that a positive law can
never, of its own force, and ordinarily does not otherwise, operate
beyond the territorial limits of the power by which it is en-
acted; and, hence, unless It is otherwise enabled, a corporation
must indeed dwell in the place of its creation, and cannot
migrate into another sovereignty. But the law of one state
may have operation for certain purposes in another by the
comity }^^ or permission of the latter, and we see no insuper-
able difficulty in the way of such migration, provided the former
does not positively forbid and the latter does positively consent.
It is conceded that, with such consent, they lawfidly may, as
they often actually do, remove their officers, agents, offices, and
effects into another sovereignty, and there exercise their func-
tions and franchises. In such a case, where is the corporation?
If it be said that it still dwells in the place of its creation, and is-
acting elsewhere only by agents, the answer is no more by agents
elsewhere than in the place of its creation. It can do nothing
an3rwhere, nor manifest its presence or being at all, except
through its agents, its property, or its operation. Where these
are, then, it seems most accordant with substantial fact and rea-
son to say, there is the corporation. Where these are not, we
know of no means by which process can be served upon it; and
if there be none, that fact would seem to be conclusive upon the
question of residence for the time being, at least for purposes of
judicial jurisdiction.' "
In Montana, it was held that the fact that a foreign company
had subjected itself to a penalty by failing to file its charter or
act of incorporation as required by the statute, though such fail-
ure did not disqualify it from being sued, did not thereby lose
the right to plead the statute: See King v. National etc. Co., 4
Mont. 1.
In support of the text, the author cites the following *<*® au-
thorities: Bank of U. S. v. McKenzie, 2 Brock, 393. Compare
Clarke v. Bank of Mississippi, 10 Ark. 516, 52 Am. Dec. 248;
Holy Trinity Church v. United States, 143 U. S. 457; Huss v.
Central R. R. etc. Co., 66 Ala. 472; Lawrence v. Ballon, 50 Cal.
258; Express Co. v. Ware, 20 Wall. 543; Hall v. Vermont etc.
R. R. Co.,|28 Vt. 401; Pennsylvania Co. v. Sloan, 1 111. App.
364; King v. National etc. Co., 4 Mont. 1; Connecticut Mut.
Life Ins. Co. v. Duerson, 28 Gratt. 630; Wall v. Chicago R. R.
Co., 69 Iowa, 498; McCabe v. Illinois Cent. R. R. Co., 4 McCrary,.
May, 1898.] Turcott v. Railroad. 665
492, 13 Fed. Rep. 827. See, also, Winney v. Sandwich Mfg. Co.,
(Iowa, Dec. 17, 1891), 50 K W. Rep. 565; Koons v. Chicago etc.
Ry. Co., 23 Iowa, 493. Compare Abell v. Penn. Mut. Ins. Co.,
18 W. Va. 400; North Missouri R. R. Co. v. Akers, 4 Kan. *453,
96 Am. Dec. 183; Waterman v. Sprague Mfg. Co., 55 Conn. 654;
New York Cent. R. R. v. Estill, 147 U. S. 608.
We are aware that New York, Nevada, Kansas, and possibly
other states, do not follow this rule. It is said that such hold-
ing raises a discrimination against individuals and in favor of
corporations. The argument is, that individuals cannot claim
the exemption when they are out of the state or are nonresidents,
and it would be inequitable to allow corporations out of the state
or nonresidents to claim it. But this apparent difference arises
out of the fact that individuals out of the state or residing out
**** of it, cannot be reached by process against a resident agent,
while a corporation can; so that in the one case suit cannot be
brought and in the other it may. Absence from the state, and
residence out of the state, in the sense of the statute, means
Buch absence and such nonresidence as renders it impracticable
at all times to obtain service of process, so that, while a corpora-
tion's technical legal residence may be where it was created, its
residence and status, for purposes of suit, will be where it can,
through its officers and agents, be reached with process. While
a corporation may reside beyond the state, and be out of the
state, still it may, through its officers and agents, subject itself
to the jurisdiction of the courts of the state. It may sue and
be sued in a jurisdiction foreign to its technical residence.
Nor do we think the failure to comply with the act of 1891,
chapter 122, will preclude this foreign corporation from setting
up the statute. •
It would not be a proper construction of that statute to hold
that a corporation actually doing business in the state without
complying with the statute could not be sued for a tort commit-
ted, and, having been impleaded upon the ground of tort, it can-
not be that the failure to comply with that statute must pre-
clude it from making any defense, for it logically follows that
if it cannot make this defense because of its failure, it can
make no other.
The scope and purpose of that act was to require corporations
to file and register their charters, **^ in order that they might
do business, own or acquire property, and be enabled to sue, but
it was never intended to exempt them from suit if they disre-
garded the statute, nor to estop them from making defense if so
666 Brown v. Electric Ry. Co. [Tenn.
sued; otherwise their property might he taken from them, and
they estopped to defend. This company was in the state own-
ing property and doing business before the act was passed, and
while this did not exempt it from a compliance with the act, m
order that it might have all the rights of a domestic corporation,
at the same time it was not the purpose nor the proper con-
struction of that act that its property should he taken from it,
or its right to defend actions brought against it should be cut
off by its failure to comply with it.
Let the judgment be affirmed with costs.
LIMITATIONS OF ACTIONS— ABSENCE FROM STATE-
CORPORATIONS.— A foreign corporation is a "person" within the
meaning of tJie exceptions in the statute of limitations as to per-
sons absent from the state: North Missouri R. R. Co. v. Akeis, 4
Kan. 453, 96 Am. Dec. 183; monographic note to Moore v. Arm-
strong, 36 Am. Dec. 73. Contra, Clarlie v. Bank of Mississippi, 10
Ark. 516, 52 Am. Dec. 248, but see the note thereto.
CORPORATIONS— RESIDENCE.— A corporation can have but
■one legal residence, and that must be within the state or sovereignty
creating it: Ireland v. Globe Milling etc. Co., 19 R. 1. 180, 61 Am.
St. Rep. 756, and note; Duke v. Taylor, 37 Fla. 64, 53 Am. St. Rep.
232.
CORPORATIONS— FOREIGN — FILING OF CHARTER.— The
"failure of a foreign corporation engaged in business in the state to
<?omply with its law by filing a copy of its articles of incorpora-
tion and the certificate of the appointment of an agent authorized
to accept service of process cannot be taken advantage of by the
■corporation. In such case, valid service of process may be made
upon its managing agent: Foster v. Betcher Lumber Co., 5 S. Dak.
67, 49 Am. St. Rep. 869.
Beqwn V. Eleotrio Eailway Company.
[101 Tennessee 252.]
NEGLIGENCE— ACTION FOR DEATH OF HUSBAND—
RI2LEASE BY HUSBAND.— A settlement and adjustment of a claim
for personal injuries made by a deceased husband in his lifetime
bars an action by his widow for his death resulting from such in-
juries.
MASTER AND SERVANT— ASSUMPTION OF RISK.— Dan-
ger from a bank or wall of earth falling is one open to common ob-
servation, and a servant engaged In excavating a ditch who, know-
ing that he is exposed to such danger, continues to work, assumes
the risks and is not entitled to recover for injuries sustained.
Case & Case, for the appellant.
Brown & Spurlock, for the appellee.
Sept. 1898.] Bbown v. Electric Ry. Co. 667
**^ WILKES, J. This is an action for personal injuries, re-
eulting in the death of plaintiff's husband, Andrew Brown.
Defendant introduced no evidence, hut demurred to that of
plaintiff, which was sustained by the trial judge and the suit dis-
missed, and the plaintiff has appealed and assigned errors.
The defendant, as one of his pleas, stated that the matter of
damages arising out of this accident was compromised and set-
tled with the deceased in his lifetime.
There was a replication to this plea, among other things, to
the effect that this settlement was before the husband died, and
before the plaintiff's right of action accrued, and was no bar to
it. The court on motion, struck out this part of the replication,
and this is assigned as error. There was no testimony on this
feature of the case, and, under the shape it has assumed, it is not
material to be considered. It may be said, however, that it was
not error to strike out the replication, since if there had been a
settlement and adjustment made by the deceased in his lifetime
of his claim for damages, it would bar any subsequent action by
the widow. Of course, the good faith and binding effect of such
settlement could be put in issue as was done, but that also be-
comes immaterial under the demurrer, which raises and relies
solely upon the theory that there was no cause of action to any-
one arising out of the accident.
The facts as disclosed by plaintiff's proof are **^ that her hus-
band was an illiterate negro, an ordinary laborer, but there is no
proof that he was weak-minded or imbecile. He was employed
with another to dig and uncover an escape pipe at or near the
defendant's power-house, in an alley between the power-house
and a frame house on the east of it. This alley was some ten
feet wide. The ditch started in at a depth of three or four feet
at the north, and deepened to seven feet or more at the edge of
Seventh street. Beneath the surface the dirt to be excavated
was loose for some distance and then there was clay, and it was
thrown out, as excavated, on the east side of the ditch, next to
the power building. There was a ledge of about three feet on
which the dirt was banked up. There were no stays across or
along the ditch, and no protection from its falling in or caving
in.
It did fall in on Andrew Brown, while he was excavating at a
a place where it was about six feet deep, and crushed him so that
he died. An expert engineer, Fritzwater, had charge of the
work, and Brown was working under his directions and obeying
668 Brown v. Electric Ry. Co. [Tenn..
his orders. After the accident defendant took precautions to
avoid further caving. The pipes were rusted.
It is insisted that this is not a case where the employe has full
knowledge of the danger and assumes the risk; that he was an
ignorant negro, and could not be presumed to know his danger
from the character of the soil, which was filled in with cinders
^^'^ and debris, nor that* the banking of the dirt upon the narrow
ledge woidd cause it to cave in; and that all these facts and the
danger consequent on them were well known to the engineer and
not communicated to the employe; that it was the duty of the
employer to furnish a safe place to work in; that the work was
done under the immediate supervision of the engineer who was
present; that stays and supports for the excavation should have
been provided and used; and that the evidence should have gone
to the jury, especially iu view of the ignorance of the deceased,
as to whether he knew of the danger. The right of recovery is
resisted on the idea that the danger, if any, was patent; that it
could be appreciated and known by the weakest intelligence, and
that the deceased, when he undertook the work, assumed the
risks incident to it.
If the plaintiff in this case was aware of the danger attending
his work, or it was so obvious and apparent that a man of ordin-
ary intelligence would have seen it, then he must be held to have
taken its risks and hazards, and would not be entitled to recover:
Bailey's Personal Injuries, sees. 501, 502a, 796, 796a.
The witnesses state that the loose character of the soil and the
banks was apparent, and the danger of their caving in must have
been obvious to the most ordinary intelligence and to a common
laborer. The witness, McCabe, says that it could be seen as you
went down into the ground that it was ^"^ made earth, and any
man of ordinary sense could see the kind of soil it was; that it
was priacipally filled in with cinders, which was loose stuff, and
the person who was digging could tell this better than anyone
else. The witness, Gass, states substantially to the same effect,
and says that any man of ordinary sense could tell whether he
was digging through cinders or clay. It clearly appears, there-
fore, that the deceased knew the danger to which he was exposed,
and continued to work, and in such cases he must be held to have
assumed the risks, and is not entitled to recover for injuries sus-
tained.
Danger from a bank or wall of earth falling is one open to
common observation, and is a risk assumed by anyone walking
thereon: Olson v. McMullen, 34 Minn. 95; Pederson v. Eush-
Sept. 1898.] Beown t;. Elkctric Ry. Co. 669
ford, 41 Minn. 290; Swanson v. Great Northern Ry. Co., 68
Minn. 184; Loughlin v. State, 105 N. Y. 159; Del Sejnore v.
Hallinan, 153 N. Y. 274; Evans v. Council Bluffs, 65 Iowa, 238;
Kranz v. Long Island Ry. Co., 123 N. Y. 5; Hughes v. Maiden
€tc. Gas Light Co., 1G8 Mass. 396.
Let the judgment of the court below be affirmed with costs.
NEGLIGENCE-ACrriON FOR DEATH-RELEASE.— If a stat-
ute makes the killing of a passenger of a railway corporation
through gross negligence punishable by a penalty payable to a
widow and children or next of kin, such passenger cannot release
the corporation from liability, and therefore his agreement to do so
cannot bar an action brought for his death by an administrator for
the benefit of the persons entitled to the penalty: Doyle v. Fltch-
burg R. R. Co., 162 Mass. 66, 44 Am. St. Rep. 335. A sued B for
assault and battery, and the suit was settled and dismissed. A died
a few days afterward from the effects of the assault. Held, that
A's widow was not barred of her action against B, under the stat-
ute, for damages for the killing: Donahue v. Drexler, 82 Ky. 157,
56 Am. Rep. 886.
MASTER AND SERVANT— ASSUMPTION OF RISKS.— If de-
fects complained of are as open and obvious to the servant as they
are to the master, the servant cannot recover for an Injury aris-
ing therefrom: Louisville etc. R. R. Co. v. Stutts, 105 Ala. 368, 53
Am. St. Rep. 127; Borden v. Daisy etc. Co., 98 Wis. 407, 67 Am. St.
Hep. 816, and note. When a servant does not assume obvious
risks: Maitland v. Gilbert Paper Co., 97 Wis. 476, 65 Am. St Rep.
137, and note.
Of Actions for the Death of a Human Being:.*
The proper limits of a note of this character are quite inadequate
to the treatment of all the questions which have arisen In actions
brought to recover damages for the death of another. The single
matter of the measure and elements of damages In such actions Is
in Itself a large subject, and, as It Is discussed in a monographic
note to Louisville etc. Ry. Co. v. Goodykoontz, 12 Am. St Rep. 375-
383, we shall not consider it herein. We shall also exclude from
our discussion cases arising under civil damages acts passed In
many states, giving to persons suffering through the intoxication
of others, an action for damages against persons furnishing liquor
to those through whose Intoxication the suffering resulted. Our
subject might easily be allowed to lap over the law of negligence
as well as that of master and servant, but we shall endeavor to
avoid such a result by omitting unnecessary excursions Into related
legal domains and by confining our attention to the mere right of ac-
tion for the death of another, and to matters of practice and pro-
ceedings In the enforcement of such right.
The Right of Action is Statutory.— Actio personalis moritur cum
persona is an Important maxim of the common law. Under It the
•BKFKEKNCB to MONOOftAPHIC NOTES.
Action for wrongful act causing^ death in another state: 14 Am. St. Rep. 85S-855.
Elements and measure of damages in actions for death: 12 Am. 8t. Rep. S76-S8S.
Actions for injuries resulting in death: 4» Am. Dec. 632-641; 37 Am. Rep. 716-719.
670 Brown v. Electric Ry. Co. [Tenn,
right of recovery for injury resulting in deatli abates witli tho-
death of the person injured. It must be regarded as a propositiort
no longer open to question, though sometimes criticised and, less
frequently, dissented from, that at common law no right of civil
action for death was recognized or existed, and that such right of
action, as it is known today, rests purely in statutory enactments:
Kahl V. Memphis etc. R. R. Co., 95 Ala. 337; Kramer v. Market
Street R. R. Co., 25 Cal. 434; Kelly v. Union Pac. Ry. Co., 16 CaL
455; Hindry v. Holt, 24 Colo. 464, 65 Am. St. Rep. 235; Connecticut
Ins. Co. V. New York etc. R. R. Co., 25 Conn. 265, 65 Am. Dec. 571;
Western etc. R. R. Co., v. Strong, 52 Ga. 461; Shields v. Yonge, 15
Ga. 349, 60 Am. Dec. 698; Chicago etc. R. R. Co. v. Schroeder, 18 IlL
App. 328; Long v. Morrison, 14 Ind. 595, 77 Am. Dec. 72; Jackson
V. Pittsburgh etc. Ry. Co., 140 Ind. 241, 49 Am. St. Rep. 192; Conner^
V. Burlington etc. Ry. Co., 71 Iowa, 490, 60 Am. Rep. 814; Dwyer
V. Chicago etc. Ry. Co., 84 Iowa, 479, 35 Am. St. Rep. 322; Eureka
V. Merrifield, 53 Kan. 794; Winnegar v. Central Passenger Ry. Co.,
85 Ky. 547; Hubgh v. New Orleans R. R. Co., 6 La. Ann. 495, 54
Am. Dec. 565; Hermann v. New Orleans etc. R. R. Co., 11 La. Ann.
5; Van Amburg v. Vicksburg etc. R. R. Co., 37 La. Ann. 650, 55
Am. Rep. 517; State v. Grand Trunk Ry., 58 Me. 176, 4 Am. Rep.
258: Carey v. Berkshire R. R. Co., 1 Cush. 475, 48 Am. Dec. 616;
Richardson v. New York Cent. R. R. Co., 98 Mass. 85; Hyatt v.
Adams, 16 Mich. 180; Amos v. Mobile etc. R. R. Co., 63 Miss. 509;
State v. Manchester etc. R. R., 52 N. H. 528; Corliss v. Worcester
etc. R. R. 63 N. H. 404; Grosso v. Delaware etc. R. R. Co., 50 N.
J. L. 317; Myers v. Holborn, 58 N. J. L. 193, 55 Am. St. Rep. 606;
Whitford v. Panama R. R. Co., 23 N. Y. 465; Lucas v. New lork
Cent. R. R. Co., 21 Barb. 245; Woodard v. Michigan Southern etc.
R. R. Co., 10 Ohio St. 121; Pennsylvania R. R. Co. v. Adams, 55
Pa. St. 499; Usher v. West Jersey R. R. Co., 126 Pa. St 206, 12
Am. St. Rep. 863; Gulf etc. Ry. Co. v. Beall, 91 Tex. 310, 66 Am. St.
Rep. 892; Edgar v. Castello, 14 S. C. 20, 37 Am. Rep. 714; Thomas v.
Union Pac. R. R. Co., 1 Utah, 232; Needham v. Grand Trunk Ry. Co.»
88 Vt. 294; Insurance Co. v. Brame, 95 U. S. 754; Armstrong v»
Beadle, 5 Saw. 484; Sullivan v. Union Pac. R. R. Co., 1 McCrary^
801, 2 Fed. Rep. 447.
Perhaps the only well-considered American dissent from thi»
proposition is the opinion delivered by Dillon, O. J., In Sullivan v.
Union Pac. R. R. Co., 3 Dill. 334, in which that learned jurist de-
nies the binding authority of Lord Ellenborough's statement ia
Baker v. Bolton, 1 Camp. 493, that "In a civil court, the death of a
human being cannot be complained of as an Injury." Judge Dillon
points out that, since Baker v. Bolton, 1 Camp. 493, was determined
in 1808, the decision therein Is not binding upon the courts of this
country as part of the common law. Considering the matter thus.
Judge Dillon dissented from the proposition to which we have just
cited authorities, so far as It applied to the case In band. But hi»
decision has since been reversed and robbed of its claim to authority
Sept. 1898.] Brown v. Electric Ry. Co. 671
by later federal decisions cited above. In Holmes v. O. & C. Ry.
Co., 5 Fed. Rep. 75, Deady, D. J. said: "It Is admitted that it came^
to be the rule at common law that an action will not lie to recover
damages for the death of a human being. The maxim, actio per-
sonalis moritur cum persona, was held to apply. It is also admitted
that the weight of authority in this country is with the Englisl>
rule. But It Is not admitted that the rule is founded in reason or 1^
consonant with Justice": See The Garland, 5 Fed. Rep. 924. So la
Van Amburg v. Vlclcsburg etc. R. R. Co., 3T La. Ann. 650, 55 Am.
Rep. 517, the common-law rule is adverted to in this wise: "Legis-
lation and jurisprudence have combined to perpetuate the extra-
ordinary doctrine that the life of a free man cannot be made the-
subject of valuation, and under the domination of that dogmatic
utterance, made earlier than the Roman Digest, reproduced therein^
and echoed by the courts of all countries from then till now, tho-
singular spectacle has been witnessed of courts sanctioning dam-
ages for short-lived pains, and refusing them for a life-long sorrow
and the pecuniary losses consequent upon the death of one from,
whom was derived support, comfort, and even the necessary stays-
of life. Legislation has at last come to the relief of future suf-
ferers." So in Gulf etc. Ry. Co. v. Beall, 91 Tex. blO, 66 Am. St. Rep.
892, the court considers itself bound by the rule stated In the
preceding paragraph, though "none of the reasons assigned therefor-
seem entirely satisfactory," and "the reason for the original adop-
tion of the rule .... is involved in doubt and obscurity.^' And In
Maney v. Chicago etc. R. R. Co., 49 111. App. 105, the rule Is criticised
as allowing "a glaring absurdity in allowing a husband and father, if
injured, but not killed, a right of action for the recovery of damages-
thus sustained, and denying to his widow and children any compen-
sation for damages inflicted upon them should the Injury be greater
and result in his death."
That there is justice in some of these criticisms cannot be denied.
In considering any proposition of law, the reasons upon which it
is based cannot be overlooked. But it Is of greater importance to-
lawyers to know what the law Is than to know why It Is what It
Is. That a proposition of law, though firmly established by au-
thority, is not based upon reason, Is a matter worthy of knowledge,
because prophetic of the disappearance of the proposition from the
body of the law, but should not lead one Into mistake as to what
the law is. Various reasons have been suggested for the common-
law rule aside from the maxim that personal injuries die with the-
person. It has been said that by death the civil injury merges in
the felony, but It Is manifest that In the bulk of instances of
death from injuries no felony is constituted. In Hyatt v. Adams,
16 Mich. 180, the court, per Christiancy, J., enters into a lengthy
discussion of the reason of the rule in question, reaching the con-
clusion "that the reason of the rule Is to be found In that natural
and almost universal repugnance among enlightened nations to set-
ting a price upon human life, or any attempt to estimate Its value-
by a pecuniary standard, a repugnance which seems to have beeik
€72 Brown v. Electric Ry. Co. [Tenn.
strong and prevalent among nations in proportion as they have
been or become more enlightened and refined, and especially so
where the Christian religion has exercised its most beneflcient in-
fluence and where human life has been held most sacred." The
statutes passed quite generally in America are looked upon by the
able justice as necessary concessions to the needs created by
modern developments in modes of travel and business— concessions
not unmixed with some incidental evils. "And it will be fortunate
in the future," he concludes, "if it shall be found that habituating
the public mind to the idea of pecuniary compensation for human
life has not tended to wealien its safeguards, and to render it less
sacred in popular estimation." For our own part we see little
menace in this, certainly much less than we should see in a state
of the law which encouraged negligent destruction of human life
by providing no remedy therefor except where a felony was con-
stituted.
Statutory Enactment and Construction.— Both In England and
throughout the United States, statutes have been enacted abrogat-
ing the common-law rule which refused to allow the maintenance
of an action against one who by wrongful act, neglect, or default,
caused the death of another. The English statute (9 & 10 Vict.,
c. 93) was passed in 184G, and, being the earliest of this class of
statutes, has served as a model for subsequent legislation directed .
toward the same end. It is commonly referred to as Lord Camp-
bell's act. These statutes, being in abrogation of the common law,
are strictly construed. The slightest variation in verbiage between
two statutes may be of great importance in its effect upon the
decisions thereunder. So it is well settled that only those persons
named in the statute as proper parties plaintiff may sue: Wilson v.
Bumstead, 12 Neb. 1; Chicago etc. R. R. Co. v. Oyster, Nebraska,
Feb., 1899. The cases which adhere to this almost elementary rule
-derive their especial interest from their construction of various
words and phrases. Where a statute designates the parties who
itoay sue, and provides that the "heir or heirs" of the deceased may
sue, If there is no husband or wife, or if he or she fails to sue within
one year after the death, the words quoted mean "child or child-
ren," and do not include all those entitled to share In the estate
of a person dying Intestate. The right of action Is, therefore,
limited to lineal descendents: Hindry v. Holt, 24 Colo. 464, 65 Am.
St. Rep. 235; Jordan v. Cincinnati etc. R. R. Co., 89 Ky. 40. And
in construing the word "heir" to mean "child or children," It Is held
to Include adult as well as minor children: Pennsylvania R. R. Co.
V. Malla, Kentucky Ct. of App., Feb. 1899. In a similar statute,
"heirs" is held to be restricted to the widow and children of de-
ceased, and does not Include parents or collateral relatives: Noble
V. Seattle, 19 Wash. 133. On the other hand, the words "heirs at
law," as used In the Arkansas statute, are held to be used In con-
tradistinction to devisees and to Include all those entitled to share
In the distribution, under the Arkansas statutes, of the personal
Sept. 1898.] Brown v. Electric Ry. Co. 673
estate of persons dying Intestate: St. Louis etc. Ey. C5o. t. Need-
ham, 10 U. S. App. 339, 52 Fed. Rep. 371.
Where a statute limits the right of action to lineal descendants
of the deceased, his niece cannot sue: Hindry v. Holt, 24 Colo. 464,
«5 Am. St. Hep. 235. Under a statute providing for an action by the
■widow or next of liin of deceased, a widower is not enabled to sue
for the death of his wife, as he is not included In "the next of
kin": Western Union Tel. Co. v. McGill, 57 Fed. Rep. 699; Dickins
V. Railroad Co., 23 N. Y. 158; Drake v. Gilmore, 52 N. Y. 389.
The words "next of kin" are limited in legal meaning, as in com-
mon use, to blood relations, and do not include a husband or a
wife unless accompanied by other words clearly manifesting a
purpose to extend their signification: Haraden v. Larrabee, 113
Mass. 430. Though in Ohio it was held that "next of kin" used in a
statute allowing an action for death included the widower of a de-
ceased woman: Steel v. Kurtz, 28 Ohio St. 191. A statute allow-
ing a wife to sue for the death of her husband does not authorize
the latter to sue for the death of the former: Grosso v. Delaware
etc. R. R, Co., 50 N. J. L. 317; Georgia R. R. etc. Co. v. Wynn, 42
<5a. 331. If a right of action is given to the mother for the death
of a minor child, the father cannot sue: Frazier v. Georgia R. R.
etc. Co., 96 Ga. 785. Where the right of action is given to the
widow by statute, the personal representative cannot sue: Litch-
field Coal Co. V. Taylor, 81 111. 590; and, conversely, the widow
cannot sue under a statute giving a right of action to the personal
representatives of the deceased: Weidner v. Rankin, 26 Ohio St.
522; Holston v. Coal etc. Co., 95 Tenn. 521; Usher v. West Jersey
R. R. Co., 126 Pa. St. 206, 12 Am. St. Rep. 863. SimUarly, under
a statute providlug that actions for the widow and next of kin may
in all cases be brought by the executor or administrator of the de-
ceased, except that where there is a widow only she may sue in
her own name, the father of a deceased minor cannot sue in his
own name as next of kin: Goodwin v. Nickerson, 17 R. I. 478. See,
also, Fitzhenry v. Consolidated Traction Co., N, J. Sup. Ct., Feb.,
1899; Lovell v. De Bardelaben Coal etc. Co., 90 Ala. 13; Eureka v.
Merrifield, 53 Kan. 794; ScheflSer v. Minneapolis etc. Ry. Co., 32
Minn. 125. The words "personal representatives" mean the ad-
ministrator or executor of the deceased, and not the heir or next
of kin: Kramer v. Market Street R. R. Co., 25 Cal. 434; and such
words do not Include parent or child, or husband or wife. Illinois
-Cent. R. R. Co. v. Hunter, 70 Miss. 471; Railroad v. Johnson, 97
Tenn. 667. Where the right of action Is given the distributees of a
deceased person, his personal representatives cannot sue: HuJbert
V. Topeka, 34 Fed. Rep. 510.
Under a statute authorizing a child to recover for the homicide
of a parent, it has no right of action for the homicide of Its step-
father: Marshall v. Macon Sash etc. Co., 103 Ga. 725, 68 Am. St.
Rep. 140. Conversely, a stepfather cannot sue for the death of a
etepchlld: Hennessey v. Bavarian Brewing Co., 145 Mo. 104, 68 Am.
AM, St. Uep., Vol. LXX.-43
674 Beown V, Electkic Ry. Co. [Tenn»
St. Rep. 554. A statute giving to parents the right to recover for
the -wrongful death of a minor child does not include a man who
marries the mother of a bastard child: Thornburg v. American
Strawboard Co., 141 Ind. 443, 50 Am. St. Rep. 334; nor can th*
father or mother of au illegitimate child recover for its death: Mc-
Donald V. Pittsburgh etc. Ry. Co., 144 Ind. 459, 55 Am. St. Rep..
185; Marshall v. Wabash R. R. Co., 46 Fed. Rep. 269. The wont
"child," used in a statute giving an action to a father for the death
of his child, is not equivalent to the word "minor," but is limited
to such as occupy the position of child to a parent and are depen-
dent upon the parent for support. It does not include a minor who
is the head of a family: Pittsburgh etc. Ry. Co. v. Vining, 27 Ind.
513, 92 Am. Dec. 269. "Minor and unmarried," used in a statute,.
cannot be read "minor or unmarried" so as to allow- parents to re-
cover for the death of an adult unmarried son: Isaac v. Denver etc.
R. R. Co., 12 Daly, 340. A statute giving an action for the death
of a "person" does not enable a recovery for the death of a child
whose birth was hastened by an accident to its mother, and whicb"
survived only a few minutes: Dietrich v. Northampton, 138 Mass.
14, 52 Am. Rep. 242; Hawkins v. Front Street etc. R. R. Co., Z
Wash. 592, 28 Am. St. Rep. 72. "Widow or children, husband or
father," does not include a mother so as to enable her to sue for
the death of her minor child: Amos v. Mobile etc. R. R. Co., 63
Miss. 509. It has been held in Texas that a stepfather may repre-
sent his wife's min»r children as nest friend in a suit for damages
for causing the death of their father: International etc. R. R. Co.
V. Kuehn, 70 Tex. 582.
Statutes quite generally aim to give dependent children a right
of action for the death of a parent. "Minor heirs" cannot include
children of age: Huberwald v. Orleans R. R. Co., 50 La. Ann. 477.
Where a statute gave an action for the benefit of "children" of a
person killed through the wrongful act, neglect, or default of
another, a child born after his father's death is entitled to have
an action brought for his benefit: Nelson v. Galveston etc. Ry. Co.,.
78 Tex. 621, 22 Am. St. Rep. 81. Such a child is entitled to partici-
pate In the benefit of a judgment recovered for the negligent kill-
ing of its parent: Texas etc. Ry. Co. v. Robertson, 82 Tex. 657, 27
Am. St. Rep. 629. Whether or not an adult child may recover for
the death of his parent depends in each case upon the wording and-
theory of the statute upon which recovery is sought to be based.
Where the aim of the statute is to afford a remedy only to those
children who are dependent upon their parent for support, an
adult child cannot recover: Mott v. Central R. R., 70 Ga. 680, 48
Am. Rep. 595; St. Louis etc. Ry. Co. v. Johnston, 78 Tex. 536. In
Maryland, it was held that since the statute made no reference to
the age or condition of the parties sought to be benefited, adult
children might sue for the death of a parent: Baltimore etc. R. R.
Co. V. State, 60 Md. 449. And the mere fact that children are adult
and self-supporting does not, in a number of states, necessarily
preclude a recovery by them for pecuniary loss consequent upoa
Sept. 1898.] Brown v. Electric Ry. Co. 675
a parent's death: Lock wood v. New York etc. R. R. Co., 98 N. Y.
523; Schnats v. Philadelphia etc. R. R. Co., 160 Pa. St. G02; Tuteur
V. Chicago etc. R. R. Co., 77 Wis. 505. Minor children may recover
for the homicide of their mother under the Georgia statute au-
thorizing a recovery by "a widow, or, if no widow, a child or
children .... for the homicide of a husband or parent": Atlanta
etc. R, R. Co. V. Venable, G5 Ga. 55; but they have no such right
of action where their father is alive: Scott v. Central Railroad, 77
Ga. 450. Brothers and sisters of a deceased person are not entitled
to sue under a statute authorizing an action for the benefit of
"husband or widow, or lineal descendents or ancestors": Brown v.
Chicago etc. Ry. Co., Wisconsin, Dec, 1898.
Plaintiff Must 'Bring Himself Within Statute.— M.uch of the matter
included in the division of our note just finished might have been
omitted had we been content to rest upon a mere statement of the
rule that only the persons named in the statute may bring an action
for the death of another But a rule so general and absolute in its
terms cannot be understood from a bare statement of it, so we
have shown at Considerable length the various applications of the
rule which our courts have made. The particular thing evinced
by such a recital is, that courts, without exception, apply a rule
of strict construction to statutes giving a right of action for death.
Another proposition, which directly results from this rule of con-
struction, and which Is an essential corollary to the rule that only
the persons named in the statute may sue, is that one seeking to
recover under a statute for the death of a human being must bring
himself clearly within the terms of the statute: McDonald v. Pitts-
burgh etc. Ry. Co., 144 Ind. 459, 55 Am. St. Rep. 185; and that the
burden of proof is upon him to show the existence in fact of the
relationship to the deceased necessary to the maintenance of the
action: Deni v. Pennsylvania R. R. Co., 181 Pa. St. 525, 59 Am.
St. Rep. 676. Thus, in Arkansas the father, if living, must sue
for the death of a minor, and if the mother sues, she must show
affirmatively and positively that the father is dead. A bare allega-
tion that she is a widow is insufficient: St. Louis etc. Ry. Co. v.
Yocum, 34 Ark. 493. Where the statute gives to a father and
mother an action for the death of a "minor and unmarried" child,
a petition failing to allege that the deceased was unmarried does
not state a cause of action: Dulaney v. Missouri Pac. Ry. Co., 21
Mo. App. 597. Compare Barker v. Hannibal etc. R. R. Co., 91 Mo.
86. Generally, where the personal representatives of a deceased
person are authorized to sue only for the benefit of the widow,
children, or next of kin, the existence of such beneficiaries must
be alleged: Holton v. Daly, 106 111. 131; West Chicago etc. R. R. Co.
v. Mabie, 77 111. App. 176; Stewart v. Terre Haute etc. R. R. Co.,
103 Ind. 44; Schwarz v. Judd, 28 Minn. 371; Burlington etc. R. R. Co.
V. Crockett, 17 Neb. 570; Serensen v. Northern Pac. R. R. Co., 45 Fed.
Rep. 407. But such an allegation has been considered unnecessary
because "a collateral fact of this character, the existence of which
in almost all cases is common knowledge, will be presumed: Colum-
676 Beown v. Electric Ry. Co. [Tenn.
bus etc. Ky. Co. v. Bradford, 86 Ala. 574; and, by another court,
on the ground that there is a presumption that every Intestate
leaves next of kin, and the party who wishes to negative the pre-
sumption must aver and prove it: Warner v. Western etc. li. R.
Co., 94 N. C. 250. Wiiere the personal representative is given a
right to sue only for the benefit of certain designated beneficiaries,
the existence of such beneficiaries will scarcely be presumed. The
presumption in favor of the existence of next of liin or heirs can-
not be reasonably stretched to cover such a case. Where the right
of recovery Is regarded as surviving the deceased and as becom-
ing part of the assets of his estate, such right may be enforced
by the personal representative for the benefit of the estate; Stewart
V. Louisville etc. R. R. Co., 83 Ala. 493; and it would seem that
in such a case the presumption of the existence of persons entitled
to share in the estate as distributees would render a direct allega-
tion of that fact unnecessary. This raises another matter relative
to the theory of statutes giving actions for the death of human
beings.
Two Classes of Statutes.— These statutes are divisible Into: 1. Those
which provide merely for the survival in favor of the estate or
designated beneficiaries of the action which the deceased would
have had in his own favor had he survived his injuries: and 2. Those
which create an entirely new cause of action distinct from any
that deceased might have had had he survived. The distinction
between these two classes would be of greater importance to us
were we to take up the matter of measure and elements of dam-
ages, but it has a limited influence upon our subject as we have
defined it. We have already mentioned its pertinency to the mat-
ter of necessary allegations in petitions for relief under the statutes.
If the statute merely provides for the survival of a right of action.
It becomes necessary to determine that the deceased, at the mo-
ment of his death, had a right ojC action based upon his injuries
and 8ufi"erings therefrom. If his death was instantaneous, no period
of suffering Intervening between his injury and his death. It is
plain that under such a statute no action would survive. It would
be paradoxical to say that a deceased person had a right of action
for his own death. It would be difficult. In case of instantaneous
death to determine at what point deceased's cause of action ac-
crued, and also as to what Is meant by the survival of such an
action. But the theory of this class of statutes Is not that they
provide for the survival of a cause of action, but, instead, that
they create a new cause of action which was unknown to the com-
mon law. This is the general rule, although there are exceptions
to it: Schwarz v. Judd, 28 Minn. 371; Munro v. Pacific Coast Dredg-
ing etc. Co., 84 Cal. 515, 18 Am. St. Rep. 248; Brown v. Chicago
etc Ry. Co., Wisconsin, Dec, 1898. See citations under "The right
of action is statutory," supra. Under such statutes the plaintiff
is not regarded as representing the right of action which deceased
would have had, but as suing in his own behalf for damages suf-
fered through the death of the deceased: Morgan y. Southern Tac
Sept. 1898.] Brown v. Electric Ry. Co. 677
Co., 95 Cal. 510, 29 Am. St Rep. 143; Pennsylvania R. R, Co. v.
Vandever, 36 Pa. St. 298; Atchison etc. R. R. Co. v. Brown, 26 Kan.
443; Donaldson v. Mississippi etc. R, R. Co., 18 Iowa, 280, 87 Am.
Dec. 391; Kansas Pac. Ry. Co. v. Miller, 2 Colo. 460; Hyatt v. Adams,
16 Mich. 180; Legg v. Britton, 64 Vt. 652. Though where the aim
of the statute is to simply transmit to survivors the right of action
which deceased would have had had he lived, the plaintiff stands
In the stead of the deceased: Hennessey v. Bavarian Brewing Co.,
145 Mo. 104, 68 Am. St. Rep. 554. In Kansas, the statute permits
actions for injury to the person to survive only when d^ath does
not result from the injury, but occurs from other causes. Where,
however, death results from the injury, a right of action is created
for the benefit of the widow^ and children, or next of kin: Martin
V. Missouri Pac. Ry. Co., 58 Kan. 475.
Instantaneous Death.— There can be no doubt that at common law
no action existed for the instantaneous death of a human being.
Where, however, deceased had an interval of conscious suffering,
it has been held that his right of action survives for the benefit
of his estate: Clare v. New York etc. R. R. Co., 172 Mass. 211;
Wlnuogar v. Central Passenger Ry. Co., 85 Ky. 547. Compare
Kelley v. Union Pac. Ry. Co., 16 Colo. 455. Where Injuries to a
child resulted in death, but not Instantaneously, it was held that
at common law the surviving mother might sue for the loss of
the child's services and expenses incurred for medical attention,
care, and nursing: Natchez etc. R. R. Co. v. Cook, 63 Miss. 38;
.Tackson v. Pittsburgh etc. Ry. Co.^ 140 Ind. 241, 49 Am. St Rep.
192. Since the general theory of American statutes on this subject
is, as we have said, that the action thereby newly created is en-
tirely distinct from any action which the deceased might have had
had he lived. It logically follows that the newly created action is
not barred by the fact that the death of the deceased was instan-
taneous: Connors v. Burlington etc. Ry. Co., 71 Iowa, 490, 60 Am.
Rep. 814; Worden v. Humeston etc. Ry. Co., 72 Iowa, 201; Givens
V. Kentucky Cent. Ry. Co., 89 Ky. 231; Daly v. New Jersey Steel
etc. Co., 155 Mass. 1; Reed v. Northeastern R. R. Co., 37 S. C. 42;
Nashville etc. R. R. Co. v. Prince, 2 Heisk. 580, announcing a dif-
ferent rule from that adhered to in Louisville etc. R. R. Co. v.
Burke, 6 Cold. 45; International etc. R. R. Co. v. Kindred, 57 Tex.
491. We find it declared that to entitle an administrator to sue
under the Vermont statute it is not necessary that death should
have resulted instantly from the injury complained of: Boyden v.
Fitchburg R. R. Co., 70 Vt. 125; and that the remedies provided by
the Maine statute are limited to cases where the injured person dies
immediately: Sawyer v. Perry, 88 Me. 42. Where a statute was
designed to cause to survive to the personal representative any
right of personal action which the deceased might have commenced
or prosecuted if living, it was logically held that an administrator
could not sue for injuries causing the death of his intestate If the
death was Instantaneous: Illinois Cent. R. R. Co. v. Pendergrass, 69
Miss. 425; McVey v. Illinois Cent. R, R. Co., 73 Miss. 487; Beldlng
678 Brown v. Electric Ry. Co. [Tenn.
V. Black Hills etc. R. R. Co., 3 S. Dak. 369. Compare Dlmmey v.
Railroad Co., 27 W. Va. 32; 55 Am. Rep. 292.
Proper and Necessary Parties— Joinder. — We have already said that
actions for death can be maintained only by the persons named in
statutes as beneficiaries, and that, as a condition precedent to a
recovery, a plaintiff must bring himself within the statute under
which he sues. The discussion of these propositions is in point to
the question. Who are proper parties? In Indiana, a father cannot
maintain an action as Administrator of his deceased minor son,
unless there has been an emancipation of the infant: Berry v. Louis-
ville etc. R. R. Co., 128 Ind. 484; though under the Indiana statutes
the father has a right to recover for the injury or death of his
child: Baltimore etc. Ry. Co. v. Bradford, 20 Ind. App. 348, 67 Am.
St. Rep. 252. It is indispensable that the plaintiff sue in the proper
capacity. Under the Illinois statute, a father may sue as adminis-
trator for the death of his minor child: Chicago v. Major, 18 111.
349, 68 Am. Dec. 553. The question as to who are necessary and
proper parties depends entirely upon the particular statute under
which suit is brought. The statutes of the different states, though
modelled from Lord Campbell's Act, vary sufficiently in their
terms to render it almost impossible anywhere in our subject to
indulge in the statement of general propositions. It becomes, then,
the first duty of the practitioner to consult the statute upon which
he relies, for the rule of law that remedial statutes, though in
abrogation of the common law, must be liberally construed to
accomplish the end desired, has not been much observed in the
interpretation of statutes giving an action for the death of a human
being. On one hand it is held that where a right of action is given
to the heirs at law of a deceased person for the benefit of the widow
and next of kin, all the heirs at law are indispensable parties to the
maintenance of the action: St. Louis etc. Ry. Co. v. Needham,52 Fed.
Rep. 371, 10 U. S. App. 339. On another hand a widow Is allowed to
bring suit for herself, and also for the use of her husband's parents
without their knowledge or consent: San Antonio etc. Ry. Co. v. Ren-
ken, 15 Tex. Civ. App. 229. Compare East Line etc. Ry. Co. v. Cul-
berson, 68 Tex. 664. Under the Pennsylvania statute, the widow in
such case has the sole right of action: Lehigh Iron Co. v. Rupp, 100
Pa. St. 95. In Tennessee, children are unnecessary parties to a suit
brought by the widow or administrator: Collins v. Bast Tennessee
etc. R. R. Co., 9 Heisk. 841. Generally, where an action is given
to the father and mother, as parents, for the death Of a minor child.
It Is not necessary that they be joined as parties plaintiff. Either
may sue alone: Pierce v. Conners, 20 Colo. 178, 46 Am. St. Rep.
279; but there Is no impropriety In their suing jointly: Texas etc.
Ry. Co. V. Hall, 83 Tex. 675. A married woman deserted by her
husband may maintain an acflon In her own name for the death of
a minor child of herself* and husband: Kerr v. Pennsylvania R. R.,
169 Pa. St. 95. Where a statute provides that the "action shall
be for the sole and exclusive benefit of the surviving husband, wife,
children, and parents" of deceased, grandchildren are neither
Sept 1898.] Bbown v. Electeic Ry. Co. 679
necessary nor proper parties to the suit; Dallas Rapid Transit Ry.
Co. V. Elliott, 7 Tex. OIv. App. 216. Where a widow sues for the
death of her husband, there Is no misjoinder of parties plaintiff If
Bhe sues Individually and as guardian of a minor child, the Issue
of her marriage with deceased: Helm v. O'Rourke, 46 La. Ann. 178.
Dependency and Expectation of Benefits. — In Georgia, a mother or
father cannot recover under the statute for the death of a child,
unless It be shown that such mother or father was dependent upon
such child for support, and that such deceased child contributed
to the support or maintenance of the mother or father: Clay ▼.
Central R. R. etc. Co., 84 Ga. 345. It Is sufficient that a mother
was partially dependent upon a deceased son, though her husband
also contributed to her support: Daniels v. Savannah etc. Ry. Co.,
86 Ga. 236; Richmond etc. R. R. Co. v. Johnston, 89 Ga. 560;
as where all of a family reside together and labor for their
mutual support, the proceeds of the labor of the minor child
going Into the common stock: Augusta Ry. Co. Y. Glover, 92 Ga.
132; Atlanta etc. Ry. Co. v. Gravitt, 93 Ga. 369, 44 Am. St Rep.
146. Where, however, a son, while serving a term In the peniten-
tiary, was unlawfully killed, but at the time of his death was not
actually contributing to his father's support, the latter could not
recover for the homicide: Smith v. Hatcher, 102 Ga. 158. Where
the deceased for years prior to his death had voluntarily cared
for and supported his aged mother, a minor sister, and a minor
niece, all of whom were without property or means of support, such
support In the past gave them a reasonable expectancy of Its con-
tinuance In the future; and, when coupled with the disabling ad-
vanced age of the mother, and the disabling minority of the others,
and their want of property means, conferred upon them the right
to recover under the statute as "dependents for support": Duval
v. Hunt, 34 Fla. 85. It is not necessary that deceased should have
been legally bound to support the plaintiff, provided there was a
reasonable expectation of support or benefit: Chicago etc. R. R. Co.
V. Branyan, 10 Ind. App. 570; Daly v. New Jersey Steel etc Co.,
155 Mass. 1; Winnt v. International etc. R. R. Co., 74 Tex. 32;
Railroad Co. v. Barron, 6 Wall. 90; Boyden v. Fitchburg R. R. Co.,
70 Vt 125. Under the Colorado statute, it need not appear that
plaintiff was dependent upon the person killed for support: Brennan
V. Molly Gibson etc Milling Co., 44 Fed. Rep. 795. See, also, How-
ard V. Delaware etc. Canal Co., 40 Fed. Rep. 195. Where an action
Is given next of kin for pecuniary damages resulting from the
death of their relative, a reasonable expectation 9 benefit from
deceased had he lived will support an action: Grotenkemper v. Har-
ris, 25 Ohio St 510; Pennsylvania R. R. Co. v. Adams, 55 Pa. St
499. The mere receiving of occasional assistance does not show de-
pendency for support upon the wages of deceased, under the Mas-
sachusetts statute: Hodnett v. Boston etc. R. R. Co., 156 Mass. 86L
Compare Houlihan v. Connecticut River R. R. Co., 164 Mass. 555;
^hnatz V. Philadelphia etc. R. R., 160 Pa. St 602. Under a statute
680 Brown v. Electric Ry. Co. [Tenn^
allowing an action by a child for the death of its parent, the word
"child" includes only those occupying the position of child to a
parent and dependent upon the parent for support. It does not
Include a minor who is the head of a family: Pittsburgh etc. Ry.
Co. V. Vining, 27 Ind. 513, 92 Am. Dec. 269. Nor can parents sue
for the death of a child, free by age or emancipation, who contrib-
uted in no way to their support: Lehigh Iron Co. v. Rupp, 100 Pa..
St 95.
Nature of Injury.— An injury to a person resulting in his death
cannot give to beneficiaries under a statute allowing an action for
such injury any better basis for a recovery than deceased himself
would have had had he survived. It is generally held under stat-
utes modeled from Lord Campbell's act that no actions may be had
thereunder for injuries resulting in death, unless the injury be of
such a nature that deceased himself, had he lived, might have sued
therefor: Spiva v. Osage Coal etc. Co., 88 Mo. 68; Quincy Coal etc.
Co. V. Hood, 77 111. 68; Texas etc. R. R, Co. v. Berry, 67 Tex. 238.
The applications of this rule are various. Thus, it may be stated
that, in such an action brought by a beneficiary under the statute,
all the defenses which would have availed had the action been
brought by deceased are available to the defendant: Ohio etc. R. R.
Co. V. Tindall, 13 Ind. 366, 74 Am. Dec. 259. These defenses In-
clude matters going to the cause of the Injury, the nature of de-
fendant's negligence, contributory negligence on the part of de-
ceased, and matters of defense peculiar to the law of master and
servant, all of which matters fall outside the scope of this note.
In Sheffer v. Railroad Co., 105 U. S. 249, It appeared that deceased
had been injured in a railway collision, and, becoming thereby dis-
ordered in mind and body, after an Interval of eight months com-
mitted suicide. His representatives sued for his death, but ware
denied a recovery, the court relying upon the doctrine of proximate
cause. In Rhode Island, it was held that a statute giving a cause
of action for death "inflicted by the wrongful act of another" does
not embrace the case of mere passive neglect or omission of duty:
Bradbury v. Furlong, 13 R. I. 15, 43 Am. Rep. 1; and, under the
same statute, that no action would lie for the death of a wife
brought about by detaining her from her husband and slandering
him: Neilson v. Brown, 13 R. I. 651, 43 Am. Rep. 58. In the last
case cited, the court concluded thus: "We understand that statute
to give a right of action in those cases In which, at common law,
an action might have been maintained for the Injury from which
death resulted; but death could result from no Injury, unless an
Injury to the IB^eased person, and for such Injury only the deceased
person could have maintained an action. It follows, therefore, that
no action can be maintained under this statute, except In cases
where the deceased person, had he lived, would have had an action.
In this case, the count alleges that the wife was by persuasion
detained from her husband, and tlanderous and false statements
regarding him and her marriage were made to her. It seems clear
that for these acts no action could have been maintained by the
Sept. 1898.] Brown v. Electric Ry. Co. 681
wife or for her use, and therefore the present action must faU." See>
also, Vawter v. Hultz, 112 Mo. 633.
State Statutes in Federal Courts— Marine Tor**.— Actions for death
based upon state statutes, are often brought In federal courts, gen-
erally where death resulted from a marine tort. It was formerly
doubted that admiralty courts were obliged to adhere to the com-
mon-law rule denying actions for death, and held that such an ac-
tion might be brought In admiralty in the absence of statute, but
this doubt has been removed by the federal supreme court, and
statutory authority is now necessary to the maintenance of such
an action in admiralty, as in other courts. A statute of a seaboard
state giving an action for wrongful death will support an actiou
for wrongful death on the high seas within three miles of the state
shore, brought In an admiralty court: In re Humboldt etc. Assn.,
60 Fed. Rep. 428, where, by the state's constitution and laws, her
boundaries extend three miles beyond the seashore: Humboldt Lum-
ber etc. Assn. V. Christopherson, 73 Fed. Rep. 239. Such a statute
will support an action in rem in a federal court of admiralty for
death resulting from negligence on the part of a steamboat navi-
gating a river of the state: The St Nicholas, 49 Fed. Rep. 671. It
was held in that case that it was unnecessary for the state statute
to create a lien upon a vessel for the liability sought to be en-
forced: Compare The Willamette, 59 Fed. Rep. 797; Holmes v. O. &
C. Ry. Co., 5 Fed. Rep. 75. Where there Is no such lien created,
an admiralty court may enforce the liability in personam: The City
of Norwalk, 55 Fed. Rep. 98; but the liability Is not enforceable
by a libel in rem, except where such lien is created: The Corsair,
145 U. S. 335; Welsh v. The North Cambria, 40 Fed. Rep. 655; The
Wydale, 37 Fed. Rep. 716; The Glendale, 81 Fed. Rep. 633. While
a state statute may cover the case of death occurring through negli-
gence upon navigable waters within the state's Jurisdiction (Sherlock
V. Ailing, 93 U. S. 99), it cannot embrace the case of death on the
high seas beyond the territorial limits of the state: Armstrong v.
Beadle, 5 Saw. 484. Compare McDonald v. Mallory, 77 N. Y. 546, 33
Am. Rep. 664, where It was held that the laws of the state to which
a vessel belongs maybe regarded as following her upon the high seas
until she comes within the Jurisdiction of some other government,
and that a state statute giving an action for wrongful death covers
the case of a death from negligence, upon the high seas, on a vessel
hailing from, and registered within, the state. The right to recover
the penal sum of five thousand dollars provided by the Missouri
statute for occasioning death by negligence, unsliillfulness or crimi-
nal Intent, cannot be enforced in a federal court in another state,
the rule applying that penal statutes are only enforceable In the
sovereignty of their creation: Marshall v. Wabash R. R. Co., 46 Fed.
Rep. 269.
Bar or Abatement of Action— Matteis Relating TJiereto.— The right of
action which one spouse is given for the death of the other Is not
affected by his or her remarriage subsequent to such death: Georgia
B. R. etc. Co. V. Garr, 57 Ga. 277, 24 Am. Rep. 492; International
€82 Brown v. Electric Ry. Co. [Tenn.
etc. E. K. Co. V. Kuehn, 70 Tex. 582; Gulf etc. Ry. Co. v. Younger,
90 Tex. 387; Davis v. Guarnieri, 45 Ohio St. 470, 4 Am. St. Rep.
648. This Is upon the ground that "a right of action arises at th<>
time of death to recover just w^hat was lost by it; and that the
loss thus occasioned is none the less, even though the injured party
thereafter acquire, through his ovp^n skill or industry or the charity
-or affection of others, more than he lost": Railway Co. v. Maddry,
■57 Arl£. 306. Where two persons married while slaves, and con-
tinued to live together until after the enactment of a statute con-
firming slave marriages for all civil purposes, then separated, each
marrying another, it was held that the woman still remained tho
lav/ful wife of the first husband and could recover for his wrongful
^death: Thomas v. East Tennessee etc. Ry. Co., 63 Fed. Rep. 420.
Nor is a widow's action for her husband's death barred by the feet
that she married him after he had received the injury which re-
sulted in his death: Gross v. Electric Traction Co., 180 Pa. St. 99.
In Texas, it is held that a wife under a common-law marriage,
and the issue thereunder, are entitled to recover for the death of
the husband and father: Galveston etc. Ry. Co. v. Cody, Tex. Civ.
App., Feb., 1899. The remarriage of a woman, and the assumption
by the husband of the duties of stepfather toward her child, do
not affect her right to sue for the wrongful death of such child:
Hennessey v. Bavarian Brewing Co., 145 Mo. 104, 58 Am. St. Rep.
654. A wife, though living in separation from her husband, is not
prevented from maintaining an action for his death: Dallas etc. Ry.
Co. V. Spielcer, 61 Tex. 427, 48 Am. Rep. 297. This is true although
the separation was for the twelve years preceding his death, during
which time he contributed nothing to the support of his family:
Baltimore etc. R. R. Co. v. Chambers, 81 Md. 371.
Bar or Abatement of Action— Former Recovery.— The usual aim of
statutes creating a right of recovery for wrongful death is to allow
only one action for an injury resulting in death. This, however.
Is not always true, as we shall see, but when it is plain from the
language and intendment of the statute that only one action Is al-
lowed, a suit by one of the beneficiaries named in the statute Is
a bar to any subsequent action by other beneficiaries: Munro v.
Pacific Coast Dredging Co., 84 Cal. 515, 18 Am. St. Rep. 248; Lu-
brano v. Atlantic Mills, 19 R. I. 129; Hartigan v. Southern Pac. Co.,
86 Cal. 142; Beard v. Skeldon, 113 111. 584; Galveston etc. R. R. Co.
V. Le Gierse, 51 Tex. 189; Paschal v. Owen, 77 Tex. 583; St. Louis
«tc. Ry. Co. V. Needham, 10 U. S. App. 339, 52 Fed. Rep. 371; Ewell
T. Chicago etc. Ry. Co., 29 Fed. Rep. 57; Louisville etc. R. R. Co. v.
McElwain, 98 Ky. 700, 56 Am. St. Rep. 385; Legg v. Britton, 64 Vt.
•652. In placing such construction upon the Arkansas statute, San-
born, O. .T., in St. Louis etc. Ry. Co. v. Needham, 10 U. S. App. 339,
52 Fed. Rep. 371, said: "It gives 'an action,' a single action, not
several actions for the wrongful killing. It provides that every
such action must be brought In the name of the personal repre-
sentatives, If there are such; otherwise, by the helrs-at-law.
It will not be gravely Insisted that the personal representatives
Sept. 1898.] Beown v. Electric Ry. Co. 683
could maintain more than a single action, or that, where there
are several administrators, one of them could maintain the ac-
tion without joining all; and It Is equally clear that when the
action is brought by the heirs there must be but a single action,
and all the heirs must be made parties to It, so that the entire
controversy may be determined and the entire amount recovered
and distributed In the single action given by the statute. The
simplicity and effectiveness of such an action, the Inconvenience
and Injustice to the plaintiffs and defendants alike resulting
from any other practice; the rule of distribution of the amount
recovered, based, not upon the Injury to each person entitled
to receive a share, but upon the statute of descents; the settled
rule of law as to parties jointly Interested In a cause of action,
and the plain reading of the statute, compel the conclusion that
«uch was the intention of the legislature." Where, under such a
statute, two actions are begun, one by the personal representative,
the other by the widow, the defendant may elect which he will
defend, and plead the pendency of either In bar of the other: Hen-
derson V. Kentucky Cent. R. K. Co., 86 Ky. 389. Under these stat-
utes, a common-law recovery for suffering of the deceased inter-
vening between his injury and his death bars the statutory action
by beneficiaries: Conner v. Paul, 12 Bush, 144. For contrary hold-
ings, see Clare v. New York etc. R. R. Co., 172 Mass. 211; Nelson
V. Galveston etc. R, R. Co., 78 Tex. 621, 22 Am. St. Rep. 81; Bowea
V. Boston, 155 Mass. 344; Hedrick v. Ilwaco R. R. etc. Co., 4 Wash.
400. Where plaintiff's Intestate was killed, and his horses and
wagon destroyed. In a collision with defendant's train, a suit by
the administrator to recover for the death of his intestate Is not
barred by a former recovery by the same plaintiff of the value of
the horses and wagon: Peake v. Baltimore etc. R. R. Co., 26 Fed.
Rep. 495. But a widow's right of action Is barred by a recovery
of judgment had by her husband for his Injuries: Legg v. Britton,
€4 Vt. 652. See, also, Hecht v. Ohio etc. Ry. Co., 132 Ind. 507.
Bar or Abatement of Action— Compromise or Release.— Vn^ev purely
survival statutes, or those preserving for the benefit of designated
beneficiaries only the right of action which deceased would have
had had he lived, a release or compromise for value executed by
the deceased before his death Is a good defense to an action brought
by the beneficiaries under the statute after his death: Hill v. Penn-
sylvania R. R. Co., 178 Pa. St. 223, 56 Am. St. Rep. 754; Price v.
Railroad Co., 33 S. C. 556, 26 Am. St. Rep. 700; Brown v. Electric
Ry. Co., 101 Tenn. 252; ante, p. 666. Only a minority of our various
statutes, however, belong to the class known as survival statutes..
Where a statute creates a new cause of action, distinct from that
which deceased might have had, a cause of action, not alone for
injuries, but for death, and vests It In designated beneficiaries,
aiming to compensate them for loss through the fact of deceased's
death, a release or compromise by deceased before his death cannot
logically bar an action by the beneficiaries for the death of the
deceased: Hurst v. Detroit City Ry., 84 Mich. 539; Illinois Cent. etc.
R. R. Co. V. Cozby, 69 111. App. 256; Maney v. Chicago etc. R. R.
684 Bbown r. Electric Ry. Co. [Tenn»
Co., 49 111. App. l(^; Pittsburgh etc. R. R. Co. v. Hosea, 152 Ind.
412. Where a statute makes the killing of a passenger of a railway
corporation through gross negligence punishable by a penalty pay-
able to the widow and children or next of kin, such passenger can-
not release the corporation from liability, and therefore his agree-
ment to do so cannot bar an action brought for his death by an
administrator for the benefit of the persons entitled to the penalty:
Doyle V. Fitchburg R. R. Co., 162 Mass. 66, 44 Am. St. Rep. 335.
As has been said above, it Is commonly held that no action for
death can be maintained, except where deceased himself could have
sued had he survived. When the right of action given by statute,
while not simply that which deceased would have had, depends
upon the right of deceased to have sued, it is sometimes held that
a release or compromise by deceased before his death, if sufficient
to have barred his own right of action, bars, also, that of the statu-
tory beneficiaries: Sykora v. Case etc. Machine Co., 59 Minn. 130;
Price V. Railroad Co., 33 S. C. 556, 26 Am. St. Rep. 700.
It is somewhat difficult to combat the logic which leads to such
a conclusion. The rule, however, that no action for wrongful death
is maintainable, except where deceased himself could have sued
had he survived, applies to, as indeed it grew out of, matters per-
taining to the nature and cause of the injury which resulted in
death. Was the negligence or wrongful act of defendant the proxi-
mate cause of the injury? If not, deceased could not have recovered
against him, nor can his successors under the statute. Did de-
ceased's contributory negligence cause the injury? If so, any action
for such injury Is similarly barred. If the relation of master and
servant subsisted between deceased and defendant, was the Injury
resultant from the act or neglect of a fellow-servant, or was it,
for any reason arising out of the rules of master and servant, such
an injury as gave rise to no liability on the part of the defendant?
If this Is answered affirmatively, and in the two cases mentioned
before, no cause of action ever arose which was susceptible of re-
lease or compromise. Where, however, a cause of action does arise,
and the Injured person has a period of suffering and expense, there
seems no reason that he should not be able, while living, to make
an adjustment of his claim with defendant which would bar a
recovery by his beneficiaries after his death upon the same claim.
But the action given under other than survival statutes Is entirely
distinct from the action which deceased had at the moment prior
to his death. It Is an action for damages arising from the mere
fact of death, not damages to the deceased, but damages to his
• successors under the statute. Therefore, we cannot comprehend
the reasoning which enables an Injured person to release a cause
of action which has not accrued, and cannot accrue until his death,
and which then accrues to third persons. It would be necessary
to support such a conclusion that we admit that a person has a
right of action for his own death. A greater degree of absurdity
would not be attained in the enactment of a statute making siilcide
punishable as murder In the first degree.
Sept. 1898.] Beown v. Electric Ry. Co. 685
Where a right of action for death Is vested In the personal repre-
«entatlves of the deceased for the benefit of the widow or children
and next of kin, the personal representative may bind the bene-
ficiaries by a release or compromise of the claim out of court:
Parker v. Providence etc. Steamboat Co., 17 R. I. 376, 33 Am. St
Rep. 8G9; Hartigan v. Southern Pac. Co., 86 Cal. 142. An admin-
istrator's suit for Injuries resulting In his intestate's death, brought
on behalf of the widow and children, cannot be compromised by the
widow alone, without the consent of the administrator or the con-
currence of the other beneficiaries: Railroad- Co. v. AcufP, 92 Tenn.
26; Yelton v. Evans ville etc. R. R. Co., 134 Ind. 414; Do well v.
Burlington etc. Ry. Co., 62 Iowa, 629. Compare South etc. R. R.
<^o. V. Sullivan, 59 Ala. 272. Where the administrator, after insti-
tuting the suit, resigned, and the suit is continued in the name of
the widow for the use and benefit of herself and child, she may
settle the suit as she sees fit, without the consent of the child'.^
guardian: Stephens v. Nashville etc. Ry., 10 Lea, 448. A widow
may compromise and settle the action given to her and the hus-
band'^ next of kin for the husband's death, either before or after
she has Instituted suit, and the other beneficiaries will be bound:
Holder v. Railroad, 92 Tenn. 141, 36 Am. St. Rep. 77; Natchez Cot-
ton Mills Co. V. Mull ins, 67 Miss. 672. But a contrary rule is main-
tained In Southern Pac. Co. v. Tomlinson, 163 U. S. 369; Houston
etc. Ry. Co. v. Bradley, 45 Tex. 171; Galveston etc. R. R. Co. v.
Olerse. 51 Tex. 189. Where a railroad employs entered into a con-
tract with the relief department of the company to the effect that
the acceptance of benefits from such department for Injury or death
€hould operate as a release of all claims against the railroad com-
pany arising from such Injury or death, the acceptance of benefits
from the relief department by his widow, who was the sole bene-
ficiary named in the contract, will not bar a recovery for the wrong-
ful death of the decedent for the use of his child: Pittsburgh etc.
Ry. Co. V. Moore, 152 Ind. 345; Chicago etc. R. R. Co. v. Wymore,
40 Neb. 645. The true rule would appear from all the authorities
to be that one of the beneficiaries cannot, by release, compromise,
or settlement, prejudice the other beneficiaries, or conclude them,
unless the sole right of action is vested In him.
Bar or Abatement of Action— Death^Miscellaneotis.— Where a parent,
entitled to bring an action of tort for the homicide of a son, dies
without having Instituted suit, the right of action does not survive
to the administrator of such parent: Frazler v. Georgia R. R. etc.
Co., 101 Ga. 77. Similarly, an action by a husband for the death
of his wife abates on the death of the husband: Harvey v. Balti-
more etc. R. R, Co., 70 Md. 319. Where a father, having brought
suit for the death of his son, died while the action was pending
nnd before judgment, it was held that his right of action did not
survive to his heirs: Chlvers v. Rogers, 50 La. Ann. 57; Huberwald
V. Orleans R. R. Co., 50 La. Ann. 477. The Texas statutory action
for Injuries resulting in death does not survive against the estate
of the wrongdoer, where no action was commenced against him in
686 BaowN v. Electric Ry. Co. [Tenn.
his lifetime: Jolinson v. Farmer, 89 Tex. 610. This Is In accordance
with the maxim, actio personalis moritur cum persona: Hegerich v.
Keddie, 99 N. Y. 258, 52 Am. Rep. 25; Noe v. Smiley, 125 Pa. St. 136;
Russell V. Sunbury, 37 Ohio St. 372, 41 Am. Rep. 523; Hamilton v.
Jones, 125 Ind. .176; Green v. Thompson, 26 Minn. 500. There can be
no doubt of the correctness of these decisions. Of course, it is by th»>
abrogation of the maxim quoted that actions for death are maintain-
able, speaking broadly, but such abrogation is only with especial
reference to the allowance of such actions. Having been created,
such an action is merely a personal one, subject to the usual rule of
abatement by death of one or both the parties to it. In a number
of states, the survival of this class of actions for the benefit of
successors of the plaintifC against the successors of the defend-
ant is provided for by statute, but in the absence of such en-
actment the usual rules as to abatement apply: Pennsylvania
Co. V. Davis, 4 Ind. App. 51; Johnson v. Farmer, 89 Tex.^
610. Where a person is killed through the wrongful act or
neglect of another, and leaves none of the beneficiaries named in
the statute, the statutory action for his death does not arile. It
cannot be enforced by creditors of the deceased: Railway Co. v.
Lilly, 90 Tenn. 563. The Arkansas statute relating to married
women, providing that their earnings shall be their sole and sep-
arate property, does not divest a husband of the right to his wife's
services, nor, where her death has been caused by negligence, pre-
clude him from recovering for the loss of such services: St. Louis
etc. Ry. Co. v. Henson, 58 Fed. Rep. 531.
Statute of Limitations.— AX common law the rule was that no lia-
bility for murder arose unless deceased died within a year and a day
from the time of his Injury. This limitation, however, does not apply
to actions for death: Louisville etc. R. R. Co. v. Clarke, 152 U. S.
230; Schlichting v. Wintgen, 25 Hun, 626. In perhaps every state
there Is a special statutory limitation as to the time within which
an action for death must be brought. It would not be worth while
here to collate these various provisions, as a practitioner will be
able to examine the statute of his own state. SuflBce It to say that
the period fixed by statute is absolute, and that no delay beyond
such period will be allowed to be explained: Taylor v. Cranberry
Iron etc. Co., 04 N. C. 525; George v. Chicago etc. Ry. Co. 51 Wis.
603. The minority of the plaintiffs does not prevent the running
of the statute: Bledsoe v. Stokes, 1 Baxt. 312; Louisville etc. R. R.
Co. V. Sanders, 86 Ky. 259; Foster v. Yazoo etc. R. R. Co., 72 Miss.
886; though it Is not probable that the statute would be held to run
against a minor, except where there Is some one in existence au-
thorized to sue for his benefit. An administrator's right of action
for the death of a minor begins to run from the time of death:
Murphy v. Chicago etc. Ry. Co., 80 Iowa, 26. It was held that
where a posthumous child Is entitled to recover damages for the
death of Its father, the statute of limitations does not begin to run
against him from the time when the cause of action accrued, merely
because his mother was capable of commencing suit at that time:
Oct. 1898.] Gann v. Railroad. 687
Nelson v. Galveston etc. Ry. Co., 78 Tex. 621, 22 Am. St, Rep. 81.
The time at which the statute of limitations begins to run will
depend generally upon the wording of the particular statute under
which suit is brought The general and reasonable rule is, that It
runs from the time of the death and not from that of the injury:
Hanna v. Je£fersonville R. R. Co., 32 Ind. 113; Louisville etc. R. R.
Co. V. Clarke, 152 U. S. 230; Nestelle v. Northern Pac. R. R. Co.,
66 Fed. Rep. 261. Compare Fowlkes v. Nashville etc. R. R. Co.,
9 Heisk. 829; Rugland v. Anderson, 30 Minn. 386. A declaration ia
an action under the statute for causing the death of a person is suf-
ficient after verdict, where it alleges the time of death, but does not
allege specifically that the action is not barred: Hill v. New Haven,,
87 Vt 601. 88 Am. Dec. 613.
Gann v. Railroad.
[101 Tennessee, 880.]
APPEALr-IMMATERIAL ERROR.— On appeal, the conrt
will not review the action of the lower court in admitting evidence
as part of the res gestae, where the admission or rejection of such
evidence would not aflfect the case or change the result.
RAILROAD COMPANIES— INJURIES TO SERVANTS—
FELLOW-SERVANTS.— While a section foreman and his subordi-
nates generally occupy the position of vice-principal and servants
as to each other, yet such foreman may become the fellow-servant
of his 8ut)ordinates during the performance of work properly that
of a fellow-servant, as by handling the brake on a hand-car used
by the section gang. While engaged in such work the principal is
not liable for injui^es resulting to a meml}er of the section gang
from the foreman's negligence.
RAILROAD COMPANIES— INJURIES TO SERVANTS-
SAFE APPLIANCES— NEGLIGENCE OF SECTION FOREMAN.
In the matter of providing safe appliances for the use of his sub-
ordinates, a section foreman bears to such subordinates the rela-
tion of a vice-principal, and for his negligence In this regard the
company is liable.
RAILROAD COMPANIES— INJURIES TO SERVANTS— AS-
SUMPTION OF RISKS.— A section hand who continues to use a
hand-car, the brake on which he knows to be dangerously defec-
tive, assumes the risk arising from such defect and cannot recover
for injuries resulting therefrom.
W. T. Murray and B. F. Tatiim, for the appellant.
W. D. Spears, for the appellee.
*»i WILKES, J. This is an action for personal injuriea^
tried by the conrt and jury, and resulting in a verdict and judg-
ment for plaintiff for twelve hundred and fifty dollars. The de-
fendant railroad has appealed and assigned errors.
688 Gann v. Railroad. [Tenn.
The first error assigned is to the admission of certain state-
ments made by Cox, immediately after the accident occurred, as
to the cause of it, and how it happened. It is insisted they were
not part of the res gestae, and were, therefore, inadmissible. We
need not pass upon this assignment, as the statements made by
<^ox would not change the result of the case or place it in any
■different light than if they had been rejected.
It is next insisted that the negligence which caused the acci-
-dent in this case was the personal negligence of Cox, and not
official negligence, and that the court not only failed to make
the proper distinction between the two classes of cases, but re-
fused to charge a request which would have pointed out the dif-
ference.
It appears that Cox was a section boss and Gann was a sec-
tion hand under him; that Cox had authority and control over
Gann; that he was subject to his orders; that Cox had the right
to employ and discharge at will, and had complete control of the
section and hands upon it.
^^^ It appears that Cox one evening ordered the section hands
to get on a hand-car, to go to a point on the road known as
*'Eamsey's Bottom," to measure up a lot of old iron. Cox, as
-was his custom, took a position at the brake, for the purpose of
holding it and guiding the movements of the car. Gann and
the other hands, under direction of Cox, operated the propelling
lever which drove the car. The accident occurred on a steep
down grade, and the car was running at about fifteen miles an
hour. The brake was a peculiar one, and appears to have been
-of Cox's own invention. The main insistence is, that Cox neg-
ligently applied, or failed to apply, this brake in such manner as
to suddenly check the car. It appears. that it acted upon a prin-
ciple the reverse of the ordinary brake, and that it was neces-
sary to hold it off, or it would apply itself automatically and im-
mediately stop the car unless held off. The sudden checking
of the car, in consequence of Cox letting the brake loose, forced
the lever down on plaintiff's knee, and drove the leg bone down
into the ankle, permanently injuring the plaintiff. He fell from
the car, and it was at once stopped, and Cox went back to where
he was lying, and, according to the proof of two witnesses
(though contradicted by Cox himself), stated that he did not go
to do it, that his coat was about to get caught in the wheel, and
he reached back for it with his left hand, and that threw him
around so that the brake handle came out from under his right
•*** arm, and the brake went on. This is the statement to which
Oct. 1898.] Gann t;. Railroad. 689
objection was made. There is nothing in it prejudicial to the
defendant in this case upon its theory.
It is insisted that Cox, in operating this brake, was a fellow-
servant with Gann and the other hands, not filling the place of
the master, but, for the time being, in the work and doing the
service of a servant.
The court qharged the jury, in substance, that under the facta
us thus staled Cox and Gann were not fellow-servants, and the
defendant would be liable for Cox's negligence. He was re-
quested to charge, in substance, the reverse of this proposition,
and declined.
It has been held in this state that a section boss and his sub-
ordinates occupy the relation of master and servant as to each
other. It is evident, however, that a man may occupy the posi-
tion of a master or vice-principal in some respects and in the do-
ing of some acts, and that of a fellow-servant in other respects
and in doing other acts. If a superior undertakes to do the work
of a fellow-servant, and puts himself in the place to do the work
of a fellow-servant, he becomes one as to that particular work,
and his negligence in such case is that of a fellow-servant, and
not that of a vice-principal. An individual may act in a dual
•capacity, not, it is true, at the same moment and in the same
act, but he may, while generally acting as vice-principal and
•*®** standing in the place of a mastef, lay aside that character
and authority, and occupy, for the time being, the place and do
the work of a fellow-servant, and while thus engaged in the par-
ticular act he is, in the eye of the law, a fellow-servant, and the
principal is not responsible for his negligence.
This distinction is clearly pointed out in the case of Railroad
•Co. V. Bolton, 99 Tenn. 277, and cases there cited. See, also,
Allen V. Goodwin, 92 Tenn. 385.
The distinction is plainly and forcibly stated in Stockmeyer v.
Reed, 55 Fed. Rep. 259, as follows: "The question is not one of
rank. If the superintendent was acting at the time in the capac-
ity of a fellow-servant, and his negligence caused the injury, the
master is not liable. Notwithstanding his superior power, such
superintendent is still a servant, and, in respect to such acts and
work as properly belongs to a servant to do, he is, while perform-
ing them, discharging the duties of a servant": See the same
case on appeal, Reed v. Stockmeyer, 74 Fed. Rep. 186. The same
distinction is held in Arkansas: Railway Co. v. Torry, 58 Ark.
217, and cases there cited. So, likewise, in Indiana: NaU v,
AM. 8r. Rkp., Vol. LXX.-44
690 Gann v. Railroad. [Tenn^
Louisville etc. E. R. Co., 129 Ind. 264; Taylor v. Evansville etc.
R. R. Co., 121 Ind. 124, 16 Am. St. Rep. 372. New York, Penn^
Bylvania, Michigan, and other states hold the same doctrine:.
Hankins v. New York etc. R. R. Co., 142 N. Y. 416, 40 Am. St.
Rep. 616; Ross v. Walker, 139 Pa. St. 42, 23 Am. St. Rep. 160;.
Harrison v. Detroit etc. R. R. Co., 79 Mich. 385 409^ 19 j^^^ g^^
Rep. 180. And the same doctrine is held in North Dakota, Min-
nesota, Georgia, Oregon, Virginia, Vermont, Kansas, California,.
Massachusetts, "West Virginia, Illinois, South Carolina, Rhode
Island, and other states. The states of Ohio and Missouri maj
be said not to recognize the distinction clearly and fully. And
Texas, under an act of the legislature of that state, defining the-
relation, seems to be undecided, if not antagonistic to the view:.
Texas etc. Ry. Co. v. Reed, 88 Tex. 439; Sweeney v. Gulf etc. Ry.
Co., 84 Tex. 433, 31 Am. St. Rep. 71. See the subject elabo-
rately discussed in volume 47 of the Central Law Journal, of
August 12, 1898, page 130 et seq. See, also, Bailey's Personal
Injuries, sees. 1834, 1972, 2154, 2176, 2535.
The court was asked to charge that if plaintiff was one of a
gang ot laborers at work on the defendant road, and if the gang
was under Cox, as foreman, and if Cox had charge of the brake,
and the injury was brought about through the negligence of Cox
in letting the brake loose and suddenly stopping the car, or
throwing it on and suddenly stopping the car, the negligence
would be the personal negligence of Cox, as distinguished from
his official negligence, and defendant would not be liable; that
in order to charge the defendant, Cox must so far stand in the
place of the master as to be charged in the particular matter
with a duty toward the defendant, which, under the law, tha
master ^®^ owed to him, and his negligence in such case could
not be such an obligation. This was refused, and was, we think,
error. We think the case is almost identical with that of Rail-
road Co. V. Bolton, 99 Tenn. 276, and with that of Northern Pac.
R, R. Co. V. Peterson, 162 U. S. 346. See, also. Northern Pac.
R. R. Co. V. Charless, 162 U. S. 359; Martin v. Atchison etc. R.
R. Co., 166 U. S. 403.
There is a conflict in the evidence as to whether this brake^
was in good and safe condition, and this is material, because,,
even if Cox was doing the work of a fellow-servant in handling^
the brake, and for his negligence in so doing the company would
not be liable, still, if he failed to provide safe and proper appli-
ances, he would, in that matter, be doing the work of his prin-
Oct. 1898.] Gann v. Railroad. G91
cipal, and for his negligence in not providing safe appliances the
company would be responsible, as was held in Railroad Co. v.
Northington, 91 Tenn. 56.
The proof tends to show that the brake was somewhat worn,
so that it did not work as it would if in perfect condition, and
that, in consequence of this wearing, Cox was required to hold it
oflF with his hands all the time, otherwise it would automatically
close upon the wheels, and immediately stop the car. The court
charged the jury that "if the brake was not the kind ordinarily
used in the management of hand-cars, and was not reasonably
safe, and the plaintiff knew its condition, and continued in the
employment of defendant knowing just what this brake was —
that it was defective and not reasonably safe — he could not re-
cover."
^■^ Tbe proof leaves no doubt but that Gann knew the condi-
tion of the brake, whether it was safe or defective, so that we
cannot affirm the judgment upon the ground that the brake was
defective, or was so found by the jury. If they did so find, they
must also have found that plaintiff had full knowledge of its
condition.
It is urged upon us that this view of the law is inconsistent
with the holding of this court in Railroad Co. v. Northington,
91 Tenn. 56, et sequitur. We do not so regard it. In the North-
in gton case the section boss was recognized as the superior, as
he is in this case. His negligence in the Northington case was
that of a vice-principal, and was official. In this case it was
that of a fellow-servant, and was personal. In the Northington
case the section boss caused the gang to push before them a truck
or push-car, containing two dumpbeds or boxes, in moving from
one place to another. Instead of furnishing these dumpbeds
with proper appliances to fasten them together, and thus to
make it safe to push them over the track, there was no way to
fasten them. To remedy this omission, the foreman stood upon
the boxes, with a foot in each, thus attempting to supply the
place of proper fastenings and couplings, which it was his official
duty to provide. In addition, he was directing the movements of
the car, and saw that the dumpbox was slipping, but calculated
that it would not strike the platform, and took the risk of its
^®® doing 80, without giving any warning to the crew. He was
negligent, therefore, in not providing, in the first instance, safe
and proper appliances, and, next, in requiring the car to be run
on after he saw the risk and danger, and without notifying the
Gann v. Railroad. [Tenn,
crew of such danger. There was no evidence in that case that
the foreman was in the habit of thus substituting his feet for a
coupling appliance to hold the cars together, or that the crew
was aware of such practice, in which event they might be held to
have assumed the risk if they did not object (as was charged in
the present case). He was also negligent, while guiding and
directing the movements of the car, in not stopping when he
saw the danger, and in not notifying his crew of such danger,
and in both these negligent acts he was clearly in the line of his
official duty as vice-principal. But, in the case at bar, if the
brake was defective, it had been so for some time, and the fact
was well known to plaintiff. The section boss was giving no
directions and was not controlling the movements of the crew,
but was manipulating the brake personally, which was a servant's
place, and the accident was due to the unintentional, negligent
act of the foreman thus engaged, in allowing the brake to es-
cape his control.
We are of opinion there is error in the judgment of the court
below, and it is reversed and cause remanded for a new trial. Ap-
pellee will pay costs of appeal.
In Electric Railway Co. v. Lawson, 101 Tenn. 406, questions
similar to those decided in the principal case were presented. The
action was for the death of plaintiff's decedent, who was a section
hand, which death resulted from an attempt on his part, In obedi-
ence to an order of the section foreman, to board a moving car.
wnereby he was thrown under the car and killed. The relation
between the section foreman and decedent was in -issue. The court
held that there was no immediate order or sudden emergency shown
such as would justify an attempt to obey an order of a superior
in a hazardous matter. As to the remaining matters— the relation
between the foreman and deceased, and the question of the neg-
ligence of the former— the court adhered to the rule established in
Tennessee that a section boss or track foreman is a vice-principal.
As to whether the foreman's negligence in failing to stop the car
in his charge in order to allow deceased to get on, was personal or
official, it was held to be official. It was his duty "to control the
cars .... and it was also his duty to order the men on and off
the cars. What he did or omitted to do, therefore, If negligent, was
the master's negligence. He was running by there without stop-
ping before or after deceased caught the car, having given orders
to board them while in motion. The jury had the right to find
this was negligence and that It was official."
APPEAL.— HARMLESS ERROR in the admission of evidence Is
no ground for a reversal of the judgment: liockford Ry. Co. v.
Blake, 173 111. 354, 64 Am. St. Rep. 122. A judgment will not be
reversed for the reception of Improper evidence If the same result
must have been reached had such evidence been excluded: Park-
hurst V. Berdell, 110 N. Y. 386, 0 Am. St. Rep. 384. Where evidence
could not produce prejudice, there can be no reversal: Empire Mill
Co. v. Lovell, 77 Iowa, 100, 14 Am. St. Rep. 272.
Nov. 1898.] Weeks v. McNulty. 693
RAILROADS — SECTION FOREMAN— VICE-PRINCIPAL.— A
railway section foreman, havfng power to control, employ, and dis-
charge tlie men under li!m, is a vice-principal, and not a fellow-
servant with them, and the railway company is liable for his neg-
ligent act in throwing baclc an open switch, whereby one of the
men under his control Is injured: Sweeney v. Gulf etc. Ry. C5o., 84
Tex. 433, 31 Am. St. Rep. 71; Sullivan v. Hannibal etc. R. R. Co.,
107 Mo. 66, 28 Am. St. Rep. 388, and note; Bloyd v. St. Louis etc.
Ry. Co., 58 Arlf. 66, 41 Am. St. Rep. 85, and note. Contra, Span-
cake V. Philadelphia etc. R. R. Co., 148 Pa. St. 184, 33 Am. St Rep.
821; Ell V. Northern Pac. R. R. Co., 1 N. Dak. 336, 26 Am. St. Rep.
621, and note; Schroeder v. Flint etc. R. B. Co., 103 "Mich. 213, 50
Am. St. Rep. 354.
RAILROADS— INJURIES TO SERVANTS-ASSUMPTION OF
RISKS.— If a car belonging to a connecting carrier is equipped w^h
double buffers, that fact is open, apparent, and obvious. An ex-
perienced brakeman who attempts to make a coupling with such
car assumes the risks attendant thereon: Chicago etc. R. R. Co. v.
Curtis, 51 Neb. 442, 66 Am. St. Rep. 456; Louisville etc. R. R. Co.
V. Stutts, 105 Ala. 368, 53 Am. St. Rep. 127. Mere knowledge of
a railroad employ^ that an appliance owned by the company is
defective, and that risk is incurred in Its use, does not, as matter of
law, defeat the employS's action when the danger Is not such as
to threaten Immediate Injury, or when it is reasonable to suppose
that the appliance may be safely used by the exercise of care and
caution: Swadley v. Missouri Pac. Ry. Co., 118 Mo. 268, 40 Am.
St. Rep. 366; Soeder v. St I^uls etc Ry. Co., 100 Mo. 673, 18 Ana.
St Rep. 724.
Weeks v. MoNultt.
[101 Tennessee, 495.]
INNKEEPERS— LIABILITY— GENERAL RULE.— The gen-
eral rule of law governing the Jiablllty of an Innkeeper Is, that he
is not an Insurer of the person of his guest against Injury, but his
obligation Is merely to exercise reasonable care that his guests may
not be injured by anything happening through the innkeeper's negli-
gence.
INNKEEPERS— NEGLIGENCE— INJURY. TO GUEST BY
FIRE.— No presumption of negligence on the part of an Innkeeper
arises where a guest loses his life In a fire originating in, and de-
stroying the premises. To make the Innkeeper liable in such a
case It must be shown that his negligence was the proximate cause
of the fire and the consequent Injuries.
APPEAL— REFUSAL TO PERMIT ANSWER TO QUES-
TIONS.—The refusal of the trial court to permit answers to perti-
nent questions affords no cause for reversal, unless the record
shows affirmatively that the answers would have been competent
and material evidence.
INNKEEPERS— NEGLIGENCE IN FAILING TO PROVIDE
FIRE-ESCAPES — MUNICIPAL ORDINANCE— EVIDENCE,— In
an action against an Innkeeper, based upon his negligence In falling
to provide his premises with fire-escapes, as required by city ordi-
nance, resulting In the death of plaintiff's decedent. It Is not error to
exclude the violated ordinance from evidence where no causal con-
694 Weeks v. McNulty, [Tenn.
nectlon between the violation of the ordinance and the injuries com-
plained of is shown.
EVIDENCE-ADMlfeSIONS AGAINST INTEREST— TESTI-
MONY IN SIMILAR CASE.— Where, in the course of a trial in an
action for negligence, plaintiff is permitted to read to the jury por-
tions of cross-examination of the defendant, in a former trial in-
volving identical questions, for the purpose of showing admissions
by defendant against his interest, defendant should be allowed to
read the entire examination in chief to the jury.
APPEAL-INSTRUCTIONS— FAILURE OP DEFENDANT
TO TESTIFY.— It is not error in an action for negligence to in-
struct the jury that no prejudicial inference could be drawn against
defendants from their failure to testify, where it does not appear
that such defendants had facts peculiarly within their knowledge
^d not fully known to other witnesses.
Templeton & Gates, for the appellant.
Fowler, Mynatt & Fowler, and Washburn, Pickle & Turner,
for the appellee.
•*»« McAIJSTEE, J. Plaintiff brings this suit to recover
damages for the death of her husband, Arthur E. Weeks, which
is alleged to have been occasioned *^'' by the negligence of the
defendants. The grounds of liability alleged in the declaration
are: 1. That the defendants, at the date aforesaid, were proprie-
tors of Hotel Knox, a public inn in the city of Knoxville, and
had negligently permitted said hotel to be in an unsafe and dan-
gerous condition; and 2. That defendants had not employed a
sufficient complement of servants for the protection of the hotel
and guests; and 3. That the servants employed were incompe-
tent, whereby said hotel was, on April 9, 1897, destroyed by fire,
and plaintiff's intestate, Arthur E. Weeks, who was a guest there-
in, lost his life. The more specific grounds of negligence are
stated in the second count of the declaration, viz: That defend-
ants had failed to provide fire-escapes, as ordered by an ordinance
of the city of Knoxville, or other reasonable means of escape
from said building; that defendants failed to arouse deceased or
give him proper warning of said fire, and that this failure was
due to defendant's omission in not employing a responsible
watchman. It is further alleged that the fire was caused, and
said hotel destroyed, by the negligence of defendant in allowing
the cellar of his storehouse, which was situated next door to said
hotel, to be filled with inflammable material. Defendants
pleaded not guilty. The case was tried by a special jury, to
whom a large volume of testimony was submitted. The trial re-
sulted in a verdict and judgment for defendants. Plaintiff ap-
pealed, and has assigned errors.
Nov. 1898.] Weeks v. McNulty. 696
498 rpjj^g £g^g|,g necessary to be stated are that tHe defendant,
Frank McNulty, was the owner and proprietor of a public inn
in the city of Knoxville, known as Hotel Knox. Plaintiff's in-
testate, Arthur Weeks, was a traveling man, representing the
Rochester Stamping Works and the Robinson Cutlery Company,
■of Rochester, New York. On the evening of April 7, 1897, said
Weeks reached the city of Knoxville, registered at the Hotel
Knox, and was assigned to room 49, on the third floor. About
3 o'clock in the morning following Hotel Knox was destroyed
by fire, and said Weeks perished in the flames. The fire was first
-discovered by the night watchman of the hotel, who' immediately
gave the alarm, ascended the stairway leading to the second and
third floors, knocked upon the doors, and made every effort to
arouse the guests. It is in proof that the guests were all
aroused and escaped, excepting deceased and one other. It is
in evidence that one of the guests, as he passed out, heard some
one in room 49 pounding at the door, and noticed that he had
kicked out one of the panels. If this evidence is to be credited,
it tends to show that deceased heard the alarm, but had, unfor-
tunately, fastened himself in, or, in the excitement, had lost all
command of his faculties. It is also shown that parties occupy-
ing rooms on the same floor with deceased, immediately contigu-
ous, and across the hall in opposite and diagonal directions, all
received the alarm and succeeded in making ■*®® their escape.
The building was provided with a front and rear stairway, but
had no flre escapes. South of the Hotel Knox, and immediately
adjoining, was the banking house of the Third National Bank,
which being only one story in height, several of the guests leaped
upon its roof from the burning hotel building. This mode of
escape was accessible to deceased, since his window overlooked
the roof; but it is not shown he had knowledge of it.
The general rule of law governing the liability of an inn-
keeper is, that he is not an insurer of the person of his guest
against injury, but his obligation is merely to exercise reasonable
care that his guests may not be injured by anything happening
through the innkeeper's negligence: 11 Am. & Eng. Ency. of
Law, 32.
"There is no natural presumption," said this court, "that a
fire, the origin of which is unknown, was the result of the want
of care of the owner or occupant of the premises. The ancient
rule of the common law, which presumed negligence in such
cases, was pronounced in the reported cases to be harsh and un-
696 Weeks v. McNulty. [Tenn.
reasonable, and was by the statute, 6 Anne, chapter 31, abro-
gated. The courts of this country, whether regarding the stat-
ute of Anne as in force or not, have unanimously held that neg-
ligence or misconduct was the gist of the action against one upon
whose premises a fire had originated, and that such negligence
would not be presumed from mere proof of the loss by fire com-
municated ^^** from the premises of another": Eailway Co. v.
Manchester Mills, 88 Tenn. 659. It must be shown that the
negligence of the innkeeper in this case was the proximate cause
of the fire and the consequent injuries: Deming v. Merchants'
Cotton Press Co., 90 Tenn. 353; Eailroad Co. v. Kelly, 91 Tenn.
699, 30 Am. St. Rep. 902; Postal Tel. Co. v. Zopfi, 93 Tenn. 374,
We understand these principles were substantially charged by
the circuit judge, and the issues of fact have been resolved by
the jury in favor of the defendants. We find material evidence
in the record to sustain these findings, and, under the rule, the-
verdict cannot be disturbed on this assignment.
The third assignment is, that the court erred in excluding
testimony showing that defendant, McNulty, had stored in the
rear of the grocery store, on the ground floor and near the ele-
vator shaft, oils and other combustible materials. Counsel is in
error in his statement of the action of the court. The grocery
store, it appears, adjoins the hotel, and is situated just north of
it. It was owned by McNulty, the proprietor of Hotel Knox.
The object of this inquiry was to show that defendant had been
guilty of negligence in storing oils and other inflammable sub-
stances on the ground floor of the grocery store, near the elevator
shaft. This testimony was excepted to by defendant, on the
ground that no such negligence was alleged in the declaration.
The negligence alleged was that defendants had permitted the
hotel to be in an unsafe and dangerous ^^^ condition, and that
they had filled the cellar with inflammable materials, but there
was no allegation of negligence in storing oils and other com-
bustible materials in the grocery store, on the floor above the
basement. Moreover, it seems defendant was permitted to prove
that coal oil was kept in the grocery store,but, when the question
was asked, how near the coal oil was kept to the elevator shaft,
an objection was interposed by defendants' counsel, which was
sustained by the court. If it be conceded that the action of
the court in sustaining the objection was erroneous, it is not
shown in the bill of exceptions what the witness would have an-
swered. It has been frequently held by this court that the re-
Nov. 1898.] Weeks v. McNulty. 697
fusal of the trial court to permit answers to pertinent questions
affords no cause for reversal, unless the record shows affirma-
tively that the answers would have been competent and material
evidence: Telegraph Co. v. Barnes, 95 Tenn. 271; Holmark v.
Molin, 5 Cold. 484; State v. Turner, 6 Baxt. 203.
The fourth assignment is, that the court erred in excluding
the ordinance of the city of Knoxville, requiring the owners and
keepers of hotels to erect fire-escapes thereon. The objection
offered to this testimony was that the ordinance in question con-
templated that notice to erect fire escapes must be given to the
owner of the property by the board of public works, and that
no such notice was given to the owner and proprietor of Hotel
Knox. The declaration, as already observed, alleged that de-
fendant ***** had failed to provide fire-escapes for Hotel Knox,
as ordered by an ordinance of the city of Knoxville. The insist-
ence of counsel for defendant is that this ordinance contains no
absolute requirement for the construction of fire-escapes, but
only provides that the same may be required by the board of pub-
lic works, if, in their judgment, they are deemed necessary. It
is further insisted that, under the ordinance, the supervision,
control, and direction of everything pertaining to fire escapes,
including the number, locality, strength, capacity, and mode of
structure, is committed to the board of public works, and that
no plans or directions were ever furnished defendants by said
board. It is insisted, however, that failure to comply with even
an absolute requirement of a municipal ordinance in the erec-
tion of fire-escapes will not render the delinquent party liable to
a civil action for damages resulting from such neglect, especially
where the ordinance provides a penalty, and does not provide in
its face for the civil liability. It is conceded that a civil action
will lie for an act done in violation of a prohibitory state law
(Queen v. Dayton Coal etc. Co., 95 Tenn. 458, 49 Am. St. Rep.
935), but it is insisted a different rule prevails when the act is
done in violation of a city ordinance. This precise question was
left open and undecided by this court in Schmalzried v. White,
97 Tenn. 45.
It was held in Osborne v. McMasters, 40 Minn. 103, 12 Am.
St. Rep. 698, where a statute or municipal ordinance ^^^ im-
poses upon any person a specific duty for the protection or bene-
fit of others, if he neglects to perform that duty he is liable to
those for whose benefit or protection it was imposed for any in-
juries of the character which the statute or ordinance was de-
698 Weeks v. McNulty. [Tenn.
€igned to prevent, and which were proximately produced by suchi
neglect.
In Bott V. Pratt, 33 Minn. 323, 53 Am. Eep. 47, it was held
that where a city ordinance, in pursuance of the charter, makes
it unlawful to leave a team standing unfastened or unguarded
in a street, anyone injured by a violation thereof may maintain
«,n action against the wrongdoer.
In Salisbury v. Herchenroder, 106 Mass. 458, 8 Am. Rep. 354,
it appeared that defendant had suspended a sign over a street
in Boston, in violation of a public ordinance of the city. Dur-
ing an extraordinary gale, the sign was blown down, and a bolt,
part of the fastenings, was hurled against plaintiff's window,
■causing damage, for which action was brought. Held that de-
fendant was liable, notwithstanding due care was exercised in
constructing and fastening the sign. The reason was, that the
defendant had placed and kept the sign there illegally, and this
illegal act contributed to plaintiff's injury.
In Hayes v. Michigan Cent. R. R. Co., Ill U. S. 328, the
action was to recover damages for personal injuries alleged to
have been sustained by the plaintiff, a boy eight or nine years
old, who ^^^ lost his arm by being run over by one of the de-
fendant's cars. The particular negligence charged in the declar-
ation was the omission of the railroad company to build a fence
on the west line of its right of way, as required by an ordinance
of the city of Chicago. The court held that an ordinance passed
in pursuance of legislative authority has the force of law within
the limits of the city, and, although in case of injury to persons
by reason of the failure of the company to erect such fence, such
•default is not conclusive of liability, irrespective of contribu-
tory negligence by plaintiff, yet an action will lie for the per-
«onal injury, and this breach of duty will be evidence of negli-
gence. ''The duty," says Mr. Justice Matthews, "is due, not to
the city as a municipal body, but to the public, considered as
comprised of individual persons, and each person specially in-
jured by the breach of the obligation is entitled to his individual
compensation, and to an action for its recovery." "The nature
of the duty," said Justice Cooley, in Taylor v. Lake Shore etc.
Ey. Co., 45 Mich. 74, 40 Am. Rep. 457, "and the benefits to be
accomplished through its performance, must generally determine
■whether it is a duty to the public in part or exclusively, or
whether individuals may claim that it is a duty imposed wholly
or in part for their especial benefit."
Kov. 1898.] Weeks t;. McNulty. 699
We are aware there is a line of cases whicli hold that when
the duties enjoined by ordinance are due to the municipality, or
to the public at large, and ''** not as composed of individuals,
the rule is different, and an action will not lie for a breach of the
■ordinance. In many cases of the latter class it was held that
the owners of land abutting on streets were liable to the city
alone for the breach of ordinances requiring such owners to keep
sidewalks clear of snow and ice, and in good repair, and that they
were not liable in damages to persons injured by their neglect
to perform the duties enjoined by such ordinances. These cases,
it is said, proceed upon the ground that it is the sole duty of
the city to keep the streets in good repair and clear of snow and
ice: See Flynn v. Canton Co. 40 Md. 312, 17 Am. Eep. 603;
Heeney v. Sprague, 11 E. I. 456, 23 Am. Eep. 602; Vandyke v.
Cincinnati, 1 Disn. 532; Philadelphia etc. R. E. Co. v. Ervin, 89
Pa. St. 71, 33 Am. Eep. 726.
An ordinance which a municipal corporation is authorized to
make is as binding on all persons within the corporate limits as
any statute or other law of the state, and all persons interested
are bound to take notice of its existence: Bott v. Pratt, 33 Minn.
328, 53 Am. Eep. 51; Heland v. Lowell, 3 Allen, 407, 81 Am.
Dec. 670; Vandine's Case, 6 Pick. 187, 17 Am. Dec. 351; Gil-
more V. Holt, 4 Pick. 257; Johnson v. Simonton, 43 Cal. 242-249.
The duty to erect fire-escapes required by this ordinance is not
due simply to the municipality, or public at large, but was a
regulation designed for ***** the peculiar benefit and protection
of individuals. It is well settled that when a statute commands
■or prohibits a thing for the benefit of a person, he shall have a
remedy upon the same statute for the thing enacted for his bene-
fit, or for a wrong done him contrary to its terms: Queen v. Day-
ton Coal etc. Co., 95 Tenn. 463, 49 Am. St. Eep. 935; Pauley
V. Steam Gauge etc. Co., 131 N. Y. 90; Willy v. Mulledy, 78
N. Y. 314, 34 Am. Eep. 536.
We do not, however, decide the effect of the breach of an or-
dinance in fixing civil liability, nor do we adjudicate the proper
•construction of the ordinance offered in evidence, sinie neither
■question is necessarily involved in this case, for the following
reason, namely: There is no proof in the record even tending
to show that the deceased lost his life in consequence of the fail-
ure to construct fire-escapes, as provided by the city ordinance.
The principle is recognized in all the cases that a liability can-
not be predicated alone upon the breach of an ordinance, but it
700 Weeks v, McNulty. [Teniu
mnst affirmatively appear that the injury sustained resulted
proximately from said breach.
In Queen v. Dayton Coal etc. Co., 95 Tenn. 458, 49 Am. St.
Eep. 935, we said: "So, we think, the employment of the minor,
in violation of the provisions of the statute in question, was an
act of negligence on the part of defendant, and a causal connec-
tion between the employment and the injuries sustained by the
boy being shown, there is liability The breach of the
statute is actionable negligence, whenever it is shown ^^"^ that
the injuries were sustained in consequence of the employment.
In other words, it is not enough that negligence exists, or that
the ordinance was violated, unless it proximately caused the in-
jury: Deming v. Cotton Press Co., 90 Tenn. 353; Eailroad Co.
V. Kelly, 91 Tenn. 699, 30 Am. St. Rep. 902; Postal Tel. Co. v.
Zopfi, 93 Tenn. 374.
After a very attentive reading of the record in this cause, we
have failed to discover any causal connection between the death
of plaintiff's intestate and the failure of defendant in error to
erect fire-escapes, as required by the ordinance. It is not shown
that deceased was at a window or in any position where a fire-
escape would have afforded him any benefit whatever.
There is evidence tending to show that deceased had locked
himself in his room and was heard beating on his door, trying
to make his escape. It is shown that one of the windows of his
room overlooked the Third National Bank building, and that
deceased could, with entire safety to himself, have escaped by
leaping to the roof of that building, as many others similarly
situated successfully did escape. As already stated, it is not
shown that deceased knew of this avenue of escape, and we can-
not perceive how he would have been benefited by fire-escapes,
under the circumstances surrounding him. We are, therefore,
of opinion that, if the contention of counsel for plaintiff in error
in respect of the proper construction of this ordinance were cor-
rect, and that *^**** its breach would constitute actionable negli-
gence, these questions are mere abstractions in this case, since
no causal connection between the violation of the ordinance and
the injuries sustained by the plaintiff is shown.
The fifth assignment is, that the court erred in permitting de-
fendants to read as evidence the stenographer's report of the
examination in chief of defendant, John R. Northington, given
on the trial of the case of H. L. Crowder against these defend-
ants in the circuit court of Knox county. It appears that the
Nov. 1898.] Weeks r. McNulty, 701
case of Crowder against these defendants had been tried only a
few days prior to this case, and on that trial John R. Northing-
ton was examined as a witness. The questions at issue in the
Crowder case were identical with those involved in the present
case. The plaintiff's counsel in the present trial read a large
portion of Northington's cross-examination given on the former
trial, for the purpose of showing admissions by Northington
against his interest. Counsel for defendants then insisted the
statements of Northington could not be well understood unless
the whole of it was read, and thereupon offered to read the re-
mainder of his evidence. The court ruled that defendant's coun-
sel had the right to introduce the whole of the statement where
any part of it is offered by the other side, and thereupon defend-
ant read the whole of Northington's examination in chief, and
plaintiff read the whole cross-examination, including the portion
**^ her counsel had previously read. "We think, after reading
the testimony of Northington, that the cross-examination read
by plaintiff's counsel could not be fully understood without read-
ing the examination in chief. Says Mr. "Wood, in his work on
Practice and Evidence, section 160: "An important rule relat-
ing to the admissions of a party is that the whole statement con-
taining the admission must be taken together, whether the ad-
mission is verbal or written; for, although some part of it may
contain matter favorable to the party, and the object is only
to ascertain what he has conceded against himself, and what
may therefore be presumed to be proven, yet, unless the whole is
received and considered, the true meaning and import of the
part which is good evidence against him cannot be ascertained.'*
Of course, it is not admissible, under this rule, to read matters
wholly disconnected and apart from the matter which constitutes
the admission, but the whole admission, and anything bearing
upon it and explanatory of it, is competent and relevant. More-
over, it is a conclusive answer to this assignment that plaintiff
in error did not stand on the exception made, but read the whole
of the cross-examination.
The seventh assignment is, that the court erred in charging
the jury that no prejudicial inference could be drawn against
defendants in this case from the mere fact that they did not
offer themselves as witnesses and testify in this case. The gen-
eral rule undoubtedly is, that the failure of a party to be ^^^
examined, as to matters necessarily within his personal knowl-
edge, affords a presumption against him, where the proof is not
702 Weeks v. McNulty. . [Tenn.
clear, and the case he seeks to make could be proven by him if
true: Dunlap v. Haynes, 4 Heisk. 476.
It is shown by witness, Hacker, that defendant, McNulty, waa
examined at the coroner's inquest, and stated that he did not get
to the hotel until after the fire, and, hence, knew nothing about
the matter. It is not shown there were any facts connected with
the case peculiarly within his knowledge, and which were not
known so fully to any other witness. The condition of the prem-
ises, including the elevator shaft, as well as the character and
habits of John Davis, the colored night watchman, were fully
proved Dy other witnesses. In respect of M. L. Eqss' testimony,
this witness was introduced by plaintiff, and does not state any-
thing calling for a denial from defendant.
Numerous assignments are made, all of which have been care-
fully considered, but we find in them no reversible error.
Affirmed.
INNKEEPERS— LIABILITY.— An innkeeper Is bound to see that
one who enters his inn is protected, not only from the assaults or
Insults of those in his employ, but of the drunken and vicious men
whom he may choose to harbor: Rommel v. Schambacher, 120 Pa.
St. 579, 6 Am. St. Rep. 732, and note discussing the question. If a
guest is beaten in an inn, the innkeeper shall not answer for It:
monographic note to Clute v. Wiggins, 7 Am. Dec. 452. Liability
of innkeeper where guest contracts disease: Gilbert v. Hoffman, 66-
Iowa, 205, 55 Am. Rep. 263; Sheffer v. Willoughby, 163 111. 518,
54 Am. St. Rep. 483.
EVIDENCE — ADMISSIONS AT A PREVIOUS TRIAL.— Ad
admission made at the first trial, if reduced to writing, or Incorpo-
rated Into a record of the case, will be binding at another trial
of the case: Holley v. Young, 68 Me. 215, 28 Am. Rep. 40. The rule
as applied to notes of testimony taken by counsel on a former trial:
Philadelphia etc. R. R. Co. v. Spearen, 47 Pa. St. 300, 86 Am. Dec.
544. As applied to minutes of testimony taken by the judge, see
Fitzpatrick v. FItzpatrick, 6 R. I. 64, 75 Am. Dec. 681.
INSTRUCTIONS — DEFENDANT NOT TAKING WITNESS
STAND.— In a criminal case, It is proper to Instruct a jury that un-
favorable Inferences are not to be predicated upon the fact that
the defendant did not take the witness stand: People v. Seamen^
107 Mich. 348, 61 Am. St. Rep. 826.
Dec. 1898.] Austin v. Statb. 70ft
Austin v. Statb.
[101 TSNNESSKE, 563.]
EVIDENCE — JUDICIAL NOTICE — DELETERIOUS NA^
TURE OP CIGARETTES.— A court may take judicial notice that
cigarettes possess no virtue, are inherently bad, and wholly noxlous-
and deleterious to health.
INTERSTATE COMMERCE— REGULATION BY STATES—
CIGARETTES.— Cigarettes are not legitimate articles of commerce,.
and, in the absence of congressional regulation to the cojitrary, a
state statute may prohibit the importation and sale of cigarettes
within the state. Such a statute is not in contravention of that
clause of the federal constitution which inhibits state regulation
of interstate commerce.
POLICE POWER— REGULATION BY STATES OP INTER-
STATE COMMERCE.— Every state has the right under its re-
served police power to prohibit the importation and sale of all ar-
ticles inherently unworthy of commerce and unfit for the use of
its people, and, in the absence of congressional action to the con-
trary, the determination by a state legislature that an article of
doubtful commercial quality Is not a legitimate article of commerce,
is conclusive.
INTERSTATE COMMERCE— STATE REGULATION— SI-
LENCE OF CONGRESS.— The rule that the silence of congress in
relation to articles confessedly suited for commerce Is to be talven
as legally equivalent to its declaration that the transportation of'
those articles into the states shall be free and unrestricted, has no
application to articles of doubtful commercial quality.
STATUTES— PKESUMPTION OP CONSTITUTIONALITY. —
All intendments are in favor of the constitutionality of every stat-
ute passed with requisite form and ceremony.
INTERSTATE COMMERCE— STATE REGULATION- CON-
STITUTIONALITY—BURDEN OP PROOF.— The burden is upon.
a person who assails a state's restrictive or prohibitory statute as
an unwarranted interference with interstate commerce, to show
that the particular article involved Is a legitimate subject of com-
merce.
INTERSTATE COMMERCE — LEGITIMATE COMMODI-
TIES—CONGRESSIONAL TAXATION OP CIGARETTES.— Con-
gress, by Imposing a revenue tax upon cigarettes, does not recog-
nize them as proper commercial commodities.
INTERSTATE COMMERCE— ORIGINAL PACKAGE— DEFI-
NITION.—An original package, as applied to interstate or Inter-
national commerce, is a package, bundle, or aggregation of goods,
put up in whatever form, covering, or receptable for transporta-
tion, and as a unit transported from one state or nation to another.
INTERSTATE COMMERCE— ORIGINAL PACKAGE— BAS-
KET CONTAINING CIGARETTE PACKAGES.— Where a num-
ber of packages of cigarettes containing ten cigarettes each are
shipped from one state to another in a basket, the basket Is an
original package within the Interstate commerce act The presence-
or absence of covering to the basket Is immaterial to the question
whether or not the basket is an original package, and It Is of no-
Importance that the basket is owned by the transporting carrier.
POLICE POWER — MANUFACTURE AND SALE OP-
CIGARETTES.- A state statute prohibiting the sale of cigarettes
manufactured within the state, is valid as an internal police regu-
lation.
704 Austin v. State. [Tenn.
Welker & Parker, for the appellant.
Attorney General Pickle, for the appellee.
^^* CALDWELL, J. W. B. Austin prosecutes this appeal in
•error from the judgment of the circuit court of Monroe coimty,
wherehy he was sentenced to pay a fine of fifty dollars and costs
-of suit, for unlawfully selling cigarettes. He admits the sale,
■but denies that it was unlawful.
^^^ Austin, who was a citizen and merchant of Monroe
county, Tennessee, purchased from the American Tobacco Com-
pany, a New J ersey corporation, at its factory in Durham, North
Carolina, a lot of cigarettes, in packages of ten cigarettes each,
which it shipped thence, by express, to him at his place of busi-
ness in this state; and there he sold one of these packages, with-
out breaking, to W. Gr. Brown, an adult citizen of the same
county.
The statute under which the conviction was had uncondition-
ally prohibits all sales of cigarettes, whether manufactured in
this state or elsewhere. It provides "that it shall be a misde-
meanor for any person, firm, or corporation to sell, offer to sell,
or to bring into the state for the purpose of selling, giving away,
>or otherwise disposing of, any cigarettes, cigarette paper, or sub-
stitute for the same; and a violation of any of the provisions of
this act shall be a misdemeanor, punishable by a fine of not less
<than fifty dollars": Acts 1897, c. 30, sec. 1.
Austin concedes that his sale to Brown was clearly within the
prohibition of this act, yet he says it was lawful, nevertheless.
The substance of his contention is, that his sale was of an im-
ported commercial article, in the original package, and that the
statutory prohibition, as applied to such a sale, is obnoxious to
the commerce clause of the federal constitution, and, therefore,
null and void.
In considering this contention, we raise two vital inquiries:
Whether or not cigarettes are legitimate **** articles of com-
merce, and whether or not the sale shown in this case was of an
•original package in the true commercial sense.
1. Are cigarettes legitimate articles of commerce? We think
•they are not, because wholly noxious and deleterious to health.
Their use is always harmful; never beneficial. They possess no
virtue, but are inherently bad, and bad only. They find no true
commendation for merit or usefulness in any sphere. On the
^contrary, they are widely condemned as pernicious altogether.
Dec. 1898.] Austin v. State. 705
Beyond question, their every tendency is toward the impairment
of physical health and mental vigor. There is no proof in the
record as to the character of cigarettes, yet their character is
80 well and so generally known to be that stated above, that
the courts are authorized to take judicial cognizance of the
fact. No particular proof is required in regard to those facts
which, by human observation and experience, have become well
and generally known to be true: Schollenberger v. Pennsylva-
nia, 171 U. S. 1; 1 Greenleaf on Evidence, sec. 6; 1 Wharton on
Evidence, sec. 282; 1 Jones on Evidence, sees. 129, 134; Lan-
fear v. Mestier, 18 La. Ann. 497, 89 Am. Dec. 658, and note
693; State v. Goyette, 11 K. I. 592; Watson v. State, 55 Ala. 158;
nor is it essential that they shall have been formally recorded in
written history or science to entitle courts to take judicial notice
of them: Boullemet v. State, 28 Ala. 83, 12 Am. & Eng. Ency.
of Law, 199.
It is a part of the history of the organization of '^'' the vol-
unteer army in the United States during the present year that
large numbers of men, otherwise capable, had rendered them-
selves unfit for service by the use of cigarettes, and that, among
the applicants who were addicted to the use of cigarettes, more
were rejected by examining physicians on account of disabilities
thus caused than for any other, and, perhaps, every other reason.
It is also a part of the unwritten history of the legislation in
question that it was based upon and brought to passage by the
firm conviction in the minds of legislators and of the public
that cigarettes are wholly noxious and deleterious. The enact-
ment was made upon this idea, and alone for the protection
of the people of the state from an unmitigated evil. Such being
the nature of cigarettes, they cannot be legitimate articles of
commerce, and, consequently, are not within the provision of
the federal constitution (U. S. Const., art. 1, sec. 8, cl. 3) in re-
lation to the regulation by Congress of conmierce with foreign
nations, and among the several states, and with the Indian
tribes. Only those things which are in fact commodities in some
true sense, and, as such, are proper things for importation and
use, can be legitimate articles of commerce and within the scope
of the constitutional provision invoked by the defendant in this
case. Kegulation of traffic in things not suited for commerce
was not by that provision delegated to Congress. Every state
has the right, under its reserved police power, to prohibit the
importation **® and sale of all articles inherently unworthy of
AM. 8t. Rkp., Vol. LXX.— 46
706 Austin v. State. [Tenn.
commerce and unfit for the use of its people. Indeed, an active
duty rests upon the legislative branch of the state government to
enact appropriate laws for the protection of the public against
the hurtful influence of such articles, and, in the discharge of
that important duty, the members of the legislature must be al-
lowed to act in accordance with the dictates of their own best
judgment. This does not mean, however, that the state legisla-
ture may override congressional legislation on the subject, or
that the state has the paramount right to determine what is
and what is not a legitimate article of interstate or international
commerce. The reverse is true. Congress has the superior
right in the determination of that question, and its decision,
when made, is controlling. But, if the question arises in the
state in advance of congressional action, as in the present in-
stance, the state legislature may and should act according to its
own deliberate view of the matter, and its action, when taken,
is and should be conclusive until Congress shall have given some
adverse expression on the same subject. We are mindful of the
rule that the silence of Congress in relation to articles confess-
edly suited for commerce is to be taken as legally equivalent to
its declaration that the transportation of those articles into the
states shall be free and unrestricted: Mobile v. Kimball, 103
V. S. 691; Eobbins v. Shelby Taxing Dist., 120 U. S. 492; Leisy
V. Hardin, 135 U. S. 100; State v. Scott, 98 ^^ Tenn. 260; but
congressional nonaction upon the antecedent question as to
whether or not other articles are suited for commerce, is not
tantamount to an affirmation by that body that they are so
Articles of the former class are already within the domain of
congressional regulation, while those of the latter class are as
yet beyond that domain and within the control of the states,
and, from the nature of the case, must remain so, unless and
until affirmatively determined by higher authority to be worthy
of commerce, and thereby transferred to the other class. The
right of a state to protect its people, in their comfort, health,
and safety, against the importation and sale of noncommercial
articles has long been recognized, and never questioned, by the
supreme court of the United States: License Cases, 5 How. 504;
Bowman v. Chicago etc. Ry. Co., 125 U. S. 465; Hannibal etc.
R. E. Co. v. Husen, 95 U. S. 465; Leisy v. Hardin, 135 U. S.
100; Plumley v. Massachusetts, 155 IJ. S. 461; Collins v. New
Hampshire, 171 U. S. 30; Schollenberger v. Pennsylvania, 171
U. S. 1.
Dec. 1898.] Austin v. State, 707
In the license cases Mr. Justice Catron observed that what
belongs to commerce is within the jurisdiction of the United
States, and that what does not belong to commerce is within the
jurisdiction of the state, and by the state may be excluded from
introduction: License Cases, 5 How. 600.
The statute of Pennsylvania impeached in Schollenberger v.
Pennsylvania, 171 U. S. 1, was adjudged violation '^'^^ of the
commerce clause of the federal constitution, because it prohib-
ited the importation and sale of pure oleomargarine. In the
course of his opinion in that case, Mr. Justice Peckham attached
controlling importance to the fact that pure oleomargarine, as
contradistinguished from that which was adulterated, was a
wholesome article of food, and had been recognized by Congress
as a commodity suitable for commerce; and, in recognition of
the state's right to exclude the adulterated article, said: "The
bad article may be prohibited, but not the pure and healthy
one."
In Plumley v. Massachusetts, 155 U. S. 467, it was said, in
effect, by the court, speaking through Mr. Justice Harlan, that
deceptive discoloration or adulteration of imported oleomar-
garine removed it from the domain of congressional regulation,
and subjected it to unconditional exclusion by state law.
The New Hampshire enactment involved in Collins v. New
Hampshire, 171 U. S. 30, provided for the exclusion of all oleo-
margarine not of a pink color. It was held to be invalid, for
the reason that it virtually excluded pure oleomargarine, which
was never naturally pink in color, and which was a proper and
well-recognized commercial commodity.
The case of Leisy v. Hardin, 135 U. S. 100, is the one most
urged upon our attention by counsel for Austin. That case,
however, like all the others, recognized the right of the state,
under its police power, to prevent the introduction of noncom-
mercial **''* articles among its people. Mr. Chief Justice Fuller
distinctly places the court's decision upon the ground that the
commodities whose importation and sale were so greatly re-
stricted by the Iowa statute there examined, had been "recog-
nized by the usages of the commercial world, the laws of Con-
gress, and the decisions of courts" as proper articles of commerce,
and were, therefore, subject, in the first instance, to con-
gressional regulation only. In the conclusion of the opinion he
said: ''Whatever our individual views may be as to the dele-
terious or dangerous qualities of particular articles, we cannot
708 Austin v. State. [Tennw
hold that any articles which Congress recognizes as suhjects of
interstate commerce are not such, or that whatever are thus
recognized can be controlled by state laws amounting to regula-
tion, while they retain that character; although, at the sam&
time, if directly dangerous in themselves, the state may take
appropriate measures to guard against injury before it obtains
complete jurisdiction over them."
That case, then, as the others that declare state restrictions
and prohibitions unauthorized and invalid, is distinguishable
from the present one in the fundamental and ever-controlling
fact that the articles there in question were commercial com-
modities in some true sense, and as such appropriately recog-
nized, while those here in question are not so. Moreover, besides
the conclusive recognition received by those articles, they stand
upon a higher plane in respect of inherent merit than cigarettes,
for they are confessedly •*^'''^ beneficial in some instances and for
some purposes, while cigarettes have no redeeming qualities.
The Iowa statute, upon its face, distinctly acknowledged that
the restricted articles possessed some virtue, by allowing im-
portations and sales of them for certain purposes and under cer-
tain restrictions. In no instance has a state's right of author-
ity and control been, denied when the commodity restricted or
prohibited was not first found to be a proper subject of com-
merce, and therefore within the jurisdiction of Congress and
beyond the jurisdiction of the state. The existence of that
fundamental fact has always been the decisive criterion, and the
burden of showing it is upon the complaining party.
All intendments are in favor of the constitutionality of every
statute passed with requisite form and ceremony: Cooley's Con-
stitutional Limitations, 6th ed., 218; Black's Constitutional Law,
sec. 28; Sutherland on Statutory Construction, sec. 332; Rail-
road Co. V. Harris, 99 Tenn. 703; hence, the burden is upon
the person who assails a state's restrictive or prohibitory statute,
BO passed, as an unwarranted interference with interstate or in-
ternational commerce, to show that the particular article
involved is a legitimate subject of commerce. If that fact be
not made to appear in some appropriate way, his assaUment must
be unsuccessful.
Mr. Chief Justice Marshall, in Brown v. Maryland, 12 "Wheat.
436, wherein a state statute was challenged for repugnance to
the commerce clause of the federal constitution, remarked: "It
•"^^ has been truly said that the presumption is in favor of every
Deo. 1898.] Austin v. State. 709
»
kgislative act, and that the whole burden of proof lies on him
who denies its constitutionality."
The same rule was announced and emphasized by Mr. Chief
Justice Waite in this language: "Every possible presumption is
in favor of the validity of a statute, and this continues until the
contrary is shown beyond a reasonable doubt. One branch of
the government cannot encroach on the domain of another with- '
out danger. The safety of our institutions depends in no small
degree on a strict observance of this salutary rule": Sinking
Fund Cases, 99 F. S. 718.
If there were only a doubt, then, that cigarettes are legiti-
mate articles of commerce, that doubt would be resolved against
the defendant and this act would be sustained. But, as already
stated, they are clearly not so, as the court may judicially know
(SchoUenberger v. Pennsylvania, 171 U. S. 1), and the passage
of the act is a legislative determination to that effect, which
must be treated as conclusive of the question, in the absence of
congressional expression to the contrary. Congress has laid a
tax on cigarettes, prescribing the forms in which they may be
put up and the manner in which they shall be stamped: U. S.
Eev. Stats., sec. 3392. This was done, however, for purposes of
revenue only, and, without more, was not a recognition of them
as legitimate articles of commerce. '^^'* It was no expression on
the subject of commerce one way or the other. Indeed, all in-
ternal revenue legislation is referable to a different provision
of the fundamental law (IT. S. Const., art. 1, sec. 8, cl. 1), and
should be construed as relating to questions of revenue only,
nnless obviously intended to include some additional subject,
which is not true in this instance. The fact that Congress has
declared by general statute (U. S. Rev. Stats., sec. 3243) that
the payment of any tax imposed by the internal revenue laws
for the carrying on of any trade or business shall not authorize
the pursuit of that trade or business in any state forbidding the
same, nor prohibit state taxation thereon, indicates unmistakably
that Congress does not intend by the imposition of such special
tax to reach, determine, or in any way affect questions apper-
taining to interstate or international commerce. The imposi-
tion of the tax is aside from all these questions. The statement
herein that the taxation of cigarettes is not a recognition of
them as proper commercial commodities, is sustained by the rea-
soning and decision in the case of Plumley v. Pennsylvania, 155
U. S. 461.
710 Austin v. State. [Tenn,
2. Was the sale shown to have been made in this case a sale
of an original package, in the true commercial sense? We
think not. It may he truly said to have been an original pack-
age for the purposes of taxation, because put up by the manu-
facturer, in the first instance, in one of the forms **'''' prescribed
by the internal revenue statute (U. S. Eev. Stats., sec. 3392);
yet it was not an original commercial package, because not sold
and transported apart from other like articles, but in the same
general receptacle with them. Speaking generally, we would
say that an original package, as applied to interstate and inter-
national commerce, is a package, bundle, or aggregation of goods,
put up, in whatever form, covering, or receptacle, for transporta-
tion and as a unit transported from one state or nation to an-
other.
In Guckheimer v. Sellers, 81 Fed, Eep. 997, the court said:
"An original package, within the meaning of the law of inter-
state commerce, is the package delivered by the importer to the
carrier at the initial point of shipment, in the exact condition
in which shipped. In the case of liquors in bottles, if the bot-
tles are shipped singly, each is an original package; but, if a
number are fastened together and marked, or are packed in a
box, barrel, crate, or other receptacle, such bundle, box, barrel^
crate, or other receptacle constitutes the original package."
The supreme court of Iowa considered this question in Mc-
Gregor V. Cone, 104 Iowa, 465, 65 Am. St. Eep. 522; and, upon
the authority of numerous cited cases, ruled, as correctly stated
in the headnote, as follows: "1. An original package is that
package which is delivered by the importer to the carrier at the
initial point of shipment, in the exact condition in which it was
shipped; 2. The determination of the *"^® internal revenue de-
partment that a package is a proper and original package for
purposes of taxation, does not show that it is an original pack-
age of commerce; 3. A pine box, in which are packed for com-
mercial shipment packages of cigarettes, each of which contains •
ten cigarettes and is sealed with an internal revenue stamp, with-
out any other packing or inclosure around or about them except
the box itself, is the original package of commerce; and, when
that is opened, the packages of cigarettes are subject to the police
power of the state, as a part of the common mass of property
therein."
The material facts of the present case are, that the defend-
ant purchased from the American Tobacco Company, at its fac-
Dec. 1898.] Austin v. State. 711
tory in Durham, North Carolina, a lot of cigarettes, manufac-
tured by that company at that factory, and there, by it, put into
pasteboard boxes, in quantities of ten cigarettes to each box;
that each of these boxes, known as packages, was separately
stamped and labeled, as prescribed by the United States revenue
statute; that, after defendant's purchase, the American Tobacco
Company piled upon the floor of its warehouse in Durham,
North Carolina, the number of boxes or packages sold, and,
having done so, notified the Southern Express Company to come
and get them; and said company, by its agent, took them from
the floor and placed them in an open basket, already and pre-
viously in the possession of the Southern Express Company, and,
in that basket, had them transported by express to the defend-
ant's ^"^"^ town in Tennessee, and there an agent of the same
express company took the basket to the defendant's place of
business, and lifted from it, on to the counter of the defendant,
the lot of detached boxes or packages of cigarettes, and there-
upon took a receipt, and departed with the empty basket.
Thereafter the defendant sold one of these boxes or packages,
without breaking it, and for that sale he stands convicted.
Under these facts, it is entirely manifest to our minds that
the basket, with its contents, made one original package in the
true commercial sense, each box or package of cigarettes being a
constituent part thereof, and that the original commercial pack-
age was broken, and each box or package of cigarettes assumed
a separate identity before the law when the basket was relieved
of its contents. This is true, though the basket was open all
the while, and was filled and emptied by the agent of the ex-
press company. A box, crate, barrel, or basket, filled with goods
for shipment, and actually transported from a citizen of one
state to a citizen of another state, it is no less a receptacle of the
goods in a legal sense, and such receptacle is no less an original
commercial package because open and not covered. The pres-
ence or absence of a covering to a receptacle so used is of no
consequence in determining what is and what is not an original
package.
In South Dakota v. Chapman, 1 S. Dak. 414, and also in Eion
V. Alabama, 91 Ala. 3, it ^"^^ appeared that whisky, in bottles
separately wrapped, had been packed and shipped in uncovered
boxes, furnished by the shippers, and the court held, in each case,
that the open boxes, and not the separate bottles, were the origi-
nal commercial packages. The ownership of the basket used in.
712 Austin v. State. [Tenn.
the shipment involved in this case — ^whether in the shipper or the
carrier — ^is not disclosed. If the defendant predicated anjrthing
of ownership in the carrier, the burden was upon him to show
that ownership. To avail himself of the protection afforded hy
the federal law in relation to the sale of original packages, he
must prove every fact essential to show that his sale was of
such a package: Keith v. Alabama, 91 Ala. 2. But we regard
the question of such ownership as wholly immaterial, for, in
taking the basket to the factory of the shipper and there put-
ting the cigarettes in it, the express company's agent was act-
ing for the seller, and the legal effect of his action was the same
as if the basket had been procured and filled by the shipper
alone. It is perfectly obvious, moreover, that this plan of ship-
ment was resorted to as a mere device for the purpose of evading
the state law against the sale of cigarettes. Prior to the pas-
sage of this law, as is well known, no such scheme was adopted
in the transportation of such articles, and the carrier was not
called upon to play so unusual a part in such a matter.
Our conclusion upon the whole case is: 1. That ^''^ cigarettes
are not legitimate articles of commerce, and, consequently, that
their importation and sale are not within the scope of the com-
merce clause of the federal constitution, but are subject to state
control and prohibition; and, 2. That if they were legitimate
articles of commerce the sale for which the defendant stands
convicted was not of an original commercial package, and hence
was not protected by that clause of the federal constitution.
Since cigarettes are not legitimate articles of commerce and
as such within the domain of congressional regulation, the stat-
ute here called in question is valid as a whole — that part which
prohibits the importation and sale of cigarettes manufactured
out of the state, as well as that part prohibiting the sale of
those manufactured in the state — and the defendant's conviction
is sustainable under the statute generally, or under the former
part, without reference to the question of original package. But
if they were legitimate articles of commerce, and the former
part of the statute, therefore, invalid, the latter part would
remain valid, nevertheless (State v. Scott, 98 Tenn. 254), as an
internal police regulation (Kidd v. Pearson, 128 U. S. 1; Mugler
V. Kansas, 123 U. S. 623; Plumley v. Massachusetts, 155 U. S.
461); and the defendant's conviction would be sustainable there-
under, because his sale to Brown was not of an original com-
mercial package^ but only of a part thereof after it had been
Dec. 1898.] Austin v. State. 713
broken and its contents thereby made subject to the laws •***
of the state, like other local property of the same class: Leisy
V. Hardin, 135 U. S. 100; SchoUenberger v. Pennsylvania, 171
U. S. 1.
We are aware that Judge Lurton, for whose opinion we have
great respect, ruled otherwise in the case of Sawrie v. State, 82
Fed. Rep. G15, upon a record very similar to this one, yet we
believe our conclusion entirely sound.
Affirm.
INTERSTATE COMMERCE— REGULATION BY STATE— LEGI-
TIMATE COMMODITIES.— A state has no right to Interfere with,
or to attempt to regulate, interstate commerce in an article on the
ground that it Is deleterious to the inhabitants of the state, so
long as it Is recognized in the commercial world, by the laws of
congress, and by the decisions of the courts as a commodity in
which a right of traflSc exists: McGregor v. Cone, 104 Iowa, 465,
65 Am. St. Rep. 522. The rule In the principal case that cigarettes
are not legitimate articles of commerce is denied in McGregor v.
Cone, 104 Iowa, 465, 65 Am. St. Rep. 522, where It was held that
cigarettes are a recognized commercial commodity. Hence, a state
statute which prohibits the sale of cigarettes within the state by
all persons, except jobbers, who do an interstate business with
customers outside of the state, is in contravention of section 8, ar-
ticle 1, of the federal constitution, conferring upon congress the
exclusive right to regulate commerce among the several states, and
Is void, so far as it amounts to such a regulation: See, also, State v.
Goetze, 43 W. Va. 495, 64 Am. St. Rep. 871.
INTERSTATE COMMERCE-ORIGINAL PACKAGES.— The mle
stated in the principal case as to what constitutes an original pack-
age is sustained by McGregor v. Gone, 104 Iowa, 465, 05 Am. St.
Rep. 522; Haley v. State, 42 Neb. 556, 47 Am. St. Rep. 718; State v.
Parsons, 124 Mo. 436, 46 Am. St. Rep. 457, and note; monographic
note to People v. Wemple, 27 Am. St. Rep. 553. But In State v.
Goetze, 43 W. Va. 495, 64 Am. St. Rep. 871. it was held that if
cigarettes are put up in paper boxes, at a factory for the manu-
facture of cigarettes, each box containing ten cigarettes, and are
shipped, for sale. In a large wooden box, which, for convenience of
shipment, contains a number of the smaller paper boxes, each
paper box must be regarded as an original package, where it has a
proper label, giving the name of the cigarettes, the caution notice,
the number of the factory, the number of the revenue district, et
cetera.
STATUTES.— ALL PRESUMPTIONS ARE SOLVED IN favor ol
the constitutionality of a statute. It devolves upon one who as-
sails it to point out certainly and clearly wherein it is unconstitu-
tional: Mauldin v. Greenville, 42 S. C. 293, 46 Am. St. Rep. 723.
714 GoNCE V. McCJoY. [Tenn.
GONOB V, MoCoY.
[101 T£NNE88£E, 687.]
EXECUTION— SALES-GAVEAT EMPTOR.— In execution-
and Judicial sales of land, except in special cases, there is no war-
ranty of title or quality, but the rule of caveat emptor applies, and
the purchaser gets virtually nothing but the quit-claim title of the
debtor defendant.
EXECUTION— SALES— JUDGMENT CREDITOR AS PUR-
CHASER—DEFECT OF TITLE.— A judgment creditor who bid*
the amount of his judgment on land and thus satisfies it is not en-
titled to have the satisfaction vacated and the judgment reinstated
because he only obtained a life estate in the land, when he believed
he was getting a fee simple estate, and bought under that belief. If
he obtains any beneficial interest by his purchase, he is not entitled
to such relief.
ESTATES— ESTIMATE OF VALUE— LIFE ESTATE.— The
value of a life estate should be estimated, not in the light of its ac-
tual duration as subsequently developed, or the rents received in
that time, but at its value at the time of purchase, estimated ac-
cording to the rules usually adopted in estimating the value of life
estates.
Estill & Tumey, J. T. Matthews and Banks & Embry, for the
appellant.
Lynch & Lynch, for the appellee.
»8« WILKES, J. This bill is filed to set aside the satisfac-
tion of a judgment and have it restored to vitality and force,
and to have the judgment thus restored declared a lien upon
land and the land sold to satisfy the same. The chancellor dis-
missed the bill, refusing any relief, and the complainant ap-
pealed. The court of chancery appeals reversed the chancellor,
and decreed that the satisfaction be set aside; that a lien be de-
clared for the reinstated judgment; that it be collected out of
certain lands and out of a certain judgment obtained by de-
fendant, McCoy, against Sells, the vendor of the land to him.
The case was also remanded for an account of rents received
by complainants and for the execution of the decree. Both par-
ties have appealed to this ^*^^ court — the complainant from sa
much of the decree as holds him for rents, and the defendants
from the remainder of the decree, setting aside the satisfaction
and declaring a lien and decreeing a collection.
The facts found by the court of chancery appeals, so far as
they need be stated, are that McCoy purchased from P. G. Sells
a tract of land which belonged originally to one Eice, at the
price of two thousand four hundred dollars, of which twelve
Dec. 1898.] Gonck v. McCoy. 715-
hundred dollars was paid in cash, and for the balance three
notes were given, each for four hundred dollars. One of these-
notes was paid, and complainant bought the other two for six
hundred and sixty-six dollars, and claims to be an innocent
holder of them. They were secured by a lien on the land. The
land, by proper proceeding was sold to satisfy the judgment
obtained on these notes, amounting to one thousand and fiftj
dollars, and was bought by complainant, at his debt and costs,,
and the judgment was thus satisfied. It appears, however, that
Eice, the original owner of the land, before he conveyed it to
Sells, had made a conveyance of it to Nancy McCoy, reserving
a life estate in himself. One of the conditions of the convey-
ance to Nancy McCoy was that she should live with Eice and
family until his death. She failed to do this, but left the
state, and Eice thereupon filed a bill to vacate the deed, alleging
that it had never been delivered and had never taken effect.
Such proceedings were had that this deed was set aside, and Eice
thereupon sold to William Sells, and he to P. 0. Sells, and he
to A. J. McCoy, as before '^^^ stated. After the vendor's lien
had been enforced by Gonce, the holder of the notes, against A.
J. McCoy, and after the death of Eice, Nancy McCoy having
also died, her heirs filed a petition setting up the original deed
to their. mother, and claiming the land under it, alleging that
when Eice's proceedings were had against Nancy McCoy, to
vacate her deed, she was dead, and the proceeding therefore a
nullity. The result of this suit was that the heirs of Nancy
McCoy recovered the land from Gonce, the purchaser and holder
of the notes; and Gonce thus lost the benefit of his purchase,
except as to the life estate of Eice. He had possession, however,
of the land, under his purchase, from November 5, 1892, to May
5, 1893, the date when Eice died, and until that date his pur-
chase was good in any event, as he held the life estate of Eice,
and was entitled to hold it, even as against the heirs of Nancy
McCoy. This bill was then filed by Gonce, the purchaser of the
land and holder of the notes, to set aside the satisfaction of his
judgment, on the ground that, by his purchase, he had not ob-
tained a fee simple title to the land bought. We consider this^
question primarily, inasmuch as, if the judgment is not set aside,
the question of its lien and enforcement need not be considered..
The court of chancery appeals find that when complainant
bought the notes sued on he was assured by both McCoy, the
maker, and Sells, the indorser^ that the title to the land for
716 GoNCE V. McCoy. [Tenn.
which they ^^^ were given was good, and he believed he was get-
ting a good title in fee simple to the land by his purchase. It
appears that neither party had actual notice of the particular
defect in title which caused the loss, and, hence, there was no
fraud, though there is some evidence of a supposed defect aris-
ing from a different source known to both parties.
Gonce, as before stated, obtained by his purchase the life
estate of Rice, but did not get the fee simple. He went into
possession in November, 1892. Rice died in May, 1893. In
this interval, Goiice had received the rents and profits of the
land, and was required by the court of chancery appeals to
account for the same as a credit upon his judgments when rein-
stated and as a condition to their reinstatement. Upon this
feature of the case the question is narrowed down to this: Is the
creditor, who has bid his judgments on land, and thus satisfied
them, entitled to have this satisfaction vacated and the judg-
ments reinstated because he only obtained a life estate in the
land, when he believed he was getting a fee simple estate and
bought under that belief? Unquestionably, if there be a total
failure of title and the purchaser get nothing by his purchase,
such a result would follow.
The provision of the code (Shannon's Comp. Stats., sec. 4719),
is, in substance, that the satisfaction may be set aside by scire
facias if no title is obtained to the property bought to satisfy
the judgment.
But the question in this case is. Does such remedy, ^^^ or a
remedy in chancery, exist when the purchaser obtains a valid
title to the property, but not the one which he understood he
was getting — in other words, when the title acquired is good so
far as it goes, but does not confer the quantum of estate which
the purchaser expects under his purchase? It is well settled
that in sales of land under decree and under execution, except
in special cases, there is no warranty of title or quality, but the
rule of caveat emptor applies, and the purchaser gets virtually
nothing but the quitclaim title of the debtor defendant. In
this case it appears that the complainant, as purchaser, was aware
that the title to this land was questionable, and bought with
this knowledge, but he did not know of the particular defect
which afterward occasioned his loss, but his knowledge was of
other supposed defects which were not real. He bought a prop-
erty under these circumstances which originally cost two thou-
sand four hundred dollars, and paid for it in notes which cost
Dec. 1898.] Gonce v. McCoy. 717
him six hundred and Bixty-sir dollars, and wliile he had no
notice, as stated, of the defect in title which finally caused the
loss, he did know that the title was heing questioned on other
grounds, and hought at the risk of this and over the protest of
the defendant, McCoy, who was trjdng to prevent an enforce-
ment of the vendor's lien and a sale of the land by setting up
a defective title. We think that the fact that the complainant,
as purchaser, got only a life estate, when he expected to get a fee
simple estate, cannot entitle him to have the satisfaction ''^^ of
his judgments bid on the property set aside. It is true the life
estate proved to be of short duration, and hence brought but
little return to the purchaser. But this cannot matter. It
might have continued for a long number of years and been al-
most as valuable as the fee, so there was neither entire failure
of title nor of consideration. To hold that, because he thought
or expected to get a fee, he is entitled to relief because he only
got a life estate, would be proceeding upon the idea that the
sale carries with it a warranty of title, not only as to validity of
title, but as to quantum of estate.
He is not entitled to such relief if he obtains any '^beneficial
interest" by his purchase, and the courts cannot measure the
benefit or value of the interest acquired if it is substantial:
Hayes v. Cartwright, 6 Lea, 145. It should be stated that
Gonce, the purchaser, does not offer to refund what he really
obtained by his purchase, but he objects to refunding or account-
ing for anything he has received, and appeals from so much of
the decree of the court of chancery appeals as requires him to
give credit for the rents received; in other words, he insists he
has a right to have his judgments restored and reinstated and
still to hold on to all he has received from a sale under these
judgments. In his bill he does not offer to return what he
received, and while he acquired Kice's life estate under his pur-
chase, he refuses to account for what he received '^^^ out of hia
purchase of it. This he cannot do; Hill v. Harriman, 95 Tenn.
305. But if complainant is entitled to have the satisfaction set
aside at all, it would be more proper to do so on condition that
he account for the value of the life estate he obtained and not
merely the rents during the time he occupied it. And the value
of that life estate would be estimated, not in the light of the
actual duration of the life estate as subsequently developed or
the rents received during that time, but at its value at the time
of purchase, estimated according to the rules usually adopted in
718 GoNCE t>. McCoy. [Tenn.
■estimating the value of life estates. To illustrate: If this life
estate of Kice had contiimed for ten, twenty, or fifty years, and
■complainant had all the while been enjoying the use of the prop-
-erty under his purchase, it would hardly he insisted he would
he entitled to have the satisfaction set aside on the ground that
he had not obtained the fee. The value of the estate acquired
hy complainant at his purchase must be estimated at the date of
the purchase and its probable value at that time, and not by
its actual return as subsequently developed.
"We are of opinion that the court of chancery appeals is in.
€rror in holding that the complainant is entitled to have the
€atisf action of the judgment in this case set aside and the judg-
ments restored to force and vitality, but that he is bound by his
purchase and the benefits received thereunder, and it is not
necessary to consider the other question.
605 fpjjg decree of the court of chancery appeals is reversed
and the decree of the chancellor afiirmed, and the bill is dis-
missed, and complainants will pay all costs in this court and
the court below.
EXECUTION— SALES— CAVEAT EMPTOR— .There Is no war-
ranty of title by a sheriff at an execution sale. The purchaser takes
just what title the defendant in the execution has, and buys at his
peril. The rule of caveat emptor applies to him: Greer v. Winter-
smith, 85 Ky. 516, 7 Am. St. Rep. 613, and note. In sales of land
under execution, the rule caveat emptor applies, and, on failure of
title, the purchaser has no relief from the payment of his bid ex-
cept by resort to equity: Stearns v. Edson, 63 Vt. 259, 25 Am, St.
Rep, 758; Lewark v. Carter, 117 Ind. 206, 10 Am. St. Rep. 40, and
note*. See the extended note to McGhee v. Ellis, 14 Am. Dec. 131,
where the entire question is discussed. See, also, Henderson t.
Overton, 2 Yerg. 394, 24 Am. Dec. 492.
CASES
nr THB
COURT OP CRIMINAL APPEALS
or
TEXAS.
Jones v. State.
[88 Texas Cbiuinal Rkfobts, 87.]
WITNESSES — COMPETENCY — WIFE IN CRIMINAL
OASB.— A wife can be a witness for her husband, but not against
him, and the state in a criminal case has the right to cross-examine
her pertaining to the facts sworn to by her on direct examination.
When the state leaves the matter elicited in the examination in
chief, and attempts to prove independent material facts by her, it
makes her its witness and a witness against her husband against
his objection. This cannot be legitimately done. To permit It Is re-
versible error.
WITNESSES — CROSS-EXAMINATION — MAKING ONE
PARTY'S OWN WITNESS.— When the matter elicited from a wit-
ness in his examination In chief is departed from, or when the facts
sought to be established on cross-examination are not pertinent or
germane to those elicited in the examination in chief, the witness
becomes the witness of the party attempting to prove such matter.
HOMICIDE— WIFE OF THE ACCUSED AS A WITNESS-
EVIDENCE TO SUPPORT HER.— If the defense to murder is in-
sulting words and conduct by the deceased toward the wife of the
accused which she communicated to him, and to which she has
testified. It is error to exclude the testimony of witnesses to estab-
lish the fact that, before the homicide, she had stated to them the
facts as testified to by her. Such testimony Is admissible to sup-
port her, and to show that her husband believed her statements
and committed the homicide In consequence thereof, when the the-
ory and evidence on behalf of the prosecution is to the effect that
her testimony was prompted by an improper motive and was re-
cently fabricated solely to aid In the defense of the husband.
MURDER— INSULTING CONDUCT TOWARD WIFE— EVI-
DENCE.—If the defense to murder Is Insulting conduct by the de-
ceased toward the wife of the accused, he may prove, as original
evidence, that prior to the homicide his wife communicated a state-
ment of the Insulting conduct toward her to the witness, who in
turn communicated It to the husband.
HOMICIDE — MURDER — EVIDENCE OF REPUTATION
OF DECEASED.- If the defense to murder is insulting conduct of
the deceased toward the wife of the accused, which she has com-
(71»>
720 Jones v. State. [Texaa,
municated to him, the bad general reputation of the deceased, as
well as his general reputation as a man of unchaste and lecherous
habits toward women, is admissible in evidence upon the issue a»
to whether the accused believed the information received from his
wife and acted thereon.
HOMICIDD-EVIDBNCE— STATEMENTS OF DECEASED
—HEARSAY.— If the defense to murder is insulting conduct by the
deceased toward the wife of the accused, the testimony of a wit-
ness, that, subsequently to the alleged insulting conduct, he saw a
woman in the office of the deceased, and that the latter informed
him that she was the wife of the accused, is hearsay and inadmis-
sible.
HOMICIDE — WIFE AS WITNESS — CROSS-EXAMINA-
TION.—If, upon the trial of a husband on a criminal charge, hia
wife as a witness, on direct examination, should swear to facts in-
jurious to him, he cannot complain, but her cross-examination must
be confined to tlie matter elicited upon the examination in chief.
Everything which is legitimate for the purpose of testing her knowl-
edge of the facts sworn to, her bias or prejudice, or any matter
that legitimately goes to discredit her, is admissible on cross-ex-
amination, but if the prosecution leaves the matter testified to on
the examination in chief and proposes to prove independent crim-
inative facts against the accused, this is not cross-examination, and
the wife then becomes a witness for the prosecution. Her exami-
nation must then stop, because she cannot become a witness against
her husband.
HOMICIDE— EVIDENCE— RES GESTAE.— If the defense to
murder is insulting conduct by the deceased toward the wife of the
accused, and she has testified as to such conduct and to communi-
cating it to her husband, and that he and deceased were friendly
until she made such communication, the prosecution cannot prove
by her, as part of the res gestae, on cross-examination, matters re-
lating to the disposition of her property, deceased's connection there-
with, or the squandering of her property by her husband.
WITNESSES— IMPEACHMENT.— If a witness is attacked by
showing that he has testified corruptly, or has recently fabricated
his testimony, he can be supported by proof that that he had at a
prior time made the same statements, before any motive could have
existed.
E. B. Seay, J. C. Muse, S. H. Eussell, and Miller & Williams,
for the appellant.
M. Trice, assistant attorney general, for the state.
®® DAVIDSON, J. Appellant was convicted of murder in
the second degree and given twenty years in the penitentiary;
hence this appeal.
The record contains something over three hundred pages of
tjrpewritten matter, a great deal of which is absolutely unneces-
sary to a proper understandng of the points in the case neces-
sary to be reviewed by this court. We have repeatedly called
attention to the fact that care should be taken by the lower
courts in preparing a record for this court, so that the points
in the case may be clearly presented, without unnecessary pro-
June, 1897.] Jones i;. Statk. 721
lixity or confusion. To make a record in the lower court con-
taining a great deal of useless matter is an idle consumption of
time, tending to produce confusion, requiring great labor in the
preparart;ion of such a record, and is a draft upon the time of
this court in reading, analyzing, and dissecting the same so as
to ascertain what essential matter the record contains. And we
egain call attention to this practice.
After a painstaking and exhaustive perusal of the voluminous
record, it occurs to us that the only questions that require a
discussion and reviewal by this court, necessary to a proper dis-
position of this case, are as follows: 1. The action of the court
in permitting a cross-examination of Mrs. Jones upon matters,
as insisted upon by appellant, not drawn out from her on the
€xamination in chief, and not pertinent to such examination;
•2. The action of the court in refusing to permit the appellant
to prove by the witness Kendall what defendant and his wife
may have told him with reference to the alleged insults of de-
ceased toward her; 3. The general reputation of deceased with
reference to his being a man of chaste and virtuous habits and
conduct toward women, or otherwise; 4. The admission of the
testimony of S. Q. Kichardson, as to seeing a woman in the office
of Veal during the year 1885, and that Veal told witness that it
was Mrs. Jones, et cetera.
In order to a proper understanding of these questions, we
will summarize the case sufficiently to show their bearing. The
evidence on the part of the state tended to show an unprovoked
murder. The killing occurred in the city of Dallas during the
fall of 1892, while the Dallas Fair was in progress. On the
morning of the homicide, Veal, the deceased, and several others,
were in a room in the third story of the Gaston building on
Commerce street, preparing some data or program in connection
with the Confederate Eeunion to take place at the Fair, Veal
was busy at the time, writing. Defendant came upstairs, walked
into the room, drew his pistol, placed it in close proximity to
the head of deceased, and fired upon and killed him. The de-
fense set up by appellant went merely to the degree of the homi-
cide; that is, he claimed that he killed deceased because of the
insulting words and conduct toward his wife, after their mar-
riage, which was intensified by an alleged rape upon ®® her by
the deceased prior to their marriage; and that he killed deceased
on their first meeting after being informed thereof. The de-
fendant having been previously acquitted of murder in the first
AM. ar. RKP.. Vol. lxx.— 16
722 Jones v. State. [Texas,
degree, the only issue presented on this trial was whether or
not he was guilty of murder in the second degree or of man-
slaughter.
1. Appellant introduced his wife as a witness, who testified
as to the alleged rape, which she testified was committed upon,
her in the year 1871, prior to her marriage with the defendant,
which occurred in March, 1874. In that connection she stated
that she was living with a Mrs. Cockrell, in Dallas. That she
occupied a room upstairs, with her infant child, by a former
marriage. That Veal came and stayed all night at Mrs. Cock-
rell's, he being then a minister of the gospel in the Methodist
Church, and was assigned a room upstairs, in which he slept.
That some time during the night she was aroused from slumber,
and saw standing by her bed a man. She raised up and told
him to go away. "He kept standing there, and when I said
that, he put his hand out to mine, and put his hand over my
mouth, and he says, *Hush, they'll hear you.' I was almost
paralyzed with fright, but I seemed to realize what his object
was, and threw myself backward, and threw my arms around
my baby, but he pulled me away and ravished me. 1 was not
conscious at the time I was outraged. When consciousness re-
turned to me. Veal had gone." She further testified that "about
a year after her marriage with defendant, while she was living
on Eoss avenue, in Dallas, one day some one knocked at the
door and the servant came and opened it, and Captain Veal, the
deceased, came in. That Veal, instead of going into the parlor,
came into the room where she was sitting. That she got up,
and he came toward her, with his arms out, just like he was
going to take her in his arms; that she stepped back and said:
*You forget yourself. Captain Veal, You forget that I have a
husband to protect me now.' *' She told him to go away, and
turned and left the room. "A number of years after that, while
I was living in East Dallas, near the ice factory, and after I had
moved in from Mesquite, my little girl came and said, 'There is
a gentleman at the door.' I looked, and saw Captain Veal stand-
ing in the front door. I said: 'What do you mean. Captain Veal,
by coming to my house? You know I do not want to see you.
It makes me miserable to see you; and I don't want to see you,*^
And he said, *I was taking a walk, and thought I would stop
in and see you a few minutes.* And I told him he was not
welcome, and did not want him to come near me. He only
stayed a few minutes, and then left. These were the only two>
June, 1897.] Jones v. State. 723
occasions I ever saw Veal after I was married to Dr. Jones."
She testified that in the fall of 1891, for the first time, she men-
tioned Veal's conduct toward her, both before and since her
marriage with the defendant. That when she told her husband
of these matters he became greatly excited, and acted like a
crazy man. He wanted to go immediately to Fort Worth (where
Veal then lived), but she begged him not to, and to let Veal
alone. That repeatedly thereafter the subject was mentioned,
the defendant bringing it up, and on such occasions *^® he would
act like a crazy man. This is the condensed testimony of Mrs.
Jones introduced by the defendant. Over the objections of the
defendant, the state proved by Mrs. Jones that she had conveyed
certain property to her son, James Bullington, at the instance
of Mrs. Cockrell and Mitch Gray, upon the eve of her marriage
to the defendant; that this angered the defendant, and he also
became angry at Mitch Gray and Mrs. Cockrell because of this
matter; that the defendant forbade his wife visiting Mrs. Cockrell
for nearly twenty years on account thereof; the squandering of
the witness' property by the defendant; the effort of the witness,
Mrs. Jones, and the defendant to have the disabilities of min-
ority of James Bullington removed, in order to have him recon-
vey the property to witness; and also interrogated the defend-
ant's wife as to advice given by the deceased to her in reference
to her property, and that deceased transacted business for witness
and defendant. These matters were all brought out upon what
is termed a cross-examination of the witness. Mrs. Jones had
testified to no facts to which these matters related or were ger-
mane; not one. When the state left the* matter elicited upon
examination in chief, and attempted to prove these things by
Mrs. Jones, it made her its witness, and would have had the
right to introduce her as a witness, and prove these facts, if ap-
pellant had never placed her upon the stand, if such facts could
be proved by her, as was done in this instance. The wife can be
a witness for the husband, but not against him. He is permitted
to prove by her any fact that he desires. The state had the
right to cross-examine her pertaining to the facts sworn to by
her on direct examination. This would be a cross-examination.
But when the state leaves the matter elicited in the examination
in chief, and attempts to prove independent facts by her, it
makes her its witness, and a witness against her husband, over
his objections. This cannot be done. This is no new doctrine
in this state, but is settled by a number of cases: See Creamer
724 Jones v. State. [Texas,
V. State, 34 Tex. 173; Greenwood v. State, 35 Tex. 587; Hamp-
ton V. State, 45 Tex. 154; Washington v. State, 17 Tex. Crim.
App. 197; Johnson v. State, 28 Tex. Crim. App. 17; Bluman v.
State, 33 Tex. Crim. Kep. 43; Hoover v. State, 35 Tex. Crim.
Eep. 342. The rule adopted by the courts in our state is illus-
trated by the right to cross-examine a witness. The cross-exam-
ination of an ordinary witness can only be conducted as to such
matters as are pertinent to the matters brought out in the ex-
amination in chief; and in most jurisdictions in our country,
where a party seeks on cross-examination to bring out matters
not germane or pertinent to the examination in chief, if they are
legitimate in evidence as competent testimony for the party
seeking to bring them out on cross-examination, he will not be
permitted to do so in the cross-examination of such witness, but
when he comes to present his case he can introduce the witness
on his own behalf. See the rule stated in 1 Greenleaf on Evi-
dence, section 445, and authorities there cited. This practice
renders patent the fact that the witness, so far as the matters
which do not pertain to the examination in chief are concerned,
is the witness of the party introducing them. Now, in some
jurisdictions ^^^ the party is not required to stand the witness
aside until he introduces his evidence, but may prove any per-
tinent fact by the witness introduced by the other party; but in
doing so, if he departs from the matter elicited in chief, he
makes the witness his own witness. So, applying either rule,
the conclusion is inevitable that when the matter elicited in
chief is departed from, or when the facts sought to be established
upon a cross-examinaflon, so called, are not pertinent or germane
to that elicited in chief, the witness becomes the witness of the
party attempting to prove such matter. Apply that rule to this
case: The facts proved by Mrs. Jones, over the objection of the
defendant, as above stated, had no relation whatever — were not
pertinent or germane — to any fact elicited on her examination in
chief. In a case it may be important as to when the defendant
married. He introduces his wife, and proves the date of the mar-
riage. If the rule be otherwise than" that stated by us, the state
would be permitted to prove by the wife all manner and every
description of criminative facts against the husbaAd. We are of
opinion that the state had a right to prove by Mrs. Jones, because
it was pertinent to her examination in chief, that she visited the
deceased after the commission of the alleged rape and the other
insulting conduct. Any fact or circumstance which tended to
June, 1897.] Jones v. State. 725
ehow a friendly relation between Veal and Mrs. Jones after
the insulting conduct above mentioned occurred is admissible,
because pertinent to her examination in chief; but nothing else,
according to this record, was permissible to be shown by the
state on cross-examination. Now, while the court might have
violated this rule in permitting the state to prove facts not
germane to the examination in chief, yet, unless the facts are of
such a character as to have a material bearing upon the issues
involved, we would not reverse this judgment upon this ground.
The question, therefore, is the materiality of these facts; their
bearing, et cetera, when viewed with reference to the theories of
both parties. The record develops the fact that the theory of
the state was that Jones killed the deceased because he was try-
ing to protect Mrs. Jones, and especially her son, James Bulling-
ton, from the avarice of Jones, the defendant; that Veal was the
protector of Mrs. Jones and her son, and that he was a serious
obstacle in the way of Jones in his (Jones') desire to obtain the
possession and control of the property which belonged to Bul-
lington, having been transferred to him just before the marriage
of the mother with the defendant; his object was to get a deed
from young Bui ling ton to his wife for the property and real
estate, and finally to have the control and management, and
perhaps the absolute fee to the property, in himself, and that
the deceased was an obstacle in the way of defendant to perfect
his plans. The theory of the defendant was, that owing to the
insults, outrages, and conduct of Veal toward his wife, he killed
him, and that he was, therefore, guilty of nothing greater than
manslaughter. These were the opposing theories. The battle
was fought upon these lines; the state marshalling all the facts
and circumstances in support of its theory, and the defendant
all that supported his theory. Now, the state is permitted, over
the objections ^^'^ of the defendant, to lay the very foundation
upon which this theory rests by the testimony of Mrs. Jones,
which was not germane to anything elicited by the defendant.
We think the testimony was very important when we look to the
issues between the parties, and, not being pertinent or germane
to her examination in chief, but being original testimony, she
being the wife of the appellant, its admission, over the objection
of appellant, was improper.
2. On the trial of the case, appellant introduced one T. G. T.
Kendall, and proposed to prove by him that immediately after
the communication made by the wife of appellant to him in the
726 Jones v. State. [Texas,
fall of 1891 (about a year prior to the homicide) in regard to
Veal's conduct toward her, that defendant, being in great dis-
tress of mind, sougnt his friend, said Kendall, to advise with
him relative to the communication so made by his wife; that
defendant was then in an excited and distressed condition of
mind, and then and there told Kendall of said communication
so made to him by his wife, to wit, that Veal had raped her in
1872, prior to her marriage with defendant, and after her mar-
riage with defendant, in 1874 or 1875, and again in 1885, Veal
had visited her with lecherous and carnal propositions, and that
in said first visit Veal had sought to embrace his (defendant's)
wife; defendant stating then and there to said Kendall that his
(defendant's) wife had commimicated such facts to him a few
days prior thereto. Defendant further offered to prove that he
expressed to Kendall his unqualified belief in the truth of the
statement so made to him by his wife; that said Kendall then
stated to defendant that he did not believe it, that he had known
defendant's wife since she was a child, and that he would not
believe that Veal or any other man had raped or insulted her,
unless he heard it from her own lips; and said Kendall refused
to talk with defendant, and left him. He also offered to prove
by Kendall that shortly thereafter he saw Mrs. Jones (wife of
appellant), and that she told him of the circumstance of Veal
having raped her before her marriage with appellant, and of his
subsequent visits to her as stated above. A few hours after this,
Kendall again met defendant, and told him: "I have been to
your house. I have seen and talked with your wife, and she haa
told me that what you stated to me in regard to Veal's conduct
toward her was true." And said witness, in that connection,
stated to appellant: "Every word your wife has stated to me and
to you is true. Veal did everything she says he did. I know
your wife to be incapable of telling a lie. A purer, better
woman never lived, and I believe every word she says about it."
Appellant also offered to prove by Kendall that repeatedly after
said communications appellant talked with him about said
matters up to within a few days of the homicide, and on all
such occasions he was greatly excited, and appeared to be in a
distressed condition of mind, and on such occasions was never
calm, and always avowed his belief in the truth of said commu-
nications made to him by his wife. Appellant also proposed to
prove by his wife that she made the statement to Kendall as
above stated; and it was also proposed to prove by her that she
June, 1897.] Jones v. State. 727
told Mrs. Cockrell these same matters. All of **' this testi-
mony was objected to by the state, and excluded by the court,
to which defendant execpted. Appellant insists that said testi-
mony was admissible as tending to show that his defense set up
in this case was not fabricated, and as tending to rebut the con-
tention of the state that said matters were manufactured after
the homicide. He also urges that said testimony was admissible
as tending to establish both the truth of the facts communicated
to defendant by his wife, and the defendant's belief in the truth
of said communication; and also showed a communication to
defendant by Kendall of the same facts communicated to the
defendant by his wife, and that defendant's wife, long anterior
to the homicide, had communicated said rape and subsequent
insults by Veal to another than the defendant.
The statement of acts presents but one issue, and that is,
whether appellant was guilty of murder in killing W. G. Veal,
or whether he was gulity of manslaughter. If the jury believed
the testimony of Mrs. Jones and appellant, the theory of appel-
lant that it was nothing greater than manslaughter is clearly
presented. If the jury did not believe the testimony of appel-
lant and Mrs. Jones, then manslaughter, so far as the jury is
concerned, is not in the case. The state's theory is, that the
killing was not prompted by a passion aroused by this miscon-
duct of Veal toward Mrs. Jones (wife of appellant), and that her
testimony was manufactured to aid her husband in his defense.
Every particle of testimony introduced by the state is for the
purpose of making a case in opposition to the truth of the tes-
timony of Mrs. Jones and defendant. Now, the rule of law is,
that where the opposing case is that the witness testified under
corrupt motives, or where the impeaching evidence goes to
charge the witness with a recent fabrication of his testimony,
the party introducing the witness can prove that before the
motive existed (the motive in this case being to save the life or
liberty of her husband), the witness made the same statement aa
that sworn to. To state the proposition in another form: if the
opposing case is to the effect that the witness had a corrupt
motive in swearing to certain facts, or that the witness recently
fabricated the testimony for a purpose (in this case the motive
being to prevent the conviction of appellant, and that, therefore,
this testimony was manufactured . after the death of Veal), the
party introducing the witness (being the appellant in this case)
can show that before the deceased (Veal) was killed the witnesa
728 Jones v. State. [Texas^
(Mrs. Jones) told the same story which she swears to upon the-
trial. By such proof, the charge that it was fabricated, or
prompted by an improper motive, is completely met and des-
troyed, if believed by the jury. The authorities are divided as^
to whether a witness can be supported because the adversary
has shown that he made conflicting statements about the fact.
We hold that this can be done. This, however, is a doubtful
question when tested by the authorities. All the authorities
agree, where the attack is made that the witness is prompted by
improper motives,or has recently fabricated the story, that under
either of these contingencies the party introducing his witness
can prove his witness stated the same facts prior to **** the
time when the motive could have existed, or prior to the occa-
sion or circumstances prompting the manufacturing of the testi-
mony. We have repeatedly written upon this subject, laying
down substantially the same rules that we here state, and we
deem it unnecessary to even cite the cases. In support of this
last proposition we cite 1 Wharton on Evidence, 2d ed., art. 570.
We also call attention to the long list of cases cited by Mr.
Wharton in note 2 to this article. Apply these principles to this
case: When the testimony in the case had been concluded, there
was no evidence before the jury that Mrs. Jones or appellant
had ever alluded to the outrages committed upon Mrs. Jones.
The inference was cogent, indeed, that it was fabricated to save
the life or liberty of the appellant. When the testimony of Mrs.
Jones is scrutinized, it is placed in a very doubtful attitude. It
would have been perfectly natural and reasonable for the jury to
have inferred that she had manufactured her testimony because
she wanted to save her husband. But suppose, in addition to
her testimony (it being of a doubtful character standing alone),
the evidence of Kendall had been received, would any man have
entertained the same doubts about its truth as if her testimony
had been without support? Law should be common sense, and
there is no man but- what would have much more readily believed
her testimony if they had known that she told the same story
before the death of Veal as that which she swears to on the trial.
We are of opinion that this testimony was admissible for the
purpose of supporting Mrs. Jones, and for the purpose of show-
ing that Jones believed her statements. Again, in another view,
this testimony was admissible as independent evidence, for the
purpose of showing that the insulting conduct of Veal toward
Mrs. Jones had been communicated to Jones prior to the homi-
June, 1897.] Jones v. State. 729
cide. It is true that Mrs. Jones swore directly that she com-
municated the insulting conduct of Veal to her hushand, but the
defendant was not circumscribed by making such proof by his
wife. As original testimony, it was entirely competent for the
defendant to have introduced Kendall to show that Mrs. Jonea
communicated the conduct of Veal to him, and that he in turn
told it to the defendant prior to the homicide.
3. The next question presented is, whether or not appellant
had the right to prove the general reputation of deceased with
reference to his being a man of chaste and virtuous habits and
conduct toward women or otherwise. Appellant attempted to
do this by a number of witnesses, and on objection by the state it
was excluded by the court. We are of opinion that specific acta
of lewdness (which appellant also claims were excluded) were not
admissible. The general principle applicable to such specific
acts is that it would involve too many issues, and the court can-
not turn aside to try a vast number of collateral matters. But
the rule is different as to general reputation. "We are of opinion
that proof of deceased's general reputation being bad in this par-
ticular was not admissible for the purpose of showing that he
was guilty of the insulting conduct toward Mrs. Jones, but we
are of the opinion that his general ***' reputation was admissi-
ble for the purpose of determining whether Jones believed the
story told him by his wife. We have no doubt of the correctness
of this proposition. In addition to this, appellant had a right
to prove that his general reputation was bad, and that he was
informed of such reputation. This evidence is admissible, as
before stated, to show that he not only believed what his wife
had told him, but added greater probability to the presumption
that he acted on this belief.
4. The next question presented is as to the action of the
court in admitting the testimony of S. Q. Eichardson as to see-
ing a woman in the oflBce of Veal during the year 1885, and that
Veal told witness that it was Mrs. Jones. The object of this tes-
timony on the part of the state was doubtless for the purpose of
showing the friendly relation existing between Mrs. Jones and
Veal, and so to discredit her story with reference to Veal's in-
sults toward her. Now, if this testimony had identified the
Mrs. Jones seen in Veal's ofilce by Eichardson as the wife of ap-
pellant, or if it had a tendency to so identify her, it would have
been admissible. But, in our opinion, there was no circum-
stance connected with this matter that aufl&ciently identifies her
730 Jones v. State, [Texas,
as being tte wife of appellant, and so the testimony should have
been excluded. Again, what Veal said about it was clearly hear-
say evidence, in the absence of any testimony tending to iden-
tify Mrs. Jones there mentioned as the wife of the appellant.
This testimony, as presented, is purely hearsay. If, in fact, Mrs.
Jones • visited Veal, as attempted to be shown by Eichardson,
this would have been a very strong circumstance with the jury,
tending to negative or disprove everything that she had said
about the insulting conduct of the deceased. The conclusion
would have been very strong, indeed, that she had manufactured
this story for the purpose of saving the life and liberty of her
husband. Now, the rule is that no conclusion can rise higher
than the facts from which it is made. When a conclusion is
eought to be made, the fact upon which it is based must be
clearly proved. Vague suspicions, leading to hurtful conclu-
sions, are not permitted in law. See Burrill on Circumstantial
Evidence, 126. This is the second appeal of this case, appellant
having previously been convicted of murder in the first degree,
but the case was reversed, because it was not properly tried:
Jones V. State, 33 Tex. Crim. Eep. 492, 47 Am. St. Eep. 46.
The questions discussed in this opinion are upon the admission
and exclusion of evidence, which, in our opinion, go to the merits
of the case. The errors are not mere irregularities, but are in
regard to the admission and exclusion of evidence upon vital
questions, and it is impossible for us to tell what influence the
excluded testimony might have had upon the jury, or what in-
fluence the admitted testimony may have wrought upon their
minds. The rules with regard to said testimony, it occurs to us,
are obvious. They are found in the text-books on evidence, and
have been followed by this court in a number of decisions. We
cannot afford to set a bad precedent by their violations, nor are
we inclined to do so. In the discharge of our duty, the rules
of evidence must be observed in all cases. This is for the com-
mon benefit of all, in order that all may alike be protected by
the rules of law. Because, in our ***** opinion, these rules were
not adhered to and enforced in the court below, the judgment is
reversed, and the cause remanded.
After the above opinion was handed down, a motion for re-
hearing and brief in behalf of the state was filed by Hon. Mann
Trice, assistant attorney general:
***^ DAVIDSON, J. We have carefully considered the mo-
tion for rehearing presented by the assistant attorney general.
June, 1897.] Jones v. State. 731
At a former day of this term this court reversed the judgment
of the lower court on four errors committed. We will go over
the grounds again, and re-examine the record.
1. The first error is in relation to the court's permitting the
state to prove by Mrs. Jones, wife of appellant, facts and cir-
cumstances not germane to anything she had sworn on her tes-
timony in chief. "We held, and still hold, that this cannot be
done. The law will not permit the husband or wife to be a wit-
ness against each other. If the husband is upon trial, and his
wife is a witness, and she should swear to facts injurious to him,
in answer to questions propounded, he could not complain, but,
where she swears to certain facts and circumstances, the cross-
examination must be confined to the matter elicited in chief. Of
course, everything which is legitimate for the purpose of testing
her knowledge of the fact sworn to, her bias, her prejudice, in
fact any matter that goes legitimately to discredit her, is admissi-
ble on cross-examination. However, where the state leaves the
matter testified to in chief, and proposes to prove independent
criminative facts against the accused, this would not be a cross-
examination of the witness. When the matter is departed from,
the witness ceases to be a witness for her husband, and becomes
a witness for the state. This is absolutely demonstrated by the
overwhelming weight of the authority. Mr. Wharton, in his
work on Evidence, section 529, says: "Although, in England,
counsel, in cross-examination, are permitted to ask questions
bearing on the whole case, so as to bring out matters of inde-
pendent defense, in this country, in most jurisdictions, cross-
examinations, with greater propriety, are confined to the subject
of the examination in chief, and that of the credit of the witness.
If a matter of defense is to be proved, this must be reserved
until the cross-examining party has opened his case, when he is
at liberty to call the witness to prove such defense.'* In support
of this proposition, Mr. Wharton cites not less than fifty cases,
from the states of New Hampshire, New Jersey, Pennsylvania,
Michigan, Indiana, Illinois, Iowa, Wisconsin, Minnesota, Kan-
sas, Nevada, Georgia, California, Arkansas, Nebraska, and a
number of others. The supreme court of the United States holds
that, where the matter sworn to in chief is departed from on so-
called cross-examination, the witness becomes the witness of the
party who elicits this matter. To illustrate the proposition:
The defendant ^*'* introduces a witness to prove certain facts.
Ihe state cross-examines as to these facts, and then proves in-
732 Jones v. State. [Texas,
dependent facts by the witness — facts which are not germane
to the examination in chief. So far as these facts are concerned,
the witness becomes the witness of the defendant. Now, let us
illustrate the question before us: An accused party is upon trial
for murder. It becomes relevant and important to know when
he and his wife were married, or when a certain child of theirs
was born, or whether he was at home at a particular hour of a
certain night, et cetera. He introduces his wife, and she swears
to the date of the marriage, to the birth of the child, and that
her husband on that particular night was at home. The state
can cross-examine her thoroughly as to the marriage, where it
occurred, who attended, who were the bridesmaids, grooms, and
how old the parties were, et cetera, and then institute an in-
quiry as to her prejudice, contradictory statements, if there are
such, and every matter which is proper to test her means of
knowledge and credibility. So, with reference to the birth of
the child, and the supposed alibi. This testimony is elicited
from the wife, to wit, the marriage, birth of the child, and proof
of the alibi. After having cross-examined the witness pertain-
ing to these matters, the state proposed to prove by the defend-
ant's wife that he had a motive to kill the deceased; that he had
threatened to kill deceased; that he had arms suitable for that
purpose, corresponding with those used at the homicide, et cet-
era. These matters are not relevant at all to the marriage, the
birth of the child, or the alibi; and, when the state proves these
facts by the wife, she then becomes the witness of the state, and
is emphatically forced to testify against her husband. We can-
not give a clearer illustration of this question than that above.
In line with the cases referred to above will be found the case
of People V. Briggs, 60 How. Pr. 17. In that case, Osbom, P. J.,
illustrates a provision of the New York statute which provides
that the husband and wife shall not testify against each other,
and which might have been inserted for a certain purpose, to wit,
he says: "For instance, a wife might be called as a witness on
behalf of the husband, to prove some one isolated fact. It may
be that the legislature, by saying that she should not be com-
pelled to testify or give evidence against him, intended to pre-
vent, upon cross-examination, an inquiry into any other matters
not inquired into upon the direct examination, and which might
be very damaging to the husband, and so vice versa." We deem
deem it unnecessary to add additional authorities upon this sub-
ject. In Texas and other states the witness is not required to
June, 1897.] Jones v. State. 733
etand aside until the opposing party introduces his evidence.
The adverse party can cross-examine the witness thoroughly
pertaining to the matters elicited in chief, and will not be re-
quired to wait until he presents his testimony in order to prove
facts relevant to the main issue, by the witness. He can prove
any competent fact by the witness on what is called cross-exam-
ination, but this rule does not affect the question at all. Sup-
pose, upon the so-called cross-examination, the matter elicited in
chief is completely departed from, and new matter is sought to
be established by the witness, which is relevant to the main ^^"^
issue, would the party be permitted to lead the witness in regard
to this matter? Would he not still, though he could elicit the
matter, be held to examine him just as if he had introduced him?
Certainly. By way of illustration: The plaintiff introduces a
witness, and proves a relevant fact. The adverse party can
cross-examine him thoroughly as to this fact. After doing so,
if he leaves this matter, and proposes to prove important relevant
facts by the witness introduced by the plaintiff, he is not bound
to require him to stand aside, but can do so. Should he propose
to prove the facts by leading questions, and the plaintiff objects,
not to his right to prove the facts, but leading the witness, this
tests the question as to whose witness he is as to this matter.
Evidently, he is then the witness of the defendant.
The assistant attorney general insists that anything pertaining
to the res gestae can be proved by the wife. In his motion for
rehearing he says: "I concede that the general rule is as stated
by the court, that the cross-examination of the wife should be
confined to the matters drawn out on the examination in chief,
or be germane thereto; but there are well established exceptions
to this general rule, which is universal and binding — ^that is,
the right of cross-examination extends to all matters connected
with the res gestae, and as to credit." Res gestae of what?
Ees gestae of what she said in chief? If so, we do not object.
Does he mean the res gestae of the homicide? If so, we certainly
cannot concede any such proposition. Mrs. Jones did not say
one word about the homicide. She was not a witness to the
homicide, and knew nothing of the facts attending the homicide.
If res gestae can be established by the wife or husband, upon
cross-examination, then the assistant attorney general's excep-
tion should be the rule, instead of that stated by him to be the
rule, for we have never yet been able to place any limit to what
is called res gestae of a homicide. Our understanding of this
734 Jones v. State. [Texas,
rule, as explained by Mr. Stephens in his work on Evidence, is
that the homicide has its res gestae, or attending circumstances;
that any relevant fact to the main fact is its res gestae, until you
extend it into a field in which the fact has no probative force.
It would be a novel case in which a relevant fact would not be
res gestae of the main fact, or which would not have its own rea
gestae. Now, we concede that anything that is res gestae to
what was said is admissible. Mrs. Jones testified as to the rape
by Veal, and his subsequent insulting conduct toward her, and
that Veal and appellant had been friendly before she communi-
cated these facts to appellant. The state proved by her, over
the objections of appellant, all that matter pertaining to the
effort to have the disabilities of her son removed, so that he
could make a deed to her, et cetera. We most seriously would
ask if this matter was res gestae to the rape or subsequent in-
sulting conduct? Was it calculated to explain, modify, or to
affect in any manner her testimony in regard to Veal's conduct?
How and in what manner did it bear on the fact that Veal and
Jones had been friendly r* If this evidence be a part of the res
gestae of the efforts to remove the disabilities of the minor son,
^^® then could there be any relevant fact which would not have
been res' gestae? And instead of confining the cross-examina-
tion, so called, to the matters elicited in chief, we would never
find a case that did not have res gestae enough to admit any-
thing they proposed to prove. Would not this idea of the as-
sistant attorney general's theory of res gestae be a most remark-
ablt, novel application of this doctrine? We confess that, out-
side of this motion for rehearing, we have never found such an
extension of the doctrine. To condense: It means that the wife
can be made a witness against her husband in the face of the
prohibition of the statute in regard to any matter relevant to
the case, whether it be germane to what she hrd sworn in chief or
not.
It is contended, however, by the assistant attorney general,
that in fact the wife was not compelled to testify to any fact
which was not germane to her testimony in chief; that there was
merely an effort to make her testify to such facts. A very slight
investigation of this record will demonstrate that several very
important facts were sworn to by her, over the objection of ap-
pellant. For instance, we refer to bill of exceptions number 3,
which was approved by the trial judge. The bill was reserved to
the action of the court permitting the state to elicit from Mrs.
June, 1897.] Jones v. State. 731^
Jones a great deal of testimony with reference to the transfer by
herself of a large amount of property to her infant son, the day
before her marriage with the defendant, and thus laying the
foundation of the theory of the state in proving a motive for the
killing other than that assigned by the appellant. The import-
ance of this testimony must be conceded, for the state relied
upon these matters as a motive for the killing, and for the pur-
pose of avoiding the testimony, relied upon by the appellant, re-
garding the insulting conduct of Veal toward appellant's wife as
the cause for the killing. Mrs. Jones had not testified for the-
defendant in regard to this property transaction, and it was
brought out from her by the state, over appellant's objection. If
appellant killed Veal on account of his supposed connection with
the transfer of the property, it might be considered by the jury
as an answer to Mrs. Jones' evidence in regard to the insulting
conduct, and tend to phow that her testimony in regard to such
insulting conduct was a fabrication. Then the antagonism;
between the two theories was potent and sharp, the defendant
relying upon what his wife and Kendall had told him with refer-
ence to the insulting conduct of Veal toward his wife, and the-
state relying upon the fact that the motive operating upon
Jones' mind at the killing grew out of the property transaction.
2. The assistant attorney general contends that this court
erred in reversing the judgment because the trial court refused
to permit Mrs. Jones to be corroborated Dy the statement of the
witness Kendall, in reference to the alleged rape and insulting
conduct. He says: "It is never admissible to sustain a witness
by proof of general good character or otherwise, until the repu-
tation of the witness is assailed for truth and veracity, or im-
peached by showing contradictory statements. These are con-
ditions precedent to offering testimony to corroborate or sus-
tain a *^® witness." The original opinion in this case does not
insinuate that the state had proved that Mrs. Jones had made
contradictory statements about any matter. In that opinion wa
never discussed the question as to whether the witness could be
supported when thus attacked, to wit, by proof of contradictory
statements. But, since our attention has been called to this
subject, we will go further, and discuss the question as to
whether a party can support his witness when thus attacked.
We deemed it unnecessary to discuss this in our former opin-
ion. Now, then, was there an effort made to show that Mrs.
Jones had made contradictory statements about this matter?
786 Jones v. State. [Texas,
There was not, "but there was an efEort made, and it is claimed
that it was successful, to show that her conduct gave the lie to
the tale she told; that after this rape hy Yeal, et cetera, she vis-
ited Yeal; that business relations existed between them, et cet-
■era. There is no difference in the character of the attack. If
the state had proved that she had made contradictory statements
in regard to the matter testified to by her, every decision in this
state is to the effect that she could have been supported by proof
that she made the same statement to others as that sworn to on
the trial. Acts speak as loud, and demonstrate the condition of
the mind as effectually, as words. For what purpose was the
evidence introduced, tending to show that she was on friendly
terms with Veal, if it was not to establish the fact that what
she had said about the insulting conduct was false? There
could have been no other purpose. In fact, the evidence would
not have been relevant for any other purpose in this case. This
attack was as effectual, if not more so, than to have proved that
she did make a contradictory statement. Being thus attacked,
under all the authorities in this state, the wife could have been
supported.
The assistant attorney general cites us to Mr. Wharton and
authorities which deny the correctness of a proposition that a
witness can be supported when thus attacked. We have written
a number of opinions in which we called attention to the fact
that Mr. Wharton and a great many cases question or deny the
•correctness of the proposition. We have not invented this rule
for this case, but have applied it to every case in which the ques-
tion has arisen. The original opinion was based upon this propo-
sition, found in Mr. Wharton's work on Evidence, section 570,
and the same section relied on by the assistant attorney general,
and the rule is not questioned by any authority, to wit: "On the
other hand, where the opposing case is that the witness testified
under corrupt motives, or where the impeaching evidence goes
to charge the witness with a recent fabrication of his testimony,
it is but proper that such evidence should be rebutted. It has
•consequently been ruled that statements made by a witness cor-
roborating his evidence upon the trial, such statements being
uttered soon after the transaction in litigation, and at a time
vhen the witness could not have been subject to any disturbing
influences, are competent when proof has been offered to im-
peach him, by showing that he had recently fabricated the' nar-
rative, or that he testified corruptly." In support of this propo-
June, 1897.] Jones v. State. 737
ation, Mr. Wharton cites a *^® great number of authorities,
<;ommon law as well as from the different states of this Union.
And in the note to said text we find this: "Russell (3 Russell
on Crimes, 593) holds *that the better opinion seems to be that
such evidence is not admissible, except in cases where the coun-
sel on the other side impute a design to misrepresent, from some
motive of interest or relationship.* " And this note is supported
by a great number of authorities, all of which are English cases,
including as well Phillips, Starkie, and Hawkins. These ex-
cerpts from Mr. Wharton will be found in the very same section
quoted and relied upon by the assistant attorney general. If
we had based our ruling upon the fact that Mrs. Jones was
supported, because proof had been made tending to show
that she had made contradictory statements, the excerpt from
Mr. Wharton contained in the motion of the assistant attor-
ney general would have had some explanation. But, as be-
fore stated, the appellate courts of this state have held, in
an unbroken line of decisions, that where a witness is attacked
by showing contradictory statements, the witness can be sup-
ported. We are not called upon to go back on that rule, for, as
above stated, the opinion is not upon that subject. Now, will
any one deny but what the state's case — the opposing case —
most powerfully suggests that Mrs. Jones had fabricated her tes-
timony to save her husband's life? There was the motive, the
cause assigned, and no doubt argued with great force and effect
before the jury. To meet this, appellant had the right to show
that his wife did not fabricate this testimony to save her hus-
band; that she told the same story before the killing of Veal.
For the first time in this state, so far as we know, the motion for
rehearing in this case questions the rule, where, when a witness
is attacked by showing that he testified corruptly, or had re-
■cently fabricated his testimony for a purpose, he could be sup-
ported by proof that he (witness) made the same statemencs be-
fore the motive could have existed, and that it was not fabri-
<»ted, because he had told the same story before. In this case
the motive on the part of Mrs. Jones was to save the life of her
husband, if her testimony was false. This was the opposing case
of the state on the trial.
3. We have no doubt of the correctness of our views in re-
gard to proof of the general reputation of Veal as being a man
«f unchaste and lecherous habits, as applied to the facts of this
case. By analogy, we could adduce any number of cases; for in-
AM. St. Rbp.. \ ol. LXX.— 47
738 Jones v. State. [Texaa^
stance, the case of Horbach v. State, 43 Tex. 243. In that case
Judge Roberts properly held that the general reputation of
Thomas was admissible as a dangerous and violent man when
drinking. That testimony was not for the purpose of excusing
Horbach for killing Thomas, but for the purpose of determin-
ing the light in which Horbach had a right to view the acts and
conduct of the deceased, in connection with his bad character.
The same principle is applicable here. Did Jones believe what
his wife told him? He had a right to look to the general reputa-
tion of Veal upon that subject; and the jury had a right to know
the general reputation of Veal, in order to determine whether
or not Jones believed the story told him by his wife.
*** 4. The assistant attorney general contends that the court
i erred in holding that the testimony of S. Q. Eichardson waa
inadmissible, and insists that, as other witnesses testified that
Mrs. Jones and Veal met on friendly terms, therefore the testi-
mony of said Eichardson was admissible. Now, Eichardson doea
not swear that the Mrs. Jones who testified in this case, and th&
wife of the appellant, was the woman that he saw in Veal's office^
He swears that Veal said that a certain woman who visited his
office was Mrs. Dr. Jones. Suppose Veal had said that it waa
Mrs. Dr. Jones, the wife of Dr. E. H. Jones, this appellant;
would it be contended that this would have been admissible?
Would it not be hearsay testimony? If Eichardson knew that
Mrs. Jones, the wife of appellant, was the lady who visited Veal,
and of whom he was testifying, there would be no necessity of
stating what Veal said about it. If Eichardson knew this wit-
ness to be the lady, and that she and Veal conversed, all that
was said would have been admissible, because Eichardson him-
self would have identified Mrs. Jones as the wife of appellant.
However, he knew nothing of this himself. The state simply
proved by him that a woman visited the office of Veal, and that
Veal said her name was Mrs. Dr. Jones. As we have said. Veal
might have told Eichardson that she was Mrs. Dr. Jones, the-
wife of Dr. E. H. Jones, this appellant; yet, unless Eichardson
knew that she was the witness, Mrs. Dr. Jones, all that Veal said
would have been hearsay.
We have gone over the motion made for a new trial made by
the assistant attorney general, as well as the transcript herein,
and our views have not been shaken in the least, but confirmed.
The motion for rehearing filed by the state is overruled, and, in
accordance with the original opinion, the judgment of the lower
court is reversed, and the cause remanded.
June, 1897.J Jones v. State. t39
IN THE SUBSEQUENT CASE of Galnes v. State, 38 Tex. Crlm.
Rep. 202-220, it was again decided, on the autliority of the prin-
cipal case, that if the wife of the accused is a witness for him on
his trial for murder, her cross-examination must be limited strictly
to such facts as are pertinent and germane to matters brought out
on her examination in chief, and it is reversible error to permit her
to be cross-examined against objection, as to important collateral
matters Injurious to the accused, or to permit her, after such Illegal
cross-examination, to be impeached by proof of her contradictory
statements as to such matters, and it Is beyond the power of the
court to cure the error and to so limit and control such evidence
In the charge to the jury as to deprive it of its injurious effect.
WITNESSES-COMPETENCY OP WIPE IN CRIMINAL CASE.
Under a statute providing that "husband and wife may be wit-
nesses for each other in all criminal cases, but they shall not be
required to testify against each other, as witnesses for the prosecu-
tion," neither is a competent voluntary witness against the other:
Byrd v. State, 57 Miss. 243, 34 Am. Rep. 440, and note. Extended
note to State v. Boyd, 27 Am. Dec. 377. See the note to Hitchcock
V. Moore, 14 Am. St. Rep. 481; Crawford v. State, 98 Wis. 623, 67
Am. St. Rep. 829, and note.
WITNESSES.-CROSS-EXAMINATION must be confined to the
matters about which the direct testimony was given: State v.
Eifert, 102 Iowa, 188, 63 Am. St. Rep. 433, and note.
WITNESSES — CROSS-EXAMINATION— MAKING ONE PAR-
TY'S OWN WITNESS.— The defendant has no right to cross-ex-
amine the plaintiff's witness as to matters of defense which have
no dependence upon or necessary connection with his direct testi-
mony, but the defendant must make the witness his own witness
as to such testimony: Mitchell v. Welch, 17 Pa. St. 339. 55 Am. Dec.
557, and note. But cross-examination as to new matter, when it Is
part of the res gestae, is allowable: Bank v. Fordyce, 9 Pa. St 275;
49 Am. Dec. 561.
WITNESSES— IMPEACHMENT.— If It Is charged, either directly
or by Implication, that the testimony of the witness is a recent
fabrication, Inconsistent with his previous declarations or conduct,
and having its origin in some event powerfully affecting his In-
terests, or in some change in his situation with reference to the
transaction or to the parties, It is admissible to rebut the Imputation
by proving declarations prior to such event or change, agreeing
with what he now swears to be the truth: See the extended note
to Johnson v. I'attersou, 11 Am. Dec. 759.
HOMICIDE— INSULTING LANGUAGE TO WIPE AS A DB-
PENSE.— The general rule is that words, however aggravating, are
not considered sufficient provocation to extenuate the killing of a
person, so as to render it manslaughter: Commonwealth v. York, 9
Met. 93, 43 Am. Dec. 373; Commonwealth v. Webster, 5 Cush. 295,
52 Am. Dec. 711. But in Texas, by statute. It Is provided that In-
sulting words toward a female relation should be adequate cause
to reduce a homicide from murder to manslaughter: Hudson v.
State, 6 Tex. App. 565, 32 Am. Rep. 593.
740 Ex PARTE Newman. [Texas,
Ex PARTE Newman.
[38 Texas Cmminal Kepoets, 165. J
BAIL IN CAPITAL CASE— BURDEN OP PROOF.— On an
application by habeas corpus for bail in a capital case, the burden
to establish the fact that the proof is evident is upon the state and
not upon the relator to prove the contrary.
BAIL-ACCUSED, WHEN ENTITLED TO.— Unless the case
Is a capital one and the proof is evident of this fact, and unless the
proof is evident that the prisoner is guilty of a capital crime, he
is entitled to bail, and the burden of proof is on the prosecution to
Bhow that he Is not so entitled.
AN INDICTMENT FURNISHES NO PROOF that an accused
is guilty of a capital crime, much less that he is guilty of a capital
crime of which the proof is evident.
HABEAS CORPUS— BURDEN OP PROOF.— Although the
statute gives the relator the right to open and close the argument
in a habeas corpus proceeding, it does not necessarily follow, nor
follow at all, that the burden of proof is upon him.
W. Kelso, J. M. Goggin and H. C. Carter, for the relator.
M. Trice, assistant attorney general, for the state.
1^ HUET, P. J. Appellant was charged by indictment with
robbery by the use of firearms. The indictment charges a capi-
tal offense. Upon the trial below, relator introduced one wit-
ness, Lewis, the prosecutor and alleged injured person. This
witness failed to identify the relator as one of the parties en-
gaged in the robbery. The names of a number of witnesses were
on the back of the indictment. These witnesses were not used
by the relator. The testimony of this witness shows that other
parties were engaged in the robbery, but that he did not know
who they were. The court below refused bail, holding evidently
that the burden was upon the applicant to establish the fact
that the proof was not evident that he was one of the parties
engaged in the robbery, which is conceded to be a capital of-
fense. In this view of the question, the court below is sup-
ported by the opinion of Judge Willson in Ex parte Smith, 23
Tex. Crim. App. 100. The question is therefore presented
whether or not the rule laid down in that case is correct. If
the burden is upon the defendant to show that the proof is evi-
dent that it was not a capital offense, or that he was not a par-
ticipant therein, then, in this case, the relator has not discharged
the burden. If, however, the burden is upon the state, the re-
lator is entitled to bail. Now, the question is. Upon whom is
the burden in such a case? The constitution provides *®® that
all prisoners shall be bailable by sufficient sureties, except for
June, 1897.] Ex parte Newman. 741
capital offenses when the proof is evident. "We hold that the
general rule is in favor of bail, but that there is an exception
to this general rule, and that the party relying upon the excep-
tion must prove it. The exception is in favpr of the state. Un-
less the case be a capital one, and the proof is evident of this
fact, and unless the proof is evident that the prisoner is guilty
of a capital crime, he is entitled to bail. He stands upon the
constitution of this state, which grants bail to all prisoners with
sufficient sureties; and, as before stated, the party relying upon
the exception must prove it. We are also of opinion that the in-
dictment furnishes no proof that he is guilty of a capital crime,
much less that he is guilty of a capital crime in which the proof
is evident. Let us concede for the argument that the legislature
could shift the burden of proof, and could make an indict-
ment a prima facie case of proof evident. This has not been
done by the legislature, and we must pass upon the constitutional
provision as it stands. Through great caution, it is provided in
the section of the constitution that this provision shall not be
so construed as to prevent bail after indictment found upon the
examination of the evidence in such manner as may be pre-
scribed by law. The legislature has never prescribed how the
examination shall be conducted. Hence, it remains just as if
that provision was not inserted, and will remain so until the
legislature acts upon the subject. A great many states hold,
under constitutions substantially similar to ours, that, after in-
dictment found, the person is not entitled to bail, and go to the
extent of holding that inquiry cannot be made into the subject
after indictment is found. Now, this provision of the constitu-
tion provides that it shall not be so construed as to prevent bail
after indictment found. It may be contended, because the act
of the legislature gives the relator the right to open and con-
elude the argument in a habeas corpus case, that it therefore
follows that the burden of proof is upon him. But such we do
not construe to be the meaning of article 199 of the Code of
Criminal Procedure of 1895. The general rule is, that the party
having the burden of proof has the opening and conclusion.
This statute appears to us simply to guarantee to an applicant
in a habeas corpus proceeding an additional advantage, as an
exception to the general rule; for, if the burden was upon him,
he had this right, independent of the statute. The construction
contended for would require, in a case like this, that the appli-
cant go into the enemy's camp, and examine the adversary's wit-
742 Ex PARTE Newman. [Texas,
nesses as his own. He would not be authorized to cross-examine
them, nor to impeach them. Such a construction environs an
applicant for bail in a writ of habeas corpus with difficulties
which we do not believe the constitution authorizes; and cer-
tainly a statute that would impose this burden ought to be clear
and unambiguous, and not be left to implication or inference
merely. Entertaining these views, the case of Ex parte Smith,
33 Tex. Crim. App. 100, and others following that authority, are
hereby overruled, and the rule as to the burden of proof above
indicated is now established as the mode of procedure ^^"^ in
this state. We are not to be understood as overruling all of the
rules stated in the Smith case, but only that which pertains to
the burden of proof.
The judgment is reversed, and the relator is granted bail in
the sum of three thousand dollars.
BAIL IN CAPITAL CASE.— All persons have a constitutional
right to bail by sufficient sureties, except for capital offenses, when
the proof is evident or the presumption great: Ex parte Goans, 99
Mo. 193, 17 Am. St. Rep. 571.
BAIL OF ONE CHARGED WITH MURDER.— A prisoner may
be admitted to bail on habeas corpus, if charged with murder by
a coroner's Inquest, but not after the finding of an indictment of
a grand jury, because in the former case the court may looli into
the depositions, and in the latter the evidence Is secret: People v.
McLeod, 1 Hill, 377, 25 Wend. 483, 37 Am. Dec. 328.
BAII^INDICTMENT AS PROOF OF GUILT.— The guilt of a
prisoner while on trial, cannot be presumed from the fact that an
indictment has been found against him; but between the time of
the indictment and the trial, so far as the intermediate proceedings
are concerned, it furnishes the strongest possible evidence of guilt:
Hight V. United States, Morris, 407, 43 Am. Dec. 111. An Indict-
ment for a capital offense furnishes of Itself presumption of guilt
too great to entitle a defendant to bail as a matter of right under
the California constitution, or as a matter of discretion under the
state legislation In that regard: People v. Tinder, 19 Cal. 539, 81
Am. Dec. 77; Ex parte Goans, 99 Mo. 193, 17 Am. St. Rep. 571.
Bail may sometimes be allowed In capital cases after Indictment,
though no special or extraordinary circumstances exist: People ▼.
Tinder, 19 Cal. 539, 81 Am. Dec. 77, and monographic note thereto.
Nov. 1897.] Ex PABTB Bbown. 7tf
Ex PARTE Brown.
[88 Tbxas Ckiuimal Kepobtb, 293.]
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW— TITLE OF ACT.— An act known
as the "cold storage act,'* and entitled, "an act to define and prevent
cold storage In a local option county, precinct, city, town, or sub-
division of a county, and to affix a penalty for running, keeping, or
maintaining them in such county, city, or town, or subdivision, suffi-
ciently embraces the subject-matter of the act, and is not within
& constitutional provision invalidating laws where the substance of
the act Is not embraced in the title.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW— POLICE REGULATIONS.— The
state may Interfere under Its police power to prohibit the keeping
of property injurious to the lives, health, and comfort of all per-
sons, but it is not authorized, under the guise of a police regulation,
to invade the fundamental privileges and . interfere with the full
enjoyment by the citizen of his recognized property rights, and if a
statute purporting to have been enacted to protect the public health,
the public morals, or the public safety has no real or substantial re-
lation to those subjects, it Is the duty of the courts to so adjudge.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW— POLICE POWER — KEEPING
INTOXICATING LIQUORS.— The keeping of liquors in his posses-
sion by a person whether for himself or another, unless he does so
for the illegal sale thereof, or for some other improper purpose,
cannot injure or affect the health, morals, or safety of the public.
Hence a statute prohibiting such keeping in possession is not a
legitimate exercise of the police power, but it is an abridgment
of the privileges and immunities of the citizen, without any legal
justification, and therefore void.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW — LOCAL OPTION.— A constitu-
tional provision giving the legislature authority to enact laws with
regard to the adoption of local option by the people is exclusive of
any other method to be pursued by the legislature for dealing with
the question, especially so far as the same territory is concerned
Where local option has been adopted.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW — POLICE POWER — INTOXI-
CATING LIQUORS.— An attempt by the legislature to make the
keeping of liquor by one citizen for another In a local option terri-
tory, whether in a house, tent, or anywhere else, and whether for
«. consideration or without, a crime, or an attempt on the part of
the legislature to make It criminal for a person who may be the
owner or proprietor of any 'building. In local option territory, to
solicit or take and order for another person for Intoxicating liquors,
to be sent or delivered to the proprietor or owner of such house for
the person giving such order. Is without authority of law, as viola-
tive of the citizen's fundamental right to use his own property as
he pleases, not Injuring another person, and it is not competent for
the legislature, under its power of police regulation, to Impair the
legal ownership and holding of one's property, either by hImseU
or by another person.
W. W. Nelms, for the relator.
M. Trice, assistant attorney general, for tHe state.
8<>* HENDERSON, J. Appellant was charged by infonnation
in the county court of Wiliamson county with violating what is
744 Ex PARTE Brown. [Texas^
known as the "cold storage act." He was arrested under said
information, and sued out a writ of habeas corpus before the
county judge, who, after bearing the case, remanded the appli-
cant to the custody of the sheriff to answer said information;
and from said order defendant prosecutes this appeal.
The contention of appellant is, that the act of the twenty-fifth
legislature, page 128, entitled, "An act to define and prevent
cold storage in a local option county, precinct, city, town, or sub-
division of a county, and to aflSx a penalty for running, keeping,
or maintaining them in such county, city, or town, or subdivi-
sion," is unconstitutional and void. We understand the grounds
of his contention to be that said act is void: 1. Because the cap-
tion of said act is not in accordance with section 35 of article 3
of the constitution; 2. Because the act itself is an invasion of
the rights of private property, not authorized by the constitu-
tion; 3. That said act is violative of section 20 of article 16 of
our state constitution (said section known as the "local option
clause").
Without quoting in extenso the act in question, we will con-
dense the provisions of said act. In section 1 an attempt is
made to define what a cold storage is. It provides: 1. That any
building, et cetera, in any local option district, which may be
kept or maintained for the purpose of storing, cooling, or keep-
ing intoxicating liquors, et cetera, for others, is a cold storage;
2. Or any building, et cetera, in any local option district, which
shall be used or kept to store or keep for any other person than
the owner any intoxicating liquors, et cetera, is a cold storage; 3.
Or any such building, et cetera, in any local option district,
where the agent, owner, et cetera, may solicit or take any orders
from others for intoxicating liquors, to be sent or delivered to
such owner, et cetera, for the person giving such order, shall
constitute a cold storage. The second section of said act pro-
vides, substantially: 1. That any owner, agent, et cetera, wha
shall keep, et cetera, any cold storage house, or be interested in
keeping the same, in any local option district, shall be guilty of
a misdemeanor, et cetera; 2. Any person who shall solicit or take
orders for any intoxicating liquors to be sent or shipped to ^^^
any person who may keep, et cetera, or be interested in the keep-
ing, et cetera, of any cold storage in any local option district,
shall be guilty of a misdemeanor, and fined not less than one hun-
dred dollars nor more than five hundred dollars, and, in addi-
tion thereto, shall be imprisoned in the county jail not less than
No7. 1897.] Ex PARTE Brown. 74&
twenty-five nor more than one hundred days. Section 3 pro-
vides, if any owner, et cetera, of any cold storage, where local
option is in force, shall solicit or take any order for intoxicating
liquors to he shipped or sent into any snch local option district,
and such intoxicating liquors shall he shipped or sent therein
hy reason of such order, that the same shall constitute a sale in
such local option district.
The information against appellant charges that, in a local op-
tion district, **he was the owner and proprietor and the agent
and employe of the owner and proprietor of a cold storage, and
was interested in the keeping, maintaining, and managing a cold
storage within said justice precinct, and that he did then and
there solicit and take orders for intoxicating liquors to he
shipped to a person who then and there kept, maintained, and
managed a cold storage, and to he shipped to the agent and em-
ploy6 of a cold storage, and in the care of the proprietor, agent,
and employ^ of a cold storage,"
We are not inclined to regard said act as violative of section
35 of article 3 of the constitution, as, in our opinion, the title
sufficiently emhraces the subject matter of the act. The effect
of the act, however, is to make criminal the act of any person
who may keep or maintain a nouse in a local option district for
the storage, keeping, or cooling of intoxicating liquors for others,
or the owner, proprietor, et cetera, of any building, et cetera,
which shall be used to store such intoxicating liquors for others
than the owner, for it makes criminal the act of any person who,
as owner, proprietor, et cetera, may solicit orders from others for
intoxicating liquors to be sent or delivered to such owner, et
cetera; that is, it proposes to make criminal the act of keeping
or storing any intoxicating liquors for others than the owner of
such building, in any house, building, et cetera, in any district
where local option is in force.
If we had no provision of the constitution on the subject of
local option, we believe that this act would be unconstitutional,
as an invasion of the fundamental right of a citizen to the free
use and exercise of property, and that the legislature would not
be authorized, under the guise of a police regulation, to so inter-
fere with the enjoyment on the part of the citizen of his prop-
erty rights. Intoxicating liquors are regarded as property, both
in the state and nation, and it is not necessary to refer to acts
of legislation or decisions of the courts in which intoxicating
liquors are so regarded. Furthermore, we have a distinct con-
746 Ex PARTE Brown. [Texas,
fititutional provision on the subject of tlie power of the legisla-
ture in regard to the liquor traffic. That constitutional provi-
€ion is as follows: "The legislature shall, at its first session, en-
act a law whereby the qualified voters of any county, justice pre-
cinct, town, city, or such subdivision of a county as may be des-
ignated by the commissioners' court of such county, may, by a
majority vote, determine from time to time whether the sale of
intoxicating ^^^ liquors shall be prohibited within the pre-
scribed limits"; Const., art. 16, sec. 20. It occurs to us that
this expression of the will of the people on the subject is exclu-
sive of any other method to be pursued by the legislature. What-
ever may be said as to the power of the legislatures of other
states, with no express provisions of their constitutions on this
subject, to legislate in regard to the liquor traffic under the gen-
eral police power, the same does not apply with us. We have
an express provision on the subject, and that provision was in-
tended to prescribe a method of dealing with the question, and
to exclude any other rule or method, at least so far as local op-
tion territory is concerned: See HoUey v. State, 14 Tex. Grim.
App. 505; Stallworth v. State, 16 Tex. Grim. App. 345; Steele v.
State, 19 Tex. Grim. App. 425; Ninenger v. State, 25 Tex. Grim.
App. 449.
In State v. Oilman, 33 W. Va. 146, almost the identical ques-
tion here presented came before that court; and the views of
the learned judge who delivered the opinion are so well expressed
that we give them in full: "Has the legislature of this state the
constitutional power to make such an act a crime? The four-
teenth amendment to the constitution of the United States de-
clares: *No state shall make or enforce any law which shall
abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United
States'; and the same amendment makes all persons bom or
naturalized in the United States citizens thereof. It is conceded
that the 'privileges and immunities' here protected are such only
as are in their nature fundamental — such as belong of right to
the citizens of all free governments, and which have at all times
been enjoyed by the citizens of the several states of the Union,
from the time of their becoming free, independent, and sovereign.
What these fundamental rights are it is not easy to enumerate,
the courts preferring not to describe and define them in a gen-
eral classification, but to decide each case as it may arise. The
following, however, have been held to be embraced among them;
Trotection by the government; the enjoyment of life and lib-
Nov. 1897.] Ex PABTB Brown. 741
erty, with the right to acquire and possess properly of every
kind, and to pursue and obtain happiness and safety, subject to
such restraints as the government may justly prescribe for the
general good of the whole': Washington, J., in Corfield v. Cory-
ell, 4 Wash. C. C. 380, Fed. Cas. No. 3230; Connor v. Elliott, 18
How. 591; In re Parrott, 6 Saw. 349, 1 Fed. Kep. 481; 6 Meyers
Fed. Dec, sec. 1000; Butchers' Union Slaughter-House Co. v.
Crescent City Livestock Landing Co., Ill U. S. 746. These are
inalienable and indefeasible rights, which no man, or set of men,
by even the largest majority, can take from the citizen. They
are absolute and inherent in the people, and all free govern-
ments must recognize and respect them. Therefore, it is incum-
bent upon the courts to give to the constitutional provisions
which guarantee them a liberal construction, and to hold in-
operative and void all statutes which attempt to destroy or in-
terfere with them: Cooley's Constitutional Limitations (35), 44.
It can hardly be questioned that the right to possess property
is one of these rights, and that that right embraces the ^^^
privilege of a citizen to keep in his possession property for an-
other. It is not denied that the keeping of property which
is injurious to the lives, health, or comfort of all persons may be
prohibited under the police power. The maxim, *Sic utere tuo
ut alienum non laedas,' being of universal application, it must,
of course, be within the range of legislative action to define the
mode and manner in which everyone may so use his own as not
to injure others. But it does not follow that every statute en-
acted ostensibly for the promotion of these ends is to be ac-
cepted as a legitimate exercise of the police power of the state;
and much less is such the case when the statute is merely claimed
by its defenders to be intended for that purpose. The court, in
its opinion in Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U. S. 661, says: 'The courts
are not bound by mere forms, nor are they to be misled by mere
pretenses. They are at liberty — indeed, are under a solemn
duty — to look at the substance of things, whenever they enter
upon the inquiry whether the legislature has transcended the
limits of its authority. If, therefore, a statute purporting to
have been enacted to protect the public health, the public mor-
als, or the public safety has no real or substantial relation to
those objects, or is a palpable invasion of rights secured by the
fundamental law, it is the duty of the courts to so adjudge, and
thereby give effect to the constitution': Mugler v. Kansas, 123
U. S. 661. The keeping of liquors in his possession by a per-
748 Ex PARTE Brown. [Texas,
Bon, whether for himself or for another, unless he does so for
the illegal sale of it, or for some other improper purpose, can
by no possibility injure or affect the health, morals, or safety of
the public; and therefore the statute prohibiting such keep-
ing in possession is not a legitimate exercise of the police power.
It is an abridgment of the privileges and immunities of the
citizen, without any legal justification, and therefore void. But
it seems to me the said provision of the statute is in violation
of that provision of our state constitution, which declares that
'laws may be passed regulating or prohibiting the sale of intoxi-
cating liquors within the limits of this state': Const., art. 6,
FCC. 46. While it is admitted to be a well-settled principle that
the legislature has the same unlimited power in regard to legis-
lation which resides in the British parliament, except where it is
restrained either by the state or federal constitutions, still it is
equally true that these constitutional limitations are not con-
fined to express inhibitions, for there are but few positive re-
straints upon the legislative power contained in the constitution.
The third article, or ^bill of rights' lays down the ancient limita-
tions which have always been considered essential in a constitu-
tional government, whether monarchial or popular; and there
are scattered through the instrument some other express provi-
sions in restraint of legislative authority. But the affirmative
prescriptions and general arrangements of the constitution are
far more fruitful of restraints upon the legislative power. Every
positive direction contains an implication against everything
contrary to it, or which would frustrate or disappoint the pur-
pose of that provision. The frame of the government, the grant
of legislative power itself, the organization of the executive au-
thority, and the erection of the principal courts of justice, ****^
create implied limitations upon the law-making authority, as
strong as though a negative was expressed in each instance:
Cooley's Constitutional Limitations, 87; People v. Draper, 15
N. Y, 543, If the people had not made the provision above
quoted a part of the constitution, the legislature would, so far
as that instrument is concerned, have had plenary and unre-
stricted authority to deal with liquors in any manner it chose to
do. But the people, by declaring that 'laws may be passed
regulating or prohibiting the sale of intoxicating liquors,' ac-
cording to the principles we have announced, imposed a restraint
upon this plenary power. By granting an express authority to
the legislature to regulate or prohibit the sale, there is an im-
Nov. 1897.] Ex PAETB Bbown. 749
plied inhibition to the exercise of any authority in respect to
that subject which is not embraced in the grant. This rule is
simply an application of the old maxim, 'Expressio unius est
exclusio alterius/ which Lord Bacon concisely explains by say-
ing: 'As exception strengthens the force of a law in cases not
excepted, so enumeration weakens it in cases not enumerated.'
The express power here given to regulate or prohibit the sale
of liquors, unless it was intended to limit the legislative author-
ity, would render this provision of the constitution wholly nuga-
tory and useless, because, as we have seen, without this provision
the legislature would have had plenary power over the whole
subject. It could not only have legislated in respect to the pro-
hibition and sale of liquors, but in all other respects. It seems
to me, therefore, that the purpose and effect of this constitu-
tional provision was and is to restrict and limit the legislative
authority to the powers expressly granted therein — that is, to
the power to regulate or prohibit the sale of liquors; and con-
sequently a legislative act not within the legitimate scope of
this express grant, unless it is a fair and reasonable exercise of
the police power, must be held unconstitutional and void."
We entirely concur with the principles enunciated in the fore-
going opinion, and their application to the question in this case
is obvious; and we accordingly hold the attempt of the legisla-
ture to make the keeping of liquor by one citizen for another,
in a local option territory, whether in a house, tent, or any-
where else, and whether for a consideration or without a con-
sideration, a crime, or the attempt on the part of the legislature
to make it criminal for a person who may be the owner or pro-
prietor of any building, et cetera, in a local option territory,
to solicit or take an order from another person for intoxicating
liquors, to be sent or delivered to the proprietor or owner of
such house for the person giving such order, to be without
authority of law, as violative of the citizen's fundamental right
to use his own property as he pleases, not injuring another per-
son; and that it is not competent for the legislature, under its
power of police regulation, to impair the legal ownership and
holding of one's property, either by himself or by another per-
son.
We further hold that the act in question, applicable alone to
local option territory, is violative of the express provisions of
our constitution on the subject. If this law could be enforced
in such local option territory, '^^^ then a minister or any mem-
ber of any of the various churches who should hold or keep
750 Ex PARTE Brown. [Texas,
wine at his residence or any house under his control, for the
purpose of being used by the members of his church in the ad-
ministration of the Lord's Supper, would be guilty of keeping a
cold storage, for he would come under the terms of the law
which inhibits the keeping of intoxicating liquors for others.
This illustration will serve to show the futility of legislation to
hamper or prevent the use or ownership of one's property for
a purpose that is not inhibited by the constitutional provision
on the subject. That provision inhibits the sale only and was
evidently intended by the people to mark the limitation of power
of the legislature on that subject. The people, in saying that
a sale of intoxicating liquors might be prohibited, deny to the
legislature the power to otherwise interfere with its use; and
the cold storage act was an attempted interference with the use
of intoxicating liquors in local option territory, not authorized
or warranted by the constitution, and we accordingly hold it
illegal and void, and it is therefore ordered that the relator be
discharged.
Hurt, presiding judge, absent.
STATUTES— TITLE OF ACT— CONSTITUTIONALITY.— An act
Is unconstitutional and void if its title is not broad enough to in-
clude the subject matter of the legislation: State v. Tibbets, 52
Neb. 228, G6 Am. St. Rep. 492. See the monographic note to Bobel
V. People, 64 Am. St Rep. 70.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW— POLICE POWER.— The legislature
cannot, under the guise of a police regulation, arbitrarily invade
private property or personal rights, but it must appear to the court,
when such regulation is called in question, that there is a clear and
real connection between the assumed purpose of the law and its
actual provisions: Chicago etc. R. R. Co. v. State, 47 Neb. 549, 53
Am. St. Rep. 557. The courts can say whether the police power
has been properly exercised by the legislature: People v. Warden,
157 N. Y. 116, 68 Am. St. Rep. 763; Colon v. LIsk, 153 N. Y. 188,
60 Am. St. Rep. 609.
INTOXICATING LIQUORS— LOCAL OPTION.— One Indicted for
selling Intoxicating liquor in violation of a local option law in
force In a certain county, by furnishing to others and forwarding
to wholesalers in another county blank orders for liquor, directing
It to be shipped in the care of the defendant, who received and de-
livered the liquor to the persons thus ordering It, who pay him
therefore, is not guilty if the liquor is shipped to him as the agent of
those who order It, or at their request: State v. WIngfield, 115 Mo.
428. 37 Am. St. Rep. 406.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW— LOCAL OPTION.— Wherever a local
option law has been adopted In accordance with a constitutional
provision, and been put In force. It operates to repeal all laws and
parts of laws In conflict with It, within the limits of the locality in
which It has been adopted; and a general law imposing an occupa-
tion tax on retail liquor dealers is not In force in localities where
the local option law has been adopted: Extended note to Common-
wealth V. Kimball. 35 Am. Dec. 338.
Nov. 1897.] Jones v. Statk. 761
Jones v. State.
[88 Texas Cbihinai. Refobtb, 864.j
LIBBL.-RECOGNIZANCE ON APPEAL which recites that
the defendant "stands charged with the offense of libel," Is suffi-
cient.
LIBEL OF A CLASS.— It Is a violation of the Texas statute
to libel any sect, company, or class of persons without naming any
person in particular who may belong to such class.
LIBEL OF A CLASS.— A publication charging the street-car
conductors of a certain city with being pimps, and that they would
sell the virtue of their sisters for a drink, is libelous per se.
W. H. Smith, for the appellant.
M. Trice, assistant attorney-general, for the state.
see DAVIDSON, J. Appellant was convicted of libel. The
assistant attorney general moves to dismiss the appeal, because
the recognizance fails to recite an offense known to the law.
Said recognizance recites that the defendant "stands charged
with the offense of libel." This is the only recitation in said
obligation of the offense. None of the constitutent element*
are set out or attempted to be set out. We think that the recog-
nizance is sufficient. Libel is defined to be an offense by the
statutes, and is an offense eo nomine, as theft, murder, slander,^
et cetera. The motion to dismiss the appeal is overruled.
Appellant filed his motion in arrest of judgment, because the-
indictment is fatally defective, in that the published statement
alleged to be libelous fails to convey the idea that the persons
referred to had been guilty of a penal offense, or that they had
been guilty of some act or omission which, though not penal,
was disgraceful to them as members of society, the natural eon-
sequence of which was to bring them into contempt among^
honorable persons; or that they had some moral vice, or physi-
cal or mental defect or disease, which rendered them unfit for
intercourse with respectable society, and such as would cause
them to be generally avoided; or that they were notoriously of
bad or infamous character. His second contention is, that the
printed and published matter could be held to refer to but one
person, to wit, the conductor causing the injury to a colored
woman on East Avenue L car, and the indictment fails to desig-
nate by name who that conductor was; and he generally urges
that the published matter is not libelous. Omitting the for-
mal parts of the indictment, it charges that "defendant and
W. H. Noble, on the 14th of November, 1896, in the county of
752 Jones 17. State. [Texas,
Galveston, in the state of Texas, with force and arms, then and
there, with intent to injure A. S. Spurgeon" and others, setting
them out by name, "did unlawfully and maliciously make, write,
print, publish, sell, and circulate a malicious statement of and
concerning the said A. S. Spurgeon" and others mentioned, "and
-affecting the reputation of the said A. S, Spurgeon" and others
mentioned, "who were then and there conductors employed by
the Galveston City Eailroad Company, on the various lines in
the city of Galveston, Texas, which malicious statement was of
the tenor following, to wit: 'Irish Snides. It is really disgust-
ing, to say the least, for one to take notice and see how the
Irish snides employed by the street-car company (meaning the
Galveston City Eailroad Company) as conductors on the various
lines of this city (meaning the city of Galveston) discriminate.
With a few exceptions, these cowboys, escaped lunatics, and
imported lords have a way of their own, and discriminate with
■a vim. These whelps seem to forget that they are public ser-
vants, and treat our ^^'^ best colored ladies with a contempt
that could only be found in a Yale chump. Some few nights
ago, a colored lady, while dismounting from an East L car, was
thrown to the ground by the mangy ape that poses as conductor
ringing the bell before she was off the step. And the lousy
little puppy, that scarcely speaks English, said to a white gentle-
man, that spoke of the danger of such proceedings, that she was
« 'she coon.' Has it come to this? Such pimps (meaning one
who provides the means and opportunities for libidinous gratifi-
-cation; that is to say, a procurer for the lusts of others) as this,
men so low that they would willingly sell the virtue of their
€ister for a drink, the descendants of Oscar Wilde (meaning that
they commit the crime of sodomy), greasy curs, foul-smelling
•scavengers, are imported to this country to insult and humiliate
the people that help to make these enterprises — that build up
and support these public affairs. We coons! Some of the best
families of America have raised coons. I expect that foreign
whelp is a coon, but the woman in question is a colored lady.
Perhaps I am a coon, but I would not give one drop of my
■'cooney' blood for a barrel of the 'blud' of such ^bludy* Irish
finides. It's time that the car company should right these wrongs,
and employ only respectable, intelligent men, that will do jus-
tice to all alike. We pay a nickel, and we demand a nickel's
worth. There is too many intelligent men in this country to
import such beastly bastards to insult the people here.'" It
will be seen by this indictment that all of the parties named in
Nov. 1897.] Jones v. State. 768
the alleged libelous matter are alleged to Tie conductors of tha
Oalveston City Eailroad Company.
Taking appellant's grounds of his motion out of the order
in which he places them, we notice that ground of said motion
first which alleges the indictment is insufficient, because it only
refers to one conductor causing the injury to a colored woman,
€t cetera, and fails to designate by name that conductor. By
reference to the libelous matter published, it will be seen that
the first sentence in said publication refers to the conductors
on the various street-cars of this city (meaning the city of Gal-
veston) as a class. The libelous matter makes no exception
among the conductors, but includes all of them. This has been
held sufficient, without designating the names; and we hold this
to be sufficient designation of every conductor in the service of
said railroad company at the time of said publication. It
therefore would be a violation of our statute to libel any sect,
•company, or class of men without naming any person in par-
ticular who may belong to said class: See 13 Am. & Eng. Ency.
of Law, 499, and notes; 2 McClain's Criminal Law, sec. 1044.
In reply to appellant's contention that the indictment fails
to charge said conductors, either directly or by innuendo, with
an offense against the laws, or with some act or omission which,
though not a penal offense, is disgraceful to said conductors as
members of society, or the natural consequence of which is to
bring them into contempt among honorable persons, or that
they have some moral vice or physical or mental defect or disease
which renders them unfit for mtercourse with respectable
€ociety, and such as would cause them to be generally avoided,
or that ^'^ they are of notoriously bad or infamous character,
we have this to say: That the first allegation in the indictment,
to wit, that one of these conductors caused a colored lady to be
thrown to the ground while dismounting from a street-car, im-
puted an assault to one of said conductors belonging to the class
charged in the indictment, but does not name him. But con-
■cede that we should be in error as to the effect of this allega-
tion; unquestionably the charge that said conductors were pimps,
with the innuendo following the same, is such a charge as im-
puted some act, which, though not a penal offense, was disgrace-
ful to said conductors as members of society, and the natural
•consequence of which was to bring them into contempt among
honorable persons. So of that portion of said publication which
charged that said conductors were so low that they would will-
AM. St. Rep.. Vou LXX.— 18
754 Jones v. State. [Texas^
ingly sell the virtue of their sister for a drink. These charges
attributed to said conductors that they were of notoriously bad
or infamous character; and, as the prosecution in this case was
under all of said allegations, if the proof sustained anyone, it
was sufficient. It will be further noticed by reference to the
allegations in the indictment that there are innuendo averments
contained therein sufficiently explanatory of said statements in
said publication. But, if there had not been, we hold that they
were sufficient in and of themselves to constitute libel without
innuendoes. The statements in the publication were so plain
and unmistakable in their meaning that no intelligent person
could fail to understand and comprehend what was intended
by them: More v. Bennett, 48 N. Y. 472; 2 McClain's Criminal
Law, sec. 1043, and authorities cited in note 2.
In regard to the remaining question, that the publication i»
not libelous, under the views herein expressed, it will be seen
that such contention is without merit. "We think the indict-
ment is sufficient, and the judgment is affirmed.
Libel or Slander of a Class or Number of Persons.
In order to maintain an action for libel or slander, the detama-
tory words must refer to some ascertained or ascertainable person,
and such person must be the plaintiff. If the words used do not,
In fact, contain any reflection on any particular Individual, no aver-
ment or innuendo can malie them defamatory: Harvey v. CoflSn, 5
Blackf. 566; Petsch v. Dispatch Printing Co., 40 Minn. 291; Miller
V. Maxwell, 16 Wend. 9; Brashear v. Shepherd, Sneed. (Ky.) 249;
Baldwin v. Hildreth, 14 Gray, 221. Thus In an action for libel by
a grand jury's report, where the only evidence to show that plain-
tiff was one of the majority of the board therein referred to Is an
Indictment brought In by the grand jury at the same time against
the plaintiff and other members of the board of police commis-
sioners, charging them and other persons with having combined to.
obstruct the laws and to remove a chief of police, is not sufl3cient
to show that he was the person Intended by the grand jury's re-
port, which alleges corruption on the part of a majority of such
board, but in which the removal of the chief of police was but In-
cidentally mentioned: Caruth v. Ralcheson, 96 Mo. 186.
If an article In a newspaper Is libelous In reflecting on a class of
persons, one of that class. In order to maintain an action, must
Bhow that he Is specially Included In such class. "If a man wrote
that all lawyers were thieves, no particular lawyer could sue him,
unless there Is something to point to the particular Individual";
Eastwood V. Holmes, 1 Post. & F. 347.
Though the words used may at first appear to apply only to »
class, and not to be specially defamatory of any particular indi-
vidual or member of such class, yet an action may be maintained
Nov. 1897.] Jones v. State. 765
by any person of that class who can satisfy the court that the words
used refer especially to himself, but the words must be capable of
bearing such special application, and there must be an averment
that the words were spoken of the plaintiff and he must also aver
extraneous facts, if any, showing that he was the person specially
referred to. "The principle is undoubtedly correct that where libel-
ous or slanderous matter is published against a class or aggregate
body of persons, an individual member, not specially mentioned or
Included or designated, cannot maintain an action, for this, among
other reasons, that the body may act very corruptly or disgrace-
fully, yet the individual may have been In the minority and may
have opposed the measures alluded to. But where many indi-
viduals are severally Included In the same attack, whether by the
language of the satirist or the pencil of the caricaturist, the plain-
tiff is not the less entitled to redress, because others are injured by
the same act. Then the question is, whether, on the whole, the
declaration does aver with sufficient certainty, that the plaintiff is
individually held up to contempt": Ellis v. Kimball, 16 Pick. 132-
135. If a declaration alleges that the defendant published of and
concerning the plaintiff and of a certain court martial of which he
was a member, a defamatory libel and caricature, consisting of a
certain picture and representation of such court martial, and of the
plaintiff. In which he is pointed out as a member thereof by position
and certain grotesque resemblances, and is represented and ex-
hibited In an awkward and ludicrous light, posture, and position,
It avers with sufficient certainty that plaintiff was specially libelled
and also sets forth the libel with sufficient certainty: Ellis v. Kim-
ball, 16 Pick. 132.
It Is a libel to write of a Roman Catholic nunnery that it Is a
brothel of prostitution, for this is an aspersion on the character of
the nuns In general, though none are singled out by name, and any
nun belonging to that particular nunnery could maintain an action
therefor: Gathercole's case. 2 Lew. O. C. 237. An article published
in a newspaper calling policemen hogs and blood-sucking police
officers, who Insist on sitting on juries to the neglect of their duties
and to cheat honorable citizens out of their jury fees, and adding
that this has no reference to the chief of police, because he is be-
neath notice, is an actionable libel as to him and to either of such
policemen: Smith v. Utley, 92 Wis. 133. A charge by one made to
a father that "your children are thieves, and I can prove It" is suffi-
ciently d'efinlte to enable either of such children to maintain an
action for slander: Gidney v. Blake, 11 Johns. 54; and to constitute
a criminal libel it Is not necessary that the alleged libelous article
reflect upon the conduct of any particular person, and if It Is di-
rected against a family It is libelous: State v. Brady, 44 Kan. 43o,
21 Am. St. Rep. 296. It has been held In New York, erroneously,
no doubt, that a civil action for libel does not lie by an officer of a
regiment, for a publication reflecting upon the officers of the regi-
ment generally, without averring special damage: Sumner v. Buel,
12 Johns. 475. This case was questioned in Ryckman v. Delaven,
756 Jones v. State. [Texas,
25 Wend. 186, where it was held that an action of libel may be
maintained by an individual for an injury to his business resulting
from a libelous publication, although it aft'ects the business of others
engaged in the same calling, unless it is manifest from the face of
the publication that the charges made were intended against a class
of society, a particular profession, or order or body of men, and
cannot by possibility import a personal application tending to pri-
vate injury. This case intimates, however, that if the libel is
against a class without special damage to any one of such class, the
proceeding must be by criminal libel, and not by private suit. Mr.
Chancellor Walworth, in delivering the opinion of the court, said:
"There are many cases in the books where the writers and pub-
lishers of defamatory charges reflecting upon the conduct of particu-
lar classes, or bodies of individuals, have been proceeded against
by indictment or information, although no particular one was named
or designated therein to whom the charge had a personal applica-
tion. AJl those cases, however, whether the libel is upon an or-
ganized body of men, as a legislature, a court of justice, a church,
or a company of soldiers, or upon a particular class of individuals,
proceed upon the ground that the charge is a misdemeanor, al-
though it has no personal application to the individual or the body
or class libeled, because it tends to excite the angry passions of
the community, either in favor or against the body or class in ref-
erence to the conduct of which the charge is made, or because it
tends to impair the confidence of the people in their government
or in the administration of the laws" : Ryckman v. Delaven, 25
Wend. 196; following White v. Delaven, 17 Wend. 49, wherein it
was held that an action for libel does not lie for a publication al-
leged to affect the individual character of persons and the trade
and business carried on by them, if on its face it does not point
at the individuals named otherwise than that they pursue a particu-
lar trade or business in a certain section of the city. A publica-
tion affecting a class of persons does not entitle an Individual of
that class to sustain an action for the publication. We apprehend
that the true rule is that, although the libelous publication is di-
rected against a particular class of persons or a group, yet any one
of that class or group may maintain an action upon showing that
the words apply especially to him. "Even where the words may at
first sight appear only to apply to the subordinate engineers as a
class, and not to be specially defamatory of any particular one
of them, still, if the plaintiff can satisfy the jury that they refer
especially to him, he is authorized to maintain the action: Hardy
V. Williamson, 86 Ga. 551, 22 Am, St. Rep. 479.
If several are included in the same libel, they may each maintain
a separate action for the injury: Smart v. Blanchard, 42 N. H. 137.
Thus, where a suit was pending against the plaintiff and sixteen
others, and, In a discourse concerning the suit, the defendant said,
"These defendants helped to murder H. F.," and it was held that
each of the seventeen defendants was entitled to maintain his sepa-
rate action for slander: Foxcroft v. I^acy, Hob. 89. The publication
Nov. 1897.] Payne v. State. 757
of a statement that persons employed In a certain department "havo
been dismissed for alleged thefts of leather belonging to the depart-
ment, and that the rascals ought to feel thankful for getting oCC
without more severe punishment," is libelous as to each of the
persons so discharged: Dwyer v. Fireman's Journal Co., 11 Daly,
24S; Ryer v. Fireman's Journal Co., 11 Daly, 2ol.
The words, "Those people upstairs keep a whore house," are
actionable per se, and where the complaint alleges that such words
were spoken concerning the plaintiff, such allegation is sufficient
to connect the plaintifC with the words "the people upstairs," and
will admit proof that plaintiff was one of the people referred to: Cook
V. Rief, 20 Jones & S. 302, 52 N. Y. Sup. Ct. 302. If words amount-
ing to a libel against a group of persons, as the "city hall ring,"
leave it uncertain as to the application thereof to the plaintiff, such
application, may be shown by proof of extrinsic facts which need
not be alleged in the complaint: Petsch v. Dispatch Printing Co.,
4ff Minn, 291. To the same effect, Thibault v. Sessions, 101 Mich.
279. A publication, if false, of a list of persons who, though able,
will not pay their debts, is libelous, and an action therefor may be
maintained by anyone of the persons named: Nettles v. Somervell,
6 Tex. Civ. App. 627. An article is libelous per se which, being
published in a newspaper, of certain persons, including the plain-
tiff, charges that, with contracted fanatacism, alleged ladies have
perambulated the streets to prevent such newspaper from being
purchased; that these ladies brazenly lowered themselves to a level
which they would blush, if they possessed modesty, to see described
in type; that the time used by them could be more profitably em-
ployed in scrubbing their filthy kitchens; that women like them
have little Christianity except that which they flaunt on dress pa-
rade; that they are usually indifferently good mothers, wives and
daughters, and are intermeddlers who accomplish nothing, and
neglect the duties God has created for them: Street y. Johnson.
80 Wis. 455, 27 Am. St Rep. 42.
Payne v. State.
[88 TsxAS Cbimikai. Reports, 494.]
RAPE— FRAUD IN PERSONATING HUSBAND— INDICT-
MENT.—An indictment which charges a rape by fraud in person-
ating the husband must allege that the injured female is a married
woman, and not the wife of the defendant; and while it is not
necessary to allege the name of the husband, it is the better prac-
tice to do so.
RAPE— FRAUD IN PERSONATING HUSBAND.— In order
to constitute the crime of rape by fraud In personating the hus-
band the defendant must resort to some device or stratagem, some
artifice or trick, intending to deceive the prosecutrix and make her
believe that he is her husband, and the effect of such stratagem
758 Payne v. State. [Texas,
must also be to deceive and Impose on her and make her believe
that he Is her husband at the time the act is committed, and by
this means gain her consent to the copulation.
RAPE— BY FORCE— PERSONATING HUSBAND.— If a man
begins the act of copulation with a married woman while she is
asleep, and upon awakening she makes no resistance, believing him
to be her husband, the crime may be rape by force, but not by
fraud.
J. E. Thomas, for the appellant.
M. Trice, assistant attorney general, for the state.
496 HENDEESON, J. Appellant was convicted of rape, and
his punishment assessed at confinement in the penitentiary for
a term of five years; hence this appeal. The charging part of
the indictment is as follows: "That defendant did then and
there hy force, threats, and fraud, and without the consent -of
the said Jessie Winn, ravish and have carnal knowledge of the
said Jessie Winn, the said Jessie Winn not being then and there
the wife of the said Bunyon Payne," et cetera.
The evidence showed that on the night of the alleged offense
there was a party at the house of one H. B. Payne, the father
of the appellant. The party broke up some time after midnight,
and the prosecutrix, Mrs. Jessie Winn, and her husband, stayed
overnight at said house. A bed was made down for them in
the main room of the house, and in the same room, on the other
side from the bed of the prosecutrix and her husband, Dan
Loftin and his two brothers, and the defendant and his two
brothers, slept on pallets. In the kitchen, adjoining this room,
Mrs. McGary and her husband slept. Some time in the night,
just about daylight, Mrs. Jessie Winn awoke, and found de-
fendant on top of her. She did not then know who he was.
He had her clothes up. She tried to get him to get off, but he
would not do so. He had intercourse with her. Had already
commenced intercourse with her when she waked up. At the
time she thought it was her husband, and called him "George."
That she did not do anything but talk to him, and try to get
him to get off. That at the time she was unwell with her
menses, but he did not get off until he got through. While he
was in the act, and when she first waked up, she put her arms
around his neck and kissed him, and said, "George, what do you
mean?'* That when he got off of her he crawled from the
bed of the prosecutrix to his pallet on his hands and knees, and
she then knew **'' it was not her husband, but recognized
him as Bunyon Payne. She immediately aroused her husband.
Deo. 1897.] Payne v. State. 769
And told him what defendant had done. There was also other
testimony in the case; and, among other witnesses, Mrs. G. Gt.
McGary testified to seeing defendant sitting at the head of her
bed during the night, sometime before the alleged rape, after
she had retired.
Appellant's first bill of exceptions is with regard to the admis-
45ion of evidence that the prosecutrix was a married woman, and
the wife of G, W. "Winn. This was objected to, on the ground
that the indictment did not allege that the injured female was
B, married woman. This brings in question the validity of the
indictment in this case. The conviction was no doubt procured
und»?r the allegation of fraud, which, by our statute, is defined
to mean "the use of some stratagem, by which the woman i8
induced to believe the offender is her husband; or in administer-
ing, without her knowledge or consent, some substance pro-
ducing unnatural sexual desire, or such stupor as prevents or
weakens resistance, and committing the offense while she is un-
der the influence of such substance": See Pen. Code, 1895, art.
636. We have examined the authorities as to the form of an
indictment where the rape was committed by a false personation
of the husband, but we have been unable to find a case where
the question of the indictment has been treated. In England,
AS in this country, it appears that rape is a statutory offense, and
we understand that, under an ordinary indictment in England
for rape by force and without the consent of the alleged injured
female, the proof can be made for rape by procuring the inter-
course by a false personation of the husband of the female: See
Eegina v. Young, 38 L. T., N. S., 540; Wharton's Criminal Law,
see. 561, and notes. In this state the statute above quoted was
evidently passed to cover this character of offense; that is, where
the alleged rape was committed by fraud. And in Franklin v.
State, 34 Tex. Crim. Eep. 203, we held that the indictment for
an attempt to commit a rape need not set out the particular
kind of fraud, whether by personating the husband or adminis-
tering some substance to the female; and that the general charge
of an attempt to rape by fraud is sufficient, and furnishes tne
basis for proof of either means stated m the statute. We also
held in that case that, where the indictment alleged that the
injured female was a married woman, this would authorize proof
of the name of her husband, though his name was not set out
in the indictment. This is as far as we feel authorized to go.
We hold that an indictment, as in this case, which charges a
760 Payne v. State. [Texas^
rape by fraud in personating the husband, in order to be suffi-
cient, must allege that the injured female is a married woman,
and not the wife of the defendant. While it is not necessary to
allege the name of the husband, still this allegation would be
the better practice, and it would be no means vitiate the indict-
ment. The allegations of the indictment being defective in
this respect, we hold it insufficient to sustain a conviction for
rape by fraud in personating the husband.
498 rjij^g question is also presented to us whether or not the
facts of this case show such false personation of the husband as
to constitute a rape; that is, it is insisted that the intercourse
was accomplished without any stratagem or deception on the
part of the appellant to induce the prosecutrix to believe that
he was her husband. It is a feature of our constitution, and a
cardinal principle in all our criminal law, that no one can be
punished unless under a written law of this state in which the
offense has been defined. Now, the definition above quoted from
the statutes, where the prosecution is based on fraud, makes it
essential that the defendant use some stratagem by which the
woman is induced to believe that the offender is her husband.
A "stratagem" is defined to be "any artifice; a trick by which
some advantage is intended to be obtained": See Century Dic-
tionary. Now, according to our statute, it becomes absolutely
necessary, in order to constitute this offense, that the defendant
resort to some device or stratagem, some artifice or tric^, intend-
ing to deceive the prosecutrix, and make her believe that he is
her husband: and not only so, but the effect of his stratagem
must be to deceive and impose on her, and make her believe
that he is her husband at the time the act was committed, and
by this means gain her consent to the copulation. Applying
this rule to the facts as they appear in the record, we find that
the prosecutrix testifies that, when she first awoke, the defend-
ant had already penetrated her person, and was then in the act
of copulating with her. She being asleep at the time, it was
impossible, no matter what his acts may have been in the prem'
ises, that they should have operated upon her mind so as to
induce her to consent under the belief that he was her husband.
And, moreover, the record fails to disclose that he used any
stratagem; his only action being to go to her bed, get on top of
her, and begin the act of copulation while she was asleep. What
was done after the act of copulation began, even if it could be
conceded that he then resorted to some stratagem to continue
Dec. 1897.] Payne v. State. 761
the operation, would not constitute this offense; but the record
fails to disclose, even during the continuance of the act, that
he resorted to any artifice or trick to induce her to believe that
he was her husband. In Mooney v. State, 29 Tex. Crim. App.
257, this court held that the act of copulation by a defendant
with the wife of another person, while she was asleep, she being
incapable of consenting^ at the time, was rape by force; and this
is in accord with a number of authorities. But this was not
rape by fraud: See Kegina v. Young, 38 L. T., N. S., 540, and
Wharton's Criminal Law, sec. 561, and notes. In Ledbetter v.
State, 33 Tex. Crim. Rep. 400, the conviction in that case for
rape by falsely personating her husband was upheld on the
ground that the evidence was sufficient to show that the ap-
pellant by his language, as well as conduct, induced the injured
female to believe that he was her husband. In that case the evi-
dence showed that she was awake at the time, and consented
to the act, under the belief that appellant was her husband.
But, as stated above, such is not the testimony in this case; and,
in our opinion, tne evidence is not sufficient to authorize a con-
viction of rape by frazil. The court in his charge submitted
rape by fraud *^^ alone. As to the testimony of Mrs. McGary,
we are inclined to believe that same was not admissible, but,
as limited by the court, perhaps it was not calculated to injure
the appellant so as to authorize a reversal of the case.
For the error di&cussed the judgment is reversed and the cause
remanded.
RAPEJ-FRAUD IN PERSONATING HUSBAND.-Cohabltatlon
procured by means of the fraudulent personation of a female's hus-
band does not amount to the crime of rape; there Is neither actual
nor constructive force: Lewis v. State, 30 Ala. 54, 68 Am. Dec. 113.
See, however, as holdlnj? that consent obtained by fraud Is no con-
sent, and does not deprive the offense of the character of rape, the
note to State v. Murphy, 41 Am. Dec. 84.
RAPE.— AN INDICTMENT for rape need not allege that the
woman ravished was not the wife of the defendant: Commonwealth
▼. Fogerty, 8 Gray, 489, 69 Am. Dec 264.
DoRSBY V, Statb. [Texas,
Dorset v. State.
[38 Texas Criminal Kepoets, 527.]
FOODS— ADULTERATION OF.— An Inaictment charging the
manufacture and offer for sale of an adulterated article of food
must allege the article with which it is adulterated, under a statute
which makes any article of food criminally adulterated "if any sub-
stance or substances has or have been mixed with it so as to reduce
or lower or injuriously affect its quality or strength, or if any in-
ferior or cheaper substance or substances have been substituted
wholly or in part for the article."
FOODS— ADULTERATION OF— POWER TO PROHIBIT.—
Under the police power of the state, the legislature may legally pass
an act stating in distinct terms, as to any article of food or drink,
that if any person shall adulterate such article, naming it, with
any other substance, without labeling it, he shall be guilty of an
offense; but it is not competent to make criminal the mixing or
mingling of articles of food which are wholesome and nutritious
and absolutely prohibit the sale thereof.
FOODS— ADULTERATION OF— POWER TO REGULATE.—
A statute providing that, if certain named wholesome and nutritious
articles of food are mixed or intermingled, the product must be la-
beled, showing the component elements thereof, and punishing a
failure to so label, is valid, but a statute which embraces all arti-
cles of food or drink, without naming any, and makes the mixture
of any articles of food, however nutritious, without labeling the
product, an offense, is too general in its terms and cannot be en-
forced.
Martin & Flanary and G. A. McCall, for the appellant.
W. "W. Walling, and M. Trice, assistant attorney general, for
the state.
«30 HENDEESON", J. Appellant was convicted of know-
ingly and fraudulently adulterating an article of food, and his
punishment assessed at a fine of one hundred dollars; hence this
appeal.
As appellant made a motion to quash the information, and
assigns the refusal of the court to quash the same as error, we
will set out the charging part of the information, to wit: "That
H. B. Dorsey did then and there knowingly and fraudulently
manufacture, offer for sale, and sell a certain article of food, to
wit, flour, which was then and there known hy him, the said
H. B. Dorsey, to be adulterated, contrary," et cetera. There are
two statutes pertaining to this subject, under either of which
the indictment may have been drawn. Tlie first is article 427
of the Penal Code of '^^^ 3895, which provides: "If any person
shall fraudulently adulterate, for the purpose of sale, any sub-
stance intended for food, .... with any substance injurioua
Jan. 1898.] Dorsey t;. State. 768
to health, he shall he punished hy a fine not less than fifty dol-
lars nor more than five hundred dollars." Article 430 provides:
**No person shall within this state manufacture, offer for sale,
or sell any article of food, which is by him known to be adul-
terated within the meaning of this law**; and the punishment
assessed is a fine not exceeding one hundred dollars. Article
432 of the Penal Code undertakes to more specifically define
the meaning of the term "adulteration," and in what it con-
sists. As to foods or drinks, the following are the provisions
necessary to be quoted, so far as applicable to this case: "1. If
any substance or substances has or have been mixed with it so
as to reduce or lower or injuriously affect its quality or strength;
2. If any inferior or cheaper substance or substances have been
substituted wholly or in part for the article"; "6. If it be col-
ored or coated or polished or powdered, whereby damage is
concealed, or it is made to appear better than it really is, or of
greater value." Appended to this article is the following:
''Provided, that the state health officer may, with the approval
of the governor, from time to time declare certain articles or
preparations to be exempt from the provisions of this law; and
provided, further, that the provision of this act shall not apply
to mixtures or compounds recognized as ordinary articles of food,
provided the same are not injurious to health, and that the
articles are distinctly labeled as a mixture, stating the com-
ponents of the mixture." The proof in this case shows (which
was admitted by appellant) that the adulteration was of flour;
that is, flour and meal were mixed or mingled together by a
bolting process which was in operation in defendant's flouring
mill. The mixture or compound contained ninety per cent of
flour and ten per cent of com meal.
The contention of the defendant as to the indictment is that
it should have stated how the adulteration was made; that is,
the contention is, that it was necessary to prove an admixture
or adulteration of the flour, and to show how the same was adul-
terated, by evidence, and that the indictment should have con-
tained the allegations, so as to put appellant on notice of what
he was charged to answer. For instance, in this case it is in-
sisted that the indictment should have alleged that the flour was
adulterated with a certain portion of com m'eal, and that said
meal was a substance such as to reduce or lower or injuriously
affect the quality of the flour, or that said flour was adulterated
with meal, which was an inferior or cheaper substance than the
764 DoRSEY V. State. [Texas,
flour with which it was mixed. It occurs to us that this con-
tention is sound. There are a number of articles or substances
which might be intermingled with flour so as to reduce or lower
or injuriously affect its quality or strength, or which are of an
inferior or cheaper character; and under our system of criminal
pleading the appellant should have been charged with the par-
ticular substance with which the article in question was adulter-
ated, so that he might be prepared to meet the state's case.
*^^ We take it that the indictment in question was brought
under article 430, and not under article 427, inasmuch as there
is no allegation, nor does the proof indicate, that the meal shown
to have been mixed with the flour was injurious to health. In
fact, the contrary appears. It further appears from the evi-
dence in the case that both compounds which are claimed to
constitute the adulteration are recognized as ordinary articles
of food, and not injurious to health. In such case, under the
provisions of the law, if such articles are mixed together, and
are distinctly labeled as a mixture, the person manufacturing
such article is not indictable. It would, therefore, seem to fol-
low that the indictment, to be good under this article, should
negative the fact that such substances or articles of food, when
combined so as to produce a wholesome article of food, were
properly labeled. Of course, it is competent, under the police
power of the state, for the legisuature to pass an act stating in
distinct terms, as to any article of food or drink, that if any
person, et cetera, shall adulterate such article (naming it) with
any other substance, without labeling same, such person shall
be guilty of an offense. We understand this to be a rule laid
down by the authorities. Some of the legislation is based on the
adulteration of articles of food or drink which are unwholesome
or injurious, and this appears to be provided against in article
427 of our statute. Other legislation is aimed at the prevention
of frauds on the public, to prevent palming off on them an
article of food other or different from that which they are led
to believe they are purchasing; and as to the latter, the authori-
ties appear to hold that it is competent for the legislature to pro-
hibit the mixture or compound altogether, though it may not be
injurious or unwholesome: See Powell v. Commonwealth, 114 Pa.
St. 265, 60 Am. Rep. 350, and authorities there cited; Waterbury
V. Newton, 50 N. J. L. 534; Palmer v. State, 39 Ohio St. 236, 48
Am. Pep. 429. We would not be understood as indorsing the doc-
trine laid down in the above authorities. The courts have gone
Jnn. 1898.] Dorsey v. Statb. 765
to great length in upholding legislation under the police power.
In some decisions it has been so magnified as to be regarded as
almost omnipotent. We do not agree to the doctrine that un-
der this power, or any other, the legislature can make criminal
the mixture or mingling of articles of food which are whole-
some and nutritious, and prohibit the sale thereof. "We can add
nothing to the dissenting opinion of Judge Gordon in the case
of Powell V. Commonwealth, 114 Pa. St. 265, 60 Am. Eep. 350.
We do agree to this proposition, that the legislature, when such
articles (namely, articles of wholesome and nutritious food) are
mixed and intermingled, can require that the product be labeled,
showing the component elements thereof, and punish a failure
to so label. We further hold that the present act of the legis-
lature on the subject is too general in its terms. It simply em-
braces all articles of food or drink, without naming any, and
makes the mixture of any articles of food, however nutritious,
without labeling the product, an offense. A great many articles
of food are mixed and combined together, and such combina-
tions are not only harmless, but are healthy, as articles of food;
and to require all such articles to be labeled, '^^^ so as to show
the constituent elements composing the same, it occurs to us,
is extremely onerous legislation. We hold that an act on this
subject, to be enforced, should name the particular article of
food, the adulteration of which is prohibited by the legislature,
and which is required to be labeled. In all the cases on the
subject which have come to our notice, the legislature appears
to have directed the law to some particular article of food or
drink. For instance, in the Powell case, supra, the act was for
the purpose of prohibiting the manufacture of oleomargarine.
Now, as bearing on the subject before us, we hold that it would
be entirely competent for the legislature, by an act, to prohibit
the sale, et cetera, of flour mixed with meal, or any other whole-
some article, without properly labeling the product of such com-
bination. They have not done this. The prosecution is at-
tempted to be maintained under the general act to prohibit the
intermixing of all foods. We do not believe that it was com-
petent for the legislature to do this.
The judgment is reversed, and the prosecution ordered dis-
missed.
POLICE POWER— ADULTERATION OF FOODS.— No man has
a constitutional right to keep secret the composition of substances
which he sells to the public as articles of food. Therefore, a statute
766 DoESEY V. State. [Texas.
requiring the seller of "lard substitutes" to give notice of that fact
to the purchaser, by labeling the article with a quantitative analysis
of its ingredients, does not deprive the seller of his property with-
out due process of law, but is a valid exercise of the police power:
State V. Aslesen, 50 Minn. 5, 36 Am. St Rep. 620. A statute prohib-
iting and maliing criminal the sale of oleomargarine unless it has
been colored pinli is constitutional, though applicable to that manu-
factured without, as well as within, the state. Such a statute has
for its object the prevention of fraud on the public, and is there-
fore within the police power of the state: State v. Myers, 42 W.
Va. 822, 57 Am. St. Rep. 887; State v. Campbell, 64 N. H. 402, 10
Am. St. Rep. 419, and note; monographic note to Butler t. Chambers.
1 Am. St Rep. 644.
CASES
HT THB
SUPEEME COUET
UTAH.
Murphy v. Motlb.
[17 Utah, 113.]
MARRIAGE AND DIVORCE— ALIMONY AFTER DEATH
OF HUSBAND.— Whether a divorced wife and minor children, or
any of them, are entitled to have the payment of alimony or money
for their support continue after the death of the divorced husband
depends on the nature and terms of the decree of divorce.
MARRIAGE AND DIVORCE— ALIMONY AFTER DEATH
OF HUSBAND.— A decree in a divorce suit granting an absolute
divorce and providing that the mother shall have the care and cus-
tody of the minor children, and the father shall pay a certain sum
monthly toward their support during their minority, is not dis-
charged nor annulled by the death of the father. Its performance
may be enforced thereafter out of his estate.
MARRIAGE AND DIVORCE— ALIMONY— SECURITY.— If
there Is danger that a divorced husband may dispose of his property
by conveyance or squander it, so that nothing will remain upon
which the decree of divorce providing for alimony or the support
of minor children can operate, the court may require him to fur-
nish security for its performance.
MARRIAGE AND DIVORCE-ALIMONY— SECURITY— EN-
FORCEMENT OF LIEN.— If a court, in granting an absolute di-
vorce, decrees that a husband shall pay a certain sum per month
toward the support of his minor children, and makes such obliga-
tion a lien upon part of his property, it may foreclose the lien upou
failure of payment, and its power to do this is not affected by the
death of the father; and if the proceeds are insuflQcient to satisfy
the claim, it may enforce payment of the balance out of the estate.
J. H. and 0. H. Moyle, for the appellant.
Ferguson & Cannon, for the respondent.
**« BAETCH, J. This action was institnted hy the plaintifT
against the defendant, as executor of the last will and testament
(767)
768 Murphy v. Moyle. [Utah,
of Jesse J. Murphy, deceased, and involves the sum of four
hundred and forty-seven dollars, claimed by virtue of a decree,
and subsequent modification thereof, made by the district court
of the late territory of Utah, in an action for divorce brought
by defendant's testate against the plaintiff. In that case, the
-defendant (plaintiff herein) filed a cross-complaint, and a decree
was granted in her favor on her cross-complaint, by which the
bonds of matrimony existing between the parties were dissolved,
and a certain sum of money decreed to be paid monthly by the
defendant therein to the plaintiff, for the support of their two
minor children during their minoritj^ and until they would be
of age. To secure the payment of such sum, it was decreed to
be a lien on certain property of the plaintiff in that suit. The
*'^'' decree was afterward so modified as to require payment of
but one-half of the original sum, and this was to be for the
support of the child in whose behalf this suit was brought.
Since the death of the testate, payment has been refused by
the executor, who also refused to allow the claim above men-
tioned. At the trial of this cause, the court rendered judgment
in favor of the plaintiff, directing that the "defendant, as execu-
tor of the last will and testament of Jesse J. Murphy, deceased,
pay to the clerk of the court, for the use of the plaintiff, the
€um of four hundred and forty-seven dollars, to be paid by said
<;lerk to the plaintiff in the following manner: The sum of two
hundred and sixteen dollars to be paid as soon as received by
«aid clerk; the sum of six dollars per month on the first day
of April, 1897; the sum of six dollars per month on each suc-
<5eeding month thereafter until May 15, 1900, for the care, sup-
port, and education of Clara Murphy, the minor daughter of the
■deceased, to be paid to plaintiff while said minor is under age,
-and in the care and custody of plaintiff" — and further decreed
that the plaintiff had a lien on the property described in the
-decree, made in the divorce proceedings, and ordered the same
to be sold to satisfy the lien, and the proceeds to be turned over
to the clerk of the court, and that, if the proceeds were insuffi-
■cient to pay the amount, the executor should pay the deficiency.
Judgment was also given for costs.
The material question to be determined is whether, under
the decree made in the proceedings for divorce, as afterward
modified, and under the law, the court was authorized to mako
the decree in controversy herein. Counsel for the appellant
contend that the piyment of the money for the support of the
June, 1898.] Murphy v. Moyle. 769
minor child could not be enforced after the death of the tes-
tate. The rule which counsel would here invoke was doubt-
less applicable at *** common law to a divorce a mensa et thoro,
which did not finally terminate the marriage relation, but merely
effected a separation, without disturbing the marital rights and
obligations; but it does not necessarily apply to a decree of
divorce granted under the statutes of this state, which has the
same effect upon the marriage relations and marital rights
and obligations as a divorce a vinculo matrimonii at common
law. In such case,whether or not the divorced wife and minor
children, or any of them, are entitled to have the payment of
Alimony or money for their support continue after the death of
the deceased depends on the nature and terms of the decree
allowing the same. In the case at bar, the original decree of
•divorce, after declaring the bonds of matrimony existing between
the parties dissolved, and awarding the care, custody, and con-
trol of their minor children (who are therein mentioned as
Priscilla Ellen Murphy and Clara Jane Murphy) to the defend-
ant, the plaintiff herein, respecting the matter of support for
them, provides as follows: "It is further ordered, adjudged, and
-decreed by the court that the defendant have and receive from
the plaintilT the sum of twelve dollars per month permanent
alimony and support for her said minor children, the said
amount to be paid to her by the plaintiff on the first day of each
and every month during the minority of said children, and until
they become of age, and that, as security for the payment there-
of, the defendant have a lien" upon certain premises and prop-
erty described in the decree. It will be noticed that by this
decree the plaintiff was required to pay the sum of twelve dol-
lars per month alimony and support for their two minor chil-
dren during their minority, and there is no other limitation
than their minority, and that a specific lien was placed on cer-
tain property to secure the payment of such sum. The *^**
■divorce granted was absolute, and severed all marital relations;
and the children during their minority had no other recourse
against their father or his estate for support than that provided
in the decree, unless by the order of the court. Afterward, this
•decree in respect to the support of the minor children was modi-
fied as follows: "It is therefore hereby ordered, adjudged, and
decreed that said former decree entered in this case, June 24,
1890, be and the same shall be, and is, modified as follows:
That said defendant shall have the care and custody of the said
AM. St. Kxf- Vol. LXX.— 19
770 MuKPHY V. MoYLB. [Utah,
minor child Clara Murphy, and the said plaintiff shall pay to
the said defendant, for the support and maintenance of said
Clara Murphy, the sum of six dollars each month. And it i»
further ordered that said decree entered June 24, 1890, is hereby
further modified so that the lien provided for on said three-
quarters of lot 24 in hlock 4, and the portion of lot 3, in said
Ogden City survey, county of Weber, territory of Utah, is-
hereby set aside and dissolved so far as modified, and shall stand
for naught; and said lien is retained and continued as follows:
Defendant shall still have a lien on the following portion of said
lot, and that only to secure the payment of said six dollars per
month for the support of said minor child." The property
to be affected by the lien, and which is in this action ordered
to be sold, is then described. This modified decree simply
cuts off the support to one of the children, and it does not ma-
terially afl'ect the force of the former decree as to the other.
It does not in express terms require payment during minority,
but the former decree does; and it will be noticed that the
original decree is set aside and held for naught only "so far as
modified." Therefore, construing the two decrees together, it
becomes apparent that the intention was to provide for the sup-
port of the child mentioned in the modified decree during
minority; and this ^** is the manifest intention indicated by
the modified decree. Were, then, these decrees, and especially
the provisions thereof respecting the children, made in pursu-
ance of law?
Section 2606 of the Comp. Laws of Utah of 1888, so far a»
material here, reads: "When a divorce is decreed, the court shall
make such order in relation to the children and property of the
parties, and the maintenance of the wife, and such portion of
the children as may be awarded to her, as may be just and
equitable; .... provided, further, that when it shall appear
to the court at a future time that it would be for the interest
of the parties concerned that a change should be effected in
regard to the formal disposal of children or distribution of prop-
erty, the court shall have power to make such change as will be
conducive to the best interest of all parties concerned." This
statute is broad and comprehensive. Under it the court has
power to make such a decree as the circumstances may warrant,
and, doubtless, if there is danger of the father squandering the
estate, or if, from hostility or other cause, he is likely to refuse
maintenance to his wife, or support to his children awarded to
June, 1898.] Murphy v. Moylb. 771
her, and thus leave the children to he supported hy the mother
without aid from the estate, the court may make such order
respecting the property and the support and maintenance of
the wife and children as is just and equitable, and such order
or decree may be made to continue in force after his decease;
and the court may afterward, if occasion shall require it, make
such change in any decree as "will be conducive to the best
interest of all parties concerned/' The court may also properly
require the husband to furnish security where there is danger
that he will dispose of his property by conveyance or squander it,
so that nothing will remain upon which the decree can operate.
Testing, ^^^ therefore, the original and modified decrees by the
terms of the statute, it is evident that they were both authorized,
and created an obligation to pay and a lien on the property des-
cribed in the modified decree as security for payment in ac-
cordance with the terms of the decrees, which obligation and
lien continued in force after the death of the deceased, and
bound his estate. Such lien was subject to foreclosure for fail-
ure to make payment of the sum stipulated at any time during
the minority of the child. It could be foreclosed the same as
any other lien for the purpose of enforcing payment. In
O'Hagan v. O'Hagan, 4 Iowa, 509, with reference to a decree
of divorce fixing a certain allowance as alimony to the wife for
life, it was said: "This decree has the same force and validity
as any other judgment, and may be collected in the same man-
ner. It is a fixed, ascertained, and subsisting debt against him,
and, upon his death, against his estate.
Nor was it improper, under the terms of the original and
modified decrees, for the court in this case to decree the prop-
erty to be sold, and the proceeds applied to the payment of a
sum, equal in amount to that which was ordered to be paid dur-
ing the minority of the child, and have the same paid to the
clerk of the court, to be paid by him to the plaintiff as it be-
comes due. The court had the right to enforce the former de-
crees, and foreclose the lien upon failure of payment, and its
power to do so was not affected by the death of the testate, and,
if the proceeds shall be insufficient to satisfy the claim, it may
enforce payment of the balance out of the estate: Miller v. Miller,
64 Me. 484; Storey v. Storey, 125 111. 608, 8 Am. St. Rep. 417;
Carson v. Murray, 3 Paige, 483; Burr v. Burr, 7 Hill, 207;
Stratton v. Stratton, 77 Me. 373, 52 Am. Rep. 779. The cases
cited by appellant do not appear to be in point under our *^
772 MuBPHY V. MoYLB. [Utah,
statute and the decree of divorce herein considered, and there-
fore we do not deem it important to review them.
We cannot sanction appellant's contention. It is unsound,
as heing at variance not only with the decrees of the court and
the law, but also with justice, for it is the solemn duty of every
husband and father to support his wife during life, and his
children during their minority, suitably to their station in life,
and, if he fail to do so, every principle of justice demands that
they be thus supported out of his estate. This is, doubtless,
what the court endeavored to do in this case, as is apparent from
an examination of the several decrees. We are of the opinion
that the decree in the case at bar is valid, and, as there is no
reversible error in the record, the judgment must be affirmed.
It is 60 ordered.
Zane, C. J., concurs.
Miner, J., dissents.
MARRIAGE AND DIVORCE — ALIMONY AFER DEATH OP
HUSBAND.— Where alimony is decreed in terms for the natural
life of the wife, it subsists even after the defendant's death: Strat-
ton V. Stratton, 77 Me. 373, 52 Am. Rep. 779. A consent decree,
which provides for payment of alimony to a divorced wife "so Ion.?
as she may remain sole and unmarried," is binding upon the hus-
band during his lifetime, and upon his estate after his decease, so
long as the wife remains unmarried: Storey v. Storey, 125 111. 60S,
8 Am. St. Rep. 417. The right to alimony ceases on the death of
the husband, and cannot afterward be availably asserted, unless
It has been before ascertained and fixed by decree: Gaines v. Gaines,
9 B. Mon. 2^, 48 Am. Dec. 425. In an earlier case in Kentucky,
however. It was held that the right to alimony continues only during
the lifetime of the husband, or during the separation of the wife
from him; and it is, therefore, erroneous to decree it to her for the
term of her life: Lockridge v. Lockrldge, 3 Dana, 28, 28 Am.
Dec. 52.
MARRIAGE AND DIVORCE — ALIMONY — LIEN. — Alimony
awarded in a divorce case may be decreed to be a lien upon the real
estate of the defendant, but not upon his personal property: John-
Bon v. Johnson, 22 Colo. 20, 55 Am. St Rep. 112, and note. See,
also, Gaston v. Gaston, 114 Cal. 542, 65 Am. St. Rep. 86.
July, 1898.] SiNQEB V. Salt Lake Coppee Mfq. Co. 773
Singer v. Salt Lake Copper Manufacturing Co.
[17 Utah, 143.]
CORPORATIONS— MEETINGS— PRESUMPTIONS AS TO
REGULARITY.— If meetings of a legally constituted board of di-
rectors have been held, and business within the scope of and pur-
suant to the purposes for which the corporation was organized has
been transacted, the presumption is, that such meetings were regu-
larly called, convened, and held for the transaction of such business,
and the onus probandi is upon him who maintains the contrary to
allege and prove that they were not so called and held.
CORPORATIONS— MEETINGS— PRESUMPTION AS TO
REGULARITY.— If it appears that a special meeting of the directors
of a corporation was held and that a quorum was present, it must
be presumed that due notice of the meeting was given and that
all steps necessary to constitute it a regular and valid meeting were
taken.
CORPORATIONS— TRUST DEED— EXECUTION OF.— If a
committee is authorized by the board of directors of a corporation
to procure a loan for it and the oflBcers who execute a trust deed
to secure such loan are expressly authorized to do so by the board
of directors and the by-laws of the corporation, the validity of the
deed cannot be assailed on the ground that it is not signed by the
president and secretary of the corporation.
CORPORATIONS— TRUST DEED— DIRECTOR DEALING
WITH CORPORATION.— If, in the execution of a trust deed by
a corporation, there is an entire absence of want of good faith,
fraud and collusion and the corporation is a going concern, a stock-
holder or director is not prohibited from dealing with It. In such
case the mere fact that a director furnished a portion of the money
does not vitiate the trust deed given to secure the loan. Contracts
made by a corporation with its officers are not void per se, but will
be carefully scrutinized in equity and set aside, if not made In the
utmost good faith.
CORPORATIONS — MEEITNGS — NOTICE.— As a general
rule, notice must be given in some way to all directors of the meet-
ings of the board, where the by-laws and rules of the corporation
do not provide the time and place of meeting, in order to render
them valid. To this rule there are exceptions, as where such an
emergency exists as justifies Immediate action on the part of the
board, and the giving of notice to all the members is not practicable,
or where a director secretes himself In order to prevent a meeting,
or Is beyond the reach of notice.
CORPORATIONS — MEETINGS — WANT OP NOTICE.- A
meeting of the directors of a corporation held without notice to ab-
sent directors, or the existence of such an emergency as excuses
notice to them, renders the business transacted at such meeting
void.
CORPORATIONS— INSOLVENCY— TRUST DEED.— The in-
solvency of a corporation at the time a trust deed Is authorized and
executed by It does not alone render the Instrument void.
T. Pierce, for the appellanta.
Shepard & Sanford, Williams, Van Colt & Sutherland, G. A.
Smith, Marshall & Eoyle, J. W. Barton, Dickson, Ellis & Ellia,
C. F. Loofbourow, and A. F. Sanford, for the respondents.
774 Singer v. Salt Lake Copper Mfg. Co. [Utah,
**** BAETCH, J. The first assignment of error which we
will consider is the one respecting the holding of the court, that
the first trust deed, or that executed June 1, 1894, is valid. The
appellants insist that it is void, and appear to base their con-
tention upon the grounds that the meetings of the board at
which it was authorized and executed were not legally called, that
the deed was not signed by the president and secretary, and that
one of the beneficiaries was a director of the corporation, and
participated in the meeting at Denver when the trust deed was
executed. Under section 493 of 1 Mills' Annotated Statutes
of Colorado, by virtue of which the Salt Lake City Copper
Manufacturing Company was incorporated, and under the ar-
ticles of incorporation and by-laws, there is no doubt that the
board of directors had the right to hold meetings beyond the
limits of the state of Colorado; and the question, therefore, as
to the first point of contention, is whether the meetings at New
York and Denver were lawfully convened. A careful examina-
tion of the record reveals nothing to show that either one of
these meetings was convened without notice to all the directors.
On the contrary, from the minutes of the New York meeting it
is clear that the board met on call of the president at New York
on May 23, 1894. Whether this call was made by previous order
of the board, as provided in the articles of incorporation, or
whether all the members were actually notified of the meeting,
does not appear from the minutes. Nor is there any extrinsic
evidence to show that the directors were not properly notified.
It does appear that ^'"* four of the five members of the board
were present, and participated in the meeting. So, of the Den-
ver meeting, there is nothing to indicate that it was not a legally
called meeting, of which all the directors had due and legal
notice. The minutes of both meetings show the business which
was transacted, and that a quorum was present. Under such
circumstances, and in the absence of any evidence to show that
the meetings were not lawfully convened, the court would not
be justified in holding that these meetings were unlawful.
Where meetings of a legally constituted board of directors have
been held, and business within the scope of and pursuant to the
purposes for which the corporation was organized was transacted,
the presumption is, that such meetings were regularly called and
held for the transaction of such business, and the onus probandi
is upon him who maintains the contrary to allege and prove
that they were not so called and held. "This presumption in-
July, 1898.] Singer v. Salt Lake Coppeb Mfg. Co. 775
eludes the presumption that the meeting of a hoard of directors
at which a given resolution was passed was regularly convened.
Thus, where the validity of an act done at a special meeting of
the board of directors of a corporation is drawn in question on
the ground that some of the directors were not notified to at-
tend the meeting, the burden is on the party attacking the
regularity of the proceedings to show that the directors in ques-
tion were not in fact notified. If it appear that a meeting waa
held, and that a quorum was present, it will be presumed, in the
absence of evidence to the contrary, that due notice was given,
and that all steps necessary to constitute it a regular and valid
meeting were taken": 3 Thompson on Corporations, sec. 3297;
see, also, sec, 3926; 1 Cook on Stock and Stockholders, sec. 600;
1 Morawetz on Private Corporations, sec. 532; Wells v. Kodgers,
€0 Mich. 525; Leavitt v. Oxford etc. Min. Co., 3 Utah, 265; Cho-
teau Ins. Co. v. Holmes, 68 Mo. 601, 30 Am. Eep. 807; ^'^^ Har-
din V. Iowa Ey. etc. Co., 78 Iowa, 726. And notice need not be af-
firmatively shown by the record: 3 Thompson on Corporations,
eec. 3934; Sargent v. Webster, 13 Met. 497, 46 Am. Dec. 743;
Wells V. Rodgers, 60 Mich. 525.
If, therefore, the appellants wished to attack the validity of
either or both of the meetings in question, it was incumbent
upon them, by proper averment in their answer, to raise the
issue that the meeting or meetings were irregularly and illegally
convened, because of want of notice or otherwise, and then to
establish the fact by proof at the trial. The question of the le-
gality of those meetings was one of grave importance to the
plaintiif, because upon it depended the validity of the first trust
deed, through which he and others claimed priority of payment
over the appellants. This is especially so, owing to the insolv-
ency of the common debtor. The plaintiff was entitled to be in-
formed by their answer as to the true nature of the defense which
his adversaries intended to make, so that he could prepare to
meet it. "The very object and design of all pleading by the
plaintiff, and of all pleading of new matter by the defendant,
is that the adverse party may be informed of the leal cause of
action or defense relied upon by the pleader, and may thus have
an opportunity of meeting and defeating it, if possible, at the
trial. Unless the petition or complaint, on the one hand, and
the answer, on the other, fully and fairly accomplishes this pur-
pose, the pleading would be a useless ceremony, productive only
of delay, and the parties might better be permitted to state
776 Singer v. Salt Lake Copper Mfg. Co. [Utah^
their demands orally before the court at the time of the trial.
The requirement, therefore, that the cause of action or the af-
firmative defense must be stated as it actually is, and that the
proofs must establish it as stated, is involved in the very theory
of pleading": Pomeroy's Eemedies and Eemedial Eights, sec.
554; 15'' Walton v. Minturn, 1 Cal. 363; Green v. Palmer, 15
Cal. 412, 76 Am. Dec. 492; Campbell v. Jones, 38 Cal. 507.
There appear to be no allegations in the answers of the appel-
lants that no notice of those meetings was given to the directors,,
nor that they were otherwise unlawfully held. They having
failed to raise such an issue by the pleadings, and to establish
the same by competent evidence, the presumption, "Omnia rite
acta," must be held to apply, and the meetings be regarded aa
in all respects regular and valid.
There is no foundation for the contention that the first trust
deed was not properly executed. A committee was authorized
to procure the loan, and the officers who executed the trust deed
were expressly authorized by the board, and by virtue of the by-
laws were proper officers, to execute the deed. Nor can the fact
that the plaintiff, who was a director and interested in the loan,
participated in the meeting at Denver when the trust deed was
executed and delivered, avail the appellants, under the facts and
circumstances disclosed. The board of directors of the corpora^
tion consisted of five members, three of whom constituted a
quorum, and at the meeting held in New York there were pres-
ent four directors, and it is true that plaintiff was one of them,
but there was a quorum present without him. At that meeting,
by unanimous action, the board authorized a committee to nego-
tiate a loan of one hundred thousand dollars, and empowered
the proper officers to execute the necessary papers therefor, in-
cluding a trust deed, on the property of the company. At that
time the corporation was solvent — a going concern — and pur-
suing the objects of its creation. The loan was ordered to be
negotiated for the purpose of paying its bills and overdrafts at
a bank, and to complete and put into operation its electrolytical
plant and copper refinery. The committee, it appears, found it
difficult to procure the *®® entire sum from disinterested parties,
and hence negotiated with the plaintiff and three others, who
furnished the money; and at the meeting held in Denver the
loan which had thus been previously authorized was perfected,
by the proper officers executing and delivering the notes and
trust deed. There seems to be nothing in the transaction which
July, 1898.] Singer v. Salt Lake Coopeb Mfg. Co. 777
is tainted witH fraud or collusion. It has the appearance of a
fair business dealing, made, not for the purpose of hindering
or delaying creditors in the collection of their claims, or secur-
ing an advantage over creditors, or defrauding them, but for the
purpose of discharging honest obligations, and continuing the
business of the corporation. Under these circumstances, the
mere fact that a director furnished a portion of the money bor-
rowed does not have the effect of vitiating the trust deed given
to secure the loan. Nor would this trust deed be void, under
the circumstances surrounding its execution, even if it were con-
ceded that the plaintiff, being the director who furnished a por-
tion of the money, improperly voted, as one of the quorum, at
the Denver meeting where the same loan was again authorized,
because an examination of the minutes of the New York meet-
ing shows that the power then and there conferred upon the
committee to negotiate the loan was full and complete, and
hence there was no necessity for any further authorization at
the subsequent meeting. The mere doing of an unnecessary
thing, at the Denver meeting, cannot have the effect of render-
ing void what was lawfully done at the New York meeting. At
the time of the transaction neither the good faith of the plain-
tiff nor of the other beneficiaries was questioned by the com-
pany or any stockholder or creditors, and months thereafter the
claims of these beneficiaries, including that of the plaintiff, were
recognized in the very trust deed under which the appellants
claim; *^® and this with the knowledge of the appellants.
Where, as in the execution of the trust deed here under consid-
eration, there is an entire absence of a want of good faith, fraud,
and collusion, and the corporation is yet a going concern, no
sound principle of law prohibits a stockholder or director from
dealing with the corporation. A corporation is an artificial en-
tity, and one of the principal objects of its creation is to con-
tract with individuals in due course of business. This it may
do with its directors and stockholders as well as with others;
and, under the weight of American authority, at least, contracts
made by the corporation with its officers are not void per se,
but at most voidable merely, at the election of the corporation
or its representatives, within a reasonable time. Neither the
corporation nor a stockholder is complaining here. It is quite
true that since the will of snch an officer goes to make up or
forms a part of the will of the legal entity, and the officer is
therefore, in some sense, on both sides of the contract — is deal-
778 Singer v. Salt Lake Coppeb Mfg. Co. [Utah,
ing with a creature of which he forms a part — his contract with
the corporation will be very carefully and closely scrutinized in
equity, and will be set aside if not made in the utmost good
faith. This doctrine was recognized by this court in Mercantile
€o. V. Mt. Pleasant Equitable Co-operative Inst., 12 Utah, 213,
where it was said: "So, in the absence of contrary legislation, a
mortgage executed by a corporation under embarrassed circum-
stances, to enable it to continue its business, will be sustained
if the whole transaction be in good faith; and a corporation may
also, in like manner, obligate itself to a stockholder or director.
But in such last cases a court of equity will very closely scru-
tinize the transactions, and, in case of a contest between a gen-
eral creditor and a director or other managing officer, will require
of the latter very strict proof of good faith, and that *®^ the
mortgage or other encumbrance was not executed in expectancy
«f insolvency, for the purpose of securing an advantage over
other creditors; and such transactions may be set aside on slight
grounds."
In Twin-Lick Oil Co. v. Marbury, 91 TJ. S. 587, Mr. Justice
Miller, delivering the opinion of the court, said: "While it is
true that the defendant, as a director of the corporation, was
bound by all those rules of conscientious fairness which courts
of equity have imposed as the guides for dealing in such cases,
it cannot be maintained that any rule forbids one director among
several from loaning money to the corporation, when the money
is needed, and the transaction is open and otherwise free from
blame. No adjudged case has gone so far as this. Such a doc-
trine, while it would afford little protection to the corporation
against actual fraud or oppression, would deprive it of the aid of
those most interested in giving aid judiciously, and best quali-
fied to judge of the necessity of that aid, and of the extent to
which it may safely be given": 3 Thompson on Corporations,
sees. 4059, 4061; Harts v. Brown, 77 111. 226; Saltmarsh v.
Spaulding, 147 Mass. 224; Smith v. Skeary, 47 Conn. 47; Pneu-
matic Gas Co. V. Berry, 113 U. S. 322; Beach v. Miller, 130
111. 162, 17 Am. St. liep. 291; Leavenworth Co. Commrs. v.
Chicago etc. Ry. Co., 134 U. S. 688. Upon the foregoing con-
siderations, we are of the opinion that the trust deed executed
June 1, 1894, is valid.
This brings us to the question of the validity of the trust
deed executed to A. Hanauer, trustee, on September 24, 1894.
The appellants maintain that this trust deed is valid, while the
July, 1898.] Singer v. Salt Lake Copper Mfg. Co. 779
respondents insist that it is void, because: 1. No notice to
directors was given of the meeting at which it was authorized;
2. The company at the time of its authorization and execution
was insolvent; and 3. For actual fraud. The main controversy
on ^^^ this branch of the case is respecting the legality of the
meeting held on September 24, 1894, and the motives which
prompted the execution of the trust deed of that date. On the
question of notice to directors of the meetings of the board,
article 2 of the by-laws of the corporation, in conformity with
section 493 of 1 Mills' Annotated Statutes of Colorado provides
**The board of directors shall hold meetings, when called by the
secretary, upon request of the president or any three directors,
upon timely notice thereof." Under this provision of this by-
law, the directors were required to hold meetings, and were to
have timely notice; that is, every director was entitled to have
notice in some way of each and every meeting of the board.
In general, the directors had no authority to act, except when
lawfully convened upon notice to all of them. This is a rule
common to all corporations, and prescribes the mode for con-
vening the agents to transact corporate business. A corpora-
tion, being but an artificial entity, has but one will, and this
will is collected by the sense of a majority of the directors. Its
will so collected, directs and controls the corporate acts. It is
therefore important that every director should have an oppor-
tunity to be heard on all matters affecting the corporation, bo
that, through the sense of all, its best interests may be subserved.
Every director is entitled to the reasoning, judgment, and advice
of every other director, and cannot be deprived therefrom
through failure to give notice. So the stockholders are entitled
to have the corporate business conducted in view of the experi-
ence and wisdom of all the directors, and of this right they can-
not be deprived by the arbitrary will of a quorum. It is true
it is not imperative for every director to be present at every
meeting, but he should, if possible, have notice, and an oppor-
tunity **** to be present; for where matters to be acted upon call
for deliberation and judgment, all interests and parties to be
affected should have the benefit of the wisdom and counsel of
all those intrusted with the decision. Although all may not
concur, still the arguments and information of each may modify
and affect the conclusion which otherwise might be reached.
If notice were not required, it would doubtless frequently hap-
pen that the director, whose judgment because of his superior
780 Singer v. Salt Lake Coppek Mfg. Co. [Utah,
knowledge, power of perception, and experience in the corporate
affairs, would carry the greatest weight in the deliberations,
would, through lack of notice, he absent, and the other directors
deprived of the benefit of his arguments. There are other rea-
Bons why personal notice must be given to the directors of all
meetings of the board for which the time and place of holding
the same are not stated in the by-laws or rules of the corpora-
tion. If the law were otherwise, the interests and rights of the
minority would be subject to great abuse, and even those of the
majority would not be safe; for, where the minority would con-
stitute a majority of a quorum, they might give notice to a
bare quorum, and at a meeting so called change the entire policy
of the majority, and transact business which would destroy the
best interests of the corporation. This sequence was clearly
stated by Mr. Justice Brewer in Paola etc. Ey. Co. v. Anderson
Co. Commrs., 16 Kan. 309, where he says that, if the rule as to
notice were otherwise, then, in a 'Tsody composed of twelve
members, a quorum of seven could act, and a majority of that
quorum — four — could bind the body. An unscrupulous minor-
ity of four, by withholding notice to five, might thus bind both
the body and the corporation.** While, however, the general
rule is that every director, ^^^ under such by-laws as the one
in question herein, must have notice of the time and place of
every meeting of the board, still there may be exceptions, as
where such an emergency exists as justifies immediate action on
the part of the board, and the giving of notice to all the mem-
bers is not practicable, or where a director should secrete him-
self in order to prevent a meeting, or is beyond the reach of
notice; and there may be other instances where the giving of
notice to every director would not be practicable, and a lack of
notice would be excusable. In such cases, the rule cannot be
permitted to be used as a weapon to prevent the transaction of
corporate business, and thereby defeat the end and object for
which the corporation was created. The general rule that notice
must be given in some way to all directors of meetings of the
board, where the by-laws and rules of the corporation do not
provide the time and place of meeting, in order to render them
valid, is well settled. In Simon v. Sevier Assn., 54 Ark. 58,
it was said: "No director is required to attend a meeting of
directors held without authority. Every one of them is entitled
to vote and be heard in all the proceedings of the board. The
shareholders in the corporation are entitled to the influence and
July, 1898.] Singer v. Salt Lake &jppeb Mra. Co. 781
advice of every director in the management of their affairs.
Hence, in order to accomplish the object for which each director
was elected, a mere majority of the directors cannot constitute
a majority of the board for the transaction of business unless
they meet according to, and by authority of, the by-laws or rules
of the corporation, or are called together upon due and legal
notice given to all of them. Assembled in any other manner,
they cannot act as a board, but as individuals, and such acts are
not the acts of the corporation": 5 Thompson on Corporations,
sec. 6176; 1 Morawetz on Private Corporations, sec. 532; 1 Beach
on Private Corporations, sec. 279; Bank of Little Eock v. Mc-
Carthy, i«* 55 Ark. 473, 29 Am. St. Rep. 60; Stow v. Wyse, 7
Conn. 214, 18 Am. Dec. 99; Farwell v. Houghton Copper "Works,
8 Fed. Rep. 66; Doernbecher v. Columbia City Lumber Co., 21
Or. 573, 28 Am. St. Rep. 766; Wiggin v. First Baptist Church, 8
Met. 301; Harding v. Vandewater, 40 Cal. 77; Doyle v. Mizner,
42 Mich. 332.
Appellants cited the cases of Edgerly v. Emerson, 23 N. H.
555, 55 Am. Dec. 207, and Bank v. Flour Co., 41 Ohio St. 552,
which hold that, if a quorum of directors meet ani unite in any
determination, the company is bound thereby, though the absent
creditors had no notice; but these cases are evidently opposed
to the great weight of authority, and we therefore decline to
follow them. In the case at bar, it is shown that all the di-
rectors of the corporation were summoned to Salt Lake City
to attend a meeting to be held on September 20, 1894, for the
purpose of transacting the business and straightening up the
affairs of the corporation. It was found that the one hundred
thousand dollars borrowed previously, on June 1st, had been
expended, but the company's plant had not been completed as
had been anticipated. The corporation was fifty thousand dol-
lars in debt, and money was needed to pay for labor, machinery,
et cetera; and, it would seem, certain persons were to advance
the money. On September 20th, pursuant to call, the directors
held a meeting, all being present, and, upon transacting the
corporate business, adjourned. At that meeting Saks was au-
thorized to borrow ten thousand dollars for the use of the cor-
poration, of which, it appears, the plaintiff paid two thousand
five hundred dollars, and, after guarantying, with two others,
the payment of the fifty thousand dollars debt, on September
21, 1894, started for Chicago, and afterward went to New York
city. Directors Green and Mears resigned, and their places
782 Singer v. Salt Lake Copper Mfg. Co. [Utah,
were filled by others. On September 24, 1894, David May,
Andrew Saks, and J. E. Shoenberg, being a quorum of the di-
rectors, held a special meeting, as shown by the evidence, with-
out any *®^ notice whatever to the absent members, or the exist-
ence of such an emergency as would excuse notice, and at such
meeting the trust deed here under consideration was authorized,
and then executed. The directors holding this meeting knew
where the plaintiff was going, but nevertheless failed to notify
him of the meeting, which was held but three days after his
departure, and but four days after the regularly convened meet-
ing. In the trust deed, Saks and May preferred themselves,
for the sum of fifty thousand dollars, over the creditors secured
by the trust deed of June 1, 1894, which was unrecorded; and
yet there appears to be nothing to show that the corporation
owed them anything. At the same meeting these directors also
transferred to the trustee in the trust deed ninety-nine thousand
nine hundred and ninety-seven shares of the capital stock of the
Utah Mining Company, as further security. All the parties to
the trust deed of September 24, 1894, and the directors who
authorized its execution, knew at that time of the unrecorded
trust deed, and were aware of its terms and conditions. Further
record reference respecting the meeting and trust deed here
under consideration would seem useless and unimportant, be-
cause the inevitable conclusion to which reflection upon the
facts and circumstances shown by the record leads is that the
meeting of September 24, 1894, falls within the rule above con-
sidered, and therefore, for lack of notice to the absent directors,
was unlawfully convened; that all the acts done by the directors
at that meeting were without force or effect; that the trust deed
and transfer of the mining stock of that date are, ab initio,
null and void.
As to the second proposition of respondents, the fact that the
corporation was insolvent when the trust deed was authorized
and excuted, alone, would not per se render that instrument
void.
Having reached the conclusion stated above, it becomes *^**
unnecessary to discuss the question of fraud. It suffices to say,
in relation thereto, that the transaction which culminated in
the execution of the second trust deed and transfer of the stock
was, under the doctrine of Mercantile Co. v. Mt. Pleasant Equi-
table Co-operative Inst., 12 Utah, 213, also fraudulent. Nor is
it necessary to discuss any of the other questions presented in
the record. The decree entered by the learned court appears to
July, 1898.] Singer v. Salt Lake Copper Mfg. Co. 785
dispose of the various claims against the corporation in a lawful
manner, and upon careful consideration we are not inclined to
disturb that decree. The judgment is affirmed.
Zane, C. J., and Miner, J., concur.
CORPORATIONS — MEETINGS OF DIRECTORS —NOTICE.—
It Is indispensable to a legal meeting of the directors of a corpora-
tion for the transaction of business that all the directors have
notice, either actual or constructive, of the time and place of the
meeting, unless they are all actually present thereat. The transac-
tions of any meeting not so held are void, and evidence of such
transactions are iDadmissfble upon a direct attack: Doernbecher v.
Columbia City etc. Co., 21 Or. 573, 28 Am. St. Rep. 706. Notice ta
all the directors of a corporation of a business meeting thereof is
generally necessary to its validity, and can only be dispensed with
when it is Impracticable to give such notice to the minority in a
case of emergency, and when the act done in the absence of one
or more of them not served with notice clearly appears to be rea-
sonably necessary as well as proper to the welfare of the corpora-
tion: Bank v. McCarthy, 55 Ark. 473, 29 Am. St. Rep. 60, and note.
A quorum of the directors of a corporation having attended a spe-
cial meeting, it will be presumed prima facie that all of the di-
rectors were duly notified to attend: Chouteau Ins. Co. v. Holmes.
G8 Mo, 601, 30 Am. Rep. 807. On the entire question of the validity
of corporate acts done or authorized at a meeting not properly
called, see the extended note to Stow v. Wyse, 18 Am. Dec. 102.
As holding that notice to all the directors is not necessary, see
Sargent v. Webster, 13 Met. 497, 46 Am. Dec. 743; Edgerly v. Emer-
son, 23 N. H. 555. 55 Am. Dec. 207.
CORPORATIONS — DIRECTORS DEALING WITH.— Di lectors
of a corporation may loan It money or Indorse for It, and have the
same right to collect the debt or secure themselves as Is accorded
to other creditors of the corporation: Schufeldt v. Smith, 131 Mo.
280, 52 Am. St. Rep. 028; Illinois Steel Co. v. O'Donnell, 156 111.
624, 47 Am. St. Rep. 245. A director or oflScer of a solvent corpora-
tion Is a trustee and agent of It and of Its stockholders only and so
far as Its creditors are concerned. He may deal with It, loan it
money, and take security therefor, in like manner as a stranger.
In such case the subsequent Insolvency of the corporation will not
affect such officer's right to recover his loan or enforce his security:
Mullanphy Sav. Bank v. Schott, 135 111. 655, 25 Am. St. Rep. 401,
and note. As favoring a more strict rule, see O'Connor etc. Co. v.
Coosa etc. Co., 95 Ala. 614, 36 Am. St. Rep. 251. See, also, th»
monographic note to Beach y. Miller, 17 Am. St Rep. 298-308.
784 Morrison v. Willard. [Utah,
Morrison v. Willard.
[17 Utah, 306.]
MECHANIC'S LIENS — NOTICE — SUFFICIENCY OF.— A
notice of mechanic's lien wtiich fails to show that the material was
furnished for the construction of the building in question, or that
-any portion of the material was used in the construction, or pur-
chased for the purpose of constructing the building referred to in
the notice of lien, and which also fails to show the terms, time
given, and conditions of the contract, and which contains no state-
ment, except inferentially, as to what the contract was, how much
lumber was purchased, what price was agreed to be paid for it,
"Whether it was purchased or delivered for the purpose of construct-
ing the building in question, or whether it was ever used therein,
Is InsufBcient and void.
MECHANIC'S LIENS — NOTICE — ESSENTIALS OP. — A
notice of mechanic's lien must contain and set out, as far as the
<;laimant is able to ascertain and disclose it, the contract between
the owner and contractor, so that the price, terms, and conditions
of the contract may be known as affecting the rights and interests
of the subcontractor and others interested. Otherwise, the notice
Is insufficient and void.
MECHANIC'S LIENS.— ESSENTIAL AVERMENTS OMIT-
TED from the notice of a mechanic's lien cannot, in an action to
foreclose the lien, be supplied by averments in the complaint or by
•extrinsic evidence.
J. M. Bowman, for the appellant.
King, Burton & King, for the respondent.
*®'' MINEK, J. Plaintiff commenced this action to fore-
close a mechanic's lien upon property owned by defendant Clay-
ton, arising upon its contract in furnishing material to Willard
& Stewart, as subcontractors on a contract by them to build a
house for defendant Clayton, and to secure a judgment against
Willard and Clayton. The notice claiming a lien, as filed and
set forth in the complaint, so far as material, reads as follows:
■''To Whom it May Concern:
"Notice is hereby given that Morrison, Merrill & Co., a cor-
poration duly organized under the laws of Utah, intends to claim
and hold a lien on the following described premises, to wit,
.... said described premises being the property of B. J. Clay-
ton, who contracted with H. W. Willard and E. Stewart, doing
business as Willard & Stewart, to erect said Clayton a residence
on above-described premises. The claimants, Morrison, Merrill
& Co., as subcontractors in the first degree, having furnished
Willard and Stewart lumber and building material to the amount
of $775.68, on which there is a credit of $301.64, leaving still
•due and unpaid $474.04, for which amount said lien is claimed.
June, 1898.] Morrison v. Willabd. 786
together with interest at eight per cent per annum from Sep-
tember 10, 1896, said Willard and Stewart having bought said
material and agreed to pay for the same in cash/*
^^^ Defendant Clayton filed a demurrer to the complaint on
the ground that it did not state facts sufficient to constitute
& cause of action. The demurrer was sustained as to defendant
Clayton. Plaintiff declined to amend, and the complaint was
dismissed as to Clayton. Thereupon the plaintiff appeals to
this court.
The question in the case arises upon the sufficiency of the
notice under the statute. The Eevised Statutes, section 1386,
provides that "every original contractor within sixty days after
the completion of his contract, and every person save the original
contractor claiming the benefit of this chapter, must, within
forty days after furnishing the last material or performing the
last labor for any building, improvement, or structure, or for
any alteration, addition to or repair of, or performance of any
labor in, or furnishing any materials for, any mining claim, file
for record with the county recorder of the county in which the
property or some part thereof is situated, a claim in writing
containing a notice of intention to hold and claim a lien, and a
statement of his demand, after deducting all just credits and
offsets, with the name of the owner if known, and also the name
of the person by whom he was employed or to whom he fur-
nished the material, with a statement of the terms, time given,
and conditions of his contract, specifying the time when the
first and last labor was performed, or the first and last material
furnished, and also a description of the property to be charged
with the lien, sufficient for identification, which claim must be
verified by the oath of himself or some other person." The
evident purpose and object of the statute was to inform the
owner or others interested as to the extent and nature of a
lienor's claim, in order to facilitate investigation, and determine
the relative rank and merits of the lien filed. The rights of
subcontractors and materialmen can be ascertained by **** refer-
ence to the lien as filed, and necessarily rest upon proof of con-
tracts between the parties, such as accord with the terms and
conditions set forth in the claim of lien filed. In order to entitle
a person to a lien upon the property of another for materials
furnished or labor performed, such claimant must substantially
comply with all of the requirements of the statute in the state-
ment of his claim for a lien, and in all essential particolars such
▲H. ST. Rbp., Vol. LXX.-60
786 MOERISON V. WiLLARD. [Utah^
statement must be true. Whatever rights such lienor has he
chtains by virtue of the statute, and a full, substantial compli-
ance with its provisions must be observed, or his rights there-
under will fail. The lien is brought into operation by virtue of
the statute. The contract for the construction of the building
is entered into with a view of or with reference to the statute.
The lien is a mere incidental accompaniment, as a means of
enforcing payment, or a mere remedy given by statute which
secures a performance provided for, but which does not exist,
notwithstanding the justice of the claim, unless the claimant
brings himself within the requirements of the statute, and shows
a substantial compliance with its essential provisions: Hooper
V. Flood, 54 Cal. 222; Goss v. Sterlitz, 54 Cal. 640; Wagner v.
Hansen, 103 Cal. 104; Phillips on Mechanics' Liens, sec. 9. Un-
der these circumstances, was the lien as filed a substantial com-
pliance with the essential requirements of the statute? The
statute requires the name of the owner, if known, to be stated
in the notice. Tlie notice recites that, "said described premises-
being the property of B. J. Clayton." We are of the opinion
that this recital is in substantial compliance with the statute.
Again, it does not appear from the notice that the material
was furnished for the construction of the building in question,
or that any portion of the material was used in the construc-
tion or purchase for the purpose of ^^** constructing the build-
ing referred to in the notice of lien. In order to comply with
the terms of the statute, it should appear that the material
was furnished for the building in question, or was used in its
construction. The statute authorizes the lien when it appears
that materials were furnished for any building, improvement,
or structure, et cetera. Under such a statute, when the lienor
seeks to obtain a lien upon the real property of the owner, and
obtains a right thereto, it is reasonable to require the lienor ta
show that the material was furnished for the construction of
the building upon which he seeks to obtain his lien: Fathman
etc. Mill Co. T. Eitter, 33 Mo. App. 404; Boisot on Mechanics*
Liens, sec. 308.
The statute also requires that the notice shall contain a state-
ment of the "terms, time given, and conditions" of the contract.
This requirement of the statute was not substantially complied
with. Except inferentially, the notice contains no statement
as to what the contract was, how much lumber was purchased
or fumiflhed, what price was agreed to be paid for the lumber^
June, 1898.] Morrison v, Willard. 787
whether the lumber was purchased or delivered for the purpose
of constructing the building in question, and whether it was ever
used in the building in question. The nature of the contract
and the time in which it was to be performed, whether the price
as charged was the price agreed to be paid, what the contract was
between the owner and the contractor, and whether the credit
allowed was a just credit or otherwise, does not sufficiently ap-
pear. All these questions were largely left to conjecture and
uncertainty: Hooper v. Flood, 54 Cal. 221; Boisot on Mechanics'
Liens, 401; Gates v. Brown, 1 Wash. 470; Wagner v. Hansen,
103 Cal. 104.
The Eevised Statutes, section 1373 (Sess. Laws 1894, p. 44),
provides that "in case of a contract between an owner and a
contractor, the lien shall extend to the entire contract price,
and such ^** contract shall operate as a lien in favor of all per-
sons except the contractor to the extent of the whole contract
price, and, after all such liens are satisfied, then as a lien for
any balance of the contract price in favor of the contractor."
Under this statute, no lien of the subcontractor can extend be-
yond the contract price between the owner and the contractor.
The extent of the rights of the subcontractor under his lien will
depend upon the original contract between the owner and the
contractor. It is therefore necessary that the notice of lien
should contain and set out, so far as claimant is able to ascertain
and disclose it, the contract between the owner and the con-
tractor, so that the price, terms, and conditions of the contract
may be known as affecting the rights and interests of the sub-
contractor and others interested; Boisot on Mechanics' Liens,
sec. 402; Gates v. Brown, 1 Wash. 470. These essential aver-
ments, having been omitted in the notice of lien, cannot be sup-
plied by averments in the complaint, or by extrinsic evidence:
Bertheolet v. Parker, 43 Wis. 551; Malter v. Falcon Min. Co., 18
Kev. 209; Wagner v. Hansen, 103 Cal. 104.
We are of the opinion that the demurrer was properly sus-
tained. We find no error in the record. The judgment of the
district court is affirmed, with costs.
«
Zane, C. J., and Bartch, J., concur.
MECHANIC'S LIEN-NOTICE— ESSENTIATyS.— A mechan-
ic's lien notice is sufficient If It describes the premises and sUites
the amount due, to whom and from whom, and for what It is due:
Coburn v. Stephens, 137 lud. GS3, 45 Am. St Rep. 218, and note;
Getty V. Ames, 30 Or. 573. 60 Am. St Rep. 835, and note; Odd
Fellows' Hall v. Masser, 24 Pa. St 507, 64 Am. Dec. 675, and note.
788 Staines v. Burton. [Utah,
A notice of a claim for a mechanic's lien required to be made and
filed for record cannot be amended or reformed. The notice of the
claim must be perfect when filed: Madera Flume etc. Co. v. Kendall,
120 Cal. 182, 6G Am. St. Rep. 177, and note; Fernandez v. Burleson,
110 Cal. 164, 52 Am. St. Rep. 75, and note. But it seems that a mere
imperfect description of the property in the lien notice may be aided
by extrinsic evidence where there are proper allegations in the
pleadings, upon the principle that that is certain which can be made
certain: Coburn v. Stephens, 137 Ind, 683, 45 Am. St. Rep. 218.
Staines v. Burton.
[17 Utah, 331.]
WILLS — CHARITABLE TRUST — DESIGNATION OP
TRUSTEE.— If a testator, after providing for certain beneficiaries
in his will, declares therein that "after the death of each one I de-
sire that my executors shall malie over to the presiding bishop of
the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints the half of my es-
tate from which that wife's income was derived. The presiding
bishop shall receive it in trust and expend the annual income ac-
cording to his discretion, for the benefits of the members of the
Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints," the will clearly
designates such presiding bishop as trustee and suflaciently do-
scribes the beneficiaries under the will.
WILLS— CHARITABLE TRUSTS.— A bequest by will to the
presiding bishop of a certain church, in trust, to expend the annual
Income, according to his discretion, for the benefit of the members
of such church, "whether it be for public schools, parlis, watering
cities, acclimatizing foreign plants, or anything else whereby the
members may be benefited, creates a charitable use or trust, and is
not within the rule against perpetuities.
WILLS-CHARITABLE TRUSTS— CONSTRUCTION.— If a
charitable Intent appears on the face of a will, but the terms used
are broad enough to allow the fund being applied either In a lawful
or unlawful manner, the gift must be supported, and its application
restrained within the bounds of the law.
Shepard & Tanford, for the appellant.
L. G. Young and F. S. Eichards, for the respondents.
*** ZANE, C. J. It appears from this record that William
Carter Staines, late of Salt Lake City, made his will on March
1, 1873, devising certain real estate to his two wives, Lilias and
Priscilla, and in which he disposed of his remaining estate as
follows: "My will is that my executors ^^ shall sell it, and
invest the proceeds as they think best, to be safe, and to yield
the most income. This income I wish to have divided as it
accrues, quarterly or semiannually, between the above-named
Lilias and Priscilla, one-half to each as long as she lives. After
July, 1898.] Staines v. Burton. 789
the death of each one, I desire that my executors shall make
over to the presiding hishop of the Church of Jesus Christ
of Latter-Day Saints the half of my estate from which that
wife's income was derived. The presiding bishop shall receive
it in trust, to expend the annual interest or income, accord-
ing to his discretion, for the benefit of the members of the
Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints, whether it be for
schools, parks, watering cities, planting forests, acclimatizing
foreign plants, or anything else whereby the members may be
benefited." He made a codicil to the will on January 20, 1881,
devising certain other lands to the appellant, his only child,
to be held and used in case he should die without issue, and
prior to testator's wives, Lilias and Priscilla, "the same to de-
scend to and be used and disbursed as stated in the last clause
of my said last will and testament"; and he departed this life on
the second day of August, 1881. The property subject to the
last clause of. his will is now estimated to be of the value of
$42,526.
Appellant's counsel insist that it is uncertain from testator's
language who should hold the residue of the estate as distin-
guished from the income from it — whether the body known as
the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints or its presiding
bishop. The language clearly says the presiding bishop is to re-
ceive it in trust, and this is equivalent to saying he shall hold it
in trust.
Counsel also insist that it is uncertain for whose benefit the
property must be held after the death of his wives — whether for
the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day ^^* Saints or its mem-
bers. As to the beneficiaries, there appears to be no room for
a reasonable doubt. The language of the clause is: "The pre-
siding bishop shall receive it in trust, to expend the annual inter-
est or income according to his discretion, for the benefit of the
members of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints,
whether it be for schools, parks, watering cities, planting for-
ests, acclimatizing foreign plants, or anything else whereby the
members may be benefited." The expenditures are not required
to be made for church purposes. The benefits contemplated are
temporal, not spiritual; they do not relate to good faith or wor-
ship. Besides, the expenditures are required to be made for the
benefit of the members of the church. The class of persons to
be benefited is distinguished and identified by church member-
ship.
790 Staines v. Burton. [Utah,
It is further urged that the clause creates a perpetuity, and
that it is therefore void. The estate subject to the clause is cer-
tainly taken out of commerce for a longer period than a life in
being and twenty-one years beyond. It is unalienable for all
time, and must be held void if subject to the rule of law for-
bidding perpetuities. However, that rule does not apply to
grants, devises, or bequests to charitable uses.
It is claimed the testator devoted the property in question to
charity. This brings us to the question. Are the uses expressed
in the will charitable? The income provided was to be ex-
pended for the benefit of the members of the church. They
were to be benefited by devoting it to schools, parks, watering
cities, planting forests, and to acclimatizing foreign plants, or
in aid of other enterprises to benefit the same class of persons.
By the general expression, "anything else whereby the members
may be benefited," we are authorized to assume the testator
^^"^ meant enterprises similar to those mentioned in the same
connection, and, if those were charitable, we may infer he in-
tended charitable objects by his general expression. At the
time the testator made his will a very large majority of the
people of the territory were Latter-Day Saints. In fact, there
were comparatively few that were not so recognized. In dedi-
cating a portion of his estate to their benefit, he devoted to the
good of a class that included almost the entire public. He se-
lected the enterprises and objects which he intended to encour-
age and aid from the standpoint of an early settler in an arid
region. He was a resident of a city with but few schools, and
without parks, and for whose people there was an increasing de-
mand for. water. He was in a new country without forests, and
to which comparatively few foreign plants had been introduced.
He had provided for his wives and his only child, and wanted to
devote the remainder of his estate to the benefit of the people of
his own faith. The enterprises he wished to foster and aid by
his bounty were the ones upon which the advancement, pros-
perity, and the welfare of the people largely depended. He gave
without ostentation, and from motives free from the taint of
selfish or private considerations. The objects upon which the
testator directed the income from the estate in question to be
expended were undoubtedly charitable in a legal sense: Jackson
V. Phillips, 14 Allen, 529; 1 Beach on Trusts, sec. 371; Eussell
V. Allen, 107 U. S. 163; Anderson's Law Dictionary, term "Char-
ity."
July, 1898.] Staines v. Burton. 791
In Jackson v. Phillips, 14 Allen, 539, the court said: 'It is
well settled that any purpose is charitable in the legal sense of
the word which is within the principle and reason of the statute
[43 Elizabeth, c. 4], although not expressly named in it," and
the illustrations give are: "Gifts for the promotion ^® of sci-
ence, learning, and useful knowledge, though by different donors
and in different ways from those enumerated under the second
class; and gifts for bringing water into a town, for building a
town house, or otherwise improving a town or city, though not
alluded to in the third class, have been held to be charitable."
And later in the same opinion the court uses the following lan-
guage: "A precise and complete definition of a legal charity is
hardly to be found in the books. The one most commonly used
in modern cases, originating in the judgment of Sir William
Grant, confirmed by that of Lord Eldon in Morice v. Bishop of
Durham, 9 Ves. 405, 10 Ves. 541, that those purposes are con-
sidered charitable which are enumerated in statute of 43 Eliza-
beth, or which by analogies are deemed within its spirit and in-
tendment, leaves something to be desired in point of certainty,
and suggests no principle. Mr. Binney, in his great argument
in the Girard will case, 41 defined a charitable or pious gift
to be 'whatever is given for the love of God, or for the love
of your neighbor, in the catholic and universal sense — ^given
from these motives and to these ends — free from the stain or
taint of every consideration that is personal, private, or selfish.*
And this definition has been approved by the supreme court of
Pennsylvania: Price v. Maxwell, 28 Pa. St. 35. A more concise
and practical rule is that of Lord Camden, adopted by Chancellor
Kent, by Lord Lyndhurst, and by the supreme court of the
United States: *A gift to a general public use, which extends
to the poor as well as the rich.' " Except in a few states, the
statute of 43 Elizabeth, chapter 4, is admitted to be the princi-
pal test of what are in law charitable uses; and many purposes
not named in it have been held to be charitable when withia
the reason and spirit of the statute. The testator named in the
clause quoted ^^'^ schools, parks, a water supply to cities, plant-
ing forests, acclimatizing foreign plants, and any other similar
enterprise, as objects to which his trustee was authorized to de-
vote the income from the estate mentioned. The terms of the
trust did not require the trustee to aid all of them. He might
devote all of the income to schools or parks, or to either or any
ot them, if, in his judgment, by so doing, the members of the
792 Staines v. Burton. [Utah,
church would he henefited most. He did not name any unlawful
object, or any purpose forbidden by the law agi^inst perpetuities;
and, if the trustee were to attempt to expend the fund for any
unlawful purpose, the court, in the exercise of its chancery ju-
risdiction, would be authorized to limit such expenditures to
charitable and lawful purposes: United States v. Late Corpora-
tion etc., 8 Utah, 343; Jackson v. Phillips, 14 Allen, 539; Mor-
mon Church V. United States, 136 U. S. 1; 1 Beach on Trusts,,
sec. 324. In United States v. Late Corporation etc., 8 Utah,
342, the court said: "When the dedication is broad enough to
allow the trustee to apply the fund to unlawful as well as lawful
purposes, the court will limit the application to the lawful ones.
When the terms of the gift authorize the trustee to devote the
fund to either of two objects — one lawful and the other illegal
— its application will be confined to the legal purpose, and the
unlawful one will be rejected." In the case of Jackson v. Phil-
lips, 14 Allen, 539, the court said: "When a charitable intent
appears on the face of the will, but the terms used^re broad
enough to allow of the fund being applied either in a lawful or
an unlawful manner, the gift will be supported, and its applica-
tion restrained within the bounds of the law. The most fre-
quent illustrations^ of this in the English courts have arisen un-
der the statute of 9 George II, chapter 36 (commonly called the
^statute of mortmain'), prohibiting ^'^^ devises of land, or be-
quests of money to be laid out in land, to charitable uses. In
the leading case Lord Hardwicke held that a direction of execu-
tors to 'settle and secure, by purchase of land of inheritance or
otherwise, as they shall be advised, out of my personal estate,*
two annuities, to be paid yearly forever for charitable objects,
was valid, because it left the option to the executor to make the
investment in personal property, which was not prohibited by
the statute; and said, 'This bequest is not void, and there is no
authority to construe it to be void, if by law it can possibly be
made good,' or (according to another, and perhaps more accu-
rate, report) 'no authority to construe it to be void by law if it
can possibly be made good.'" A definition of a legal charity
applicable to all cases can hardly be found. And when a chari-
table intent appears on the face of the will, and the terms used
are broad enough to allow the fund to be used for charitable ob-
jects, and for those within the rule of law forbidding perpetui-
ties— for lawful and unlawful purposes — the decisions are con-
flicthig as to whether the gift will be good as to the lawful pur-
pose, and its application restrained to that. Some of the cases^
July, 1898.] Staines v. Bubton. 795
apparently in conflict may be reconciled, while others cannot.
We are of the opinion that the views we have expressed are sup-
ported by the weight of authority and by reason. The decree of
the court below is affirmed.
Bartch and Miner, JJ., concur.
CHARITABLE TRUSTS— DESIGNATION OP TRUSTEE ANI>
BENEFICIARIES.— A gift for a specific charitable purpose will
not fall for want of a trustee: Sears v. Chapman, 158 Mass. 4tlO, 35
Am. St. Rep. 502. Gifts and trusts for public charitable uses are
favorably and liberally construed, and In such cases it Is not nec-
essary that the trustee be known or capable of taking, nor that
the beneficiary or objects of the charity be certain and definite:
Raley v. Umatilla County, 15 Or. 172, 3 Am. St. Rep. 142. All
charities are not public, however, and when the right to share In
the benefits of a charity depends on the fact of voluntary associa-
tion with some particular society, while all not members of such
society are excluded, the charity Is not purely public in its nature:
Philadelphia v. Masonic Home, 160 Pa. St. 572, 40 Am. St. Rep.
736. The general rule Is, that in charitable trusts there must be
certainty respecting both the beneficiaries of the trust and the
nature of the benefit they are to receive under it: See the mono-
graphic note to Fifield v. Van Wyck, 64 Am. St. Rep. 756. Accord-
ingly, It has been held that a bequest of property to be used by
a Roman Catholic Bishop of the diocese of G., for the benefit and
behoof of the Roman Catholic Church, Is void for uncertainty:
McHugh V. McCole, 97 Wis. 166, 65 Am. St. Rep. 106. As to what
purposes are charitable In their nature, so that a gift to them will
constitute a valid trust, see the monographic note to Hoeffer v.
Clogan, 63 Am. St. Rep. 256-269; Dye v. Beaver Creek Church, 4S
S. C. 444, 59 Am. St. Rep. 724, and note; Mannix v. Purcell, 46
Ohio St. 102; 15 Am. St Rep. 562.
CHARITABLE TRUSTS.— THE RULE AGAINST PERPETUI-
TIES does not apply to gifts for charitable uses: Mills v. Davison,
64 N. J. Eq. ^9, 55 Am. St Rep. 594, and note.
CHARITABLE TRUSTS— CONSTRUCTION.— If two modes of
construction are fairly open, one of which turns a charitable be-
quest In a will Into an Illegal perpetuity, while the other makes it
valid and operative, the latter construction must be adopted: Wood-
ruff V. Marsh, 63 Conn. 125. 38 Am. St Rep. 346.
794 In be Cheistensen. [Utah,
In ee Christensbn.
[17 Utah, 412.]
INSANITY — OPINIONS OF NONEXPERTS.— Intimate ac-
<lTiaIntances of a person whose sanity is tlie subject of investiga-
tion and wlio liave been close observers of his conduct, though not
competent as experts, when they can instance acts indicating men-
tal derangement, are competent to give their opinions as to the
sanity or insanity of such person.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW.— THE TEERITORIAL LAW of
Utah so far as it purported to confer general common-law and chan-
cery jurisdiction on probate courts is void.
MARRIAGE AND DIVORCE— WANT OF JURISDICTION.
A decree of divorce granted without jurisdiction of the subject mat-
ter or of the person, without cause stated and without proof, is
Absolutely void.
JUDGMENTS— WHEN VOID— COLLATERAL ATTACK.—
A judgment pronounced by a tribunal having no authority to de-
termine the matter in issue is necessarily and incurably void, and
may be shown to be so in any collateral or other proceeding in
which it is drawn in question.
JUDGMENTS— VOID CANNOT BE VALIDATED.— A judg-
ment or decree which is absolutely void cannot be validated or con-
firmed by subsequent legislation.
JUDGMENTS— JURISDICTION.— If a statute purporting to
confer jurisdiction is void, no intendment of law or presumption
of fact can be made in favor of the jurisdiction.
JUDGMENTS— WHEN MAY BE VALIDATED.— If a court
has jurisuiction of the subject matter of the suit and of the person,
and some essential step is omitted which the legislature has the •
right to dispense with, it may validate the judgment or decree,
notwithstanding the omission or irregularity.
MARRIAGE AND DIVORCE.— PROCEEDINGS FOR DI-
VORCE ARE JUDICIAL IN THEIR NATURE, and should be had
in courts of justice under constitutions conferring judicial power
on those tribunals. A divorce cannot be granted lawfully except
for sufficient cause, upon proof and with notice to, or the appear-
ance of, the party comulained of.
JUDGMENTS.— ESTOPPEL CANNOT BE BASED on a void
Judgment or decree.
JUDGMENTS AS ESTOPPEL.— If the court has jurisdiction
of the subject matter of the suit and of the parties, and the decree
or judgment may be reversed or set aside for error or irregularity,
and the defendant waives his right to have this done by executing
or accepting It, he is estopped from denying Its binding effect, but,
if such judgment is void for any reason, he is not estopped.
Moyle, Zane & Costigan and W. D. Livingston, for the appel-
lant.
Eeid & Cherry, Rawlins, Thurman, Hurd & Wedgwood, for
the respondent.
■**** ZANE, C. J. It appears from the record in this case that
Herman J. Christensen, late of the city of Manti, in the county
June, 1898.] In be Christensen. 795
of Sanpete, in the state of Utah, died intestate on June 26, 1897,
the owner of real and personal property valued at seventy-seven
thousand five hundred and seventy-one dollars and ninety-six
cents; that three children by Hannah Christensen, his first wife,
and two children by his last alleged lawful wife, Petrea Sorenson
Christensen, from whom he was divorced after their birth, sur-
vived him; that after Luther T. Tuttle had been appointed ad-
ministrator of the intestate's estate, and had filed an inventory
thereof in the probate court of said county, Hannah Christensen,
by her guardian, Tlieodore E. Christensen, filed her petition, as
the intestate's widow, for an allowance from his estate. It also
**° appears that the administrator of the intestate answered
the petition admitting the marriage, but alleging a divorce on
December 5, 1854, by a decree of the probate court of Sanpete
county, and that petitioner afterward intermarried with John
Hathaway, and that she was therefore estopped from claiming
she was the widow of the decedent. It further appears that the
district court, sitting for the disposition of probate business,
after hearing the evidence offered by both sides, without mak-
ing findings, entered an order denying the prayer of the peti-
tioner. From this order the petitioner, by her guardian, has ap-
pealed to this court.
These alleged facts present for our decision the question. Was
petitioner the lawful wife of the intestate at the time of his
death, and as his widow is she entitled to an interest in his
estate? The determination of that question requires us to de-
cide upon the validity of the alleged decree; and, if we shall find
the decree to be void, to decide whether her conduct estops her
from obtaining the rights of a widow. An issue as to petition-
er's sanity was also raised on the trial. Insanity, if found, would
appear to he more pertinent to the question of estoppel, but
we think it should have a bearing upon the decision of the other
question. Therefore we will first consider the evidence upon
that issue.
It appears from the evidence in the record that the petitioner
and the intestate were married in the kingdom of Denmark
about 1843; that three sons were born to them there; that a
daughter was born to them upon the plains.
Mrs. Snow, an old resident of Manti, who knew them in Cop-
enhagen, and emigrated to Utah in the same company, testified,
in substance, that Hannah Christensen had great trouble because
her husband, after they reached this country, always wanted to
796 In be Christensen. [Utah,
get rid of her, *^® and take the children from her, and was al«
ways looking after other women; that he took up with a girl
by the name of Elizabeth while crossing the plains, whom he
married at Springville, Utah, on the way to Manti. Witness
knew the petitioner was left behind at Salt Lake City; that she
followed out to the Jordan river, and her husband took her back;
that she knew them afterward in Manti; that her troubles ap-
peared to unhinge her mind; that she had a great deal of trouble,
and had queer ways; that there always appeared to be some-
thing on her mind vexing her, caused by her husband's actions;
that petitioner's peculiar actions indicated her mind was af-
fected; that her mental condition has appeared better since the
death of her husband.
Elsie C. Dungar also testified, in substance, that she came
across the plains in the same company with Herman J, Christen-
sen and Hannah, his wife. Their first stop was at Salt Lake
City. Eemembered the time when Herman tried to get rid of
his wife. He put her away. She wanted to come with him and
the children. When the company left, she went out in the night
to the camp. They had three little boys, and a little baby, Sarah,
born on the plains. The petitioner followed out to the camp,
and her husband and another man took her back to Salt Lake
City, because he did not want to take her with him. He took
the boys, and left the baby with her mother. He had a woman
with him, who was the first one he married afterward. The peti-
tioner afterward followed her husband. She was troubled after
she reached Manti, because her husband had put her away, and
she was flighty — wrong in her mind. She could work a little.
She had no place to go to. She remained in Manti many years,
and lived at witness' home part of the time. After her sons
*'^'' grew up, they built her a small house. Afterward she was
moved to Gunnison, a neighboring town, for a time. She trav-
eled around the streets night and day. She came to witness*
house many times, and would sleep there. She was running
around like an irresponsible person. She had no home there.
Theodore Christensen testified, in substance, that he was the
second son of the petitioner and intestate. The eldest son was
dead. Witness was born in the kingdom of Denmark in 1845,
and came with his parents to Utah in 1853, and remembered the
trouble when his mother was left behind, and the children were
brought to Manti. Eemembered her following out to the camp
when they left Salt Lake, and how she hung on to the wagon,
and tried to come with the children. Eemembered all that.
June, 1898.] I» ke Christensen. 797
**At that time, after the trouble began, my mother's mind failed
her. It became very weak. She appeared to be losing her reason.
Witness noticed the change, even as a boy. His mother fol-
lowed them to Manti, a few months after she was left behind.
WTien she got there she was not allowed to see her children. She
came to tlie house and to the windows, and was screaming and
crying, and we children wanted to get out to her, and were
not allowed to. Quilts were put up to the windows, and some
woman came, and said, Tor God's sake, let her see her chil-
dren.' After that she would come every little while to see us,
but was not allowed to stay. She appeared to be out of her
right mind. Eecently her mental condition has improved." The
children on the streets called her "Crazy Hannah" (witness ob-
jected to that). At times she would talk rationally, and at
other times she appeared crazy. Witness' father brought an-
other woman with him to Manti. Did not know why his mother
was left behind '^^^ and deserted. When witness grew up, he
built a little house for her, and his mother and Sarah lived there
until she moved to Gunnison. "We boys took care of her after
we grew up. She has wandered around a good deal."
Titus Christensen, the third son, testified, in substance, that
he was two years old when his father and mother reached Salt
Lake City, and can remember as far back as 1860. Witness re-
membered that he liked to go and see his mother, but his father
would object. That his mother talked about his father a great
deal, and appeared to be confused and bothered. After witness
got old enough, he thought she was deranged. She said wild
things. She treated witness well, but she would talk to herself
about reformation. Was troubled about the way father was
doing. After witness grew up, people told them they ought to
have a guardian appointed for her.
Witness Luke testified, in substance, that he had known the
petitioner since 1854. That his wife had employed her to wash
for her. Sometimes she would talk reasonably, and at other
times her mind appeared to be unbalanced. That was his de-
liberate judgment. When the name of her husband was men-
tioned, or her children were spoken of, she would fall all to
pieces. She would say Herman was a villain. Had robbed her
of her children. Witness would try to pacify her, but it did no
good. Some people called her "Crazy Hannah." She was treated
like a crazy person.
Sarah Martin testified, in substance, that she was the daughter
of petitioner and intestate, and was born on the plains. Could
798 In be Chbistensen. [Utah,
rememter living with her mother as a child. She made pictures
on the walls, and said that was witness' father. Sometimes she
would say the devil was after him with big sticks. She would
run out at all hours of the night screaming, and witness would
lie in bed, '*^® when a little girl, also screaming. "Her mental
condition has "continued the same until the present, except of
late years she was been more calm, but she still makes the pic-
tures on the walls, and thinks they are trying to murder her.'*
Whenever she would talk about witness' father, she would go
into a frenzy. "Witness and her mother lived for a while in an
old cellar. Her mother broke pictures once; and set the house
on fire at another time, and partially burned it. She said some-
thing bothered her; that she could hear it all the time, but she
could not tell what. It was reported that Hathaway was a de-
serter from Johnson's army, and drifted to Manti, and her
mother was a poor demented woman running around, and that
he took advantage of her.
In substance, such was the testimony of the witnesses who
knew the petitioner longest and most intimately. Other wit-
nesses, who saw petitioner occasionally, and whose acquaintance
was not so intimate, did not think she was insane. Some of
them, however, who had talked with her, testified that, when
her husband's name would be mentioned, she would become agi-
tated and greatly excited.
The opinions of witnesses not competent as experts, and not in-
timately acquainted with persons whose sanity is the subject of
investigation, unless they have closely observed their appearance
and expressions, are worth but little; while the opinions of inti-
mate acquaintances who have been close observers of their con-
duct, though not competent as experts, when they can instance
acts indicating mental derangement, are often more reliable and
more valuable than professional experts, who have not had the
benefit of such intimate acquaintance. It must be conceded that
the treatment of this woman, and the wrongs and hardships she
endured were well calculated to agitate *^® her feelings, and
arouse her emotional nature, becloud her reason, and to impair
and unsettle her mental balance and equilibrium. One witness,
who had known her in Denmark; after speaking of her troubles
on the plains, at Salt Lake, and Manti, said, in her judgment,
"They unhinged her mind." Another said, "Her mind became
unbalanced." Another said that "she talked queer — not like
others in similar trouble; that she was flighty, and her mind was
wrong." Another said she was regarded as crazy; that she was
June, 1898.] In re Christensen. 79^
called "Crazy Hannah." Her daughter said she would get out
of bed at night, and go screaming into the street; that she cov-
ered the walls of her house with pictures, and called some of
them devils with big sticks after her husband; that she broke
pictures on one occasion, and set her house on fire on another,
saying they bothered her; that she was tired of living there;.
that she could hear them all the time, but she did not know what.
Such are some of her acts and expressions, detailed by those
who knew her best. It would appear that her feelings and her
emotional nature were subject to uncontrollable excitement and
agitation, and that her mind was haunted with delusions, and
that, therefore, it was not in its normal condition. There is no
evidence tending to prove that her mind was unsound before
her husband deserted her and took another wife, and forcibly
separated her from her children. After she had been put awuy
by her husband (as one witness expressed), and she was left be-
hind, and had attempted to follow and hold on to the wagon in
which her children were, and after she had been in the night
forcibly brought back to Salt Lake by her husband and another
man, and after she had followed her husband and children more
than one hundred and fifty miles, to Manti, and was denied ad-
mission to the house where her children were, or the privilege of
seeing them, she became incapable *^* of controlling her feel-
ings and emotions and of exercising her reason. Her mental
equilibrium and balance was overthrown, and a cloud passed
over her mind, her life was blasted, and she was left a mere
wreck. There can be no doubt that the case of this much
wronged and abused woman appeals strongly for remedial jus-
tice, and that she should be given a portion of her husband's
estate during the remainder of her days, if the rules of law wiE
permit.
The decree on which the administrator relies to show the peti-
tioner was not the intestate's wife, at the time of his death, is as-
follows: "December 5, 1854. Probata court of Sanpete county,
in session, by a special call by his honor, George Peacock, i»
place of the regular term of the following Monday, and pro-
ceeded to business. The court then proceeded to investigate the
charge contained in the petition presented by Hammond J.
Christensen v. Hanne Christensen for divorce. Polance Kof-
fert was sworn as interpreter to interpret the Danish language.
The court heard the testimony, and decided that Hammond J.
Christensen be divorced, and that he have control of three chil-
dren, namely, Julius H. Christensen, Theodore Edward, and
600 In ee Christensen. [Utah,
"Titus I. E. Christensen, and Hanne Christensen to have F. C.
Christensen, aged 18 months, until otherwise directed by the
-court, and the said Hammond J. Christensen to pay all costs of
«mt, which is ten dollars. Court adjourned. George Peacock,
Probate Judge." To its admission in evidence the petitioner, by
his counsel, objected on numerous grounds, and exceptions were
taken to its admission. The decree recites that the court was in
special session by a special call of the judge, in place of the
regular term, .in convene on the following Monday. By what au-
thority such special session was called and held does not ap-
pear from the record. *^- The decree also recites that the court
proceeded to investigate the charge contained in the petition
presented by Hammond J. Christensen against Hanne Christen-
sen for divorce. It appears from the transcript that petitioner's
husband was named Herman J. Christensen, while the name in
the decree is Hammond J. Christensen. It is not stated what the
charge in the petition was, or what the petition contained, and
there were no findings made by the court, and it does not ap-
pear otherwise that there was any petition filed. It is recited
that the court heard the testimony, and decided that Hammond
-J. Christensen be divorced (from whom it is not mentioned), and
that he should have control of three children, naming them,
and that Hanne Christensen should have F. C. Christensen, aged
18 months, until otherwise ordered.
Counsel for the petitioner insist that the foregoing decree ia
absolutely void for several reasons: First, because the probate .
-court, who assumed to render it, did not have jurisdiction of the
subject matter of the suit. An act of the territorial legislature
in force March 6, 1852, under which the probate court assumed
jurisdiction to enter the decree, expressly provided that probate
courts should have jurisdiction in all cases of divorce. But that
legislature possessed only such authority to confer jurisdiction
on those courts as the act of congress known as the "organic
act" conferred upon it. While that act conferred common-law
and chancery jurisdiction upon the supreme and district courts,
respectively, it gave to the probate court only such jurisdiction
as its name indicated — such as that court had theretofore exer-
<;ised in England and in the United States. It did not give it
general jurisdiction in chancery or at law, nor did it authorize
the legislature of the territory to do so. Divorce causes belong
to chancery jurisdiction. In Ferris v. Higley, 20 **^ Wall. 375,
the supreme court, of the United States held that the territorial
law now in question, so far as it purported to confer general
June, 1898.] In re Christensen. 801
■common-law and cliancery jurisdiction on the probate courts,
was absolutely void: Perea v. Barela, 6 N. Mex. 239; Perea v.
Barela, 5 N. Mex. 458; Cast v. Cast, 1 Utah, 112; Higbee v. Hig-
bee, 4 Utah, 19. The authority of the court to try a cause and
render judgment must be determined from the facts alleged as
the cause of action and the law conferring and limiting its pow-
•ers. If the only law purporting to confer jurisdiction on the
court to try the case is void, then all acts of the court are with-
out authority, and also void. In such a case, no intendment of
law or presumption of fact can be made in favor of its jurisdic-
tion, whether it be as to the subject matter or the person, or as
to averment or proof. Therefore, we must hold the decree ad-
mitted in evidence absolutely void: 1. Because the court had no
jurisdiction to try a divorce case; 2. Because there was no proof
of service of notice on the defendant; 3. Because it does not ap-
pear that any cause for a divorce, such as the law required, was
stated; and 4. Because it does not appear that any proof was
made on which to grant the decree. It is true that one witness
testified that Hannah Christensen was present, and said she did
not want to be divorced. That could only be regarded as an ob-
jection to the divorce, not as an entry of appearance, even if she
had been competent to enter her appearance: Freeman on Judg-
ments, 4th ed., sees. 130, 123; Galpin v. Page, 18 Wall. 351. "A
judgment pronounced by a tribunal having no authority to de-
termine the matter in issue is necessarily and incurably void,
and may be shown to be so in any collateral or other proceeding
in which it is drawn in question'*: 1 Freeman on Judgments,
eec. 120; Browne's Jurisprudence of Insanity, sec. 1.
*^* Counsel for the intestate's estate rely on the following
provision of section 3 of an act of Congress in force June 23,
1874, as follows: "All judgments and decrees heretofore ren-
dered by the probate courts which have been executed, and the
time to appeal from which has by the existing laws of said ter-
ritory expired, are hereby validated and confirmed." A preced-
ing clause of the same section expressly provides that "probate
courts, in their respective counties, shall have jurisdiction in
the settlement of estates of decedents and in matters of guard-
ianship and other like matters; but otherwise they shall have no
civil, chancery, or criminal jurisdiction whatever; they shall have
jurisdiction of suits of divorce for statutory causes concurrently
with the district courts." In addition to the territorial stat-
ute of March 6, 1852, intended to confer jurisdiction upon the
AM. St. Rbf.. Vol. LXX.— 51
802 In re Cheistensen. [Utah^
probate courts of the territory to grant divorces, the same leg-
islature passed an act in force January 19, 1855, section 29, de-
claring: "The several probate courts in their respective counties
have power to exercise original jurisdiction, both civil and crim-
inal as well in chancery as at common law, .... and they shall
be governed in all respects by the same general rules and regula-
tions as regards practice as the district courts." Under this pro-
vision the probate courts for nine years had assumed jurisdic-
tion to try causes and render judgments in criminal and civil
cases both at law and in equity. During this time men have
been tried in those courts in the various counties, and convicted
of various crimes, and sentenced to imprisonment or fined, and
had served terms of imprisonment; others had paid their fines.
Judgment had also been rendered against parties for sums vary-
ing in amounts, which had been paid, and determining prop-
erty rights that had been executed. Doubtless Congress pre-
sumed the parties had been served with process, or had *^* ap-
peared, and had received justice; that in some cases sentences
had been made upon pleas of guilty; that some of the judgments
and decrees in civil cases had been by agreement or confession;
that many had been paid, and possession of property, personal
or real, had been given under others; and in that way the judg-
ments or decrees had been executed, and justice had been done.
It does not appear from the language of the curative provision
that Congress understood that the judgments and decrees re-
ferred to were absolutely void. Judgments and decrees that
had been executed, and from which the time for appeal had
expired, were intended. No appeal can be necessary from a
judgment that is entirely and absolutely void. Such judgments
and decrees are of no effect, and parties endeavoring to execute
them may be treated as trespassers. As we have seen, "a judg-
ment pronounced by a tribunal having no authority to deter-
mine the matter in issue is necessarily and incurably void, and
may be shown to be so in any collateral or other proceeding in
which it is drawn in question." Again, the same author says:
"A void judgment is, in legal effect, no judgment. From it
no rights can be obtained. Being worthless in itself, all pro-
ceedings founded upon it are equally worthless. It neither
binds nor bars anyone. All acts performed under it, and all
claims flowing out of it, are void. The parties attempting to
enforce it may be responsible as trespassers. The purchaser at a
sale by virtue of its authority finds himself without title and
without redress": Freeman on Judgments, sees. 117, 120.
June, 1898.] In be Christensen. 803
At the time the curative provision in question was enacted by
Congress, the cases of Cast v. Cast, 1 Utah, 113, and Ferris v.
Higley, 20 Wall. 375, declaring the probate courts of Utah had
not common-law or chancery jurisdiction, and that so much of
the act of the territorial legislature as purported ■*** to give
them jurisdiction in divorce cases and general jurisdiction in
criminal and civil cases were absolutely void, had not been ren-
dered. "We are, therefore, not disposed to hold that Congress
intended to make a decree like the one admitted in evidence and
relied upon in this case valid — a decree rendered without juris-
diction to grant a divorce, and without jurisdiction of the per-
son of the defendant, and in which it did not appear that a
petition was filed stating any cause for divorce, as the law re-
quired, and in which it did not appear that any proof was made
of a cause for divorce, as required by law; and if the national
legislature had, by the provision in question, intended to vali-
date such a decree, absolutely void beyond all question, the
provision would have been as void as the decree. The United
States is based on the will of the people, possesses only such
powers as they have expressly conferred upon it, and such as
are necessary to the use of such as are expressed, and no more.
And the legislative branch of those delegated powers Congress
possesses. It does not possess absolute power. It has no more
power to make a valid decree out of a void one than it has to
make such a decree out of a sheet of blank paper. It cannot
make black white, or white black, or something out of nothing.
Undoubtedly, the law-making department of the government
may validate judgments and decrees voidable on account of
errors or irregularities merely. If the court has jurisdiction of
the subject matter of the suit and of the person, and some
essential step is omitted which the legislature had the right to
dispense with, it may validate the judgment or decree, notwith-
standing the omission or irregularity. The legislature prescribes
the methods and mode of procedure, and the rules under which
judicial power shall be exercised, and in doing so may dispense
with such formalities as are not ^^"^ essential to the jurisdiction
of the court. Whatever it may have dispensed with by law
before action brought it may dispense with by statute afterward.
It cannot, however, dispense with jurisdiction of the subject
matter of the smt, or of the parties, nor with a complaint,
declaration, petition, or claim. There must be some right, duty,
or claim specified. There must be a subject matter stated, and
a must be such a one as the court has the right to take juris-
804 In be Christensen. [Utah,
diction of, and, if the judgment or decree is to be hased upon
facts, they must be first ascertained and found to exist. These
requirements are essential to remedial justice, and appear to be
axiomatic.
Judge Cooley says: *^e have elsewhere referred to a number of
cases where statutes have been held unobjectionable which vali-
dated legal proceedings, notwithstanding irregularities apparent
in -them. These statutes may as properly be made applicable to
judicial as to ministerial proceedings; and although, when they
refer to such proceedings, they may at first seem like an inter-
ference with judicial authority, yet if they are only in aid of
judicial proceedings, and tend to their support by precluding
parties from taking advantage of errors which do not affect their
substantial rights, they cannot be obnoxious to the charge of
usurping judicial power. The legislature does, or may, prescribe
the rules under which the judicial power is exercised by the
courts; and in doing so it may dispense with any of those for-
malities which are not essential to the jurisdiction of the court;
and whatever it may dispense with by statute anterior to the
proceedings, we believe it may also dispense with by statute after
the proceedings have been taken, if the court has failed to observe
any of those formalities. But it would not be competent for the
legislature to authorize a court to proceed and adjudicate upon
the rights of parties, without giving ^^s them an opportunity
to be heard before it; and, for the same reason, it would be
incompetent for it, by retrospective legislation, to make valid
any proceedings which had been had in the courts, but which
were void for want of jurisdiction over the parties. Such a
legislative enactment would be doubly objectionable: 1. As an
exercise of judicial power, since, the proceedings in court being
void, it would be the statute alone which would constitute an
adjudication upon the rights of the parties; and 2. Because, in
all judicial proceedings, notice to parties and an opportunity to
defend are essential — ^both of which they would be deprived of
in such a case. And for like reasons a statute validating pro-
ceedings had before an intruder into a judicial office, before
whom no one is authorized or required to appear, and who could
have jurisdiction neither of the parties nor of the subject mat-
ter, would also be void."
The weight of authority is undoubtedly against the proposi-
tion that the law-making power may validate void judgments and
decrees, and we find no authority for the validation of such a
decree as the one relied upon by the administrator. Authority
June, 1898.] In be Christensen. 805
is against it. Some of the cases, however, fail to distinguish be-
tween void and voidable judgments. Nor do we think it can
be supported on principle: McDaniel v. Correll, 19 111. 226, 68
Am. Dec. 587; Kichards v. Eote, 68 Pa. St. 248; Roche v.
Waters, 72 Md. 264; Nelson v. Kountree, 23 Wis. 367; Yeatman
V. Day, 79 Ky. 186; MaxweU v. Goetschius, 40 N. J. L. 383, 29
Am. Eep. 242.
It is claimed, however, that Congress had the power to grant
the divorce in question, and could, therefore, validate this void
decree by a law enacted ten years after it was framed. Con-
gress attempted to validate judgments in criminal and civil cases
which had been executed. The effect of the curative act was
(if held to validate the decree ^® in question) to divorce the
petitioner from her late husband, and make the divorce take
effect ten years before it was actually granted. But Congress
is a legislative body. It is not vested with judicial powers, like
the British parliament and many of the states of this Union
during their early history; nor has Congress ever attempted to
exercise such judicial power, as some of the state legislatures,
after their constitutions had partitioned the powers of the state
government, and confined their functions to law-making, have.
Section 1, article 1, of the United States Constitution declares
that "all legislative power therein granted shall be vested in a
Congress of the United States, which shall consist of a senate
and house of representatives." And section 1, article 2, declares
that "the executive power shall be vested in a president of the
United States of America." And section 1 of article 3 of the
same instrument declares "the judicial power of the United
States shall be vested in one supreme court, and in such inferior
courts as the Congress may from time to time ordain and estab-
lish." All the legislative power delegated to the national gov-
ernment is vested in Congress, except so far as the president
may participate therein, in the approval of laws or by his veto;
and all the executive power is vested in the president, except
so far as the senate may give effect to appointments and treaties
by its advice and consent; and all the judicial power delegated
to the national government is vested in one supreme court, and
in such inferior courts as Congress may, from time to time,
ordain and establish, except as the senate may use such power
in impeachment trials, and in such investigations as it may make
in exercising its legislative power, and in requiring witnesses to
appear and testify therein. It is plain that no express or im-
plied authority to try divorce or other causes is vested in Con-
806 In be Christensen. [Utah,
gress, but, on the contrary, all ^^ judicial power, except aa
above pointed out, is vested in the judicial department of the
government.
There are decisions to the effect that the granting of a di-
vorce may be regarded as a legislative act, and that the legisla-
ture may, without any alleged cause for divorce, and without
any notice to either party or opportunity to be heard, and with-
out any proof, by an authoritative order or fiat, grant divorces;
and there is a second class of cases which hold that divorce is a
judicial act in those cases upon which general laws confer on
the courts authority to grant divorces for cause, and that in
such cases the legislature cannot grant divorces, but that the
legislature may, by special act, grant divorces for other causes.
A third class of cases, however, hold that marriage secures to
the respective parties legal rights which cannot be dissolved
except for sufficient cause, which must be alleged, and that
the other party should have notice and an opportunity to be
heard; that the truth can only be ascertained by proof; that a
decree of divorce can only be granted on such proof; and that
such a proceeding is necessarily judicial; and, in those states
whose constitutions vest all judicial power in the judicial de-
partment of the government, decrees of divorce can only be
granted by courts of justice. In the case of Higbee v. Higbee,
4 Utah, 19, it appeared that Lyman P. Higbee, an attorney at
law, residing with his wife in Idaho, sent her to California for
her health, assuring her that he would follow. Soon afterward
he was elected to the legislature of that territory, and he In-
duced that body to grant him a divorce from his wife without
notice to her, without her knowledge, without assigning cause
for divorce, and without any proof. Afterward, he removed to
the late territory of Utah, and after his death his wife, as his
widow, was denied any interest in his estate by the probate
court; but, ■*^^ on appeal to the supreme court of the territory,
the legislative divorce of Idaho was held to be void, and his wife
was held to be his widow, and entitled to a share of his estate.
The case of Maynard v. Hill, 125 U. S. 190, is relied upon to
establish the authority of Congress to grant a divorce and to
validate the void decree in evidence. The opinion was by a
divided court. It held a divorce granted by the legislature of
the territory of Oregon valid. In that opinion the court, among
other things, said: "It is conceded that to determine the pro-
priety of dissolving the marriage relation may involve investiga-
tions of a judicial nature, which can properly be conducted by
June, 1898.] In be Chribtenbkn. 807
the judicial tribunal. Yet such investigations are no more than,
those usually made when a change of the law is designed. They
•do not render the enactment, which follows the information ob-
tained, void as a judicial act, because it may recite the cause of
of its passage. Many causes may arise, physical, moral, and
intellectual — such as the contracting by one of the parties of an
incurable disease, like leprosy, or confirmed insanity, or hopeless
idiocy, or a conviction of a felony — which would render the con-
tinuance of the marriage relation intolerable to the other party,
and productive of no possible benefit to society. When the ob-
ject of the relation has been thus defeated, and no jurisdiction
is vested in the judicial tribunals to grant a divorce, it is not
perceived that any principle should prevent the legislature from
interfering, and putting an end to the relation, in the interest
of the parties as well as of society. If the act declaring the
divorce should attempt to interfere with rights of property
vested in either party, a different question woidd be presented."
In this it is conceded that investigations of a judicial char-
acter, to determine the propriety of dissolving the marriage rela-
tion, may be involved, and that a decree of *^^ divorce cannot
be granted except for cause; and it was further said, when the
object of the marriage relation has been defeated, and no juris-
diction is vested in the judicial tribunals to grant a divorce, that
no principle was perceived that should prevent the legislature
from granting a divorce. It was also added that, if the act
declaring the divorce should attempt to interfere with the rights
of property vested in either party, a different question would
be presented. Undoubtedly, legislatures should pass a general
Jaw such as they may believe the happiness and welfare of society
demands, specifying causes for divorces. There was such a law
in force in the territory of Utah when the divorce in question
was attempted to be granted, and when the validating act was
passed, and the district courts were open, with undoubted juris-
diction.
Inasmuch as the welfare of society and the happiness of the
people of the state depend so largely on the family founded on
marriage, and the public has an interest in its protection and
maintenance, as well as the parties, some courts have gone so
far as to hold the legislature may ignore the rights of the par-
ties, and dissolve the relation, without inquiry, and without
opportunity to the parties to be heard, and may disregard the
rights of the husband or wife not at fault; that the legislature in
that way may break up the family and set the wife and the chil-
808 In re Christensen. [Utah^
dren adrift without any provision for support, for it is conceded
that the legislature, in granting the divorce, can-not make a
decree for alimony, or as to custody of children, or as to
property. In effect, it is held by such cases that the legislature
may, at the instance of the delinquent, or one at fault, without
inquiry, strike in the dark, and break up the family, and with-
out warning set the wife and children adrift, humiliated and
disgraced, without any provision for their support or mainte-
nance.
433 ipjjg weight of authority undoubtedly is to the effect that
a divorce should not be granted except for sufficient cause; that
the party complained of should have an opportunity to be heard
• — should have a day in court; that the decree of divorce should b&
upon proof; and that such a proceeding is judicial in its nature.
Our conclusion is, that the trial of divorce causes should be had
in courts of justice under constitutions conferring judicijil power
on those tribunals: Higbee v. Higbee, 4 Utah, 19; Ponder v.
Graham, 4 Fla. 23; Bryson v. Brysoii, 44 Mo. 232; State v. Fry,
4 Mo. *120 (81); 2 Kent's Commentaries, 13th ed., 106; Dart-
mouth College V. Woodward (Story, J.), 4 Wheat. 694; Cooley's
Constitutional Limitations, 6th ed., 132; Greenough v. Green-
ough, 11 Pa. St. 489, 51 Am. Dec. 567; In re Handley's Estate,
15 Utah, 212, 62 Am. St. Eep. 926; Maxwell v. Goetschius, 40
N. J. L. 383, 29 Am. Rep. 242. When the people of Utah
formed a state government, they set the question at rest for the
future in this state, by forbidding the enactment of private or
special laws granting divorces.
Counsel for the decedent's estate also insist that the petitioner
is estopped from claiming any interest in her late husband's
estate, because of her misconduct, after the void decree, in con-
tracting a marriage with another man, or by acting toward him
for a time as though they were married. An estoppel cannot be
based on a void decree or judgment. If the decree or judgment
is simply voidable, a different rule may be applied. When the
court has jurisdiction of the subject matter of the suit and of
the parties, and the decree or judgment may be reversed or set
aside for error or irregularity, if the defendant waives his right
to do so by executing or accepting it, he will be estopped from
denying its binding effect; but, when such judgment is void for
any reason, he will not be estopped. The void decree in con-
troversy was obtained '*^* by the decedent when he knew he waa
not entitled to it. The evidence is conclusive that about a year
before the divorce he married a young girl, and, in view of that
June, 1898.] In bb Chbistensen. 80^
fact, his lawful wife had a complete defense to a divorce at hi&
instance. Besides, he had deserted and abandoned his wife, and
had taken her children from her under circumstances so cruel
and hard as to overthrow her reason. Under such circum-
stances, there is no legal rule or equitable principle that would
have permitted the decedent during his lifetime to be divorced
from her because of her imbecility or misconduct, which hia
unkind and inhuman treatment brought about. Nor can his
administrator or heirs rely upon it to defeat her rights as his
widow. She is not responsible for the void decree, nor does
it appear that she consented to it. In her forlorn, wretched,
and pitiable condition she did say that she did not want a
divorce, and it appears from the evidence that from that day
she has been incapable of forming a rational conclusion with
respect to the consequences and effects of her ovm actions.
When her husband was the subject of conversation, her feelings
and emotions overwhelmed her reason.
The disastrous consequences suggested that may follow a judg-
ment of this court holding the decree of divorce in question of
no effect, notwithstanding the curative act relied upon, are not
likely to follow. Nearly forty years have elapsed since the last
of such decrees or judgments were rendered. It will, in all
probability, be found that the statute of limitations and the dis-
pensations of time have shorn such decrees, and transactions in
con§equence of them, of the consequences feared by counsel, if
they are now ascertained to have been void. Owing to the
peculiar circumstances of this case, we are of the opinion that
the petitioner's right to an estate in the decedent's *^^ estate has
survived, notwithstanding the statute of limitations and the
lapse of time; and that this aged woman, with her physical and
mental infirmities, is entitled, as his widow, to an interest in
decedent's estate, and to whatever comfort it may afford her
during the remainder of her days.
The order appealed from is reversed, and the court below is
directed to recognize the petitioner as the lawful widow of the
decedent, and to adjudicate the rights of the respective parties
found to have an interest in his estate, and to make payment or
distribution thereof, according to law,
Bartch and Miner, JJ., concur.
INSANITY — OPINION OF NONEXPERT.— A witness, not a
physician, may give his opinion as to a person's Insanity, when his
opinion is accompanied with the reasons upon which It Is founded:
810 Crescent Min. Co. v. Silver King Min. Co. [Utah,
Maxwell v. Harrison, 8 Ga. 61, 52 Am. Dec. 385, and note. When
A nonexpert may not testify: Grand Lodge I. O. M. A. v. Wieting,
168 111. 408, 61 Am. St. Rep. 123.
MARRIAGE AND DIVORCE— JURISDICTION— FOREIGN DI-
VORCE.—A divorce entered in another state against a resident of
the state of New Yoric in a suit in which the defendant did not ap-
pear, in which process was not served on her within the state
wherein the decree was rendered, is void as against her in New
York: Atherton v. Atherton, 155 N. Y. 129, 63 Am. St. Rep. 650;
McCreery v. Davis, 44 S. C. 195, 51 Am. St. Rep. 794; DeMeli v.
De Meli, 120 N. Y. 485, 17 Am, St. Rep. 652; monographic note to
Tolen V. Tolen, 21 Am. Dec. 747.
JUDGMENT— ESTOPPEL.— A judgment Is conclusive as an es-
toppel, though it is subject to be opened on an application to let
in a defense, so long as it stands unopened: Stevens v. Reynolds,
143 Ind, 467, 52 Am. St. Rep. 422. A judgment, though clearly
■erroneous, is conclusive as an estoppel: People v. Holladay, 93 Cal.
241, 27 Am, St. Rep. 186, However, nothing but a valid judgment
will operate as an estoppel upon anyone: Springer v. Shavender,
118 N. C. 33, 54 Am, St. Rep. 708. See, also, Hodson v. Union Pac.
Ey. Co. 14 Utah, 402, 60 Am, St, Rep. 902.
JUDGMENTS— VOID— COLLATERAL ATTACK.- A judgment
void for want of jurisdiction of the subject matter cannot conclude
any person, and may be collaterally attacked: Springer v. Shaven-
der, 118 N. C. 33, 54 Am. St. Rep. 708, On the collateral attack of
judgments see the monographic note to Morrill v. Morrill, 23 Am.
St. Rep. 104. A judgment is void and entirely worthless, and no
one is bound to obey it, if the court pronouncing it had not juris-
diction over the suliject matter of the action or of the persons sought
to be bound by it: Savage v. Sternberg. 19 Wash. 679, 67 Am. St.
Rep. 751; Staff Qrd v. Gallops, 123 N. C. 19, 68 Am. St. Rep. 815.
JUDGMENTS— VALIDATING JUDICIAL PROCEEDINGS.— A
retrospective statute curing defects in legal proceedings, where
they are in their nature irregularities only, and do not extend to
matters of jurisdiction, is not void on constitutional grounds upless
expressly forbidden: Note to State v. Torinus, 37 Am. Rep. 397.
Ceesoent Mining Company v. Silver Kino Min-
ing Company.
[17 Utah, 444.]
WATERS AND WATERCOURSES— PERCOLATING
WATEI^-APPROPRIATION.— Percolating water, after passing In-
to an underground artificial tunnel, and not naturally flowing from
or into a natural stream with a well-defined channel, banks, and
course. Is not subject to appropriation by another while It remains
in the tunnel upon the owner's land; but if the water Is allowed
to flow Into an artificial lake upon public land It is then subject
to appropriation. The appropriator does not, however, thereby ac-
quire an easement In the tunnel nor a prescriptive right to have the
water flow from the tunnel Into the lake uninterruptedly and con-
tinuously, altliough he has continually used the water of the lake
for a long period of years.
Aug, 1898.] Crescent Mm. Co. v. Silver King Min. Co. 811
WATERS AND WATERCOURSES— PERCOLATING
WATER.— The owner of the soil Is entitled to the waters percolat-
ing through It. Such water is not subject to appropriation until
it leaves his land.
WATERS AND WATERCOURSES— PERCOLATING
WATER —APPROPRIATION.— The ordinary rules of law apply-
ing to the appropriation of surface streams do not apply to perco-
lating waters and subterranean streams with undefined and un-
known courses and banks.
WATERS AND WATERCOURSES— PERCOLATING
WATER.— If water percolates through and under the surface of the
€arth upon the land of one person and comes to the surface just
before It empties itself upon the land of another, the owner of such
land has no right to demand that such percolation shall continue.
WATERS AND WATERCOURSES— PERCOLATING
WATER.— A PERSON MAY LAWFULLY DIG A WELL on his
own land, though thereby he destroys the subterranean, undefined,
percolating water of his adjoining neighbor's spring, and no action
can be maintained therefor.
WATERS AND WATERCOURSES— PERCOLATING
WATERS.— PRESCRIPTIVE RIGHT TO.— Whenever percolating
water is so hidden in the earth that its course is not discoverable
from the surface, there can be no such thing as a prescription in
favor of an adjacent proprietor to have an uninterrupted flow of
such stream through the land of his neighbor.
WATERS AND WATERCOURSES— PERCOLATING
WATER which has been gathered in artificial tunnels or ditches
and allowed to flow from the proprietor's land to an Inferior pro-
prietor, and has been used by him a greater period of time than that
allowed by the statute of limitations, does not become his by pre-
scriptive title.
WATERS AND WATERCOURSES— PERCOLATING
WATER, so long as it remains in an artificial tunnel or mining
claim of the proprietor of the land, is not open to appropriation by
another*
TRESPASS — INJUNCTION AGAINST.— If one who owns
valuable mining property and a water supply at a considerable dis-
tance therefrom digs a trench and Inserts a pipe line therein under
the surface of worthless, uncultivated, and unused land of another
from his water supply to his mine, covering the trench with the ma-
terial taken out, and not causing the landowner any damage except
nominal, the latter is not entitled to an injunction restraining the
trespass, when it appears that to restrain the laying of the pipe
line would caupe irreparable damage to the mine-owner and de-
stroy a large Industry without any benefit to the landowner. In
such case, the remedy at law being adequate the landowner must be
required to resort to such remedy for the recovery of damages at-
tending the trespass.
INJUNCTIONS— WHEN NOT GRANTED.-If the facts pre-
sent no matter requiring equitable relief, and the granting of an in-
junction will work irreparable injury to one party with no appre-
ciable benefit to the other, and the remedy at law Is adequate to
<io full justice, the court should refuse to issue an Injunction as
not within Its legitimate Jurisdiction.
Moyle, Zane & Costigan and Marshall, Eoyle & Hempstead,
for the appellants.
812 Crescent Min. Co. v. Silver King Min. Co. [Utah>
Dickson, Ellis & Ellis, for the respondent.
'*^* MINEE, J. It appears from the findings of the lower
court that the plaintiff in the year 1886 constructed a dam
across the outlet of what is called "Thayne" or "Shadow" lake,
and by this means impounded and retained the waters flowing
into said lake, and, by means of a pipe line inserted into said
lake, took from the unappropriated waters thereof sufficient to
fill its said pipe, and carried the same to the Crescent mine,
for use in carrying on the mining operations of the plaintiff;
that one of the principal sources of supply of said Shadow lake
or reservoir was the stream of water flowing from the Thayne or
Jeanette tunnel, situated in and excavated upon the Thayne and
Jeanette mining claims, the property of the defendant, and its
grantors and predecessors in interest, which said stream of water
was, at the date of the diversion by the plaintiff, as aforesaid,
of the waters of said Shadow lake, running from said tunnel
into said lake; that said Thayne or Jeanette tunnel was run upon
and excavated upon mining claims and mining property owned
by said defendant, and its grantors and predecessors in interest,
prior to the year 1883, and prior to the diversion and use of said
waters of said lake, and its natural sources of supply, by said
plaintiff, which said mining claims and mining property were
duly patented by the United States to the grantors and predeces-
sors in interest of defendant '**® prior to the running and ex-
cavation of said tunnel, and prior to the appropriation of any of
the waters of said lake, and its natural sources of supply; that all
the water issuing from said tunnel was developed by said de-
fendant, and its grantors and predecessors in interest, by the
running and excavation of said tunnel, and that said water was
first encountered in said tunnel at about seven hundred feet from
its mouth, and was and is percolating water, issuing from the
rocks in said patented mining claims, and said water is not from
any subterranean stream, having any defined course, bed, or
banks, and that the waters of said tunnel were not open to
appropriation by said plaintiff or other person, excepting said
defendant, and were subject to the control and ownership of
said defendant, and said tunnel was an artificial watercourse,
and was not a natural source of supply of said lake. The court
further found that the mining claims of plaintiff over and across
which the pipe line of the defendant was laid unlawfully, and a
trench dug in and upon said claims unlawfully, were and are bar-
ren, rocky, uncultivated, and unused mining claims, and are
Aug. 1898.] Crescent Min. Co. v. Silveb King Min. Co. 813
situated upon a barren, rocky, and worthless hillside, and that
the digging of said trench and the laying of said pipe line did
not damage said mining claim of plaintiff, or either of them, in
any manner whatever, except nominally; that in the digging of
said trench, and in the laying of said pipe line, said defendant
did not removft any earth or material from said mining claims,
and did not in any way disturb said mining claims except to
dig said trench, and lay said pipe line therein, and then cover
the same with the earth and material taken in digging said
trench.
The first question for determination is. Did the lower court
err in its conclusions of law and decree rendered in this action,
wherein it found and decreed that the respondent ^^ was the
owner, and entitled to the exclusive use and enjoyment, of all
the water issuing and flowing out of the Jeanette or Thayne
tunnel, mentioned and described in the complaint and findings,
60 long as said water is in said tunnel, and upon the mining
claims of the defendant, and is entitled to divert said water of
said tunnel to such uses as it may deem fit; provided, such diver-
sion be made upon the mining claims of defendant, and before
the waters of said tunnel reach the said reservoir or lake known
as "Shadow lake," from which lake appellant appropriated and
carried away said waters through its pipe line to its mine. The
plaintiff contends that, under such a state of facts, the court
should have decreed it the right to have the water percolating
into and issuing from the Thayne or Jeanette tunnel, and wholly
located upon the patented land of the defendant, flow unin-
terruptedly into Shadow lake, located upon the land of the
plaintiff, and that it was entitled to all of such waters by virtue
of its alleged appropriation of the waters of said lake so formed;
and that, because said plaintiff has used said waters of Shadow
lake for more than seven years, it has a prescriptive right to have
the same flow from said tunnel uninterruptedly and continuously
into said lake.
It is not contended that the plaintiff at any time entered upon
the land of the defendant, or upon said tunnel, or appropriated
the waters thereof, except after the waters had been allowed to
flow into the so-called "Shadow lake"; nor is it claimed that the
plaintiff at any time interfered with defendant's possession or
use of said water while it was still in the tunnel or in the min-
ing claim of the defendant. Under such circumstances, could
the plaintiff acquire, as ajrainst the defendant, any right in such
water while it remained in the tunnel or in the mining claim of
814 Crescent Min. Co. v. Silver King Min. Co. [Utah,
the defendant, from '^^ which said waters percolated into said
tunnel. The waters issuing from the artificial tunnel into the
lake are found to be underground, percolating waters from the
mining claim of the defendant, and not waters naturally flowing
in a stream with a well-defined channel, banks, and course. Un-
der such a state of facts, the law seems to be well settled that
water percolating through the soil is not, and cannot be, dis-
tinguished from the soil itself. The owner of the soil is entitled
to the waters percolating through it, and such water is not sub-
ject to appropriation. The ordinary rules of law applying to
the appropriation of surface streams do not apply to percolating
water and subterranean streams, with undefined and unknown
courses and banks. When water percolates through and under
the surface of the earth upon land belonging to one person, and
comes to the surface just before it empties itself upon the land
of another, the owner of such land has no right to demand that
such percolation shall continue. It is held that a person may
lawfully dig a well on his own land, though thereby he destroys
the subterranean, undefined, percolating water of his neighbor's
spring, and no action will lie therefor: Hosier v. Caldwell, 7 Nev.
363; Eoath v. Driscoll, 20 Conn. 533, 52 Am. Dec. 352.
In the case of Acton v. Blundell, 12 Mees. & W. 324, it is said:
"In the case of the running stream, the owner of the soil merely
transmits the water over its surface. He receives as much from
his higher neighbor as he sends down to his neighbor below.
He is neither better nor worse. The level of the water remains
the same. But if the man who sinks the well on his own land can
acquire by that act an absolute and indefeasible right to the
water that collects in it, he has the power of preventing his
neighbor from making any use of the springs in his own soil
which shall interfere with the enjoyment of the *°^ well. He
has the power, still further, of debarring the owner of the land
in which the spring is first found, or through which it is trans-
mitted, from draining his land for the proper cultivation of the
soil; and thus, by an act which is voluntary on his part, and
which may be entirely unsuspected by his neighbor, he may im-
pose on such neighbor the necessity of bearing a heavy ex-
pense, if the latter has erected machinery, for the purposes of
mining, and discovers, when too late, that the appropriation of
the water has already been made." The court held that the
case does not fall within the rule which obtains as to surface
streams, nor is it to be governed by analogy therewith: Green-
leaf V. Francis, 18 Pick. 117; Basse tt v. Salisbury Mfg. Co., 43
Aug. 1898.] Crescent Mik. Co. v. Silver King Min. Co. 815
N. H. 569, 82 Am. Dec. 179; Goodale v. Tuttle, 29 K Y. 459;
Swett V. Cutts, 50 N. H. 439, 9 Am. Kep. 276; Broadbent v.
Eamsbotham, 11 Ex. 602; Eegina v. Metropolitan Board of
Works, 3 Best & S. 716; Grand Junction Canal Co. v. Shugar, &
Ch. App. 483; Roath v. Driscoll, 20 Conn. 533, 52 Am. Dec. 352;
Wheatley v. Baugh, 25 Pa. St. 528, 64 Am. Dec. 721.
If the percolating waters which collected in the tunnel were
open to appropriation, as claimed by the appellant, such appro-
priation would clothe him with full ownership of the waters of
the lake, as well as the waters in the tunnel, and deprive the de-
fendant of the right to use them for any purpose; and, although
plaintiff had asserted no dominion over the percolating watera
of the mining claim or tunnel, and had not interfered with the
defendant's use thereof, he would still acquire an easement in de-
fendant's mining claim to use the water thereof as he saw fit,
notwithstanding the fact that defendant did not object to an
appropriation of the water by him after it had left the tunnel
of the mining claim. The result of such a contention would ba
that plaintiff would acquire a right to compel the defendant,,
who had developed ^^'"^ and gathered the water into the tunnel
for his own purposes, to suffer it to flow therefrom uninter-
ruptedly into the lake forever; whereby plaintiff would acquire
an easement and estate in the defendant's mining claim to the
extent of the flow of the water, and thus destroy defendant's
power to develop or use the mine for the pursuit of minerals, or
any other useful purpose for which the water would be necessary.
Such a rule, if established, would at once become adverse to the
mining industry of the state. If, when digging a trench, a miner
should strike a considerable quantity of water, and allow it to
run down a canyon until he could be prepared to use it, a
stranger should be allowed to appropriate and use, and there-
after the owner be compelled to keep the water running from
the tunnel for his use, the owner would soon be compelled to
abandon his enterprise, and lose the benefits of his labor and
the product of his land. It is evident that such a rule would be
unjust as applied to percolating water; but, if well founded, and
applied to a case like this, the estate of the defendant would be
encumbered, and held subject to this easement of the plaintiff
to have the water flow into the lake continually. Again, it doea^
not appear that the plaintiff ever had the adverse use of the
water in the tunnel, but took the water after it had left the-
tunnel and mining claim, and passed into the lake upon the pub-
lic domain, and after defendant had lost control of the same.
SI 6 Crescent Min. Co. v. Silver King Min. Co. [Utah,
Such possession and user in no way interfered with the defend-
ant or his property. It could not have maintained an action
against the plaintiff for such taking and user after the water
passed out of the tunnel into the lake, and no cause of action
would have arisen for such user against the plaintiff. Having
no cause of action against the plaintiff therefor, the statute of
limitations would not commence to run until a cause of action
should accrue.
454 In Wheatley v. Baugh, 25 Pa. St. 528, 64 Am. Dec. 721,
the court said: "Percolations spread in every direction through
the earth, and it is impossible to avoid disturbing them without
relinquishing the necessary enjoyment of the land. Accord-
ingly, the law has never gone so far as to recognize in one man a
right to convert another's farm to his own use for a filter. Such
a claim, if sustained, would amount to a total abrogation of the
right of property Even if this right were admitted to
exist, the diiiiculty in ascertaining the fact of its violation, as
well as the extent of it, would be insurmountable. But it seems
to be thought that the enjojonent of the spring by the plaintiff
below and those under whom he claims, for the period of twen-
ty-one years, gives him a right to its continued existence, al-
though the neighboring proprietor may thereby be deprived of
the chief value of his own land. This depends upon the ques-
tion whether the enjoyment of the spring was such as to have
invaded his neighbor's rights, so as to enable the latter to main-
tain an action for the injury. No man can be barred by a statute
of limitations for not bringing his action within the prescribed
period, until it is first shown that he had a cause of action which
he could have maintained." As between plaintiff and third per-
sons, the plaintiff, being the first person to divert the water
after it left the tunnel, would have the right to its use; and the
defendant's grantors could not have maintained an action
against the plaintiff to prevent it from using the water, after it
had permitted the water to pass from its tunnel on its land,
Dor could the defendant maintain such action after it had ac-
quired title thereto. This is the basis upon which it must be
determined whether the plaintiff could acquire any right to this
water by prescription: Ellis v. Duncan, 21 Barb. 230; Chatfield
V. Wilson, 28 Vt. 49; New Albany etc. E. R. Co. v. Peterson, 14
Ind. 112, 77 Am. Dec. 60; ^so Frazier v. Brown, 12 Ohio St.
294; Trustees v. Youmans, 60 Barb. 316, 45 N. Y. 362, 6 Am.
Eep. 100; Swett v. Cutts, 50 N. H. 439, 9 Am. Eep. 276; Hosier
V. Caldwell, 7 Nev. 363; Chase v. Silverstone, 62 Me. 176, 16
Aug. 1898.] Crescent Min. Co. v. Silver King Min. Co. 817
Am. Kep. 419; Taylor v. Fickas, 64 Ind. 167, 31 Am. Eep. 114;
Coleman v. Chadwick, 80 Pa. St. 81, 21 Am. Rep. 93; Chesley v.
King, 74 Me. 164, 43 Am. Eep. 569; Bloodgood v. Ayers, 108
N. Y. 400, 2 Am. St. Eep. 443, 37 Hun, 356.
The rule is that, whenever the stream is so hidden in the earth
that its course is not discoverable from the surface, there can be
no such thing as a prescription in favor of an adjacent proprie-
tor to have an uninterrupted flow of such stream through the
land of his neighbor: Haldeman v. Bruckhart, 45 Pa. St. 514,
-84 Am. Dec. 511; Lybe's Appeal, 106 Pa. St. 626, SI Am. Eep.
^42; Buffum v. Harris, 5 R. I. 243.
It is clear that, prior to the time when the tunnel was dug
upon the mining claim of the defendant, the water was perco-
lating water, flowing, seeping, or circulating in minute particles
beneath the surface thereof, without banks or defined channels,
And that its course was invisible and unknown. By the construc-
tion of this tunnel, this percolating water has become an arti-
£cial stream, and has never been diverted from the defendant's
land, nor its waters taken away from the defendant or its gran-
tors. Under such circumstances, when percolating waters have
been gathered into tunnels or ditches, and allowed to flow from
the proprietor's land to the inferior proprietor, and have been
used by him a greater period of time than that allowed by the
statute of limitations, it has been held that no title by prescrip-
tion has been gained. Gould on "Waters, page 402, lays down the
rule that: "Where an artificial watercourse is made solely to get
rid of a nuisance to mines, and to enable their proprietors to get
the ores lying within the mineral field drained by it, the flow of
the water through that channel is, from the nature of the case,
of a temporary character, ^** having its continuance only while
the convenience of the mine owners requires it; and a user of the
water by others for twenty years, or a longer period, affords no
presumption of a grant of any right to the water in perpetuity":
Wood V. Wood, 3 Ex. 746; Greatrex v. Hayward, 8 Ex. 291; Ark-
wright V. Gell, 5 Mees. & W. 226; Gould on Waters, sec. 225;
Angell on Watercourses, sec. 206; Washburn on Easements, 367-
372; Hanson v. McCue, 42 Cal. 306, 10 Am. Eep. 299; Lakeside
Ditch Co. v. Crane, 80 Cal. 181; Southern Pac. E. E. Co. v. Du-
four, 95 Cal. 615; Pierre v. Fernald, 26 Me. 436, 46 Am. Dec.
573.
The case of Sullivan v. Mining Co., 11 Utah, 438, relied
upon by the able counsel for the plaintiff, rests upon a different
«tate of facts from those disclosed in this case, and is not in
Am. dr. Rkp., Vol. LXX.— 62
818 Crescent Min. Co. v. Silver King Min. Co. f Utahy
conflict with the principles here laid down. In that case de-
fendant's predecessors in interest dug a well upon the publia
lands of the United States, and used water therefrom, for do-
mestic and other purposes, for nearly twenty years. Thereafter
the plaintiff located a mining claim, embracing the well within
its boundaries, and brought suit for trespass against the occu-
pants of the well. The court held the grantors of the defend-
ant having located the well on the public domain prior to the-
location of the plaintiff's mining claim, that, by virtue of sec-
tions 2339, 2340, of the Eevised Statutes of the United States,
the plaintiff located his mining claim subject to the rights of
the defendant and its grantors, and expressly Recognized the
principles here laid down — that percolating waters belong to the-
owner of the soil, and that the owner could dig a well upon his
own ground, and thereby dry up the well, supplied by percolat-
ing waters of his adjacent neighbor, without liability.
We conclude that section 2780 of the Compiled Laws of Utah
of 1888 was intended to apply to natural watercourses having
a natural source of supply, and that it does not apply to ^^'^ per-
colating waters arising in the land of the owner, and carried
through artificial drains, constructed by the owner, for the pur-
pose of improving the property, or for the convenience of the
owner. So long as such water remained in the tunnel, or on
said mining claim of the defendant, it was not open to appro-
priation by the plaintiff, or any other person, except the defend-
ant and his grantors, and was the property of said defendant^
and subject to its ownership and control.
The second question for consideration is. Did the court err
in its conclusions of law and decree rendered in this action,
wherein it found and decreed that the plaintiff was not entitled
to an injunction against the defendant for the digging of the-
trench and laying and maintaining the pipe line across the bar-
ren, rocky, and worthless mining claims of the plaintiff, men-
tioned in the complaint and findings herein, but is remitted to-
its action at law for said acts and damages therefor? In this case
the court found that the defendant did not remove the earthy
rock or soil of the plaintiff's mining claim, but simply dug a
trench, and laid a pipe line therein, and covered it with the ma-
terial taken out in digging the trench, and that neither the soil
nor anything else was removed from the mining claim, and that
said mining claim across which the trench was dug was barren,
rocky, worthless, uncultivated, not used or worked, and that the
pipe line and the digging of the trench did not injure said claim
Aug. 1898. J Crescent Min. Co. v. Silver King Min. Co. S19
in any manner whatever, and that plaintiff suffered no injury,
and was not damaged in any manner, except nominally, for
such trespass, and that plaintiff had an adequate remedy at law
for the alleged injury. Defendant owned water necessary to
run his plant, located several miles away, between which water
and its mine the plaintiff owned a strip of barren, rocky, worth-
less, uncultivated, *^^ unused land, on a barren hillside, over
which, as claimed, it refused to sell a right of way, or permit the
defendant to run its pipe line to its mine. It does not appear
that there was any other way of reaching the mine with the
water, or that any water was obtainable. Without the water,
one of the largest mhiing industries in the state, employing hun-
dreds of laborers, and producing hundreds of thousands of dol-
lars' worth of mineral annually, must be closed down and cease
operation. The laying of the pipe line across this barren, value-
less land caused no appreciable injury to the plaintiff. The
court found the damages to be nominal. No easement could be
acquired by the defendant in the land without the consent of the
plaintiff. To restrain the laying of the pipe line would cause
defendant irreparable damage, and destroy and lay waste a min-
ing industry of incalculable value, throw out of employment
hundreds of laborers, and seriously retard and injure the people
of the community and state in which the mine is located. To
grant the injunction asked for would work a great and irrepara-
ble injury to the defendant, without corresponding or any bene-
fit to the plaintiff; while to refuse it would injure neither, but
leave the plaintiff to its remedy at law, where it could obtain
such redress as the law should award it. Under such circum-
stances, the remedy at law being complete, the plaintiff should
be required to resort to such remedy. The construction of this
pipe line across the barren waste, under the circumstances shown
in this case, was not an irreparable injury. If it was an injury
at all, it was but nominal. If an injury was done to the land by
laying the pipe line, the plaintiff had a complete remedy at law
for the injury, and it appears the defendant is amply responsi-
ble to answer for the damages. No peculiar, present, specula-
tive, or other '*'*® value is attached to the land crossed by the
line. Few, if any, cases can be found where a court of equity
has interfered by injunction to restrain a naked trespass, as
such, without a showing that the property itself had some pe-
culiar value, and could not admit of due recompense, or would
be destroyed or irreparably injured by repeated or continued
acts of trespass. In section 697 of High on Injunctions, it 18
820 Crescent Min. Co. v. Silver King Min. Co. [Utah,
said that the foundation of the jurisdiction of courts of equity
to grant injunctions rests in the prohability of irreparable in-
jury, the inadequacy of pecuniary compensation, and the pre-
vention of a multiplicity of suits; and, when facts are not shown
to bring the case within these conditions, the relief will be re-
fused. Equity will not, therefore, enjoin a mere^ trespass to
realty, as such, in the absence of any element of irreparable in-
jury. If, therefore, the plaintiff can recover for the- trespass
compensation equivalent or adequate to the injury which it has
sustained, such injury, in no sense of the word, can be consid-
ered irreparable.
All the adjudged cases fix the rule to be idiat the injury must
"be of that peculiar nature that it cannot be adequately compen-
sated in damages or allowed for in money. There must be some
just, equitable feature or incident to take the case out of the
rule, or equity will not interfere. When the facts present no
matter requiring equitable relief, and the granting of the in-
junction will work a wrong and irreparable injury to one party,
with no appreciable benefit to the other, and the remedy at law
is adequate to do full justice, the court should reject such juris-
diction as not within its legitimate province. To hold other-
wise would confound all principles upon which equitable juris-
diction stands. This court has already passed upon this same
question in the case of McGregor v. Silver King Min. Co., 14
Utah, 47, 60 Am. St. Rep. 883, and in Crescent *«<> Min. Co. v.
Silver King Min. Co., 14 Utah, 67, adversely to the plaintiff.
This cause grew out of the same acts of alleged trespass, and
were parts of the same transaction, with reference to the laying
of the pipe line. In the case of McGregor v. Silver King Min.
Co., 14 Utah, 47, 60 Am. St. Eep. 883, this court held that, un-
der the circumstances disclosed, there was no just cause to in-
voke the equitable interference of a court of equity to prevent
a trespass consisting of laying a pipe line across the barren,
rocky, uncultivated, worthless land of the plaintiff, without do-
ing more; and that in such case the plaintiff would be remitted
to his action at law for damages. In that case, quoting from
Bassett v. Salisbury Mfg. Co., 47 K H. 437, adopted and ap-
proved in Thorn v. Sweeney, 12 Nev. 251, the court held: "The
power to grant injunctions to prevent injustice has always been
regarded as peculiar and extraordinary. It is not controlled by
ordinary and technical rules, but the application for its exer-
cise is addressed to the conscience and sound discretion of the
court. Ordinarily, it will not be exercised when the right of
Aug. 1898.] Crescent Min. Co. v. Silver King Min. Co. 821
the complaiiiant is doubtful, and has not been settled at law;
and, even when it has been so settled, an injunction will not be
granted when the remedy at law is adequate. It is not enough
that an injury merely nominal or theoretical is apprehended,
even although an action at law might be maintained for it; but,
to justify the interposition of this summary power, there must
be cause to fear substantial and serious damage, for which courts
of law could furnish no adequate remedy. When injuries shall
be regarded as irreparable at law must depend upon the circum-
stances of the particular case. If the injury be trivial, as by
.... raising the water of the river a few inches upon its rocky
shore, doing him no appreciable or serious damage, equity would
not ordinarily interfere by injunction, "**"• even in cases where
the right has been established at law; for the power is extraor-
dinary in its character, and is to be exercised, in general, only
in cases of necessity, and when the court can see that other reme-
dies are inadequate to do justice between the parties, and even
then it is to be exercised with great care and discretion. If the
granting of an injunction would necessarily cause great loss to
the defendant — a loss altogether disproportionate to the injuries
sustained by the plaintiff — that fact should be considered in de-
termining whether the application should be granted; and in
some cases it would justly have great weight. It has often been
supposed that, when the right has been established at law, the
plaintiff would be entitled to an injunction as a matter of course;
and this misapprehension has arisen, probably, from the fact
that, in a large number of cases, injunctions have been refused
upon the express ground that the title of the plaintiff had not
been established at law, leaving room for inference that if it had
been so established the injunction would have been issued. This,
however, is clearly not the doctrine of courts of equity, for they
will not ordinarily exercise this summary and extraordinary
power, when substantial justice can be done by courts of law."
The doctrine here announced is fully supported by Bigelow v.
Hartford Bridge Co., 14 Conn. 565, 36 Am. Dec. 503; Wason v.
Sanborn, 45 N. H. 170; Blake v. Brooklyn, 26 Barb. 301; Mur-
ray v. Knapp, 48 How. Pr. 462, 62 Barb. 566; Nicodemus v. Nico-
demus, 41 Md. 537; "Weigel v. Walsh, 45 Mo. 560; Bechtel v. Cars-
lake, 11 K J. Eq. 244; Catching v. Terrell, 10 Ga. 578; Wood-
ing V. Malone, 30 Ga. 980; 1 High on Injunctions, sees. 483,
697, 699, 701; Eden on Injunctions, 231; 2 Story's Equity Juris-
prudence, 925, 928; Thorn v. Sweeney, 12 Nev. 251.
822 Crescent Min. Co. v. Silver King Min. Co. [Utah,
The case of Uline v. New York Cent. etc. K. E. Co., 101 N. Y.
98, 54 Am. Eep. 661, relied upon by appellant, arose where a
private owner of lots ^*^ on a public street sought to recover
damages against a railroad company for raising the grade of the
street and sidewalks, and so shaping the streets and gutters as to
pour water therefrom upon the lots into the premises and base-
ment of plaintiff's house, thereby flooding the lots and basement,
BO as to render them uninhabitable, and depriving plaintiff of the
rental value thereof, to his great and irreparable injury. The
case of Pappenheim v. Metropolitan etc. Ey. Co., 128 N. Y. 436,
26 Am. St. Eep. 486, was brought to restrain the defendant from
operating an elevated railroad in front of plaintiff's premises m
the city of New York, and to recover damages therefor. The
case of Wheelock v. Noonan, 108 N. Y. 179, 2 Am. St. Eep. 405,
was brought to compel defendant to remove from six lots belong-
ing to plaintiff stone and heavy bowlders whi#h defendant had
placed upon the surface thereof, from fourteen to eighteen feet
in height, causing plaintiff great and irreparable damage and in-
jury, and destroying the rental value and use of the premises.
These, and other cases cited, present a state of facts entirely dif-
ferent from those shown in this case. It is plain that the ob-
ject of the defendant was not to destroy or injure the plaintiff's
property that could not readily be compensated in damages. Its
acts were not to destroy or injure the plaintiff's property, but to
preserve its own from destruction, without injury, except nom-
inal, to the plaintiff; and it is claimed that any damages aris-
ing therefrom were offered to be paid.
The case of Eichards v. Dower, 64 Cal. 63, relie'd upon by;
plaintiff's counsel, materially differs from the present case, in
that the defendant in that case was excavating for a tunnel, and
was removing the soil from the premises, and carrying it away,
to the injury of the inheritance. Under such circumstances, the
injunction was properly granted.
^^^ We find no error in the record. The findings and judg-
ment of the trial court are correct. The judgment of the dis-
trict court is affirmed, with costs.
Hart, district judge, concurs.
MR. JUSTICE McCARTY dissented from that part of the deci-
sion holding that plaintiff was not entitled to equitable relief re-
straining the defendant from maintaining Its pipe line across and
through plaintiff's mining claims, as It was evident to his mind
that an action at law would not afford the plaintiff a complete and
Aug. 1898.] Crescent Min. Co. v. Silver Kino Min. Co. 823
adequate remedy for the wrongs complained of, for while he would
in an action at law be entitled to recover for damage done prior
to and up to the time of filing the complaint, yet the judgment
"would be no protection against defendant continuing the trespass:
Uline V. New York Cent. etc. R. R. Co., 101 N. Y. 98, 53 Am. Rep.
123, 54 Am. Rep. G61; Pappenheim v. Metropolitan Elevated Ry.
■oo., 128 N. Y. 436. 26 Am. St. Rep. 486. To deny the plaintiff
equitable relief would force him to a multiplicity of suits or to the
abandonment of his property: Uline v. New York Cent. etc. R. R. Co.,
101 N. Y. 98, 53 Am. Rep. 123, 54 Am. Rep. 661. "The right to in-
junctive relief in cases of trespass, when the plalntiCCa title, pos-
session, and right of possession of the property are admitted or es-
tablished, does not depend on the amount and the extent of the
damage done or suffered in each particular case, but depends more
upon the nature and character of the trespass. This doctrine Is
invoked and followed in the case of Richards v. Dower, 64 Cal. 62,
which was an action for an injunction against the construction of
a tunnel through plaintiff's lot, and twenty feet below the surface
thereof. The court found: 'That said tunnel has not affected, and
will not if completed affect, injuriously or otherwise, the surface
ground of plaintiff's said lot; that the driving of the tunnel was
not, and will not. If completed, cause the plaintiff Irreparable In-
jury, or Injure said lot In any way, and that the defendant is not
insolvent.' The court dissolved the preliminary Injunction, and
ordered judgment for the defendant. On appeal, the supreme
court said: 'The findings show that the tunnel which the defendant
is constructing through the plaintiff's land Is of a permanent char-
acter. It disturbs the plaintiff's possession, and. If permitted to
continue, will ripen Into an easement. This, of itself, is sufficient
to entitle him to an injunction: Polrler v. Fetter, 20 Kan. 47; John-
son v. Rochester, 13 Hun, 285; Williams v. Railroad Co., 16 N. Y.
97, 69 Am. Dec. 651 In 3 Pomeroy'a Equity Jurisprudence,
sec. 1357, the learned author says: 'If the trespass Is continuous In
its nature. If repeated acts of wrong are done or threatened, al-
though each of these acts, taken by Itself, may not be destructive,
and the legal remedy may, therefore, be adequate for each single
act If It stood alone, and also the entire wrong may be prevented
or stopped by Injunction, on the ground of avoiding 'a repetition
of similar actions, .... the ultimate criterion Is the Inadequacy
of the legal remedy It Is certain that many trespasses are
now enjoined, which, If committed, would fall far short of destroy-
ing the property, or of rendering its restoration to Its original con-
dition Impossible. The injunction Is granted, not merely because
the injury is essentially destructive, but because, being continuous
or repeated, the full compensation for the entire wrong cannot be
obtained In one action at law for damages.' This doctrine Is sup-
ported by the following authorties: 1 High on Injunctions, 702;
1 Beach on Modern Equity Jurisprudence, sec. 2; Richards v. Dower,
64 Cal. 62; Walker v. Emerson, 89 Cal. 450; Shepard v. Railway
Co., 117 N. Y. 442; Mudge v. Salisbury, 110 N. Y. 413; Wheelock
824 Crescent Min. Co. v. Silveb King Min. Co. [Utah^
T. Noonan, 108 N. T. 179, 2 Am. St. Rep. 405; Mills v. New Orleans
Seed Co., 65 Miss. 391, 7 Am. St. Kep. 671, and note; Connole v.
Mining Co., 20 Mont. 523; Williams v. Kailioad Co., 16 N. Y. 97, 6&
Am. Dec. 651; Poirier v. Fetter, 20 Kan. 47; Miller v. Lynch, 149
Pa. St. 460; Johnson v. Rochester, 13 Hun, 285; Valentine v. Schrei-
ber, 38 N. Y. Supp. 417, 3 N. Y. App. Div. 235.
WATERS— PERCOLATING WATERS— WHAT LAW GOV-
ERNS—APPROPRIATION— PRESCRIPTION.— The principles of
law which govern the right to waters flowing upon the surface of
the earth are inapplicable to waters which are beneath its surface
and percolate through the soil: Gould v. Eaton, 111 Cal. 639, 52
Am. St. Rep. 201. Percolating waters are parts of the earth itself,
as much as the soil and stones, with the same absolute right of
use and appropriation by the owner of the land. Hence a proprietor
of adjoining lands cannot complain of a diversion of such waters:
Wheelock v. Jacobs, 70 Vt. 162, 67 Am. St. Rep. 659; Metcalf v.
Nelson, 8 S. Dak. 87, 59 Am. St. Rep. 746. The owner of land
through which subsurface water, without any distinct, definite,
and known channel, percolates or filters to the land of another, is
not prohibited from digging into his land and appropriating the
water to any useful purpose of his own, though by so doing the
water may be entirely diverted from the land to which it would
otherwise naturally pass: Tampa Water etc. Co. v. Oline, 37 Fla.
586, 53 Am. St. Rep. 262; Gould v. Eaton, 111 Cal. 639, 52 Am. St.
Rep. 201. Waters percolating through the soil belong to the owner
of the freehold, and he may use them as he chooses, free from any
usufructuary rights in others: Hanson v. McCue, 42 Cal. 303, 10
Am. Rep. 299. Prior occupancy of water percolating in the earth
gives no exclusive right as against owners of adjacent land: Roath
V. Driscoll, 20 Conn. 533, 52 Am. Dec. 352. A prescriptive right,
therefore, to percolating waters cannot be acquired: Wheelock v.
Jacobs, 70 Vt. 162, 67 Am. St. Rep. 659; Sweet v. Cutts, 50 N. H.
439, 9 Am. Rep. 276, and note thereto. On the entire question of
subterranean or percolating waters, see the monographic notes to
AVheelock v. Jacobs, 67 Am. St. Rep. 663-772; and to Wheatley
V. Baugh, 64 Am. Dec. 727-730. It will be presumed, in the absence
of evidence, that a spring is formed and fed by percolating waters,
rather than by the outbreak upon the surface of the earth of a
subterranean stream: Metcalf v. Nelson, 8 S. Dak. 87, 59 Am. St.
Rep. 746; Tampa Water etc. Co. v. Cline, 37 Fla. 586, 53 Am. St
Rep. 262.
INJUNCTION TO RESTRAIN TRESPASS.-It is not usual to
Issue an Injunction to restrain a trespass. And the digging of a
trench, and the laying of a pipeline therein, across plaintiff's land,
which Is rocky, barren, vacant, and comparatively valueless. Is not
such an irreparable injury as to justify the issuance of an Injunc-
tion, where it appears that the damages, If any, are merely nom-
inal; that the defendant Is solvent and able to respond in damages;
and that proceedings have been taken under the statute for con-
demnation: McGregor v. Silver King Min. Co., 14 Utah, 47, 60 Am.
St. Rep. 883, and note thereto. See, also, Jones v. Concord etc. B.
B., 67 N. H. 234, 68 Am. St. Rep. 650.
CASES
IN THB
SUPREME COURT
or
VIRGINIA.
BURDTS V. BURDIS.
[96 ViKGINIA. 81.]
DEVISE— FAILURE OF, FOR IMPOSSIBILITY OF PER-
FORMANCE OF CONDITION PRECEDENT.— If a condition pre-
cedent is annexed to a devise of real estate, and its performance
is or becomes impossible, the devise fails, although there Is no
default or laches on the part of the devisee himself.
DEVISE— IMPOSSIBILITY OF PERFORMANCE OF CON-
DITION SUBSEQUENT— EFFECT OF.— If a condition subsequent
is annexed to a devise of real estate, and its performance becomes
impossible, without the fault of the devisee, the estate is not de-
feated or forfeited, but the devisee will hold the property by an
absolute title, as if no condition had been annexed to the devise.
WILLS— CONDITIONS PRECEDENT AND SUBSEQUENT—
WHAT ARE— DISTINCTION.— There are no technical words to
distinguish between conditions precedent and conditions subsequent.
The distinction is matter of construction. The words may indif-
ferently make either, according to the intent of the person who
creates the condition. If the language of the particular clause, br
of the whole will, shows that the act on which the estate depends
must be performed before the estate can vest, the condition is
precedent, and, unless it is performed, the devisee can take nothing.
If, on the contrary, the act does not necessarily precede the vest-
ing of the estate, but may accompany or follow it, and this can
be collected from the whole will, the condition is subsequent
WILLS— CONDITIONS SUBSEQUENT— IMPOSSIBILTY OF
PERFORMANCE— EFFECT OF.— If a testator devises to his wife,
for her life, his "homestead and five acres around the house," with
the understanding that his son will support and take care of her,
and that, at her death, the "homestead and land shall return to"
the son "as compensation therefor," but the wife of the testator
dies In his lifetime, and he makes no change in his will, the whole
will, taken together, Including the wish therein expressed that the
son shall support and provide for his two sisters as long as they
remain single, shows that the condition upon which the son is to
take the estate is a condition subsequent, and not a condition
(826)
S26 BuRDis V. BuEDis. [Virginia,
precedent, and its performance having been rendered impossible
by the act of God, in the death of the wife in the lifetime of the
testator, the son holds the estate by an absolute title, as if the
testator had attached no condition to the devise, for the act on
which the estate depends does not necessarily precede the vesting
of the estate, but may accompany or follow it.
LEGACIES— DEVISES— IMPOSSIBILITY OF PERFORM-
ANCE OF CONDITION SUBSEQUENT— EFFECT OF.— While
there is a difference between a legacy and a devise where the con-
■dition is precedent, there is no difference where the condition is
subsequent; but in the latter case the estate to which the condition
is annexed, whether it is land or a money legacy, if the performance
of the condition is rendered impossible, becomes, by that event,
absolute in the devisee as well as in the legatee.
Suit brought by Burdis against Burdis and others, in which
the chief question involved was the proper construction of a will.
By a clause of the will, subsequent to the devise mentioned in
the opinion, the testator expressed a wish that his son, Albert,
would support and provide for his two sisters as long as they
remained single. The testator survived his wife, but made no
change in his will. There was a decree for the complainant and
the defendants appealed.
Little & Little, for the appellants.
No counsel for the appellee
*^ EIELY, J. Joseph Burdis devised to his wife for her life
his homestead and five acres of land, with the understanding that
his son, Albert, would support and take care of her, and at her
death the homestead and land should return to Albert as com-
pensation therefor.
The wife of the testator died in his lifetime, and the matter to
be determined is, whether or not his son, Albert, is entitled, un-
der these circumstances, to the homestead and land. This de-
pends upon the question whether the condition upon which he
was to have the property was a condition precedent to its vest-
ing in him, or was a condition subsequent, the nonperformance
of which would divest the estate given to him by the will. The
law is clear that where a condition precedent is annexed to a de-
vise of real estate, and its performance is or becomes impossible,
the devise fails, although there be no default or laches on the
part of the devisee himself: 2 Jarman on Wills, 10; 4 Kent's
Commentaries, 125; 2 Minor's Institutes, 228; but if the condi-
tion is subsequent, and its performance becomes impossible, the
rule is different. In that case the estate will not be defeated or
forfeited, but the devisee will hold the property by an absolute
June, 1898.] Burdis v. Burdis. 827
title, as if no' condition had been annexed to the ** devise: 2
Jarman on Wills, 11; 4 Kent's Commentaries, 130; Eidgway v,
Woodhouse, 7 Beav. 437; Collett v. Collett, 35 Beav. 312; Mc-
Lachlan v. McLachlan, 9 Paige, 534; Martin v. Ballon, 13 Barb.
119; Livingston v. Gordon, 84 N. Y. 140; Merrill v. Emery, 10
Pick. 507; Parker v. Parker, 133 Mass. 584; Morse v. Hayden,
82 Me. 227.
There are no technical words to distinguish between condi-
tions precedent and conditions subsequent. The distinction is
matter of construction. The same words may indifferently
make either, according to the intent of the person who creates
the condition. If the language of the particular clause, or of
the whole will, shows that the act on which the estate depends
must be performed before the estate can vest, the condition is
precedent, and, unless it be performed, the devisee can take noth-
ing. If, on the contrary, the act does not necessarily precede
the vesting of the estate, but may accompany or follow it, and
this can be collected from the whole will, the condition is subse-
quent: Finlay v. King, 3 Pet. 346; Martin v. Ballon, 13 Barb.
119; 4 Kent's Commentaries, 124.
The words, "with the understanding that my son Albert will
support and take care of her," in the will under construction,
which are relied upon as constituting a condition of the gift to
the son, are not annexed thereto, but are connected with the
devise to the testator's wife. The testator owned, in addition to
what he called the homestead, a tract of land of one hundred
and seven acres, and the words which are coupled with the devise
to the wife were manifestly assigned as a reason for the devise
to her of the homestead and the five acres around it, and not as
a condition of the gift to her, while the words "as compensation
therefor," which are attached to the devise to the son, do not
constitute so much a condition of the gift to him as show the
motive for it.
But if the language referred to be in legal effect a condition
of the devise to the son, there is nothing in the will that makes
the support and care of the wife of the testator by their son
Albert necessarily precede the vesting in him of the estate in
** remainder, but much to indicate the contrary. The obligk-,
tion relied upon as a condition precedent was not a single act,
to be done or omitted at once, but a continuing condition, which
might run through a long series of years, and require the per-
formance of many acts.
828 BuRDis V. BujRDia. [Virginia^
The support and care of the wife was a continuing duty as
long as she might live. If she had survived the testator she
would have only heen forty-five years old at the time of hi*
death, and would have had, according to all haman calculation,
many years still of expectation of life. There is nothing in the
will to indicate that the testator intended the devise to the son
to remain in "a state of contingency'' during the many years
that he might have the support and care of his mother, and it
would be unreasonable to believe, without an express direction
or plain implication in the will to that effect, that he so intended.
Although he lived more than a year after the death of his wife,
he left his will unchanged. By it he also required his son to
support and provide for his two sisters, the younger of whom
was only fifteen years of age, as long as they might remain sin-
gle, an obligation that might terminate in the lifetime of the
mother, or continue long after her death. Taking the whole will
together, as should be done, we are of opinion that the condition
upon which the testator's son, Albert, was to take the estate
was a condition subsequent, and not a condition precedent, and
its performance having been rendered impossible by the act of
God in the death of the wife in the lifetime of the testator, Al-
bert holds the estate by an absolute title as if the testator had
attached no condition to the devise.
In Nunnery v. Carter, 5 Jones Eq. 370, 78 Am. Dec. 231, the
testator devised to his wife a tract of land for her life, with
remainder to his son James. He also bequeathed to her certain
slaves and other personal property for her life, and then "to be
Jiimes Carter's, provided he take care of his mother; if not, to be
wiiose that does take care of her." The wife in that case, as in
the case at bar, died in the lifetime of the testator, and it was
contended there, **** as it is here, that the slaves and other per-
sonal property were given to James upon a condition precedent,
which, being rendered impossible by the death of the tenant
for life, the property never vested in him, but remained undis-
posed of, and subject to be distributed as intestate property.
The court, however, held that the condition, "though in form
and appearance a precedent one, was, in reality and legal effect,
a subsequent condition, and as such could not, by becoming an
impossible one, prevent the legacy from taking effect." It is
true that it was the case of a legacy, and that the subject of the
present controversy is a devise. "While there is a difference be-
tween a legacy and a devise where the condition is precedent,
there is no difference where the condition is subsequent; but
June, 189S.] Burdis v. Burdis. 829
in the latter case the estate to whicfi the condition is annexed,
whether it be land or a money legacy, if the performance of the
condition be rendered impossible, becomes, by that event, abso-
lute in the devisee as well as in the legatee: 2 Jarman on Wills,
10; Finlay v. King, 3 Pet. 346; Martin v. Ballon, 13 Barb. 119.
In Birmingham v. Lesan, 77 Me. 494, the testator devised to
his wife all his real estate for her life, the same to go to John
Mehan at her death, if any remained, provided he maintained
and provided for her decently from the proceeds of the farm,
or otherwise; but if he failed to provide for her, then she was
empowered to call on the selectmen to provide for her in her
own house. The will also provided that John Mehan should
be allowed to use the farm for the purpose of maintaining him-
self and the testator's wife by farming the same. It was held by
the court that John Mehan took the estate upon a condition
subsequent, but having failed to perform the condition, the
heirs, or residuary devisees, had the right to create a forfeiture
by an entry for that purpose, although the will contained no
clause of that purport.
There is no error in the decree appealed from, and the same
must be affirmed.
Conditions Precedent and Sa1)seanent— Impossibility of Performance.*
Generally.— A% to when a condition Is precedent- and when subse-
quent Is well stated In the principal case. An estate upon condi-
tion Is one which Is made to vest, or to be enlarged, or defeated,
upon the happening or not happening of some event. The condi-
tion may be express or implied, precedent or subsequent. Condi-
tions precedent are such as must happen before the estate dependent
upon them can arise or be enlarged. Conditions subsequent are
such as, when they do happen, defeat the estate: Raley v. Umatilla
Co., 15 Or. 172, 3 Am. St. Rep. 142. The general rule is, that a con-
dition precedent must be literally performed before a right can ac-
crue or an estate be vested. Thus. If, In the case of a devise, a
condition becomes Impossible to be performed, even though there
Is no default or laches on the part of the devisee himself, the de-
vise falls, and even equity will not relieve. But the rule Is diflferent
if a condition subsequent becomes Impossible. In that case, the
estate will not be defeated or forfeited: Martin v. Ballou, 13 Barb.
119, 132. "There Is a wide distinction," says Mr. Justice Swayne,
delivering the opinion of the court in Davis v. Gray, 16 Wall. 203,
•rkferenck to monographic notes.
Devises and conditions In restraint of marriage: 3S Am. Dec. 156-161.
How deed may be avoided for breach of condition subsequent: 44 Am. Dec. 748-
When legacy wiU vest, notwithstanding failtire to perform condition: 78 Am. Dee.
830 BuRDis V. BuRDis. [Virginia
229, "between a condition precedent, wliere no title has vested and
none Is to vest until the condition is performed, and a condition sub-
sequent, operating by way of defeasance. In the former case,
equity can give no relief. The failure to perform is an inevitable
bar. No right can ever vest. The result is very different where
the condition is subsequent," as equity can there relieve against a
forfeiture. So illegal conditions subsequent are void: Blacli v.
Oliver, 1 Ala. 449, 35 Am. Dec. 38; Scovill v. McMahon, 62 Conn.
378, 36 Am. St. Rep. 350; and a contract of sale executed in all
other respects amounts to an absolute sale: Blaclc v. Oliver, 1 Ala.
449, 35 Am. Dec. 38. If the further performance of a condition
subsequent that premises should be used as a cemetery is rendered
unlawful by a valid act of the legislature, the condition is thereby
discharged and the title of the grantee freed therefrom: Scoville v.
McMahon, 62 Conn. 378, 36 Am. St. Rep. 350.
Senseless, repugnant, or nugatory conditions subsequent do not
affect an instrument by which a right is to accrue or an estate is
to vest: Stockton v. Turner, 7 J. J. Marsh. 192; Case v. Dwire. 60
Iowa, 442; Jones v. Port Huron etc. Thresher Co., 171 111. 502; Wead
V. Gray, 78 Mo. 59; Kelley v. Meins, 135 Mass. 231, 235. If a con-
dition is subsequent, and performance is, at the time it is created.
Impossible, or is afterward rendered impossible, the condition Is
void, performance is dispensed with, and the estate vests absolutely,
whether such impossibility is created by the act of God: Hoss v.
Hoss, 140 Ind. 551; Morse v. Hayden, 82 Me. 227; Parlier v. Parker,
123 Mass. 584; Burnham v. Burnham, 79 Wis. 557, 567; or of the
law: Mahoning Co. v. Young, 59 Fed. Rep. 96, 16 U. S. App. 253, 277;
Burnham v. Burnham, 79 Wis. 557, 567; or of the act of the grantor:
Elkhart etc. Co. v. Ellis, 113 Ind. 215, 218; Burnham v. Burnham, 79
Wis. 566; Vanderslice v. Hanks, 3 Cal. 27, 40. Conditions subsequent
In a deed are strictly construed, as they lend to defeat or destroy
estates, and are rarely enforced in equity so as to defeat an estate
for a breach thereof: See monographic note to Cross v. Carson, 44
Am. Dec. 744, showing how a deed may be avoided for breach of
condition subsequent: Taylor v. Sutton, 15 Ga. 103, 60 Am. Dec.
682; Thompson v. Thompson, 9 Ind. 323, 68 Am. Dec. 638; Emerson
V. Simpson, 43 N. H. 475, 82 Am. Dec. 168; Rawson v. Inhabitants,
7 Allen, 125, 83 Am. Dec. 670; Peden v. Chicago etc. Ry. Co., 73
Iowa, 328; 5 Am. St. Rep. 680. So with a condition subsequent in
a will: RIdgway v. Woodhouse, 7 Beav. 437, 443. If the condition
which is to divest an estate "becomes Impossible, by the act of God^
the condition Is discharged: McLachlan v. McLachlan, 9 Paige, 534.
If a party to a contract, who is entitled to the benefit of a condi-
tion, upon the performance of which his responsibility Is to arise,
dispenses with, or by any act of his own prevents, the performance
the opposite party Is excused from proving a strict compliance with
the condition: Williams v. United States Bank, 2 Pet. 96, 102;
Seymour v. Bennet, 14 Mass. 206; Cooper v. Mowry, 16 Mass. 5, 7;
Clendennen v. Paulsel, 3 Mo. (230) 166. A party to a contract, who
prevents the performance of any condition, can neither claim a bene-
Jane, 1898.] Burdis v. Burdis. 831
fit nor escape liability from the failure of such condition: Dill v. Pope,
29 Kan. 289. One "who prevents the performance of a condition, or
makes It impossible by his own act, cannot take advantage of the^
nonperformance: Cape Fear Nav. Co. v. Wilcox, 7 Jones, 481; 78
Am. Dec. 200. It always excuses the performance of a condition
precedent in a contract that the performance was hindered by the
other party: Camp v. Barker, 21 Vt. 409; and he who, by his own.
act, prevents the performance of a condition precedent cannot take
advantage of its nonperformance: Jones v. Walker, 13 B. Mon. 103,
56 Am. Dec. 557. Whether a condition in a deed is precedent or
subsequent, if the act of the party who imposed it makes Its per-
formance impossible, or unnecessary, the condition is no longer
binding, and the estate conveyed by the deed, in which it is con-
tained, is discharged therefrom: Jones v. Chesapeake etc. R. R. Co.,-
14 W. Va. 514, 523. But if the act of a party, for whose benefit con-
ditions precedent attach, Is relied on as an excuse for nonperfor.
mance, it must be the proximate and not the remote cause of the-
failure to perform, and be of such a character as to render per-
formance impossible, or induce the belief that it was waived, or, if
attempted, would not be accepted: Brooklyn Life Ins. Co. v. Bledsoe,
52 Ala. 538, 553.
Notwithstanding the rule at law that, If a condition subsequent
is possible at the time of making It, and becomes afterward im-
possible to be complied with, by the act of God, or the law, or the
grantor, the estate having once vested, is not thereby divested, but
becomes absolute, a court of equity will not enforce such rule-
where it would be harsh and work injustice, especially where the-
circumstances do not call for a severe application of the rules-
. of law upon either side. Thus, the state of Texas made a large-
grant of lands to a railroad company defeasible if certain things-
were not done within a certain time by the company; but the state
plunged into the Civil War, and, by prosecuting it, confessedly
rendered it impossible for the company to fulfill the conditions
Imposed upon it during the continuance of the war. In other words,
the performance of all the conditions not performed was prevented
by the state itself, and the court, after the war was over, applied
the equitable principle that the conditions might still be complied
with, but in such reasonable time as would put the parties in the
same situation, as near as might be, as if no breach of condition
had occurred: Davis v. Gray, 16 Wall. 203, 230. Equity may also
Interpose upon the breach of a condition subsequent, and relievo
against a forfeiture, upon the principle of compensation, where
that principle can be applied, giving damages, if damages should
be given, and the proper amount can be ascertained: Davis v. Gray,
16 WaU. 203, 230; Chipman v. Thompson, Walk. Ch. 405; Wells v.
Smith, 2 Edw. Ch. 78. Thus, a court of equity will not always
enforce the forfeiture of a device for nonperformance of "condition*
subsequent. If the devisee accepts, and It would be Inequitable
or Impossible to compel him to perform the conditions, a court of
equity will award compensation in damages for breach of the con-
ditions, if that is an adequate remedy: Bird v. Hawkins, N. J. EJq.^
March. 1899.
^32 BuRDis V. BuRDis. [Virginia,
Contracts.— Whether conditions in a contract are precedent or
subsequent is to be determined by the intention of the parties, as
collected from the contract, whatever may be the order in which
they are placed, or the manner in whiQh they are expressed: Fin-
lay V. King, 3 Pet. 346. A right depending upon a condition prece-
dent does not accrue unless the condition is performed, although
performance becomes impossible by the act of God: Mizell v.
Burnett, 4 Jones, 249, 69 Am. Dec. 744; Oakley v. Morton, 11 N. Y.
26, 62 Am. Dec. 49; Eldridge v. Rowe, 2 Gilm. 91, 43 Am. Dec. 41;
Kives V. Baptiste, 25 Ala. 382. Thus, a contract for the sale of an
Invention at a valuation price, to be fixed by persons named, is
impliedly cond'itional upon those persons surviving and making the
valuation. Hence, if they die before doing so, the contract is ter-
minated by their death, the valuation stipulated for having thus
become impossible: Estate of Preston v. Smith, 67 111. App. 613,
•617, citing numerous authorities in support of the proposition that
contracts for personal service, which can only be performed during
the lifetime of the party contracting, are subject to the implied con-
dition of his continuing to live and to be in health to perform them,
and are terminated by his death or incapacity from illness. Stipu-
lations in a contract are not, however, to be construed as conditions
precedent, unless that construction is made necessary by the terms
of the contract: Deacon v. Blodget, 111 Cal. 416.
One who prevents the performance or happening of a condition
precedent upon which his liability, by the terms of a contract, is
made to depend, cannot avail himself of its nonperformance: Jones
V. "Walker, 13 B. Mon. 163, 56 Am. Dec. 557. He cannot take ad-
vantage of his own wrong, and screen himself from payment for
what was done under the contract: Buffkin v. Baird, 73 N. C. 283.
If the performance of a condition precedent has been prevented by
the defendant, the plaintiff may recover, on a general count, the
value of the services he has performed: Morford v. Ambrose, 3 J. J.
Marsh. 688, as upon a quantum meruit: Buffkin v. Baird, 73 N. O.
283. The general rule is, that there can be no recovery upon a
quantum meruit if a condition precedent has not been performed,
but if the defendant completes the contract himself, putting it out
of the plaintiff's power to do so, there may be a recovery upon u
quantum meruit, as If the work had been completed by the plaintiff,
but not In a workmanlike manner: Escott v. White, 10 Bush, 169.
On the other hand, in all cases where the condition of a bond or
recognizance Is possible at the time of making the condition, and
before the same can be performed, the condition becomes impossi-
ble by the act of God, or of the law, or the obligee, there the obli-
gation Is saved. Thus, If compliance with a sheriff's recognizance
to appear on attachment becomes Impossible by reason of his sicfe-
ness on the day set, and his subsequent death, nonperformance is
excused and no action lies: People v. Manning, 8 Cow. 297, 18 Am.
Dec. 451.
Deeds.— It, for any reason, a condition precedent In a deed is, or
t)ecomes Impossible of performance, no estate vests: Stockton v.
June, 1898.] Bubdis v. Burdis. 833
Weber, 98 Cal. 433, 441; Vanhorne v. Dorrance, 2 Dall. 304, 317;
Harvey v. Aston, 1 Atk. 376. An Impossible or Illegal condition In
a deed Is void, and the grantee takes the estate freed from the con-
dition: Raley v. Umatilla Co., 15 Or. 172, 3 Am. St. Rep. 142; note
to Cross V. Carson, 44 Am. Dec. 745; Barksdale v. Elam, 30 Miss.
•094. A grant in restraint of marriage Is void, unless there Is a valid
limitation over: Randall v. Marble, G9 Me. 310, 31 Am. Rep. 281.
Whether a condition Is precedent or subsequent does not depend
upon any precise form of words, or their place in the deed, but
must be determined from the whole instrument: Rogan v. Walker,
1 Wis. 527; and the Intention of the parties: Shinn v. Roberts, 20
N. .T. L. 435, 43 Am. Dec. 63(5; Underbill v. Saratoga etc. R. R. Co.,
^0 Barb. 455. An estate which has once vested in a grantee cannot
he defeated by a condition subsequent which Is Impossible, Illegal,
■or repugnant to the estate granted: Ricketts v. Louisville etc. Ry.
Co., 91 Ky. 221, 34 Am. St. Rep. 176. Conditions subsequent in a
deed are good whenever their performance is not impossible, or doea
not afterward b.ecome so by the act of God, or of the grantor, and
they are not contrary to law, nor repugnant to the deed; otherwise
they are void, and the grantee takes an absolute estate: Taylor v.
Sutton, 15 Ga. 103, 60 Am. Dec. 682. But the rule that a condition,
reservation, or exception which is repugnant to the granting part
of a deed Is null and void applies only in cases where the repug-
nancy Is such that the Intention of the parties cannot be ascertained
from the whole Instrument, or, If ascertained, cannot be carried Into
■effect in accordance with established principles of law: Bassett v.
Budlong, 77 Mich. 338, 18 Am. St. Rep. 404. A condition suosequent
In the form of a power of revocation reserved In a deed will not
3)6 deemed impossible of execution, on the ground that the deed
provides that the revocation shall be by an instrument to be ac-
knowledged and recorded, as in the case of a deed to land. The right
of revocation is not lost merely because the grantor has thus pre-
scribed as a part of the proceedings by which the revocation Is to
be carried into effect some formality which the law does not recog-
nize. In such a case, therefore, the provision that the revocation
is to be acknowledged and recorded is not to be regarded as so far
of the essence or substance of the right as to defeat it: Ricketts v.
Louis,ville etc. Ry. Co., 91 Ky. 221, 34 Am. St Rep. 17a If the
performance of a condition of a bond is prevented by the omission
of the obligee, the obligor is discharged: Whitney v. Spencer, 4
<Jow. 39.
Devise.— Ab In other cases, the question as to whether a condition
In a devise Is precedent or subsequent depends upon intention, that
Is, upon whether the testator Intended that a compliance with the
requisition annexed to the estate devised should 'be a condition of
Its acquisition, or merely of its retention: Birmingham v. Lesau, 77
Me. 494, 497; Reuff v. Coleman, 30 W. Va. 171;* In re Stlckney's
Will, 85 Md. 79, 60 Am. St. Rep. 308. If real property Is devised,
subject to a condition precedent which becomes Impossible of per-
formance before the time of performance arrives, the title to it will
Am. 8t. Rkp., Vou LXX.-^
834 BuRDis V. BuRDis. [Virginia,
not vest In the devisee: See Shockley v. Parvis, 4 Houst. 568; De»
V. Hance, 11 N, J. L. 244, 257; note to Nunnery v. Carter, 78 Am»
Dec. 234; Cassem v. Kennedy, 147 111. 660, 664; Winthrop v. Mc-
Kim, 51 How. Pr. 323, 327, though it is otherwise as to a legacy
subject to a condition precedent. See the principal case and "Lega-
cies," infra. If a device of property depends on the performance
of a condition precedent, which is not performed, and which can-
not be performed, because of the intervention of death, no estate-
vests in the devisee: Den v. Messenger, 33 N. J. L. 499. If a con-
dition subsequent, which is to divest an estate, becomes impossible^
as by an act of God, the condition is discharged, and an absolute
estate exists as if no condition had been imposed: See the principal
case; McLachlan v. McLachlan, 9 Paige, 534; Parlier v. Parlier, 123
Mass. 584; Taylor v. Mason, 9 Wheat. 325; Jones v. Bramblet, 1
Scam. 276, 281. Thus, if real property and specific personal estate
is devised on condition that the devisee shall provide and maintain
the son of the testator until he attains his majority, this is a gift
on a condition subsequent, and, If the son dies during the lifetime
of the testator, the devisee will hold the property by an absolute
title, as if no condition had been attached: Morse v. Hayden, 82
Me. 227.
So, where a condition subsequent Is void for repugnancy, the
devisee takes without condition: Zillmer v. Landguth, 94 Wis. 607;
Langdon v. Ingram, 28 Ind. 360, 362; and, if a condition subsequent
is void as against public policy, or because it is illegal, the devisee
will take the estate discharged of the condition: O'Brien v. Barkley,
28 N. Y. Supp. 1049. Thus, a condition subsequent in a devise, plac-
ing a restraint upon marriage, is null and void: Smythe v. Smythe,
90 Va. 638; but conditions precedent annexed to a devise must be
observed, no matter how restrictive of marriage: Phillips v. Fergu-
son, 85 Va. 509, 17 Am. St. Kep. 78.
Legacies.— It personal property is bequeathed upon a condition
precedent, which becomes impossible of performance before the
time of performance arrives, the title vests in the legatee, upon
the death of the testator, unless it appears that the performance
of the condition was the sole motive for the making of the be-
quest: Nunnery v. Carter, 5 Jones Eq. 370, 78 Am. Dec. 231; Culin'»
Appeal, 20 Pa. St. 243; but where it appears that the sole motive
of making a devise of real property was that the devisee should
perform a certain act as a condition precedent, the devise will
lapse upon the condition becoming impossible of performance, and
no title will vest in the devisee or his heirs: Lefler v. Rowland,.
Phill. Eq. 144; Nunnery v. Carter, 5 Jones' Eq. 370, 78 Am. Dec.
231. There Is a difference between a legacy and a devise where
the condition Is precedent, but there is no difference where the
condition Is subsequent: See the principal case. A devise of land
upon a condition precedent can never take effect where the condi-
tion has become. In any way, impossible to be performed. All the
authorities agree In this; but. by the civil law, which on this sub-
ject haa been adopted by the courts of equity, when a condition
June, 1898.] Burdis v. Burdis. 835
precedent to the vesting of a legacy is impossible, the bequest Is
single, that Is, discharged from the condition, and the legatee will
be entitled as If the legacy were unconditional. An exception to
this rule in relation to legacies prevails, as above stated, where the
condition Is the motive, or as some authors say, the sole motive of
the bequest: Lefler v. Rowland, Phill. Eq. 143; monographic note
to Nunnery v. Carter, 78 Am. Dec. 235, on when a legacy will vest,
notwithstanding a failure to perform a condition.
If, however, a condition subsequent Is annexed to a legacy, and
the condition is rendered impossible by the act of God, or otherwise,
the rule is the same as In the case of a devise on a condition subse-
quent, and the estate becomes, by such event, absolute In the
legatee as well as In the devisee: Se the prin€lpal case; Merrfll v.
Emery, 10 Pick. 507; Morse v. Hayden, 82 Me. 227; In re Dempsey,
55 N. Y. Supp. 427, 5 Misc. Kep. 257; note to Nunnery v. Carter,
78 Am. Dec. 235; Jones v. Bramblet, 1 Scam. 276, 281. A bequest
made to executors in trust to pay the income to a specified charitable
institution so long as it maintains a certain person, and, in case it
maintains him for life, to pay the principal thereto, is valid and en-
titles the society named to the bequest upon the performance of the
condition, though such person has been expelled from the institution
before the testator's death. He has no right of selection while the
specified Institution continues ready to maintain him. The legacy
is not bequeathed to him solely, and he has only an interest in It
to the extent of a support for life, which consists in the perform-
ance by the society of the obligations required by the testator's
will. His right, then, is not. In any sense, to the legacy, but his
claim Is upon the society; or, if it fails to conform to the require-
ments of the will, upon such other society as may be substituted
In Its place. The society is entitled to the income, and, in con-
formity with the will, must maintain such person, not from the In-
come derived from the legacy, but out of such funds as it may have
from all sources of revenue. Hence, If he refuses to return, after
expulsion, and live at the institution, or to be provided for else-
where according to the offer made to him, thus rendering it practi-
cally impossible for the society to bestow upon him the benefits In-
tended by the legacy. It cannot affect Its right to the same. Tho
reasonable and true construction of the condition of his support Is,
that the testator only Intended that he should be maintained there
If he so desired, and that he was not absolutely bound to live there.
In the latter case, however, it was not designed that his refusal,
which renders a strict performance Impossible, should deprive the
society of the legacy. His maintenance is a condition to be per-
formed after the acceptance of the bequest. It is a condition sub-
sequent, and when it becomes impossible to perform it, the estate
is not defeated or forfeited, but continues as if no condition was
attached: Livingston v. Gordon, 84 N. Y. 136, 142.
If a condition is subsequent, the estate vests In the donee imme-
diately after the will takes effect. If it is a bequest of personalty,
vhe vesting is absolute. If it is a devise of realty, the title will
836 BuRDTS tJ. BuKDis. [Virginia,
divest upon the happening of the contingency. But if the condition
subsequent becomes impossible, then the title does not divest, but
becomes absolute: Note to Nunnery v. Carter, 78 Am. Dec, 235.
Thus, if a testator bequeathes certain property to K., on condition
that K. marries a daughter of the testator's sister, T., and T. has
no daughter, the condition is one subsequent, and, as it is not
capable of being performed, the devise vests in the donee at the
testator's death, and does not divest: Note to Nunnery v. Carter,
78 Am. Dec. 235. A legacy given to a person, though payable at
a future time, vests immediately, but if it is not given until a stated
time in the future, or, if time is annexed not to the payment only,
but to the gift itself, the legacy does not vest until that time.
Hence, If the legatee dies before the time, the gift is lost: In re
Rogers, 94 Cal. 526. If a wife, after providing a support for life
for her husband from the income of her property, and, if necessary,
to use her entire estate, bequeaths a certain portion of the residue
to his niece, in consideration of her care and maintenance of the
testatrix and her husband during their natural lives, such provision
is not, in terms, a condition, but rather it has been held, an expres-
sion of the reason or inducement for the legacy, which vests on the
death of the testatrix, subject to be divested in the event of the
entire estate being required for the support of the husband: Mc-
Carty v. Fish, 87 Mich. 48, 58,
An illegal condition subsequent, or one opposed to public policy,
or which is repugnant to the legacy to which it is attached, is void
and the legatee takes the property absolutely: Ridgway v. Wood-
house, 7 Beav, 437, 443; In re Walkerly, 108 Cal. 627, 645, 49 Am,
St, Rep. 97, 104; In re Elliot, L. R. (1896) 2 Ch. 353. Thus, in the
case of a present gift, vesting immediately, if the condition de-
ferring the time of its payment is repugnant to it as being impos-
sible upon its face, the condition is void: In r6 Walkerly, 108 Cal,
627, 645, 49 Am. St. Rep. 97, 104. For an extended discussion of
conditions precedent and subsequent in restraint of marriage, as
applied to devises and legacies, see the monographic note to Cop-
page V. Alexander, 38 Am. Dec. 160, on devises and conditions in
restraint of marriage. If a bequest is made upon condition that the
legatee shall marry with the consent of her mother, it Is a condi-
tion subsequent, and. If she marries without the consent of her
mother, the latter being dead at the time, the performance of the
condition is excused, because it was rendered impossible by the act
of God, and the legatee takes a vested Interest: Collett v, Collett, 35
Beav, 312.
Pardons.— A pardon may Impose any condition that the governor
thinks proper, provided It Is neither immoral, impossible, nor il-
legal: State V, Wolfer, 53 Minn. 135, 39 Am. St. Rep. 582; Lee v.
Murphy, 22 Gratt. 789, 12 Am. Rep. 503. A pardon on condition that
the prisoner take up and maintain his residence out of the state
during the balance of his life does not Impose any Impossible, im-
moral, or illegal condition. Such condition Is therefore valid: State
V. Wolfer, 53 Minn. 135, 39 Am. St. Rep. 582. The condition Im-
June, 1898.] Wilson v. Hundley. 837
posed may be one precedent or subsequent, and It lies on the
grantee to perform it. If he does not, the pardon, in case of a con-
dition precedent, does not take effect; and. In case of a condition
subsequent, the pardon becomes null: Flavell's case, 8 Watts & S.
197, 11)9. A pardon does not taice effect if upon a condition prece-
dent, impossible to be performed: State v. Mclntire, 1 Jones, 1, 59
Am. Dec. 56a.
"Wilson v, Hundley.
[96 Virginia, 96.]
CONTRACTS PROCURED BY FRAUD— RIGHTS AND
REMEDIES OF PARTY DEFRAUDED.— A contract Induced by
fraud Is not void, but voidable at the option of the party Injured
by the fraud. Upon its discovery he has, as a general rule, the
choice of two remedies: 1. He may elect to rescind the contract,
if he can restore what he has received in the same state or con-
dition In which he received It, and sue for and recover back the
consideration he has paid or given; or, if he has not paid or given
anything, repudiate the contract, and rely, when sued, upon the
fraud as a complete defense; 2. He may elect to retain what he
has received under the contract, and bring an action to recover
damages for the Injury he has sustained from the deceit. By
adopting the latter course, he, In effect, affirms the contract, but
not as made in good faith. He consents to be bound by Its pro-
visions, but does not thereby release or waive his claim for damages
arising from the fraud collateral to the agreement.
CONTRACTS PROCURED BY FRAUD— RESCISSION OR
AFFIRMANCE— ELECTION.— If a party who has been defrauded
In the procurement of a contract elects, on discovery of the fraud,
to affirm the contract, his election is final and conclusive. He has
but one election to rescind, and, having once elected to affirm the
contract, he cannot thereafter disaffirm It, but must abide by the
decision he has made.
CONTRACTS PROCURED BY FRAUD— AFFIRMANCE-
RESCISSION— NEW INCIDENTS OF SAME FRAUD.— If a con-
tract has been procured by fraud, and the person defrauded, witli
knowledge of the substance of the fraud, elects to affirm the con-
tract, he cannot subsequently, upon discovering new incidents of
the same fraud, elect to rescind the contract. Knowledge of the
essence of the fraud puts him to his election. The subsequent dis-
covery of a new Incident in the fraud does not confer a new right
to rescind, but merely confirms the previous knowledge of the
same fraud.
CORPORATIONS— FICTITIONS SUBSCRIPTIONS TO
STOCK— VALIDITY OF FRAUD.— Fictitious or colorable subscrip-
tions to stock, made and used with the intent to induce other per-
sons to subscribe, with the secret understanding that no liability
shall attach to them by reason of their subscriptions, and that they
shall thereafter be allowed to withdraw them, do not operate as
a fraud upon bona fide subscribers, for they are as valid and bind-
ing upon the subscribers as If they had been originally made in
good faith, and will be upheld and so treated by the courts. Hence,
838 Wilson v, Hundley. [Virginia,
such subscriptions do not give a bona fide subscriber a right to avoid
his subscription.
JOINT STOCK COMPANIES— SUBSCRIPTION TO STOCK
INDUCED BY FRAUD— ACTION FOR DAMAGES— INAPPLI-
CABILITY OF GENERAL RULE —The general rule that a person
who has been induced by fraud to enter into a contract pertaining
to goods and chattels may, upon the discovery of the fraud, elect
to retain what he has received and bring an action to recover any
damages he has sustained by reason of the fraud, does not apply
to subscriptions for stock in a joint stock company, for such an action
is at variance with the contract entered into by the subscriber.
JOINT STOCK COMPANIES— SUBSCRIPTION TO STOCK
INDUCED BY FRAUD-REMEDY OF SUBSCRIBER IN AB-
SENCE OF RIGHT OF RESCISSION.— If a person has been in-
duced by the fraudulent representations of an agent of a joint
stock company to take shares therein, and the shareholder is de-
barred from a rescission of his contract by the insolvency of the
company, or from any other cause, he is without remedy against
the company, and is left to his action against the agent who so
induced him to subscribe.
JOINT STOCK COMPANIES— SUBSCRIPTION TO STOCK-
NATURE OF, THOUGH INDUCED BY FRAUD— ACTION FOR
DAMAGES.- A subscription to the capital stock of a joint stock
company is not only an undertaking to the company, but with all
other subscribers, and it is of the essence of the contract between
the shareholders that they shall all contribute ratably to the pay-
ment of the company's debts and liabilities. Hence, a shareholder
who was induced by the fraudulent representations of an agent
of the company to take shares in it, cannot, after he discovers the
fraud, elect to retain the shares and sue the company for damages,
as this would throw the burden of the payment of the debts and
liabilities on the other shareholders, who are as innocent of the
fraud as he is.
A WRIT OF ERROR MUST BE DECIDED according to the
law as it was at the time the judgment was rendered, without any
consideration of subsequent acts.
Assumpsit brought by Wilson against Hundley, to recover the
balance due on a stock subscription. The defendant set up
fraud in the procurement of the subscription, and attempted
to maintain a cross-action against the company for damages for
the deceit. Hundley prevailed, and Wilson sued out a writ of
error.
B. B. Munford and S. S. P. Patteson, for the plaintiff in error.
James Lyons, George J. Hundley, and W. W. Henry, for the
defendant in error.
^ RIELY, J. In the summer of 1890 George J. Hundley,
the defendant in error, subscribed for 500 shares of the capital
stock of the Rivermont Company, of the par value of $10 per
Bhare, to be paid for in installments upon the call of the board
of directors. On August 7, 1890, he made the first payment of
June, 1898.] Wilson v. Hundley. 839
$1,000, and on November 24, 1890, he made the second payment
of $1,000, in pursuance of the second call of $2 per share, but
made default in the payment of the three remaining calls of
$1,000 each.
On June 2, 1893, the company made an assignment of all its
assets, including unpaid subscriptions to its stock, to William
V. Wilson, Jr., the plaintiff in error, in trust for the benefit of
its creditors, who brought this suit to recover from the said
Hundley the balance due on his subscription. Against its re-
covery he set up the defense of fraud in the procurement of the
fiubscription.
The fraudulent representation mainly relied upon was that
Warwick & Carson, the agents of the company through whom
the subscription was made, represented that certain persons,
called the "Roanoke Syndicate," had subscribed to the stock
of the company to the amount of $700,000, which was nearly
one-half of the whole amount of its capital stock of $1,500,000,
which representation was not true; that the "Roanoke Syndi-
cate" only subscribed absolutely for $150,000 of the stock, and
took merely an option on $550,000 more of the stock; and that
the defendant did not learn of this misrepresentation until after
he had paid the first and second calls on his subscription.
It appeared in evidence that the defendant, having heard
that the "Roanoke Syndicate" had not subscribed for $700,000
of the stock, according to the representation of Warwick &
Carson, wrote, on January 20, 1891, to Charles M. Blackford,
the president of the Ri Vermont Company, stating what he had
heard as to this matter, inquiring as to its truth, and making
*® complaint if it were true. The president replied to his let-
ter the next day, and stated that the "Roanoke Syndicate" sub-
scribed absolutely for $150,000 of the stock, upon which they
had paid as the calls were made, and had "an option on sev-
eral hundred thousand more," which had not yet expired.
Upon the receipt of the letter of the president, the defendant
wrote, on January 22, 1891, to the general manager of the com-
pany as follows:
"I wrote Major Blackford that I had heard a large subscriber
to the stock here say that the Roanoke people only took an
option on the stock, and some seemed disposed to kick on that
account. Major Blackford responded that the Roanoke people
had only taken $150,000; this leaves, I suppose, the stock taken
only about $1,000,000, and throws a heavier burden on us than
we anticipated, but I don*t know that it will eventually hurt us.
840 Wilson v. Hundley. [Virginia^
I hold tliis position, though, I am with you for good or evil, and
I mean to stand by you to the best of my ability and hold up
your hands. I have the utmost confidence in you and Captain
Blackford. I have so far paid up my calls, hard as the time waa
when the last one was made. I have just received another which
I did not expect, and which Wan\'ick & Carson say is earlier
than it ought to have been for us who came in later. I shall do
my best to meet it; if I don't, I am willing to pay interest and
secure it if required. ... It was intimated to us that this third
call would probably not be made, and I had hoped it would not.
But I am with you, and shall do my best; I have faith, too, in
your ultimate success,"
On January 2Q, 1891, the defendant, in reply to a letter of
the 24th of January, received from the general manager, in
which it was stated that "the amount of stock sold is $835,900,
the balance is held in the treasury to meet contingencies, includ-
ing the one referred to in your letter about R. Syndicate/' wrote-
the following:
"And I can assure you that your agents here, *®® Warwick &
Carson, assured us all that $700,000 had been taken by the
Roanoke and Clarke & Co. syndicates, and their list shown us
included that subscription, and it undoubtedly influenced me
and others, as would naturally be the case. Now, you see tho
difference it makes is this: If that stock had actually been
taken, this third call would not, in all probability, have been
precipitated upon us now, for you would have had money
enough I merely mention these things to show you that
I am not a mere grumbler, and I mean to do my very best to
advance the interest of the company, though I am surprised at
these heavy calls rapidly made."
On January 29, 1891, he again wrote to the general manager,
who had written to him on the 27th, and inclosed a statement
showing how the moneys received had been disbursed and what
the company still owed, as follows:
'TTours of the 27th, with inclosed statement, received, for
which accept my thanks. I shall use it to explain matters ta
our Richmond friends. I think if you would send out a circular,
though, it would have a good effect. Of course, there are some
•who are scared, and some who are reckless in their assertions.
As for myself, I have the utmost confidence in the ability and
integrity of the management, and make this statement to all
my friends; and furthermore, if the enterprise does not make
money for us, I shall lose confidence in my own judgment.*'
June, 1898.] Wilson v. Hundley, - 841
I have quoted thus fully from the letters of the defendant in
error to show how unequivocally he elected, after he had
acquired actual knowledge from official sources in the most
direct and reliable way of the falsity of the alleged representa-
tion, to affirm his contract of subscription.
A contract induced by fraud is not void, but voidable at the
option of the party injured by the fraud. Upon the discovery
of the fraud, he has, as a general rule, the choice of two reme-
die& — ^he may elect to rescind the contract, if he can restore what
he has received in the same state or condition in which **** he
received it, and sue for and recover back the consideration he has
paid or given, or, if he has not paid or given anything, repudiate
the contract, and rely, when sued, upon the fraud as a complete
defense; or he may elect to retain what he has received under
the contract, and bring an action to recover damages for the
injury he has sustained from the deceit. By adopting the latter
course, he, in effect, affirms the contract, but not as made in
good faith. He consents to be bound by its provisions, but does
not thereby release or waive his claim for damages arising from
the fraud collateral to the agreement: Whitney v. Allaire, 4
Denio, 554; 1 N. Y. 305; Selway v. Fogg, 5 Mees. & W. 86;
Clarke v. Dickson, 9Q Eng. Com. L. 148; Matlock v. Eeppy, 47
Ark. 148; Herrin v. Libbey, 36 Me. 357; Bacon v. Brown, 4 Bibb.
91; Peck v. Brewer, 48 111. 55; PearsoU v. Chapin, 44 Pa. St. 9;
Gifford V. Carvill, 29 Cal. 589; Parker v. Marquis, 64 Mo. 38;
Robinson v. Siple, 129 Mo. 208; Tiffany on Sales, 119; and
Bishop on Contracts, sees. 679, 685.
If, however, the party who has been defrauded, elect, on the
discovery of the fraud, to affirm the contract, his election is
final and conclusive. He has but one election to rescind, and,
having once elected to affirm the contract, he cannot thereafter
disaffirm it, but must abide by the decision he has made: Bige-
low on Fraud, 436; Grymes v. Sanders, 93 U. S. 55; Dennis v.
Jones, 44 N. J. Eq. 513, 6 Am. St. Rep. 899; Hurt v. Miller, 95
Va. 32; and Hudson v. Waugh, 93 Va. 618.
In Ormes v. Beadel, 1861, 30 L. J. Eq. 1, Lord Campbell
eaid: "Ko case can be found to establish the doctrine that if a
voidable contract is voluntarily acted upon, with a knowledge of
all the facts, in the hope that it may turn out to the advantage
of a party who might have avoided it, he may still avoid it,
when, after abiding the event, it has turned out to his disad-
vantage."
842 > Wilson v. Hundley, [Virginia,
The defendaDt contended, however, that he was not pre-
cluded from repudiating his contract of subscription by having
*•** elected to affirm it after learning that the "Koanoke Syndi-
cate" had only subscribed absolutely to $150,000 of the stock,
-and taken merely an option for $550,000 more, for the reason
that the general manager, in informing him of the real nature
of the subscription, withheld from him the terms of the option,
■and that he only learned of them some time thereafter from a
member of the syndicate, and discovered the '^bad judgment"
•displayed by the company in making such an agreement.
The substance of the fraud was the fact that the entire sub-
scription of $700,000 was not absolute, as had been represented,
Mt the greater part of it was merely optional. The "Roanoke"
people had simply secured the right to take $550,000 more of
the stock by a certain time, but were not bound to do so.
This was the important and material matter. The defendant
"Was only to be injuriously affected by their failure to elect to
take it. It was the optional nature of the subscription that
constituted the fraud, and gave to the defendant the right to
rescind his contract. Knowledge subsequently acquired of the
terms of the option was not the discovery of a new fraud.
These were merely incidents of the same fraud, and their dis-
covery did not revive a right of rescission that had been waived
after the discovery of the essential fact that constituted the
fraud. The subsequent discovery of a new incident in the
fraud does not confer a new right to rescind, but merely con-
firms the previous knowledge of the same fraud. It is seldom
that a party who is the victim of a fraud learns all its circum-
stances at the time he discovers the fraud. It is the fact of the
fraud, as, in this case, the falsity of the representation with
respect to the subscription of the "Roanoke Syndicate," which
^ves the right to avoid the contract, not the particular terms
of the option. These do not change the essence of the fraud,
nor affect the right of rescission. It was not necessary that the
defendant in error should be apprised of all the incidents of
the fraud before he could, by the affirmance of his contract,
deprive himself of the right to rescind it. Knowledge of the
*®* fraud itself was sufficient ground for the rescission of his
contract, and equally so for its affirmance: Benjamin on Sales,
2d Am. ed. by Perkins, sees. 452, 453; 1 Addison on Contracts,
660. 312; Campbell v. Fleming, 28 Eng. Com. L. 40, 1 Adol. &
Ell. 40: Bach v. Tuch, 126 N. Y. 63; and Max Meadows etc. Co.
V. Brady, 92 Va. 79.
June, 1898.] Wilson v. Hundley. 843
The defendant claimed the right to avoid his suhscription
upon the further ground that he was also induced to subscribe
by the representation that Byrd Warwick and Fred, S. Myers,
who were well-known and prosperous business men of the city
of Richmond, had each subscribed to the stock of the company
to the amount of ten thousand dollars, when, in fact, they had
not done so, and their subscriptions were wholly fictitious. In
this contention he is not sustained by the evidence. It was
proved that their subscriptions were regular, and not made
upon any agreement or understanding whatever inconsistent
■with their import, though for some reason not appearing in
the record they were subsequently allowed by the company to
withdraw their subscriptions.
But if it had been shown that their subscriptions were
fictitious or colorable only, and were made and used with the
intent to induce other persons to subscribe, with the secret
understanding that no liability should attach to them by reason
of their subscriptions, or that they should thereafter be allowed
to withdraw them, this could not have operated as a fraud
upon the defendant or injured him, for subscriptions made under
such circumstances are, in the eye of the law, as valid and bind-
ing upon the subscribers as if they had been originally made in
good faith, and will be upheld and so treated by the courts: 2
Thompson on Corporations, sees. 1404-1406; 1 Morawetz on
Corporations, sec. 107; Taylor on Corporations, sees. 105, 521.
The defendant having, by afl&rmance of his contract of sub-
ficription, precluded himself from thereafter rescinding or re-
pudiating it, the next inquiry is whether he could maintain his
cross-action against the company for damages for the deceit.
**** A person who has been induced by fraud to enter into a
contract may, upon the discovery of the fraud, as we have seen,
elect to rescind the contract and recover back the consideration
he has paid or given, if he is able to restore in an unchanged
state what he has received; or he may elect to retain what he
has received and bring an action to recover any damages he has
sustained by reason of the fraud. This is undoubtedly the rule
■with respect to contracts that pertain to goods and chattels, but
it has been laid down as the law by the tribunal of last resort
in England, the house of lords, that a person who has been in-
duced by the fraudulent misrepresentations of an agent of a
company to take shares in it, cannot, after he discovers the
fraud, elect to retain the shares and sue the company for
■damages.
844 Wilson v. Hundley. [Virginia^
In Houldsworth v. Glasgow Bank, L. K. 5 App. Cas. 317, tlie
distinction between contracts relating to goods and chattels and
contracts of subscription to shares of stock was distinctly
pointed out, and it was there decided, as was foreshadowed in
the previous case of Addie v. Western Bank of Scotland, L. E. 1
Sc. App. 146, that a shareholder, who has been induced to pur-
chase his shares by the fraud of an agent of the company, cannot
maintain an action against the company for damages for the
deceit, so long as he is a member of the company, upon the
ground that such an action is at variance with the contract en-
tered into by him with his fellow shareholders or partners in
becoming a member of the company. The same principle was
followed in In re Addlestone Linoleum Co., L. E. 37 Ch. Div.
191.
The effect of these decisions is, that if the shareholder is de-
barred from a rescission of his contract by the insolvency of
the company, or from any other cause, he is without remedy
against the company, and is left to his action against the agent
who induced him by the fraudulent representation to subscribe
for the stock: Benjamin on Sales, 6th Am. ed., sees. 705-709;
Taylor on Corporations, sec. 523; 1 Cook on Stock and Stock-
holders, sec. 159, note.
**** A subscription to the capital stock of a joint stock com-
pany is not only an undertaking to the company, but with all
other subscribers. It is of the essence of the contract between
the shareholders that they shall all contribute ratably to the pay-
ment of the company's debts and liabilities. The amount
which each pays, or agrees to pay, for his stock is, by his con-
tract of membership, dedicated to that end. If a subscriber,
who has been induced by fraud to purchase his shares, elects
after the discovery of the fraud to affirm his contract of sub-
scription, he thereby, in effect, says: "Notwithstanding the
fraud by which I was induced to become a member of the com-
pany, I shall still stand in with it, and take my chances.'' If he
could thereafter maintain an action against the company for
damages for the fraud, which, if right in principle, might go to
the extent of allowing him to recover back by way of damages
all that he had paid in on account of his shares, he would thereby
recoup his entire loss; and, notwithstanding his election to re-
tain his shares and to continue a member of the company, he
would contribute, in fact, not one cent to the payment of the
debts and liabilities. The effect, therefore, of allowing an action
to be maintained by a shareholder against the company for fraud
June, 1898.] Wilson v. Hundley. 845
would be to throw the burden of the payment of the debts and
liabilities on the other shareholders, who are as innocent of the
fraud as he — a result which would be wholly at variance with
his contract of membership.
The defendant in error, in consequence of having elected to
remain a member of the company, could not thereafter main-
tain an action against it to recover damages for the alleged fraud.
Applying the foregoing principles to the case before us, it
follows that the circuit court erred in its ruling upon the in-
structions to be given to the jury, and also in its ruling upon
the motion for a new trial.
In reaching our conclusion, the question of the constitution-
ality of the act of the general assembly of December 19, 1895
^^ (Acts 1895-96, p. 25), or of the act of December 22, 1897
(Acts 1897-98, p. 16), which was much argued at the bar, was
not involved, and any discussion of it would be inappropriate,
€ven if we could consider the latter act, but which could not be
done, as it was enacted several months after the rendition of the
judgment, and the writ of error must be decided according to
the law as it was at the time that the judgment was rendered:
Anderson v. Hygeia Hotel Co., 92 Va. 687.
The judgment of the circuit court must be reversed, the ver-
dict«of the jury set aside, and a new trial awarded, upon which
new trial, if. the evidence be the same, or substantially the same,
as on the last trial, and instructions be again asked for, the jury
are to be instructed in accordance with the views expressed in
this opinion.
CONTRACTS PROCURED BY FRAUD— RESCISSION— DAM-
AGES.—If a contract has been procured from a person by fraud,
he may maintain an action to recover the damages sustained by
him without first rescinding the contract and offering to return
the consideration received for it. Where a party has been induced
l)y fraud to enter into an executed contract for the purchase of
property, he may either rescind and recover baclj the consideration
paid, or affirm the contract and recover damages for the fraud: Baird
v. Howard, 51 Ohio St. 57, 46 Am. St. Rep. 550, and note.
CORPORATIONS— SUBSCRIPTIONS INDUCED BY
FRAUD— REMEDY.— The general rule that contracts obtained by
fraud may be avoided by the Injured party applies to subscriptions
to corporate stocli: See monographic note to PaVker v. Thomas,
81 Am. Dec. 401, on subscriptions to corporate stock. Fraud in pro-
curing a subscription to the stock of a corporation entitles the sub-
scriber to a release. But the contract entered into through fraud
is voidable merely, and not absolutely void. It Is valid and bind-
ing until the defrauded party elects to treat It as void. And If he
fails to repudiate it before the rights of Innocent third parties have
Intervened, their equities to treat it as valid may be superior to
846 Foster v. Commonwealth. [Virginia,
his claim to avoid it: See monographic note to Thompson v. Reno
Sav, Bank, 3 Am. St. Rep. 824, on the liability of stockholders to
creditors of corporations for corporate debts. If a subscription
for shares has been obtained by fraudulent representations, it may
be annulled by the subscribers at any time before other equities
have intervened: Bosher v. Richmond etc. Land Co., 89 Vt. 455,
37 Am. St. Rep. 879. But he must exercise reasonable care and
vigilance in discovering the fraud, and, in any case, he must, upon
discovery of the fraud, promptly repudiate the purchase, if he would
avoid his subscription: Virginia Land Co. v. Haupt, 90 Va. 533,
44 Am. St. Rep. 939, and note. One who has been induced to sub-
scribe for corporate stock by fraudulent representations cannot
recover the amount paid until the claims of creditors of the cor-
poration are satisfied: Notes to Bosher v. Richmond etc. Land Co.,
37 Am. St Rep. 887; Parker v. Thomas, 81 Am. Dec. 401. To avoid
liability, he should, within a reasonable time after discovering the
fraud, and before the rights of innocent third persons have accrued,
rescind, or offer to rescind, the contract, which Includes the duty
to return, or offer to return, his stock to the company: Zang v.
Adams, 23 Colo. 408, 58 Am. St. Rep. 249.
Foster v. Commonwealth.
[96 Virginia, 306.j
RAPE— ATTEMPT TO COMMIT.— A BOY UNDER FOUR-
TEEN YEARS OP AGE is conclusively presumed to be incapable
of commftting the crime of rape, whatever may be the real fact.
Evidence to rebut the presumption is inadmissible. He cannot,
therefore, be held guilty of an attempt to commit the offense.
The plaintiff in error was adjudged to be guilty of a felony,
and was sentenced to imprisonment in the penitentiary for a
period of eight years.
E. H. Logan and W. "W. Ballard, for the plaintiff in error.
A. J. Montague, attorney general, for the commonwealth.
**^ EIELY, J. This case presents for decision the import-
ant question whether a boy under fourteen years of age is capa-
ble under the law of committing the crime of rape, or of the
attempt to commit it. It does not appear ever to have been
passed upon in this state by any court of last resort.
»<»'' In Law v. Commonwealth, 75 Va. 885, 40 Am. Rep. 750,
it was stated as the result of all the authorities that a boy under
fourteen years of age who aids and assists another person in the
commission of the offense of rape may be convicted as principal
in the second degree, if it appear from all the circumstances of
the case that he had a mischievous discretion, but the particular
Sept. 1898.] Foster v. Commonwealth. 847
question we are now called upon to decide was pot involved in
that case, and, though adverted to, the court refrained from ex-
pressing any opinion upon it.
By the common law, a hoy under fourteen years of age is con-
clusively presumed to he incapahle of committing the offense,
whatever he the real fact. Evidence to rehut the presumption
is inadmissihle: 1 Hale's Pleas of the Crown, 630; 4 Black's Com-
mentaries, 212; 2 Russell on Crimes, 9th ed., 1117; 2 Archhold's
Criminal Pleading and Practice, 156; Eex v. Eldershaw, 3 Car.
& P. 366; Rex v. Groomhridge, 7 Car. & P. 582; Rex v. Phillips,
8 Car. & P. 736; Rex v. Jordan, 9 Car. & P. 118; Rex v. Brimilow^
9 Car. & P. 366; Queen v. Waite (1892), 2 Q. B. 600; Queen v.
WiUiams (1893), 1 Q. B. 320.
In the United States the rule of the common law has not
heen uniformly followed. It was adhered to in State v. Handy,
4 Harr. (Del.) 566; State v. Sam, 60 N. C. 293; WUliams v.
State, 20 Fla. 777; and in McKinney v. State, 29 Fla. 565, 3a
Am. St. Rep. 140. See, also. Commonwealth v. Green, 2 Pick.
380.
In Williams v. State, 20 Fla. 777, it was held" that as there was-
no statute in Florida fixing the age within which a person is^
capable of committing the crime of rape, the rule of the common
law prevailed, and that a hoy under fourteen years of age could
not be guilty of the offense.
In some of the other states the rule of the common law has^
been laid down in a modified form.
In Williams v. State, 14 Ohio, 222, 45 Am. Dec. 536, it was
held that an infant under the age of fourteen years is presumed
to be incapable of committing the crime of rape, or of an
attempt to commit it; but that the presumption may be rebutted
by proof that he has ^*® arrived at puberty, and is capable of
consummating the crime. This decision was made in 1846.
The question was again before the court in 1878 in the case of
Hiltabiddle v. State, 35 Ohio St. 52, 35 Am. Rep. 592, and the
rule in its modified form, as laid down in Williams v. State, 14
Ohio, 222, 45 Am. Dec. 536, since it had stood as the law of that
state for many years, was followed, but it is strongly implied in
the opinion that except for the previous decision the court
would have adhered to the rule of the common law.
The rule in its modified form, as adopted in Williams v. State^
14 Ohio, 222, 45 Am. Dec. 536, has been followed in New York,.
Tennessee, Kentucky, Louisiana, and Georgia: People v. Ran*
dolph, 2 Park. C. C. 174; Wagoner v. State, 5 Lea, 352, 40 Am.
548 Foster v. Commonwealth. [Virginia,
Sep. 36; Heilmgin v. Commonwealth, 84 Ky. 457, 4 Am. St. Kep.
207; State v. Jones, 39 La. Ann. 935; Gordon v. State, 93 Ga.
531, 44 Am. St. Rep. 189. See State v. Yeargan, 117 N. C.
706, 36 L. E. Ann., note 203.
The American text-writers upon criminal law, so far as we
have had access to them, adhere to the rule of the common law:
Davis on Criminal Law, 25, 29; Minor's Synonyms of Criminal
Law, 73; Wharton on Criminal Law, sec. 551; 3 Greenleaf on
Evidence, sec. 215; 1 Bishop's New Criminal Law, sec. 373; 2
Bishop's New Criminal Law, sec. 1117.
The last-named author, who is universally recognized as one
■of the ablest and most philosophical writers upon law in this
country, in his latest work on criminal law approves unquali-
:fiedly the rule of the common law for the sake of convenience
and decency, as well as for its justice, and doubts "whether
physical capacity in boys below fourteen is sufficiently frequent
to call for the abolition of a technical rule so well adapted as this
to prevent those particular statements of indecent things which
wear away the sense of the refined, placed by the Maker in the
human mind as a protector of its virtue": 2 Bishop's New Crim-
inal Law, sec. 1117.
The convention of May, 1776, which declared our separation
from England, and framed the first constitution of the state,
ordained that "the common law of England, all statutes or
^**® acts of parliament made in aid of the common law prior to
the fourth year of the reign of King James I, and which are of a
general nature, not local to that kingdom, together with the
several acts of the general assembly of this colony now in force,
€0 far as the same may consist with the several ordinances,
declarations, and resolutions of the general convention, shall be
■the rule of decision, and shall be considered as in full force, until
the same shall be altered by the legislative power of this colony":
9 Hen. Stat. 127, sec. 6; 13 Hen. Stat. 23, c. 17; and 1 R. C,
-c. 38, 40, pp. 135, 136.
In the year 1792 so much of the ordinance of 1776 as adopted
the acts of parliament of a general nature, made in aid of the
•common law prior to the fourth year of James I, was repealed by
the legislature; but that part of the ordinance of 1776, which
established the common law until it should be altered by legis-
lative power, has never been repealed.
The revisors of the code of 1849 prepared, and the legislature
adopted, the following statute, prescribing the force and effect
to be given to the common law: "The common law of England,
€ept. 1898.] Foster v. Commonwealth. 849
fio far as it is not repugnant to the principles of the bill of
rights and constitution of this state, shall continue in force
within the same, and be the rule of decision, except in those
respects wherein it is or shall be altered by the general assem-
bl/': Code 1849, c. 16, sec. 1. And this is, by statute, the force
And effect to be given to it at the present time: Code of 1887,
fiec. 2.
Consequently, the common law of England, so far as it is not
repugnant to the principles of the bill of rights and constitution
of this state, or has not been modified by our written law, is in
full force in this state, and constitutes the rule of decision on all
subjects, whether of a civil or criminal nature: See Report of
revisors of code of 1849, p. 68, note.
Although, by the terms of the ordinance of 1776, the common
law was adopted generally and without a qualification ^*® sim-
ilar to that annexed to the adoption of the British statutes, yet
it has always been considered that the same principle governs the
adoption of the common law. Such of its doctrines and prin-
ciples as are repugnant to the nature and character of our
political system, or which the different and varied circumstances
of our country render inapplicable to us, are either not in force
here, or must be so modified in their application as to adapt
them to our condition. It is a reasonable and substantial com-
pliance with the common law, "whose peculiar beauty is that it
adapts itself to the rights of parties under every change of cir-
cumstances," rather than a literal one, which is exacted by its
adoption: 1 Tucker's Commentaries, 9; Coleman v. Moody, 4
Hen. & M. 20, 21; Findlay v. Smith, 6 Munf. 148, 8 Am. Dec.
733; Stout v. Jackson, 2 Rand. 147; Stokes v. Upper Appomattox
Co., 3 Leigh, 337.
The legislature, which is the representative of the sovereign
power of the people, and specially charged with the duty of
making or amending laws to meet their needs, has not at any
time enacted any law changing the rule of the common law with
respect to the matter under consideration. The presumption
from the inaction of the legislature is that it has not been found
that the climate of our state, or the habits and condition of our
people, require any change or modification of the rule. And, in
this connection, it is significant, and tends to confirm the pre-
sumption from the inaction of the legislature, that in the judicial
history of the state, extending over a period of more than a
hundred years, no case drawing in question the rule of the com-
AM. St. Rkp., Vou LXX.— 51
850 Foster v. Commonwealth. [Virginia,
mon law in respect to the age of puberty in males can be found
in any court of last resort in the state.
We are not aware of any climatic influence on our people by
reason of their locality, or difference in their habits or condi-
tion, that calls for a modification of our unwritten laws as to-
the age of puberty, even if we were satisfied that we had the
power to make it in view of the force and effect the statute
^** requires shall be given to the common law. The inconven-
ience, if not absolute inability, of obtaining evidence of the
puberty of a boy under the age of fourteen and his capacity
to commit the crime of rape, except by the exposure of hi»
person, either voluntary or compulsory, and the questionable
right of the commonwealth to obtain it by compulsion, do not
invite a modification of the arbitrary rule of the common law;
while the unreliable and unsatisfactory evidence of the capacity
of the accused to commit the crime, when so obtained and
adduced, and the statement and discussion of indecent things
which must attend its introduction before the jury, would
cause us to hesitate to depart from a long-established rule,
which has had the sanction of the wisest judges and under-
gone the test of years.
The circumstances under which the evidence to establish the
puberty of the accused in the case before us was obtained, to-
gether with its nature and doubtful character, are well calcu-
Med to deter any modification of the rule of the common law,,
unless made necessary by the social condition of our people, and
required for the protection of virtue.
The accused being under fourteen years of age, and conclu-
sively presumed to be incapable of committing the crime of rape,-
it logically follows, as a plain, legal deduction, thait he was also-
incapable in law of an attempt to commit it. He could not be
held to be guilty of an attempt to commit an offense which he
was physically impotent to perpetrate: 1 Bishop's New Crimi-
nal Law, 746; 2 Bishop's New Criminal Law, 1136; 2 Russell on
Crimes, 676; 3 Greenleaf on Evidence, sec. 215, note; State v.
Sam, 60 N. C. 293, 300; Queen v. Waite, 2 Q. B. 600; Queen v.
Williams, 1 Q. B. 320.
The judgment of the circuit court must be reversed, and a
new trial awarded the plaintiff in error, to be had in accordance
with the views expressed in the foregoing opinion.
RAPE— ATTEMPT TO COMMIT— CAPACITY OF DEFEND-
ANT.—By the common law, a boy under fourteen years of age can-
Sept. 1898.] LyNCHBURQ Perpetual etc. Co. v. Fellers. 851
not be convicted of rape. He Is presumed to be physically incap-
able of committing the crime. Hence, he cannot be convicted of
assault with intent to commit rape until the state proves his capacity
to commit rape: Gordon v. State, 93 Ga. 531, 44 Am. St. Bep. 189.
Evidence Is inadmissible, at common law, to show that, In point
of fact, he can commit the offense, but, in some of our states, the
presumption of incapacity may be overcome by proof that, in point
of fact, he has arrived at the age of puberty: McKinny v. State,
28 Fla. 565, 30 Am. St Rep. 140. and note.
Lynohbueq Perpetual Building and Loan Com-
pany V, Fellers.
[96 Virginia, 337.]
LIENS — TRUST DEED — SUBSEQUENT PURCHASER-.
SUBJECTING LANDS TO PAYMENT OF LIEN— PREJUDICIAL
ACT WITH NOTICE OF EQUITIES.- When a person buys part of
a tract of land, with full notice or knowledge of a deed of trust on
the whole of it, he must, in order to prevent the land so purchased
from being subjected to the payment of such lien, show that the
holder thereof has, with notice of his equities, done some act to Lis
prejudice.
LIENS — TRUST DEED — SUBSEQUENT PURCHASER—
SUBJECTING LANDS TO PAYMENT OP LIEN— ASSUMPTION
OF TRUST DEBT— RESCISSION— BURDEN OF PROOF.— If one
executes to a loan company a deed of trust on the whole of certain
land to secure a loan, and then sells part of the property to a
church, which assumes the payment of the loan, one who subse-
quently buys another portion of the land must, if he would prevent
it from being subjected to the lien of the trust deed, on the ground
that the contract to assume the payment of the trust debt has
been rescinded, assume the burden of proving that the loan com-
pany assented to the rescission of the contract.
LIENS — TRUST DEED — SUBSEQUENT PURCHASER—
SUBJFKJTING LANDS TO PAYMENT OF LIEN— ORDER OF—
RELEASE OF PRIMARY SECURITY— EFFECT OF.— If a person
executes a trust deed to a loan company on the whole of certain
land to secure a loan, and then sells part of the property to a church,
which assumes the payment of the loan, but subsequently sells
other portions of the land, at different times, to two other persons,
and then rescinds the contract by which the trustees of the church
assumed to pay the trust debt, after which the loan company, with
notice of the last purchasers* Interest In the property embraced In
the trust deed, but without notice of such rescission, releases the
church property from the lien of the trust deed, the property last
purchased is not absolutely released from the lien of the trust deed,
but only discharged from an amount of the trust deed debt equal
to the value of the parcel released so far as the proceeds of that
parcel have not been applied to the payment of the lien, because
the injury done to the last purchaser by the release was the differ-
ence between the value of the property released and what was ac-
tually paid out of Its proceeds, or on account of it, upon the lien.
That part of the land still owned by the grantor should be first
852 Lynchburg Perpetual etc. Co. v. Fellers. [Virginia,
subjected to the payment of the loan company's debt, and, If the
proceeds of the last purchaser's lot is not sufficient to satisfy that
portion of the loan company's debt chargeable upon it, the next
preceding lot, in order of alienation, is liable, and this lot will also
be chargeable with that portion of the loan company's debt from
which the last purchaser's lot was discharged by the release ot the
church lot from the lien of the deed of trust
LIENS — TRUST DEED — SUBSEQUENT PURCHASER-
SUBJECTING LANDS TO PAYMENT OF LIEN— RELEASE OP
PRIMARY SECURITY— GENERAL RULE-EXCEPTION.— Ordi-
narily, when the equities of the various owners of lands subject to
a deed of trust are unequal, so that their respective parcels are
Jiable, in the inverse order of their alienation, if the deed of trust
creditor, having notice of this situation, releases a parcel which is
primarily liable, he thereby discharges or releases those parcels
which are subsequently liable, in the order of their several liabili-
ties, from an amount of the deed of trust debt equal to the value
of the parcel released; but this effect of the release may be obviated
by the conduct of the parties to be affected. Thus, if a whole tract
of land is covered by a trust deed to secure a debt, and the trust
deed creditor releases the trust deed lien, without notice of the
rights and interests of one who had purchased a parcel of the land
subject to the deed of trust, such purchaser cannot claim the benefit
of the general rule where he had notice of all the facts constituting
the release.
DEEDS— REGISTRY OF, BY SUBSEQUENT PURCHASER,
AS NOTICE— OBJECT OF REGISTRY LAWS.— The registry of a
deed by a subsequent purchaser is no notice to parties who have
acquired their rights before the time when the deed is registered,
for registry laws are not intended to affect the holders of ante-
cedent rights, but only such persons as are compelled to search the
records in order to protect their own interests.
Suit in cliancery brought by the appellees, M. L. Fellers and
others, against the Lynchburg Perpetual Building and Loan
Company. The facts are quite fully stated in the opinion. A
part of Huff's tract of land was vacant. He executed the deed
of trust on the entire tract to secure his debt to the loan com-
pany, and sold a vacant lot to the trustees of the church, exe-
cuting and delivering to them a deed therefor. Huff's deed to
Strickler was not put of record until September 8, 1891, and his
deed to Fellers was put of record on June 4, 1892. Strickler
and Fellers both paid for their lots in full, and the church paid
in full for its repurchase. The loan company had no actual
notice of the conveyance to Strickler. There was no direct
proof that the loan company had any knowledge of the rescis-
sion of the original contract between Huff and the trustees of
the church, but it was sought to charge the company with such
knowledge by reason of the knowledge of John "W. Woods, its
counsel in Roanoake. It sufficiently appeared, however, that
whatever knowledge he had was acquired after the termination
of his duties in respect to that transaction, and in reference to
Sept. 1898.] Lynchburg Perpetual etc. Co. v. Fellers. 853
a matter in which he was not the agent of the company. The
loan company appealed from the decree, the nature of which ap-
pears in the opinion.
Moomaw & Woods, for the appellant.
Scott & Staples, 'Hansbrongh & Hall, Josiah Friend, and S.
Hamilton Graves, for the appellees.
33© BUCHANAN, J. In February, 1891, W. B. Huff, who
was the owner of a lot ***• of land in the city of Koanoke, on
which there were three houses, executed a deed of trust to secure
the payment of the sum of $2,000, which he had borrowed from
the appellant. In July following, Huff sold and conveyed a
part of the lot to the trustees of the United Brethren Church
for $2,600. They paid $600 in cash, and assumed, it is alleged,
payment of the debt due the appellant. At or about the same
time Huff sold and conveyed another portion of the lot, with a
house on it, to W. H. Strickler, one of the trustees of the church.
In November of the same year M. L. Fellers purchased from
Huff another portion of the lot, upon which the other two
houses were located, and received a conveyance therefor. The
trustees of the church, after paying three monthly instalments
(July, August, and September) of $42.94 each, upon the debt
secured by the deed of trust, notified Huff thait they could not,
and would not, proceed further with their purchase. Between
that time and November, 1892 (precisely when does not clearly
appear), Huff and the church trustees agreed to rescind the con-
tract between them for the sale and purchase of the lot. No
reconveyance was made, but the deed from Huff to them, which
had never been recorded, was destroyed. Prior to the twenty-
sixth day of November, 1892, Huff agreed to sell to the trustees
of the church a portion of the lot embraced in their first con-
tract, which had been rescinded. The trustees of the church
required, as a condition precedent to their purchase, that Huff
should have that portion of the lot released from the lien of the
deed of trust. The lien was released by the appellant by deed
dated November 12, 1892, as to that portion of the lot, and on
the 26th of the month Huff conveyed it to the trustees of the
church.
A large part of the appellant's debt remains unpaid, and the
questions presented by this record are, what property is liable
for its payment, and the order in which the property liable
should be subjected.
854 Lynchburq Perpetual etc. Co. v. Fellers. [Virginia,
The second, third, fourth, fifth, and sixth assignments of ***
error raise substantially the same question, viz.. To what extent,
if at all, had the land purchased by Fellers been released from
the lien of the deed of trust by reason of the conduct of the
appellant.
The conduct relied on to show that it had been absolutely
released was that Huff and the trustees of the church had
rescinded the contract between them of July, 1891, by which
the latter had assumed the payment of the debt secured by the
deed of trust, and that this rescission was with the assent of
the appellant.
The burden of proving that the appellant had assented to the
rescission of the contract was upon Fellers. He had purchased
with full knowledge of the appellant's lien, and, in order to pre-
vent the land so purchased from being subjected to its payment,
it was necessary for him to show that the appellant, with notice
of his equities, had done some act to his prejudice. The evi-
dence does show, we think, that the appellant had notice of
Fellers' purchase, or that he had an interest in the land when
the appellant executed the release of November 12, 1892. After
his purchase was made and the policy of insurance had expired,
which had theretofore been taken out by Huff on the property
for the benefit of appellant, and as a further protection to the
debt secured by the deed of trust, Fellers obtained a new policy
in his own name on the house on that portion of the property
purchased by him. That policy was sent to the appellant by the
secretary of the insurance company, accompanied by a letter
dated July 7, 1892, in these words: "Please find inclosed fire
insurance policy, $1,200, in renewal of policy of W. P. Huff,
expired on the 9 th, on property on which you have a lien. It
was the opinion of Mr. Fellers that the houses insured would
not stand more insurance than $600 each, and for that reason
the amount was reduced." It is proved that it appeared from
Fellers' policy of insurance that the title was in him, and that
the appellant had a deed of trust upon the property. It further
appears **^ that, in December, 1893, after the property had been
advertised for sale under the deed of trust. Fellers went to the
office of appellant to see the secretary in order to get an exten-
sion of time, and whilst there he inquired if the policies of in-
surance had not expired, thinking that he had only taken them
out for twelve months, when the secretary replied that they had
not; that they were three-year policies; went to his safe and
took them out, and said, "Here are the policies and deed of
Sept. 1898.] Lynchburg Perpetual etc. Co. v. Fellers. 865
trust." When asked if the appellant knew before that time
that he was a purchaser of the property, he replied that he could
not say that it did, as there had never been any correspondence
between them, but that the facts seemed to be familiar to the
fiecretary when he (Fellers) told him who he was.
Unexplained, and the appellant made no effort to explain,
them, these facts show that the company must have known,
when it released the church lot from the lien of the deed of
trust, that Fellers had acquired an interest in the property em-
braced in the deed of trust. Upon no other reasonable theory
can its acceptance and retention of Fellers' policy of insurance
be explained or justified. The evidence, however, does not
show, in our opinion, that the appellant was a party to or knew
of the rescission of the contract of July, 1891, by which the
trustees of the church assumed to pay the debt secured by the
deed of trust. The circuit court erred, therefore, in holding that
the Fellers property was absolutely released from the lien of the
deed of trust. It was only discharged from an amount of the
deed of trust debt equal to the value of the parcel released so
far as the proceeds of that parcel had not been applied to the
payment of the lien. The injury done to Fellers by the release
was the difference between the value of the property released
and what was actually paid out of its proceeds, or on account of
it, upon the lien.
In the event the proceeds of the Fellers lot is not sufi&cient
to satisfy that portion of the appellant's debts chargeable upon
**^ it, as hereinbefore shown, the Strickler lot wUl be liable,
being next in order of alienation by Huff. It will also be
chargeable with that portion of the debt of appellant from
which the Fellers lot was discharged by the release of the church
lot from the lien of the deed of trust. Ordinarily, when the equi-
ties of the various owners of lands subject to a deed of trust are
unequal, so that their respective parcels are liable, in the in-
verse order of their alienation, if the deed of trust creditor,
having notice of this situation, releases a parcel which is pri-
marily liable, he thereby discharges or releases those parcels
which are subsequently liable in the order of their several liabili-
ties from an amount of the deed of trust debt equal to the value
of the parcel released. But this effect of the release may be
obviated by the conduct of the parties to be affected: 3 Pome-
Toy's Equity Jurisprudence, sec. 1226.
In this case Strickler's conduct has been such that he can-
not claim the benefit of the general rule. He was one of tho
856 LyNCHBURQ Perpetual etc. Co. v. Fellers. [Virginia^
trustees of the church when their first purchase was made, when
that contract was rescinded, when they made their second pur-
chase upon the condition that the lien of the deed of trust upon
it should be released, and when that release was made. He was-
an active participant in all these various transactions between
Huff and the trustees of the church, and had full knowledge of
all the facts. The evidence does not show that the appellant
had notice of his rights or interest in the property when it re-
leased its lien, even if notice under the facts of the case could
affect the question. There is no pretense that Strickler in-
formed the appellant of his purchase.
The registry of his deed was not notice to the appellant. It;
is true, we think, as stated by counsel, that this court has never
pased upon that question, but it is well settled, both upon prin-
ciple and authority, that the registry of a deed by a subsequent
purchaser is not notice to parties who have acquired their righta
before the time when the deed is registered. Neither the lan-
guage nor the policy of the registry acts was ^"** intended to
affect the holders of antecedent rights, but only such persons
as are compelled to search the records in order to protect their
own interests: Cheeseborough v. Millard, 1 Johns. Ch. 409, 414,
7 Am. Dec. 494; George v. Wood, 9 Allen, 80, 85 Am. Dec. 741;
notes to Aldrich v. Cooper, 1 White & Tudor's Lead. Cas. Eq.,
4th Am. from 4th London ed., 307-312; 1 Jones on Mortgages,
sees. 562, 372; 2 Pomeroy's Equity Jurisprudence, sees. 656,.
657, 1226.
Neither is it satisfactorily shown that Judge Woods was such
an agent of the appellant and acquired his knowledge of Strick-
ler*s purchase under such circumstances as that his knowledge
would be notice to it.
Whether the trustees of the church, who, it is alleged, as-
sumed payment of the appellant's debt, are personally liable for
it, and, if so, whether Fellers is substituted to the appellant's
rights against them or to their rights, if any, against the church
property, are questions which cannot be passed upon at this
time. Only two of the five or more trustees of the church who
are charged with having assumed the payment of the appellant's
debt are parties to this suit. They are necessary parties, and,
before any decree is made affecting their rights, they should be
made parties to this suit.
We are of opinion, therefore, that the decree complained of
must be affirmed in so far as it fixes the amount due appellant
Sept. 1898.] Lynchburg Perpetual etc. Co. t. Fellees. 857
on its debt, and directs the vacant lot situated on the southeast
corner of Franklin road and Day avenue, still owned by Huff,
to be first subjected to its payment, and that in all other respects
the decree must be reversed, and the cause remanded to the cir-
cuit court to be proceeded with in accordance with the views
expressed in this opinion.
PRIMARY FUND FOR PAYMENT OP MORTGAGE— ORDER
OF SALE OF LANDS ALIENED BY MORTGAGOR.— If the owner
of mortgaged lands sells portions of them to third parties, retain-
ing part of them himself, unless the purchaser took cum onere, the
portion so remaining In the mortgagor becomes the primary fund
for the payment of the mortgage, and the portions sold are liable
In the inverse order of their alienation: Merchants' Nat. Bank v.
Stanton, 55 Minn. 211, 43 Am. St. Rep. 491; note to Turner v. Flen-
nikin, 44 Am. St. Rep. 627. The mortgagee Is not bound to inquire,
before releasing a portion of the land, whether any portion has
been conveyed or encumbered since his lien attached; but will re-
tain the right to have the land sold in the Inverse order of aliena-
tion, unless, before giving the release, he had actual or constructive
notice of such subsequent alienation or encumbrance: Howard Ins.
Co. V. Halsey, 8 N. Y. 271, 59 Am. Dec. 478. Where two lots are
mortgaged to secure the same debt, and the mortgagor subsequently
conveys one of the lots, the remaining lot Is primarily liable under
the mortgage: Gaskill v. Sine, 13 N. J. Eq. 400, 78 Am. Dec. 105.
IF A MORTGAGEE RELEASES PART OF THE MORT-
GAGED PREMISES AFTER OTHER PARTS HAVE BEEN
SOLD, having notice of the prior sale, he thereby releases the
property first sold. If the property actually released by him Is of
sufficient value to pay the mortgage debt: Turner v. Flenniken, 164
Pa. St. 469, 44 Am. St. Rep. 624. Compare Guion v. Knapp, 6 Paige,
35, 29 Am. Dec. 741.
THE REGISTRY LAW applies only In cases where the Interest
of a subsequent judgment creditor, mortgagee, or purchaser, at the
time he acts, can be affected by want of notice of the unregistered
instrument. It was not Intended to relate to those who have no
concern in the instrument when they acquire their rights. The rec-
ord of a deed is constructive notice only as against subsequent pur-
chasers and encumbrancers: Note to Ocobock t. Baker, 66 Am. St.
Bep. 524.
S58 New South Building & Loan Assn. v. Reed. [Virginia.
New South Building & Loan Assn. v. Eeed.
[96 Virginia, 345.]
JUDGMENTS RENDERED DURING TERM HAVE EF-
FECT FROM FIRST DAY THEREOF-PRIORITY OF LIEN.—
A judgment rendered during a term of court relates back to the first
day thereof, and is a lien upon the real estate of the judgment
debtor from that time. It is, therefore, a lien which has priority
•over a deed of trust recorded during the term, though the judgment
was actually rendered after the deed of trust was recorded.
APPEAL— WHAT CANNOT BE FIRST ASSERTED ON—
SUBROGATION.— A claim for affirmative relief, such as one to be
subrogated to the rights of a lien creditor not made in the court be-
low, cannot be asserted for the first time in the appellate court.
FRAUDULENT CONVEYANCE— A VOLUNTARY DEED IS
NOT FRAUDULENT AS TO DEBTS AFTERWARD CREATED.
A voluntary deed will not be set aside at the instance of subsequent
■creditors of the grantor where no fraud is shown; and creditors
whose debts were created after it was made and recorded cannot
subject the property thereby conveyed upon the ground that it was
executed in fraud of their rights.
HUSBAND AND WIFE.— IMPROVEMENTS PUT UPON
THE WIFE'S SEPARATE REAL ESTATE BY HER INSOLVENT
HUSBAND, in fraud of his creditors, can be followed by them on
the premises where they are put, and the land may be charged, in
their favor, with the value of such improvements.
HUSBAND AND WIFE^CONTROVERSY OVER FUNDS,
THE WIFE'S SEPARATE ESTATE, TAKEN BY HER INSOL-
VENT HUSBAND— RIGHTS OF CREDITORS.— In a contest be-
tween the creditors of an insolvent husband and his wife over funds
which, at one time, constituted her separate estate, but which she
allowed to pass Into her husband's hands, the creditors will pre-
vail, where there is nothing to sbow that the transaction was in-
tended as a loan, or that the husband and wife Intended to occupy
the relation of debtor and creditor in respect to such funds.
Suit to subject certain property to the payment of debts.
The appellees, D. V. Eeed and Margaret 0. Reed, his wife, went
to Roanoke, Virginia, in 1888, taking with them about $300
belonging to D. V. Reed, the tools of his trade, and about
$1,200 of the separate estate of Mrs. Reed, derived from the
sale of certain lands owned by her in West Virginia. D. V.
Eeed mingled this money with his own, and used it as such, with
his wife's assent, and, shortly after their arrival, purchased prop-
erty, in Roanoke, at the corner of Luck and Roanoke streets, on
which he erected a carriage factory. On April 17, 1893, D. V.
Eeed conveyed this property in trust to secure to the appellant,
the New South Building and Loan Association, the payment of
a debt of $4,500, for money loaned him. This deed was ad-
mitted to record on the same day. On December 6, 1894, the
property was sold, under this deed of trust, to the association, for
Sept. 1898.J New Sout^ Building & Loan Assn. v. Reed. 859
^2,500, which sum was credited on the debt due the association.
At a term of the circuit court, beginning on April 10, 1893,
two judgments were rendered against D. V. Reed— one on May-
IB, 1893, in favor of the Enterprise Carriage Manufacturing
Company for $140.25, and the other on May 19, 1893, in favor of
the Ohio Spiral Spring Buggy Company, for $400. Both were
docketed on May 23, 1893. On April 15, 1891, George A. Baker
«nd wife had conveyed to Mrs. Reed a lot of land in the city of
Roanoke, at the corner of Mountain street and Franklin road.
The deed was admitted to record on November 2, 1891. It
stated a consideration of $2,400, of which $1,200 was paid in
cash. For the remainder of the indebtedness, Mrs. Reed as-
sumed the payment of negotiable notes aggregating $600, and
executed a negotiable note, payable to Baker, for the other $600.
All but about $50 of the entire consideration for this property
was paid. In February, 1895, the two companies which had
recovered judgments against D. V. Reed, suing for themselves
and all other lien creditors of D. V. Reed, filed a bill, in which
D. V. Reed and the loan association were defendants, charging
that the judgments mentioned were liens on the lot at the cor-
ner of Luck and Roanoke streets, from and after the first day
of the term at which they were rendered, and on all the other
real estate then and thereafter owned by D. V. Reed, and that
the loan association acquired the property at Luck and Roanoke
streets subject to the lien of the judgments named. It was
also charged that the consideration for the lot conveyed to Mrs.
Reed by Baker was paid by D. V. Reed, who procured the deed
to the property with intent to hinder, delay, and defraud his
creditors. Further allegations were made that Reed's wife had
notice of his fraudulent intent; that the deed from Walker and
wife to Mrs. Reed was void as to D. V. Reed's creditors; and
that the judgments mentioned were liens upon the property so
conveyed. The bill prayed that the property purchased by the
loan association be subjected to the judgments named; and that
the deed from Baker and wife to Mrs. Reed be set aside and
annulled, and the property attempted to be conveyed thereby
be subjected to the pa3anent of D. V. Reed's debts. The loan
association put in an answer which it prayed might be treated
as a cross-bill. The association denied that the property pur-
chased by it was subject to the judgments mentioned, and
claimed to be a bona fide purchaser without notice. It con-
tended that, if the judgments were held to be prior liens upon
the property so purchased by it, D. V. Reed was the owner of
860 New South Building & Loan Assn. v. Reed. [Virginia,
other property which should first be subjected to the payment
of the judgment liens. The association joined in the prayer
of the bill that the deed from Baker and wife to Mrs. Eeed be
set aside and annulled, and further prayed that the property
conveyed thereby be subjected to the payment of the balance
due it on its loan to D. V. Eeed, as shown above. It also con-
tended, in the appellate court, that as the money it loaned to
D. V. Eeed was used largely in paying off liens on the property
at Luck and Eoanoke streets, it should, to that extent, be sub-
rogated to the rights of such prior lienholders; and that is was,
consequently, entitled to priority over the judgments. The
pleadings, however, did not set up this claim, and it was not
asserted in the trial court. The defendant loan association, and
others, appealed from the decree, the nature of which appears
in the opinion. The appellants Nelson & Myers were creditors
of D. V. Eeed, and came into the suit by petition as parties
conjplainant.
C. A. McHugh and John M. Hart, for the appellants.
Scott & Staples, "Watts, Eobertson & Kobertson, and Lockett
& Cosby, for the appellees.
348 HAEEISON, J. The court is of opinion that the two
judgments asserted in the original bill in this cause, one in
favor of the Enterprise Carriage Manufacturing Company, and
the other in favor of **® the Ohio Spiral Spring Buggy Com-
pany, constitute liens upon the real estate of D. V. Eeed prior
in dignity to the deed of trust upon said real estate in favor of
the appellant building asociation, dated and recorded April 17,
1893. Both of these judgments were rendered at the April
term, 1893, of the circuit court for the city of Eoanoke, which
term began April 10, 1893. The judgments were rendered after
the recordation of the deed of trust, but they operate as liens
upon the real estate of the judgment debtor from the first day
of the term of the court at which they were rendered. This we
have seen was before the deed of trust was recorded, and hence
judgments rendered at that term have priority over the deed of
trust recorded during the term: Code, sec. 3567; Hockman v.
Hockraan, 93 Va. 455, 57 Am. St. Eep. 816.
The court is further of opinion that the appellant building
association is not entitled to be subrogated to the liens existing
upon the real estate of D. V. Eeed at the time its loan was
made, and upon which said loan was secured. This claim for
Sept. 1898.] New South Building & Loan Assn. v. Reed. 861
cubrogation is for affirmative relief. It was never made in the
court below, but is suggested for the first time in the closing
brief of counsel for appellant, filed a few days before the case
was called for argument in this court. The cause was not con-
ducted in the court below with reference to the contention now
made as a means of relief, and, even if it was proper to allow
parties to be surprised by a new case made here for the first
time, the evidence furnished no basis for the relief asked.
The court is further of opinion that the deed of April 15,
1891, from George A. Baker and wife, conveying to Mrs. M. 0.
Reed a certain lot of land in the city of Roanoke, on the comer
of Mountain street and Franklin road, was not made at the in-
stance of D. V. Reed, the husband of the grantee, with intent
to hinder, delay, and defraud his creditors. The evidence shows
that, at the time of this conveyance, D. V. Reed had ample prop-
erty to pay his debts, and that its execution in no way preju-
diced any creditor of D. V. Reed whose debt existed ^® at the
time it was made. Nor is there any evidence or circumstance
tending to show that the deed in question was intended to preju-
dice the rights of subsequent creditors of D. V. Reed. The
deed was merely voluntary, and the appellants, whose debts were
created after it was made and recorded, cannot subject the prop-
erty thereby conveyed upon the ground that it was executed in
fraud of their rights: Code, sec. 2459; Rose v. Brown, 11 W. Va.
122; Kanawha Valley Bank v. Wilson, 25 W. Va. 242.
The court is further of opinion that D. V. Reed, having cre-
ated the debts due to the appellants, could not thereafter law-
fully divert his estate to the payment of purchase money due
from his wife on her separate real estate, or to the cost of improv-
ing said real estate, leaving his own debts unpaid, and without
the means of payment. It is well settled that improvements put
upon the wife's separate realty by the husband, in fraud of credi-
tors, can be followed by the creditors on the premises where they
are put, and the realty can, in favor of the creditors, be charged
with the value of such improvements. It would be contrary to
the plainest principles of right and justice to permit an insolvent
husband to divert his means, and invest it in improving his
wife's separate estate, which is not liable to his debts, and thus
defeat the demands of his creditors: Rose v. Brown, 11 W. Va.
122; Kanawha Valley Bank v. Wilson, 25 W. Va. 242; Burt v.
Timmons, 29 W. Va. 441, 6 Am. St. Rep. 664.
The contention on behalf of Mrs. Reed that the balance of
purchase money on her lot, and the cost of improving the same.
862 New South Building & Loan Assn. v. Reed. [Virginia,
was paid by D. V. Eeed with separate estate in his hands be-
longing to her, is not sustained by the evidence. It appears
that about the year 1888 the proceeds of certain real estate in
West Virginia belonging to Mrs. Eeed, amounting to about
$1,200, passed into the hands of D. V. Eeed, without anything
to show that it was intended as a loan, or that the husband and
wife intended to occupy the relation of debtor and creditor in
respect thereto. Under such circumstances the wife cannot pre-
vail against the creditors of the husband: Spence v. Eepass, 94
Va. 716.
*^* Admitting, however, that D. V. Eeed was under obliga-
tion to account to his wife for this fund, as debtor to her separate
estate, it is shown that all obligation on this account was more
than discharged by the conveyance to Mrs. Eeed, and the sub-
sequent improvement of certain real estate in the city of Eoan-
oke, not in controversy in this case, and by the payment for her,
prior to the creation of the debts due appellants, of a large part
of the purchase money for the lot in question.
The court is further of opinion that the record does not show,
with sufficient clearness to form the basis of a decree, what
amount was paid by D. V. Eeed, after the creation of the debts
due to appellants in discharge of unsatisfied purchase money due
on the house and lot in question belonging to Mrs. Eeed, or
what sum was paid by him, after that date, in discharge of the
outstanding cost of making improvements upon said lot. The
cause ought to have been recommitted to a commissioner, and
these facts ascertained and reported to the court, and, when cor-
rectly determined, a decree entered, charging the property in
question with the amount thus shown to have been diverted by
D. V. Eeed from the just claims of his creditors.
The lower court having held that there was no charge upon
the house and lot belonging to Mrs. Eeed, situated on the cor-
ner of Mountain street and Franklin road, in the city of Eoan-
oke, in favor of appellants, its decree must in this respect be
reversed and set aside, and in all other respects affirmed, and the
cause remanded to the Hustings court for the city of Eoanoke
for further proceedings to be had in accordance with the views
expressed in this opinion.
JUDGMENT LIEN ATTACHES, WHEN— FIRST DAY OP
TERM— PRIORITY— The lien of a Judgment, deemed under the
statute to have been entered on the first day of the term of the
court at which It was recovered, begins with the first moment of
the day on which It attaches, irrespective of the hour at which the
entry was in fact made, and such lien overreaches deeds of trust
Nov. 1898.] Snydbb v. Grandstaff. 86$
or other encumbrances filed for record subsequent to such time, al-
though the Indorsement of the clerk shows that the judgment was.
In fact, entered after such deeds or other encumbrances were filed
for record: Note to Ocobock v. Baker, 66 Am. St. Rep. 523.
APPEAI^WHAT CANNOT BE FIRST ASSERTED ON.— A
question not raised at the trial will not be considered for the first
time on appeal: Reich v. Cochran, 151 N. Y. 122, 56 Am. St Rep^
607; State v. Myers, 70 Minn. 179, 68 Am. St. Rep. 521.
FRAUDULENT CONVEYANCES— VOLUNTARY DEED.— A vol-
untary conveyance is not, as against subsequent creditors, fraudu-
lent or void, though the grantor was indebted at the time it wa*
executed: Note to Gilliland v. Jones, 55 Am. St. Rep. 216. A fraudu-
lent intent must be established to set It aside as to them: Cole v.
Brown, 114 Mich. 396, 68 Am. St. Rep. 491.
HUSBAND AND WIFE— INSOLVENCY OP HUSBAND— USB
OF WIFE'S MONEY BY HIM— RIGHTS OF CREDITORS.—
When a wife having money in her own right gives it to her husbanck
for general use, without any agreement or expectation that It is a
loan, and without any obligation for its repayment, the transaction
cannot generally, in later years, be made the means of protecting
the insolvent husband's property against his creditors. In such
cases, the transaction will generally be deemed to have been made-
without consideration, and for the purpose of hindering, delaying
or defrauding creditors: Note to O'Brien v. Stambach, 63 Am. St.
Rep. 376.
HUSBAND AKD WIFE — CREDITOR'S RIGHT TO FOLLOW
IMPROVEMENTS PUT UPON WIFE'S LAND BY HUSBAND.—
The creditors of a husband may follow additions to a wife's estate-
made thereon by the husband in fraud of their rights: Trefetheiv
V. Lynam, 90 Me. 376, 60 Am. St. Rep. 271. Hence, improvement*
put upon her real property, in fraud of his creditors, can be followed-
by them on the premises where they are put; and such realty can,
in favor of such creditors, be charged with the value of such im-
provements: Burt T. Tlmmons, 29 W. V»- 441, 6 Am. St Eep. 664.
Snyder v. Grandstapp.
(96 ViKGlKiA, 478.]
PLEADING— BILL IN EQUITY.— MULTIFARIOUSNESS:
does not arise from the presentation of dififerent views of the same-
collocation of facts, but It must be two distinct collocations of dis-
tinct and different facts, each collocation presenting different rights,
and calling for different relief. Hence, a bill is not multifarious
because a party states his case In the alternative.
EQUITY— BILL FOR REFORMATION OF DEED— WHEN
NOT DEMURRABLE.— Equity is the proper forum for the reforma-
tion of a deed and a claim, In a bill for that purpose, of a mutual
mistake, prevents the bill from being demurrable, though It fall»
to allege notice to a purchaser for value. The complainant must.
It is true, prove notice to a bona fide purchaser for value, but the-
defense that he had no notice must be made by plea or answer.
VENDOR AND PURCHASER— LATENT EQUITIES-MU-
TUAL MISTAKE.— A PURCHASER FOR VALUE is not affected
864 Snydeb v. Grandstaff. [Virginia,
I
by any latent equity, whether by lien, encumbrance, trust, fraud,
or any other claim; and a mutual mistalie stands on the same foot-
ing as any other equity.
DEEDS— MARRIAGE AS A VALUABLE CONSIDERA-
TION.— A deed made by a man to his intended wife, followed by
marriage, is conclusively presumed to be in consideration of mar-
riage, and is based on a valuable consideration.
DEEDS UPON CONSIDERATION OF MARRIAGE— VA-
LIDITY OF.— Under the statute of Virginia, conveyances upon con-
sideration of marriage are void as to existing creditors, but not as
to those who claim to be paramount purchasers under a wiU.
VENDOR AND PURCHASER— BURDEN OF PROVING
NOTICE TO PURCHASER FOR VALUE.— One who alleges that
a purchaser for value had notice must assume the burden of prov-
ing it, and mere proof of confidential relations between the grantor
and the grantee is insufficient.
VENDOR AND PURCHASER— NOTICE TO PURCHASER
FOR VALUE— SUFFICIENCY OF.— To charge a purchaser for
value with notice, it is necessary that the evidence should establish
notice, either actual or constructive. Otherwise, it is insufficient.
VENDOR AND PURCHASER— AFFIRMATIONS OF TI-
TLE.—Purchasers for value have a right to rely on the affirmations
of grantors, and grantoi's are bound by their affirmations of title.
VENDOR AND PURCHASER— VARIANCE BETWEEN
CONTRACT FOR SALE OF LAND AND DEED— PRESUMPTION
—BURDEN.— In the event of a conflict between the terms of an
agreement for the sale of land and a subsequent deed to it, the
presumption is, that the purposes of the parties were altered, and
that the deed expresses the final and true agreement between them.
Hence, the burden of proof is upon him who denies that the writing
spealcs the final agreement to rebut this presumption by the clearest
and most satisfactory evidence.
EQUITY HAS NO JURISDICTION TO CONSTRUE MUNI-
MENTS OF TITLE in a case where one holds adversely to the in-
strument under which another claims, whether a deed or a will,
for it is the province of courts of law to construe instruments
which involve legal rights. Hence, the party out of possession can-
not involie the aid of a court of equity to determine who has the
tetter right.
DEEDS — PURCHASE BY DEVISEES UNDER A WILL —
•CONVEYANCE TO INTENDED WIFE, FOLLOWED BY MAR-
RIAGE—RIGHTS OF SURVIVORSHIP VESTED IN WIDOW.—
When it appears that a whole estate was devised to the testator's
three grandchildren, "to be equally divided between them, share and
share alike, but, on the death of either of them without issue, his
or her share should pass to the survivors or survivor, and, in case
all died without issue, then to collateral kindred"; that the devisees
afterward apportioned the estate among themselves, and each, by
a deed expressly stating his intention and desire, conveyed to the
others all of his right, title, and interest In the property allotted
to such other; and that one of the devisees, contemplating marriage,
deeded his share to his Intended wife, marrying her on the same
day, but died shortly afterward, without issue, or possibility of
Issue, It must be held that all rights of survivorship In the other
two devisees passed by their deeds to the deceased, and by the
latter's deed became vested In his widow.
Nov. 1898.] Snyder v. Gkandstafp. 865
Suit in chancery wherein L. A. Snyder and others were tlie
complainants, and A. J. Grandstaff, and Flora GrandstafE, mar-
ried to Joseph V. Snyder, were the defendants. The defendants
.prevailed, and the complainants appealed.
Walton & Walton, for the appellants.
Barton & Boyd, and L. Triple tt, Jr., for the appellees.
*''* CAEDWELL, J. This is an appeal from a decree of the
•circuit court of Shenandoah county. In deciding the case, the
learned judge of that court delivered the following opinion,
which is filed with, and made a part of, the record:
"Israel Allen devised, in the third clause of his will, that after
the death of his wife, his whole estate, real, personal, and mixed,
should pass to his three grandchildren, L. A. Snyder, Amanda
Long, and Joseph V. Snyder, to be equally divided between
them, share and share alike, but, on the death of either of them
without issue, his or her share should pass to the survivors, or
survivor, and, in case all died without issue, then to collateral
3dn.
"By deed dated July 20, 1895, L. A. Snyder and wife, Amanda
Long and husband (Joseph V. Snyder signing the deed as party
of the second part), reciting that, under the third clause of the
will, the said parties were entitled to one equal third of the
•estate; that they had agreed upon a partition of the real estate;
that Joseph V. Snyder was to be equalized by payment to him
■of $3,000 out of the personal estate; that the said parties de-
sired *to vest exclusive title to the several parcels of land in the
said parties to whom they had been assigned and allotted re-
spectively,* in consideration of one dollar, et cetera, conveyed
unto the said Joseph V. Snyder, his heirs and assigns, 'all right,
title, and interest of the said parties of the first part* in the de-
scribed property.
"Similar deeds were made to each of the grantors by the other
two devisees for the tracts assigned and allotted to each.
"On the 7th of April, 1896, Joseph V. Snyder, referring to
rthis deed for description, conveyed the real estate embraced
therein, in fee to Flora Grandstaff, with general warranty, and
upon the expressed consideration of one dollar cash in hand
paid, and on the same day, and shortly thereafter, intermarried
with her. This deed was duly recorded on the 8th, and within
€ome six weeks thereaf terward Joseph V. Snyder died without is-
AM. St. Rkp.. Vou LXX.— 65
866 Snyder v. Grandstafp. [Virgin ia^
sue, or possibility of issue. His father is his ^'^^ heir, and A. J.
Grandstaff is his administrator, and his widow and father are hi*
distributees.
"L. A. Snyder, Amanda Long, and Lee Long, her husband,
filed their bill to December rules, 1896, claiming that, under
the will of Israel Allen, they are entitled to the real estate by
virtue of survivorship; that Mrs, Flora Snyder withholds posses-
sion from them; that under a proper construction of the dee^
of 20th of July, 1895, they never parted with this interest, but
if such deed should be otherwise construed, that it was executed
under a mutual mistake, and contrary to the real intention of
the parties; and they pray that the same may be reformed, and
for general relief. To this bill the administrator and widow are-
made parties. No claim is asserted against or through the es-
tate of Joseph V. Snyder. The widow demurs to the bill, and
files her answer. Depositions on the part of the plaintiffs have
been taken, with intent to show mistake, and on the part of the
defendants to show that the consideration of the deed to her was
marriage. In her answer, after denying any mistake in the deed,,
she claims to be a purchaser for value without notice.
"I do not think the bill is multifarious, for parties have the
right to state their case in the alternative. Multifariousness
does not arise from the presentation of different views of the
same collocation of facts, but it must be two distinct colloca-
tions of distinct and dift'erent facts, each collocation presenting
different rights, and calling for different relief. Equity is the
proper forum for the reformation of a deed, and I have reached
the conclusion that this claim in the bill of a mutual mistake
prevents the bill from being demurrable, even though the bill
fails to allege notice to a purchaser for value. There is no doubt
that complainants must prove notice to a bona fide purchaser
for valuable consideration, but under the decision of the court
of appeals in Rorer Iron Co. v. Trout, 83 Va. 415, 5 Am. St.
Hep. 285, the defense must be made by plea or answer. Thia
case seemingly conflicts with Carter v. Allen, 21 Gratt. 241, on
this point, but it is ^'^'^ a later case, and the views of the court
are sustained by reference to various authorities, and I have not
observed that it has yet been overruled. Besides, in the case at
bar, the defense is made by answer;, and can better be considered
in connection with the evidence than upon demurrer. I there-
fore overrule the demurrer.
"Passing from the demurrer, the first suggestion is the ques-
tion we adjourned from the demurrer, namely, assuming that
Nov. 1898.] Snyder v. Grandstaff. ^ 867
a mistake has "been made, how is the defendant affected thereby?
"1. A purchaser for value and without notice is not affected
by any latent equity. A mutual mistake stands on the same foot-
ing as any other equity. Kerr on Fraud and Mistake, page 436,
specifically lays this down as to mistake. I quote: 'As against a
bona fide purchaser for value without notice, no relief can be
had in equity.' Almost the same words are used in Pomeroy on
Equity, section 776. But the case of Carter v. Allen, 21 Gratt.
241, and on this point it is cited with approval in Eorer Iron
Co. V. Trout, 83 Va. 415, 5 Am. St. Hep. 285, is directly in point.
'The doctrine that the courts of equity will not grant relief
against bona fide purchasers without notice has always been
adhered to as an indispensable muniment of title. It is wholly
immaterial of what nature the equity is, whether it is founded
on a lien or encumbrance, or trust, or a fraud, or any other claim;
for a bona fide purchaser of the estate for a valuable considera-
tion without notice purges away the equity from the estate, in
the hands of all persons who may derive title under it, with the
exception of the original party whose conscience stands bound
by the violation of his trust, and meditated fraud.' In Eorer
Iron Co. v. Trout, 83 Va. 415, 5 Am. St. Kep. 285, the same
broad doctrine is laid down: *It cannot be questioned at this day
that the purchaser for value without notice, actual or construc-
tive, will not be affected by a latent equity, whether by lien, en-
cumbrance, or trust, or fraud, or any other claim.'
"2. A deed made by a man to his intended wife, followed by
marriage, is conclusively presumed to be in consideration ^'^^ of
marriage, and is based on a valuable consideration. In Sterry v.
Arden, 1 Johns. Ch. 271, Chancellor Kent says: 'The marriage
was a valuable consideration, which fixed the interest in the
grantee against all the world, and as much as if she had paid an
adequate consideration pecuniarily. It has been a principle of
long standing, and uniformly recognized, that a deed voluntary
or fraudulent in its creation, and voidable by a purchaser, may
become good by matter ex post facto. It is the constant lan-
guage of the books and of the courts, that a voluntary deed ia
made good by subsequent marriage, and marriage has always
been held to be the highest consideration in law.' He cites for
this Coke on Littleton. This citation is quoted with approval
by the court in Huston v. Cantril, 11 Leigh, 136, and in Herring
V. Wickham, 29 Gratt. 628, 26 Am. Rep. 405. In the last-
named case, which is an exceedingly careful discussion of the
matter by Judge Staples, Justice Story is quoted with approval
868 ' Snyder v. Grandstaff. [Virginia,
as follows: ^Marriage, in contemplation of the law, is not only
a valuable consideratioii to support such a settlement, but a
consideration of highest value, and, from motives of the sound-
est policy, is upheld with steady resolution. The husband and
wife, parties, to such a contract, are therefore deemed, in the
highest sense, purchasers for a valuable consideration/
"Judge Tucker, in Huston v. Cantril, 11 Leigh, 136, says:
'Marriage, from the earliest times, has been considered in law a
Yaluable consideration.*
"Judge Baldwin, in Welles v. Cole, 6 Gratt. 645, says: 'Mar-
riage furnishes a valuable consideration for an agreement, as
much so as money paid, or agreed to be paid.*
"I might multiply indefinitely citations to show that a volun-
tary deed before marriage, upon marriage becomes a deed for
valuable consideration, for the citations above made are from
cases of this character. Such undoubtedly is the law, unless the
code has changed it. Judge Burks, in his review of the changes
made by the code, assigns, as a reason for the change made by
section 2459, that it was intended to defeat frauds '*''* perpe-
trated upon existing creditors by the marriage of an insolvent
debtor, accompanied by gifts to his wife. Herring v. Wickham,
29 Gratt. 628, 26 Am. Eep. 405, and Coutts v. Greenhow, 2
Munf. 363, 5 Am. Dec. 472, furnish instances of gross injustice
to existing creditors. In these cases the man cohabiting with a
woman for years in concubinage, becoming involved, conveyed to
her all his property, and then married her. Marriage in such
extreme instances furnished the valuable consideration, and the
settlements were maintained, and just creditors defeated. Actu-
ally a man was allowed to do for his concubine what he could
not do had she been his lawful wife. In the transformation of
the character of the relationship, she carried his property be-
yond the reach of just obligations. It was to correct any repeti-
tions of such an evil that the change was made. This object is
plainly expressed in the wording of the law. The statute does
not declare that such conveyances are voluntary. It simply de-
clares that conveyances upon consideration of marriage are void
as to existing creditors. Complainants present no claim as cred-
itors; they claim, not as subsequent purchasers, but as paramount
purchasers under the will of Israel Allen. The statute does not
seem to make reference to this class of rights, and I believe the
doctrine applies that the law will not be considered changed
by statute beyond the modifications of the statute. It is not
necessary to refer to the testimony in relation to the considera-
Noy. 1898.] Snydeb v. Gkandstaff. 869
tion of this deed. The law imports that the consideration was
marriage, and the parol testimony is but confirmatory of what
the law, unaided by testimony, presumes. I believe the conclu-
sion, then, is inevitable, that Mrs. Snyder is a purchaser for
value.
"3. The burden is now on the complainants to show that she
is a purchaser with notice. This notice may be actual or con-
structive. It is not pretended by the complainants that they,
or anybody else, told this purchaser for value of the equity, al-
though some of them seem to have known of the deed of Apcil
7th, prior to the marriage ceremony. ***** It is urged that the
confidential relations between the grantor and grantee in the
deed of April 7th, will imply that the grantee received notice.
This confidential relation was not held sufiicient in Herring v.
Wickham, 29 Gratt. 628, 26 Am. Eep. 405, when a great wrong
was perpetrated on creditors. The deed itself imports that
Joseph Snyder did not know of, or recognize, the equities of
complainants. Why should we suppose that he conveyed a title
to Flora Grandstaff, telling her that he had no such title to con-
vey? Nor is anything to be inferred from the fact that she was
in the habit of passing by the several tracts of land. "What more
natural than to suppose that she drew the natural inference that
the parties were in possession under their deeds? This is all the
evidence to show actual notice. As to constructive notice, the
principal point urged in argument was the existence of a pre-
liminary contract, of date April, 1895, which should have
apprised Mrs. Snyder that the deed of 20th of July, 1895, was
made under mistake. There is no evidence to show that Mrs.
Snyder knew of this contract. If, by reading the deed of the
20th of July, 1895, she could gather there was a contract of such
date or character in existence, it is more than I have been able
to do, after careful study. But suppose that she did know of it,
that every provision in it was known to her, this does not prove
that she did know the deed did not express the final and true
agreement between the parties. On the contrary, she would
have a right to presume that the purposes of the parties were al-
tered, if there was conflict between the agreement and deed. In
Donaldson v. Levine, 93 Va. 472, the court says: 'The burden
is throughout on the complainant, who must rebut the presump-
tion that the writing speaks the final agreement by the clearest
and most satisfactory evidence. It must not only appear that
the parties entertained a different intention in the first in-
stance, but that it was not changed at or before the execution of
870 Snyder v. Grandstafp. [Virginia,
the instrument; for otherwise the legal and natural inference is,
it was laid aside for that expressed in the writing/ Why should
anyone '*®^ be required to look behind the recorded title, and
run down the preliminary contracts to discover that the parties
to a solemn deed have made a mistake? In the first recital of
the deed, reference is made to the third clause of the will, and
the parties declare that under said clause they are entitled to
the whole estate. This is a mistaken construction of that clause,
but so far from showing that the parties intended to convey only
a limited estate, it goes strongly to show that it was their inten-
tion to convey the whole estate. Why recite they were entitled
to the whole, if they intended to convey only a part, and do not
then use restrictive words? It is a principle, too, that purchas-
j ers for value have a right to rely on the aflSirmations of grantors,
and grantors are bound by their affirmations of title: See Eey-
nolds V. Cook, 83 Va. 817, 6 Am. St. Kep. 317; Nye v. Lovitt, 92
Ya. 710.
"I have come to the conclusion that there was nothing on
the face of the deed from which Mrs. Snyder could have in-
ferred that the parties thereto had made a mistake. She stands
as a purchaser for value and without notice, and has a right to
such title as the deed of the 20th of July, 1895, conveys. This
renders wholly unnecessary any consideration of the evidence
as to whether a mistake in fact was made, or whether it was such
a mistake as equity would correct. It is certain that the par-
ties cannot be restored to the status quo of the 20th of July,
1895. The right of survivorship in the lands of the complain-
ants held by Joseph V. Snyder on that day, and which, it is
claimed, he surrendered to them in consideration of their sur-
render to him, was worth at least as much as the rights they sur-
rendered to him. It is not shown there was anything unrea-
sonable in the exchange. Today, by the providence of God,
his right is worth nothing. Theirs, they claim, is worth this
$10,000 farm. Contingencies have become events. A reforma-
tion is a revision now. The altered conditions are not favorable
for the interposition of equity, to say the least. There seems to
have been no haste about the deed. Five persons signed it.
Three **** on its date acknowledged it in Shenandoah; two on
the 1st of August, in the county of Page, and it was not re-
corded until 2d of October.
"Having reached the conclusion that each party is entitled to
stand upon the deed as written, I am in exceeding doubt if the
province of the court of equity is not exhausted. The construe-
Nov. 1898.] Snyder v. Gbandstaff. 871
tion of the muniments of title, whether the same be deed or will,
furnishes no ground of equitable jurisdiction. Courts of law
<;onstrue deeds or wills involving legal rights. Where there are
mutual rights under the same instrument, whether deed or will,
in the same property, courts of equity often have jurisdiction to
define and partition, or otherwise divide, but where one holds ad-
versely to the instrument, under which another claims, there
is no jurisdiction in equity, whether the instrument is a deed or
will, as a general rule. Certainly not for the mere purpose of
■construing the deed or will. If such were the case, all a party
would have to do in any case would be to file his muniments of
title with his bill, aver some one holds adversely, and pray the
court to say if he was not entitled. The action of ejectment
would soon become obsolete. In this case I have proceeded on
the theory that a purchaser for value without notice is protected
against any equity that may exist. This is a matter of defense.
Again, in certain contingencies, this widow may be entitled to
dower. It has been decided in Virginia that widows are endow-
able in defeasible fees of this character, even where the husband
died without issue: Jones v. Hughes, 27 Gratt. 560; Medley v.
Medley, 27 Gratt. 568. If the deed of the 20th of July should
be held not to pass the right of survivorship, and should the
deed of the 7th of April, under sections 2270 and 2271, be held
no bar to dower, the widow in this case would be entitled to
dower. After a good deal of hesitation, I think the court should
proceed to a final determination of the rights of parties.
"There are some cases which hold that a partition deed is not
to be so strictly construed as other deeds. This was decided "**•
prior to our code, under the law which then seemed to exist, that
partition between coparceners and cotenants might be by parol.
No deed being necessary, the title vested, not by operation of
the deed of partition, but by virtue of the original grant. The
code made a deed necessary, and the reason no longer exists.
But, however this deed is viewed, it unmistakably conveys unto
Joseph V. Snyder, his heirs, and assigns, all of the right, title,
and interest of the parties of the first part. It precedes this
sweeping granting clause by a declaration that it is the inten-
tion of the parties to vest exclusive title to the tracts of land in
the grantee, and throughout the deed it wholly discards any
right of survivorship in the grantors. There is no ambiguity
about the word 'all'; a conveyance of 'all' is not a reservation of
'part.' Suppose anyone examined this deed for the purpose of
lending money on it, would he not have been justified in believ-
872 Snyder v. Grandstaff. [Virginia^
ing that the grantors no longer retained any interest in the prop-
erty? The widow, as we have seen, stands in this position. I
am of the opinion that the title of survivorship did pass under
this deed to Joseph V. Snyder, and that by his deed to Flora.
Grandstaff the same became invested in her.
"I think the court should refuse relief to parties careless
enough to blunder, who received at the time full value for their
blunder, who have everything to gain and nothing to lose by
its correction now, as against one who dealt for a valuable con-
sideration on the faith of their recorded deed."
Upon a careful examination of the record, we find that our
views of this case are fully and clearly expressed in the opinion
of Judge Thomas "W. Harrison, which this court adopts; and,
for the reasons therein given, we are of opinion that there is
no error in the decree complained of, and it is therefore affirmed.
PLEADING— BILL IN EQUITY— MULTIFARIOUSNESS.— No
general principle in regard to multifariousness can be extracted
from the cases. It must be left to the discretion of the court in
each case: Notes to Hall v. Henderson, 62 Am. St. Rep. 148; Fel-
lows V. Fellows, 15 Am. Dec. 427-430. But a bill in equity may b&
framed in a double aspect, embracing alternative averments for
relief, provided each aspect entitles the complainant to substan-
tially the same relief, and the same defenses are applicable to each:
Hall V. Henderson, J14 Ala. 601, 62 Am. St. Rep. 141.
EQUITY — JURISDICTION — REFORMATION OF INSTRU-
MENTS—MISTAKE.— A court of equity will not entertain jurisdic-
tion of purely legal questions, such as the construction of a deed,
devise, or will: Simmons v. Hendriclis, 8 Ired. Eq. 85, 55 Am. Dec.
439; Bussy v. McKie, 2 McCord Eq. 23, 16 Am. Dec. 628. It will-
not interfere where the remedy at law is complete and adequate:
Sherman v. Clark, 4 Nev. 138, 97 Am. Dec. 5(16; but will in cases
where the courts of law cannot grant relief: Lining v. Geddes, 1
McCord Eq. 304, 16 Am. Dec. 606. It will not entertain Jurisdic-
tion of a cause involving the title to land, where no ground of"
equity Is alleged: Bussy v. McKie, 2 McCord Eq. 23, 16 Am. Dec.
628. Mistake in a written instrument is a proper ground for relief
In equity, and it may be reformed to express the meaning and In-
tention of the parties: See monographic note to Williams v. Hamil-
ton, 65 Am. St. Rep. 481, on reformation of contracts.
MARRIAGE IS A VALUABLE CONSIDERATION for a convey-
ance, or other contract— the highest known to the law: Nowack
V. Berger, 133 Mo. 24, 54 Am. St. Rep. 663. A contract of marriage
is not only a good, but a valuable, consideration for a deed: Prig-
non V. Daussat, 4 Wash. 199, 31 Am. St. Rep. 914, Compare La-
fontain v. Hayhurst, 89 Me. 388, 56 Am. St. Rep. 430. A promise
of marriage is a valuable consideration for a deed, and, If the
marriage afterward takes place, the deed is valid, so far as the
consideration Is concerned: Tolman v. Ward, 86 Me. 303, 41 Am.
St. Rep. 556.
EVIDENCE— BURDEN OP PROOF.— One who asserts a fact
must ordinarily assume the burden of proving it: Foster y. Reld, 7S
Dec. 1898.] Camp v. Bbucb. 873
Iowa, 205, 16 Am. St. Rep. 437, and note. The burden Is generally
on the party holding the affirmative: Bowser v. Bliss, 7 Blackf. 344,
43 Am. Dec. 93.
VENDOR AND PURCHASER— NOTICE.— One who purchases for
a valuable consideration is not chargeable with notice, unless the
circumstances are strong enough to fix upon him the Imputation of
mala fides: Note to Anderson v. Blood, 57 Am. St. Rep. 521. But,
whatever will put a purchaser on Inquiry and lead to knowledge
Is notice: Note to Pleasants v. Blodgett, 42 Am. St. Rep. 627.
CONTRACTS-MERGER OP AGREEMENT INTO WRITING.—
When parties reduce their contract to writing, all oral negotiations
preceding and accompanying the execution of the written contract
are deemed merged into it, and the writing Is the exclusive evidence
between the parties: Note to Palmer v. Farrell, 15 Am. St Rep. 714.
Camp v, Bruob.
[96 Virginia, 521.]
CONTRACTS-ILLEGALITY OF, IS FATAL.— The law re-
fuses to enforce Illegal contracts from reasons of public policy, and
it is Immaterial at what stage of the case the Illegality appears.
CONTRACTS — ILLEGALITY — WAIVER — FAILURE TO
PLEAD.— The Illegality of a contract cannot be gotten rid of either
by a failure to plead It, or by agreeing to waive It in the most
solemn manner.
APPEAL-ILLEGALITY OF CONTRACT MAY BE FIRST
RAISED ON.— A suit in equity cannot be maintained upon an Ille-
gal contract, although the defense of Illegality was not raised by the
pleadings, or relied upon In the trial court. It may be made for
the first time on the argument in the appellate court.
CONTRACTS OPPOSED TO PUBLIC POLICY— JUDICIAL
SALES— BUYING BIDS.— The object in Judicial sales is to get the
best price that can be fairly had for the property. Hence, to allow
one bidder to buy off another, which Is but a species of bribery,
and thus prevent the property from bringing the best price, Is con-
demned by the law, and the courts will not enforce contracts
founded in such practices.
CONTRACTS OPPOSED TO PUBLIC POLICY— JUDICAL
SALES — BUYING BID BEFORE CONFIRMATION.— An agree-
ment between the purchaser at a judicial sale and another person
that the former will, upon a confirmation of the sale, sell the prop-
erty to the latter at an advanced price is contrary to public policy
and void, because it tends to prevent the property from bringing
the best nrlce.
JUDICIAL SALES— SALE OF BID AT AN ADVANCE—
CONFIRMATION.— A court will never, where the facts are known
to It, confirm a judicial sale, if the bidder has sold his bid at an
advance, unless the advance paid, or to be paid, inures to the benefit
of the parties to the suit.
JUDICIAL SALES-RIGHT OF COURT TO KNOW ALL
THE FACTS— DUTY OF COMMISSIONER— A commissioner who
makes a judicial sale is the agent of the court, and should report
■874 Camp v. Bruce. [Virginia,
liis information of facts, particularly as to tlie buying of bids before
confirmation, to the court, as the court has a right to linow all that
he knows about the matter, to the end that the sale may not be con-
firmed unless it is proper to do so.
Suit for specific performance brought by the appellants, W. N.
damp and P. D. Camp, against the appellee, B. M. Bruce. The
purpose was to compel Bruce to convey to the complainants a
tract of 2,900 acres of land. The complainants charged that
Bruce had bought the land at a judicial sale, and before con-
iirmation had sold the land to them at a price stated, which was
•about $500 in excess of the amount which Bruce had agreed to
pay for it, and had agreed that, upon confirmation, he and his
wife would unite with the commissioner and make them a deed;
hnt that, by trickery, scheming, and fraud, the said Bruce
fraudulently and deceitfully contrived to defeat his agreement
with the complainants by having an upset bid put in for the
land, for the benefit and advantage of himself. On June 11,
1894, Bruce purchased the land for $2,100; and, after sundry
wpset bids and resales, he finally became the purchaser on July
5, 1895, at the price of $4,850, which sale was confirmed. He
had the property when this suit was commenced. The complain-
ants averred their readiness and willingness to comply with their
part of the contract, and prayed that Bruce be compelled to con-
vey the land to them.
Jackson Guy and J. B. Prince, for the appellants.
E. H. Eawles, E. E. Boykin, and Neely, Seldner & Warring-
ton, for the appellee.
»23 BUCHANAN, J. The record shows that on the eleventh
day of June, 1894, at a judicial sale in the case of Eanstead v.
Eanstead, et cetera, the appellee purchased a tract of land con-
taining 2,900 acres at the price of $2,100; that he complied with
the terms of sale by paying the cash required and executing his
tonds for the deferred payments, that the sale was reported to
the court, but pending confirmation he entered into a written
Agreement with the appellants by which, in consideration of their
assuming payment of the purchase money bonds held by the com-
missioner, and the payment of $1,565, to the appellee (which was
$500 profit on his bid), he sold and conveyed all his right, title,
and interest in the land, and in the sale and purchase thereof, to
the appellants, and agreed that he and his wife would unite with
the commissioner in his conveyance of the land which he was di-
rected to ask the court to have made to the appellants. An up-
Dec. 1898.] • Camp v. Bruce. 875
set bid having been put in, the sale to the appellee was set aside,
and a resale ordered. After the land had been resold several
times, upset bids having been put in from time to time, the ap-
pellee finally became the purchaser at the price of $4,850, at a
sale which was confirmed.
Some months after the confirmation of that sale, the appel-
lants filed this bill to compel the appellee to specifically exe-
cute **^"* his agreement with them, upon the ground that he, in
violation of its provisions and in fraud of their rights, had im-
properly and fraudulently procured the upset bid to be put in
which prevented the confirmation of the first sale made to him.
The appellee answered the bill, and, among other things, ad-
mitted the execution of the agreement, and alleged that he
would have complied with its provisions if the sale had been
confirmed, but denied that he procured the upset bid to be put
in which prevented its confirmation.
The first question to be determined is, whether that agreement
is one which a court of equity will enforce. If it be an illegal
contract, as claimed in argument, this suit cannot be maintained,
although that defense was not raised by the pleadings, nor relied
upon in the circuit court. The law refuses to enforce illegal
contracts, as a rule, not out of regard for the party objecting,
nor from any wish to protect his interests, but from reasons of
public policy. Whenever, therefore, the illegality of the con-
tract appears, whether alleged in the pleadings or made known
for the first time in the evidence, it is fatal to the case. That
defect cannot be gotten rid of either by failure to plead it, or
by agreeing to waive it in the most solemn manner. The law
will not enforce contracts founded in its violation: Fry on Spe-
cific Performance, sec. 309; 1 Story's Equity Pleading, 261;
Pomeroy's Specific Performance of Contracts, 2d ed., sec. 286;
Coppell V. Hall, 7 Wall. 542.
We have no statute declaring that contracts like the one un-
der consideration are unlawful, yet under the principles of the
common law any contract that is made for the purpose of, or
whose necessary effect or tendency is to lessen competition and
restrain bidding at judicial sales, is held to be illegal because op-
posed to public policy. The object in all such sales is to get the
Tjest price that can be fairly had for the property. The policy
of the law, therefore, is to secure such sale from every kind of
improper influence. To allow one bidder to buy off another,
which is but a species of bribery, and thus prevent the property
from bringing the best price, is condemned by •*** the law, and
876 Camp v. Bruce. * [Virginia^
the courts will not enforce contracts founded in such practices;
Underwood v. McVeigh, 23 Gratt. 409, 428, 429; Cocks v. Izard,.
7 Wall. 559, 562; Pry on Specific Performance, sec. 308; Pom-
eroy's Specific Performance of Conijracts, sec. 283; Greenhood on
Public Policy, 183-189. Tested by these principles the agree-
ment in question was clearly illegal.
If the parties had succeeded in having the sale confirmed by
the court and the appellants substituted as purchasers, in lieu
of the appellee, at his bid of $2,100, the agreement would have
operated as a fraud upon the court and the parties whose lands
were being sold for purposes of partition. It would have enabled
the appellee to put $500 in his pocket for which he furnished no
valuable consideration, would have taken from the co-owners
that much of their inheritance and enabled the appellants to get
the property by buying off the court's bidder instead of putting
in an upset bid, and taldng the chances of having to pay a
higher price for it at a resale. Neither in this case nor in the
case in which the land was sold could such an agreement be en-
forced. If the commissioner who made the sale in the case of
Eanstead v. Kanstead had reported to the court that, since the
sale made by him, the appellee had sold his bid to the appellants
at a profit of $500, to be paid when the sale was confirmed (as he
ought to have done, for he wrote the agreement, and knew all the
facts, and the court, whose agent he was, had the right to know
all that he knew about the appellants' dealings with its bidder
that could affect the confirmation of the sale), instead of merely
reporting that the appellee desired the conveyance for the land
to be made to the appellants, the court would not have confirmed
the sale at the appellee's bid of $2,100, although no upset bid
had been put in.
A court will never, where the facts are known to it, confirm
a sale where the bidder has sold his bid at an advance, unless
the advance paid, or to be paid, inures to the benefit of the •***
parties to the suit. It does not allow bidders to trade behind
its back, and speculate in that way on property which it is sell-
ing: 2 Daniell's Chancery Practice, 2d ed., 1285; Hodder v. Euf-
fin, 1 Tarn. 341.
In order to prevent this, it became the practice of the Eng-
lish chancery courts, in the time of Lord Elden it is said, to
require the bidder who desired the court to substitute another in
his stead to file an affidavit that there was "no underhand bar-
gain between them"; lligby v. McNamara, 6 Ves. 616; Vale v.
Dec. 1898.] Camp v. Bruce. 877
Davenport, 6 Yes. 615; Holroyd v. Wyatt, 9 Jur. 1072; 2 Coll.
C. C. 327.
The rule of the English chancery courts upon this subject is
thus stated in 2 Daniel's Chancery Practice, fifth edition, 1285:
"If, after becoming the bidder for an estate, the purchaser is
desirous of being discharged from his contract, and of substitut-
ing another person in his stead, the court will, on motion, make
an order to that effect; he must, however, support the motion by
an affidavit that there is no under-bargain, for the new purchaser
may give the other a sum of money to stand in his place, and so
deceive the court; and the rule appears to be that, if a purchaser
resell behind the back of the court before the purchase is con-
firmed, the second purchaser is considered as a substituted pur-
chaser, and must pay the additional price into court for the bene-
fit of the estate. When the highest bidder at an auction induced
the auctioneer to accept another person in his place, concealing
the fact that he had sold his bargain at an advance, which he
received and absconded, the property was ordered to be resold,
reserving all questions of liability of the original or sub-
purchaser."
The English rule of requiring affidavits, where one purchaser
is asked to be substituted for another, is a wise one, and the
agreement sought to be enforced shows the necessity for some
such safeguard in our practice. It might be well for our courts
in all such cases, unless the parties consent to the substitution,
to adopt the English practice. It is of the utmost '^^'^ conse-
c[uence that judicial sales, and especially sales for partition where
infants are generally interested, should be protected from prac-
tices and influences which may prevent the lands from bringing
the best price.
The bill was properly dismissed by the circuit court, and ita
decree must be affirmed.
CONTRACTS — ILLEGALITY — ENFORCEMENT— JUDICIAL
SALES.— Courts will not enforce illegal contracts: Bradtfeldt v.
Cooke, 27 Or. 194, 50 Am. St. Rep. 701, and note. Any agreement
whereby bidding Is checked or stifled at an auction or a Judicial
sale is void, as against public policy: Note to Jones v. Caswell, 2
Am. Dec. 138; Loyd v. Malone, 74 Am. Dec. 187. Compare Barton
V. Benson, 126 Pa. St 431, 12 Am. St. Rep. 883.
878 Spiller v. Wells. [Virginia,
Spiller V. Wells.
196 Virginia, 598.]
JURISDICTION — COURTS OF CONCURRENT — WHICH
ACQUIRES PRECEDENCE— In case of a conflict of jurisdiction
between two courts having concurrent jurisdiction, that court which
first acquires cognizance of the controversy, or obtains possession
of the property in dispute, is entitled to retain it until the end of
the litigation, and should decide all questions which legitimately
flow out of the controversy.
JURISDICTION— HOW ACQUIRED— CONCURRENT JUR-
ISDICTION—PRIORITY—SERVICE OF PROCESS.— Jurisdiction
is acquired by the issue and service of process, and, in case of con-
flict between courts of concurrent jurisdiction, the date of service
of the process determines the priority of the jurisdiction; but it i»
an essential condition in the application of this rule that the first
suit shall afford the plaintiff in the second an adequate and com-
plete opportunity for the adjudication of his rights.
MECHANIC'S LIENS— SUIT BY SUBCONTRACTOR TO
ENFORCE— PRECEDENCE WHERE DIFFERENT COURTS
HAVE CONCURRENT JURISDICTION.— If a saibcontractor Insti-
tutes a suit in chancery to enforce a mechanic's lien, and makes
the general contractor a party defendant, setting forth the latter's
recorded lien in his bill, that court, notwithstanding the concui'-
rent jurisdiction of another court, acquires jurisdiction, and should
determine the rights of the parties. It is not incumbent on the
general contractor to institute a separate suit in order to enforce
his lien, as his rights, as well as those claiming under him as sub-
contractors, may be fully protected in the first suit.
LIMITATIONS OF ACTIONS— MECHANICS' LIENS— EF-
FECT OF SUIT BY SUBCONTRACTOR.— Upon the institution of
a suit by a subcontractor to enforce a mechanic's lien, where the
general contractor is made a party defendant, and the latter's re-
corded lien Is set forth in the subcontractor's bill, the statute of
limitations ceases to run, not only as against the complainant's lien,
but as against the lien of the general contractor and of all those
claiming as contractors under him.
Appeal from a decree of the law and chancery court of the
city of Norfolk in a suit in chancery wherein the appellees, Wells
and others, were the complainants, and the appellants, Spiller
and others, were the defendants.
George Mcintosh, for the appellants.
Thomas W. Shelton and E. H. Baker & Son, for the appellees.
»»» KEITH, P. The facts with which we have to deal are
as follows: Appellants contracted with Wells to erect a three-
story brick building in the city of Norfolk, which was completed
on the fourth day of July, 1896. On the thirtieth day of Au-
gust of that year, Wells perfected his lien as general contractor
by filing in the clerk's office of the corporation court of the city
Jan. 1899.] Spilleb v. Wellb. 819
of Norfolk an account showing the amount and character of the
work done, the material furnished, the prices charged therefor^
the pa3Tiients made, and balance due, and a description of the
property upon which he claimed a lien, all of which was duly
recorded by the clerk.
At rules held in the clerk*s office of. the court of law and
chancery of the city of Norfolk on the first Monday in January,
1897, "Wells filed his bill to enforce this lien. Appellants were
made parties defendant, and into this suit came a number of per-
sons claiming as subcontractors under the plaintiff, and asking^
to have their rights protected.
William H. Barnard, doing business as Barnard & Co., also
filed a petition in which he alleges that J. W. Wells, the gen-
eral contractor, had contracted with him to do the tinning, iron
work, and plastering, and to furnish the necessary terra cotta
pipe and work for draining the building to be erected; that
petitioner had fully complied with his contract with Wells, and
had on the 31st of July, 1896, filed his mechanic's lien upon
the building in the clerk's office of the corporation court of the
city of Norfolk for eighteen hundred and thirty-six dollars and
eighty-eight cents, that being the balance due to him, and on.
the next day gave notice in writing to the owners of the prop-
erty of the amount and character of the lien. Petitioner fur-
ther avers that on the 26th of December, 1896, he instituted a
suit in chancery in the circuit court of the city of Norfolk
against Wells, the general contractor, and the owners of the
building, to enforce his said lien; that °®* the circuit court
thus acquired jurisdiction of the suit, of the parties thereto, and
the subject matter thereof. On the 28th and 29th of Decem-
ber process in said suit was duly executed on all the defendants,
and from that time the circuit court had "exclusive jurisdiction
of all matters growing out of the enforcement of the mechanic's
lien against the property, and the settlement of all matters in
controversy concerning said liens."
The prayer of the petition is, that the suit instituted by Wells
in the court of law and chancery of the city of Norfolk to the
first January rules, 1897 (which was Monday, the third day of
the month), may be dismissed, or that he may be restrained from
further proceeding therein until the final disposition by the cir-
cuit court of the city of Norfolk of the suit instituted by peti-
tioner.
By a decree entered April 10, 1897, the cause was brought on
to be heard upon the petition of Barnard & Co. and of the sub-
SSO Spiller v. Wells. [Virginia,
contractors, and tlie petition of Barnard & Co. was dismissed,
-and the cause referred to a commissioner to state certain ac-
counts. The commissioner having reported in obedience to this
"decree, a further decree was entered on the 1st of July, 1897,
ascertaining the amounts due tlie general contractor and the
■cuhcontractors, and directing a sale of the real estate to satisfy
their demand. From that decree appellants appealed, and the
chief contention is that the court erred in rejecting the prayer
-of the petition of Barnard & Co.
In Craig v. Hoge, 95 Va. 275, this court had occasion to ex-
amine the law in relation to a conflict of jurisdiction between
two courts having concurrent jurisdiction, and it was there
held. Judge Eiely delivering the opinion, that "that court which
first acquired cognizance of the controversy, or obtains posses-
sion of the property in dispute, is entitled to retain it until the
•end of the litigation, and should decide all questions which
legitimately flow out of the controversy; that jurisdiction is
acquired by the issue and service of process, and, in ^^^ case of
■conflict between courts of concurrent jurisdiction, the date of
service of the process determines the priority of the jurisdic-
tion." It is further stated that technical creditor's bills are ex-
ceptions to the general rule which pertains to a conflict of juris-
diction between courts of concurrent jurisdiction; but as the bills
-before us are not creditor's bills, but suits brought to ascertain
and enforce liens binding a specific piece of property, we need
not confuse or embarrass the discussion by further reference to
this exception. The rule established is necessary to the orderly
and decent administration of justice. Nothing can be more
unseemly than a struggle for jurisdiction between courts; but
A rule which rests for its support upon considerations of con-
venience, however great, and of decency, order, and priority,
however exacting, must yield to the higher principle which ac-
cords to every citizen the right to have a hearing before some
court. An essential condition, therefore, of the application of
the rule insisted upon as to priority of jurisdiction, is that the
first suit shall afford the plaintiff in the second an adequate and
complete opportunity for the adjudication of his rights. When
Barnard & Co. instituted their suit in the circuit court, that
court acquired jurisdiction over the subject of litigation, and
the parties to it. Wells, who afterward brought suit in the law
and chancery court, was made a party defendant. His case is
.fully stated in the bill; that he was general contractor for the
erection of the building, and that he had perfected his me-
Jan. 1899.] Spiller v. Wei.ls. 881
chanic's lien, amounting to six thousand, seven hundred and
eighty-eight dollars and twenty cents — the precise sum for which
the lien is claimed by Wells, in the account filed as an exhibit
with his own bill. The lien of Wells, of course, inures to the
benefit of all subcontractors, so that they can also be amply pro-
tected in the circuit court.
While the suit in that court is not a general creditor's bill,
^nd did not affect the statute of limitations as to creditors not
named as parties to it, there can be no doubt that as to liens
claimed by parties to it, and directly involved in the suit, the
*^* statute ceased to run upon its institution. The work was
completed on the 4th of July, 1896, and it was necessary to sue
within six months, that is to say, on or before January 4, 1897;
but we are of opinion that it was not incumbent upon Wells to
institute a separate suit in order to enforce his lien, but that
he, and those claiming under him as subcontractors, could be
iully protected in the suit brought by Barnard & Co., and that
the statute ceased to run as to the lien of the general contractor
from its institution. If the stoppage of the statute by the suit
in the circuit court had not had effect as to the subcontractors,
as well as the general contractor, their claims would have been
barred when presented in the suit brought by Wells, for their
petitions were not filed until the 9th of April, 1897, more than
three months after the expiration of the six months within
which it was necessary to bring suit.
We are of opinion that the general contractor could have
had complete relief in the circuit court which first acquired
jurisdiction over the subject of litigation and the parties to it;
that from its institution the statute of limitations ceased to run
as against his mechanic's lien and all claiming as contractors
Tinder him, and that, as a consequence, this case is controlled by
the decision in Craig v. Hoge, 95 Va. 275; and the decree of the
court of law and chancery is therefore reversed.
JURISDICTION— CONCURRENT— WHEN BECOMES EXCLU-
SIVE.—When the jurisdiction of a court attaches to any subject
matter of jurisdiction, although concurrent with other courts, it
becomes exclusive for all purposes necessary to the acomplishment
of the object of the suit. When courts have concurrent jurisdiction,
that which first takes cognizance of the case has the right to retain
it to the exclusion of the other: Relsner v. Gulf etc. Ry. Co., 89
Tex. 656, 59 Am. St. Rep. 84. As between courts of co-ordinate
jurisdiction, the tribunal issuing process has exclusive control over
It: Ohapin v. James, 11 R. I. 86, 23 Am. Rep. 412; and any means
■of acquiring jurisdiction is properly denominated process: Note to
'AM. bT. BKP.. VouLXX.-aft
882 MooRB V. Triplett. [Virginia,
White V. Johnson, 50 Am. St. Rep. 737. If two or more courts have
concurrent jurisdiction over the same subject matter, the court first
acquiring jurisdiction by the service of process will retain it, to-
the exclusion of the other: Plume etc. Mfg. Co. v. Caldwell, 136-
111. 163, 29 Am. St. Rep. 305, and monographic note thereto on con-
flicts of jurisdiction. See, also. Gay v. Brierfield etc. Iron Co., 94
Ala. 303, 33 Am. St Rep. 122, and extended note thereto.
MooRB V. Triplett.
[96 VIEGINIA, 603.]
VENDOR AND PURCHASER— ASSUMPTION OF DEBTS—
PRIMARY LIABILITY OF PURCHASER.— When a purchaser
assumes the payment of certain debts of his vendor, in considera-
tion of a conveyance of land, he is personally answerable therefor^
and, as between the vendor and himself, he is primarily liable for
Buch debts.
GIFTS- VALIDITY OF, WHERE OBLIGATIONS EXIST.—
A man must be just before he Is generous. He cannot, therefore^
make a valid gift of his property and leave his obligations unsatis-
fied or unprovided for.
JUDICIAL SALES — CONFIRMATION— DISCRETION.— A
court, in determining whether or not it will confirm a judicial sale,
must, under the circumstances of the particular case, exercise a
sound legal discretion with a view to fairness, prudence, and a just
regard to the rights of all concerned.
JUDICIAL SALES— "UPSET" BIDS— ACCEPTANCE OF.—
A court must sell property at the best price obtainable. Hence, a
substantial and well secured "upset" bid should be accepted, unlesa
there are circumstances going to show that injustice would be done
to the purchaser or other person.
JUDICIAL SALES— "UPSET" BIDS— REJECTION OF— DIS-
CRETION.—If land is sold under the order of a court, and an "up-
set" bid Is made thereon, the court must exercise a sound legal
discretion as to whether it will accept it or not. A bid for ten per
cent, advance, well secured, and put In before confirmation, is as-
much a valid bid as If made at the auction, but the court is not
always bound to accept it, without regard to the circumstances of
the case.
JUDICIAL SALES — "UPSET" BIDS — WHO CANNOT
MAKE,— One who was a bidder at a judicial sale, by himself or
by an agent, or who was present and had the opportunity to bid,
will not, as a general rule, be permitted to put in an "upset" bid.
He should have bidden at the sale, in open competition with all
others, what he was willing to give for the property.
JUDICIAL SALES-"UPSET" BIDS— WHEN PROPERLY
REJECTED— CONFIRMATION.— When a farm, composed of fer-
tile bottom lands and poor uplands, is about to be sold at a judicial
sale, and Is laid off Into parcels, so that one who buys a parcel of
the lowland Is thereby Induced and willing to buy upland which
can be used advantageously with it, the court, after the sale, will
reject an "upset" bid made at a small advance on only a part of
a purchase, where the effect of accepting It would be to cause th»
Jan. 1899.] Moore v. Triplett. 883
purchaser of two parcels to lose one of them, and without which
he would not want the other, particularly If the terms of the "up-
set" bid preclude a resale of the tract in the manner as before.
JUDICIAL SALES— HOW COURT SHOULD ACT UPON
REPORT.— A court should so act upon a report of a sale of prop-
ei-ty made under its order as not to deter or discourage bidders. It
should so act as to induce possible purchasers to attend such sales,
to encourage fair, open, and competitive bidding in order that the
highest possible price may be obtained, and to inspire confidence
In the stability of judicial sales. This is due not merely to the
purchaser, but also to creditors, debtors, and the owners of prop-
erty which has to be sold by the court.
Three chancery suits were heard together, and this was an
appeal from several decrees pronounced therein. In 1883, M. M.
Moore borrowed $10,000 of Israel Allen, and secured the same
by deeds of trust on portions of his real property. On July 11,
1885, he was largely indebted to his mother, Mrs. A. M. F.
Moore, on various accounts, and she was his surety for a large
sum. In consideration of these sums, of his mother's assump-
tion of the payment of the debt to Allen, and of certain other
enumerated debts, he conveyed to her by deed, dated July 11,
1885, all of his real and personal property, including that cov-
ered by the deeds of trust to Allen. Upon the real and personal
property so conveyed, outside of that covered by the Allen deeds
of trust, the creditors of M. M. Moore had no lien. His wife did
not join in this deed. On the same day, July 11, 1885, his
mother deeded the property conveyed to her to a trustee to
furnish a support for her son, and for the benefit of his wife and
children, subject, however, to the payment of the debts for
which she was answerable for her son. The two deeds of July
11, 1885, were recorded on the same day, but, a few days after-
ward, Triplett and others, creditors of M. M. Moore, and whose
debts were not secured, attacked the two deeds as fraudulent.
Pending this litigation, Allen, who was a party to the suit,
directed his trustee to make a sale of the land conveyed in trust
to secure his debts. This sale was enjoined. The two causes
were finally heard together, and the two deeds of July 11, 1885,
were declared to be fraudulent and void, and the property con-
veyed was held liable for complainant's debts. The defendants
asked leave to file a bill of review for errors apparent on the face
of the record, but it was denied. On appeal to the supreme court,
the decree holding the deeds fraudulent was reversed, and the
cause was remanded for further proceedings. It was contended
on behalf of Mrs. A. M. F. Moore, and those claiming under
her, that her assumption of her son's debts waa a mere personal
884 Moore v. Triplett. [Virginia,
undertaking on her part, and created no lien on the land con-
veyed by her, and no trust in favor of the creditors. There was
a decree for the sale of the land conveyed by her to pay the debts
mentioned, and, when sales of the property were reported to the
court, sundry exceptions were filed by the Moores and others.
One exception was that substantial "upset" bids had been filed
on several of the tracts. In two of the suits, the appellees, Trip-
lett and others, or some of them, were the complainants, and the
appellants, Moore and others, were the defendants; and in the
other suit the appellants were the complainants, and some of the
appellees were the defendants. The main controversy on the
appeal is stated in the opinion.
James H. Williams and John E. Keller, for the appellants.
Barton & Boyd, L. Triplett, Jr., and Walton & Walton, for
the appellees.
^^"^ RIELY, J. This is the sequel of the case of Moore v.
Triplett, reported in 23 S. E. 69, decided in 1896.
The main question involved by the appeal is the propriety of
the decree of the circuit court subjecting to the payment of the
debts of Israel Allen and others the land conveyed by Morgan
M. Moore to his mother by the deed of July 11, 1885, and set-
tled by her by a cotemporaneous deed on his wife and children.
The debts were due by him, and assumed by his mother.
They constituted a large part of the consideration for the con-
veyance to her of his land, and were successfully relied upon
at the hearing of the former appeal to sustain the validity of
the said deeds. She died without having paid the debts, and
they have not since been otherwise discharged. They have
remained unpaid from 1885 down to the present time, upward
of thirteen years. The debts of Allen were secured by prior
deeds of trust on parts of the land conveyed by Morgan Moore
to his mother.
**** By accepting the conveyance and promising to pay the
debts, she became personally liable for them, and, as between her
son and herself, she was primarily bound. This doctrine has
been so repeatedly recognized by this court as no longer to admit
of question: Willard v. Worsham, 76 Va. 392; Osborne v. Cabell,
77 Va. 463; Francisco v. Shelton, 85 Va. 779; Tatum v. Ballard,
94 Va. 370; Ellett v. McQhee, 94 Va. 377.
The assumpsit by the mother of Morgan Moore of his debts
constituting a part of the consideration for the conveyance to
Jan. 1899.] Moore v. Triplett. 885
her of his land, it would be against equity and good conscience
to permit her to make a voluntary settlement of the property
80 as to protect it from liability for the debts, so assumed, in
the hands of her beneficiaries. A man must be just before he
is generous. He cannot make a valid gift of his property and
leave his obligations unsatisfied or unprovided for. Indeed, the
deed of settlement itself seems to contemplate the payment of
the debts assumed from the property conveyed, and makes pro-
vision for a sale of a part thereof for that purpose. The grantor
was apparently in doubt as to her right to make the settlement,
but expresses her desire to do so "as far as legal and proper for
her to do." The deed is inartistically drawn, but it is fairly
plain that the grantor intended to provide, in the deed of set-
tlement ,for the payment, irom the property thereby settled,
of the debts which she had assumed, in the event that they were
not otherwise paid. There is, therefore, no error in the decree
for the sale of the land to pay the said debts.
Another assignment of error was the refusal of the court to
accept the upset bids put in on certain parcels of the land, and
its confirmation of the sale that had been made thereof.
"Whether a court should confirm a report of sale depends in
a great measure upon the circumstances of the particular case.
In acting upon the report, it must exercise not an arbitrary,
but a sound legal discretion in view of all the circumstances.
It must be exercised in the interest of fairness and prudence,
and with a just regard to the rights of all concerned. This is
*"* the result of many cases on the subject: Hudgins v. Lanier,
23 Gratt. 494; Brock v. Kice, 27 Gratt. 812; Roudabush v. Miller,
32 Gratt. 454; Berlin v. Melhorn, 75 Va. 639; and Hansucker v.
Walker, 76 Va. 753.
In Todd V. Gallego Mills Mfg. Co., 84 Va. 577, it is said: "All
tlie cases agree that the court must sell at the best price obtain-
able, and when a substantial upset bid, well secured and safe,
for ten per cent advance, is put in before confirmation, it is as
much a valid bid as if made at the auction. This is the settled
law of this court, and will doubtless so remain until the legis-
lature shall [otherwise] provide by law as has been done by
the English parliament." This same language was quoted
with approval in Ewald v. Crockett, 85 Va. 299.
The above statement of law was construed by the counsel of
the appellants to be a departure from the previous cases and the
former practice in this state, and to mean that "a substantial
upset bid, well secured and safe, for ten per cent advance, put
b86 MooBE V. Triplett. [Virginia,
in before confirmation/* was always to be accepted, without re-
gard to the circumstances of the case, and that the court had
no discretion in the matter. Such a construction is a misap-
prehension of the import of that decision. The court in that
case found no equitable circumstances, which, in the exercise
of a sound legal discretion, called for a rejection of the upset
bid. It was in amount a large advance on the price obtained
at the sale, and in that view substantial. It was well secured
and safe. The creditors whom it benefited desired its accept-
ance, and the purchaser, as the court took pains to show at
length, had no just ground of complaint. We understand the
decision in that case to mean simply that a substantial and well
secured upset bid should be accepted, unless there are circum-
stances going to show that injustice would be done to the pur-
chaser or other person. That such was the purport of that
decision, and the understanding of the judge who delivered
the opinion of the court in that case, and also in Ewald v.
Crockett, 85 Ya. 299, is clearly manifested in the subsequent
case of ^^® Carr v. Carr, 88 Va. 735, where he enunciates the
long and well-established rule in Virginia that "the court, in
acting upon the matter, was called upon to act in the exercise of
a sound legal discretion in view of all the circumstances. It is
to be exercised in the interest of fairness, prudence, and with a
just regard to the rights of all concerned." And he refers to
the cases decided long before Todd v. Gallego Mills Mfg. Co., 84
Va. 577, to sustain his declaration of the practice and the law
on the subject in this state.
Considering the circumstances of the case at bar, and apply-
ing the rule prevailing in this state, our conclusion is, that the
circuit court did not err in rejecting the upset bids and con-
firming the report of sale of the parcels of land in question.
The sale took place under favorable circumstances, was fairly
made, and there is not a suggestion of misconduct or impro-
priety on the part of anyone.
There is no evidence or complaint even that the land did not
sell for a fair price, and bring its market value. The commis-
sioners state in their report that it brought a good price, and
recommend the confirmation of the sale.
The main upset bid was put in by one who had an agent at
the sale, who bid for him. It has been generally understood by
the profession, and enforced by the courts, that one who was a
bidder at the sale, by himself or by an agent, which is the same
thing, or was present and had the opportunity to bid, would
Jan. 1899.] " Moore v. Tbiplett. 887
not, as a general mle, be permitted to put in an upset "bid. He
must bid at the sale in open competition with all others what
he is willing to give for the property. A different rule would
have a pernicious effect upon judicial sales of property.
The contention over the rejection of the upset bids is not
made by the parties who put in the same, but by the owners of
the land. As respects the rights of the latter, it appears that
every fair means was resorted to that was likely to realize the
best possible price at the sale. It was advertised in two of the
county newspapers for upward of sixty days, and the several
tracts ^^^ divided into two or more convenient parcels for the
purposes of the sale. The parcels were first offered for sale, and
then the tract as a whole, with the understanding that the
largest amount realized would be reported to the court as the
sale. That by parcels realized the largest amount. The entire
farm, embracing all the tracts and parcels, with the exception
of the mansion house and fifty-four acres that had been cried
out to the wife of Morgan M. Moore, was then offered as a
whole, without, however, any advance bid being made on the
sale by parcels. The mansion house and fifty-four acres was
excepted from the offer of the whole farm at the request of
Morgan Moore. As stated by the judge of the circuit court,
**the sale of the land seems to have been conducted by the
commissioners in strict accordance with the wishes of the
Moores, the owners of the land. The terms of the sale were
modified to advance their interest. The land was offered in
such parcels as they indicated, and offered as long and as often
as they requested. They did not then, nor do they now, make
any complaint that the sale was not an open and fair bidding,
and the prices obtained were not all that could have been ex-
pected and desired." The circumstances of the sale furnish
them no ground for any complaint.
The case of the purchaser would be very different if the upset
bids were accepted. They were made on only a part>of his pur-
chases, and his other purchases would stand and be confirmed.
The farm is composed of lowlands and uplands. The bottom
lands are fertile and productive; the uplands are poor, and in
part wild and uncultivated. In dividing the farm for the pur-
poses of sale, it was wisely so laid off into parcels that anyone
bujdng a parcel of the productive bottom land could also buy a
contiguous or conveniently located parcel of upland, and the two
be utilized together. The owner of the one would find it con-
venient and desirable to own the other, but he would not desira
888 Moore v. Teiplett. [Virginia^.
to own any part of the upland unless he could also own some
convenient part of the bottom land. The purchaser, **^* J. I.
Triplett, having at the sale first bought a parcel of the lowland,
was thereby induced and willing to buy upland that could be
advantageously used along with it. The latter, without the
bottom land, he did not want, and would not have given as much
for it as he bid, if, indeed, he had bid for it at all. The upset
bids were made on only a part of his purchases, and one of them
so circumscribed that, if accepted, he could not bid on the
parcels as at the last sale. It was an offer of an advance of seven
and a fraction per cent on a parcel of the bottom land bought
by him, and upon another parcel of like land bought by another
person, and made a condition that both parcels be again offered
as one tract. The other upset bid is a small advance on one of
the parcels of upland bought by Triplett. If the upset bids
were accepted, the effect would be to compel him to take, in any
event, all the parcels of upland except one, which he would not
have purchased at all if he had not first bought the parcel of
bottom land, and force him to buy not only it on the resale, but
also the other parcel of bottom land coupled with it as a condi-
tion of the upset bid, and incur the risk of having to pay an
exorbitant price for them both. This would be eminently un-
fair and unjust, and a court of equity will never put a judicial
purchaser in such a situation. The court, in the interest of fair-
ness and justice, in view of all the circumstances, rightly rejected
the upset bids and confirmed the sales of the land as made by
the trustee and commissioners under its decree.
Judicial sales are constantly taking place, and it must con-
tinue to be so as long as there are debts to be collected, and liens
to be enforced. Great care should be observed that the practice
of the court in acting upon a report of sale should not be such
as to deter or discourage bidders, but such as to induce possible
purchasers to attend such sales, to encourage fair, open and
competitive bidding in order that the highest possible price be
obtained, and to inspire confidence in the stability of judicial
sales. This is due not merely to the purchaser, but ***^ also
to creditors, debtors, and the owners of property which has to be
Bold by the court.
There A^ere a number of other errors assigned which related
to minor matters, such as the appointment of the receiver in
the case, and the settlement of his accounts. Due notice was
given for his appointment and no objection made, and, as re-
Feb. 1899.] Weight v. Independence Nat. Bank. 88&
spects his accounts, it is sufficient to say, without particulariz-
ing, that no error appears in the action of the court.
The decrees appealed from must be affirmed.
JUDICIAL SALES— PROPER CONDUCT OF— DISCRETION OP
COURT.— Public judicial sales should be so conducted as to produce
as much as possible for the parties in Interest, and to that end
full, free, and fair competition should be secured: Note to Herndon
V. Gibson, 37 Am. St. Rep. 767. In judicial sales, the court is the
vendor, and It may confirm or refuse to confirm a sale made under
its order, in the exercise of a sound judicial discretion: State Nat.
Bank v. Neel, 53 Ark. 110, 22 Am. St. Rep. 185.
JUDICIAL SALES— ADVANCE OR "UPSET" BIDS.— A RE-
SALE of property will not be ordered upon an offer of Increase of
price alone, when the property has not been sold at a sacrifice.
Special circumstances, appealing to equitable considerations, must
always exist, where the sale is not void, to justify an order for a
resale: Page v. Kress, 80 Mich. 85, 20 Am. St. Rep. 504, and note.
Compare Moran v. Clark, 30 W. Va. 358, 8 Am. St. Rep. 66; Colonial
etc. Mortgage Co. v. Sweet, 65 Ark. 152, 67 Am. St. Rep. 910, and
note thereto showing that the English rule to open a sale when-
ever an advance of ten per cent on the former sale is offered is not
adopted in Alabama.
Wright v. Independence National Bank.
[96 ViRaiNIA, 728.]
CONTRACTS— DISCHARGE OF FIRST INtTORSER BY
AGREEMENT FOR INDULGENCE-PARTIES.— An agreement
for Indulgence which will discharge or release the first indorser on
a promissory note cannot be made with any other person than the
maker of the note, or principal debtor.
CONTRACTS — EXTENDING TIME TO SECOND IN-
DORSER FOR PAYMENT OF NOTE DOES NOT DISCHARGE
FIRST INDORSER OR SURETY.— An agreement between the
holder of a negotiable note and a second indorser upon it, to extend
the time of payment, does not discharge the first, though an accom-
modation Indorser from his liability on the note, and furnishes no
defense to an action brought against him by the holder, as the
agreement does not prevent the first indorser from paying the debt,
and proceeding at once against the maker, or from exercising any
rights which a surety may assert for his protection against his
principal.
APPEAT^REVERSAI^ERROR IN GIVING AND REFUS-
ING INSTRUCTIONS.— Conceding that the trial court erred in giv-
ing and refusing certain instructions, there should be no reversal
where the appellate court can see from the whole record that under
correct instructions a different verdict could not have been rightly
found, or that the exceptant could not have been prejudiced by the
action of the court in giving the instructions given, or In refusing
those which were rejected.
Action on a promissory note, brought by the Independence Na-
tional Bank against Wright. This was the second action by the
€90 Wbight v. Independence Nat. Bank. [Virginia,
same plaintiff against the same defendant on tlie same note. The
first action had been dismissed, and it was claimed by Wright,
the plaintiff in error in this action, that he was released because
he had indorsed the note for the accommodation of the maker,
and that the first action was dismissed without his knowledge or
consent, upon an agreement made with the maker of the note,
for a valuable consideration, to forbear to sue for a definite time.
The agreement to dismiss was made with one B. E. Hughes, vice-
president of the Traders Bank, which bank was the second in-
dorser of the note. Wright claimed that Hughes was acting for
the maker of the note, but this was denied. This was the chief
controversy in the case, and was decided adversely to Wright,
against whom a judgment was rendered, and he sued out a writ
of error.
J. E. Edmunds and J. E. Hughes, for the plaintiff in error.
John H. Lewis, for the defendant in error.
^2» BUCHANAN, J, The defense relied on in this case is
that tlie defendant, an accommodation indorser, had been re-
leased by an agreement of the creditor extending the time for
the payment of the writing sued on. That paper was a nego-
tiable note made by W. P. Eoberts, payable to H. D. Wright, or
order, at the Traders Bank of Lynchburg, indorsed by Wright
to that bank, and by it indorsed to and held by the plaintiff as
collateral, with other notes, to secure the payment of a note due
to it from the Traders Bank. After actions at law had been
brought by the plaintiff on the notes held by it as collateral,
including the note sued on, the plaintiff made a verbal contract
with the Traders Bank by which it was agreed that if the latter
would curtail or reduce its note to the plaintiff to one thousand
dollars, that it (the plaintiff) would allow the Traders Bank to
give a new note for that sum, payable in thirty days, and dismiss
all the suits on the collaterals, upon the payment of the court
costs and attorney's fees. The curtailment was made, the new
note given, the costs and attorney's fees paid, and the suits dis-
missed.
In the view we take of this case, it is unnecessary to consider
whether the agreement made between the plaintiff and '^^^
the Traders Bank was 'such an agreement giving time for the
payment of the note as would have discharged the defendant
if the agreement had been made with the maker of the note,
instead of the Traders Bank, the last indorser.
Feb. 1899.] Wright v. Independence Nat. Bank. 891
The defendant's counsel insists that, whilst the agreement
was made with the vice-president of the Traders Bank, he was
the agent of the defendant to have the suit against him dis-
missed, and that, under the facts of the case, the agreement
must be regarded as having been made with the maker of the
note as well as with the Traders Bank. In this he is mistaken.
The record not only fails to show that the maker was any party
to the agreement, but it shows clearly that he was not.
The first question, therefore, to be considered is, whether an
agreement for indulgence, which will discharge or release the
first indorser, can be made with any other person tjian the maker
of the note, or principal debtor.
In 2 Daniel on Negotiable Instruments, fourth edition, section
1324, it is said: "The agreement for indulgence, in order to dis-
charge the drawer or indorser, must be made with the maker or
acceptor who is the principal debtor; and if it be made with a
third party, it will not affect the drawer's or indorser's rights
or remedies, although such third party may have his appropri-
ate remedy for breach of the contract with him."
The text-writers generally, in discussing the character of the
agreement which will operate as a discharge of the indorser,
drawer, or surety, seem to treat it as a matter of course that
the agreement must be with the principal debtor: 2 Brandt on
Suretyship and Guaranty, sec. 342; Baylies on Sureties, 240; 1
Parsons on Bills and Notes, 238; Edwards on Bills and Notes,
567; 24 Am. & Eng. Ency. of Law, 238; 5 Robinson's Practice,
769. And this would seem to be necessarily so from the grounds
upon which it is held that the indorser, drawer, or surety is dis-
charged from liability.
The reason given why the extension of time for payment dis-
charges the indorser, drawer, or surety, is because the creditor
^* thereby inflicts an injury on him, and deprives him of the
means of relieving himself, either by paying the debt, and im-
mediately proceeding against the principal (being substituted to
the creditor's rights), or by filing his bill quia timet to compel
the debtor to pay the creditor, for the surety's exoneration; for,
if the creditor could not himself, in consequence of his own
agreement, compel the principal debtor to pay, neither could the
indorser, drawer, or surety who, in such case, asserts the riglita
of the creditor for his own safety: Norris v. Crummey, 2 Rand.
333, 334; Shannon v. McMullin, 25 Gratt. 212, 213; 2 Daniel
on Negotiable Instruments, sec. 1313.
892 Wkight v. Independence Nat. Bank. [Virginia^
But if the agreement of the creditor be made with some other
person than the principal debtor, what is there to prevent the
indorser, drawer, or surety from paying the debt, and proceed-
ing at once against the principal, or from requiring the creditor
to forthwith institute suit on the contract as provided by sec-
tion 2890 of the Code, or from filing his bill quia timet? The
principal debtor, being no party to the agreement, and having
paid no consideration for the promise, cannot rely on it. This
was the view taken by the court in Frazer v. Jordan, 8 El. & B.
303, where the agreement was made with a stranger. In that,
case it was said: "We think that the doctrine ought not to be
extended to the case of a contract with a stranger. The prin-
cipal debtor, having given no consideration for the promise, haa
no ground to complain of a breach of it, and cannot say that
faith has been broken with him. There is no privity of contract
with him; and we see nothing on which any right, either at law
or in equity (see Lord Abinger's observations in Lyon v. Holt,
5 Mees. & W. 253, 254), for him to insist upon such contract,
can be founded. The stranger may have some private reason of
his own to wish for some indulgence to be shown, and, if he has
given a good consideration, may be entitled to damages, nominal,
large, or small, according to any legal interest he may have, but
surely he is the only person to take advantage of his contract.**
''^^ The agreement relied on in this case having been made
between the holder of the note (the plaintiff) and the last
indorser upon it, did not prevent the first indorser (the defend-
ant) from paying the debt, and proceeding at once against the
maker, or from exercising any rights which a surety may assert
for his protection against his principal. The agreement did not
discharge the first indorser from his liability on the note, and
furnished no defense against the plaintiff's recovery.
The action of the court in giving and refusing certain in-
fitructions is assigned as error.
It is unnecessary to consider that assignment of error, for if
it were conceded that the action of the court was erroneous, as
claimed, it is immaterial, for under the facts of the case, upon
correct instructions, a different verdict could not have been
rightly found by the jury. And it is the settled rule of this
court, recognized and acted upon in numerous cases, not to
reverse where the court can see from the whole record that
under correct instructions a different verdict could not have
been rightly found, or that the exceptant could not have been
prejudiced by the action of the court in giving the instructions
Feb. 1899.] Wright v. Independence Nat. Bank. 893
given, or in refusing those which were rejected: Richmond Ey.
etc. Co. Y. Garthright, 92 Va. 627, 629, 53 Am. St. Bep. 839;
Brighthope Ry. Co. v. Rogers, 76 Va. 443, 451.
We are of opinion tfiat the judgment complained of is right,
and that it should be affirmed.
A BONA FIDE INDORSER IS DISCHARGED by any dealings
between the holder and principal debtor which defeat the in-
dorser's remedy on the instrument, though It Is otherwise where
no remedy of his is prejudiced: Pitt v. Congdon, 2 N. Y. 352, 51 Am.
Dec. 299, and note showing what dealings between the principal
debtor and the holder will or will not release an accommodation In-
dorser; and that an accommodation Indorser is to be regarded as
a surety. Compare Phoenix Brewing Co. v. Rumbarger, 181 Pa. St.
251, 59 Am. St Rep. 647.
APPEAL — REVERSAL — HARMLESS ERROR — INSTRUC-
TIONS.—If the result reached by the trial court is correct, errors
in giving or denying declarations of law, or in giving or denying
instructions, must be treated as harmless on appeal: Fox v. Windes,
127 Mo. 502, 48 Am. St. Rep. 648. An instruction stating the law
too strongly as against the defendant does not entitle him to a re-
versal, If, under no proper Instruction, Judgment could have been
given in his favor: Lake y. Hancock, 88 Fla. 63, 50 Am. St. Bep.
150.
OASES
IN THB
SUPREME COURT
09
WISCONSIN.
Paesons v. Parsons.
[101 Wisconsin, 76.]
JUDGMENTS — JUDICIAL, DETERMINATIONS— CJOLLAT-
ERAL ATTACK.— A judicial determination may be contrary to con-
clusive evidence, or legal evidence, or without any evidence, yet
not collaterally impeachable for want of jurisdiction.
ADOPTION— CONSENT OF ABANDONING PARENT.—
Statute may authorize the adoption of a child without the consent
of an absent or abandoning parent, and adoption proceedings had
thereunder, and completed without notice to, or consent of, such
a parent, are valid.
ADOPTION — STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION. — Adoption
statutes are humane provisions which look primarily to the interests
of children, and every reasonable intendment should be Indulged In,
In case of doubt. In the line of promoting that object.
ADOPTION— NOTICE TO ABANDONING PARENT.— Un-
der a statute authorizing the adoption of a child without notice to
an abandoning parent, notice to such parent is not requisite to a
valid determination of the fact of abandonment as regards all other
parties to the proceedings.
ADOPTION — PROCEEDINGS IN — COLLATBRAIi AT-
TACK.— Where a proper petition has been filed in adoption proceed-
ings, the court acquires jurisdiction to determine whether the per-
son who signs as next of kin Is such, and its determination,
whether based upon sufficient evidence or not, cannot be collaterally
attacked for want of jurisdiction.
ADOPTION-JUDGMENT OF— ESTOPPEL TO ATTACK.—
After the lapse of many yeers, during which time the status of the
subject of adoption has been recognized as legally fixed by the
judgment, by all parties to the proceedings, one of those parties,
on whose motion the judgment was rendered, Is In no position to
appeal to equity to declare It void.
Edward S. Bragg, for the appellant.
(894)
Nov. 1898.] Parsons v. Parsons. 895
Gary & Forward and C. A. Forward, for the respondent.
""^ MAESHALL, J. This case turns on whether the county
court obtained jurisdiction to make the order of adoption. It
is challenged solely upon the ground that the consent of the
living parent, the father, was not given, and there was no ad-
judication, on notice to the absent parent, of the fact of aban-
donment, nor any consent given in place of that '^^ the alleged
abandoning parent by the next of kin, nor by a guardian or a.
suitable person appointed by the court. There is no claim but
that the petition, in form, complies with the statute. It alleges
every fact which the statute requires, was made by the proper
persons, and was verified by them. True, it does not appear
that notice was given to the father, and, if that were requisite
to the jurisdiction of the court to take any steps in the pro-
ceedings, the order of adoption was void. On this subject we
are furnished with a learned discussion of the statute and a cita-
tion of many authorities on both sides of the controversy, in
some of which the subject is considered at great length, but if
the statute itself furnishes a plain solution of the question we
have no need to go elsewhere to support it.
The statute to be considered is section 4022 of the Revised
Statutes of 1878, which reads as follows: **No such adoption
shall be made without the written consent of the living parents
of such child, unless the court shall find that one of the parents
has abandoned the child, or gone to parts unknown." Thus it
will be seen that, upon the fact being established that the living
parent has abandoned his child, he is deemed by the statute to
have thereby relinquished all parental right to be consulted in
respect to the child's welfare, and his consent to the adoption
is therefore dispensed with. The term "abandon" obviously
means no more than neglect or refusal to perform the natural
and legal obligations of care and support which parents owe to
their children. The fact of abandonment, judicially deter-
mined, was essential to the jurisdiction; not essential that it
should be determined on proper evidence, necessarily, or in ac-
cordance with the truth, because mere error in that regard does
not affect jurisdiction. If jurisdiction be obtained to determine
a fact, its determination wrong or on insufficient or improper
evidence is immaterial on the question of legal right to proceed
judicially to the next step. That is deemed to be elementary.
Now, that ** the fact of abandonment was judicially deter-
mined in this proceeding must be conceded. True, there wa»
896 Parsons v. Parsons. [Wisconsin,
no evidence, so far as appears, but the verified petition, and the
Allegation of abandonment was on information and belief. That
was mere hearsay, but that fact goes merely to the sufficiency of
proof, which, as stated, may involve error, but not jurisdictional
error. A judicial determination may be contrary to conclusive
evidence or legal evidence, or without any evidence, yet cannot
be impeached for want of jurisdiction: Van Fleet on Collateral
Attack, sec. 693, 695. That rule applies to all judicial proceed-
ings. It has often been invoked in proceedings like this. As
for example in Van Matre v. Sankey, 148 111. 536, 39 Am. St.
Eep. 196, it was held that if the court has jurisdiction to act
at all, however erroneous its action, it must still stand until re-
versed on appeal.
It follows that the only remaining question on this branch
of the case is. Did the court have jurisdiction to act on the sub-
ject of the alleged abandonment, in the absence of notice, ac-
tual or constructive, to the parent? That must be answered in
the affirmative. When the proceedings in question were had,
the statute did not require notice, actual or constructive, to a
parent who had abandoned his child. That was unquestionably
ihe legislative idea. Eesort to rules of liberal construction is
not necessary to reach that conclusion. But if the statute
would admit of two constructions, the result would be the same.
We would feel bound to repudiate the doctrine of strict con-
struction contended for vigorously by appellant. The adoption
statute is a humane provision which looks to the interests of
children primarily. That is its controlling idea and policy.
Therefore, every reasonable intendment should be indulged in,
in case of doubt, in the line of promoting that object. Other
oourts have taken the same view, but, if it were otherwise, our
duty to carry out an obvious legislative intent would be the
same. That the statute was designed to enable ^* those who
are not blessed with the love and society of children in the
family to acquire it by taking them into the family fold and
giving a home to those in need of such shelter, protection, and
care, thus creating mutual obligations, promotive of mutual
happiness and the moral well-being of society, is most clear. It
has made, and is making, a multitude of happy homes, happy
parents, happy children, and valuable members of society, and
no narrow construction should be indulged in that will tend to
•defeat a result so obviously intended and in every way bo bene-
:ficial.
Nov. 1898.] Parsons v. Pabsons. 897
The conclusion reached as to the necessity of notice to the
■ahsent and abandoning parent is but affirming what was clearly
held, inferentially, in Schiltz v. Eoenitz, 86 Wis. 31; 39 Am. St.
Eep. 873. The court there, while holding that the order was
not conclusive upon the father on the fact of abandonment,
who had no notice of the proceedings, said that it might, how-
■ever, well be held valid as to the child, obviously meaning be-
cause the court had jurisdiction that far, which, of course, in-
cluded jurisdiction of the petitioner who commenced the pro-
ceedings. That such was the intention of the court, as under-
stood by the legislative department of the government, is evi-
-denced by the fact that subsequently a proviso was added to the
section in the following words: "Provided, that unless the liv-
ing parent or parents of a minor consent to such adoption, it
shall be the duty of the court having jurisdiction of the pro-
ceedings, upon the filing of any petition for adoption, by order
to appoint a time and place for hearing such petition and cause
notice of such time and place to be given to such parent or
parents by personal service of said notice on such parent or
parents at least ten days before the hearing or by publication
thereof in a newspaper at least three weeks successively prior
to said hearing, and, when notice is duly given as herein pro-
vided, the parent of any minor shall be bound by the order of
adoption as fully as though he had consented thereto'*: Laws of
1895, c. 18. ®^ That notice to the parent is not requisite to u
valid determination of the fact of abandonment as regards all
other parties to the proceedings has been held in numerous cases
elsewhere, some of which are cited in the briefs of counsel:
Nugent V. Po\^ell, 4 Wyo. 173; 62 Am. St. Eep. 17; Van
Fleet on Collateral Attack, sec. 408; Barnard v. Barnard, 119
111. 92.
It is further contended by appellant that the county court
did not have jurisdiction, because consent to the adoption was
not given by the next of kin. Whether the person who signed
as next of kin was such in fact was one of the questions which
the court had jurisdiction to determine. It was not requisite to
jurisdiction that it should be determined rightly. The trite say-
ing applies, that every court has jurisdiction to err in any case,
but mere error in determining something the court has a right
to determine is irremediable by challenge to the jurisdiction
of the court. That the county judge had jurisdiction to deter-
mine that W. S. Russell was next of kin to the adopted child
AM. St RKP., You LXX.— 67
898 Parsons v. Parsons. [Wisojnsiny
cannot reasonably be questioned. That the fact was judicially
detennined appears upon the face of the order. True, it was-
determined by the verified petition only, so far as appears by
anything in the proceedings, but, as stated before, that was not
material to the jurisdiction. If determined without any evi-
dence whatever, the result would be the same. No doubt it
was competent for the county judge to have required other evi-
dence than the petition, but he was not bound to do so. If sat-
isfied of the fact by the petition itself, whether satisfied rightly
or wrongly, it was sufficient for the validity of the proceedings.
The rule on that subject was definitely stated by Mr. Justice
Winslow in Cody v. Cody, 98 Wis. 445, to the effect that three-
things only are necessary to give jurisdiction in an action or pro-
ceeding: 1. A tribunal legally organized; 2. Jurisdiction of the-
subject matter; 3. Jurisdiction of the person; and these things
all being present, jurisdiction continues, however erroneous the
proceedings ®* leading up to the result finally obtained, unless
one of the elements be in the meantime lost.
So a conclusion is reached on the merits of the case that the
decision of the circuit court was right and must be affirmed.
But if we were to go further, the result would not be otherwise.
The proceedings to avoid the judgment of adoption are clearly
of an equitable nature, and after the lapse of many years, during
which time the status of the subject of adoption has been recog-
nized as legally fixed by the judgment of the county court, by
all parties to the proceedings, one of .those parties on whose mo-
tion the judgment was rendered is in no position to appeal to
the equity powers of the court to declare it void. The plainest
principles of estoppel apply to the situation. Appellant peti-
tioned for the judgment. It was entered on her motion. The
person most interested, the child, was a ward of the court, and
its status for life was entirely and irrevocably changed by the
result of the proceedings if they were valid. Their validity was
recognized by the appellant till she became pecuniarily inter-
ested in changing her position. Clearly, she cannot be aided by
a court of equity to do that to the injury of the person she was
instrumental in locating in her family as her adopted son.
By the Court. The judgment of the circuit court is affirmed.
JUDGMENTS— COLLATERAL ATTACK— WANT OP EVI-
DENCE.—Judgments are presumed to be founded on proper and
sufficient evidence and they cannot be collaterally Impeached, no-
matter how Insufficient the evidence may, in fact, have been: Can--
Nov. 1898.] HoLLMAN V. Platteville. 899
non V. Cooper, 39 Miss. 784, 80 Am. Dec. 101, and note. A judgment
cannot be impeached collaterally where it is founded on false testi-
mony: Dilling V. Murray, 6 Ind. 324. 63 Am. Dec. 385; nor where
it is founded on incompetent evidence: Myers v. McGavock, 39 Neb.
843, 42 Am. St. Rep. 627; nor where the judgment is erroneous: Ed-
mundson v. Independent School Dist, 98 Iowa, 639, 60 Am. St. Rep.
224.
ADOPTION— CONSENT OF ABANDONING PARENT.— The
consent of the parents of a child is not necessary to its valid adop-
tion by another, where the statute upon the subject is silent respect-
ing the assent of the natural parents: Clarkson v. Hatton, 143 Mo.
47, 65 Am. St. Rep. 635, and note; Van Matre v. Sankey, 148 111. 536,
39 Am. St. Rep. 196, and monographic note thereto.
ADOPTION— NOTICE TO PARENT.— Adoption proceedings In-
stituted upon the application of the mother, without notice to the
absent father, in which it is found that such father has abandoned
the child adopted, are not subject to collateral attack by the collat-
eral heirs of the party adopting such child, on the ground of the ab-
sence of notice to such father: Nugent v. Powell, 4 Wyo. 173, 62 Am.
St. Rep. 17, and note.
ADOPTION— STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION.— Statutes author-
izing the adoption of the children of other persons should be given
a liberal intendment and operation: Cofer v. Scroggins, 98 Ala. 842,
39 Am. St Rep. 64, and note.
HOLLMAN V. PlATTBVILLB.
[101 Wisconsin, 94.]
CEMETERIES-BURIAL, RIGHTS— LICENSE TO USE
GROUND.— One who enters into possession of a lot In a public
cemetery, improves the same, and uses it for burial purposes, with
the express or implied consent of those who have control of the
cemetery, although he acquires no title to the lot, acquires a license
to use the same for burial purposes, which license, so long as it
continues, will support an action of trespass for any Invasion or
disturbance of it, whether by the grantors or strangers.
CEMETERIES— REGULATION BY CITY— LIABILITY OP
CITY IN DAMAGES.— A city given power, by statute, to adopt
regulations as to a public cemetery, and, upon proper notice, to
compel lotowners or occupants to comply with such regulations, is
liable in damages to a lot occupant, if, without having adopted any
regulations, and without notice to him, it invades his lot and cuts
down trees which he has planted therein in the improvement there-
of.
MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS-PUBLIC AND CORPOR-
ATE DUTIES— LIABILITY ARISING FROM PERFORMANCE.—
While a municipal corporation sustains no liability to one suffering
injury from the negligent or imperfect exercise of its legislative or
governmental powers, the contrary is true as respects the perform-
ance and execution of mere corporate duties. As respects such mat-
ters, the rule of respondeat superior applies, and the city will be-
come liable for the act of its servants and agents which it has
authorized or adopted.
900 HoLLMAN V. Platteville. [Wisconsin,
Action for damages arising from the act of the defendant city
in removing trees planted by plaintiff in his burial lot in a ceme-
tery under the control of the defendant. Plaintiff had no rights
in the lot other than those arising from his occupancy thereof
from 1867 to 1894, the year in which the injury complained of
was committed, and his improvement of the lot by fencing it and
planting the trefes in question. Appeal from judgment for
plaintiff.
E. E. Bums, city attorney, and J. W. Murphy, for the appel-
lant.
T. L. Cleary, for the respondent.
** BAEDEEN, J. This case must be considered and deter-
mined upon the certificate of the circuit judge. The recovery
was less than one hundred dollars, and the case could only be
brought here for ^"^ review upon a certificate of the trial judge,
pursuant to section 3047 of the Statutes of 1898. The alleged
bill of exceptions sent up with the record cannot be considered,
and should have been stricken therefrom. As it appears to us
from the statement of facts, the only question we need deter-
mine is whether the defendants are liable in damages for the
cutting of the trees on the cemetery lot in question. As we
view the case, it becomes unnecessary to determine whether
plaintiff has the legal title to the lot or not. He entered into
possession of the same in 1867, inclosed it by a fence, and planted
the trees that were cut down, and, after the fence was removed,
has cared for and attended to the lot, "and has been in posses-
sion of the same, claiming it as a family burial lot," ever since.
Whether his right thereto be considered a mere privilege, right,
or easement for the burial of his dead, or whether his rights
have ripened into absolute title by adverse possession, it matters
not for the purpose of this case. Some courts go so far as to
hold that such an easement, as well as title to the soil, may be
acquired and perfected by prescription, the right to which can-
not be defeated by the owner of the soil: Hook v. Joyce, 94 Ky.
450. Others say that where the interment is in a public ceme-
tery, when the parties whose duty is to give burial are not the
owners of the soil, they would have no higher right than a mere
easement or license: 3 Am. & Eng. Ency. of Law, 50, and cases
cited. In any event, so long as the license continued, the lot-
holder could maintain trespass for any invasion or disturbance
of it, whether by the grantors or strangers: Partridge v. First
Nov. 1898.] HoLLMAN V. Platteville. 901
Independent Church, 39 Md. 631. A case which reviews the au-
thorities at length, and contains an ample discussion of the
rights of lot claimants in cemeteries, is Bessemer etc. Co. v. Jen-
kins, 111 Ala. 135; 56 Am. St. Eep. 26. It is there said: "It
would seem, therefore, to accord with right principle and au-
thority, that where one is permitted to bury his dead in a pub-
lic cemetery by the express or implied consent of those in proper
control of it, ®® he acquires such a possession in the spot of
ground in which the bodies are buried as will entitle him to ac-
tion against the owners of the fee or strangers, who, without his
consent, negligently or wantonly disturb it." The plaintiff,
having a right to and the possession of the lot in question, could
certainly maintain an action against any person who unlawfully
disturbed or interfered therewith.
But it is said that the statute (Rev. Stats. 1878, sec. 1439)
gives the right to the common council to regulate the cemetery
as trustees, and that their action in that regard was quasi judi-
cial, and ought not to be interfered with. A perfect answer to
this contention is found in section 1453, which grants the power
to require any "lotowner or occupant to remove, rearrange, re-
build, or repair any such trees or shrubs planted, fences, struc-
tures, headstones, or monuments, so as to comply with such reg-
ulations as they shall prescribe, by giving reasonable personal
notice in writing so to do"; and, if they fail to do so, they may
cause it to be done, and recover the expense thereof from the per-
son liable to such duty. This presupposes the adoption of
proper regulations for the management and control of the ceme-
tery, which seems not to have been done in this case. Neither
was there any pretense that any notice was given plaintiff to re-
arrange or remove the trees in question. The acts of the city
were wholly without the lines of the statute and without legal
justification.
It is further urged that the city was engaged in an act for the
public benefit, in which it had no particular interest, And from
which it derived no special advantage in its corporate capacity,
and therefore it cannot be held liable. The defendant city is a
municipal corporation, charged wilh certain public duties in re-
lation to the state and the public generally, as well as with obli-
gations that are local and relate to the welfare of its members,
and the regulation of its internal affairs. In the administration
and execution of its legislative ®* and governmental powers —
such powers as are, in their very nature, public and in aid of the
902 HoLLMAN V. Platteville. [Wisconsin,
state — ^it sustains no liability to one suffering injury, if such
powers are imperfectly or negligently executed: Dillon on Muni-
cipal Corporations, sees. 965, 966. But, as respects the per-
formance and execution of mere corporate duties, the rule is dif-
ferent. "When the act done is within its charter powers and re-
lates to the administration of local or internal affairs, as distin-
guished from its legislative, discretionary, or quasi judicial du-
ties, the rule of respondeat superior applies, and the city will be-
come liable for the act of its servants and agents, which it has
authorized or adopted: Dillon on Municipal Corporations, sec.
980. In this case there can be no question but that the defend-
ant Stephens was the servant of the city and was acting under
its authority. The answer expressly admits that the acts done
by him were done under the direction and authority of the com-
mon council. The city had a right to adopt reasonable regula-
tions for the management and control of the cemetery. It also
had the power to enforce its regulations in conformity to the law
granting such power. It had no right or authority to disturb
or invade the possession of the lot held by plaintiff except in
pursuance of its statutory authority. Its fault lay in the at-
tempted exercise of its statutory powers in an unlawful manner,
and, having authorized the act done and having adopted the
wrongful act of its servant, as appears by its answer, the city
must be held to respond for the actual damage done: Dillon on
Municipal Corporations, sec. 972; Wilde v. New Orleans, 12 La.
Ann. 15. See Wilson v. Mineral Point, 39 Wis. 160; Thayer v.
Boston, 19 Pick. 511; 31 Am. Dec. 157; Squiers v. Neenah, 24
Wis. 588; Crossett v. Janesville, 28 Wis. 420.
By the Court. The judgment of the circuit court is affirmed.
CEMETERIES — BURIAL RIGHTS — LICENSE TO USE
GROUND.— If one has been permitted to biiry his dead In a public
cemetery, by the express or implied consent of those In proper con-
trol of it, he acquires such a possession in the spot of ground In
which the bodies are buried as will entitle him to maintain an ac-
tion of quare clausum fregit against the owners of the fee or
strangers, who, without his consent, negligently or wantonly dis-
turb It: Bessemer etc. Co. v. Jenkins, 111 Ala. 135, 56 Am. St. Rep.
26, and note thereto; Mitchell v. Thorne, 134 N. Y. 536, 30 Am. St.
Rep. 699. After one has purchased a lot In a cemetery, the mana-
gers thereof have no right to abridge his right of sepulture by any
unreasonable limitations thereon: Mount Morlah Cem. Assn. v. Com-
monwealth, 81 Pa. St. 235, 22 Am, Rep. 743.
CEMETERIES— REGULATIONS BY CITY.— The privilege of
burial In a public cemetery Is a mere license, subject to municipal
regulation, and revocable according to public necessity: Page v.
Nov. 1898.] Horp v. Olson. 908
I
Symonils, 63 N. H. 17, 56 Am. Rep. 481; Austin ▼. Austin City Cem.
Assn., 87 Tex. 330, 47 Am. St. Rep. 114.
MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS-DUTIES— LIABILITIES. — A
municipal corporation is not liable for injuries caused by the negli-
gence of Its agents and officers In the discharge of duties purely
governmental or discretionary. But It Is liable for Injuries caused
by Its negligence In the discharge of ministerial or specified duties
assumed by its charter: Gibson v. Huntington, 38 W. Va. 177, 45
Am. St. Rep. 853. and note. See the monographic note to Goddard v.
Inhabitants of Harps well, SO Am. St. Rep. 376-413.
HoFP V. Olson.
[101 Wisconsin, 118.]
EQUITY— ADEQUATE LEGAL REMEDY- PLEADING.—
The objection that the plaintiff In a suit In equity baa an adequate
legal remedy must be made by demurrer or answer, and, If not so
made. Is deemed waived, and cannot be raised by demurrer ore
tenus.
EQUITY— JURISDICTION— ADEQUATE LEGAL REM-
EDY. — The ground upon which equity refuses to take cognizance of
a, case In which an adequate legal remedy exists is not jurisdictional,
but merely a rule of practice, upon which the action will be dis-
missed If the attention of the court Is called to it at the proper time
and In the proper manner.
EQUITY-SUFFICIENCY OF COMPLAINT— THREAT-
ENED INJURY.— A complaint in equity sufficiently shows a threat-
ened unlawful invasion of plaintiff's property rights when it
alleges that defendant threatens to tear down a partition fence sepa-
rating his and plaintiff's property; that such act would result in
Irreparable injury to plaintiff, and that defendant is Insolvent The
objection that plaintiff has an adequate remedy being waived, such
complaint is sufficient to maintain an action to restrain the threat-
ened removal of the fence.
APPEAL— OBJECTION TO BILL OF EXCEPTIONS.— The
objection that a bill of exceptions was not properly settled, not hav-
ing been raised in the appellate court before the hearing on the
merits, cannot be raised later.
Suit in equity to restrain defendant from removing a parti-
tion fence dividing plaintiff's and defendant's property. The
complaint alleged the ownership by plaintiff and defendant of
adjoining premises, the character of the fence as a partition
fence and its maintenancre for over twenty years, the irreparable
character of the threatened injury, and the insolvency of defend-
ant. Defendant answered denying the allegations of the com-
plaint, and upon the issues so made the case came to trial. De-
fendant's objection to the introduction of evidence because the
•complaint failed to show an equitable cause of action was sua-
904 HoFF V. Olson. [Wisconsin^
tained, and plaintiff was denied leave to amend. Appeal from,
judgment for defendant.
Higbee & Bunge, for the appellant.
Smith & Griffin, for the respondent.
**® BAEDEEN, J. The reason usually assigned why a court
of equity will not entertain actions of this kind is that the party
seeking to prevent the threatened injury has an adequate remedy
at law. Beach on Injunctions, section 1125, says: "The inade-
quacy of the legal remedy is the foundation and indispensable
prerequisite for the interposition of chancery in such matters,.
for the obvious reason that a legal remedy ^^^ has been devised
to redress such wrongs, and, so long as the law provides an ade-
quate remedy, equity has no right to interfere." It is well set-
tled in this state, however, that equity will interfere in such
cases, and grant the desired relief, unless the plaintiff's right
thereto is contested in accordance with the rules of practice in
such cases. If it appears on the face of the complaint that the
plaintiff has an adequate remedy at law, a demurrer may be in-
terposed. If that fact is not apparent on the face of the plead-
ing, or the defendant is in doubt as to its sufficiency in that re-
spect, advantage of the insufficiency may be taken by answer. If
not so taken by demurrer or answer, it is waived. The defect
cannot be raised by demurrer ore tonus at the trial. This court
has not, however, been perfectly consistent in its rulings in that
regard. In Tenney v. State Bank, 20 Wis. 152, Chief Justice
Dixon inaccurately spoke of the objection as one relating to the
jurisdiction of the court, and says: **We hold that it is now too
late to object to the jurisdiction of the court. The defendant, by
answering and proceeding to trial upon the merits, waived it. It
is well settled that the objection that the plaintiff has an adequate
remedy at law must be taken in the first instance by answer."
In Peck v. School Dist. No. 4, 21 Wis. 616, he corrected himself.
He says: "The ground on which equity refuses to take cogni-
zance of and proceed in such cashes, namely, that the plaintiff ha&
an adequate remedy at law, is in no proper sense jurisdictional.
The court has power to hear and determine the action, and in
general will do so, unless objection in proper form be taken.
This may be by demurrer to the complaint, when the objection
appears upon the face of it; otherwise by answer. If not taken
in one or the other of these forms, it is waived. .... This
Nov. 1898.] HoFF V. Olson. . 905
shows that it is not a question of the jurisdiction of the court
over the subject matter of the action; for, where that is wanting,
it is well known that no consent or waiver of objection by the
parties will confer ^^^ it. Such an objection is never waived,
but may be taken at any time, either on appeal or when the
question of jurisdiction is collaterally involved. The objection
that the plaintiff has an adequate remedy at law is no more than
a rule of practice in the court of chancery, upon which the ac-
tion will be dismissed if the attention of the court is called to it
at the proper time and in the proper manner; and, although it is
most frequently spoken of by courts and writers as a question of
jurisdiction, it is strictly inaccurate to call it so." This lan-
guage is quoted with approval in State v. Circuit Court, 98 "Wis,
143, where many decisions are cited as sustaining the rule thus
laid down.
On the point of whether the objection might be raised by de-
murrer ore tenus taken at the trial, the decisions in this court
are somewhat in confusion, although the later rulings are uni-
formly against it. In Stein v. Benedict, 83 Wis. 603, it was said
that, "upon a demurrer ore tenus to a complaint which is clearly
intended as a complaint in equity, the defendant may avail him-
self of the objection that the plaintiff has an adequate remedy
at law": Citing Kilboum Lodge v. Kilbourn, 74 Wis. 452; Avery
V. Eyan, 74 Wis. 691; Denner v, Chicago etc. Ry. Co., 67 Wis.
218. These cases hardly sustain the proposition, inasmuch as
the decision in each was based on a general demurrer to the com-
plaint. The cases of Becker v. Trickel, 80 Wis. 484, Sherry v.
Smith, 72 Wis. 339, Pierstoff v. Jorges, 86 Wis. 128, 39 Am. St.
Rep. 881, Sweetser v. Silber, 87 Wis. 102, Meyer v. Garthwaite,
92 Wis. 671, and.Bigelow v. Washburn, 98 Wis. 553, are s(juarely
to the point that the objection must be taken by answer or de-
murrer, or it is waived. Stein v. Benedict, 83 Wis. 603, so far as
it holds the contrary doctrine, must be deemed to be overruled.
In this connection it may be well to notice Smith v. Oconomo-
woc, 49 Wis. 694, which was an action to restrain the defendant
from removing a fence and storm door in front of plaintiff's
building. This case was tried on its merits, and on appeal ^**
the judgment in favor of plaintiff was reversed, on the ground
that a court of equity would not entertain a suit to prevent a
threatened trespass, without first having the legal right deter-
mined in an action at law. The court evidently overlooked or
ignored the rule of waiver of this objection, as hereinbefore
^06 HoFP V. Olson. [Wisconsin,
■etated. The court has ample power and will exercise it in such
<;ases, unless due and timely objection is taken either by answer
or demurrer. Proceeding to trial without having made the ob-
jection in proper form is a full and complete waiver thereof.
The complaint in suit states sufficient to show that the de-
fendant threatens an unlawful invasion of the plaintiff's prop-
erty rights. The fence in question is alleged to be on the line
between the parties, and is a regular partition fence. In the .
•absence of allegation as to a legal division of a line fence, the
presumption as to ownership is that it is the common property
■of the adjoining owners. The fact that the fence is a line fence
makes it unlawful for either of the adjoining owners, as against
the other, to remove or tear it down without giving notice as re-
quired by section 1400 of the Eevised Statutes of 1878: Saylea
V. Bemis, 57 Wis. 315. It is possible that the complaint would
have been open to the objection that the plaintiff had an ade-
quate legal remedy, had the objection been taken by demurrer
■or answer. Failing to do so, it was waived, and the court should
have proceeded to try and determine the case.
The respondent made the point that the objection to the com-
plaint was sustained on the ground that it did not state facts
eufficient to constitute a cause of action. In answer, we say that
we must be governed by the bill of exceptions. The bill, after
reciting that an objection had been interposed, says: "But the
said judge decided that the objection was well taken, and that
no evidence would be received to prove the issues; and no evi-
dence was received, under the rulings of the court, on the
ground that said complaint does not state ^^^ facts sufficient to
■constitute a cause of action entitling the plaintiff to equitable re-
lief, but that it states a case for which the plaintiff has an ade-
quate remedy at law." This would seem to be a sufficient answer
to this contention. The facts stated, together with the alleged in-
fiolvency of the defendant, are held to be sufficient to permit the
plaintiff to maintain this action, in view of the waiver as before
etated.
The bill of exceptions bears the certificate of the circuit judge.
If the bill was not properly settled, then it was defendant's duty
to have moved to strike it out, or brought the fact to the at-
tention of this court in some proper way, before the hearing on
the merits. He cannot be permitted to take advantage of any
euch technical error after he has permitted the case to be called
for final determination.
Nov. 1898.] TiDiouTE Savings Bank v. Libbey. 907
By the Court. The judgment of the circuit court is reversed,
and th" case is remanded for further proceedings according to
law.
EQUITY-REMEDY AT LAW— DEMURRER ORE TENUS.—
When the subject matter of an action Is of equitable cognizance, a
demurrer ore tenus does not go to the point that the plaintiff has
an adequate remedy at law, but only raises the question whether
the complaint states a cause of action In equity: Pierstoff v. Jorgea,
86 Wis. 128, 89 Am. St. Rep. 881, and note.
EQUITY— ADEQUATE LEGAL REMEDY— PLEADING.— If one
sued in equity wishes to avail himself of a defense that an adequate
remedy exista at law, he must plead it: Lough v. Outerbridge,
143 N. Y. 271, 42 Am. St. Rep. 712. And a court of chancery will
not refuse to take jurisdiction of a case merely on the ground that
the complainant has a perfect remedy at law, if the parties have
submitted themselves to the jurisdiction af the chancellor without
objection: Bank of .Utica v. Utlca, 4 Paige, 399, 27 Am. Dec 72;
Bank of Utica v. Mersereau, 3 Barb. Ch. 528, 49 Am, Dec. 189.
EQUITY— PLEADING— COMPLAINT.— A complainant must
state in his bill every fact showing him to be entitled to the relief
prayed for: Brown v. Wylie, 2 W. Va. 502, 98 Am. Dec 781.
TiDiouTB Savings Bank v. Libbey.
[101 Wisconsin, 193.]
GUARANTY-ASSIGNABILITY.— A guaranty la assignable
with the obligations secured thereby, and goes with the principal
obligation. It Is enforceable by the same persons who can enforce
the principal obligation.
GUARANTY — SPECIAL AND GENERAL DISTIN-
GUISHED.—A general guaranty is one for acceptance by the
public generally. A special guaranty Is limited to the person to
whom it is addressed, and usually contemplates a trust or reposes
a confidence in some person. Such a guaranty may not be assign-
Able until the right of action has arisen thereon.
GUARANTY— ASSIGNMENT OP PRINCIPAL OBLIGA-
TION.—The transfer of a note secured by a general continuing
guaranty carries with it the security which may be enforced by
the transferee, though be took the note without knowledge of the
security.
The text of the guaranty sued upon was as follows: "For and
in consideration of the sum of one dollar to each of us in hand
■paid, and in consideration of the granting of credit and discount
by W. T. Rickards & Co., of Chicago, Illinois, to the Parson &
Libbey Company, a corporation of Chicago, Illinois, we, for our-
selves, and for our heirs, executors, administrators, and assigns,
<io hereby jointly and severally guarantee to said W. T. Rick-
908 TiDiouTE Savings Bank v. Libbey. [Wisconsin,
ards & Co., their heirs, executors, administrators, and assigns,
the payment of any and all indebtedness now due, or hereafter
to become due, to said "W. T. Eickards & Co., their heirs, execu-
tors, administrators, or assigns, growing out of or occasioned by
any, or through any, act or acts of the said Farson & Libbey
Company. It is further agreed that such guaranty shall remain
in full force and effect in respect to all indebtedness or renewals
thereof now existing or hereafter to accrue, growing out of any
and all transactions originating prior to the time a notice in
writing of the cancellation of this guaranty, signed by either of
the undersigned, shall be received by said W. T. Eickards & Co.
It is provided, however, that the undersigned shall not be liable
under this guaranty for an amount to exceed the sum of twenty
thousand dollars ($20,000). The undersigned hereby waive no-
tice of the acceptance of the guaranty, and of the amount of the
indebtedness existing from time to time from said Farson &
Libbey Company to said W. T. Eickards & Co." Appeal from
judgment for plaintiffs.
Barbers & Beglinger, for the appellants.
Thompson, Harshaw & Thompson, for the respondents.
*®*' BAEDEEN, J. A guaranty is defined to be "a separate,
independent contract, by which the guarantor undertakes, for a
valuable consideration, to be answerable for the payment of some
particular debt, or future debts, or the performance of some
duty, in case of the failure of another person primarily liable to
pay or perform"; and it is said that such guaranty is assignable,
with the obligation secured thereby, and that it goes with the
principal obligation, and is enforceable by the same persons who .
can enforce that: Colebrooke on Collateral Securities, sec. 353;
Ellsworth V. Harmon, 101 111. 274; Claflin v. Ostrom, 54 N. Y.
581; Stillman v. Northrup, 109 N. Y. 475; Everson v. Gere, 122
N. Y. 290; Lane v. Duchac, 73 Wis. 655; W. W. Kimball Co. v.
Mellon, 80 Wis. 143. The rule is, that the transfer of a note
carries with it all security without any formal assignment or de-
livery, or even mention of the latter: Carpenter v. Longan, 16
Wall. 271; Croft v. Bunster, 9 Wis. 503. A general guaranty is
one open for acceptance by the public generally. A special
guaranty is limited to the person to whom it is addressed, and
usually contemplates a trust or reposes a confidence in such per-
son. Such a guaranty may not be assignable until the right of
action has arisen thereon: Jex v. Straus, 122 N. Y. 293, distin-
Kov. 1898.] TiDiouTE Savings Bank v. Libbey. 909
gnishing Evansville Nat. Bank v. Kaufmann, 93 N. Y. 273; 45
Am. Eep. 204. The main contention of the defendants in the
present case is, that the guaranty upon which the action is
founded is special, and limited to W. T. Rickards & Co., and was
not available to the plaintiffs, their assignees. We do not think
that the construction of the guaranty in question can be thus
fairly restricted. We think that the guaranty, except as ex-
pressly limited by its terms, ^^"^ was a general, continuing one.
The defendants executed the contract of guaranty "in consider-
ation of the sum of one dollar to each of us in hand paid, and in
consideration of the granting of credit and discount by W. T.
Hickards & Co. to the Farson & Libbey Company," in which the
defendants were jointly and severally interested as owners of all
or of a large proportion of the capital stock thereof, and in
whose success they were, and each of them was, particularly and
financially interested. In other words, they gave the guaranty
to secure the indebtedness on which the action is founded, for
the benefit and advantage of a company in which they were
themselves thus interested. The Farson & Libbey Company
were anxious to realize on the notes in suit; took the same to W.
T. Rickards & Co., and negotiated, sold, and delivered the same
to that company; and it granted to said Farson & Libbey Com-
pany credit, discounted such notes, and paid it therefor the full
value and amount thereof, less interest and brokerage. The
transfer of these notes to the plaintiffs carried with it, by opera-
tion of law, all securities for their payment. The debt is the
principal thing, and the securities are only an incident. The
transfer of the former, therefore, carries with it the right to
the securities, and amounts to an equitable assignment of them.
No matter what the form of the security is, whether a real estate
<jr chattel mortgage, or a pledge of collateral notes, bonds, or
other personal property, the purchaser of the principal takes with
it the right to resort to these securities; and this is so, although
the assignment or transfer does not mention them. The reason
of this rule, within all the authorities, seems to be that when
the mortgagee transfers the debt, without assigning the mortgage
or other security, he becomes a trustee, and holds the security
for the benefit of the owner of the note, and the latter may en-
force the trust. The debtor is in no wise injured by such rule.
He has agreed that the security shall stand for the payment of
the debt, and it is of *®® no consequence to him to whom it is
paid. He has to pay it but once.
910 TiDiouTE Savings Bank v. Libbey. [Wisconsin,
The guaranty is to pay any and all indebtedness to said W. T.
Eickards & Co., their heirs, executors, administrators, and "as-
signs," incurred by Farson & Libbey Company. It is said that
the word "assigns" means substantially nothing in this connec-
tion; that it is a mere formal phrase. We cannot so regard it.
It either means that the defendants were to guarantee this pa-
per in the hands of any assignee of Eickards & Co., or it means
absolutely nothing. Eickards & Co. were bankers and brokers.
Their business was dealing in commercial paper, both buying
and selling it, all of which defendants well knew. Their pur-
pose in giving this guaranty was to give to the Farson & Libbey
Company a credit of twenty thousand dollars with these brok-
ers. It was perfectly natural, therefore, that the brokers desired
to have this paper protected, not only in their hands, but in the
hands of their customers. We conclude, therefore, that this
phrase was an apt one to express the real intention of the par-
ties, and that it means precisely what it says. Eickards & Co.
hold the security for these notes in trust, and the purchasers of
the notes are entitled to enforce the trust. The guaranty waa
given for the payment of these notes, among others, and, within
the rule of the authorities, it would seem that the purchasers
from Eickards & Co. have the right to resort to the guaranty.
The fact that the Tidioute Savings Bank did not know of
the existence of this guaranty at the time it purchased the City
Sash & Door Company note is of no significance. The securi-
ties pledged for a debt follow it, in equity, no matter how the
debt be modified or into whose hands it may come. Until the
debt is paid, the pledge accompanies it, and remains for its pay-
ment, and is available to all who may acquire title thereto: Cole-
brooke on Collateral Securities, sec. 79; Stearns v. Bates, 46
Conn. 306. The guaranty in question was given to secure the
payment of any and all indebtedness ***® due, or thereafter to
become due, to Eickards. & Co., or their assigns, "growing out of
or occasioned by any or through any act or acts of the said Far-
son & Libbey Company.'' The defendant used apt words to
make the guaranty impersonal, so far as the holders of the debts
60 created are concerned. They executed and delivered a con-
tract for all the debts created by the Farson & Libbey Company
to Eickards & Co. within the amount limited, which became an
incident to each such debt, and which passed to the bank pro
rata, upon its purchase of the note, even though it may not have
known of its existence at that time: Keyes v. Wood, 21 Vt. 331;
Nov. 1898.] Green v. Ashland Water Ca 911
Evertson v. Booth, 19 Johns. 486. To require the defendants,
to pay these notes is but to require them to fulfill their prom-
ise. It entails no hardship and creates no obligation beyond th&
plain tenor of their contract.
The argument that the guaranty was personal with Eickards^
& Co., as imposing special trust and confidence in the members^
of that firm, falls of its own weight. A bare reference to the
paper itself would seem to dispel any such illusion. The case
of Evansville Nat. Bank v. Kaufmann, 93 N. Y. 274, 45 Am.
Eep. 204, falls far short of sustaining their contention.
On the whole case, the conclusion of the trial court meets with
our entire approval.
The greater portion of this opinion was prepared by Mr. Jus-
tice Pinney before his sickness and resignation. To him credit
is due accordingly.
By the Court. The judgment of the circuit court in both
cases is afi&rmed.
GUARANTY— ASSTGNABILITT— RIGHT OF ACTION.— A valia
contract of guaranty, Indorsed upon a writing which la obligatory,
passes by assignment to the assignee, and vesta In him a right of
action In his own name against the guarantor: KlUian v. Ashley, 24-
Ark. 511, 91 Am. Dec. 519.
GUARANTY— ASSIGNMENT OF PRINCIPAL OBLIGATION.-
If a person guarantees the payment to a corporation of any and all
Indebtedness or liability then or thereafter owing to It from an-
other designated person, and notes subsequently executed by the
latter to the former are assigned by him together with all the se-
curities he may hold securing any property or indebtedness, the as-
signee is entitled to the benefit of the guaranty, and may malntala
an action thereon against the guarantor: Anchor Invest. Co. v. Kirk-
Patrick. 68 Minn. 378, 50 Am. St Rep. 417, and note.
Gebbn V, Ashland Water Company.
(101 Wisconsin, 25S.]
WATER COMPANIES— LIABILITY FOR DISTRIBUTINO
POLLUTED WATER— WARRANTY OF QUALITY.— A water
company engaged in distributing water for compensation does not
Impliedly warrant the quality of the water carried and distributed.
WATER COMPANIES— LIABILITY FOR DISTRIBUTING
POLLUTED WATER— KNOWLEDGE OF PERSON USING SUCH
WATER.— A water company which knowingly distributes water
which, from a cause not discoverable by the exercise of reasonable
care. Is dangerous for domestic use, It owes the duty to Its custom-
ers of disclosing such danger, and a failure to do so is fraud la
S12 Green v. Ashland Water Co. [Wisconsin,
iaw, rendering the company liable to any person injured thereby
without fault on his part, and the failure of duty amounts to action-
able negligence, to which the same liability is incident. But if the
person injured used the water with knowledge, actual or construc-
tive, of Its dangerous condition, no liability attaches to the com-
pany.
WATER COMPANIES-LIABILITY FOR DISTRIBUTING
POLLUTED WATER— EVIDENCE OF SUBSEQUENT PRECAU-
TIONS.—In an action against a water company for the death of a
person, occasioned by using impure water furnished by it, it is im-
proper to admit evidence that greater precautions were talien by
the defendant, after the occurrence complained of to secure pure
water, than were taken before.
EVIDENCE— SITUATION EXISTING AFTER INJURY
'COMPLAINED OF.— In an action against a water company for
death occasioned by the use of impure water furnished by the de-
fendant, it is error to admit evidence of experts as to tests made
•of the water some time after the occurrence complained of.
WITNESSES — EXPERTS — OPINION EVIDENCE. —
Where it is sought to recover from a water company for death from
typhoid fever, which disease, it is alleged, was communicated to
the deceased by impure water furnished by the defendant company,
expert witnesses should not be permitted to give opinions going to
the question of how the disease was contracted, based upon the Evi-
dence introduced upon that question, such evidence being contra-
-dictory.
WITNESSES — EXPERTS — PHYSICIANS — CAUSE OF
DEATH.— The rule that a physician may testify as to the cause of
•death, from personal examination or knowledge, extends no farther
than the immediate cause of death, and not to what set the cause in
motion.
EVIDENCE— OPINION OF WITNESSES.- In an action
against a water company for Injury occasioned by the defendant's
furnishing impure water, it is not proper to admit opinion evi-
dence as to the duty of the defendant with reference to testing the
water supply.
WATER COMPANIES-LIABILITY FOR FURNISHING
IMPURE WATER— EVIDENCE.— Where it Is sought to Impose
upon a water company a liability for Injuries occasioned by Impure
water furnished by it, it Is error to admit in evidence newspaper
■comments generally irrelevant to the issue, and of a sort tending
to prejudice the jury against the defendant.
WATER COMPANIES— IMPURE WATEI^-CONTRIBU-
TORY NEGLIGENCE IN USING.— Where It has been for some time
A matter of common knowledge that water furnished by a water
company is dangerously impure, it will be presumed that a person
of average intelligence living in the community had notice of such
fact, and, unless such presumption is rebutted, he will be deemed
;guilty of contributory negligence if he uses such water.
Action to recover damages for the death of plaintiff's intestate
alleged to have been caused by negligence on defendant's part,
in that it failed and neglected to extend its intake pipe into
■Chequamegon bay from time to time as needed to secure water
free from sewage contamination as required by its contract with
the municipality of Ashland. It is claimed that owing to such.
Nov. 1898.] Green v. Ashland Water Co. 913
breach of duty, the plaintiff's intestate, through using the wat^r
furnished by defendant, contracted typhoid fever, from which
lie died. Appeal from a judgment for plaintiff.
Tomkins & Merrill and Lamoreux & Shea, for the appellants.
Gate, Sanborn, Lamoreux & Park, for the respondent.
*^ MARSHALL, J. This action was brought, tried, sub-
mitted to the jury, and went to judgment, upon the theory, ap-
parently, that a recovery was claimed for the death of plaintiff's
intestate on the ground of actionable negligence of defendant.
Something is said in the briefs of counsel about the rule, so
called, of implied warranty in the sale of provisions for imme-
diate domestic use, as if that rule might apply to the facts. It
is not necessary to consider that theory because of the manner
in which the case was tried and submitted, as indicated, though
it is proper, and deemed advisable as a guide in future proceed-
ings, to discuss it. The doctrine of Sir William Blackstone that
there is a warranty of the wholesomeness of provisions sold for
domestic use by the buyer, and that the vendor is bound to know
their quality in that regard at his peril, is controverted by the
vreight of authority in this country and England. Liability for
damages in the circumstances mentioned is supported, but on
the ground of deceit, not contract. It would be interesting,
and probably constitute a valuable addition to our jurisprudence,
to have the true nature of that liability definitely decided here.
The writer is not familiar with any case where *** the point has
been so presented and decided that the result stands as a bind-
ing adjudication on the subject, though there are dicta here and|
there recognizing the rule stated by Blackstone as one prevailing
in this country generally: Getty v. Eountree, 2 Pinn. 379; 54
Am. Dec. 138; Williams v. Slaughter, 3 Wis. 347.
There is a strong reason for holding that caveat emptor ap-
plies to the purchases of provisions for domestic use the same
as to purchases of other articles, in the absence of express con-
tract or of fraud; that the only difference is that the situation
and relation of the parties in the one case raises an inference
of artifice, while in the other it does not. In Emerson v. Brig-
ham, 10 Mass. 197, 6 Am. Dec. 109, it is said, in substance, that
the mistake of Blackstone was in treating deceit and fraud as
breach of implied contract; that artifice must be established as
the foundation of liability, and without it no liability in the
AM. 8k. Rkp., \ ou LXX.-W
914 Geeen v. Ashland Water Co. [Wisconsin,
nature of that on an implied warranty exists in case of the sale
of provisions any more than in the sale of any other article;
that the sale of provisions for a sound price for immediate con-
sumption involves a representation of wholesomeness, and knowl-
edge of the falsehood, if falsehood there be, is presumed from
the nature of the transaction and duties growing out of the
trade; that the inference of fraud arises from the necessities of
the situation, and to the deceit attaches the liability. That was
affirmed in Winsor v. Lombard, 18 Pick. 57, where Chief Justice
Shaw stated, in effect, that the supposition as to the rule of im-
plied warranty existing in the sale of provisions any more than
in the sale of other articles, is founded in failure to distinguish
between a rule of evi(tence and a rule of law, as explained in
Mr. Justice Sewall's opinion in Emerson v. Brigham, 10 Mass.
197; 6 Am. Dec. 109. In Moses v. Mead, 1 Denio, 378, 45
Am. Dec. 676, Bronson, C. J., speaking on the same subject,
said that the dictum of Blackstone cannot be supported in its
full extent; that the liability can be supported, but on the
ground of deceit, citing Emerson v. Brigham, 10 Mass. 197, 6
Am. Dec. 109, with approval, and distinguishing Van Bracklin
V. 2«« Fonda, 13 Johns. 468, 7 Am. Dec. 339, a leading case
often cited to the implied warranty theory and as sustaining the
dictum of Blackstone. A careful reading of it shows that the
sale considered was with actual knowledge of the vendor of the
unwholesomeness of the article. He was guilty of a fraud and
liable on that ground, and that was the real foundation of the
recovery. See, further, to the same effect, Giroux v. Stedman,
145 Mass. 439, 1 Am. St. Eep. 472, and Bumby v. Bollett, IS
Mees. & W. 644. A careful examination of the text-books on
this subject shows that the writers reason along the line of Em-
erson V. Brigham, 10 Mass. 197, 6 Am. Dec. 109, and the other
cases cited: Benjamin on Sales, ed. 1892, 647; Biddle on War-
ranties, sees. 193-204; 2 Schouler on Personal Property, sec. 348;
10 Am. & Eng. Ency. of Law, 157.
Courts in recent years have not been inclined to add new ex-
ceptions to the rule of caveat emptor, or to extend those already
established. It once applied to all sales of personal property,
with the one exception of warranty of title. Many exceptions
have since been added, presumably under the influence of the
civil law, where the rule was caveat venditor, a rule as harsh to
the seller as that of the common law to the buyer. Each ex-
ception in the development of our system paved the way for
Nov, 1898.] Green v. Ashland Water Co. 9J5
another, and that for still another, as the exigencies of particu-
lar situations seemed to require, in order to harmonize moral
with legal obligations, till the rule itself ceased to be the safe
and simple guide it was when Justice Popham, in pronouncing
the law in his time, said, "If I have commodities which are
damaged, whether victuals or otherwise, and I, knowing them
to be so, sell them for good and affirm them to be so, an action
upon the case lies for deceit; and although they be damaged,
if I, knowing not that, affirm them to be good, still no action
lies without I warrant them to be good." That a more enlight-
ened sense of justice has softened and limited that rigorous rule
is by no means to be regretted; but if a written system of laws
is to be preserved at all, and the science of the law is to be found
*®* therein, so many exceptions and limitations of a principle
should not be recognized as to practically obscure it. To the
one implied warranty of title, with which the rule of the com-
mon law, as indicated, commenced, has been added that in case
of a sale by sample, warranty of general character where the
chattel is not present and. subject to inspection, warranty of
manufactured goods as to merchantable quality, warranty that
manufactured goods sold for a particular purpose are reasonably
suitable therefor, and perhaps some others. None of the
changes, however, have taken place in recent times, and as the
remedy is ample to protect against frauds on the part of vendors
where the vendees use reasonable care in looking after their own
interests, our system, without further changes, is probably as
perfect to the end that even-handed justice between individuals
may be guaranteed, as it can reasonably be.
In the light of the foregoing, no reason is perceived for say-
ing that a mere distributor of water for a compensation should
be held liable as a guarantor of its quality. It is not a com-
modity kept for sale in the strict sense of the term, but is free
to everyone, in nature's reservoirs, like light and air. It is taken
directly or indirectly from a common source of supply. The im-
mediate source, as in this case, is usually selected in advance
and fixed by contract, leaving the mere service of a carrier to be
performed, of taking the water from such source and distributing
it to the consumers. To say that the person or corporation per-
forming that service shall be burdened with an implied warranty
of the quality of the thing carried and distributed, would be
treating the transaction as a sale, strictly so called, and then ap-
plying an exception to the doctrine of caveat emptor not sup-
916 Green v. Ashland Water Co. [Wisconsin,
ported "by good reason, or any anthority we are able to find, or
any to which our attention has been called. It would burden
such public service in a way that would be destructive of private
enterprise in that line, and render public enterprise ^^'^ in the
same direction so attended with dangers as to discourage a ser-
vice that has become a necessity in all communities of any con-
siderable size, and which promotes to a high degree the welfare
and happiness of individuals in communities, great or small. If
distributors of water under public franchises be held strictly
accountable for the exercise of ordinary care not to place before
their customers an unwholesome article under circumstances
liable to induce persons in the exQrcise of ordinary care, to use
it for drinking or other domestic purposes in ignorance of the
dangers attending the use, and held liable for deceit in such
transactions, and the law be firmly administered along thos'e
lines, the safety of individuals, as affected by public water ser-
vice, will be as well promoted as is consistent with the continu-
ance of such service, whether performed by strictly public or by
quasi public agencies.
From the foregoing it will be seen that if a recovery can be
sustained on the facts of this case at all, it must be on the
ground of actionable fraud or negligence without contributory
fault on the part of the deceased. If defendant knew, or from
the situation ought to have known, the water it was distributing
in the city of Ashland was dangerous for domestic use, from
some cause not discoverable ordinarily by the exercise of reason-
able care, it owed the duty to its customers of disclosing that
danger, and a failure so to do, knowing that such customers were
liable to use the water through ignorance of its character, waa
a fraud in law, rendering the defendant liable to legal damages
to any person injured by such fraud without fault on his part,
and it was also a failure of duty amounting to actionable negli-
gence as well, to which the same liability is incident. The mere
fact, if it be a fact, that it had been rendered impracticable for
defendant to procure a supply of wholesome water in Chequa-
megon bay, as required by the contract with the city, from causes
attributable to the municipality, though constituting *®® a de-
fense against any action on its contract with the city or to forfeit
its franchise, does not excuse knowingly pumping contaminated
water from the bay and distributing the same to customers and
deceiving them into the belief that it was wholesome. But, aa
indicated, though the conduct of the defendant be held wrong-
Nov. 1898.] Green v. Ashland Water Co. 917
ful on the ground of either fraud or negligence, if the deceased
knew, or under the circumstances ought to have known, the
dangerous condition of the water, yet used it with the conse-
quence complained of, no legal liability thereby attached to the
defendant. If the deceased knew, and he is charged with knowl-
edge of what a man of ordinary intelligence under the circum-
stances ought to have known, then he was not deceived, what-
ever may have been the conduct of the defendant; and for the
same reason he is chargeable with contributing to the result com-
plained of by his own want of care. So, plaintiff's cause of ac-
tion, if any there be, sounds in tort however we may look at it,
and knowledge, or its equivalent, on the part of the defendant,
.and want of such knowledge or equivalent on the part of the
deceased, is essential to legal liability in the one case as well as
the other, the only difference being in the manner of establish-
ing the fault of the deceased, the affirmative of that being on
the complainant if a recovery be sought on the ground of fraud,
and on the defendant if on the ground of actionable negligence.
The distinction between the two is exceedingly shadowy, and
really not important in the practical application of principles.
The foregoing discussion and statement is deemed justified, if
not called for, by the positions taken by counsel. If some of
the principles contended for were applied on a new trial of the
case, and it resulted favorably to the plaintiff, the misfortune
of a reversal might probably follow. The danger in that regard
may be avoided, guided by what has been said.
In considering the specific errors assigned, it appears *®® most
logical to first take up the rulings complained of on the admis-
sion of evidence. First in order is that admitting proof that
greater precautions to obtain pure water were taken by the de-
fendant after the occurrence complained of than before. If de-
fendant in fact knew the water supply was dangerously con-
taminated, the fact that it subsequently took means to correct
the evil, as we have seen, is immaterial on that question,
but the question of whether the water was impure, and whether
defendant negligently failed to remedy the difficulty, were
material, and determinable solely by the situation prior to
the occurrence complained of. What was done afterward had
no legitimate bearing on that question, and the Jury had no
right to draw any inference therefrom. Such evidence has been
repeatedly condemned by this and other courts: Castello v.
Landwehr, 28 Wis. 522; Anderson v. Chicago etc. Ry. Co., 87
918 Gbeen v. Ashland Water Co. [Wisconsin,
Wis. 195; Downey v. Sawyer, 157 Meiss, 418; Columbia etc.,E. R.
Co. V. Hawthorne, 144 U. S. 202; Baird v. Daly, 68 N. Y. 547;
Nalley v. Hartford Carpet Co., 51 Conn. 524; 50 Am. Rep. 47;
Terre Haute etc. Ry. Co. v. Clem, 123 Ind. 15; 18 Am. St. Rep.
303; Hodges v. Percival, 132 111. 53; Hudson v. Chicago etc. Ry.
Co., 59 Iowa, 581; 44 Am. Rep. 692; Motey v. Pickle etc. Co.,
74 Fed. Rep. 155.
What has been said on the subject of evidence of precautions
against sewage contamination after the occurrence complained
of, applies to evidence of experts, received against defendant's
objection, as to tests made of water taken from the bay some
time after such occurrence. For aught that appears, the water
may have been wholesome in the early part of March, 1894, and
very unwholesome when the subsequent tests were made. 'The
evidence shows that the deceased took the fever about the 1st
of March, and that the height of the typhoid fever epidemic
was not reached till the last of that month, there being several
hundred persons afflicted in all. Under the circumstances, suf-
ficient time had elapsed for a material change in the bay water
to have taken ^"^^ place. The admission of the evidence was
plainly prejudicial error. True, evidence of a situation existing
after an injury, though a considerable time may have elapsed,
is admissible to show the situation existing at the time of the
injury, if preceded by prima facie proof that no change has taken
place in the meantime: Tremblay v. Harnden, 162 Mass. 383.
Here that preliminary proof not only was wanting, but there was
a strong case to the contrary made by the evidence.
It is further assigned for error that the court allowed opinion,
evidence as to facts in issue — the evidentiary facts (not for sci-
entific controversy) relating thereto being in dispute — contrary
to the settled law on the subject, and as declared in numerous
decisions in this court, and recently stated in Maitland v. Gil-
bert Paper Co., 97 Wis. 476; 65 Am. St. Rep. 137. The follow-
ing are some of the questions complained of: "You may state
whether or not, in your opinion, the water furnished by the
Ashland Water Company during the winter and spring of 1894
had anything to do with the typhoid fever epidemic which pre-
vailed in the city of Ashland during that time?'* "What, in
your judgment, was the cause of the typhoid fever of which he
[Green] died?" "You say the typhoid fever, in this case, in
your opinion, was caused by drinking bay water: Do you say that
from the investigations you made?" All the questions were an-
Nov. 1898.] Green v. Ashland Water Co. 919
48wered in the affirmative. The learned counsel for respondent
€ay, in support of the questions, that they were proper because
the effect of evidence produced in establishing controverted
facts, on which opinions were given, was not involved — that such
facts were not in dispute. We are unable to see the case that
way.. How can it be said the question was established beyond
controversy that the deceased did not drink other than bay
water? Let it be admitted that up to within four days from the
time he was stricken with the disease, bay water was used at
his working place as well as at his home. ^"^^ How can it be
assumed from that alone that he did not drink water elsewhere
or come in contact with some other medium whereby the seeds
of the disease were taken into his system? As to each of these
points, if the evidence was such as to remove it from the realms
of mere conjecture, certainly it was not established in plaintiff's
favor so as to warrant taking it from the jury, and, if not, cer-
tainly the expert could not properly pass upon the evidence in
giving his opinion. All the facts on which the opinions were
given, except that Green died of typhoid fever, and that prior
to his taking the disease he habitually used bay water for drink-
ing purposes, were in controversy. It seems clear that opinions
going to the question of how the disease was contracted could
have been properly elicited only on hypothetical questions, leav-
ing the jury free to consider such opinions after finding from
other evidence the existence of the foundation facts upon which
they were based.
As a second proposition, respondent suggests, with apparent
confidence, that the questions were proper under the rule that a
physician may testify as to the cause of death from personal ex-
amination or knowledge. That rule is familiar, but extends no
further than the immediate cause of death, because, manifestly,
that is the limit of scientific investigation. Failure to observe
that test often leads to prejudicial error. A competent witness
may testify as to whether a person came to his death by a wound
found upon the body, but not as to who inflicted it, because, as
said, he cannot go beyond the range of scientific investigation.
This court said an expert may testify that certain injuries to a
female, found on personal examination, may have been caused
by a ravishment, but not that they were so caused, and, we may
add, certainly not who was the guilty party: Noonan v. State,
55 Wis. 258. These illustrations show clearly that respondent's
■counsel erred in relying on the rule mentioned to sustain the
920 GBEifiN V. Ashland Water Co. [Wisconsin^
method of examination of the expert resorted to. ^'^ That such
was their reliance is evident from the the fact that they rounded
out their examination hy interrogating the witness as to whether
he gave his opinions from personal examination. Wherever ex-
pressions are used in the hooks to the effect that opinion evi-
dence of the cause of death, based on personal examination, is
admissible, they will readily be seen, by a little attention to the
matter, to relate solely to the immediate "cause, not what set the
cause in motion.
Opinion evidence was permitted against objection, as to the-
duty of the defendant with reference to testing the water supply.
As to this, respondent's counsel answer the objectionable parts
of the evidence, if there be such, were not responsive to the
questions. An examination of the record fails to bear out that
view. The questions were: "What, in your judgment, should
the water company do with reference to ascertaining the purity
or impurity of the water?" "How frequently, in your judg-
ment, should these analyses be made?'* They seem to call ver^
clearly for opinion evidence as to the duty of defendants as re-
gards testing the water supply. That certainly, if material at
all, was a question to be determined by the jury. No ground
is perceived upon which the questions can be sustained. It was
competent to show by opinion evidence that the quality of the
water was only determinable by certain tests, but whether legal
duty required defendant to make the tests was certainly not a
matter for such evidence.
The appellant further complains of a ruling, admitting in 'evi-
dence an article published in an Ashland newspaper about seven,
months prior to Green's death, wherein the defendant was
charged with distributing poisonous water to its customers and
requiring the city to pay for water service twice as much as was
proper, and it was suggested that the most expeditious method
of dealing with defendant, in order to remedy the evils com-
plained of, was to annul its franchise and seize its property; and
it was further suggested that the ^'^^ officers of the company
should be prosecuted without leniency, civilly and criminally,
if they did not voluntarily and immediately remedy such evils.
There can be no justification suggested for the admission of that
evidence. We have a right to assume that the learned counsel
for respondent were unable to suggest any, as they did not at-
tempt to do 60. If overcharges were made by the water com-
pany, that had nothing to do with causing the death of Greei^
Nov. 1898.] Green v. Ashland Water Co. 921
by typhoid fever, and if the death was so caused, the declaration*
made in a newspaper in regard to the condition of the water
certainly had no possible bearing on that question. They were
no more competent as evidence because made editorially In a
newspaper than if made by any individual. They had no legiti-
mate place in th'e trial. They were well calculated to prejudice
the jury against the defendant and prevent a fair and impartial
trial of the important issues between the parties on the legiti-
mate evidence produced. An examination of the record show*
that considerable other evidence, admitted over the objections
of appellant's counsel, to which no particular reference is made
in their brief, was irrelevant and prejudicial. This observation
refers to the proceedings of the common council covering a
period of about one year before Green's death and a month or
two afterward. That placed before the jury the history of a
bitter contest that existed between defendant and the city of
Ashland, covering the period mentioned. It closed with a reso-
Ition passed some time after the death of Green, cancelling the
defendant's franchise and directing the city attorney to com-
mence proceedings to annul the same by judicial decree and to
condemn the water supply. It is not claimed that any of this
evidence was admissible for any purpose except to show notice
to the defendant that it was claimed by the city that the bay
water was unwholesome for domestic use. So little of it was
relevant for that purpose, and that little so involved with mat-
ter having no bearing even on the question of notice, ^'^'* and so
tending to prejudice the minds of the jury unfavorably to the
defendant and to prevent a fair trial, that the whole should have
been rejected on defendant's objection.
The remaining question for consideration was raised by the
motion for a nonsuit, the motion to direct a verdict, and the
motion for a new trial. All the rulings may properly be con-
sidered together. The learned trial court correctly held that
the franchise under which the defendant operated its works did
not require it to go outside of Chequamegon bay for a water
supply. Following that and the negligence alleged in the com-
plaint— failure to extend the intake pipe to a point beyond the
reach of sewage contamination — the court submitted to the jury
these questions: "Could the defendant company have procured
wholesome water from Chequamegon bay at and prior to the
sickness of Green?'* **Wa3 the defendant company guilty of
negligence which was the proximate cause of the death of
S22 Green v. Ashland Water Co. [Wisconsin,
Oreen?" "Did defendant know, or ought it reasonably to Have
known, prior to the time when the deceased contracted the dis-
ease from which he died, that the water it furnished deceased
was contaminated by typhoid germs?" To each of such ques-
tions the jury answered in the affirmative. Thus, it will be
€een, the right of plaintiff to recover was made to turn on
whether defendant negligently failed to extend its intake pipe
into pure water in Chequamegon bay. As heretofore indicated,
the mere fact of impracticability or impossibility of obtaining a
pure water supply in the bay, if such were the facts, did not
legally excuse defendant from knowingly distributing danger-
ously impure water for domestic consumption under such cir-
cumstances that persons of ordinary intelligence might probably
use the same with dangerous consequences. But as that was not
the theory of the pleaders in making up the issues for trial, or
in the submission of their case to the jury, the case will be con-
sidered as the parties and the trial court considered it. Whether
E judgment ^''^ could be sustained under the complaint and
findings of fact against defendant on the other theory, is imma-
terial, on account of the branch touching defendant's fault
which is to be considered hereafter.
Does the evidence warrant the finding that defendant failed to
exercise ordinary care to procure a pure water supply from the
bay? That, as indicated, is the key to plaintiff's case. We
have searched the record from beginning to end, and read and
reread it with the greatest care, to find such evidence, and have
failed. The point was raised in appellant's brief that no such
evidence exists, and no reply thereto appears in the brief of re-
spondent. No evidence is pointed out by them upon which the
findings can rest. They evidently turned, if based on evidence
at all, on an unsworn report of a chemist, based in part on an
unverified report of an examination made by Vaughn, of the
Michigan University, of several samples of water, one of which
was taken from a point about one thousand feet east of the
breakwater, which point was about two miles from the pump-
ing station. The samples were selected some time after the oc-
currence complained of. The one east of the breakwater was
the only one found free from sewage contamination. The chem-
ist who made the report did not place sufficient reliance thereon
to recommend resorting for a supply to the place where, on the
single occasion, pure water was found. He thought a supply
might be found there with reasonable certainty, but expressed a
Noy. 1898.] Green v. Ashland Water Co. 928
preference for going outside the bay entirely. All the sworn
•evidence in the case shows that if pure water was found on one
•occasion at a particular place, that situation might or might not
•continue; that the bay water was so generally contaminated with
sewage, especially in the spring, that a safe supply could not
be found there with any reasonable certainty. Dr. Hosmer said,
if there was no current, there would be more protection; that
toward Washburn, just before reaching the sewage on that side
•of the *^® bay, was the safest place, but on account of the swing-
ing currents one could not tell anything about it; that empty-
ing so much sewage into the bay was sufficient to condemn it
as a source of water supply without any test. Some tests were
made of samples taken from different parts of the bay, one be-
ing near Houghton Point, several miles from the pumping sta-
tion, that being the only one free from sewage contamination.
One of the experts said that it was improper to take water for
dietetic use from a body of water having no current, into which
the sewage of a city was drained, unless the sewage delivery and
the end of the intake pipe were many miles apart. There is a
large amont of evidence of that character in the record, and
nothing to controvert it.
Further, it is shown that nearly a year prior to the death of
Oreen, the officers of the city and the officers of the water com-
pany were of one mind as to the necessity of going outside the
bay to get water suitable for domestic use. As early as Febru-
ary, 1893, an official report was made to the common council
and adopted, to the effect that the intake pipe should be ex-
tended so as to take the water supply from the lake instead of
the bay, and the city attorney was requested to draw a resolu-
tion formally directing the defendant to make such extension.
In April, thereafter, such a resolution was drafted by the board
of health and adopted by the council, and thereafter an attempt
was made to condemn the water supply and annul the defend-
ant's franchise because it did not go to the lake with its intake
pipe. It clearly appears all though the proceedings of the com-
mon council, for nearly a year prior to the death of Green, that
all parties understood that the bay water was unsuitable for
dietetic use. During all that time a contest existed between
the municipality and the defendant as to whether the latter
•was obliged to extend the intake pipe into the lake, it being
agreed that water free from dangerous pollution could not be
obtained from the bay.
924 Green v. Ashland Water Co. [Wisconsin,
277 That being the situation as to the primary parties to the
contract, the situation could not be different as to private per-
sons who became parties thereto by claiming the benefit of the
contract. The verdict of the jury on the point here considered
appears to be contrary to the evidence, and if a recovery on the
record depends on that question, the verdict should have been
directed for the defendant, and the judgment appealed from
cannot stand. There is no explanation, it would seem, of the
finding of the jury, consistent with the theory that it was based
on evidence, except that they considered that regarding the fil-
tration system, and did not mean to say that the water of the
bay, without treatment by filtration, could at any point be de-
pended upon as a safe source of supply.
It is further contended by appellant's counsel that the evi-
dence conclusively shows contributory fault of deceased, pre-
cluding a recovery. As before indicated, i£ deceased drank
the bay water with knowledge, or reasonable means of knowl-
edge, that it was dangerously polluted with sewage, he took
upon himself the risk, and the plaintiff cannot recover, whether
recovery be sought on the ground of deceit or negligence. The
jury found specifically for plaintiff on that point, yet said by
another finding that prior to the death of Green it was publicly
and widely stated, and believed, among the citizens of Ashland,
that the cause of typhoid fever epidemics in the city was the
impure drinking water furnished by defendant. In view of the
fact, which we deem uncontroverted by the evidence, that the
water was impure, and that such condition had existed for a
long time and was widely and commonly known, the findings
referred to are inconsistent, there being no evidence explaining
why the deceased did not know of that which was a matter of
common knowledge in the community where he lived. Com-
mon knowledge of a fact raises a presumption that all persons
of average intelligence have notice of it. That is elementary.
^''^ Not only was there no proof to justify the jury in saying
the deceased did not have reasonable ground to believe what
they said was commonly known and believed, but there is much
affirmative evidence to the contrary. He knew that the sewage
of the city was drained into the bay, and that the defendant's
water supply was taken therefrom. He was an intelligent, read-
ing, workingman. He took one of the city papers wherein the
ddngers of taking water from the bay were discussfed. He had
typhoid fever in his family six months before he was stricken.
Nov. 1898.] Green v. Ashland Water Co, 925
his wife being the afflicted party. She was attended by Dr.
Hosmer, one of plaintiff's witnesses, who was thoroughly con-
versant with the condition of defendant's water supply, and who
probably talked with the deceased on the subject, as he did with
intelligent men generally, it being a matter of common talk.
All these facts are in evidence. It is not deemed advisable to
quote the evidence at length. Suffice it to say that the proof is
overwhelming to the point that the bay water was dangerously
polluted at the time Green was stricken with the fever, and that
it had been in that condition, especially in the spring, for several
years; that the facts in that regard were understood in the city
generally, and had been the subject of discussion at public meet-
ings and in the city council, and in the newspapers, and among
the people for a long time. There is no evidence in the record
to rebut the presumption that the deceased had notice of what
was so commonly known. So we cannot escape the conclusion
that the verdict of the jury on the subject of Green's contribu-
tory fault is without evidence to support it, and that the con-
trary is established by the evidence. For this and the other
reasons mentioned the Judgment appealed from must be re-
versed.
By the Court. The judgment of the circuit court is reversed,
and the cause remanded for a new trial.
WATER COMPANIES— POT.LUTING WATER-INCONSIS-
TENT RIGHTS.— Two rights, which are perfectly Inconsistent, can-
not be enjoyed together. Thus, a canal cannot be used to carry wa-
ter fit for irrigation and water unfit for irrigation at the same time,
for a use of it for one of the purposes is an exclusion of the other:
North Point Irr. Co. v. Utah etc. Canal Co., 16 Utah, 246, 67 Am. St.
Bep. 607, and note.
EVIDENCE OP PRECAUTION TAKEN AFTER AN ACCI-
DENT Is not admissible to show negligence: Bloomlngton v. Legg,
151 111. 9, 42 Am. St. Rep. 216, and note collecting the cases.
EVIDENCE— OPINIONS OF WITNESSES.— A witness may tes-
tlfy as to the proper manner of performing work where he shows a
practical a*d actual knowledge of what was necessary to be done:
Kehler v. Schwenk, 151 Pa. St. 506, 31 Am. St. Rep. 777.
WITNESSES— PHYSICIANS— CAUSE OF DEATH.— A physl-
■clan may testify as to the cause of death In a particular case where
he has made a personal examination, or the facts are properly
brought to his notice by other testimony, or by hypothetical ques-
tions: See the extended note to Hammond v. Woodman, 66 Am. Dec
234-240, on the entire question of exx)ert medical testimony.
926 Maxwell v. Bank of New Richmond. [Wisconsin,
Maxwell v. Bank op New Eiohmond.
[101 Wisconsin, 286.]
ATTACHMENT— SERVICE OF GARNISHMENT— EFFECT
OF.— The service of garnishee process operates as an equitable levy
upon property belonging to the principal defendant in the hands of
the garnishee, which levy may be enforced against such property
in the hands of any other than an innocent purchaser for value, un-
less such right of enforcement be waived.
ATTACHMENT— GARNISHMENT— ELECTION OF REME-
DIES.—Where a plaintiff in a suit of garnishment, in which process
has been served on the garnishee, having the right to prevent the
garnishee from disposing of the property for which he may be lia-
ble, elects to consider the garnishee his debtor and to take personal
judgment against him, he will be held to his election, and cannot
follow the property or its proceeds.
ATTACHMENT— GARNISHMENT— EFFECT OF APPEAI>
WITHOUT STAY.— A plaintiflC in garnishment having elected to sue
the garnishee personally, and judgment being rendered for the gar-
nishee, an appeal from such judgment does not operate as a super-
sedeas, or restrain in any way the conduct of the garnishee concern-
ing the property of the principal defendant in his hands. To pre-
serve his equitable lien upon such property plaintiff must have it
continued by special order of court, and, such continuance not being
had, such lien is not revived by a reversal of the judgment appealed
from. Persons taking the property from the garnishee pending the
appeal take it free from such equitable lien.
Action for money had and received by defendant from Simon-
ton, garnishee, pending an appeal by plaintiff herein, who was
also plaintiff in the garnishment suit, from a judgment in favor
of the garnishee in a suit brought to enforce a personal liability
against the garnishee.
W. F. McNally, for the appellant.
Baker & Haven, for the respondent.
288 MARSHALL, J. The judgment appealed from must
be reversed, for two reasons: 1. The~eIection to take judgment
against the garnishee for the amount of plaintiffs' claim pre-
cluded them from subsequently following the property or the
proceeds thereof; and 2. The equitable lien in the garnishee
proceedings not being continued in any way pending the appeal,.
or the judgment appealed from stayed, or the garnishee re-
strained from executing such judgment, it protected the gar-
nishee defendant as to anjrthing he did pursuant thereto before
it was reversed.
True, the service of the garnishee process operated as an
equitable levy upon the property in the hands of Simonton
belonging to the defendant: Globe Milling Co. v. Boynton, 87
Nov. 1898.] Maxwell v. Bank op New Richmond, 927
Wis. 619; Morawetz v. Sun Ins. Office, 96 Wis. 175; 65 Am. St.
Rep. 43. But it by no means follows that under all circum-
Btances the plaintiffs could follow either the property or thfr
proceeds thereof into the hands of other parties. A bona fide
purchaser of the property without notice of the equitable lien
would take it discharged of the encumbrance, and the proceeds
of the property in the hands of a bona fide holder would be
likewise free from any claim of the plaintiff. The protection
of the plaintiff under such circumstances, against the liability of
the garnishee to dispose of the property pending the proceed-
ings, is the right to a personal judgment **® against him, if
that becomes necessary to protect the interest of the plaintiff;,
or, if the garnishee be insolvent, a restraining order may be ob-
tained in the proceeding, preventing any disposition of the prop-
erty untn the further order of the court or the termination of the
action, to that it may be produced for the benefit of the plaintiff
if such ultimately be the judgment of the court: Almy v. Platt,.
16 Wis. 169; Malley v. Altman, 14 Wis. 22; Sweet v. Oliver, 56
Iowa, 744. If no precaution be taken to prevent the garnishee
from disposing of the property for which he may be liable, the
plaintiff's reliance must be wholly on the statute which gives
him the right to such a judgment as will properly protect his-
rights, and if, in that situation, he elects to consider the gar-
nishee as his debtor and to take a personal judgment as the
price of his equitable interest in the property, the result is the
same as in any other case of election between two remedies.
Once taken, it fixes the relations 'between the parties, and the
person so electing cannot thereafter recall his act and take a
different and inconsistent position: Bank of Lodi v. Washburn
etc. Power Co., 98 Wis. 547. Here, unless plaintiffs lost their
right to hold the garnishee responsible for the property of the
debtor in his hands by not controlling its possession and disposi-
tion pending the appeal, they had a right to a personal judgment
against the garnishee, treating him as their debtor, or a judg-
ment treating the property as in the custody of the court, and all
persons coming into the possession of any part of the same, or
the proceeds thereof, with notice of the equitable lien thereon,
as liable to account therefor. They elected to take a personal
judgment, and thereby waived the right, if any they had, te
follow the property or the proceeds.
There can be no question but that the appeal from the judg-
ment in favor of the garnishee did not operate as a supersedeas
S28 Maxwell v. Bank of New Richmond. [Wisconsin,
or stay of proceedings "under such judgment, or ^^^ restrain in
-any way the conduct of the garnishee defendant concerning the
property of the principal defendant in his hands. Therefore, the
reversal of the judgment on appeal did not revive the equitable
lien upon such property. The whole scheme of the code evinces
clearly the intent that there shall be no stay in the execution of
« judgment carried to this court for review, except by a special
order to that effect or the giving of a bond to protect the respond-
■ent, or both, according to statutory requirements. Contrary to
the old practice, it is expressly provided that the mere suing out
of a writ of error and the giving of a bond to make it effectual,
-shall not operate as a supersedeas: Stats. 1898, sec. 3045. The
right of appeal is wholly a creature of the statute, and, when
•exercised, cannot have any greater affect as a supersedeas than
the suing out of a writ of error. It is laid down as an elementary
principle that a statutory appeal does not supersede a judgment
-or stay its execution in any way, except by compliance with the
special conditions requisite thereto: 2 Ency. of PI. & Pr. 333,
and note. In that view the several sections of the statutes relat-
ing to stays on appeals were evidently designed to meet all situa-
tions where a stay, in any event, should be granted. If there be
a case not covered thereby, there being no statute prohibiting
it, the trial court, and this court as well, undoubedly have in-
herent power to grant a stay if justice requires it, and to make
such an order on proper terms as may be necessary to make the
final judgment of the court effective. In case of an appeal from
a judgment dismissing an attachment or dissolving an injunc-
tion, the statute provides for continuing the same pending the
appeal: Stats. 1898, sec. 3061. Manifestly, in the absence of
«uch a continuance, the reversal of the order would not revive
the condition existing at the time of its entry so as to render the
then prevailing party liable for his conduct in the meantime.
A judgment against the ^*** garnishee protects him in comply-
ing therewith, and a reversal of it on appeal, where not super-
seded or stayed, is without prejudice to a compliance by the
garnishee with the judgment in the meantime: Rood on Gar-
nishment, sec. 215, and cases cited. And the same is true where
the judgment appealed from is in favor of the garnishee. It dis-
charges the equitable attachment of the property of the defend-
ant in the principal action just as effectually as an order dis-
charging an attachment releases the attached property from the
«pecific lien thereon created by such attachment. To preserve
Nov. 1898.] Maxwell v. Bank op New Richmond. 929
"the lien, in either case, for the purpose of further proceed-
ings, it must be continued by special order of the court and in.
compliance with the statute governing the subject, or the direc-
tion of the court, where not regulated by statute. It follows
that if a judgment be rendered in the court of original jurisdic-
tion in favor of the garnishee, and the lien of the plaintiff be not
continued pending an appeal or review on writ of error, and the
garnishee treat the property sought to be reached as free from
the equitable lien pending the proceedings, and by reason of a
reversal of the judgment the cause proceeds to a new trial, he
should be allowed to plead the disposition of the property while
discharged of the lien, as a defense: Webb v. Miller, 24 Miss.
•C38; 57 Am. Dec. 189.
The result of the application of the principles stated in the
foregoing to the case before us is that the defendant came
rightfully into possession of the money received from Simon-
ton, has a right to retain the same, and that plaintiffs have no
claim thereto whatever. The judgment in favor of Simonton
discharged the equitable lien of plaintiffs, and it was not revived
by a reversal of the judgment to the prejudice of the garnishee
defendant or those dealing with him. The lien not being con-
tinued pending the appeal, it was lost beyond recovery by the
disposition of the property pursuant to the judgment discharg-
ing the garnishee. The judgment ^^^ of the trial court to the
•contrary was erroneous and must be reversed.
By the court. The judgment of the circuit court is reversed,
and the cause remanded, with directions to dismiss the com-
plaint and to render judgment in favor of the defendant for
costs to be taxed according to law.
ATTACHMENT— GARNISHMENT— LIEN.— The garnishment by
the plaintiff of a debt due the defendant creates an Inchoate right
■to a lien upon the property of the garnishee: Montana Nat. Bank
r. Merchants' Nat. Bank, 19 Mont. 586, 61 Am. St. Rep. 532, and
note: Hulley v. Chedlc, 22 Nev. 127, 58 Am. St. Rep. 720.
ATTACHMPTNT— GARNISHMENT— EFFECT OF.— A garnish-
ment of a warehouseman, having personal property of the defend-
ant In his possession, charges such warehouseman with the respon-
sibility of retaining the property as In the custody of the law. In or-
der that It may be applied to the satisfaction of the debt on which
the garnishment was placed: Cooley v. Minnesota etc. Ry. Co., 53
Minn. 327, 39 Am. St. Rep. 609. Where a sheriff attaches a vessel
which passes Into the hands of a stranger with knowledge of the
attachment, the lien of the attaching creditor will, in equity, be al-
lowed to follow the vessel, and attach itself to the money In the
hands of such stranger, for which the vessel was sold by him: Nor-
•ton V. Hlxon. 25 111. 439. 79 Am. Dec. 338.
AH. St. Ekf., Vou LXX.— 59
930 Anderson v. Hayes. [Wisconsin^
APPEAI^NOT OPERATE AS A SUPERSEDEAS.— An appeal
does not operate as a supersedeas and stay the execution of a maa-
damus: Plnckney t. Henegan, 2 Strob. 250, 49 Am. Dec. 592.
Anderson v. Hates.
[101 Wisconsin, 538.1
LANDLORD AND TENANT— DANGEROUS CONDITION
OF LEASED PREMISES— LIABILITY OF LANDLORD.— The les-
sor of premises containing an elevator which is dangerous, owing to
a secret mechanical defect, known to the lessor, but not discover-
able by the lessee in the exercise of reasonable care, is liable to em-
ployes of the lessee for injuries received in operating the elevator
and resulting from such secret defect.
ELEVATORS — DEFECTIVE — INJURIES RESULTING
THEREFROM— CONSTRUCTION OF PLEADING.— In an action
for injuries sustained in operating an elevator which contained a-
secret defect alleged to be unknown to plaintiff, an allegation that
the elevator would not sustain the weight ordinarily and usually
placed upon it, but would drop to the ground, and was thereby a
nuisance, will be construed as meaning that the elevator was liable
to fall at any time in the course of the ordinary and necessary us*
thereof, and not as meaning that the elevator fell whenever used»
so that all who used it must have known of the defect.
Action by employes of lessee of premises containing an
elevator against the lessor for injuries received while operating
such elevator. Appeal from judgment for plaintiffs.
Boss, Dwyer & Hanitch and George B. Hudnall, for the ap«
pellant.
O'Brien & Vaughn and John Jenswold, Jr., for the respond-
ent.
'^^^ WINSLOW, J. These are actions by the employes of a
tenant against the landlord for injuries resulting, as it ia-
claimed, from a concealed defect in the demised premises, known
to the landlord, but not known by, nor disclosed to, the tenant,^
nor capable of being ascertained by the tenant by a reasonably
careful examination of the premises. The principle is well set-
tled that a tenant takes leased premises in the condition in which
they happen to be when leased, and that the landlord is not lia-
ble to the tenant for injuries resulting from lack of repair unless
he has contracted to repair, or unless the defect be a concealed
one known to the landlord and not disclosed to the tenant and
Jan. 1899.] Anderson v, Hayes. 931
not discoverable by the use of that degree of care which the law
demands; and it is equally well settled that an employe, servant,
or subtenant of the tenant has no greater rights as against the
landlord than the tenant himself: Cole v. McKey, 66 Wis. 500;
57 Am. Rep. 293. The rule is thus stated in Cowen v. Sunder-
land, 145 Mass. 363; 1 Am. St. Rep. 469: "Where there are con-
cealed defects attended with danger to the occupant, and which
a careful examination °^* would not discover, known to the
lessor, the latter is bound to reveal them in order that the lessee
may guard against them. While the failure to reveal such facts
may not be actual fraud or misrepresentation, it is such negli-
gence as may lay the foundation of an action against the lessor if
injury occurs." The rule is also recognized and stated in 2
Wood on Landlord and Tenant, section 381, and numerous case»
are there cited in its support.
We think the allegations of the present complaint bring the
case within the rule. The concealed defect was in the size of
the grooves in the clamp which held the rope above the elevator.
It is alleged to have been known to the landlord and not dis-
closed to the tenant, nor discoverable by him save upon particular
inspection and examination. This we take to mean substan-
tially taking the clamp off and examining the size of the groove,
because it is evident that mere inspection from outside would not
disclose the size of the groove, which was necessarily closed over
the rope. We do not think that the rules of reasonable care go
so far as to require the taking apart of machinery provided for
such a purpose.
It is argued that the allegation to the effect that the elevator
would not sustain the weight which was ordinarily and usually
placed upon it, but would drop to the ground, and was thereby
a nuisance, must be construed as meaning that the elevator fell
whenever it was used, and hence that all who used it must have
known of the defect. We do not regard this construction, how-
ever, as reasonable, especially in view of the fact that it is alleged
that the plaintiffs had no knowledge of the defect in the elevator
or of the dangers in its use. The allegation evidently means
that the elevator was liable to fall at any time in the course of
the ordinary and necessary use thereof.
By the Court. Orders affirmed.
Bardeen, J., took no part.
932 PoBTANCE V. Lehigh Valley Coal Co. [Wisconsin,
LANDLORD AND TENANT - CONDITION OF LEASED
PREMISES— LIABILITY OF LANDLORD.— At landlord does not
owe to a lessee, nor to the servants or employes of the lessee, the
duty of making an examination of the leased premises before turn-
ing them over to the lessee, for the purpose of determining whether
appliances used therein axe in such a condition that no injury shall
result therefrom to the lessee or his employes from their being out
of repair or weakened by the use already made of them, where the
lessee, by reasonable effort, could have discovered and guarded
against danger as well as the lessor: Whitmore v. Orono Pulp etc.
Co., 91 Me. 297, 64 Am. St. Rep. 229, and note. But a landlord is
answerable to his tenant for injuries received by the latter from hid-
den defects in the leased premises existing at the date of the lease,
of which he was ignorant, and of which the landlord knew, or might
have known, had he exercised reasonable care and diligence. This
liability does not rest upon contract or warranty, but on tne obli-
gation Implied by law that the landlord will not expose the tenant
or the public to danger, of which he knows, or in good faith
should know, and which the tenant does not know and cannot ascer-
tain by the exercise of reasonable care and diligence: Willcox v.
Hines, 100 Tenn. 538, 66 Am. St. Rep. 770, and monographic note
thereto; Willcox v. Hines, 100 Tenn. 524, 66 Am. St. Rep. 761.
PoRTANOE V, Lehigh Yalley Coal Company.
[101 WiscoKSiN, 674.]
MASTER AND SERVANT-DUTY OF MASTER TO SER-
VANT.— The duty of a master to his servant is to provide him rea-
sonably safe and proper tools, implements, and apparatus with
which to work, reasonably competent and careful coemployfis, and
a reasonably safe place to work.
MASTER AND SERVANT— DANGEROUS EMPLOYMENT-
DUTY OF MASTER— DELEGATION OF DUTY.— When an em-
ployment Is in Its nature perilous. It is the duty of the master to
provide reasonable and necessary precautions and safeguards
against such perils, and no delegation of that duty can relieve him
from responsibility for failure to perform it.
MASTER AND SERVANT— WARNING OF STARTING OF
MACHINERY- NEGLIGENCE OF FELLOW-SERVANT.— In en-
tering upon an employment a servant assumes the risk of the negli-
gence of fellow-servants, and if the master properly selects such a
fellow-servant to give warning of the starting of machinery, and In-
structs him for that purpose, he Is not responsible for the negligence
of such servant in the performance of such duty, resulting in Injury
to a coemploy6.
MASTER AND SERVANT— PRECAUTIONARY REGULA-
TIONS—ASSUMPTION OF RISK.— A servant of ten years' experi-
ence In the unloading of coal from vessels, who has worked In a par-
ticular employment of that kind, where all the conditions are the
usual ones, for several months, will be held to have assumed any
risk arising from a lack of precautionary regulations prescribed by
his master.
MASTER AND ftERVANT-FELLOW-SERVANTS.— In un-
loading coal from a vessel, servants engaged in the common under-
Jan. 1899.] Portance v. Lehigh Valley Coal Co. 933
taking, under common direction and command, with no right of con-
trol one over the other, as the scraper-man, whose duty It Is to start
the machinery, the hatch-man, whose duty It Is to signal the start*
Ing of machinery by the scraper-man, and to give warning to ser-
vants in the hold of the vessel, and other servants engaged In the
common undertaking, are fellow-servants.
APPEAL^EKROR— REVOKING ORDER OF NONSUIT.— It
Is not error for a court to withdraw its order of nonsuit and direct
a verdict instead, in an action for negligence, where no change In
the situation of parties has intervened and the Jury has not been
discharged.
In August, 1896, the defendant was operating an extensive
coal dock at the city of Superior, and the plaintifE was employed
as one of a gang unloading coal from a vessel. A man known as a
hoister raised the coal buckets from the hold of the vessel, start-
ing the machinery by a lever. On the dock a scraper-man oper-
ated similar machinery in emptying the buckets. Among the
general employes, besides the plaintiff, were a rigger, who
looked after the adjustment of tackle, ropes and other apparatus,
and a hatch-man, who stood at the hatch and communicated
between the men in the hold and the hoister and scraper-man,
signalled the starting and stopping of machinery by the latter,
and warned the men in the hold of anything endangering them.
Plaintiff, being injured by the unexpected starting of the
machinery, brought suit. Appeal from judgment for defendant.
Alexander Athey and O'Brien & Vaughn, for the appellant.
Boss, Dwyer & Hanitch, for the respondent.
'"'® DODGE, J. 1. The duty of a master to his servant is
definite and clear. It is to provide him reasonably safe and
proper tools, implements, and apparatus with which to work,
reasonably competent and careful coemploy^s, and a reasonably
safe place to work. These duties being performed, the result of
any accident must be borne by the servant. If he would seek
to make the master liable, he must prove an omission or failure
in some one of these three respects. The question, therefore, is
whether the evidence in this case — ^given all the weight to which
in any respect it can be entitled — did establish any such failure.
There is no claim or suggestion that the machinery or ap-
paratus was defective either in character or repair. There is
no suggestion that any of the coemploy6s were lacking in that
character for skill and caution which is required, nor of any
lack of care in the defendant or its representative in their selec-
tion. It is, however, strenuously argued that there was a failure
934 PoRTANCE V. Lehigh Valley Coal Co. [Wisconsin,
in the defendant's duty to make the place of labor safe, in that
notice or warning of the starting of the scraper machinery was
not given to the plaintiff. The contention of the plaintiff be-
low, and his principal contention in this court, was that the
master, recognizing the necessity of providing for such warning
as an element of ^''^ safety of place, had employed a man
known as a hatch-tender for the purpose and with the duty,
amongst others, of giving the warning, and whom it thereby
constituted its representative or agent to perform the duty of
giving warning for it, and that such hatch-tender failed to per-
form his said duty. He argues that this was a delegation to the
hatch-man of a duty resting on the master, and, therefore, that
the former's negligence is imputable to the latter.
This position involves a confusion of ideas. It is undoubt-
edly true that, when the employment is in its nature perilous, it
is the duty of the master to provide reasonable and necessary
precautions and safeguards against such perils, and that no
delegation of that duty can relieve him from responsibility for
failure to perform it. If injury to employes is to be appre-
hended from starting of machinery, or from passage of cars, as in
Promer v. Milwaukee etc. Ey. Co., 90 Wis. 215; 48 Am. St. Kep.
905, and that danger can be avoided by reasonable precautions
in the way of warning or otherwise, it may well be the duty of
the master to make provision and give direction for such pre-
cautions; but, when he does so, he fulfills his duty. If reason-
able care would require that a coemploye be provided to give
warning, it would be necessary for the master to provide one;
but, if he properly selected and instructed a competent man for
that purpose, he would no more be responsible for a failure of
the warning through negligence of such servant than he would
for the results of the negligence in performance of any other
duty by a coemploye. That is one of the risks assumed by the
other servants: Dahlke v. Illinois etc. Co., 100 Wis. 431.
This was the full scope of the decision of this court in Promer
V. Milwaukee etc. Ky. Co., 90 Wis. 215; 48 Am. St. Rep. 905.
The only point there decided was that the question should have
been submitted whether the company had prescribed sufficient
regulations to guard against injuries to its employes from mov-
ing about cars in its yards: Smith v. Chicago etc. Ry. Co., '^^
91 AVis. 503, 505. If there is anything in the opinion in that
case which can be construed as holding that, after due and suf-
ficient regulation providing for precautions by a fellow-servant,
Jan. 1899.] Portancb v. Lehigh Valley Coal Co. 935
his negligence could impose liability on tlie employer, such con-
fitruction is contrary to the well-settled law of this state, and not
intended in that case.
The rule on this subject is well expressed and illustrated in
Hartvig v. N. P. L. Co., 19 Or. 522: "As it is the duty of the
master to furnish a reasonably safe place for his servant to work,
at became the duty of the defendant company to provide such
reasonable rule or regulation in the conduct of the business aa
would protect the men while engaged in their work at the foot
■of the chute. It required the defendant not simply to employ
4skillful and competent agents and employes in its service, but to
adopt rules and regulations adapted to the dangerous nature of
the business, so as to guard against accidents; in a word, to be
"vigilant in the use of means, and in the adoption of measures, to
make the servants reasonably safe in their employment. To
this extent the master assumes the risks, while the servant as-
sumes the natural and ordinary risks incident to the business in
which he is engaged, including those arising from the negli-
gence of his fellow-servants."
The rule here announced does not at all infringe the other
well-settled doctrine that in providing the safe place to work, aa
in building a scaffold or putting in place timbers to which
tackle is to be attached (Jarnek v. Manitowoc etc. Co., 97 Wis.
C37), the duty of the master is satisfied only by actual perform-
ance, whether he does the work with his own hands or through
servants, even though the latter may also afterward work with
the plaintiff in the service, depending on the safety of such pre-
liminary structures or appliances: See Cadden v. American Steel
Barge Co., 88 Wis. 409, 417; Smith v. Chicago etc. Ey. Co., 43
Wis. 520, 526.
In this case, there is absolutely no evidence of any lack of
*®* precautionary regulations prescribed by the defendant; al-
though, if such contention were made, it would be rendered
immaterial by the fact, fully apparent, that the conditions were
all the usual ones, and the defendant, a man of ten years' expe-
rience in such service, had worked under them from the spring
until August, and must be held to have assumed any risk there-
irom. The injury in this case resulted, so far as the evidence
goes, from the negligence of the scraper-man in starting his
machinery without signal from the rigger, with whom plaintiff
was working. If, as plaintiff contends, it also resulted from the
omission of the hatch-man to give warning, no liability of the
936 PoRTANCE V. Lehigh Valley Coal Co. [Wisconsin,
defendant results, for the hatch-man, as also the scraper-man,
were clearly fellow-servants with plaintiff, all engaged in the
common undertaking of unloading the coal from the same boat,
and under common direction and command, with no right of
control one over the other: Prybilski v. Northwestern Coal Ey.
Co., 98 Wis. 413; Foley v. The Peninsular, 79 Fed. Eep. 972>
Luebke v. Chicago etc. Ey. Co., 63 Wis. 91; 53 Am. Eep. 266;
Ocean S. S. Co. v. Cheeney, 86 Ga. 278. It should be noted in
passing, however, that much which is said as to the giving of
notice by the hatch-man as a protection to the plaintiff is mis-
leading and confusing. If, as appears to be established by plain-
tiff's evidence, the scraper-man started his machinery without a
signal, no hatch-man, however vigilant, could give any effective
warning. The pressing of the lever by the scraper-man, and
the starting of the rope, to the injury of plaintiff, were neces-
sarily instantaneous. No observation by the man at the hatch
could be communicated to the man in the hold so quickly as the
motion was communicated to the rope. No matter what duties
the hatch-man may have had to give warning of danger, they
could have no application to a danger like this, the effect of
which, in the nature of things, was as instantaneous as his ear-
liest possible discovery of it.
2. Error is alleged because the court, upon motion to direct
^^^ a verdict for defendant, first announced, "Nonsuit granted,"
and then withdrew that decision and directed a verdict. This
was done practically at once, before any change in the situation
of the parties had taken place, and before the jury had been dis-
charged. True, the noon recess had intervened, but nothing
else. We can see no error in this. Surely, a moment for locus
poenitentiae must be allowed courts. It certainly cannot be
held that the moment a judge announces a conclusion he is at
once foreclosed from any further congideration. Nothing is
more common than for counsel to suggest impropriety of some
order or decision when announced, and for the judge to modify
it. It would have been entirely competent for the court, after
announcing the granting of nonsuit, to have changed his mind,
either on a reason suggested by counsel or one occurring to him-
eelf, and to have then submitted the case to the jury.
3. Numerous exceptions to exclusion of questions on cross-
examination have been pressed upon our attention as errors.
We have examined them all" carefully, and, while in one or two
instances the restrictions on plaintiff*s cross-examination were
Jan. 1899.] Pobtance v. Lehigh Valley Coal Co, 937
Bomewhat severe, we do not think the discretion of the superior
court was abused. Most of the excluded questions related to
matters already fully covered by the cross-examinations. Others
merely inquired whether the witness had already testified to cer-
tain facts. StiU others were so worded that a direct answer
would be capable of misconstruction. ♦ A question to Anderson,
the hatch-man, as to whether he could have seen a signal it
given, might have been permitted, but its exclusion could not
prejudice plaintiff. He had testified that he saw none, and, if
his failure was due to his negligence, that could not promote
plaintiff's case.
We discover no prejudicial error, and no evidence tending to
prove negligence of defendant.
By the Court. Judgment affirmed.
Bardeen, J., took no part.
MASTER AND SP]IIV ANT— GENERAL DUTY OF MASTER TO
SERVANT.— A master must use due care In supplying his servants
with safe appliances, and a safe place In which to work. He can-
not escape liability by delegating these personal duties to another:
Ell V. Northern Pac. R. R. Co., 1 N. Dak. 336. 26 Am. St. Rep. 621;
Channon v. Sanford Co., 70 Conn. .573. 66 Am. St. Rep. 133, and note;
Kennedy v. Chase. 119 Cal. 637, 63 Am. St. Rep. 153. and note;
Chicago etc. R. R. Co. v. Maroney, 170 111. 520, 62 Am. St. Rep. 396,
and note; McMahon v. Ida Min. Co., 95 Wis. 308; 60 Am. St Rep. 117,
and note.
MASTER AND SERVANT— DUTY OF MASTER— DELEGA-
TION OP DUTY.— The duty of a master to provide his servant with
reasonably safe appliances and places to work is a personal one, and
he cannot, by delegating it to another, absolve himself from lia-
bility for its nonperformance: Edward Hines Lumber Co. v. Ligas,
172 111. 315, 64 Am. St. Rep. 38; Ell v. Northern Pac. R, B, Co., 1
N. Dak. 336, 26 Am. St. Rep. 621.
MASTER AND SERVANT— ASSUMPTION OF RISKS— FEL-
LOW-SERVANTS.—A servant assumes the risk of the negligence
of his fellow-servants, but not that of the master: Handley v. Daly
Min. Co., 15 Utah, 189, 62 Am. St Rep. 916, and note; Norfolk etc.
R. R. Co. V. Houchins, 95 Va. 398, 64 Am. St. Rep. 791, and note. The
master is liable if the servant Is Incompetent, and this Is known,
or should be known, to the master: Park v. New York Cent. etc. R.
R. Co., 155 N. Y. 215, 63 Am. St. Rep. 663; Chicago etc. R. R. Go. v.
Champion, 9 Ind. App. 510, 53 Am. St Rep. 357.
MASTER AND SERVANT— WHO ARE FELLOW-SERVANTS.—
Fellow-servants are those who are so far working together as to be
practically co-operating, and who have an opportunity to control or
influence the conduct of, and who have no superiority over, one an-
other: Flannegan v. Chesapeake etc. Ry. Co., 40 W. Va. 436, 52 Am.
St. Rep. 896, and note; Moore Lime Co. v. Richardson, 95 Va. 326,
64 Am. St Rep. 785, and note.
MASTER AND SFRV ANT— ASSUMPTION OF RISKS— DUTY
OF MASTER TO PROVIDE RULES.— A person of mature years
^33 Delafield v. Smith, [Wisconsin,
taking employment is presumed to assume the hazards thereof, and
his master is not liable for a failure to instruct him unless the master
knew, or had reason to believe, that the servant was ignorant of,
or incapable of comprehending the dangers of the service: Petersou
V. New Pittsburg Coal etc. Co., 149 Ind. 260, 63 Am. St Rep. 289,
.and note. But where the master is engaged in a complex business
requiring definite rules for their protection, it is his positive duty to
.adopt rules for the protection and safety of his employes: Moore
Lime Co. v. Richardson, 95 Va. 326, 64 Am. St Rep. 785.
Delafield v. Smith.
[101 Wisconsin, 664.]
BROKERS— SALES IN BROKER'S NAME— LIABILITY OP
PRINCIPAL.— Where an agreement between a broker and his prin-
■cipal for the sale of fruit does not authorize the former to make
•contracts of sale in his own name, but makes him a mere agent to
sell on commission, the principal is not liable to him for losses sus-
tained by reason of the principal's refusal to ship fruit to fill such
•contracts, because of which refusal the broker purchased fruit at
excessive market rates to fill the contracts; but if the principal ap-
proved such contracts he is liable to the broker for commissiona
thereon.
Dunwiddie & Wheeler, for the appellant.
Fathers, Jeffris & Mouat, for the respondent.
*** CASSODAY, C. J. It appears from the record that, dur-
ing the times mentioned, the plaintiffs were copartners, doing
business as commission merchants at New York, Chicago, St.
Louis, and San Francisco; that the defendant was engaged m
packing and shipping fruit from San Francisco to different parts
■of the country; that February 7, 1890, the plaintiffs and defend-
ant entered into an agreement in writing, wherein and whereby
the plaintiffs were made the sole and exclusive sales agents for
the defendant in all the territory of the United States and Can-
ada east of the Rocky Mountains, except Kansas City, and the
<lefendant thereby agreed to pay them on all goods shipped by
the defendant into such territory, whether sold by them or not,
five per cent commission on the selling price of all goods shipped
or consigned, and, in addition thereto, all proper charges against
Buch goods, such as freight, cartage, storage, insurance, et cetera,
as well as interest at the rate of eight per cent per annum on all
advances on such goods; that the plaintiffs therein agreed to act
as the defendant's agents in the sale of all his product of canned
Jan. 1899.] Delafield v. Smith. 939
fruit, and to make advances against shipments or sales to tHe
extent of seventy-five per cent of the market or selling value;
that guch advances were to be made by their acceptance of the
defendant's drafts with documents attached, at ten days* sight;
that, so far as the then present stock on hand was concerned,
the advances were to be sufficient to liquidate the amount due
the Bank of California against each shipment, provided such
amount should not exceed the net selling value, with commis-
eions deducted; ®®^ that the plaintiffs therein also agreed to as-
sume the guaranty of payment for goods after they had been
delivered and accepted by the purchaser; that it was thereby
mutually agreed that sales for future shipment were to be made
as the defendant might direct, he holding hims:elf liable for all
claims arising from nondelivery, delay in shipment, difference in
quality, short weight, or any other justifiable cause, but sales of
goods, whether to arrive or spot, upon which the plaintiffs might
have made advances, to be sold at their discretion; that the pro-
ceeds of sales were to be applied: 1. To the liquidation of all
charges against the goods, such as freight, cartage, storage, in-
surance, et cetera, and the commission therein provided for; and
2. To the liquidation of advances made by the plaintiffs; that
the surplus of the proceeds of any sale or consignment was to
be applied to the liquidation of the deficit in others, if any; that
May 28, 1890, the parties entered into a new written agreement
to the same effect, except that the five per cent commission was
to be "on the f. o. b. San Francisco selling price."
About January 1, 1891, the plaintiffs commenced this action
on such two contracts, and the complaint alleged as a breach of
such contracts that the plaintiffs had in 1890 entered into con-
tracts for the sale and delivery of canned goods at the prices
therein specified, to be furnished by the defendant, whereby the
plaintiffs obligated themselves for the performance of such con-
tracts and the delivery of such goods; that thereafter the de-
fendant refused to supply them with the goods they had so sold
and agreed to deliver; that they were obliged to, and did, go upon
the market and purchase goods to fill part of the contracts so
made by them; that, by reason of an advance in price, they were
obliged to pay for the goods so purchased $3,604 over and above
the amount for which the defendant had so agreed to furnish
them and at which he had directed the plaintiffs to sell; that, as
to parts of the contracts so made by them with other purchasers,
^^"^ upon such refusals of the defendant they settled with the
940 Delafield v. Smith. [Wisconsin^
purchasers, and were obliged to pay, in such settlements, the dif-
ference in price between the market value at the time of set-
tlement and at the time at which the goods should have been de-
livered, which difference amounted to $2,590; that they were
also entitled to a commission of five per cent upon the selling
price, to wit, $355.75.
The defendant answered by way of admissions and denials,
and alleged, in effect, that after he had constituted the plaintiffs
his agents, and after they had sold a large quantity of goods,
they violated their agreement by retaining part of the proceeds
of the sales which they should have accounted for and paid
over, and made unauthorized, wrongful, and unlawful charges
and deductions, and wholly failed to render any account for cer-
tain sales made by them, and otherwise violated their contract
with the defendant; that thereupon he promptly notified them
that he would make no further shipments unless they fully ac-
counted and paid over to him the proceeds of the sales they had
wrongfully retained; that upon their refusal to so account and
pay over, and by reason of the breach on their part of the agree-
ments, he refused to make any further shipments to them. The
answer further alleged, by way of a first counterclaim, that the
plaintiffs had sold a large quantity of his canned goods, and re-
ceived therefor $2,619.06, which they had wrongfully retained
and refused to pay over; and, as a second counterclaim, that
November 6, 1890, the plaintiffs purchased certain goods of
him, specified in the written agreements, and, after receiving
and accepting the same, except 150 cases of apricots and 550
cases of Crawford peaches, in violation of their written agree-
ments refused to accept, receive, or pay for such apricots and
peaches, by reason of which the defendant was damaged in the
sum of $1,326.95. The plaintiffs replied to each of the counter-
claims by way of denials.
668 rpijg cause was thereupon referred to Moses S. Prichard,
Esq., to hear; try, and determine; and upon the trial thereof it
was stipulated in writing, by and between the parties thereto,
in effect, that the plaintiffs had sold the fruits mentioned in the
complaint at the prices therein stated; that the defendant had
refused to deliver the fruit, and the plaintiffs were obliged to,
and did, purchase such fruit, and pay the market price and
value thereof to fill such sales, and that the plaintiffs sustained
loss on such sales as stated; that, as to the last five items, it was
admitted that the plaintiffs sold the fruits at the prices therein
Jan. 1899.] Dela field v. Smith. 941
mentioned; that the defendant refused to deliver the fruits, and
that the plaintiffs settled with the purchasers at the market
value at the time the delivery was agreed upon between the
plaintiffs and the purchasers, and that the plaintiffs paid such
purchasers the difference between the price the goods were sold
at and the market value, in lieu of the delivery of the fruit; that
the plaintiffs lost thereby the amounts stated in the complaint.
At the close of the trial before the referee, he found, as mat-
ters of fact, in respect to the causes of action alleged in the
complaint, in accordance with such stipulations, and that, of
such sales so made by the plaintiffs as agents for the defendant,
and for and on behali of the defendant, the defendant confirmed,
approved, and ratified nine orders therein mentioned, upon
which there was an aggregate loss of $3,162.50; that the plaintiffs
were entitled to commissions upon such orders and sales so made,
in the sum of $6Q. As to the first counterclaim, the referee found,
as matter of fact, in effect, that the defendant was entitled to
the balance upon the sale of 350 cases of Criterion peaches,
shipped September 1, 1890, amounting to $395.25, with inter-
est thereon from September 1, 1890; that the defendant was
also entitled to the balance due from the New York house of
the plaintiffs of $550.98, with interest thereon from September
23, ^*^ 1890; that, as to all other items in the first counter-
claim, there had been charges made by the defendant, state-
ments rendered, balances struck, and that the defendant did not
intend to charge back any of them until after the commence-
ment of this suit; that the defendant's account of all the re-
charges and the charges back of commissions, interest, freight,
telegrams, and storage therein mentioned were made up by the
defendant after the commencement of this action, and contrary
to the contracts between the parties, and contrary to the ac-
counts rendered by the plaintiffs and accepted by the defendant;
and that as to all such items in the first counterclaim, except
the two allowed, there was no intention on the part of the de-
fendant to make any such charges against the plaintiffs until
after the commencement of this suit; and that such items and
each of them were not sustained by the proofs, and were contrary
to the contracts; and that each of them was settled and deter-
mined by the parties prior to the commencement of this action.
As to the second counterclaim, the referee found, as to mat-
ters of fact, in effect, that the defendant had orders to deliver
all goods actually purchased by the plaintiffs from him; that
942 Delatield v. Smith. Wisconsin,
December 3, 1890, the plaintiffs notified the defendant that they
would not take any more goods than they had already taken;
that there was not sufficient proof as to when the balance of
such goods were sold by the defendant, what prices they were
sold at, what damages, if any, he sustained, what the market
value was at the time the plaintiffs received the goods (if they
received them at all), and that there was no basis for the allow-
ance of any such counterclaim; that as to all the rest of the sev-
eral items of the counterclaims of the defendant, except the two
items mentioned, the referee disallowed them; that the plain-
tiffs were entitled to recover such damages, particularly found,
with interest thereon, amounting to $4-,316.85; that the de-
fendant was entitled to the reduction of such claim by reason of
the *'^® two counterclaims found in favor of the defendant,
with interest thereon as found, amounting to $1,270.26; that
the balance due to the plaintiffs May 29, 1896, from the defend-
ant, after the deduction of the counterclaims allowed, was
$3,046.59.
As conclusions of law, the referee found that the plaintiffs
were entitled to judgment against the defendant for the sum ol
$3,046.59, as of May 29, 1896, with the costs and disbursements
of this action. Such findings of the referee were fully confirmed
by the court, and judgment ordered thereon accordingly. From
the judgment entered thereon accordingly the defendant brings
this appeal.
1. The theory of the complaint is that, under the agreements
mentioned, the plaintiffs, as agents _^of the defendant, sold, in
their own names, the several cases of fruit therein mentioned,
to be shipped by the defendant to the parties who had pur-
chased the same of the plaintiffs, at Bay City, Michigan, Charles-
ton, "West Virginia, Parkersburg, "West Virginia, Muscatine,
Iowa, Cleveland, Ohio, and Defiance, Ohio; and that after such
contracts of sale by the plaintiffs, to be so delivered by the de-
fendant, the defendant, in violation of his agreements, refused to
ship any of such goods, and the plaintiffs thereby suffered loss.
The stipulation mentioned is to the same effect. Undoubtedly,
such refusals to ship the goods called for by such orders as the
defendant had approved made the defendant liable to the plain-
tiffs for the amount of commissions they would have received
had such goods been shipped. But the serious question recurs
whether, under the agreements with the defendant, he was lia-
ble to the plaintiffs for losses on such contracts of sale which
J.ui. 1899.] Delafield v. Smith. 945
they had so made in their own names with such other parties.
After careful consideration, we are constrained to hold that he-
was not liable for such losses. The agreements with the defend-
ant did not authorize the plaintiffs to make contracts of sale in
their own names. They were mere agents ^^"^^ or brokers to sell
on commission all goods shipped by the defendant into the ter-
ritory named. Had the defendant accepted orders taken by the-
plaintiffs from such other parties, then, undoubtedly, the de-
fendant would have been liable to such other parties for any
breach of such contracts of sale. But the defendant had no-
contract relation with such other parties. On the theory of thfr
complaint, the defendant had no agreement with the plaintiffs-
except as stated. The plaintiffs' agency was founded upon and
created by the express agreement of the parties. Under such
agreement, they were authorized to represent and act for the
defendant in his business dealings with third persons in making
such sales: Mechem on Agency, sec. 1. A broker is an agent of
his employer, and he differs from a factor in that he does not
ordinarily have the possession of the property which he is em-
ployed to sell, and his contracts are always made in the name of
his employer: Mechem on Agency, sees. 13, 927; Edgerton v.
Michels, 66 Wis. 130, and cases there cited. On the other hand,
a factor is intrusted with the possession of the goods, and maj
sell the same in his own name: Mechem on Agency, sees. 13,
927. Thus, it is held that, where a broker sells goods without
disclosing the name of his principal, he acts beyond the scope of
his authority, and the buyer cannot set off a debt due from the
broker to him against the demand for the goods made by the
principal: Baring v. Corrie, 2 Bam. & Aid. 137. That case i»
approved by more recent cases in England and this country:
Drakeford v. Piercy, 7 Best & S. 515, 519; Pearson v. Scott, L.
R. 9 Ch. Div. 198, 203; Cooke v. Eshelby, L. E. 12 App. Gas.
271, 275; Higgins v. Moore, 34 N. Y. 417, 419. In this last
case it was held that "authority given to a broker to sell prop-
erty does not include authority to receive payment for the
same, especially when the principal is known to the vendee.**^
There is nothing in the complaint, nor stipulation, nor the find-
ings of the court, to indicate that the agreements of February
7, 1890, and May 28, 1890, were ever ^''^ modified or changed.
We must, therefore, hold that the plaintiffs cannot recover for
any of the losses alleged in the complaint, except for the loss of
commissions.
S44 Delafield v. Smith, [Wisconsin.
2. As to tte findings of fact in respect to the first counter-
claim, we are constrained to hold that they are sustained by
the evidence. All items therein mentioned, except the two al-
lowed, appear to have been fully settled and determined by the
parties before the commencement of this action,
3, As to the second counterclaim, the court found that the
evidence in the record failed to furnish any basis for the allow-
ance of damages for the breach alleged. We cannot say that
such findings are not supported by the evidence.
By the Court. The judgment of the circuit court is re-
versed, and the cause is remanded with direction to enter judg-
ment in accordance with this opinion. In taxing costs, the de-
fendant will only be allowed for printing 100 pages.
Bardeen, J., took no part.
BROKERS— SALE IN BROKER'S NAME— A broker cannot
make a contract In bis own name without the knowledge and consent
of his principal that will bind both the principal and the other con-
tracting party, or render the principal liable for commissions or dam-
ages for the nonperformance of the contract, though he receives a
benefit from it: Hass v. Ruston, 14 Ind. App. 8, 56 Am. St. Rep.
288. See the monographic note to Walker v. Osgood, 93 Am. Dec.
171.
BROKERS— CHANGE IN TERMS OF SALE-RATIFICATION
BY PRINCIPAL.— Although the terms of sale made by a real estate
broker differ from the original terms agreed upon by himself and
the owner, he may recover his commission. If the terms ux>on which
he sells are accepted by the owner: McFarland v. Lillard, 2 Ind. App,
160, 50 Am. St. Rep. 284, and note.
INDEX TO THE NOTES.
ABATEMENT of right of action for personal injuries by the death
of the person Injured, 669, 670.
ADMINISTRATORS AND EXECUTORS, sureties on different
bonds of. 444.
ALIMONY, death of husband, whether terminates wife's right to^
772.
BAIL, Indictment creates presumption of guilt on application for,
742.
BANKS, collecting, notaries, liability of for negligence of, 219.
BUILDING AND LOAN ASSOCIATIONS, premiums and fines.
when may be exacted by, 204, 205, 227.
CEMETERIES, rights of persons who have been permitted to nse
for burial purposes, 902.
OIGARETTEjS, constitutionality of statutes prohibiting the sale of,
713.
CHARITABLE TRUST, construction of gifts for, 793.
CHILDREN, adoption of, collateral attack upon proceedings for the,
899.
CONDITIONS SUBSEQUENT, Impossibility of performance re-
lieves from necessity of, 829, 830.
definition of, 829.
forfeiture because of nonperformance of, equity may prevent,
831.
Impossibility of performance of arising prior to the nonper^
formance, 832.
impossibility of performance of arising subsequent to the con-
tract, 832.
Impossibility of performance of does not avoid the effect of
nonperformance, 829, 832.
Illegal are void, 830.
one preventing the performance of cannot urge the nonper>
formance, 832.
performance of being made unlawful, nonperformance Is ex-
cused, 830.
performance of is indispensable to the vesting of the estate, 829.
performance of prevented or rendered Impossible by the person
to whom due, 830, 831.
right dependent upon does not accrue In the absence of per>
formance, 832.
strict construction of, 830.
AM. ar. Kkp.. Vol. LXX.-60 c945)
946 Index to the Notes.
CONTRACTS, conditions in, whether are precedent or 8ubseq1lent^
tests of, 832.
OONTKIBUTION, right of between successive sets of sureties, 443-
4S4.
CORPORATIONS, directors, notice of meetings must be given, 783.
stock, conditional subscription for, 59.
etocls, lien on in favor of the corporation is enforceable against
a purchaser without notice, 312.
Btocliholders, liability of, enforcing in a foreign state, 550.
stockholders, liability of, when may be enforced in other states,.
241.
stockholders, liability of, whether primary, 402
subscriptions induced by fraud, when void of because of, 848.
See Ultra Vires.
COTENANCY, adverse possession by one of the cotenants, what l8»
193.
COTENANTS, adverse title, acquisition of by one of several, 101.
tax sale, right of one to purchase the interest of another at, 101.
DAMAGES, destruction of property having no market value^ 148^
fright as an element of, 302.
municipal corporations, when liable for, 149.
DEATH OF HUMAN BEING, abatement of action for by the death
of the beneficiary, 685.
abatement of action for by the death of the wrongdoer, 685,.
686.
abatement of one action for by the pendency of another, 683.
action for could not be sustained at the common law, 670.
action to recover for cannot be sustained unless decedent could
have recovered for his injury had he survived, 680.
admiralty courts, when may enforce liability for causing, 681.
brother or sister of, when may recover for, 675.
child dying at its birth, recovery for death of, 674.
child, illegitimate, neither father nor mother may recover for
the death of, 674.
children, when not necessary parties to actions for, 678.
children, whether may recover for the death of parent, 674.
children, who may recover as, 679, 680,
classification of statutes creating rights of action for, 676.
comments upon common law denying right of recovery for, 670.
compromise with one beneficiary, whether bars another, 685.
dependents, who are within the meaning of statutes ctea.tlng
causes of action for, 679.
father and mother, when must Join in actions for death of cbild»
678.
father's right to recover for the death of his child, 678.
heirs, all must Join in actions for, 678.
heirs, who may sue for as, 672.
Index to the Notes. 947
DEATH OF HUMAN BEING, high seas, statutes of state, whether
may create liability for death on, 681.
husband and wife may not sue for as next of kin, 673.
Instantaneous death from Injury, recovery for, 676, 677.
limitations, statutes of, in actions for causing, 686.
limitations, statutes of, when begin to run against actions for
causing, 637.
Lord Campbell's act creating liability for, 672.
marriage of widow or widower does not destroy cause of action
for, 682.
married woman deserted by her husband may sue alone for the
death of her child, 678.
marine torts, when create cause of action for, 681.
minor heirs, who entitled to sue for as, 674.
mother, wheu not entitled to sue for death of child, 674.
negligence, contributory, of decedent precludes recovery for,
684.
next of kin, who may maintain suit for as, 673.
none but persons authorized by statute may recover for, 675.
parents, dependency on child, whether necessary to entitle to
recover for his death, 679. •
parents of person tortiously killed, when may maintain action
for, 672.
parties plaintlEf in action to recover for, 677.
personal representatives, who may sue as, 673.
pleadings on behalf of the plaintiff must show that he Is within
the statutes authorizing recovery for, 675.
posthumous children, when entitled to sue for, 674.
presumption as to existence of next of kin, 676.
reasons for common-law rule denying right to recover for, 671,
672.
recovery by one beneficiary for, when precludes recovery by
another, 683, 684.
release by decedent in his lifetime, when does not preclude re-
covery by beneficiaries, 683, 684.
release by personal representatives, whether affects widow and
next of kin, 685.
release by widow, whether binds next of kin, 685.
statutes ci-eating liability for tortiously causing, 672.
stepchildren cannot sue for the death of stepfather, 673.
stepfather cannot sue for the death of stepchild, 673.
strict construction of statutes creating liability for causing, 672.
suit by one beneficiary, when bars right of suit by others, 682.
widow, when may sue for the death of her husband, 673.
widower, whether may maintain suit for the death of his wife,
673.
DEED, conditions in repugnant to the granting clause, 833.
conditions in, whether precedent or subsequent, 833.
conditions precedent, impossibility of performance, 833.
948 Index to the Notes.
DEFINITION of accident and of death by, 2iVSk
of condition precedent, 829.
of condition subsequent, 829.
of criminal contempts, 286.
of estate upon condition, 829.
of ex post facto laws, 286.
of family, 107, 108.
of general laws, 488.
of head of a family, 107, 108.
of ultra vires, 158, 160.
DEVISE, conditions in, when precedent and when subsequent, 833,
834.
DIRECTORS, powers of, 783.
DOWER, administrator's sale does not divest, 315.
DRUNKENNESS as a defense to a criminal prosecution, 412.
ELECJTRIC LIGHT CORPORATIONS, linemen, risks assumed by,
247.
EMINENT DOMAIN, change In use, when requires payment of an
additional compensation, 556.
conclusiveness of judgment In, 40.
pendente lite purchasers, when not affected by judgment in, 40.
ESTOPPEL against asserting the defense of ultra vires, 167-169.
EXECUTION SALES, caveat emptor is the rule of, 718.
GARNISHMENT of warehouseman, effect of, 929.
situs of debt for the purposes of, 609.
GUARDIANS, sureties on different bonds of, 445, 449.
HABEAS CORPUS, errors which may be reached by, 422, 423.
HEAD OF A FAMILY, adopted children, adopting parent of is a,
114.
brother who maintains his sister, 109, 110.
definition of, 107.
dependence necessary to create relation of, 107, 108.
guardian of a minor child Is entitled to a homestead as, 114.
father of illegitimate children residing with him, 109.
father supporting adult daughter, 110.
father whose children do not reside with him, 108.
husband falling to support his family does not lose his rights
as, 113.
husband of a divorced wife retains his rights as, 113.
husband of a nonresident wife, they having no children, 108b
husband, though without children, is a, 108.
marriage not essential to, 107.
mother of an Illegitimate child Is, 113.
obligation to support Is essential to the relation of, 10&-110L
parent and child, relation of Is not essential to, 107.
son supporting his mother, 109.
supporting dependents, when creates relation of, 107, 108.
unmarried person may be a, 109.
Ikdez to the Notes. 9^!^
HEAD OF A FAMILY, unmarried person supporting an Invalid
relative, 113.
widow or unmarried woman maintaining children of a deceased
relative, 113.
widower having neither wife nor children, 110.
wife living with her husband and children cannot be a, 111, 112.
wife permanently separated from her husband, 114.
wife whose husband has left the state, 114.
HOMESTEAD, actual occupancy of, when not essential to, 107.
children of a deceased owner cannot claim each for himself as
the head of a family, 115.
head of a family, who may claim as, 107-115.
householder, who may claim as. 111, 112.
partnership property, whether may be claimed as, 114, 116.
separate property of wife, whether may be dedicated as. 111.
widow having adult children living with her, 113.
widow having minor children is entitled to, 112.
widow having no children, 113.
widow maintaining children of a deceased sister Is entitled to,
113.
widow supporting stepchildren of her deceased husband is en*
titled to, 112.
wife, whether may dedicate as the head of a family. 111.
HOMICIDE, self-defense after provoking the difficulty, 569.
self-defense, duty to retreat, 569.
HUSBAND AND WIFE, competency of to testify against each
other. 739.
cross-examination of In criminal prosecutions, 739.
supporting by evidence of prior declarations, 730.
INJUNCTION against trespass, 556.
INNKEEPERS, liability of, 702.
INSANITY, defense of to an indictment for murder, test of suflB-
clency of, 636.
produced by drunlienness, when a defense to a criminal prose-
cution, 412.
INSOLVENT LAWS, discharge by, effect of on obligations held by
nonresidents, 256, 258.
foreign corporations, whether bound by discharge granted under,
256, 257.
of a state, whether conflict with the constitution of the United
States, 256.
INSURANCE, delivery of policy without payment of premium, 597.
life, incontestability clauses, validity of, 660.
INTERSTATE COMMERCE, cigarettes, state statutes prohibiting
sale of, 713.
original packages, what are, 713.
950 Index to the Notes.
JUDGMENTS, against infants, though Irregular, are not Toldi 418,
lien of against vendor's interest. 402.
lien of, when deemed to attach, 862.
perjury as a ground for relief from, 371.
relief from in equity, when will be decreed, 371.
reversal of does not destroy the title of the purchaser, 418.
setoff as against another, 573.
JUDICIAL SALES, resale, when will be ordered because of Increase
of, 889.
JURY TRIAL, comments of counsel. Improper, how to be urged
upon appeal, 507.
LANDLORD AND TENANT, holding over arises from leaving the
property of the tenant on the premises, 534, 535,
holding over because of sickness does not prevent an Implied
renewal of the lease, 533, 534.
holding over creates a new tenancy at the election of the land-
lord, 533.
holding over, effect of cannot be varied by any notice given the
landlord to which he does not assent, 535, 536.
holding over, ejectment against tenant guilty of, 533.
holding over, intention of the tenant Is not material, 534.
holding over, rebutting the presumption arising from, 537.
holding over, tenant has no election to determine whether it
shall be regarded as a trespass or as a renewal of the lease,
535.
holding over, using any part of the premises Is, 538.
holding over, what Is a, 533-538.
liability of the former to the latter for defects In the leased
premises, 932.
LAWS, general and special, what are, 488.
LEGACY, conditions precedent and subsequent, In what are, 834.
835.
conditions subsequent annexed to, whether can become lmpo»>
Bible of performance, 835.
illegal conditions annexed to, 836.
LIBEL AND SLANDER, by words directed against a whole family,
756.
must refer to some ascertainable person, 754.
of a class, averments essential to sustain a recovery for, 755.
of a class, when Justifies a recovery by an Individual, 754, 765,
of a group, class, or list of persons, 754-757.
of a nun by declaring a nunnery to be a brothel, 755,
of one person by words spolien of all, 756.
of one policeman by words spolcen of all, 766.
of several in one publication, 756, 757.
reviling a class of persons, what necessary to sustain an action,
764.
Index to the Notes. 061
LIMITATIONS, part payments which will arrest the running of, 310.
LUNATICS, care and custody of estates of are vested in chancery,
649.
gales of property of, chancery, when has jurisdiction to order*
649.
MARRIED WOMAN, homestead, whether may claim as the head of
a family, 111, 112.
MECHANICS* LIEN, claim or notice of, sufficiency of, 787, 788.
married women, property of, when bound by, 135.
MORTGAGES, assignment of, to what equities subject, 82S.
title deeds, deposit of, does not operate as, 390.
MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS, officer, when answerable for dam-
ages caused by, 149.
NAMES, fictitious, contracts made under, 329.
NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS, overdue, equities to which not
subject, 142.
parol evidence to show the relation of the parties to, 617.
parol evidence to vary the effect of their Indorsement, 896L
restrictive Indorsement, 396.
NOTICEl, of powers of corporations, all persons are chargeable wlth»
176.
PARDONS, conditions In, 836, 837.
PRESUMPTION respecting the laws of another state, 418.
RAILWAYS, landowner, when not estopped to maintain ejectment
against, 41.
employes, when liable for acts of In expelling trespassers, 98.
legislative control over, 364, 365.
ultra vires contracts of, 161, 162.
vice-principal, section foremen, when are not, 603.
RAPE, presumption of incapacity to commit, whether may be re*
butted, 850.
REMAINDERMEN AND REVERSIONERS, sales Of property,
when cannot affect the title of, 579.
SOCIAL CLUBS, liquors. Intoxicating, sales of by, 81.
SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE, of contracts relating to personal
property, 643.
SURETIES, contribution, actions at law to enforce, 453.
contribution, agreements between different sureties may destroy
the right of, 450.
contribution among, demand and notice, whether essential to
suit to enforce, 451.
contribution among, duty of, from what results, 444, 450.
contribution among, liability cannot as against either exceed the
penalty of the bond, 451, 452.
contribution among, when enforceable, 446, 447.
contribution among, where they are liable upon different In-
Btruments, 446.
952 Index to the Notes.
SURETIES, contribution of, measure of llabUity as among one
another, 451.
contribution, remedy of surety in equity where some of the
sureties are insolvent, 453.
cosureties, all persons liable for the same debt, when are, 444.
for different debts, though for the same principal, are not co-
sureties, 447.
of administrators upon different bonds executed at different
times, 444, 445.
of guardians by different bonds, 445.
on a second or renewal bond, 446, 447.
on additional bonds, liability of, 452.
on different obligations for the same debt, 444.
on successive undertaliings on appeal, 446.
primary and secondary, liability of on administrator's bond»
443.
primary, liability as between different sets of, 443.
release of one set, when releases another, 443.
second sureties on bonds which extend the time of payment,
449.
second sureties, liability of, 448.
TELEGRAPH CORPORATIONS, delay in delivering message, lia-
bility for. 211.
ULTRA VIRES, accommodation paper Issued by corporations, 164.
actions upon ultra vires contracts, courts refusing to sustain.
171, 173.
burden of proof respecting, 160.
conditions upon which corporations will be permitted to assert
the defense of, 175.
contracts by a corporation to purchase Its own stock, 164, 165.
contracts by railways to employ surgeons to attend Injured
employes, 161.
contracts by railways to lease a summer hotel, 162,
contracts by railways to purchase grain, 162.
contracts expressly forbidden, 175.
contracts for the benefit of a corporation are rarely declared to
be, 161, 162.
contracts in general furtherance of the business of a corpora*^
Uon, 162, 163.
contracts of guaranty and suretyship, 163.
contracts of one corporation to become a surety of another, 161,
contracts of real estate corporations to erect buildings, 162.
contracts of real estate corporations to procure facilities of
transit, 162.
contracts of savings banlcs speculating In stock, 162.
contracts to purchase stock In another corporation, 16B.
contracts to transfer or lease corporate property, 163.
contracts, partial performance, rights given by, 169. 170.
I^DKZ TO THE NOTES. 95$
ULTRA VIRES, contracts which are both Immoral and against pub-
lic policy and ultra vires, 169, 170.
contracts ^hlch cannot be ratified and enforced, 171, 172.
defense of is never sustained out of regard for the corporatloiie
159, 160.
definition of, 158.
dlfFerence between and illegality, 157.
doubt and confusion respecting the subject, 15&
estoppel to assert defenses of, 167-169.
executory contracts are not affected by the rule of, 165, 166.
executory contracts, defenses of may be asserted against, 165»
166.
executory, contracts which are, right of stockholder to resist en-
forcement of, 166.
Incidental powers of corporations, 161.
instances of contracts which are not, 161, 162.
lease by one railway of its property to another, 17tt,
misuse of this term, 160.
notice of existence of facts showing contracts to be, 177, 178.
notice of powers of corporations, all persons are chargeable
with, 176.
plea of is not sustainable when it would not advance justice,
159.
quantum meruit under contracts affected by, 174^
ratification of contracts invalid by, 158.
reasons for enforcing law of, 158.
recovery for benefit received under ultra vires contracts, 173,
174.
Btoclsholders, when cannot question contracts because of, 170,
180.
tests of what contracts are, 157, 16L
torts, liability for cannot be defeated by application of the rules
of. 159.
who may raise question of, 178, 179.
WATERS, percolating, belong to the owner of the soil.
WITNESS, wife, cross-examination of when offered «• a witness
for her husband, 739.
INDEX.
ABANDONMENT.
See Criminal Law. 1, 2,
ACCIDENT.
See Insurance, 7.
ACTION.
ACTIONS AGAINST STOCKHOLDERS— WHEN TRANSI-
TORY.—An action against a stocktiolder of a corporation organized
under the laws of the state of Kansas, to compel the payment of a
debt against the corporation, is transitory. (Hancock Nat. Bank y.
Ellis, 232.)
See Contracts, 1, 2, 3; Corporations, 2, 3; Estates of Decedents;
Executors and Administrators; Husband and Wife, 3; Insol-
vency, 2; Joint Stock Companies, 2, 3; Judgment, 6; Mandamus,
2; Municipal Corporations, 1, 9; Negligence, 8; Railroad Com-
panies, 18; Receivers.
ADOPTION.
1. ADOPTION — STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION. — Adoption
statutes are humane provisions which look primarily to the interests
of children, and every reasonable intendment should be Indulged in,
in case of doubt, in the line of promoting that object. (Parsons v.
Parsons, 894.)
2. ADOPTION-JUDGMENT OF— ESTOPPEL TO ATTACK.—
After the lapse of many years, during which time the status of the
subject of adoption has been recognized as legally fixed by the
judgment, by all parties to the proceedings, one of those parties,
■on whose motion the judgment was rendered, is in no position to
Appeal to equity to declare it void. (Parsons v. Parsons, 894.)
3. ADOPTION — PROCEEDINGS IN — COLLATERAL AT-
TACK.—Where a proper petition has been filed in adoption proceed-
ings, the court acquires jurisdiction to determine whether the per-
son who signs as next of kin is such, and its determination,
'Whether based upon sufilcient evidence or not, cannot be collaterally
Attacked for want of jurisdiction. (Parsons v. Parsons, 894.)
4. ADOPTION— NOTICE TO ABANDONING PARENT.— Un-
•der a statute authorizing the adoption of a child without notice lo
an abandoning parent, notice to such xmrent is not requisite to a
valid determination of the fact of abandonment as regards all other
parties to the proceedings. (Parsons v. Parsons, 894.)
5. ADOPTION — CONSENT OP ABANDONING PARENT.—
Statute may authorize the adoption of a child without the consent
of an absent or abandoning parent, and adoption proceedings had
thereunder, and completed without notice to, or consent of, such
■a parent, are valid. (Parsons v. Parsons, 894.)
(95SJ
953 Index.
ADVERSE POSSESSION.
See Cotenancy, 1-3, 7.
AGENCY.
1. AGENCY— NEGLIGENCE OF PRINCIPAL-ERRONEOUS
TELEGRAM.— Where a principal, being in doubt as to tlae mean-
ing of a telegram from his agent relating to the matter of the lat-
ter's agency, requires the telegraph agent to have the message re-
peated and the latter reports that the message as received is cor-
rect, the principal is not guilty of contributory negligence, as a mat-
ter of law, In acting upon the message as he understands it. (Has-
brouck V. Western U. T. Co., 181.)
2. AGENCY — AUTHORITY OF AGENT — ERRONEOUSLY
TRANSMITTED TELEGRAM.— Where an agent, sent by a bank-
ing firm to settle and adjust a claim against a third person, tele-
graphs his principal: "Has stock twelve hundred dollars. Mort-
gage on for fifteen hundred dollars. Am offered note, with Hark-
ness as surety, for twenty-five hundred dollars, due in eighteen
months, in full settlement," and the telegi-am Is erroneously trans-
mitted to read thus: "Have secured twelve hundred dollars mort-
gage on fifteen hundred dollars and offered note, with Harkness a»
surety, for twenty-four hundred dollars," et cetera, to which the
principal answers: "If twelve hundred mortgage is on fifteen hun-
dred dollars property, accept," the agent is justified in understand-
ing that he is to accept the offer of settlement under the facts as
he had stated them, unless the conditions are more favorable to
plaintiff than they would be with a twelve hundred mortgage on
a fifteen hundred dollar stock, and a settlement based upon and
within such an understanding is binding upon the principal. (Has-
brouck V. Western U. T. Co., 181.)
See Brokers; Husband and Wife, 1; Insurance, 15, 16, 20; Limita-
tions of Actions, 2; Telegraph Companies, 8.
ANIMALS.
ANIMALS-KICK FROM A HORSE UPON THE SIDE-
WALK-OWNER'S LIABILITY.— A person who has been kicked
and injured by a horse temporarily standing upon a sidewalk, where
It ought not to be. is entitled to recover therefor without proof
that the animal was vicious, and that the owner knew It, particu-
larly where the horse was in an exceptionally nervous condition In
consequence of the driver's treatment. In such a case. It is, there-
fore, correct to refuse to direct a verdict for the defendant. (Hardi-
man v. WhoUey, 292.)
APPEAL.
1. APPEAI^ERROR FIRST OBJECTED TO ON APPEAL.—
It cannot be first objected to on appeal that evidence, properly
admissible for a certain purpose, was admitted without Instruc-
tions limiting Its application to such purpose, where no request
was made for such instructions. (Hasbrouck v. Western U. T. Co.,
181.)
2. APPEATv— EXCEPTION TO PART OF CHARGE.— An ex-
ception to part of a charge cannot be made to apply to any other
portion than that to which it apparently relates. (Fall Brook Coal
Co. V. Hewson, 466.)
8. APPE.\T^CRIMTNAL CARES— IMPROPER APPEAL TO
JURY— ILLUSTRATION— REVERSAL OP CONVICTION.— When
a city officer is being prosecuted for conniving at the allowance of a
Index, • 957
fraudulent claim against the city, and the prosecuting attorney.
In summing up, makes harsh and unjust statements to the jury,
not founded upon evidence, but resting wholly on his unsupported
declarations; draws vivid pictures of suffering and want, of wrongs
done to widows and their broods of little children, with "pinched
and haggard" faces, by the defendant, and of a multitude of people
waiting outside the courthouse for his conviction; depicts the hard-
ships of small taxpayers; urges the privations of the poor and the
overwhelming Influence of public opinion against the defendant;
describes him as a thief, living in a palace on the proceeds of public
plunder; and even attempts to Intimidate the jui-y by telling them
that they will commit "the unpardonable sin" unless they convict
him, there is. In case of conviction, presented a situation In which
there should be a reversal, particularly where the record shows that
such statements were persisted In after repeated objections, under
the claim, sustained by the trial court, that it was right to malse
them. (People v. Fielding, 495.)
4. APPEALr-CRIMINAL CASES— IMPROPER APPEAL TO
JURY— REVERSAL OF CONVICTION.— If a conviction In a crim-
inal case follows an improper and dangerous appeal to the prejudice
of the jurors, made by the prosecuting attorney, and it is reason-
ably certain that his course brought about such result, the judgment
will be reversed for such error whenever it is raised by a proper
exception. (People v. Fielding, 495.)
5. APPEAL — DISMISSAL OF CO:SIPLAINT — RIGHTS OF
PLAINTIFF.— If the question as to whether a corporation Is an-
fiwerable upon a promissory note, payable to the plaintiff's order,
otherwise than as an indorser, is raised by the pleadings and proofs
In a suit upon the note, and the complaint is dismissed at the close
•of the plaintiff's case, and an exception talien, the question as to
whether the plaintiff, upon his proofs, was entitled to go to the
jury, is open for review on appeal, although It was not urged on the
motion to dismiss. (Wlthrow v. Slaybaclj, 507.)
6. APPEAI^EXAMINATION OF EXPERTS-HYPOTHETI-
CAL QUESTIONS.— Whether the hypothesis propounded to wit-
nesses Include the material facts necessary to the formation of an
•opinion, or whether facts are assumed which have no existence,
rests largely in the knowledge of the trial judge, and his rulings "will
be held conclusive on appeal unless prejudicial error is affirmatively
shown. (Commonwealth v. Wireback, U25.)
7. APPE.\I^F1NDIXGS OF JUDGE SITTING AS CHANCEL-
LOR.—Findings of fact made by a judge sitting as chancellor will
not be disturbed on appeal except for error which clearly appears.
An apparent preponderance of testimony against them Is not suffl-
■cient to lead to a reversal, where there Is testimony which might
warrant them. (Steinmeyer v. Siebert, 641.)
8. APPEAL-INSUFFICIENT ASSIGNMENT OP ERROR.— An
assignment of error alleging error In the admission of evidence will
not be considered, where it fails to set forth the evidence. (Swope
•V. Donnelly, 637.)
9. APPEAI^^IMMATERIAL ERROR.— On appeal, the court will
not review the action of the lower court in admitting evidence as
part of the res gestae, where the admission or rejection of such
evidence would not affect the case or change the result (Gann v.
Railroad, 687.)
10. APPEAL— INSTRUCTIONS— FAILURE OP DEFENDANT
TO TESTIFY.— It is not error In an action for negligence to instruct
the jury that no prejudicial Inference could be drawn against de-
958 ■ Index.
fendants from their'failure to testify, where It does not appear that
Buch defendants had facts peculiarly within their knowledge and not
fully known to other witnesses. (Weeks v. McNulty, 693.)
11. APPEAL — REFUSAL TO PERMIT ANSWER TO QUES-
TIONS.—The refusal of the trial court to permit answers to perti-
nent questions affords no cause for reversal, unless the record shows
affirmatively that the answers would have been competent. and ma-
terial evidence. (Weeks v. McNulty, G93.)
12. APPEAI^REVERSAI^ERROR IN GIVING AND REFUS-
ING INSTRUCTIONS.— Conceding that the trial court erred in giv-
ing and refusing certain instructions, there should be no reversal
where the appellate court can see from the whole record that under
correct instructions a different verdict could not have been rightly
found, or that the exceptant could not have been prejudiced by the
action of the court in giving the instructions given, or In refusing
those which were rejected. (Wright v. Independence Nat. Bank,
889.)
13. APPEAL— ILLEGALITY OF CONTRACT MAY BE FIRST
RAISED ON.— A suit in equity cannot be maintained upon an ille-
gal contract, although the defense of illegality was not raised by the
pleadings, or relied upon in the trial court. It may be made for
the first time on the argument in the appellate court. (Camp v.
Bruce, 873.)
14. APPEAL— WHAT CANNOT BE FIRST ASSERTED ON—
SUBROGATION.— A claim for affirmative relief, such as one to be
subrogated to the rights of a lien creditor, not made in the
court below, cannot be asserted for the first time in the appellate
court. (New South B. & L. Assn. v. Reed, 858.)
15. APPEAL-OBJECTION TO BILL OF EXCEPTIONS.— The
objection that a bill of exceptions was not properly settled, not hav-
ing been raised in the appellate court before the hearing on the
merits, cannot be raised later. (Hoff v. Olson, 903.)
16. APPEAI^ERROR— REVOKING ORDER OF NONSUIT.— It
Is not error for a court to withdraw its order of nonsuit and direct
a verdict instead, in an action for negligence, where no change in
the- situation of parties has intervened and the jury has not been
discharged. (Portance v. Lehigh Val. Coal Co., 932.)
See Attachment, 12; Homicide, 6; Instructions; Libel, 2.
ASSAULT.
ASSAULT- BATTERY UPON PERSON OF UNSTABLE
NERVES— DAMAGES.— If a street-car conductor commits an un-
justifiable battery upon the person of a lady passenger, who has
unstable nerves, the company must answer for the actual conse-
quences of the wrong to her as she is, and the damages cannot be
cut down by showing that the effect would have been less upon a
normal person. (Spade v. Lynn etc. R. R. Co., 298.)
See Husband and Wife. 1.
ASSIGNMENT.
See Corporations, 21, 24; Guaranty, 1, 3; Insurance, 8-10, 22, 23:
Mortgages, 9-11.
ASSIGNMENT FOR BENEFIT OF CRBDITORSt
See Attachment, 1; Dower, 2.
Index. 95&
ASSOCIATIONS.
1. ASSOCIATIONS— BENEFIT SOCIETIES.— THE CONSTITU-
TION OP A BENEFIT SOCIETY, If no part of Its charter, ha»
only the effect of a by-law, and cannot take from the rightfully
constituted authorities of the society their Inherent power to adopt,
from time to time, such other by-laws as Its charter permits or
necessity requires. (Supreme Lodge K. of P. v. Kutscher, 115.)
2. ASSOCIATIONS— BENEFIT SOCIETIES— EFFECT OF BY-
LAW.—A by-law of a benefit society forfeiting claims of a member
for suicide Is binding on one who joins the society before Its passage,
and whose contract requires compliance with the by-laws In force
or "hereinafter enacted." (Supreme Lodge K. of P. v. Kutscher,
115.)
3. ASSOCIATIONS — BENEFIT SOCIETIES — DELEGATION
OP POWER.— The supreme lodge of a benefit society cannot dele-
gate to a subordinate lodge the power to enact a by-law forfeiting
the certificate of membership and all claims thereunder of any
member whose death results from self-destruction, voluntary or
Involuntary, whether sane or insane. (Supreme Lodge K. of P. v,
Kutscher, 115.)
4. ASSOCIATIONS-BENEFIT SOCIETIES— CONSTRUCTION
OF CERTIFICATE.— A certificate of membership In a benefit so-
ciety which binds the member to comply with all the laws govern-
ing the endowment rank which are in force when he becomes a
member, or which may thereafter be enacted by the supreme lodge
or the board of control, binds him to comply with such laws only as
such board or the supreme lodge may lawfully enact and adopt.
(Supreme Lodge K. of P. v. Kutscher, 115.)
5. ASSOCIATION— BENEFIT SOCIETY— ADOPTION OP BY-
LAW.— The adoption by the supreme lodge of a benefit society of an
unauthorized by-law passed by a subordinate lodge renders sucb
by-law effective, and binds members of such subordinate lodge who
have agreed to comply with the by-laws now "in force or that may
be hereafter enacted by the supreme lodge." Supreme Lodge K. of
P. V. Kutscher, 115.)
6. ASSOCIATIONS— BENEFIT SOCIETIES— ENACTMENT OF
BY-LAWS.— The adoption by the supreme lodge of a benefit society,
by a viva voce vote, of a by-law passed by a subordinate lodge or
board of control without authority, is a valid enactment of such
law, although the constitution of such supreme lodge provides an-
other method of enacting by-laws. The by-law thus enacted blnd»
members whose contracts require compliance with all by-laws "now
in force or hereafter enacted by such supreme lodge." (Supreme
Lodge K. of P. v. Trebbe, 120.)
7. ASSOCIATIONS— BY-LAWS.— THE CONSTITUTION OP A
VOLUNTARY ASSOCIATION is nothing more than a by-law whicb
may be altered, abrogated, or repealed by the power enacting lt»
unless some higher rule restrains or prohibits a change or repeal.
(Supreme Lodge K. of P. v. Trebbe, 120.)
8. ASSOCIATIONS— BY-LAWS— REPEAL.— The valid passage
of a by-law by the supreme lodge of a benefit society In any mode
not prolilbited by its charter or general law is necessarily a repeal
of any other mode previously prescribed by the same supreme lodge.
(Supreme Lodge K. of P. v. Trebbe, 120.)
9. ASSOCIATIONS — BENEFIT SOCIETIES — AMENDMENT
OP BY-LAWS APPLIES TO WHAT MEMBBRS.— If a by-law of
an incorporated beneficiary association, which allows every member
•960 Index.
a, right to five dollars a week if he becomes disabled during a period
^f not exceeding thirteen weelis in each year, is amended so as to
limit his benefits to one dollar per weeli, for thirteen weelis of each
jear, during a period of five years, after he has received thirty-
nine weelis of siclj benefits, such amendment applies to a member
■who, at the time of its adoption, was under a disability, and had
been paid benefits for thirty-nine weelis. (Pain v. Societe St. Jean
Baptiste, 287.)
10. ASSOCIATIONS — BENEFIT SOCIETIES — POWER TO
AMEND BY-LAWS. — An incorporated beneficiary association has
power to so amend its by-laws as to deprive a member of his right
to future benefits, under a disability existing at the time of the
amendment, where it has, without limitation or restriction, reserved
the power to amend its by-laws. (Pain v. Societe St Jean Baptiste,
287.)
See Social Clubs.
ATTACHMENT.
1. ATTACHMENT — TRUSTEE PROCESS — PROPERTY IN
HANDS OF ASSIGNEE FOR BENEFIT OF CREDITORS.— If a
debtor conveys machinery, supplies, and stocli on hand in a shoe
factory, and boolj accounts, to an assignee In trust for the benefit
of creditors, and creditors do not become parties to the deed, the
property, in the hands of the assignee, is subject to trustee process,
though nothing has been done about taking possession of It, for the
title has passed, as between the parties to the deed, and the aS'
signee or trustee has the immediate right of possession. (Avery v.
Monroe, 250.)
2. ATTACHMENT— FALSE AFFIDAVIT.— An attachment based
•on a false afl3davit of the nonresidence of the debtor is void. (Ger-
man Nat. Bank v. Kautter, 371.)
3. ATTACHMENT— JUDGMENT BY CONSTRUCTIVE SER-
VICE—ATTACK UPON.— If plaintiff in attachment seizes a resl-
•dent's property as that of a nonresident, and sells it under a judg-
ment rendered upon constructive service, the judgment defendant
«may, in the absence of an appearance in that suit, attack such
Judgment in subsequent suit by him, wherein the attachment plain-
tiff Invokes such judgment as a defense, and show that it is void
for the reason that at the time of the Inception of the attachment
•fiult and judgment he was a resident of the state and then therein.
This may be done although the record in the attachment suit Is regu-
lar on its face. (German Nat. Bank v. Kautter, 371.)
4. ATTACHMENT SALES— TITLE OF PURCHASER-COL-
LATERAL ATTACK.— A purchaser at execution sale of the real
property of a nonresident defendant taken under attachment ac-
quires a title not subject to collateral attack in another action,
although the publication of notice preceding the judgment in the
attachment proceeding was Irregular and might have been attacked
therein. (Brown v. Bose, 379.)
5. ATTACHMENT — WHEN NONRESIDENT MAT BE
CHARGED AS GARNISHEE— JURISDICTION.-The courts of a
state can charge a nonresident debtor, transiently within their juris-
diction, as garnishee, If he has In his possession money or property
•of the defendant, or If he has contracted to pay money or deliver
property within such jurisdiction. (Balk v. Harris, 606.)
6. ATTACHMENT — GARNISHMENT — JURISDICTION. — A
-court enteitaining a garnishment must have some jurisdiction ovor
Index. 961
the thing garnished, and, where the garnishee Is a nonresident, has
In his hands no property belonging to the principal debtor, and owes
him nothing payable within that state, the jurisdiction Is defeated.
<Balk V. Harris, 60G.)
7. ATTACHMENT — NONRESIDENT GARNISHEE — JURIS-
DICTION.—As a general rule, the courts of a state cannot, by tbelr
service of process upon an inhabitant of another state transiently
within their jurisdiction, charge such person as garnishee. (Balk
V. Harris, 606.)
8. ATTACHMENT— GARNISHMENT-JURISDICTION OF AC-
TION.—Since an attachment is in effect a proceeding by the prin-
cipal debtor in the name of the plaintiff against the garnishee, the
action must be brought where the garnishee resides, for It Is there
that his creditor must have sued him. (Balk v. Harris, 606.)
9. ATTACHMENT-GARNISHMENT— SITUS OP DEBT.— In
North Carolina, the situs of a debt for purposes of an attachment
Is where the debtor resides. (Balk v. Harris, 606.)
10. ATTACHMENT— SERVICE OP GARNISMENT— EFFECT
OP.— The service of garnishee process operates as an equitable levy
upon property belonging to the principal defendant in the hands of
the garnishee, which levy may be enforced against such property In
the hands of any other than an Innocent purchaser for value, unless
such right of enforcement be waived. (Maxwell v. Bank, 926.)
11. ATTACHMENT— GARNISHMENT— ELECTION OP REME-
DIES.—Where a plaintiff in a suit of garnishment, in which process
has been served on the garnishee, having the right to prevent the
garnishee from disposing of the property for which he may be liable,
«lects to consider the garnishee his debtor and take personal judg-
ment against him, he will be held to his election, and cannot follow
the property or its proceeds. (Maxwell v. Bank, 926.)
12. ATTACHMENT— GARNISHMENT— EFFECT OP APPEAL
WITHOUT STAY.— A plaintiff In garnishment having elected to sue
the garnishee personally, and judgment being rendered for the gar-
nishee, an appeal from such judgment does not operate as a super-
sedeas, or restrain In any way the conduct of the garnishee concern-
ing the property of the principal defendant In his hands. To pre-
serve his equitable lien upon such property plaintiff must have It
continued by special order of court, and, such continuance not being
had, such lien is not revived by a reversal of the judgment appealed
from. Persons taking the property from the garnishee pending the
appeal take It free from such equitable lien. (Maxwell t. Bank,
«26.)
See Insolvency, 3.
AWARD.
See Eminent Domain, 1, 6.
BAIL.
1. BAIL IN CAPITAL CASE— BURDEN OP PROOP.^On an
application by habeas corpus for ball In a capital case, the burden
to establish the fact that the proof Is evident is upon the state and
oot upon the relator, to prove the contrary. (Ex parte Newman,
740.)
2. BAH^ACCUSED, WHEN ENTITLED TO.— Unless the case
Is a capital one and the proof Is evident of this fact, and unless the
proof is evident that the prisoner is guilty of a capital crime, he
AM. Sn Kir., Vol. LXX — «1
962 Index.
Is entitled to ball, and the burden of proof is on the prosecution to
show that he Is not so entitled. (Ex parte Newman, 740.)
BANKRUPTCY.
BANKRUPTCY— EFFECT OF FEDERAL STATUTE UPON
STATE INSOLVENCY PROCEEDINGS.— The United States
bankruptcy law of July 1, 1898, supersedes all state laws In regard
to insolvency from the date of the passage of the statute. Hence
insolvency proceedings commenced in the state courts after the pas-
sage of that law are unauthorized. (Parmenter Mfg. Co. v. Hamil-
ton. 258.)
BANKS AND BANKING,
1. BANKS AND BANKING— SELECTION OP NOTARY— POW-
ERS OF NOTARIES.— In Iowa, giving notice to indorsers of a pro-
tested Instrument is made a part of the official duty of the notary
making the protest, and a collecting bank acts prudently In Intrust-
ing to a notary the giving of such notice. (First Nat Bank v. Ger-
man Bank, 216.)
2. BANKS AND BANKING— SELECTION OF NOTARY— LIA-
BILITY FOR HIS NEGLIGENCE.— A bank to which a draft to
Bent by another bank for collection Is not liable to the latter for the
negligence of a notary public prudently selected by the former ta
protest the draft for nonpayment, which negligence consisted In the
failure of the notary to ascertain the residence of the person who
Indorsed the draft to the sender bank, or to notify him of the dis-
honor of the draft. This rule is not changed by the fact that the
notary was also assistant cashier of the collecting bank. (First
Nat. Bank v. German Bank, 216.)
3. BANKS AND BANKING— COLLECTIONS— NEGLIGENCE
OF NOTARY.— Where one bank makes another bank Its agent for
the collection of a draft, it impliedly authorizes It to employ a
notary, if necessary, to protest the draft, and if, through the notary's
negligence, collection of the draft is prevented, in the absence of
reasonable prudence on the part of the collecting bank In the selec-
tion of a notary, such collecting bank Is not liable for the notary's
negligence, but the sender bank must seek Its remedy against th»
notary. (First Nat Bank t. German Bank, 216.)
BATTERY.
See Assault
BBJNEFIT SOCIETIES.
See Associations.
BONDS.
BONDS— COUPONS OR INTEREST— NATURE.— Coupons at-
tached to bonds, being for Interest to become due on such bonds, are
a part of them and partake of their nature. (Broadfoot y. Fayette*
vUle, 610.)
Bee Fraud; Limitations of Actions, 8; Municipal Corporation, 14^ 15;
Sureties. 1.
BRIBERY.
Bee Municipal Corporations, 7.
Index. 963
BROKERS.
BROKERS-SALES IN BROKER'S NAME-LIABILITY OP
PRINCIPAL.— Where an agreement between a broker and his prin-
cipal for the sale of fruit does not authorize the former to make
contracts of sale in his own name, but makes him a mere agent to
sell on commission, the principal Is not liable to him for losses sus-
tained by reason of the principal's refusal to ship fruit to fill such
contracts, because of which refusal the broker purchased fruit at
excessive market rates to fill the contracts; but If the principal ap-
proved such contracts he is liable to the broker for commissiona
thereon. (Delafield v. Smith, 938.)
BUILDING AND LOAN ASSOCIATIONS.
1. BUILDING AND LOAN ASSOCIATIONS-USURY— PREMI-
UMS.—A statute authorizing building and loan associations to col-
lect premiums from borrowing members for the right of precedence
in taking loans, and that these premiums so paid, taken with the
legal rate of interest, shall not be construed as making the loans
usurious, contemplates good-faith bidding of premiums for the right
of precedence. "Where the monthly payments of premiums and In-
terest together exceed the legal rate of Interest, and payments made
by a member are designated as premiums merely as a device to
evade the law against usury instead of being paid in good faith to
secure a loan, the loan is usurious. (Wilcoxen v. Smith, 220.)
2. BUILDING AND LOAN ASSOCIATIONS— INSOLVENCY-
RIGHTS OF BORROWING AND NONBOBROWING MEMBERS.
In case of the insolvency of a building and loan association, and a
liquidation of its affairs, there should be an equitable distribution of
Its assets less Its liabilities. Borrowing members are only entitled
to be credited with the actual value of their shares, although by the
by-laws of the association and under the terms of their loans they
are entitled to the book, or withdrawal, value of such shares. Such
provisions in the by-laws and terms of the loans contemplate a going
concern, and do not apply when the association has become insolvent
and Is in the process of final liquidation. (Wilcoxen v. Smith, 220.)
3. BUILDING AND LOAN ASSOCIATIONS — RIGHTS OF
MEMBERS— PLEDGING STOCK AS SECURITY FOR LOAN.
Where the articles of incorporation and by-laws of a building and
loan association provide for loans to shareholders on the security
of their shares of stock, shareholders do not cease to be members
of the association by pledging their shares for loans. (Wilcoxen v.
Smith, 220.)
4. BUILDING AND LOAN ASSOCIATIONS— INSOLVENCY-
RIGHTS OF BORROWING MEMBERS— CREDIT FOR VALUE
OF SHARES.— Where a building and loan association is insolvent,-
and its affairs are In process of liquidation. It will be presumed. In
the absence of proof, that borrowilng members are entitled to have
credited upon their debts to the association the book value of their
shares. The burden of proof is upon one who would rebut this pre-
sumption to show the actual value of such shares. (Wilcoxen v.
Smith, 220.)
5. BUILDING AND LOAN ASSOCIATIONS — USURIOUS IN-
TEREST AND PREMIUMS— APPLICATION TO MEMBER'S
CREDIT.— Usurious Interest and premiums paid to a building and
loan association by a borrowing member should be applied to the
credit of such member as deductions from the amount of his loan.
(Wilcoxen v. Smith, 220.)
964 Index.
6. BTJILDTNG AND LOAN ASSOCIATIONS— AMOUNT RE-
COVERABLE FROM MEMBERS— STATUTORY CONSTRUC-
TION.—A statute fixing the amounts that may be Included in the
recovery by a building and loan association from a borrower should
be construed as fixing the maximum amount of recovery, and not
as preventing the association from contracting to receive a less
amount. (Iowa Sav. & Loan Assn. v. Heidt, 197.)
7. BUILDING AND LOAN ASSOCIATIONS— USURY— EXAC-
TION OF PREMIUMS.— A building and loan association author-
ized by statute to receive "pi-emiums bid by members for the right
of precedence in taking loans," has no authority to exact from the
borrower, where there is no competition, an arbitrary sum In ad-
dition to the interest on his loan, where the whole amounts to more
than legal interest. (Iowa Sav. & Loan Assn. v. Heidt, 197.)
8. BUILDING AND LOAN ASSOCIATIONS-USURY— INTER-
EST UPON FAQE, RATHER THAN AMOUNT, OF LOAN.— A
building and loan association, having deducted from a loan to a
member a sum sufficient to pay expenses incidental to maliing the
loan, which are properly charged to the borrower, may compute
legal interest upon the face of the loan instead of the amount ac-
tually received by the borrower without making the transactioa
usurious. (Iowa Sav. & Loan Assn. v. Heidt, 197.)
9. BUILDING AND LOAN ASSOCIATIONS— EXORBITANT
FINES.— One who purchases stock in a building and loan associa-
tion is held to a knowledge of the terms of his membership, and
will not be heard later to complain of the imposition of reasonable
fines for defaults in payments, which fines arfe authorized by statute.
(Iowa Sav. & Loan Assn. v. Heidt, 197.)
10. BUILDING AND LOAN ASSOCIATIONS— LOANS TO
MEMBERS— PROPER DEDUCTIONS.— A building and loan asso-
elation may retain from loans made to members a sum sufficient
to cover the cost of examining abstract, appraiser's fee, recording
mortgage, and expenses of management. (Iowa Sav. & Loan Assn.
V. Heidt, 197.)
11. USURY-STATUTORY CHANGES— RETROACTIVE EF-
FECT.—The privilege of pleading usury pertains only to the remedy
and may be taken away by statute as to contracts entered Into
before the enactment of the statute, nor does such a statute impair
vested rights when enacted pending an appeal from a decree In favor
of a member of a building and loan association on a plea of usury,
made to avoid the enforcement of a contract between himself and
the association. (Iowa Sav. & Loan Assn. v. Heidt, 197.)
12. BUILDING AND LOAN ASSOCIATIONS— USURY-CON-
STITUTIONAL LAW.— The legislature may exempt transactions
between building and loan associations and their members from the
operation of the law against usury. (Iowa Sav. & Loan Assn. v.
Heldt, 197.)
BURDEN OF PROOF.
BURDEN OF PROOF— PRESUMPTION.— Where a railroad
commission has taken any action under a statute, every presump-
tion Is in favor of the action, and the burden is upon the party com-
plaining to show that such action was contrary to law. (Jacobson
V. Wisconsin etc. R. R. Co., 358.)
See Bail, 1; Habeas Corpus, 4; Interstate Commerce, 6; Liens, 4;
Telegraph Companies, 4; Vendor and Purchaser, 2, 8.
Index. 965
CARRIERS.
1. A COMMON CARRIER IS ONE WHO, by virtue of his call-
Ing, undertjikes, for compensation, to transport personal property
from one place to another for all such as may choose to employ him,
and everyone who undertakes to carry for compensation the goods
of all persons Indifferently Is, as to liability, to be deemed a common
carrier. (Jacobson etc. Works v. Hurlbut, 432.)
2. CARRIERS, COMMON— WHO ARE.— Truckmen, wagoners,
cartmen, and porters who undertake to carry goods for hire as a
common employment in a city, or from one town to another, are
common carriers, although carrying Is not the exclusive business of
the parties. (Jackson etc. Works v. Hurlbut, 432.)
3. CARRIERS, COMMON— TRUCKMEN, WHO MOVE HEAVY
MACHINERY.- If persons advertise themselves as general truck-
men, their particular specialty being the moving of heavy machin-
ery, and they keep and maintain for this purpose a large number
of trucks and horses, and the necessary help for the prosecution of
the business, there is, in an action against them for damages caused
by injury to such machinery, during its transportation, no eri'or In
the refusal of the trial judge to instruct the jury that the defend-
ants are not common carriers. The circumstance that the defend-
ants have no regular tariff of charges for their work, but that a
special price Is fixed by agreement, does not change the relation.
The necessity for a different charge In each case arises, of course,
out of the difference in labor In handling articles of great bulk. The
charge In each case may be proportioned to the risk assumed and
commensurate with the carrier's responsibility as such. (Jackson
etc Works v. Hurlbut, 432.)
See Negligence, 2,
CAVEAT EMPTOR.
See Elxecution, 1.
CEMETERIES.
1. CEMETERIES-BURIAL RIGHTS— LICENSE TO USD
GROUND.— One who enters Into posseslson of a lot In a public ceme-
tery, Improves the same, and uses it for burial purposes, with the
express or implied consent of those who have control of the ceme-
tery, although he acquires no title to the lot, acquires a license to
use the same for burial purposes, which license, so long as it con«
tlnues, will support an action of trespass for any invasion or dis-
turbance of it, whether by the grantors or strangers. (Hollman v.
Platteville, 899.)
2. CEMETERIES— REGULATION. BY CITY— LIABILITY OF
CITY IN DAJIAGES.— A city given power, by statute, to adopt
regulations as to a public cemetery, and, upon proper notice, to com-
pel lotowners or occupants to comply with such regulations, is liable
in damages to a lot occupant, if, without having adopted any regu-
lations, and without notice to him, it invades his lot and cuts down
trees which he has planted therein in the improvement thereof,
(HoUman ▼. Platteville, 899.)
CHARITABLE TRUST.
See WUls, 8, 9, 10.
COLLATERAL ATTACK.
See Adoption, 3; Attachment, 4; Judgment, 10, 18.
966 Index.
CONDITIONS.
See Devise, 2, 7-0.
CONFESSIONS.
See Criminal Law, 12-14.
CONFLICT OF LAWS.
See Bankruptcy.
CONSIDERATION.
See Deeds, 2, 3; Husband and Wife, 4; Municipal Corporations, 20.
CONSTITUTIONS.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW — LOCAL OPTION.— A constitu-
tional provision giving tlie legislature authority to enact laws with
regard to the adoption of local option by the people Is exclusive of
any other method to be pursued by the legislature for dealing with
the question, especially so far as the same territory is concerned
where local option has been adopted. (Ex parte Brown, 743.)
See Mandamus, 1,
CONTEMPT.
1. CONTEMPT— INSTITUTION OF PROCEEDINGS FOR, BY
COURT— NEWSPAPER PUBLICATIONS.— When It comes, in any
manner, to the Icnowledge of the presiding justice of a court that
articles are published in a newspaper circulated in the place where
the court Is held, which are calculated to prevent a fair trial of a
cause then on trial before the court, the court, of its own motion,
can institute proceedings for contempt. (Telegram etc. Co. v. Com-
monwealth. 280.)
2. CONTEMPT— CORPORATION — FINE — EXECUTION.— The
proper method of collecting a fine imposed upon a cori>oration for a
contempt of court is by a levy of an execution issued by the court.
(Telegram etc. Co. v. Commonwealth, 280.)
3. CONTEMPT— CORPORATION— LIABILITY.— An Intent may
be Imputed to a corporation in criminal proceedings, and It may,
therefore, be held answerable for a criminal contempt of court.
(Telegram etc. Co. v. Commonwealth, 280.)
4. CONTEMPT — CORPORATION — NEWSPAPER PUBLICA-
TION OF FACTS,— It is a contempt of court for a newspaper,
printed by a corporation and circulated In the place where a trial Is
had, pending the trial, to publish statements of facts, evidence of
which Is not competent at the trial, and which Is not Introduced
thereon. If they are so made that it Is liliely that the presiding jus-
tice and the jurors will read them during the trial, and their natural
and probable effect will be to improperly Influence the justice and
the jury In the determination of the cause. (Telegram etc. Co. v.
Commonwealth, 280.)
5. CONTEMPT — CORPORATION — NEWSPAPER PUBLICA-
TION.—The publication of an article In a newspaper, printed by a
corporation and circulated In the place where a trial is had, pending
the trial, which concerns the cause on trial, and which Is calciilnted
to prejudice the jury In the cause, and prevent a fair trial, Is a
criminal contempt of the court trying the cause, for which the cor-
poration may be held answerable. (Telegram etc. Co. r. Common-
wealth, 280.)
Index. 967
CONTRACTS.
1. CONTRACT FOR BENEFIT OP THIRD PARTY-RIGHT
OP ACTION FOR BREACH.— The beneficiaries of a contract, who
furnish the consideration money of the contract, can maintain an
action for damages caused by its breach. (Gorrill v. Water Supply
Co., 598.)
2. CONTRACT FOR BENEFIT OF THIRD PARTY — ^IIGHT
OP ACTION.— One not a party or privy to a contract, but who Is a
beneficiary thereof, Is entitled to maintain an action for Its breach.
<GorrllI V. Water Supply Co., 598.)
3. CONTRACT FOR BENEFIT OP THIRD PARTY— BENE-
FICIARY ONE OP A CLASS— ACTION.— One not a party to a con-
tract, but who is a beneficiary thereof, Is entitled to maintain an
action for Its breach, even when he Is only one of a class of persons,
If the class Is sufficiently designated. (Gorrill v. Water Supply Co.,
698.)
4. CONTRACTS-CONSTRUCTION OF PROMISES.— It Is S
rule of law, as well as of ethics, that where the language of a prom-
isor may be understood In more senses than one. It Is to be Inter-
preted In the sense In which he had reason to suppose It was under-
stood by the promisee. (Kendrick v. Life Ins. Co., 592.)
5. CONTRACTS-CONSTRUCTION OF.— If It be left in doubt
"Whether given words were used In an enlarged or a restricted sense,
other things being equal, that construction should be adopted which
is most beneficial to the promisee. (Kendrick v. Life Ins. Co., 592.)
6. CONTRACTS-DISCHARGE OP FIRST INDORSER BY-
AGREEMENT FOR INDULGENCE— PARTIES.— An agreement
for Indulgence which will discharge or release the first Indorser on
a promissory note cannot be made with any other person than the
maker of the note, or principal debtor. (Wright v. Independence
Nat. Bank, 889.)
7. CONTRACTS— EXTENDING TIME TO SECOND IN-
DORSER FOR PAYMENT OP NOTE DOBS NOT DISCHARGE
FIRST INDORSER OR SURETY.— An agreement between the
holder of a negotiable note and a second Indorser upon It, to extend
the time of payment, does not discharge the first, though an accom-
modation Indorser from his liability on the note, and furnishes no
■defense to an action brought against him by the holder, as the
agreement does not prevent the first Indorser from paying the debt,
and proceeding at once against the maker, or from exercising any
rights which a surety may assert for his protection against his
principal. (Wright v. Independence Nat. Bank, 889.)
8. CONTRACTS — ILLEGALITY — WAIVER — FAILURE TO
PLEAD.— The Illegality of a contract cannot be gotten rid of either
by a failure to plead It, or by agreeing to waive it in the most
solemn manner. (Camp v. Bruce, 873.)
9. CONTRACTS— ILLEGALITY OF, IS FATAL.— The law re-
fuses to enforce illegal contracts from reasons of public policy, and
It is Immaterial at what stage of the case the illegality appears.
(Camp V. Bruce, 873.)
10. CONTRACTS OPPOSED TO PUBLIC POLICY-JUDICIAL
SALES— BUYING BIDS.— The object in Judicial sales Is to get the
best price that can be fairly had for the property. Hence, to allow
one bidder to buy off another, which Is but a species of bribery, and
thus prevent the property from bringing the best price, is con-
demned by the law, and the courts will not enforce contracts founded
4n such practices. (Camp v. Bruce, 873.)
Index.
11. CONTRACTS OPPOSED TO PUBLIC POLICY— JUDICIAI>
SALES — BUYING BID BEFORE CONFIRMATION.— An agree-
ment between the purchaser at a judicial sale and another person
that the former will, upon a confirmation of the sale, sell the prop-
erty to the latter at an advanced price is contrary to public policy
and void, because it tends to prevent the property from bringing
the best price. (Camp v. Bruce, 873.)
12. "CONTRACTS PROCURED BY FRAUD— AFFIRMANCE-
RESCISSION— NEW INCIDENTS OF SAME FRAUD.— If a con-
tract has been procured by fraud, and the person defrauded, with
knowledge of the substance of the fraud, elects to affirm the con-
tract, he cannot subsequently, upon discovering new incidents of
the same fraud, elect to rescind the contract. Knowledge of the
essence of the fraud puts him to his election. The subsequent dis-
covery of a new incident in the fraud does not confer a new right
to rescind, but merely confirms the previous knowledge of the same
fraud. (Wilson v. Hundley, 837.)
13. CONTRACTS PROCURED BY FRAUD-RESCISSION OR
AFFIRMANCE— ELECTION.— If a party who has been defrauded
in the procurement of a contract elects, on discovery of the fraud,
to affirm the contract, his election is final and conclusive. He has
but on election to rescind, and, having once elected to affirm the con-
tract, he cannot thereafter disaffirm it, but must abide by the de-
cision he has made. (Wilson v. Hundley, 837.)
14. CONTRACTS PROCURED BY FRAUD— EIGHTS AND
REMEDIES OF PARTY DEFRAUDED.— A contract induced by
fraud is not void, but voidable at the option of the party injured
by the fraud. Upon its discovery he has, as a general rule, the
choice of two remedies: 1. He may elect to rescind the contract.
If he can restore what he has received in the same state or condi-
tion in which he received it, and sue for and recover back the con-
sideration he has paid or given; or, if he has not paid or given
anything, repudiate the contract, and rely, when sued, upon the
fraud as a complete defense; 2. He may elect to retain what he
has received under the contract, and bring an action to recover dam-
ages for the injury he has sustained from the deceit. By adopting
the latter course, he, in effect, affirms the contract, but not as made
in good faith. He consents to be bound by Its provisions, but does
not thereby release or waive his claim for damages arising from
the fraud collateral to the agreement. (Wilson v. Hundley, 837.)
See Appeal, 13; Corporations, 4, 5, 7, 8; Executors and Administra-
tors; Guardian and Ward, 2, 4, 5; Insurance, 13, 14; Municipal
Corporations, 3-10; Names; Statute of Frauds, 1; Waterworks
and Water Companies, 1,
CORPORATIONS.
1. A CORPORATION HAS ITS DOMICILE In the jurisdiction
of the state which created it, and, as a consequence, has no domi-
cile anywhere else. (Bergner etc. Brewing Co. v. Dreyfus, 251.)
2. CORPORATIONS — ACTION BY A FOREIGN CORPORA-
TION—DISCHARGE OF INSOLVENT AS A BAR.— A discharge
under the insolvency laws of Massachusetts does mot discharge a
debt due from the Massachusetts debtor to a corporation of an-
other state, having Its principal place of business In the latter state,
although It has a place of business in Massachusetts, and a license
under the laws of that state, and has complied with Its laws regu-
lating foreign corporations doing business there, respecting the ap-
pointment of a person upon whom process may be served. (Bergner
etc Brewing Co. v. Dreyfus, 251.)
Index. 96»
3. CORPORATIONS — STOCKHOLDERS - LIABILITY TO
CREDITORS— TRANSITORY ACTION.— The liability of a stock-
holder in a corporation organized under the laws of the state of
Kansas for the debts of the corporation is several, and may be en-
forced \>y an action against him in any court of general jurisdiction
In the state where personal service of process can be made upon the
stockholder. (Hancock Nat. Bank v. Ellis, 232.)
4. CORPORATIONS— CONTRACT FOR STOCK SUBSCRIP-
TION—CONSTRUCTION.— A contract made to Induce stock sub-
scriptions, whereby the promisors agree to repurchase the stock
at the end of three years, upon receiving thirty days' notice that the
subscriber desires to return the stock, is conditional, and liability
thereunder does not exist in favor of a particular promisee, unless,
within a reasonable time after tlie expiration of the three years,
the thirty days' notice Is given by him to the promisors of his elec-
tion to carry the stock no longer. (Rogers v. Burr, 50.)
5. CORPORATIONS— STOCK SUBSCRIPTIONS— CONTRACTT
OF GUARANTY— CONSTRUCTION.— If joint promisors, to induce
stock subscriptions, guarantee the payment of eight per cent divi-
dends to subscribers for thi-ee years, and, at the expiration of that
time, on receiving a specified notice, to purchase the stock at Its
par value, the guaranty as to the dividends is unconditional and
binding without notice, and covers a period of three years, although
the guaranty as to purchasing the stock becomes inoperative for
want of notice. (Rogers v. Burr, 50.)
6. CORPORATIONS — STOCK SUBSCRIPTIONS — STATUTE
OF FRAUDS.— It is not necessary to the validity of a contract of
subscription to shares of stock In a manufacturing corporation that
it be reduced to writing. Shares of stock In joint stock companies
are not within the statute of frauds. (Rogers v. Burr, 50.)
7. CORPORATIONS — STOCK SUBSCRIPTIONS — VALIDITY
OF GUARANTY— CONSIDERATION.— If a number of persons, in
order to induce another to subscribe to the capital stock of a manu-
facturing corporation in which they are all Interested, execute a
joint agreement guaranteeing the payment of an annual dividend
of eight per cent for three years on such stock to subscriber who
take enougii stock for the successful organization of the corporation,
and also agreeing that if, at the expiration of such three years, the
holders of such stock do not desire to carry it any longer, "we
hereby agree, with thirty days' notice from any or all of them, to
pay each holder par value, or fifty dollars, for each share of stock
held by them, their heirs or assigns," such agreement of guaranty
Is valid and based upon a sufl5cient consideration, where the guar-
antors are residents of the town in which the manufacturing cor-
poration Is to be located, are interested in its growth and develop-
ment, and Jointly Interested with the subscribers in the furtherance
of the undertaking. (Rogers v. Burr, 50.)
8. CORPORATIONS— STOCK SUBSCRIPTIONS-CONSTRUC-
TION OP CONTRACT.— If several persons, in order to Induce a
promisee to subscribe for stock, jointly agree to buy such stock
back at the end of three years, upon receiving a specified notice
from the promisee of his election to sell, notice to one or more
joint promisors of an election by the promisee to sell his stock is not
notice to the others, and this, though one of them, as agent for the
others, has procured stock subscriptions under the contract (Rogers
V. Burr, 50.)
9. CORPORATIONS — LIABILITY OF STOCKHOLDERS-
COUNTERCLAIM.— In an action by a stockholder of an insolvent
corporation to enjoin an execution sale of real estate which has
y70 Index.
Seen purchased by Mm from the members of a firm against whom
the defendant has recovered the judgment on which the execution
issued, an answer charging that all the stockholders of such cor-
poration are liable for the payment of the debt on which the judg-
ment is based and asliing that they be brought in and required
to pay does not set up a counterclaim. (Wehn v. Fall, 397.)
10. CORPORATIONS— INSOLVENCY— RIGHTS OF CREDIT-
ORS—LIABILITY OF STOCKHOLDERS.— A creditor of an insol-
vent and dissolved corporation must first exhaust his legal rem-
edy against it, before he can sue to obtain satisfaction of his claim
against a stocliholder who nas come into possession of corporate as-
€ets. (Wehn v. Fall, 397.)
11. CORPORATIONS— INSOLVENCY-LIEN OF CREDITOR
ON ASSETS.— A creditor of an- insolvent corporation does not ac-
■quire any specific lien on its assets, and cannot proceed against one
having possession of such assets without first reducing his claim to
judgment. (Wehn v. Fall, 397.)
12. CORPORATIONS— INSOLVENCY.— CREDITORS of an In-
solvent corporation must first obtain judgment on their claims be-
fore attempting to reach property transferred by the corporatioo
in fraud of their rights. (Wehn v. Fall, 397.)
13. CORPORATIONS— BUSINESS NOT AUTHORIZED BY AR-
TICLES OF INCORPORATION— LIABILITY OF STOCKHOLD-
ERS.—The mere fact that a corporation has done some business
outside that authorized by its articles does not render the stock-
holders, as such, liable for its corporate debts, to the amount of
stock owned or held by them, although the stockholders would be
80 liable, under the state constitution, if such business had been au-
thorized by its articles. (Nicollet Nat. Bank v. Frisk-Turner Co.,
334.)
14. CORPORATIONS, CHARACTER OF — HOW DETER-
MINED.—At least in the absence of a fraudulent attempt to evade
the law, the articles of incorporation are themselves the sole cri-
terion to ascertain the purpose for which the corporation was
formed. (Nicollet Nat. Bank v. Frisk-Turner Co., 334.)
15. CORPORATIONS— POWERS— DUTIES OF THIRD PER-
SONS.—Strangers or third persons are presumed to know the law of
the land, and are bound, when dealing with corporations, to know
the powers conferred by their charters. (Nicollet Nat. Bank v.
Frisk-Turner Co., 334.)
16. CORPORATIONS, MANUFACTURING— WHEN ARTICLES
OF INCORPORATION DO NOT AUTHORIZE THE COx\DUCT-
ING OF A MERCANTILE BUSINESS.— The buying and selling of
ready-made clothing is purely a mercantile business, and is" un-
authorized by the articles of incorporation of a manufacturing cor-
poration permitting "the transaction of all business necessary
and incidental to such manufacture and sale of clothing." (Nicollet
Nat. Bank v. Frisk-Turner Co., 334.)
17. CORPORATIONS— CONSTRUCTION OF ARTICLES OP
INCORPORATIONS— MANUFACTURING.— A corporation, whose
articles of Incorporation state that "its business shall be the manu-
facturing of clothing of every description, and the sale of clothing
so manufactured, and the transaction of all other business neces-
sary and incidental to such manufacture and sale of clothing," is a
manufacturing corporation within the meaning of article 10, sec-
tion 3, of the Minnesota constitution. (Nicollet Nat. Bank v. Frisk-
Turner Co., 334.)
Index. 971
18. CORPORATIONS — DEFINITIONS. — "AN INCIDENTAI,
POWER is one that Is directly and immediately appropriate to tlie
execution of tlie specific power granted, and not one that has a
slight or remote relation to it." (Nicollet Nat. Bank v. Frisk-Turner
Co., 334.)
19. CORPORATIONS— POWERS.— A corporation possesses only
those properties which the charter of its creation confers upon it,
either expressly, or as incidental to its very existence. (Nicollet
Nat. Bank v. Frisk-Turner Co., 334.)
20. CORPORATIONS — NOTICE — KNOWLEDGE OF PRESI-
DENT.—A coi-poration cannot be charged with the knowledge of
its president, when such knowledge was obtained before he be-
came president, or when he is acting in his own interest and behalf.
<Dorr V. Life Ins. C. Co., 308.)
21. CORPORATIONS — ASSIGNMENT OF STOCK— EFFECT
ON LIEN OF THE CORPORATION.— An assignment or sale of cor-
poration stock, to a person ignorant of a statutory lien thereon held
by the corporation, will not discharge the lien. (Dorr v. Life Ins.
C. Co.. 309.)
22. CORPORATIONS-STATUTORY LIEN ON STOCK.— When,
by general law, a lien is given to a corporation upon the stock of
a. stockholder in the corporation for his indebtedness to it, that
lien is valid and enforceable against all the world, unless it has
been waived, surrendered, or lost in some sufficient manner. (Dorr
V. Life Ins. C. Co., 308.)
23. CORPORATIONS — TRUST COMPANY— PRESUMPTION
OF CAPACITY.— In the absence of specific restriction in its charter,
a trust company having general power to "execute trusts of every
description" must be presumed to have corporate capacity to act as
committee of a lunatic. (Equitable Trust Co. v. Garis, 644.)
24. CORPORATIONS — STOCKHOLDER'S LIABILITY — EN-
FORCEMENT OF IN ANOTHER STATE.— An assignee of an in-
solvent corporation of another state, appointed therein and author-
ized by the law thereof to maintain any suit which the corporation
could have maintained, may maintain an action in another state
against all the original stockholders residing therein to enforce their
common-law contractual liability to pay the subscription price of
their stock and to compel them to contribute their pro rata share of
the indebtedness of the corporation to the extent of their unpaid
etock subscriptions. This remedy exists independently of the pro-
Tisions of the statute of the former state. (Stoddard v. Lum, 541.)
25. CORPORATIONS— STATUTORY ACTION TO RECOVER
DEBT OF DIRECTORS WHERE COMPANY FAILS TO FILE AN
ANNUAL REPORT.— In a suit wherein it Is sought to charge the
defendants, as directors of a corporation, by virtue of the provisions
of a statute, which provides that, in case of failure to file an annual
report, "all the directors thereof shall be jointly and severally liable
for all the debts of the corporation then existing, and for all that
shall be contracted before such report shall be made," the plaintiff
must. In order to succeed, prove either that, at the time of default
in filing the annual report, the debt in suit existed, or that it was
contracted before the report was filed. (Withrow v. Slayback, 507.)
26. CORPORATIONS— FAILURE TO FILE ANNUAL REPORT
—ACTION FOR DEBT— ABANDONMENT OP BUSINESS AS A
DEFENSE.— If a statute makes the directors of a corporation an-
swerable for its existing debts, and those contracted before the com-
pany makes an annual report, It is no defense to an action brought
to charge them with corporate debts by virtue of the company's
972 Index.
failure fo file a report that the company had ceased to exist, by
abandoning its business and turning over its property to its cred-
itors, before the time for filing the report, If it is shown that such
transfer did not embrace all of its property, and that the company
continued to exercise acts of absolute ownership over other omitted
property, and subsequently filed a report of full payment of its cap-
ital stock, as well as two annual reports. (Withrow v. SlaybacR,
507.)
27. CORPORATIONS— FAILURE TO FILE ANNUAL REPORT
—DIRECTOR'S LIABILITY— INDORSEMENT OF NOTE BY COR-
PORATION AND PAROL PROOF OF COMPANY'S LIABILITY.
If the superintendent and an oflicer of an incorporated company
signs a promissory note given in payment of a preceding Indebted-
ness due by the company, which, by its treasurer, indorses the note,
and the payee seelis to charge the directors of the corporation with
the debt for having failed to file an annual report, under a statute
which malies them answerable for all debts existing or contracted
before the annual report is made, and the directors seek to avoid
liability by standing on a strict contract of indorsement, and insist-
ing tliat they are only contingently answerable when the note Is
due and the indorser charged, and that protest was after the time
of the filing of the report, the plaintiff should be permitted to
show, by parol evidence, the real transaction— that the corporation
was, in reality, the principal debtor, and that the company was,
therefore, answerable to the plaintiff before the default in filing the
report was cured. ("Withrow v. Slayback, 507.)
28. CORPORATIONS — MEETINGS — WANT OF NOTICE.— A
meeting of the directors of a corporation held without notice to ab-
sent directors, or the existence of such an emergency as excuses
notice to them, renders the business transacted at such meeting
void. (Singer v. Salt Lake etc. Mfg. Co., 773.)
29. CORPORATIONS — MEETINGS — PRESUMPTION AS TO
REGULARITY.— If it appears that a special meeting of the directors
of a corporation was held and that a quorum was present, It must
be presumed that due notice of the meeting was given and that
all steps necessary to constitute It a regular and valid meeting were
taken. (Singer v. Salt Lake etc. Mfg. Co., 773.)
30. CORPORATIONS— INSOLVENCY— TRUST DEED.— The in-
solvency of a corporation at the time a trust deed is authorized and
executed by it does not alone render the instrument void. (Singer
V. Salt Lake etc. Mfg. Co., 773.)
3L CORPORATIONS— TRUST DEED— EXECUTION OF.— If a
committee is authorized by the board of directors of a corporation
to procure a loan for it and the officers who execute a trust deed
to secure such loan are expressly authorized to do so by the board
of directors and the by-laws of the corporation, the validity of the
deed cannot be assailed on the ground that it Is not signed by the
president and secretary of the cprporation. (Singer v. Salt Lake etc.
Mfg. Co., 773.)
32. CORPORATIONS— TRUST DEED— DIRECTOR DEALING
WITH CORPORATION.— If, In the execution of a trust deed by
a corporation, there is an entire absence of want of good faith,
fraud and collusion and the corporation is a going concern, a stock-
holder or director is not prohibited from dealing with it. In such
case the mere fact that a director furnished a portion of the money
does not vitiate the trust deed given to secure the loan. Contracts
made by a corporation with its oflScers are not void per se, but will
be carefully scrutinized in equity and set aside, If not made In the
utmost good faith. (Singer v. Salt Lake etc. Mfg. Co., 773.)
Index. 973
S3. CORPORATIONS — MEETINGS — NOTICE.— As a general
rule, notice must be given in some way to all directors of the meet-
ings of the board, where the by-laws and rules of the corporation
do not provide the time and place of meeting, in order to render
them valid. To this rule there are exceptions, as where such an
<'mergency exists as Justifies immediate action on the part of the
board, and the giving of notice to all the members is not practicalile,
or where a director secretes himself in order to prevent a meeting,
or is beyond the reach of notice. (Singer v. Salt Lake etc. Mfg. Co.,
773.)
34. CORPORATIONS— MEETINGS— PRESUMPTIONS AS TO
REGULARITY.— If meetings of a legally constituted board of di-
rectors have been held, and business within the scope of and pur-
suant to the purposes for which the corporation was organized has
been transacted, the presumption Is, that such meetings were regu-
larly called, convened, and held for the transaction of such business,
and the onus probandl is upon him who maintains the contrary to
allege and prove that they were not so called and held. (Singer v.
Salt Lake etc. Mfg. Co., 773.)
35. CORPORATIONS.— THE RESIDENCE OF A CORPORA-
TION Is the state of Its creation. (Turcott v. Railroad, 661.)
36. CORPORATIONS — FOREIGN — FILING OF CHARTEBr-
CONSTRUCTION OF STATUTE.— The purpose of a statute requiP-
Ing foreign corporations doing business within the state to file and
register their charters, is to enable them to do business, own or
acquire property, and be enable to sue, but not to exempt them
from suit If they disregard the statute or to estop them from mak-
ing defense if so sued. (Turcott v. Railroad, 661.)
37. CORPORATIONS — FICTITIOUS SUBSCRIPTIONS TO
^TOCK— VALIDITY OF FRAUD.— Fictitious or colorable subscrip-
tions to stock, made and used with the intent to Induce other per-
sons to subscribe, with the secret understanding that no liability
shall attach to them by reason of their subscriptions, and that they
shall thereafter be allowed to withdraw them, do not operate as
a fraud upon bona fide subscribers, for they are as valid and bind-
ing upon the subscribers as if they had been originally made in
good faith, and will be upheld and so treated by the courts. Hence,
such subscriptions do not give a bona fide subscriber a right to avoid
his subscription. (Wilson v. Hundley, 837.)
See Action; Appeal, 5; Contempt, 2-5; Evidence, 8, 7; Insurance,
1, 2; Limitations of Actions, 9, 10; Municipal Corporations, 12L
COTENANCY.
1. COTENANCY- ADVERSE POSSESSION BETWEEN CO-
TENANTS— NOTICE.— In order that exclusive possession of the
land of the cotenancy by one cotenant, accompanied by hostile acts
and claims of ownership, may amount to an ouster of his cotenant,
such acts and declarations must be known to the latter. Actual no-
tice must be. shown, but it may be by circumstantial evidence
<Casey v. Casey, 190.)
2. COTENANCY — ADVERSE POSSESSION— EVIDENCE.— To
prove adverse possession by one cotenant of the land of the co-
tenancy, his declarations claiming sole ownership are admissible
in evidence though not made in the presence of his cotenant (Casey
V. Casey, 190.)
3. COTENANCY— ADVERSE POSSESSION BETWEEN CO-
TENANTS.— Exclusive occupancy by one tenant in common, ae-
974 Index.
companled by acts and declarations of sole ownership, If known
to his cotenant, will amount to ouster so that his possession may
ripen into title. (Casey v. Casey, 190.)
4. COTENANCY— DUTY OF COTENANT TO PAY TAXES.-A
widow entitled to unassigned homestead and dower in property on
which she resides, and holding with her children in cotenancy, is
bound, in order to protect their common interest, to contribute to-
ward the taxes upon a private alley constituting part of the com-
mon property. (Goralslci v. Kostuslii, 98.)
5. COTENANCY— PRIVATE ALLEY.— Owners of lots abutting
upon a private alley, established for their common benefit and ap-
purtenant to each lot. have a unity of possession and are cotenants
therein. (Goralslsi v. Kostuslii, 98.)
6. COTENANCY— TAX TITLES.— While cotenants remain in the
actual possession of the common property and maintain the unity
of possession by actual common use, neither, as against his fel-
low tenants, by purchasing a tax title upon the common premises
can obtain a title that is not subject to the election of the cotenants,
within a reasonable time, to avail themselves of the purchase by
contributing their proper proportion to reimburse the purchasing
tenant. (Goralslii v. Kostuslji, 98.)
7. COTENANCY— RIGHTS OF WIDOW OF ONE COTENANT
—SECURING ADVERSE TITLE.— Where one of two cotenants
dies, the dower interest of his widow in the land of the cotenancy
brings her within the general rule that, where one Is Interested with
another in an estate, an implied obligation arises to sustain the
common interest, and she cannot acquire and set up an adverse title
to deprive the other cotenant of his interest as by purchasing the
property at a sheriff's sale had under proceedings to collect arrears
In ground rent. (Enyard v. Enyard, 623.)
See Devise, 1; Homestead, 2.
COUNTERCLAIM.
See Corporations, 8.
COUNTIES.
See Schools.
COURTS.
COURTS — PRESUMPTION AS TO JURISDICTION.-A
county court, with a clerk and seal, is a court of record. Hence, If
it enters a judgment upon a warrant of attorney to confess judg-
ment, upon which an action is brought in another state, such court
will there be presumed to have been a court of general Jurisdiction.
(Van Norman v. Gordon, 304.)
See Criminal Law, 4; Interstate Commerce, 1; Jurisdiction; Muni-
cipal Corporations, 4.
CRIMINAL LAW.
1. CRIMINAL LAW— ABANDONMENT OF CHILD.— Under a
Statute providing that "If any father shall willfully and voluntarily
abandon his child, leaving it in dependent and destitute condition,
he shall be guilty of a misdemeanor, in order to constitute the of-
fense of abandonment, there must be an actual desertion, followed
by a refusal to support, and the absence of either of such elements
prevents the offense from being made out. (Gay v. State, 68.)
Index. 97&
2. CRIMINAL LAW— ABANDONMENT OF CHILD.-If, after
a completed act of desertion, a father has been convicted under a
statute mailing It a misdemeanor for "any father to willfully and
voluntarily abandon his child, leaving it in a dependent and desti-
tute condition," there can be no new act of abandonment until a re-
turn to the discharge of the parental obligation, and no new offense-
of abandonment until such a return, followed by another act of de-
sertion, and this although the original abandonment Is willfully and
voluntarily continued and the child remains dependent and destitute.
(Gay V. State, G8.)
3. CRIMINAL LAW — PRELIMINARY EXAMINATION —
WAIVER.— If a person accused of crime, on being arrested and
brought before an examining magistrate, voluntarily pleads guilty,
he thereby waives his right to a preliminary examination. (Latimer
V. State, 403.)
4. CRIMINAL LAW— PRELIMINARY EXAMINATION.— DIS-
TRICT COURTS ARE WITHOUT JURISDICTION to try, on In-
formation, one accused of crime, except he be a fugitive from jus-
tice, unless he has first been accorded the privilege of a prelimin-
ary examination or has waived that privilege. (Latimer v. State,
403.)
5. CRIMINAL LAW— A PRELIMINARY EXAMINATION Is a
right accorded and a privilege granted by law to everyone accused
of crime; but It Is privilege which the accused may waive. (Latimer
V. State, 403.)
6. CRIMINAL LAW.— A PRELIMINARY EXAMINATION Is^
In no sense a ti'ial of a person accused of crime. It Is not even
necessary that the person charged with a crime, on being brought
before a magistrate, should be asked to plead, or that be should
plead. (Latimer v. State, 403.)
7. CRIMINAL LAW— PRELIMINARY EXAMINATION.— The
object of a preliminary examination Is to ascertain whether the
crime charged has been committed, and, if so, whether there Is-
probable cause to believe that the accused committed It (Latimer
V. State, 403.)
8. CRIMINAL LAW— DRUNKENNESS AS DEFENSE.- While
voluntary Intoxication Is not of Itself a complete defense for one
who Is charged with the commission of an offense, yet evidence
that the accused was Intoxicated when It Is alleged he committed
the crime is admissible as a circumstance tending to show that the
act of the accused was not premeditated, and for the purpose of
ascertaining and determining the status and condition of his mind
at that time. (Latimer v. State, 403.)
9. CRIMINAL LAW— EVIDENCE— GOOD CHARACTER.— Pre-
vious good character of the accused In a criminal case is a fact
which he Is entitled to have submitted for the consideration of the
jury, precisely as any other circumstance favorable to him, without
any disparagement by the court. (Latimer v. State, 403.)
10. CRIMINAL LAW— PRELIMINARY EXAMINATION— REC-
OGNIZANCE.—If an accused, on being brought before the examin-
ing magistrate, waives his right to a preliminary examination, or
pleads guilty to the crime with which he is charged, the magis-
trate should recognize him to appear In the district court, and en-
ter upon his docket the proceedings that actually occur, and a duly
certified transcript of this record filed In the oflBce of the clerk of
the district court Invests that court with Jurisdiction to try the ac-
cused on information for the crime with which he was accused be-^
fore the examining magistrate. (Latimer v. State, 403.)
S76 Index.
11. CRIMINAL LAW— DRUNKENNESS AS DEFENSE.— If an
xicciised was so drunk at the time he is alleged to have committed
the crime chai'ged as to render him unconscious of his act, incapa-
ble of controlling his will, and forming and entertaining a felonious
intent, his intoxication is a defense. (Latimer v. State, 403.)
12. CRIMINAL LAW— CONFESSIONS— ADMISSIBILITY OP
VOLUNTARY STATEMENTS.— Voluntary statements made by a
man of ordinary intelligence and education to police officers after
bis arrest, not as evidence nor as the result of an examination in a
Judicial proceeding, afthoush reduced to writing and verified by him,
are admissible in evidence on tne trial of the crime for which h6 was
arrested, if not induced by any promise, threat, or improper influ-
ence, although he was not informed by those to whom he made the
statements that they might be used against him on his subsequent
trial. (People v. Kennedy, 557.)
13. CRIMINAL LAW— CONFESSIONS.— TEST OP ADMISSI-
BILITY of the statement of a person accused of crime, whether
made in the course of judicial proceedings or not, is whether it is
made voluntarily, and that must be determined by its nature and the
circumstances under which it is made. (People v. Kennedy, 557.)
14. CRIMINAL LAW — CONFESSIONS IMPROPERLY OB-
TAINED—ADMISSIBILITY.— If peace officers, by covert threats,
doubtful and uncertain promises, acts of intimidation, or other
questionable means, procure incriminating statements from per-
sons under arrest, and subsequently charged with crime, they are
Inadmissible against them. (People v. Kennedy, 557.)
15. AN INDICTMENT FURNISHES NO PROOF that an accused
is guilty of a capital crime, much less that he is guilty of a capital
•crime of which the proof is evident. (Ex parte Newman, 740.)
See Appeal, 3, 4; Bail; Habeas Corpus, 1, 2; Homicide; Rape;
Trial, 4, 6, 7; Witnesses, 12.
DAMAGES.
1. DAMAGES-MEASURE OF, FOR FALSE REPRESENTA-
TIONS IN SALE OF BOND.— The measure of damages, in an ac-
tion for false representations in the sale of a bond, is the difference
between the actual value of the bond, at the time of purchase, and
its value if it had been what it was represented to be, secured as
represented. Subsequent events may be considered in arriving at
the two values, at the time of the purchase, though they show the
market value of the bond to have been worthless. (Whiting v. Price,
^62.)
2. DAMAGES— MEASURE OF— DESTRUCTION OF PROP-
ERTY HAVING NO MARKET VALUE.— For the destruction of
household goods and wearing apparel having no recognized market
value, the measure of damages is their actual value, which may be
determined by evidence of their original cost, the extent of their use,
And their condition at the time of destruction. (McMahon v. Du-
buque, 143.)
3. DAMAGES— MEASURE OF— DESTRUCTION OF DWELL-
ING-HOUSB.— The measure of damages for the destruction of a
dwelling-house by fire is its actual and not necessarily its market
value. (McMahon v. Dubuque, 143.)
4. DAMAGES— IN.TURY TO HEAVY MACHINERY THROUGH
.NEGLIGENCE OF TRUCKMEN— PUTTING IN CONDITION FOR
USE.— If truckmen, in moving a large and heavy machine for plan-
ing Iron, negligently break and injure it, the expense of restoring it
to a condition for uses is a proper element of damage, in an action
Index. 977
for such Injury, for It is plain that the machine Is not an article
that the plaintiff can procure in the market at any time. Hence, IC
that item of expense alone exceeds the verdict, it is unnecessary to
-consider or discuss other items admitted in evidence upon the ques>
tlon of damages. (Jaclcson etc. Works v. Hurlbut, 432.)
See Assault; Railroad Companies, 17; Telegraph Companies, 3, 6;
Waterworks and Water Companies, 1.
DEATH.
See Negligence, 8.
DEBT.
See Corporations, 26; Taxation; Vendor and Purchaser, L
DECISIONS.
DECISIONS OF SISTER STATES— WEIGHT OF.— In a case
of first impression in a state, the decisions in other states have
only persuasive authority, and the consideration to which the rea-
soning therein is entitled. (Gorrell v. Water Sup. Co., 598.)
DEEDS.
1. DEEDS— RECITALS IN AS TO PAYMENT— EVIDENCE TO
CONTRADICT.— Although It is always competent to contradict the
recital in a deed as to the amount paid, in an action involving the
recovery of the purchase money, or as to the measure of dam-
ages in an action upon the covenants in the deed, it is not com-
petent to contradict the acknowledgment of a consideration paid,
in order to affect the validity of the deed in creating or passing a
title to the estate thereby granted. (Kendrick v. Life Ins. Co., 592.)
2. DEEDS— MARRIAGE AS A VALUABLE CONSIDERA-
TION.—A deed made by a man to his intended wife, followed by
marriage, is conclusively presumed to be in consideration of mar-
riage, and is based on a valuable consideration. (Snyder v. Grand-
staff, 863.)
3. DEEDS UPON CONSIDERATION OF MARRIAGE— VA-
LIDITY OF.— Under the statute .of Virginia, conveyances upon con-
sideration of marriage are void as to existing creditors, but not as
to those who claim to be paramount purchasers under a will. (Sny-
-der V. Grandstaff, 863.)
4. DEEDS— PURCHASE BY DEVISEES UNDER A WILL-
CONVEYANCE TO INTENDED WIFE, FOLLOWED BY MAR-
RIAGE—RIGHTS OF SURVIVORSHIP VESTED IN WIDOW.—
When it appears that a whole estate was devised to the testator's
three grandchildren, "to be equally divided between them, share and
share alike, but, on the death of either of them without issue, his
or her share should pass to the survivors or survivor, and. In case
all died without issue, then to collateral kindred"; that the devisees
afterward apportioned the estate among themselves, and each, by
a deed expressly stating his Intention and desire, conveyed to the
others all of his right, title, and Interest in the property allotted
to such other; and that one of the devisees, contemplating marriage,
deeded his share to his intended wife, marrying her on the same
day, but died shortly afterward, without issue, or possibility of
Issue, it must be held that all rights of survivorship in the other
two devisees passed by their deeds to the deceased, and by the
latter's deed became vested in his widow. (Snyder v. Grandstaff,
£63.)
AM. St. Kkp.. Vol. LXX.-«3
973 Index.
5. DEEDS— REGISTRY OF, BY SUBSEQUENT PURCHASER,
AS NOTICE— OBJECT OF REGISTRY LAWS.— The registry of a
deed by a subsequent purchaser is no notice to parties who hav&
acquired their rights before the time when the deed is registered,.
for registry laws are not intended to affect the holders of ante-
cedent rights, but only such persons as are compelled to search the
records in order to protect their own interests. (Lynchburg Perpetual
etc Co. V. Fellers, 851.)
See Corporations, 30-32; Fraudulent Conveyance; Liens.
DEFINITIONS.
"Common carrier." (Jaclison etc. Worlis v. Hurlbut, 432.)
Conditions precedent and subsequent. (Burdis v, Burdis, 825.)
"General guaranty." (Tidioute S. Bank v. Libbey, 907.)
"Incidental power." (Nicollet Nat. Bk. v. Frisk-Turner Co., 334.>
"Malice." (Brown v. Brown, 574.)
"Original package." (Austin v. State, 703.)
"Special guaranty." (Tidioute S. Bank v. Libbey, 907.)
DEPOSIT OF TITLE DEEDS.
See Mortgages, 7, 8.
DESCENT.
DESCENT— ILLEGITIMATE CHILD AS AN HEIR.— Under
the statutory law of Massachusetts, an illegitimate child is the heir
of his mother; but at common law he could not be an heir, even of
his mother. (Hayden v. Barrett, 295.)
DEVISE.
. 1. DEVISE — CONSTRUCTION — COTENANCY. — A will by
which land is devised to specified legatees, to have and to hold la
common for a home and support so long as they remain together,
and should one or more leave they can take such as given them
Individually in this will, but have no share or control of this that I»
given in common without the consent and signature of those that
remain on the place," with restriction on the right of either to alien-
ate or lease any part of the land without the consent of all, con-
stitutes such legatees cotenants in the lands devised, with a con-
dition subsequent that the whole must be used for the support of
such of the legatees as choose to remain on the place. (Harrison
v. Harrison, 60.)
2. DEVISE — RE.TECTION OF CONDITION INCAPABLE OF
PERFORMANCE.— A devise of land to specified legatees, "to have
and to hold In common for a home and support as long as they
remain together, and should one or more leave they can take such
as given them individually in this will, but have no share or control
of this that is given in common, without the consent and signature
of those that remain on the place," imposes a condition subsequent
that the whole land be used for the support of such legatees as
choose to reside thereon, but if such condition becomes Incapable of
performance, It must be rejected and the devise held to be absolute.
Hence, If one of the legatees Is forced to remove from the land by
the cruel treatment of another, the former is entitled to his share
of the estate, and the full and absolute use thereof freed of the
condition. He is also entitled to the immediate possession of his-
■hare of the estate, and can exorcise the right of partition or seek
any other remedy afforded to a cotenant (Harrison v. Harrison,.
60.)
Index. 979
8. DEVISE— REMAINDER TO PERSONS NOT IN ESSE—
JUiaSDICTION— SALE OF PROPERTY.— Where property is de-
vised for life, with a remainder over to persons not in esse, the life
tenant still living, a court has no power to order a sale of the prop-
erty, because there can be no one before the court to represent the
Interest of the remaindermen, (i'ancey's Case, 577.)
4. DEVISE — GENERAL REMAINDER — REMAINDERMEN
BE[<'ORE THE COURT-JURISDICTION-SALE OF PROPERTY.
Where property is devised for life, with a general remainder over
in which there is no element of survivorship, a court may order a
sale of the property where all the remainderjnen living are before
it, since the remaindermen represent a class, and those who may
afterward be born are concluded by the action of the court upon
those of the same class. (Yancey's Case, 577.)
5. DEVISE — REMAINDERMEN — SALE OP PROPERTY —
TITI/E OF PURCHASER.— When property, which is devised for
life with a general remainder over, is sold under an order of court,
all the remaindermen living being before the court, the purchaser
will acquire a good title against afterborn children of the life ten-
ant. (Yancey's Case, 577.)
6. DEVISE— REMAINDER TO UNDETERMINED PERSONS—
JURISDICTION— SALE OF PROPERTY.— Where property is de-
vised for life, with a remainder over to "such children as should
be living at the death of the life tenant," a court has no power to
order a sale of the property, for until the death of the life tenant
it could not be linown who would talie. (Yancey's Case, 577.)
7. LEGACIES— DEVISES— IMPOSSIBILITY OF PERFORM-
ANCE OF CONDITION SUBSEQUENT— EFFECT OF.— While
there is a difference between a legacy and a devise where the con-
dition is precedent, there is no difference where the condition is
subsequent; but in the latter case the estate to which the condition
is annexed, whether it is laud or a money legacy, if the performance
of the condition is rendered impossible, becomes, by that event,
absolute in the devisee as well as in the legatee. (Burdis v. Burdis,
825.)
8. DEVISE— IMPOSSIBILITY OF PERFORMANCE OP CON-
DITION SUBSEQUENT— EFFECT OF.-If a condition subsequent
is annexed to a devise of real estate, and its performance becomes
Impossible, without the fault of the devisee, the estate Is not de-
feated or forfeited, but the devisee will hold the property by an
absolute title, as if no condition had been annexed to the devise.
(Burdis v. Burdis, 825.)
9. DEVISE— FAILURE OF, FOR IMPOSSIBILITY OP PER-
FORMANCE OF CONDITION PRECEDENT.— If a condition pre-
cedent is annexed to a devise of real estate, and its performance
is or becomes impossible, the devise fails, although there is no
default or laches on the part of the devisee himself. (Burdis v. Bur-
dis, 825.)
See Deeds, 4.
DOMICILE.
See Corporations, 1, 85.
DOWER.
1. DOWER. STATUTORY — WHEN SUBJECT TO PAYMENT
OF HtlSBAND'S DEBTS.— In Minnesota, the widow's statutory
one-third in the real estate of her husband is "subject, in its Just
proportion with the other real estate, to the payment of such debts
980 Index.
of the deceased as are not paid from the personal estate." (Merrill
V. Security Trust Co., 312.)
2. DOWER— ASSIGNMENT FOR BENEFIT OF CREDITORS.
Where a married man executes, under the insolvent law, an as-
signment of all his nonexempt property for the benefit of credit-
ors (his wife not joining), the assignee's title to the real estate
assigned is not subject to the wife's inchoate right. (Merrill v. Se-
curity Trust Co., 312.)
3. DOWER— ESTATE OF— NATURE.— The statutory dower of
a widow is not treated as a lien upon land, but as an interest in it.
It is an estate given by the intestate laws. (Enyard v. Enyard, 623.)
DRUNKENNESS.
See Criminal Law, 8, 11.
EJECTMENT.
See Railroad Companies, 6i.
ELECTION.
See Attachment, 11; Contracts, 13.
ELECTRIC COMPANIES.
ELECTRIC LIGHT COMPANIES-INJURY TO LINEMAN
—ACTION— IMMATERIAL EVIDENCE.— A lineman who was in-
jured while in the employ of an electric lighting company by a de-
cayed pole brealiing below the surface of the ground, and falling
—upon him while he was at worli upon it, cannot maintam an action
against the company for the injury without showing that the com-
pany was negligent; and this is not done by proof that the company
failed to inspect the pole before the accident. Such evidence is im-
material, for the company owed him no duty to inspect it. On the
contrary, in any case where the apparent age of the pole was such
as to make it probable that it was not strong enough to sustain a
man worlving upon it, due care on the part of the lineman would re-
quire him to examine it Just below the surface of the ground before
risking himself upon it. (Mclsaac v. Northampton Elec. L. Co., 244.)
See Master and Servant, 1, 2.
ELEVATORS.
ELEVATORS — DEFECTIVE — INJURIES RESULTING
THEREFROM— CONSTRUCTION OF PLEADING.- In an action
for injuries sustained in operating an elevator which contained a
secret defect alleged to be unljnown to plaintiff, an allegation that
the elevator would not sustain the weight ordinarily and usually
placed upon it, but would drop to the ground, and was thereby a
nuisance, will be construed as meaning that the elevator was liable
to fall at any time In the course of the ordinary and necessary use
thereof, and not as meaning that the elevator fell whenever used,
so that all who used it must have known of the defect. (Anderson
T. Hayes, 930.)
EMINENT DOMAIN.
1. EMINENT DOMAIN.— THE AWARD OP APPRAISERS
In condemnation proceedings operates as a judgment between the
parties, and Is governed by the same rules that are ordinarily ap-
plied to judgments of courts. Such an award, or a verdict and
judgment on appeal therefrom, has the same force as an ordinary
Index. 981
judgment rendered by a court of competent Jurisdiction. It Is con-
clusive ui>on the parties and privies, but is not binding upon sti'au-
gers. (Cbarlestou etc. Ry. Co. v. Hughes, 17.)
2. EMINENT DOMAIN.— A RAILROAD COMPANY, by con-
demnation proceedings, acquires whatever Interest the person
against whom such proceedings are had has In the land, and no
more. (Charleston etc. Ry. Co. v. Hughes, 17.)
3. EMINENT DOMAIN-INTEREST ACQUIRED BY RAIL-
ROAD COMPANY.— A railroad company which constructs Its road
over land, the title to which is not fixed and determined, acquires
the interest of all those with whom it deals by negotiation or against
whom It proceeds by condemnation, but takes the risk of other
persons making claims in the future, whether they are left out of
the negotiations or proceedings by mistake or from necessity.
(Charleston etc. Ry. Co. v. Hughes, 17.)
4. EMINENT DOMAIN-CONDEMNATION PROCEEDINGS
ARE NO MORE THAN A COMPULSORY SALE of all the owner's
interest in the property, and no one can be thus compelled to sell
who is not a party to the judgment rendered by the tribunal which
is erected for this purpose. (Charleston etc. Ry. Co. v. Hughes, 17.)
5. EMINENT DOMAIN— JURISDICTION.— ONE WHO CAN-
NOT BE AND IS NOT NOTIFIED, is not bound by the award or
judgment. (Charleston etc. Ry. Co. v. Hughes, 17.)
6. EMINENT DOMAIN— CONDEMNATION PROCEEDINGS—
CONCLUSIVENESS AGAINST UNKNOWN OWNERS.-If the con-
dition of the title to property at the time of condemnation proceed-
ings is such that notice cannot be given to all interested, notice
to such as are definitely known to be Interested Is not suflicient to
deprive of their rights others whose Identity is unknown, but whose
interest in the property Is ascertainable. (Charleston etc. Ry. Co. v.
Hughes, 17.)
7. EMINENT DOMAIN-CONDEMNATION PROCEEDINGS—
CONCLUSIVENESS OF— LIFE ESTATE AND REMAINDER.— If,
at the time condemnation proceedings were had, there were two
estates in the property, one a life estate, and the other a contingent
remainder, the fact that it was impossible to ascertain the persons
who would eventually take as remaindermen does not authorize
the conclusion that the interest of such remainderman was acquired
by proceedings against the life tenant, who cannot be held to rep-
resent them. (Charleston etc. Ry. Co. v. Hughes, 17.)
8. EMINENT DOMAIN— ESTOPPEL^CONDEMNATION PRO-
CEEDINGS against the assignee of a life tenant, to whom the
entire amount awarded as damages has been paid, cannot be pleaded
in bar of the right of the remainderman in the same property to
have compensation for his interest after the termination of the life
estate. (Charleston etc. Ry. Co. v. Hughes, 17.)
9. EMINENT DOMAIN.— THE LEGISLATURE CANNOT AU-
THORIZE permanent and substantial injury to private property
without making compensation. (Garvey v. Long Island B. B. Ck).,
550.)
See Railroad Companies, 23.
EQUITY.
1. EQUITY — DISCOVERY OP LUNATIC'S PROPERTY —
SCOPE OF PRELIMINARY IN.TUNCTION.— Under a bill In equity
brought by the committee of a lunatic against the latter's husband
for the discovery of property of the lunatic kept by the husband in
982 Index.
a box In a safe deposit company, a preliminary injunction should
go no farther than is necessary for the protection and enforcement
of the lunatic's rights to property in such box, and should not in-
fringe upon defendant's right to talie therefrom property belong-
ing to him and not claimed by the committee. (Equitable Trust Co.
V. Garis, 644.)
2. EQUITY— JURISDICTION— SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE.—
The rule that equity will not entertain jurisdiction to decree sne-
cific performance respecting goods, chattels, stocks, and other things
of a merely personal nature, is limited to cases where compensa-
tion in damages will furnish a complete remedy. Where the
wrong is a betrayal of confidence, equity will decree restitution,
which may be enforced specifically against the wrongdoer. (Stein-
meyer v. Siebert, &41.)
3. EQUITY— JURISDICTION— DISCOVERT OF LUNATIC'S
PROPERTY.— The committee of a lunatic is the proper party to
maintain a bill in equity against the lunatic's husband for the dis-
covery and delivery of possession of muniments of title, negotiable
securities, and personal property, belonging to the lunatic's estate
and in the possession of the husband, where the latter denies her
title, or there is reason to apprehend that he will treat such prop-
erty adversely to her interest. (Equitable Trust Co. v. Garis, 644.)
4. EQUITY— ADEQUATE LEGAL REMEDY— PLEADING.—
The objection that the plaintiff in a suit in equity has an adequate
legal remedy must be made by demurrer or answer, and, if not so
made, is deemed waived, and cannot be raised by demurrer ore
tenus. (HofiC v. Olson, 903.)
5. EQUITY — JURISDICTION — ADEQUATE LEGAL REM-
EDY. —The ground upon which equity refuses to take cognizance of
a case in which an adequate legal remedy exists is not jurisdictional,
but merely a rule of practice, upon which the action will be dis-
missed if the attention of the court is called to it at the proper time
and In the proper manner. (Hoff v. Olson, 903.)
6. EQUITY — SUFFICIENCY OF COMPLAINT — THREAT-
ENED INJURY.— A complaint in equity sufficiently shows a threat-
ened unlawful invasion of plaintiff's property rights when it
alleges that defendant threatens to tear down a partition fence sepa-
rating his and plaintiff's property; that such act would result in
irreparable injury to plaintiff, and that defendant is insolvent. The
objection that plaintiff has an adequate remedy being waived, such
complaint is sufficient to maintain an action to restrain the threat-
ened removal of the fence, (Hoff v. Olson, 903.)
7. EQUITY HAS NO JURISDICTION TO CONSTRUE MUNI-
MENTS OF TITLE in a case where one holds adversely to the in-
strument under which another claims, whether a deed or a will,
for it is the province of courts of law to construe instruments
which involve legal rights. Hence, the party out of possession can-
not Invoke the aid of a court of equity to determine who has the
better right. (Snyder v. Grandstaflf, 863.)
8. EQUITY— BILL FOR REFORMATION OF DEED— WHEN
NOT DEMURRABLE.— Equity Is the proper forum for the reforma-
tion of a deed and a claim. In a bill for that purpose, of a mutual
mistake, prevents the bill from being demurrable, though It fails
to allege notice to a purchaser for value. The complainant must,
It is true, prove notice to a bona fide purchaser for value, but the
defense that he had no notice must be made by plea or answer.
(Snyder v. Grandstaff, 863.)
See Intervention; Judgment, 3-5; Pleading.
Index. 983
ESTATES.
ESTATES-ESTIMATE OF VALUE— LIFE ESTATE.-The
Talue of a life estate should be estimated, not iu the light of its ac-
tual duration as subsequently developed, or the rents received in
that time, but at its value at the time of purchase, estimated ac-
■cording to the rules usually adopted in estimating the value of life
estates. (Gonce v. McCoy, 714.)
See Devise, 3-6; Eminent Domain, 7; Estates of Decedents; Insane
Persons, 2.
ESTATES OP DECEDENTS.
ESTATES OF DECEDENTS— ASSETS DISPOSED OP BY
SOLE HEIll-RECOVERY BY ADMINlSTKATOK.— Where, be-
fore an administrator is appointed of an estate, against which
there are no debts proved or to be proved, a sole heir and distri-
butee malies an equitable assignment of all her interest and the
Interest of the estate in certain personal property, such assign-
ment is binding upon an administrator subsequently appointed on
the petition of such sole heir and distributee, and he cannot re-
cover the property disposed of. (Cooper v. Hay ward, 330.)
ESTOPPEL.
1. ESTOPPEL.— Where one, by his willful or fraudulent con-
duct, causes another to believe in the existence of certain facts,
who Is thereby induced to act on the belief, and does so in good
faith, and parts with his money in reliance fbereon, the former
Is estopped from denying the existence of such facts. (MoCfett v.
Parker, 319.)
2. ESTOPPEI^NECESSITY TO PLEAD.— Where a party has
an opportunity to plead an estoppel, and voluntarily omits to do so,
but goes to the issue on the facts, he thereby waives the estoppel,
and the jury Is at liberty to find according to the facts of the case.
(Bear v. Commissioners, 586.)
3. ESTOPPEI.—PI>EADING— DEMURRER.— Where the advan-
tage might have been taken of an estoppel by means of a demurrer,
and the party fails to so take advantage of It, he will be held to
have waived the estoppel. (Bear v. Commissioners, 586.)
See Adoption, 2; Eminent Domain, 8; Insurance, 12; .Tudgment, 20,
21; Mechanic's Lien, 3; Mortgages, 10; Railroad Companies,
7.
EVIDENCE.
1. EVIDENCE— FOREIGN LAW-QUESTION OP PACT.— If
the evidence of foreign law consists of reports of Judicial decisions,
the question of what the law is becomes one of fact, where the
decisions are conflicting, or where Inferences of fact must be drawn.
(Hancock Nat. Bank v. Ellis, 232.)
2. EVIDENCE— FOREIGN LAW— QUESTION OP LAW.— If
the evidence of foreign law consists entirely of statutes or reports
of Judicial decisions, the construction and effect of the statutes
-and decisions are usually for the court alone. (Hancock Nat. Bank
V. Ellis, 232.)
3. EVIDENCE— THE LAWS OF ANOTHER STATE are facta
to be proved. (Hancock Nat. Bank v. Ellis, 232.)
4. EVIDENCE— PRESUl^fPTION AS TO LAW OF ANOTHER
STATE.— The law of another state on a subject Involved in litigation
984 Index.
is presumed to be the same as that of the state In which the litiga-
tion is being carried on. (Melton v. Atlsinson, 416.)
5. EVIDENCE— NOTE INDORSED BY OOIIPORATION— HIS-
TOK~Y OF INDEBTEDNESS— PAROL.— If the plaintiff, in a suit on
a promissory note, of which he is the payee, seelis to charge the
directors of a corporation upon a contract of indorsement made
"by the corporation when the note was executed, parol evidence of
the history of the indebtedness, which resulted in the note, should
be received and submitted to the jury. (Witherow v, Slayback,^
507.)
6. EVIDENCE — CONTRACT OF INDORSEMENT — INTEN-
TION.—PAROL EVIDENCE is admissible, as between the immedi-
ate parties to a contract of indorsement, to ascertain their intention;
all the facts and circumstances which tooli place at the time of the
transaction may thus be shown. (Witherow v. Slayback, 507.)
7. EVIDENCE— NOTE INDORSED BY CORPORATION—
PAROL PROOF THAT COMPANY IS PRINCIPAL DEBTOR.
The plaintiff, in a suit on a promissory note, of which he is the
payee, and which is indorsed by a corporation, through its treas-
urer, has a right to show, if he can, by parol evidence, to the satis-
faction of a jury, that the corporation is really his principal debtor
in the transaction. (Witherow v. Slayback, 507.)
8. EVIDENCE- REASONABLE CERTAINTY— STRONG PROB-
ABILITIES.—A proposition is reasonably certain when It is suj)-
ported by the strong probabilities. (People v. Fielding, 495.)
9. EVIDENCE — JUDICIAL NOTICE — DELETERIOUS NA-
TURE OF CIGARETTES.— A court may take judicial notice that
cigarettes possess no virtue, are inherently bad, and wholly noxious
and deleterious to health. (Austin v. State, 703.)
10. EVITtENCE— ADMISSIONS AGAINST INTEREST— TESTI-
MONY IN SIMILAR CASE.— Where, in the course of a trial in an
action for negligence, plaintiff is permitted to read to the jury por-
tions of cross-examination of the defendant. In a former trial in-
volving identical questions, for the purpose of showing admissions
by defendant against his interest, defendant should be allowed to
read the entire examination in chief to the jury. (Weeks v. Mc-
Nulty, 693.)
11. EVIDENCE— SITUATION EXISTING AFTER INJURY
COMPLAINED OF.— In an action against a water company for
death occasioned by the use of impure water furnished by the de-
fendant. It Is error to admit evidence of experts as to tests made
of the water some time after the occurrence complained of. (Green
V. Ashland W. Co., 911.)
12. EVIDENCE— OPINION OF WITNESSES.— In an action
against a water company for injury occasioned by the defendant's
furnishing impure water. It Is not proper to admit opinion evi-
dence as to the duty of the defendant with reference to testing the
water supply. (Green v. Ashland W. Co., 911.)
See Appeal, 1, 8, 9; Cotenancy, 2; Criminal Law, 9, 12-15; Deeds,
1; Electric Companies; Homicide, 3, 4, 6, 11, 12, 14-17; Innkeep-
ers, 2; Insurance, 15; Negotiable Instruments, 5-7; Presumptions;
Railroad Companies, 3, 12, 13; Rewards; Telegraph Companies^
7; Waterworks and Water Companies, 6; Wills, 6, 7.
EXECUTION.
1. EXECUTION — SALES — CAVEAT EMPTOR.-In execution
and judicial sales of land, except In special cases, there is no war-
Index. 985
ranty of title or quality, but the rule of caveat emptor applies, and
the purchaser gets virtually nothing but the quit-claim title of the
debtor defendant. (Gonce v. McCoy, 714.)
2. EXECUTION— SALES— JUDGMENT CREDITOR AS PUR-
CHASER—DEFECT OF TITLE.— A judgment creditor who bids
the amount of his judgment on land and thus satisfies it is not en-
titled to have the satisfaction vacated and the judgment reinstated
because he only obtained a life estate In the land, when he believed
he was getting a fee simple estate, and bought under that belief.
If he obtains any beneficial interest by his purchase, he is not en-
titled to such relief. (Gonce v. McCoy, 714.)
Seo Attachment; Contempt, 2.
EXECUTORS AND ADMINISTRATORS.
EXECUTORS AND ADMINISTRATORS— CONTRACTS-
ACTION ON i'ROMISSORY NOTE FOR BENEFIT OF AN-
OTHER.—Where a promissory note is talien in the name of one
party for the benefit of another, the administrator of the payee may
maintain an action on it. (Cooper v. Hayward, 330.)
See Estates of Decedents.
EX POST FACTO LAWS.
See Statutes, 1-8.
FALSE REPRESENTATIONS.
See Damages, 1.
FINDINGS.
See Appeal, 7.
FOODS.
See Police Power, 2-4.
FRAUD.
1. FRAUD-FALSE REPRESENTATIONS IN SALE OF
BOND— RELYING ON REPRESENTATIONS-QUESTION FOR
JURY.— In an action for false representations in the sale of a bond,
where it appears that the defendant referred the plaintiff to the
sources of his information, and advised the plaintiff to consult the
persons named, the question as to whether he ought to have done
so may depend on circumstances, and it is not improper to leave it
to the jury. (Whiting v. Price, 262.)
2. FRAUD— FALSE REPRESENTATIONS IN SALE OF
BOND— RETURN OF BOND.— In an action for false representa-
tions in the sale of a bond, the plaintiff is not required to return
the bond to the defendant. (Whiting v. Price, 262.)
3. F'RAUD — ACTION FOR FALSE REPRESENTATIONS IN
SALE OF BOND— WHAT WILL SUPPORT.— Although a certain
bond of an electric light company states that payment thereof is
"secured by a first mortgage on all the property, rights, and fran-
chises of said company (present and future acquired)," a representa-
tion made, in selling the bond, that It was secured by a mortga?e
of real estate of the value of half a million dollars, will support an
action for false representations, where It appears that the company
owned no real estate and that the bond was not secured by a mort-
gage of real estate. (Whiting v. Price, 2C2.)
^86 Index.
See Contracts, 12-14; Corporations, 37; Insurance, 22; Joint Stock
Companies; Judgment, 5; Municipal Corporations, 8; Bape,
1. 2.
FRAUDULENT CONVEYANCES.
FRAUDULENT CONVEYANCE— A VOLUNTARY DEED IS
NOT FRAUDULENT AS TO DEBTS AFTERWARD CREATED.
A voluntary deed will not be set aside at the instance of subsequent
•creditors of the grantor where no fraud is shown; and creditors
whose debts were created after it was made and recorded cannot
subject the property thereby conveyed upon the ground that it was
■executed in fraud of their rights. (New South B. & L. Assn. v. Reed,
«58.)
GARNISHMENT.
Bee Attachment, 5-12.
GIFTS.
GIFTS-VALIDITY OF, WHERE OBLIGATIONS EXIST.-
A man must be just before he is generous^ He cannot, therefore,
inalie a valid gift of his property and leave his obligations unsatis-
fied or unprovided for. (Moore v. Triplett, 882.)
GUARANTY.
1. GUARANTY— ASSIGNABILITY.— A guaranty Is assignable
with the obligations secured thereby, and goes with the principal
obligation. It is enforceable by the same persons who can enforce
the principal obligation. (Tidioute Sav. Bank v. Libbey, 907.)
2. GUARANTY — SPECIAL AND GENERAL DISTIN-
GUISHED.—A general guaranty is one for acceptance by the
public generally. A special guaranty is limited to the person to
whom it is addressed, and usually contemplates a trust or reposes
& confidence in some person. Such a guaranty may not be assign-
able until the right of action has arisen thereon. (Tidioute Sav.
Bank v. Libbey, 907.)
3. GUARANTY— ASSIGNMENT OF PRINCIPAL OBLIGA-
TION.—The transfer of a note secured by a general continuing
guaranty carries with it the security which may be enforced by
the transferee, though he took the note without knowledge of the
security. (Tidioute Sav. Bank v. Libbey, 907.)
See Corporations, 5, 7.
GUARDIAN AND WARD.
1. GUARDIAN AND WARD — MISAPPROPRIATION OP
FUNDS.— If an unauthorized purchase is made by a guardian with
the funds of his ward, the guardian, and all other persons who,
with a knowledge of such illegal use, participate in the conversion
of such money, are liable to the ward. (Howard v. Cassels, 44.)
2. GUARDIAN AND WARD.— RATIFICATION by a ward, by
claiming the fruits of his guardian's unauthorized Investment, pre-
cludes a denial of the vendor's right to proceed against the property
purchased according to the contract to recover the balance due. The
ward must adopt and ratify the whole contract or none of it. (How-
ard V. Cassels, 44.)
3. GUARDIAN AND WARD— PARTIES.— If a testamentary
guardian enters Into a contract for the purchase of land, pays part
of the purchase money with the funds of his minor wards, and gives
a note in his representative capacity for the balance, such wards
Index. 987
are not necessary parties, and cannot complain that they are not
made parties to a suit by the vendor to recover on such note. (How-
ard V. Cassels, 44.)
4. GUARDIAN AND WARD— RATIFICATION OF UNAU-
THORIZED CONTRACT.— If a guardian enters Into an unauthor-
ized contract for the purchase of land, pays part of the purchase
money with the funds of his ward, and gives a note In his represen-
tative capacity for the balance, the ward cannot claim the fruits
of such contract, and deny the right of the vendor to proceed against
the property for the balance of the purchase money. If the ward
ratifies the illegal act, such ratification relates to the contract of
purchase, and he must ratify the contract as an entirety. He can-
not take the part only which is favorable to him, but he must also
take that other part which makes the land liable for the balance of
the purchase money. (Howard v. Cassels, 44.)
5. GUARDIAN AND WARD — CONTRACT FOR PURCHASE
OF LAND— PARTIES.— If a contract for the purchase of land en-
tered into by a testamentary guardian, under which part of the
purchase price Is paid with funds of his wards. Is authorized by
law or the terms of the will, the guardian, as the legal representa-
tive of the wards. Is the only necessary party to a suit by the vendor
to recover the balance of the purchase price, and judgment against
him binds the property of the wards in his hands, and. If such con-
tract Is not within the power of the guardian to make. It binds him
in his individual capacity only, and does not bind the property of
the wards. (Howard v. Cassels, 44.)
HABEAS CORPUS.
1. HABEAS CORPUS— REVIEW OF ERRORS.— Habeas cor-
pus Is not an appropriate proceeding to review mere errors and Ir-
regularities in a judgment of an Inferior court In a criminal case.
<In re Fanton, 418.)
2. HABEAS CORPUS.— AN EXCESSIVE SENTENCE Imposed
by a court having jurisdiction is merely erroneous and not void,
and habeas corpus does not lie on behalf of the convicted prisoner
to obtain relief therefrom. His remedy Is by writ of error. (In re
Fanton, 418.)
3. HABEAS CORPUS— VOID JUDGMENT.— If a person Is re-
strained of his liberty by virtue of an absolutely void judgment, he
may be discharged on habeas corpus, but the judgment must be
Told and not merely erroneous. (In re Fanton, 418.)
4. HABEAS CORPUS— BURDEN OF PROOF.— Although the
fitatute gives the relator the right to open and close the argument
In a habeas corpus proceeding, it does not necessarily follow, nor
follow at all, that the burden of proof Is upon him. (Ex parte New-
man, 740.)
HEIRS.
See Wills, 5.
HOMESTEAD.
1. HOMESTEADS.— RIGHTS OF CREDITORS as to property
occupied by their debtor as his homestead, after filling a bill
to cancel a previous satisfaction of their judgment to enjoin
the sale of the property and subject It to such judgment, attach
from the date of the decree and not from the time of the filing
of the bill, if the court does not cancel the satisfaction of the
judgment, but enters a money decree and directs execution to issue.
(Wike V. Garner, 102.)
988 Index.
2. HOMESTEADS— COTENANT'S EIGHT TO.— An undivided
Interest in land, accompanied by the exclusive possession, manage-
ment, and control in consideration of maintenance of liis cotenant,
is sufficient to support a right of homestead in the occupying co-
tenant. (Wike V. Garner, 102.)
3. HOMESTEADS— HEAD OF FAMILY— WHO IS.— A bache-
lor brother residing on premises with his two sisters, who are de-
pendent upon him for support, is a householder having a family,
of which he is the head and entitled to a homestead exemption.
(Wike V. Garner, 102.)
4. HOMESTEADS — OCCUPANCY WITHIN REASONABLB
TIME.— If a person buys a lot for a home, and erects a house
thereon, a creditor cannot acquire a lien on the property, if, withia
a reasonable time, the purchaser moves on the property and oc-
cupies it as a homestead. (Wike v. Garner, 102.)
HOMICIDE.
1. HOMICIDE— MURDER IN FIRST DEGREE.— A deliberate
and premeditated intention to kill, followed by the killing of a hu-
man being, completes the crime of murder in the first degree. (Peo-
ple v. Kennedy, 557.)
2. HOMICIDE— SELF-DEFENSE.— Before one can justify +he
taEing of human life in self-defense he must show that there was
reasonable ground for believing that he was in great peril, that the
killing was necessary for his escape, and that no other safe means
was open to him. When one believes himself about to be attacked
by another, and to receive great bodily harm, it is his duty to avoid
the attack, if in his power to do so; and the right of attack for the
purpose of self-defense does not arise until he has done everything
in his power to avoid its necessity. (People v. Kennedy, 557.)
3. HOMICIDE— MURDER— SUFFICIENCY OF EVIDENCK—
If the evidence shows that, after an encounter between the deceased '
and the defendant, the latter obtained a knife in a spirit of revenge,
and, after being warned not to return, did return with intent to
kill the deceased, and thereupon killed him, the jury is justified in
finding that the killing was done with premeditation and delibera-
tion, and that the defendant is guilty of murder in the first degree. ,
(People V. Kennedy, 557.)
4. HOMICIDE— MURDER— SUFFICIENCY OF PROOF.— If
the proof justifies a jury in finding that the homicide was inten-
tional and resulted from sufficient deliberation and premeditation
to warrant a verdict of murder in the first degree, the appellate
court will not interfere with the determination upon the facts. (Peo-
ple V. Kennedy, 557.)
5. HOMICIDE-MURDER^MOTIVE.— Evidence showing that
there had been a personal encounter between the deceased and the
defendant, and that the latter, humiliated by his defeat and In-
spired by a spirit of revenge, returned to the place of the first affray
and made a second attack, which was fatal, is sufficient to justify
the jury in finding that the defendant had a motive for the com-
mission of the crime. (People v. Kennedy, 557.)
6. HOMICIDE— MURDER— REVIEW OF EVIDENCE.-It is
not within the province of the appellate court. In reviewing a judg-
ment of death, to review or determine controverted questions of fact
arising upon conflicting evidence. The jury is the ultimate tribunal
In such cases, and with its decision the appellate court may not in-
terfere, unless it reaches the conclusion that Justice has not been
done. (People y. Kennedy, 557.)
Index. 989
7. HOMICIDE-DEFENSE OF INSANITY.— Whether the Insan-
ity be general or partial, in order that it may excuse homicide, the
degree of it must be so great as to have controlled the will of its
subject and to have taken from him the freedom of moral action.
(Commonwealth v. Wireback, 625.)
8. HOMICIDE— DEFENSE OF INSANITY.— MERE MORAL
OBLIQUITY OF PERCEPTION does not constitute insanity excus-
ing a person from punishment for his deliberate act, nor does a
mere perversion of the moral sense, nor does an individual belief as
to right and wrong, however sincere, constitute a delusion, or a
phase of insanity, excusing homicide. (Commonwealth v. Wireback,
«25.)
9. HOMICIDE — DEFENSE OF INSANITY — SANITY PRE-
SUMED.—If the defendant In a prosecution for homicide was sane
shortly lefore and shortly after the act of murdei-, the presumption
Is of sanity at the time of the act, which presumption could only be
rebutted by showing some special frenzy or madness, connected with
the act, which at the instant irresistibly impelled the defendant to
commit it. (Commonwealth v. Wireback, 625.)
10. HOMICIDE-DEFENSE OF INSANITY— REQUISITE DE-
CREE OF PROOF.— If one accused of homicide alleges Insanity as a
defense, he must establish it by a preponderance of evidence, or the
presumption of insanity which the law raises stands unshaken. Tbo
law recognizes no middle ground of doubt of sanity reducing murder
otherwise in the first degree to murder in the second degree. (Com-
monwealth V. Wireback, 625.)
11. HOMICIDE— EVIDENCE AS TO INSANITY-OPINION OF
WITNESSES.— The opinion of a witness as to the insanity of the
defendant in a prosecution for homlr-lde Is inadmissible, no founda-
tion therefor having been laid. But it is competent for witnesses
who have stated their opportunities for observing defendant to tes-
tify whether or not they had noticed anything in his conduct or con-
versation indicating insanity. (Commonwealth v. Wireback, 625.)
12. HOMICIDE— WIFE OF THE ACCUSED AS A WITNESS-
EVIDENCE TO SUPPORT HER.— If the defense to murder Is In-
sulting words and conduct by the deceased toward the wife of the
accused which she communicated to him, and to which she has
testified, it is error to exclude the testimony of witnesses to estab-
lish the fact that, before the homicide, she had stated to them the
facts as testified to by her. Such testimony is admissible to sup-
port her, and to show that her husband believed her statements
and committed the homicide in consequence thereof, when the the-
ory and evidence on behalf of the prosecution is to the effect that
her testimony was prompted by an improper motive and was re-
cently fabricated solely to aid in the defense of the husband. (Jones
T. State, 719.)
13. HOMICIDE — WIFE AS WITNESS — CROSS-EXAMINA-
TION.—If, upon the trial of a husband on a criminal charge, his
"Wife as a witness, on direct examination, should swear to facts in-
jurious to him, he cannot complain, but her cross-examination must
be confined to the matter elicited upon the examination In chief.
Everything which Is legitimate for the purpose of testing her knowl-
edge of the facts sworn to, her bias or prejudice, or any matter
that legitimately goes to discredit her. Is admissible on cross-ex-
amination, but if the prosecution leaves the matter testified to on
the examination in chief and proposes to prove independent crim-
inative facts against the accused, this is not cross-examination, and
the wife then becomes a witness for the prosecution. Her exami-
nation must then stop, because she canuot become a witness against
Ler husband. (Jones v. State, 719.)
990 Index.
14. HOMICIDE— EVIDENCE-STATEMENTS OF DECEASED
—HEARSAY.— If the defense to murder is insulting conduct by the
deceased toward the wife of the accused, the testimony of a wit-
ness, that, subsequently to the alleged insulting conduct, he saw a
woman in the otfice of the deceased, and that the latter informed
him that she was the wife of the accused, is hearsay and inadmis-
sible. (Jones V. State, 719.)
15. HOMICIDE— MURDER— EVIDENCE OF REPUTATION
OF DECEASED.— If the defense to murder is insulting conduct of
the deceased toward the wife of the accused, which she has com-
municated to him, the bad general reputation of the deceased, as
well as his general reputation as a man of unchaste and lecherous
habits toward women, is admissible in evidence upon the issue as
to whether the accused believed the information received from his
wife and acted thereon, (Jones v. State, 719.)
16. HOMICIDE— EVIDENCE— RES GESTAE.— If the defense to
murder is insulting conduct by the deceased toward the wife of the
accused, and she has testified as to such conduct and to communi-
cating it to her husband, and that he and deceased were friendly
until she made such communication, the prosecution cannot prove
by her, as part of the res gestae, on cross-examination, matters re-
lating to the disposition of her property, deceased's connection there-
with, or the squandering of her property by her husband. (Jonea
V. State, 719.)
17. MURDER— INSULTING CONDUCT TOWARD WIFE-EVI-
DENCE.—If the defense to murder is insulting conduct by the de-
ceased toward the wife of the accused, he may prove, as original
evidence, that prior to the homicide his wife communicated a state-
ment of the insulting conduct toward her to the witness, who in
turn communicated it to the husband. (Jones v. State, 719.)
HUSBAND AND WIFE.
1. HUSBAND AND WIFE— ASSAULT, IN WIFE'S ABSENCH,
BY HUSBAND, WHO IS HER AGENT— WIFE'S LIABILITY.—
A married woman is civilly answerable for personal injuries in-
flicted, not in her presence, upon a third person, by her husband^
while acting within the scope of his authority as her agent. (Shane
V. Lyons, 261.)
2. HUSBAND AND WIFE— UNITY OF, TO AID ENFORCE-
MENT OF COVENANT FOR WIFE'S BENEFIT.— The common-
law unity of husband and wife survives for the purpose of aiding'
the wife to enforce a covenant for her benefit made by her hus-
band, and which equity and good conscience approve. (Buchanan
V, Tilden, 454.)
3. HUSBAND AND WIFE — PROMISE TO HIM FOR HER
BENEFIT— WIFE'S RIGHT OF ACTION ON.— If an heir-at-law
and next of kin of one who died testate desires to contest a be-
quest., in the will, of a large amount of property, which, if Invalid,
would' fall to the next of kin, but has no means to conduct the liti-
gation, and obtains a loan of money, for the purpose, from a man
whose wife has an equitable interest in the suit, by reason of her
adoption by a relative of the testator, upon a promise to the huff-
band that. In case of success, the contestant will pay to the wife
the sum of fifty thousand dollars, the wife Is entitled to recover
on the contract, where the contestant succeeds in obtaining the
fund for the next of kin, whether the mere relation of husband
and wife would alone constitute a sufficient consideration to en-
able her to maintain the action, for her equities are such, when
Index. 991
considered In connection with the duty of her husband to provide
for her future, and with the fact that, with that purpose in view»
the money was procured for the contestant to institute and pur-
sue the necessary litigation to secure the fund to which her equities
related, that, all taken together, they are sufficient to sustain her
action. (Buchanan v. Tilden, 454.)
4. HUSBAND AND WIFE— CONSIDERATION FOR COVE-
N.-X-NT ON BEHALF OF WIFE.— It is not the full measure of the
legal and moral obligations imposed upon a husband by the com-
mon law simply to provide for his wife the necessaries of life, 8ucl>
as food, raiment and shelter, but it is his duty, if opportunity offers,
to make provision for her against that day when he may be in-
capacitated by disease or removed by death; and this obligation is
one that a court will recognize as a sufficient consideration to sup-
port a covenant on her behalf. (Buchanan v. Tilden, 454.)
5. HUSBAND AND WIFE— RIGHT OF PARENT TO ADVISE
MARRIED CHILD.— In cases of unhappiness and disagreement*
between a married couple, the law recognizes the right of a parent
to advise the son or daughter; and when such advice is given In
good faith and results In a separation, the act does not give the
injured party a right of action. (Brown v. Brown, 574.)
6. HUSBAND AND WIFE— PARENT AND CHILD— ADVICE
TO CHILD— MALICE.— The malice necessary to be alleged and
proved against a parent for advising his married child to abandon,
his wife or her husband, is not alone such malice as must proceed
from a malignant and revengeful disposition, but that it would be
sufficient to prove to the satisfaction of the jury that the parent'*
action was taken without proper investigation of the facts, or where
the advice was given from recklessness or dishonesty oif purpose,
the law presuming malice from such conduct in actions of this-
nature. (Brown v. Brown, 574.)
7. HUSBAND AND WIFE— LIABILITY OF PARENT FOR
ADVISING MARRIED CHILD TO ABANDON HUSBAND OR
WIFE.— Before a parent can be held liable "in damages for advis-
ing his married child to abandon his wife, or her husband, the con-
duct of the parent should be alleged and proved to be malicious.
(Brown v. Brown, 574.)
8. HUSBAND AND WIFE — CONTROVERSY OVER FUNDS,
THE WIFE'S SEPARATE ESTATE, TAKEN BY HER INSOL-
VENT HUSBAND— RIGHTS OF CREDITORS.— In a contest be-
tween the creditors of an insolvent husband and his wife over funds
which, at one time, constituted her separate estate, but which she
allowed to pass Into her husband's hands, the creditors will pre-
vail, where there Is nothing to show that the transaction was in-
tended as a loan, or that tLe husband and wife Intended to occupy
the relation of debtor and creditor in respect to such funds. (New
South B. & L. Assn. v. Reed, 858.)
9. HUSBAND AND WIFE.— IMPROVEMENTS PUT UPON
THE WIFE'S SEPARATE REAL ESTATE BY HER INSOLVENT
HUSBAND, In fraud of his creditors, can be followed by them on
the premises where they are put, and the land may be charged, in
their favor, with the value of such Improvements. (New Soutli
B. & L. Assn. y. Reed, 858.)
See Witnesses, 12.
ILLEGITIMACY.
Bee Descent; Wills, S.
592 Index.
INDICTMENT.
See Criminal Law, 15; Bape, 2.
INFANTS.
See Judgment, 11-14.
INJUNCTION.
INJUNCTIONS— WHEN NOT GRANTED.— If the facts pre-
■sent no matter requiring equitable relief, and the granting of an in-
junction will work irreparable injury to one party with no appre-
ciable benefit to the other, and the remedy at law is adequate to
do full justice, the court should refuse to issue an injunction as
■not within its legitimate jurisdiction. (Crescent Min. Co. v. Silver
King Min. Co.. 810.)
See Equity, 1; Trespass.
INNKEEPERS.
1. INNKEEPERS— NEGLIGENCE— INJURY TO GUEST BY
FIRE.— No presumption of negligence on the part of an innkeeper
arises where a guest loses his life in a fire originating in, and de-
stroying the premises. To make the innkeeper liable in such a
•case it must be shown that his negligence was the proximate cause
of the fire and the consequent injuries. (Weeks v. McNulty, 693.)
2. INNKEEPERS— NEGLIGENCE IN FAILING TO PROVIDE
FIRE-ESCAPES — MUNICIPAL ORDINANCE— EVIDENCE.-In
an action against an Innkeeper, based upon his negligence in failing
to provide his premises with fire-escapes, as required by city ordi-
nance, resulting in the death of plaintiff's decedent, it is not error to
exclude the violated ordinance from evidence where no causal con-
nection between the violation of the ordinance and the injuries com-
plained of is shown. (Weeks v. McNulty, 693.)
3. INNKEEPERS— LIABILITY— GENERAL RULE.— The gen-
eral rule of law governing the liability of an innkeeper is, that he
is not an insurer of the person of his guest against injury, but his
obligation is merely to exercise reasonable care that his guests may
•not be Injured by anything happening through the innkeeper's negli-
gence. (Weeks v. McNulty, 693.)
INSANE PERSONS.
1. INSANE PERSONS— ADMINISTRATION ' OF LUNATIC'S
ESTATE— DISBURSEMENTS— NOTICE TO NEXT OF KIN.-
Before ordering disbursements from a lunatic's estate upon peti-
tion of the committee, notice should be given to the next of kin, or
parties standing in close relation to the lunatic. (Equitable Trust
•Co. V. Garis, 644.)
2. INSANE PERSONS— ADMINISTRATION OF ESTATES OF.
It Is the duty of a court In administering the estate of an Insane
person to keep expenses within reasonable bounds, to sacrifice the
estate only when all the circumstances of the case make It neces-
sary, and to see to it that the future comfort of the lunatic shall
be made as secure as possible. (Equitable Trust Co. v. Garis, 644.)
3. INSANE PERSONS— POWERS OF COMMITTEE— EFFECT
OF APPEAL FROM ORDER OF COMMITMENT.— An appeal from
an order of commitment entered In lunacy proceedings does not
oust or suspend the committee of a lunatic from Its functions, nor
relieve it of the duty to guard the lunatic's property. Such com-
Index. 993
«atttee may still sue In equity for the discovery and deliverance of
property of the lunatic held by an unauthorized person. (Equitable
Trust Ck). V. Garis, G44.)
4. INSANITY— OPINIONS OP NONEXPERTS.-Intimate ac-
quaintances of a person whose sanity Is the subject of investiga-
tion and who have been close observers of his conduct, though not
<^}mpetent as experts, when they can instance acts indicating men«
tal derangement, are competent to give their opinions as to the
canity or Insanity of such person. (In re Christensen, 794.)
See Equity, 1, 3; Homicide, 7-11; Witnesses, 10.
INSOLVENCY.
1. INSOLVENCY— CREDITOR— COLLATERAL SECURITY.—
The rule that a creditor of an Insolvent, having collateral 8uffl>
■clent to satisfy a part only of his debt, is entitled to prove the
whole of his claim, and cannot be required to allow credit for any
collections made after the date of the insolvency, does not apply
where the insolvent's liability is that of indorser upon negotiable
notes, which it discounted to a third party, .his liability becoming
fixed subsequent to the insolvency, and where there is no indebt-
edness independent of the notes. (Mercantile Nat. Bank v. Macfar-
lane, 352.)
2. SUBROGATION— INSOLVENCY— RIGHT OF ACTION OP
HECEIVER.— The receiver of an insolvent indorser has a right of
action against the original obligors upon the paper, upon the pay-
ment of a dividend to the creditor holder; and upon full payment,
the estate of the insolvent is subrogated to all of the creditors'
rights as against prior parties. (Mercantile Nat. Bank v. Macfar-
lane, 352.)
3. INSOLVENCY— ATTACHMENT— EFFECT ON RIGHTS OP
•CREDITOR.— A proceeding In attachment, unnecessary to protect
the creditor as to money of an insolvent debtor In the creditor's
hands, will not affect the creditor's right to prove the balance of
his claim, and to share in the distribution of the Insolvent's estate.
(Mercantile Nat. Bank v. Macfarlane, 352.)
4. INSOLVENCY — NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS— RIGHTS
OP HOLDER AGAINST INSOLVENT INDORSER.— The holder of
-a note or bill indorsed by an insolvent need not enforce its col-
lection, as against parties primarily liable, before he can make a
claim upon the Insolvent estate. Nor is he required to surrender
up the obligation as a condition to participating in dividends. In
the absence of statute he may proceed against the insolvent estate,
-and also against the other parties to the obligation, until his debt
is fully collected. (Mercantile Nat. Bank v. Macfarlane, 352.)
5. INSOLVENCY — NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS — CLAIM
OF HOLDER AGAINST. INSOLVENT INDORSER.— Where the
. holder of a bill or note applies to prove his debt against the estate
of an Insolvent surety, any sura actually received in payment from
another party to the obligation must be deducted from the amount
to be proved. The sum actually remaining unpaid must be the basis
upon which the dividend Is to be computed. (Mercantile Nat Bank
T. Macfarlane, 352.)
See Building and Loan Associations, 2, 4; Corporations, 2, 10-12, 30;
Husband and Wife, 8, 9.
▲m. St. rv.. Vol. LXX.-63-
994 Index.
INSTRUCTIONS.
1. INSTRUCTIONS — IMMATERIAL ERROR. — Erroneous Ii>
Btruetions as to the interpretation to be given a doubtful telegram^
when without prejudice, are not ground for reversal. (Hasbrouck
V. Western Union T. Co., 181.)
2. INSTRUCTIONS— ERRONEOUS SUBMISSION TO JURY
OF MATTER OP LAW.— It is harmless error for the court to-
submit to the jury the question of interpretation of a tele-
gram conferring certain authority upon an agent, when, from th&
verdict rendered, it is apparent that the interpretation adopted by
the jury gave to the telegram the meaning which, as a matter of
law, was proper. (Hasbrouck v. Western U. T. Co., 181.)
3. INSTRUCTIONS— REVIEW ON APPEAL.— In determining
whether an instruction given in a trial for homicide was erroneous
and prejudicial, it should be considered not only with what precede*
and follows it, but in view of the idea being elucidated. (Common-
wealth V. Wireback, 625.)
See Appeal, 2, 10, 12; Trial, 1, 5; Witnesses, 6,
INSURANCE.
1. INSURANCE COMPANIES— ULTRA VIRES-POLICY FOR-
BIDDEN BY STATUTE.— Where a mutual insurance company
issues a policy which it is prohibited by law to issue, the policy i»
illegal and void, and the fact that premiums have been paid thereon,
and used by the company, will not estop it from pleading ultra
vires as a defense to a suit upon the policy. (In re Assignment
Mut. Guar. Ins. Co., 149.)
2. INSURANCE COMPANIES-POWERS— ASSURED MUST
TAKE NOTICE OF.— One who takes out a policy in a mutual in-
surance company which the latter has no power under its charter
to make must take notice of the laws of the state and the articles
of incorporation adopted thereunder, and cannot recover upon tli&
policy unless enabled to do so upon the ground of estoppel. (In rfr
Assignment Mut. Guar. Co., 149.)
3. INSURANCE COMPANIES— MUTUAL— WHO ARE NOT
MEMBERS.— One who Insures his property in a mutual company
In a stated amount, for a specific premium does not become a mem-
ber of the company so as to be liable for future assessments. (In re-
Assignment Mut. Guar. Ins. Co., 149.)
4. INSURANCE COMPANIES— MUTUAI^-WHEN DO NOT-
BECOME STOCK COMPANIES.— A mutual insurance company or-
ganized under a statute authorizing an association of persons mak-
ing mutual pledges and giving valid obligations to each other for
their own insurance on the assessment plan, does not become a
stock company by the issuance of shares to the subscribers of a guar-
anty fun-d, which shares are secured by obligations of the holders^
and are subject to assessment from time to time to meet any de-
ficiency that might arise in the advancements, assessments, and
pledges made to pay losses and expenses. Therefore it cannot do
business on the stock plan, cannot write a policy for a fixed amount,
accept premiums as such, nor declare dividends. (In re Assign-
ment Mut. Guar. Ins. Co., 149.)
5. INSURANCE COMPANIES — MUTUAL — LIABILITY OF
MEMBERS TO A PERSON ILLEGALLY INSURED.— While thfr
ofllcors or directors of a mutual insurance company may be held in-
dividually liable for a wrong done to a person to whom they have-
issued an Illegal and void policy, no liability for such wrong caa
Indbx. 995
be enforced against the members of the company as partners. (In
re Assignment Mut. Guar. Ins. Co., 149.)
6. INSURANCE — ACCIDENT — DEATH BY — RUPTURE OP
ARTERY.— Where the death of an Insured was due to the rupture
of an artery it will not be considered as the result of accident where
In the circumstances attending the rupture, there Is no evidence that
anything was done or occurred which the insured had not toreseen
or planned, except the rupture and Its consequences. (Feder v.
Iowa State etc. Assn., 212.)
7. INSURANCE— ACCIDENT— WHAT IS.— While it may be
true that an accident is an event which takes place without one's
foresight or expectation, and is undesigned, it is not true that every
unforeseen, undesigned, and unexpected event is an accident. A
result whicli, though not designed, foreseen, or expected, is yet the
natural and direct effect of acts voluntarily done, or of conditions
voluntarily assumed, cannot be said to be accidental. (Feder v. Iowa
State etc. Assn., 212.)
8. INSURANCE. LIFE— POLICY OF, MAY BE ASSIGNED TO
ONE HAVING N"0 INSURABLE INTEREST.— A valid policy of
life insurance is assignable. Hence, if a policy Is, in good faith
and not for the purpose of assignment, taken out, either by the in-
sured himself, or by another, who has an insurable interest in his
life, it may be lawfully assigned to one who has no insurable in-
terest In the life of the insured, and the assignee may, therefore,
enforce collection of the full amount of the policy from the com-
pany, where the assignment is general and absolute. (Steinback v.
Diepenbrock, 424.)
9. INSURANCE, LIFE— CONTRACT OF, AND ITS ASSIGN-
MENT—CONSTRUCTION—INTENTION — WAGERING POLICY.
The intention of the parties procuring a life insurance determines
its character. Hence, if one should take out such a policy to him-
self, and at once assign it to a person having no insurable interest?
In his life, the courts would unhesitatingly declare in accordance
with the facts, reading the policy and the assignmept together, as
forming part of one transaction, for the purpose of frustrating a
wagering policy. (Steinback v. Diepenbrock, 424.)
10. INSURANCE. LIPE^-POLICY OF— RIGHT TO ASSIGN-
FAILURE OF HEALTH.— A person whose life is insured is not
deprived of the right to realize on his policy, by its assignment,
whenever his necessities press him, because of a failing condition
of health. (Steinback v. Diepenbrock, 424.)
11. INSURANCE-POSSESSION OF POLICY.— Possession of an
Insurance policy, at the death of the insured, makes out a prima
facie case. (Kendrick v. Life Ins. Co., 592.)
12. INSURANCE— PAYMENT OF PREMIUM— RECITALS IN
THE POLICY— ESTOPPEL.— The acknowledgment in the policy of
the receipt of the premium estops the company to test the validity
of the policy on the ground of nonpayment of the premium. (Ken-
drick V. Life Ins. Co., 592.)
13. INSURANCE— RECITALS OF PAYMENT IN THE POLICY
—WHEN A MERE RECEIPT.— In so far as a recital in an Insur-
ance policy ot the payment of premium is a mere receipt for money,
it is only prima facie like other receipts, and will not prevent an
action to recover the money if not in truth paid. (Kendrick v. Life
Ins. Co., 592.)
14. INSURANCE — RECITALS OF PAYMENT IN THE POI^
ICY— WHEN PART OP CONTRACT.— In so far as a recital in an
insurance policy of the payment of premium is a part of the con-
996 Index.
tract of insurance, it cannot be contradicted by parol to invalidate
the contract, in the absence of fraud in procuring the delivery of
the policy. (Kendrick v. Life Ins. Co., 592.)
15. INSURANCE— INSTRUCTIONS TO AGENTS— EVIDENCE
AGAINST THE COMPANY.— The instruction to agents that if the
premium was paid more than thirty days after due there must be a
health certificate is evidence against the company that credit or
indulgence on payment was allowable. (Kendrick v. Life Ins. Co.,
592.)
16. INSURANCE — INSTRUCTIONS TO AGENTS NOT BIND-
ING ON THE INSURED.— The instruction to agents that after
thirty days' delay in the paj'ment of premium a health certificate
is required is not binding on the insured, who may rely upon the
provision in the policy itself that the payment must be made "dur-
ing life." (Kendrick v. Life Ins. Co., 592.)
17. INSURANCE— CONSTRUCTION OF POLICY.— The uniform
rule of construction of insurance policies is, that if reasonably sus-
ceptible of two constructions, that one will be adopted which is
more favorable to the insured. (Kendrick v. Life Ins. Co., 592.)
18. INSURANCE— LIFE— INCONTESTABILITY.— Where a pol-
icy of life insurance provides that after one year from its inception
it shall be incontestable if the premiums are paid, such policy can-
not be contested by the insurer, after a year has elapsed, on the
ground of fraud in obtaining the policy, and it makes no difference
whether suit is brought upon the policy by the assured's represen-
tatives or any bona fide assignee of the assured. (Clement v. In-
surance Co., 650.)
19. INSURANCE — LIFE — INCONTESTABLE CLAUSE— WA-
GERING TRANSFER.— An incontestable clause in a polioy of life
insurance cannot be relied upon to aid a transferee thereof who, by
means of an unauthorized and illegal transfer, commenced before,
S.nd consummated after, the policy issued, to recover thereon.
Such clause does not preclude inquiry into the transfer and the
right of the transferee to take under the policy, and if the transfer
is a wagering transfer the transferee cannot recover. (Clement v.
Insurance Co., 650.)
20. INSURANCE — LIFE — PAYMENT OF PREMIUMS TO
AGENT— PROOF.— Where a policy of life Insurance provides that
premiums thereon may be paid to an agent producing a receipt
therefor signed by the president or other named oflScers of the
company, the payment of premiums is sufficiently established in a
suit on the policy, by evidence that they were paid to one held out
as a general agent of the company who delivered a receipt signed
by the president when the payment was made. (Clement v. In-
surance Co., 650.)
21. INSURANCE— LIFE— INSURABLE INTEREST— WAGER-
ING POLICY.— One who takes out a policy upon the life of another
paying the premiums therefor himself must have an insurable in-
terest in the life of that other, or the policy will be a mere wager
policy upon which the party to whom it was Issued cannot recover.
(Clement v. Insurance Co., 650.)
22. INSURANCE— LIFE— INCONTESTABILITY— FRAUD OF
ASSIGNEE.— Where a policy of life Insui-ance provides that It
shall be incontestable by the company after one year If the premi-
ums are paid, and suit is brought thereon by a transferee of the
policy, after the lapse of such time, the premiums being paid, the
Insurer may, nevertheless, defend upon the ground that the plain-
tiff is not a transferee in good faith, and that the transfer was a
Index. 997
mere evasfon of the rule against wagering policies, and evidence In
support of such defense Is admissible. (Clement v. Insurance Co..
650.)
23. INSURANCE — LIFE — ASSIGNMENT — INSURABLE IN-
TEREST.—When a policy of life Insurance has once been issued
to a beneficiary legally entitled, he may assign or transfer it to an-
other who has no insurable interest, the transfer or assignment
must be in good faith, and not a mere colorable evasion of the pro-
vision in regard to w.agering contracts and in order to validate or
legalize the same. (Clement v. Insurance Co., 650.)
INTERSTATE COMMERCE.
1. INTERSTATE COMMERCE— JURISDICTION OP STATE
AND FEDERAL COURTS— CONNECTING RAILROADS.- Where
the putting in of a connecting switch at the intersection of two
railroads for the purpose of transfering cars from one road to the
other, is of some benefit both to interstate and state trafllc, the
state and the federal courts have concurrent jurisdiction in the
matter, and, in disposing of the case, they may take into considera-
tion the whole necessity resulting from the whole benefit which will
accrue to all classes of commerce. (Jacobson v. Wisconsin etc. R. R.
Co., 358.)
2. INTERSTATE COMMERCE— STATE REGULATIONS— SI-
LENCE OF CONGRESS.— The rule that the silence of congress in
relation to articles confessedly suited for commerce is to be talien
as legally equivalent to its declaration that the transportation of
those articles into the states shall be free and unrestricted, has no
application to articles of doubtful commercial quality. (Austin v.
State, 703.)
3. INTERSTATE COMMERCE— ORIGINAL PACKAGE— BAS-
KET CONTAINING CIGARETTE PACKAGES.— Where a num-
ber of pacliages of cigarettes containing ten cigarettes each are
shipped from one state to another in a basket, the basket Is an
original package within the Interstate commerce act The presence
or absence of covering to the basket is immaterial to the question
whether or not the basket Is an original package, and It is of no
importance that the basket Is owned by the transporting carrier.
(Austin V. State, 703.)
4. INTERSTATE COMMERCE— ORIGINAL PACKAGE— DEFI-
NITION.—An original package, as applied to Interstate or Inter-
national commerce, is a package, bundle, or aggregation of goods,
put up in whatever form, covering, or receptable for transporta-
tion, and as a unit transported from one state or nation to another.
(Austin V. State, 703.)
5. INTERSTATE COMMERCE— STATE REGULATION— CON-
STITUTIONALITY—BURDEN OB' PROOF.— The burden Is upon
a person who assails a state's restrictive or prohibitory statute as
an unwarranted interference with interstate commerce, to show
that the particular article Involved is a legitimate subject of com-
merce. (Austin V. State, 703.)
6. INTERSTATE COMMERCE-REGULATION BY STATES—
CIGARETTES.— Cigarettes are not legitimate articles of commerce,
and, in the absence of congressional regulation to the contrary, a
state statute may prohibit the importation and sale of cigarettes
within the state. Such a statute is not In contravention of that
clause of the federal constitution which inhibits state regulation
of Interstate commerce. (Austin v. State, 703.)
998 Index.
7. INTERSTATE COMMERCE— LEGITIMATE COMMODI-
TIES—CONGRESSIONAL TAXATION OF CIGARETTES.— Con-
gress, by imposing a revenue tax upon cigarettes, does not recog-
nize them as proper commercial commodities. (Austin v. State, 703.)
Set Police Power, 8.
INTERVENTION.
INTERVENTION IN EQUITY.— One who Intervenes In a suit
In equity, and prays for relief, both legal and equitable, is bound
to admit and provide for all the equitable rights, claims, and de-
mands justly belonging to the adversary party, and growing out of,
or necessarily Involved in, the subject matter of the controversy.
(Charleston etc. Ry. Co. v. Hughes, 17.)
INTOXICATING LIQUORS.
8ee Constitutions; Police Power, 5, 7; Social Clubs.
JOINT STOCK COMPANIES.
1. JOINT STOCK COMPANIES— SUBSCRIPTION TO STOCK
INDUCED BY FRAUD— REMEDY OF SUBSCRIBER IN AB-
SENCE 0¥ RIGHT OP RESCISSION.— If a person has been in-
duced by the fraudulent representations of an agent of a joint
stock company to take shares therein, and the shareholder Is de-
barred from a rescission of his contract by the insolvency of the
company, or from any other cause, he Is without remedy against
the company, and is left to his action against the agent who so
Induced him to subscribe. (Wilson v. Hundley, 837.)
2. JOINT STOCK COMPANIES— SUBSCRIPTION TO STOCK
INDUCED BY FRAUD— ACTION FOR DAMAGES— INAPPLI-
CABILITY OP GENERAL RULE,— The general rule that a person
who has been induced by fraud to enter into a contract pertaining
to goods and chattels may, upon the discovery of the fraud, elect
to retain what he has received and bring an action to recover any
damages he has sustained by reason of the fraud, does not apply
to subscriptions for stock in a joint stock company, for such an action
Is at variance with the contract entered Into by the subscriber.
(Wilson V. Hundley, 837.)
3. JOINT STOCK COMPANIES— SUBSCTRIPTION TO STOCK-
NATURE OF, THOUGH INDUCED BY FRAUD— ACTION FOR
DAMAGES.- A subscription to the capital stock of a joint stock
company is not only an undertaking to the company, but with all
other subscribers, and it Is of the essence of the contract between
the shareholders that they shall all contribute ratably to the pay-
ment of the company's debts and liabilities. Hence, a shareholder
who was Induced by the fraudulent representations of an agent
of the company to take shares in It, cannot, after he discovers the
fraud, elect to retain the shares and sue the company for damages,
as this would throw the burden of the payment of the debts and
liabilities on the other shareholders, who are as Innocent of the
fraud as he Is. (Wilson v. Hundley, 837.)
JUDGMENT.
1. JUDGMENTS— LIEN OF— VENDOR AND VENDEE— AP-
PLICATION OF PAYMENTS.— The mere docketing of a judgment
against the vendor of land is not notice of the lien to a purchaser
In possession under a contract of sale, and payments subsequently
made by him to the judgment debtor, pursuant to the contract.
I^DEX. 999
without actual notice of the judgment, are valid as against Ita Uen
upon the land. (Wehn v. Fall, 307.)
2. JUDGMENTS— LIEN OP— VENDOR AND VENDEE— AP-
PLICATION OF PAYMENTS.— A judgment against a vendor of
land, who retains the legal title under a contract of sale, attaches as
a Hen to such land, and, as against the vendee In possession with
actual notice, may be enforced to the extent of the unpaid pur-
chase money. (Wehn v. Fall, 397.)
3. JUDGMENTS— RELIEF IN EQUITY.— If a judgment is
based upon perjured evidence of a successful party given at the
trial, while the defeated party has a good defense which he was
prevented from presenting by reason of such perjui-y, and without
being guilty of negligence has exhausted all his ordinary legal
remedies for vacating such judgment, equity, In a proper proceed-
ing, may vacate the judgment and grant the defeated party a new
trial. (Munro v. Callahan, 36G.)
4. JUDGMENTS — RELIEF IN EQUITY — PERJURY — MIS-
TAKE.—A court of equity cannot vacate a judgment on account of
any innocent mistake or want of recollection on the part of the
successful party or his witnesses, nor even on account of the per-
jury of other witnesses in the case. (Munro v. Callahan, 366.)
5. JUDGMENTS— RELIEF IN EQUITY— FRAUD.— A court of
•«quity cannot vacate a judgment after the term at which It was
rendered, and grant the defeated party a new trial for fraud prac-
ticed upon him, except when such fraud was practiced In connec-
tion with the trial. (Munro v. Callahan, 366.)
6. JUDGMENTS OF SISTER STATEJ-ACTION UPON— PRE-
SUMPTIONS.—In nn action upon a judgment of a sister state, en-
tered upon a warrant of attorney to confess judgment, the pre-
sumption Is, that the court had jurisdiction to enter It, and that the
proceedings were regular and according to the laws of that state.
(Van Norman v. Gordon, 304.)
7. JUDGMENT CONFESSED UNDER WARRANT OF AT-
TORNEY—ILLUSTRATION -"FAITH AND CREDIT" IN AN-
OTHER STATE.— If a person signs a promissory note, executing,
at the same time, a warrant of attorney to confess judgment, and a
Judgment of a court of record In an action upon the note Is entered,
under such warrant by the confession of an attorney of such court,
who was requested to appear by the attorney named In the war-
rant, such judgment Is entitled to full faith and credit In another
state, if an action Is brought upon It, though such appearance in the
former state was really in the plalntifTs Interest, where there Is no
charge of fraud, no appearance of Irregularity, and what was done
in confessing jrdgment came within the terms of the warrant of at-
■tomey. (Van Norman v. Gordon. 304.)
8. JUDGMENT, THOUGH CONFESSED UNDER WARRANT
OP ATTORNEY. IS ENTITLED TO "FAITH AND CREDIT" IN
ANOTHER STATE.— A judgment of a court of one state Is entitled
to full faith and credit In other states where the court which ren-
dered It had jurisdiction to render such a judgment. If It had,
then the fact that It Is a judgment by confession, under a warrant
of attorney. Is Immaterial. Such judgments, when rendered by
courts having jurisdiction of the cause and the parties, have all the
qualities. Incidents, and attributes of other judgments. (Van Nor-
man V. Gordon, 304.)
9. JUDGMENTS— SETOFF OF.— A judgment, to be available as
a setoff, must be a valid subsisting obligation, final in its nature,
Bence, judgments cannot be set off against each other where one of
1000 Index.
them Bas been appealed from and the appeal is still pending and
undetermined. (De Camp v. Thomson, 570.)
10. JUDGMENTS— JUDICIAL DETERMINATIONS— COLLAT-
ERAL ATTACK.— A judicial determination may be contrary to con-
clusive evidence, or legal evidence, or without any evidence, yet
cannot collaterally be impeached for want of jurisdiction. (Parsons
V. Parsons, 894.)
11. JUDGMENTS AGAINST INFANTS.— If infant defendants in
a case have been regularly summoned, the failure to appoint a
guardian ad litem is error only, and does not render void the judg-
ment entered. (Manfull v. Graham, 412.)
12. JUDGMENTS AGAINST INFANTS— VACATING.— Under a
statute providing that "it shall not be necessary to reserve in a
judgment or order, the right of an infant to show cause against
It after his attaining full age, but in any case in which, but for
this section, such reservation would have been proper, the infant,
within one year after arriving at the age of twenty-one years, may
show cause against such judgment," the infant does not, on hi»
arriving at majoi-ity, have an absolute right to have the judgment
set aside, but only to show cause against it, and does not extend
that right beyond the cases mentioned, and under such statute an
infant is not entitled to a day in court after reaching his majority
to show cause against a judgment ordering a sale of his lands.
(Manfull V. Graham, 412.)
13. JUDGMENTS AGAINST INFANTS— VACATING.— An orig-
nal action to vacate an erroneous judgment against an infant can-,
not be maintained without showing a good defense to the first
action and judgment. (Manfull v. Graham, 412.)
14. JUDGMENTS AGAINST INFANTS— VACATING.— Under
section 602 of the code of Nebraslia, an infant, against whom an
erroneous judgment has been entered, may have it set aside, pro-
vided his disability does not appear in the record nor the error in
the proceedings, but, if these facts appear, his remedy is by writ
of error. (Manfull v. Graham, 412.)
15. JUDGMENTS RENDERED DURING TERM HAVE EF-
FECT FROM FIRST DAY THEREOF— PRIORITY OF LIEN.—
A judgment rendered during a term of court relates back to the first
day thereof, and is a lien upon the real estate of the judgment
debtor from that time. It Is, therefore, a lien which has priority
over a deed of trust recorded during the term, though the judgment
was actually rendered after the deed of trust was recorded. (New
South B. & L. Assn. v. Reed, 858.)
16. JUDGMENTS— WHEN MAY BE VALIDATED.— If a court
has jurisdiction of the subject matter of the suit and of the person,
and some essential step Is omitted which the legislature has the
right to dispense with, it may validate the judgment qv decree,
notwithstanding the omission or irregularity. (In re Christensen,
794.)
17. JUDGMENTS-JURISDICTION.- If a statute purporting to
confer jurisdiction is void, no intendment of law or presumption
of fact can be made in favor of the Jurisdiction. (In re Christen-
sen, 794.)
18. JUDGMENTS— WHEN VOID— COLLATERAL ATTACK.—
A judgment pronounced by a tribunal having no authority to de-
termine the matter in Issue is necessarily and incurably void, and
may be shown to be so in any collateral or other proceeding In
which it Is drawn In question. (In re Christensen, 794.)
Index. 1001
19. judgments— void cannot be validated.-a judg-
ment or decree which is absolutely void cannot be validated or con-
firmed by subsequent legislation. (In re Christensen, 794.)
20. JUDGMENTS.— ESTOPPEL CANNOT BE BASED on a void
Judgment or decree. (In re Christensen, 794.)
21. JUDGMENTS AS ESTOPPEL.— If the court has Jurisdiction
of the subject matter of the suit and of the parties, and the decree
or judgment may be reversed or set aside for error or Irregularity,
and the defendant waives his right to have this done by executing
or accepting It, he is estopped from denying its binding effect, but.
If such judgment is void for any reason, he is not estopped. (In re
Christensen, 794.)
See Adoption, 2; Attachment, 3; Habeas Corpus, 3.
JUDICIAL NOTICE.
See Evidence, 9.
JUDICIAL SALES.
1. JUDICIAL SALES— TITLE OF PURCHASER.— The title of
a stranger derived through sale under judgment is not subject to
defeat by the subsequent vacation of such judgment. (Manfull v.
Graham, 412.)
2. JUDICIAL SALES-"UPSET" BIDS— WHEN PROPERLY
REJECTED— CONFIRMATION.— When a farm, composed of fer-
tile bottom lands and poor uplands, is about to be sold at a judicial
sale, and is laid oflf into parcels, so that one who buys a parcel of
the lowland is thereby induced and willing to buy upland which
can be used advantageously with it, the court, after the sale, will
reject an "upset" bid made at a small advance on only a part of
a purchase, where the effect of accepting it would be to cause the
purchaser of two parcels to lose one of them, and without which
he would not want the other, particularly if the terms of the "up-
set" bid preclude a resale of the tract in the manner as before.
(Moore V. Triplett, 882.)
3. JUDICIAL SALES — HOW COURT SHOULD ACT UPON
REPORT.— A court should so act upon a report of a sale of prop-
erty made under its order as not to deter or discourage bidders. It
should so act as to Induce possible purchasers to attend such sales,
to encourage fair, open, and competitive bidding in order that the
highest possible price may be obtained, and to inspire confidence
in the stability of judicial sales. This is due not merely to the
purchaser, but also to creditors, debtors, and the owners of prop-
erty which has to be sold by the court. (Moore v. Triplett, 882.)
4. JUDICIAL SALES — "UPSET" BIDS — WHO CANNOT
MAKE.— One who was a bidder at a judicial sale, by himself or
by an agent, or who was present and had the opportunity to bid,
will not, as a general rule, be permitted to put in an "upset" bid.
He should have bidden at the sale, in open competition with all
others, what he was willing to give for the property. (Moore v.
Triplett. 882.)
5. JUDICIAL SALES— "UPSET" BIDS— REJECTION OF— DIS-
CRETION.—If land Is sold under the order of a court, and an "up-
set" bid is made thereon, the court must exercise a sound legal
discretion as to whether It will accept It or not. A bid for ten per
cent, advatfce, well secured, and put In before confirmation, is as
much a valid bid as If made at the auction, but the court Is not
always bound to accept it, without regard to the circumstances of
the case. (Moore v. Triplett, 882.)
1002 Index.
6. JUDICIAL SALES— "UPSET" BIDS-ACCEPTANCE OF.—
A court must sell property at the best price obtainable. Hence, a
substantial and well secured "upset" bid should be accepted, unless
there are circumstances going to show that injustice would be done
to the purchaser or other person. (Moore v. Triplett, 882.)
7. JUDICIAL SALES — CONFIRMATION — DISCRETION.— A
■court, in determining whether or not it will confirm a judicial sale,
must, under the circumstances of the particular case, exercise a
€Ound legal discretion with a view to fairness, prudence, and a just
regard to the rights of all concerned. (Moore v. Triplett, 882.)
8. JUDICIAL SALES — RIGHT OF COURT TO KNOW ALL
THE FACTS— DUTY OF COMMISSIONER.— A commissioner who
makes a judicial sale is the agent of the court, and should report
his information of facts, particularly as to the buying of bids before
confirmation, to the court, as the court has a right to know all that
he knows about the matter, to the end that the sale may not be con-
firmed unless it is proper to do so. (Camp v. Bruce, 873.)
9. JUDICIAL SALES — SALE OF BID AT AN ADVANCE-
CONFIRMATION.— A court will never, where the facts are known
to it, confirm a judicial sale, if the bidder has sold his bid at an
advaiKe, unless the advance paid, or to be paid, inures to the benefit
of the parties to the suit. (Camp v. Bruce, 873.)
See Attachment, 4; Contract, 10, 11; Devise, 3-6; Execution.
JURISDICTION.
1. JURISDICTION — COURTS OF CONCURRENT — WHICH
ACQUIRES PRECEDENCE.— In case of a conflict of jurisdiction
l)etween two courts having concurrent jurisdiction, that court whicn
first acquires cognizance of the controversy, or obtains possession
of the property in dispute, is entitled to retain it until the end of
the litigation, and should decide all questions which legitimately
flow out of the controversy. (Spiller v. Wells, 878.)
2. JURISDICTION— HOW ACQUIRED— CONCURRENT JUR-
ISDICTION—PRIORITY— SERVICE OF PROCESS.— Jurisdiction
Is acquired by the issue and service of process, and, in case of con-
flict between courts of concurrent jurisdiction, the date of service
of the process determines the priority of the jurisdiction; but it is
an essential condition in the application of this rule that the first
suit shall afford the plaintifiC in the second an adequate and com-
plete opportunity for the adjudication of his rights. (Spiller v. Wells,
«78.)
See Attachment, 5-8; Courts; Criminal Law, 4; Devise, 3, 4, 6; Equity,
2-7; Interstate Commerce, 2; Judgment, 17; Marriage and Di-
vorce, 6; Mechanic's Lien, 7.
JURY.
See Trial, 2.
LACHES.
See Mortgages, 1, 2, 4, fl.
LANDLORD AND TENANT.
1. LANDLORD AND TENANT— DEFECTIVE PREMISES-
LANDLORD'S LIABILITY TO TENANT'S GUESTS.-If a land-
lord maintains outside steps and a platform for the use in common
of tenants of different parts of the building, and a visitor to one
Index. 1003
of the tenants, expressly invited by the tenant to come on a par-
ticular day for a particular purpose, is Injured by a defect In the
platform while passing over it, the landlord is answerable, for the
visitor was using the platform in the tenant's right. (Coupe v.
Piatt, 293.)
2. LANDLORD AND TENANT— HOLDING OVER— WHAT
NECESSARY TO CONSTITUTE —A holding over by a tenant after
the expiration of his lease for a year, so as to render him liable for
another year's rent, must be by such voluntary act that the law im-
plies a contract on his part, or leasing of the premises for another
year. Such Implication does not arise from his act due to any stress
of circumstances which involves peril to his life, or that of some
member of his family. (Herter v. Mullen, 517.)
3. LANDLORD AND TENANT-HOLDING OVER— OMISSION
TO SURRENDER PREMISES, WHAT EXCUSES.— The failure of
the tenant to surrender the premises upon the expiration of his term
is excused when rendered impossible by act of God, unavoidable
accident, or stress of circumstances imperiling his life, or that of
some member of his family, so far as his liability to pay rent for
another term is involved by his holding over under such circum-
stances. (Herter v. Mullen, 517.)
4. LANDLORD AND TENANT— HOLDING OVER— RETEN-
TION OF POSSESSION CAUSED BY SICKNESS.— If a tenant
by the year, intending to surrender the premises at the end of his
term, is obliged to retain a room in the leased house for a short
period of time after his lease expires in order to avoid the peril of
exposing a sick member of his family to danger or death, this is not
a holding over within the meaning of the rule that if the tenant
holds over the landlord may continue the lease and recover rent for
another year. (Herter v. Mullen, 517.)
5. LANDLORD AND TENANT— DANGEROUS CONDITION
OF LEASED PREMISES— LIABILITY OF LANDLORD.— The les-
sor of premises containing an elevator which is dangerous, owing to
a, secret mechanical defect, known to the lessor, but not discover-
able by the lessee In the exercise of reasonable care, is liable to em-
ployes of the lessee for injuries received in operating the elevator
and resulting from such secret defect. (Anderson v. Hayes, 930.)
LARCENY.
LARCENY.— HOUSE— WHAT IS.— A Structure eight feet
blgh, stationary. Inclosed with wire and covered with shingles, and,
maintained for the safekeeping of birds and fowls, is a house within
the meaning of a statute defining larceny from a house or any build-
ing. (Williams v. State, 82.)
LEGACY.
See Devise, 7.
LEGISLATURE.
LEGISLATURE— POWER TO TAX— LIMITATION.— Th©
legislative power of taxation is subject to the qualification that it
must not be exercised to impair the obligation of contracts. (Broad-
foot V. Fayettevllle, 610.)
See Eminent Domain, 8; Judgment, 16; Municipal Corporations, 16;
Police Power, 4, 7: Railroad Companies, 8, 9; Statutes, 7.
1004 Index.
LIBEL.
1. LIBEL OF A CLASS.— A publication charging the street-car
conductors of a certain city with being pimps, and that they would
sell the virtue of their sisters for a drink, is libelous per se. (Jones
V. State, 751.)
2. LIBEL.— RECOGNIZANCE ON APPEAL which recites that
the defendant "stands charged with the offense of libel," is suffi-
cient. (Jones V. State, 751.)
3. LIBEL OF A CLASS.— It is a violation of the Texas statute
to libel any sect, company, or class of persons without naming any
person in particular who may belong to such class. (Jones v. State,
751.)
LIENS.
1. LIENS — TRUST DEED — SUBSEQUENT PURCHASER —
SUBJECTING LANDS TO PAYMENT OF LIEN— PREJUDICIAL
ACT WITH NOTICE OF EQUITIES.— When a person buys part of
a tract of land, with full notice or knowledge of a deed of trust on
the whole of it, he must, in order to prevent the land so purchased
from being subjected to the payment of such lien, show that the
holder thereof has, with notice of his equities, done some act to his
prejudice. (Lynchburg Perpetual etc. Co. v. Fellers, 851.)
2. LIENS — TRUST DEED — SUBSEQUENT PURCHASER —
SUBJECTING LANDS TO PAYJfENT OF LIEN— ORDER OF—
RELEASE OF PRIMARY SECURITY— EFFECT OF.— If a person
executes a trust deed to a loan company on the whole of certain
land to secure a loan, and then sells part of the property to a church,
which assumes the payment of the loan, but subsequently sells
other portions of the land, at different times, to two other persons,
and then rescinds the contract by which the trustees of the church
assumed to pay the trust debt, after which the loan company, with
notice of the last purchasers' interest in the property embraced in
the trust deed, but without notice of such rescission, releases the
church property from the lien of the trust deed, the property last
purchased is not absolutely released from the lien of the trust deed,
but only discharged from an amount of the trust deed debt equal
to the value of the parcel released so far as the proceeds of that
parcel have not been applied to the payment of the lien; because
the injury done to the last purchaser by the release was the differ-
ence between the value of the property released and what was ac-
tually paid out of its proceeds, or on account of it, upon the lien.
That part of the land still owned by the grantor should be first
subjected to the payment of the loan company's debt, and, if the
proceeds of the last purchaser's lot is not sufl!icient to satisfy that
portion of the loan company's debt chargeable upon it, the next
preceding lot, in order of alienation, is liable, and this lot will also
be chargeable with that portion of the loan company's debt from
which the last purchaser's lot was discharged by the release of the
church lot from the liep of the deed of trust. (Lynchburg Perpetual
etc. Co. V. Fellers, 851.)
3. LIENS — TRUST DEED — SUBSEQUENT PURCHASER —
SUBJECTING LANDS TO PAYMENT OF LIEN— RELEASE OF
PRIMARY SECURITY— GENERAL RULE— EXCEPTION.— Ordi-
narily, when the equities of the various owners of lands subject to
a deed of trust are unequal, so that their respective parcels are
liable, in the inverse order of their alienation, if the deed of trust
creditor, having notice of this situation, releases a parcel which Is
primarily liable, he thereby discharges or releases those parcels
Index. 1005
which are subsequently liable, In the order of their several liabili-
ties, from an amount of the deed of trust debt equal to the value
of the parcel released; but this effect of the release may be obviated
by the conduct of the parties to be affected. Thus, If a whole tract
of land Is covered by a trust deed to secure a debt, and the trust
deed creditor releases the trust deed lien, without notice of the
rights and interests of one who had purchased a parcel of the land
subject to the deed of trust, such purchaser cannot claim the benefit
of the general rule where he had notice of all the facts constituting
the release. (Lynchburg Perpetual etc. Co. v. Fellers, 851.)
4. LIENS — TRUST DEED — SUBSEQUENT PURCHASER —
SUB.TKCTINa L.\NDS TO PAYMENT OF LIEN— ASSUMPTION
OP TRUST DEBT— RESCISSION-BURDEN OF PROOF.— If one
executes to a loan company a deed of trust on the whole of certain
land to secure a loan, and then sells part of the property to a
<"hurch, which assumes the payment of the loan, one who subse-
quently buys another portion of the land must. If he would prevent
It from beluff subjected to the lien of the trust deed, on the ground
that the contract to assume the payment of the trust debt has
been rescinded, assume the burden, of proving that the loan com-
pany assented to the rescission of the contract. (Lynchburg Per-
petual etc. Co. V. Fellers, 851.)
See Corporations, 11, 21, 22; Judgment, 1, 2, 15; Marriage and Di-
vorce, 4.
LIMITATIONS OF ACTIONS.
1. LIMITATIONS OF ACTIONS.— PART PAYMENT OF A
DEBT, In order to take a case out of the statute, must be made
voluntarily by the debtor sought to be charged with the effect of it,
or by some one authorized by him to make a new promise on his
behalf. (Wolford v. Cook, 315.)
2. LIMITATIONS OF ACTIONS— PART PAYMENT— CREDI-
TOR AS AGENT OF DEBTOR.— A creditor cannot be made the
agent of the debtor to such an extent as to make an act done by him
operate as a new promise to himself. (Wolford v. Cook, 315.)
3. LIMIATIONS OF ACTIONS — PART PAYMENT — PRO-
CEEDS OF COLLATERAL SECURITIES.— Where collateral secu-
rity has been given by a debtor to his creditor, under an agreement
that, If necessary, the creditor should sell the collateral and apply
the proceeds on his debt, the subsequent sale of such collateral and
the application of the proceeds on the debt, to which the del)tor
made no objection, will not operate as a part payment at the date
■of the receipt of such proceeds, so as to Interrupt the operation of
the statute of limitations. (Wolford v. Cook, 315.)
4. LIMITATIONS OF ACTIONS— PART PAYMENT— GIVING
ADDITIONAL SECURITY.— If a debtor, in the absence of any
<;ircumstance8 tending to rebut the inference of an implied prom-
ise to pay the whole debt, gives new and additional security for
the payment of the debt, the proceeds of which when collected to
be applied on the debt. It will operate as a part payment sufficient
to take It out of the statute. (Wolford v. Cook. 3ir.)
5. LIMITATIONS OF ACTIONS— PART PAYMENT— PA Y-
TklENT IN GOODS.— It Is not necessary, for the purpose of Inter-
rupting the statute, that the part payment should be in actual
money. A payment in goods may be sufficient for that purpose.
(Wolford V. Cook, 315.)
6. LIMITATIONS OF ACTIONS — WHAT WILL STOP RUN-
NING OF STATUTE.— The statute of limitations ceases to run
1006 Index.
against a claimant whose po <ver to Institute his suit has been taken
away by statute, whether r.uch exception is contained in the act of
limitation or not. (Broadfoot v. Fayetteviile, 610.)
7. LIMITATIONS OF ACTIONS— WHAT WILL STOP RUN-
NING OF STATUTE.— The general rule is, that when the statute of
limitations once begins to run no subsequent happening or event
can obstruct its course. (Broadfoot v. Fayetteviile, 610.)
8. LIMITATIONS OF ACTIONS— COUPONS ATTACHED TO
BONDS.— The statute of limitations which applies to bonds applies
to coupons attached thereto, wnen such coupons are for interest
to become due on the bonds. (Broa-^foot v. Fayetteviile, 610.)
9. LIMITATIONS OF ACTIONS— ABSENCE FKOM STATE-
CORPORATIONS.— A statute providing for the suspension of the
running of the statute of limitations during the absence of a "per-
son" from the state applies to a corporation, and requires such ab-
sence as will prevent service of process. (Turcott v. Railroad, 661.)
10. LIMITATIONS OF ACTIONS — ABSENCE FROM THE
STATE— FOREIGN CORPORATIONS.— A foreign corporation, do-
ing business within a state, and having there agents upon whona
process may be served, is not absent from the state within the mean-
ing of a statute suspending the running of the statute of limita-
tions in favor of a person out of the state, though it has failed to
file and register its charter as required of foreign coi^orations do-
ing business within the state beiore giving them the rights of do-
mestic corporations. (Turcott v. Railroad, 661.)
11. LIMITATIONS OF ACTIONS — MECHANICS' LIENS-EF-
FECT OF SUIT BY SUBCONTRACTOR.— Upon the institution of
a suit by a subcontractor to enforce a mechanic's lien, where the
general contractor is made a party defendant, and the latter's re-
corded lien is set forth in the subcontractor's bill, the statute of
limitations ceases to run, not only as against the complainant's lien,
but as against the lien of the general contractor and of all those
claiming as contractors under him. (Spiller v. Wells, 878.)
See Mortgages, 3, 4.
LOCAL OPTION.
See Constitutions.
MALICE.
See Husband and Wife, 6, 7; Tortl.
MARKET VALUE.
See Damages, 2.
MANDAMUS.
1. MANDAMUS TO COMPEL COUNTY COMMISSIONERS
TO LEVY TAX-CONSTITUTION.-Under a constitutional pro-
vision prohibiting any tax from being levied by any county, city,
or town, except for the necessary expenses thereof, unless by a vote
of the majority of the qualified voters therein, before mandamus
can be Issued to compel the board of commissioners of a county to
levy a tax to pay a judgment against the commissioners, the plaln-
tlCf— judgment creditor— must show affirmatively by the record or
other competent evidence that the consideration of the debt, upon
which the judgment was obtained, was of such a character as to
fall under the head of ordinary or necessary county expenses. (Bear
V. Commissioners, 586.)
Index. 1007
2. MANDAMUS— NATURE— crviL ACTION.-Mandamua is In
the nature of a civil action, and Is commenced by summons, and
the pleadings and the practices are the same as are prescribed for
the conducting of civil actions. (Bear v. Commissioners, 586.)
8. MANDAMUS— NATURE.— Mandamus Is in the nature, both
of an execution and of a clvU action. (Bear v. Commissioners, 586.>
See Municipal Corporations, 13.
MARRIAGE AND DIVORCE.
1. MARRIAGE AND DIVORCE— ALIMONY— SECURITY.— If
there is danger that a divorced husband may dispose of his property
by conveyance or squander it, so that nothing will remain upon
which the decree of divorce providing for alimony or the support
of minor children can operate, the court may require him to fur-
nish security for its performance. (Murphy v. Moyle, 767.)
2. MARRIAGE AND DIVORCE— ALIMONY AFTER DEATH
OP HUSBAND.— Whether a divorced wife and minor children, or
any of them, are entitled to have the payment of alimony or money
for their support continue after the death of the divorced husband
depends on the nature and terms of the decree of divorce. (Murphy
V. Moyle, 767.)
3. MARRIAGE AND DIVORCE— ALIMONY AFTER DEATH
OP HUSBAND.— A decree In a divorce suit granting an absolute
divorce and providing that the mother shall have the care and cus-
tody of the minor children, and the father shall pay a certain sum
monthly toward their support during their minority, is not dis-
charged nor annulled by the death of the father. Its performance-
may be enforced thereafter out of his estate. (Murphy v. Moyle,
767.)
4. MARRIAGE AND DIVORCE— ALIMONY— SECURITY— EX-
FORCEMENT OF LIEN.— If a court, in granting an absolute di-
vorce, decrees that a husband shall pay a certain sum per month
toward the support of his minor children, and makes such obliga-
tion a lien upon part of his property, it may foreclose the lien upoii)
failure of payment, and its power to do this is not affected by the
death of the father; and if the proceeds are Insufficient to satisfy
the claim, it may enforce payment of the balance out of the estate.
(Murphy v. Moyle, 767.)
5. MARRIAGE AND DIVORCE — PROCEEDINGS FOR DI-
VORCE ARE JUDICIAL IN THEIR NATURE, and should be had
in courts of justice under constitutions conferring Judicial power
on those tribunals. A divorce cannot be granted lawfully except
for sufficient cause, upon proof and with notice to, or the appear-
ance of, the party complained of. (In re Christensen, 7M.)
6. MARRIAGE AND DIVORCE— WANT OP JURISDICTION.
A decree of divorce granted without jurisdiction of the subject mat-
ter or of the person, without cause stated and without proof, I»-
absolutely void. (In re Christensen, 794.)
MASTER AND SERVANT.
1. MASTER AND SERVANT— ELECTRIC LIGHT COMPA-
NIES—DUTY TO LINEMEN.— An electric light company does not
owe to a lineman, whose business It is to work upon poles on which
the company's wires are suspended, the duty to Insiwct Its poIe»
below the surface of the ground to ascertain whether they are de-
cayed, and to Inform him of that fact if such Is found to be the
case. (Mclsaac v. Northampton Elec. L. Co., 244.)
1008 Index.
2. MASTER AND SERVANT— ELECTRIC LIGHT COMPA-
NIES AND LINEMBX— ASSUMPTION OP RISKS— POLES.—
When a lineman enters the service of an electric light company for
the purpose of working upon poles on which the company's wires
are suspended, he assumes the risk that a pole of uncertain age
may break and fall when a lineman is working upon it, if he does
not take measures to ascertain its condition before going upon it.
(Mclsaac v. Northampton Elec. L. Co., 244.)
3. MASTER AND SERVANT — DUTY OF MASTER — SAFE
APPLIANCES.— The duty to furnish proper and safe appliances is
that of the common master, and injury caused by their absence
<jannot be attributed to the negligence of a fellow-servant. (Troxler
V. Southern Ry. Co., 5S0.)
4. MASTER AND SERVANT— CONTINUING NEGLIGENCE
OF MASTER-CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE OF SERVANT.—
Where the negligence of the defendant is a continuing negligence,
there can be no contributory negligence which will discharge the
master's liability. (Troxler v. Southern Ry. Co., 580.)
5. MASTER AND SERVANT— NEGLIGENCE PER SE— FAIL-
URE TO USE SAFE APPLIANCES IN GENERAL USE.— When
safer appliances have been invented, tested, and have come into
general use, it is negligence per se for the master to expose his
servant to the hazard of life or limb from antiquated and defective
appliances which have been generally discarded by the intelligence
and humanity of other employers. (Troxler v. Southern Ry. Co., 580.)
6. MASTER AND SERVANT— ASSUMPTION OF RISK.— Dan-
ger from a bank or wall of earth falling is one open to common ob-
servation, and a servant engaged in excavating a ditch who, know-
ing that he is exposed to such danger, continues to work, assumes
the risks and is not entitled to recover for injuries sustained.
<Brown v. Electric Ry. Co., 6G6.)
7. MASTER AND SERVANT— DANGEROUS EMPLOYMENT-
DUTY OF MASTER— DELEGATION OF DUTY.— When an em-
ployment is in its nature perilous, it Is the duty of the master to
provide reasonable and necessary precautions and safeguards
against such perils, and no delegation of that duty can relieve him
from responsibility for failure to perform it. (Portance v. Lehigh
Val. Coal Co., 932.)
8. MASTER AND SERVANT— DUTY OF MASTER TO SER-
VANT.—Tlie duty of a master to his servant Is to provide him rea-
sonably safe and proper tools, Implements, and apparatus with
which to work, reasonably competent and careful coemploy6s, and
ti reasonably safe place to work. (Portance v. Lehigh Val. Coal Co.,
932.)
9. MASTER AND SERVANT-FELLOW-SERVANTS.— In un-
loading coal from a vessel, servants engaged in the common under-
taking, under common direction and command, with no right of con-
trol one over the other, as the scraper-man, whose duty It Is to start
the machinery, the hatch-man, whose duty It Is to signal the start-
ing of machinery by the scraper-man, and to give warning to ser-
vants in the hold of the vessel, and other servants engaged in the
common undertaking, are fellow-servants. (Portance v. Lehigh Val.
■Coal Co.. 932.)
10. MASTER AND SERVANT— PRECAUTIONARY REGULA-
TIONS—ASSUMPTION OF RISK.— A servant of ten years' experi-
•ence In the unloading of coal from vessels, who has worked In a par-
ticular employment of that kln<-|. where all the conditions are the
usual ones, for several months, will be held to have assumed any
Ijjdkx. 1009
risk arising from a lack of precautionary regulations prescribed by
his master, (Portauce v. Leliigh Val. Coal Co., 932.)
11. MASTER AND SERVANT— WARNING OF STARTING OP
MACHINERY— NEGLIGENCE OF FELLOW-SERVANT.— In en-
tering upon an employment a servant assumes the risk of the negli-
gence of fellow-servants, and if the master properly selects such a
fellow-servant to give warning of the starting of machinery, and in-
structs him for that purpose, he is not responsible for the negligence
of such servant in the performance of such duty, resulting in injury
to a coemployS. (Portance v. Lehigh Val. Coal Co., 932.)
See Railroad Companies, 13, 14, 25-27.
MECHANIC'S LIEN.
1. MECHANICS' LIENS— FLATS AS ONE BUILDING.— Flats
built on adjacent lots belonging to the same owner are one build-
ing, for the purpose of a mechanic's lien, although the division wall
rises above the roof, and there are separate entrances, if they are
erected as one structure, under one contract, at the same time,
heated with one furnace, and a porch extends across the entire rear
of the structure with one continuous and unbroken roof. (Bastrup
V. Prendergast, 128.)
2. MECHANICS' LIENS — WANT OF DESCRIPTION OP
PROPERTY IN CONTRACT.— The mere omission of a description
or designation of the property in a building contract cannot defeat
a mechanic's lien otherwise established when the notice, or claim of
lien, filed for record properly describes the property, and all of the
Interested parties understood what property was referred to In the
contract, and the material was furnished and the building erected
upon that understanding. (Bastrup v. Prendergast, 128.)
3. MECHANICS' LIENS— ESTOPPEL AGAINST WIFE.— If a
wife, with knowledge that her husband has made false representa-
tions as to the ownership of property and has contracted in his
own name for the erection of buildings thereon, assists in procur-
ing the work to be done under the contracts, without disclosing to
the contractor her title to the property, which is of record, she is
estopped to assert her title for the purpose of defeating a mechan-
ic's lien arising out of such contract. (Bastrup v. Prendergast, 128.)
4. MECHANICS' LIENS— ESSENTIAL AVERMENTS OMIT-
TED from the notice of a mechanic's lien cannot, in an action to
foreclose the lien, be supplied by averments In the complaint or by
extrinsic evidence. (Morrison v. WiUard, 784.)
5. MECHANICS' LIEN — NOTICE — SUFFICIENCY OF. — A
notice of mechanic's lien which fails to show that the material was
furnished for the construction of the building in question, or that
any portion of the material was used in the construction, or pur-
chased for the purpose of constructing the building referred to in
the notice of lien, and which also fails to show the terms, time
given, and conditions of the contract, and which contains no state-
ment, except inferentially, as to what the contract was, how much
lumber was purchased, what price was agreed to be paid for it,
whether it was purchased or delivered for the purpose of construct-
ing the building in question, or whether it was ever used therein,
is insufficient and void. (Morrison v. Willard, 784.)
6. MECHANICS' LIENS — NOTICE — ESSENTIALS OP. — A
notice of mechanic's lien must contain and set out, as far as the
claimant is able to ascertain and disclose it, the contract between
the owner and contractor, so that the price, terms, and conditions
AM. St. E«p., Vou LXX.-04
1010 Index.
of tlie contract may be known as affecting the rights and interests
of the subcontractor and others interested. Otherwise, the notice
is insufficient and void. (Morrison v. Willard, 784.)
7. MECHANICS' LIENS — SUIT BY SUBCONTRACTOB TO
ENFORCE— PRECEDENCE WHERE DIFFERENT COURTS
HAVE CONCURRENT JURISDICTION.— If a subcontractor insti-
tutes a suit in chancery to enforce a mechanic's lien, and malces
the general contractor a party defendant, setting forth the latter's
recorded lien in his bill, that court, notwithstanding the concur-
rent jurisdiction of another court, acquires jurisdiction, and should
determine the rights of the parties. It is not incumbent on the
general contractor to institute a separate suit in order to enforce
his lien, as his rights, as well as those claiming under him as sub-
contractors, may be fully protected in the first suit (Spiller v.
Wells, 87a)
See Limitations of Actions, 11.
MISTAKE.
See Vendor and Purchaser, 8.
MORTGAGES.
1. MORTGAGES — FORECLOSURE — REDEMPTION— LACH-
ES.— An equitable right to redeem from a foreclosure sale may be
lost by laches unless asserted within a reasonable time, and before
the situation of the parties has changed, and the rights of others
have intervened, or improvements have been made. (Wallier v.
Warner, 85.)
2. MORTGAGES — FORECLOSURE — REDEMPTION— LACH-
ES.— Whether an equitable right to redeem from a foreclosure sale
has been lost by laches must be determined with reference to the
date of the amended petition praying redemption, when the original
petition seeks to establish a fee simple title in the complainant.
(Walker v. Warner, 85.)
3. MORTGAGES— PAYMENTS— LIMITATIONS.— The effect of
payments upon a mortgage debt must be determined by the stat-
ute in force at the time they were made, with reference to the toll-
ing of the statute of limitations, although the mortgage was exe-
cuted prior to such time. (Walker v. Warner, 85.)
4. MORTGAGES — FORECLOSURE — REDEMPTION— LACH-
ES — LIMITATIONS. — In determining whether there has been
laches in exercising a right of redemption from a mortgage fore-
closure, a court of equity is not necessarily controlled by the per-
iod of limitations as fixed in actions at law. A delay for a much
less time than that prescribed by the statute of limitations may,
according to the circumstances of the case, be held to be laches,
and a bar to the right of redemption. (Walker v. Warner, 85.)
5. MORTGAGES — FORECLOSURE — REDEMPTION BY
GRANTEE OF MORTGAGOR.— By foreclosure of a mortgage, sale
of the premises, and master's deed thereunder, the legal title be-
comes vested in the grantee, leaving nothing Ln the mortgagor or
his grantee to whom he has conveyed before the commencement
of the foreclosure proceeding, but to which the latter is not made
a party, except the right of redemption, which must be asserted Id
a court of equity. (Walker v. Warner, 85.)
6. MORTGAGES — FORECLOSURE — REDEMPTION— LACH-
ES. — An equity of redemption from a mortgage foreclosure
cannot be enforced when all parties have supposed that the fore-
Index. 1011
■closure was good, and the bolder of the equity of redemption has
abandoned the premises and all claim to them, never paying any
taxes or offering to redeem, until after a series of years, when the
pix)perty had passed through many hands and had become valuable.
(Walker v. Warner, 85.)
7. MORTGAGES-DEPOSIT OF TITLE DEEDS.— A mortgage
Attempted to be made by the deposit of title deeds cannot be en-
forced, although the loan secured by such deposit has been actually
received by the depositor. (Bloomfield State Bank v. Miller, 381.)
8. MORTGAGES— DEPOSIT OF TITLE DEEDS.— A mortgage
cannot be created by the deposit of title deeds without a writing, as
such mortgage is contrary to the statute of frauds and the record-
ing acts. (Bloomfield State Bank v. Miller, 381.)
9. MORTGAGE GIVEN WITHOUT CONSIDERATION TO DE-
FRAUD CREDITORS— RIGHTS OF ASSIGNEE.— Where a mort-
gage is given without consideration, to defraud creditors, the
^ishoiTest mortgagor is equitably estopped from claiming that there
was no consideration for the mortgage, as against a purchaser in
good faith, for value, and without notice. (MofCett v. Parker, 319.)
10. MORTGAGES — USURY — GRANTEE ASSUMING MORT-
GAGE—ESTOi'PEL.— A vendee who accepts a conveyance of land
subject to a mortgage thereon, and containing a covenant wiieieby
such vendee assumes and agrees to pay said mortgage, is estopped
from asserting that the obligation secured thereby is usurious.
(Scanlan v. Grimmer, 326.)
11. MORTGAGES— RIGHTS OF ASSIGNEE— EQUITIES OF
THIRD PARTIES.— A mortgage has none of the privileges of ne-
gotiable paper, but is a mere chose in action. Hence, an assignee
thereof takes it subject to any defense that exists between the origi-
nal parties, unless they are equitably estopped by their acts, or
otherwise, from asserting it as against the assignee; but the as-
signee does not take it subject to any equities of third parties of
which he has no notice. (Moffett v. Parker, 319.)
12. MORTGAGES — DEFENSE AGAINST MORTGAGEE. — A
mortgagor in a real estate mortgage, given without consideration
to defraud creditors, may enjoin Its foreclosure by the mortgagee.
^MofCett V. Parker. 319.)
MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS.
1. MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS— ENFORCEMENT OF VAC-
CINATION ORDINANCE— LIABILITY FOR DAMAGES.— A mu-
nicipal corporation Is not liable to a citizen who may sustain dam-
age on account of impure vaccine matter administered to him by the
officer or agent of such corporation in the enforcement of an ordi-
nance requiring citizens of the city to submit to vaccination.
<Wyatt v. Rome, 41.)
2. MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS ARE NOT LIABLE FOR
THE NEGLIGENCE OF ITS OFFICERS or agents In executing
sanitary regulations adopted for the purpose of preventing the
spread of contagious disease. (Wyatt v. Rome, 41.)
3. MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS — SDWER CONTRACT -
POWER OF CITY COUNCIL TO WAIVE COMPLIANCE WITH.
If the charter of a city does not make all details in the construc-
tion of sewers the basis of the consent of property owners, but
leaves such details to the common council, that body has power to
waive the performance of any of the requirements of a sewer con-
tract Hence, after part of the work under a sewer contract has
1012 Index.
been done, but not in conformity with the contract, the commott
council may, before the completion of the work, so modify the con-
tract as to malie it conform with the worli already done, leaving-
the remaining portion of the work to be constructed according to
the terms of the original contract, without modification. (Weston
V. Syracuse, 472.)
4. MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS — SEWER CONTRACT —
WHAT ACT IS ADMINISTRATIVE AND NOT LEGISLATIVE-
POWER OF COURTS.— If a contract for the construction of a
- sewer is modified by a city council, by resolution, the action taken
by such resolution is not a legislative act, but an administrative
one, and is not free from direct review or collateral attack in the
courts. (Weston v. Syracuse, 472.)
5. MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS — SEWER CONTRACT —
CERTIFICATE OF CITY ENGINEER— SUFFICIENCY OF.— If
part of the work under a sewer contract has been done, but not iu
conformity with the specifications, and the city council passes a
resolution modifying the contract so as to make it conform to the
work already done, a requirement in the contract that the con-
tractor shall obtain the city engineer's certificate of compliance
with the contract as a prerequisite to payment, is satisfied by a
certificate that the work done before the resolution complies with
the contract as modified, while the remainder complies with It, as
unmodified. (Weston v. Syracuse, 472.)
6. MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS — DEFENSE TO CON-
TRACTOR'S SUIT— WHAT MAY BE INTERPOSED.— That which
a taxpayer can accomplish for the protection of a city, by a suit
xmder the "taxpayer's act," the officers of the city, whose duty it
is to protect its property from waste and injury, may bring about
by a defense to an action brought by a contractor to recover on a
contract for the construction of a sewer, or other local inprovement.
(Weston V. Syracuse, 472.)
7. ESTOPPEL AGAINST CITY— SEWER CONTRACT— BRIB-
ERY—KNOWLEDGE OF OFFICERS.— A city is not estopped by
the conduct of its officers from denying the validity of a resolu-.
lion passed by the city council, modifying a contract for the con-
struction of a sewer, alleged to have been brought about by bribery,
where it does not appear that the ofllcers of the city knew of the
alleged bribery at the time of the several acts which the plaintiff
relies upon to create an estoppel. (Weston v. Syracuse, 472.)
8. MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS — SEWER CONTRACT —
RESOLUTION MODIFYING IS VITIATED BY FRAUD AND
CORRUPTION— INVALIDITY OF, AS A DEFENSE.- A resolution
passed by a city council, modifying a contract for the construc-
tion of a sewer can, if adopted by means of fraud and corruption,
be declared of no effect by the courts; and the invalidity of the
resolution Is a good defense, on the part of the city, to an action
brought by the contractor, especially if he was a guilty participant
In the fraud. (Weston v. Syracuse. 472.)
9. MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS — SEWER CONTRACT —
CONTRACTOR'S RIGHT OP ACTION FOR BREACH OF.— If a
city contracts for the construction of a sewer, or other local Im-
provement, provision being made In the contract that no payment
shall be made until the cost has been collected by a special assess-
ment, and the work is done according to the contract as originally
executed, or as lawfully modified, the contractor is entitled to main-
tain an action against the city for breach of contract where the
latter ignores the plaintiff's rights in the premises, not only by re-
Index. 1013
fusing to make the assessment, but by repudiating the contract,
and entering into an agreement with others for reconstructing a
portion of the sewer. (Weston v. Syracuse, 472.)
10. MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS — SEWER CONTRACT
WITH— REMEDIES TO ENFORCE PAYMENT.— If a city con-
tracts for the construction of a sewer, or other local Improvement,
and the only way provided for payment Is through a special as-
sessment. It Is the duty of the city to collect the assessment and
turn over the proceeds to the contractor; and, if it does not pro-
ceed with reasonable diligence to do so, he may and should pro-
ceed by mandamus to compel such action on its part; but. If the
city disables itself from performing the contract by some act which
renders the assessment void and uncollectible, or if it refuses to
perform the contract, then the contractor's remedy against the city
Is by action for breach of the contract. (Weston v. Syracuse, 472.)
11. MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS — ORDINANCES — DEAL-
ING IN OLD RAGS.— A city ordiuance which forbids the business of
collecting, storing, and dealing in old rags, old papers, or other such
refuse material, within the thiclily settled portions of the city, ex-
cept when conducted by licensed persons, is reasonable and valid..'
(Commonwealth v. Hubley, 242.)
12. MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS — NEGLIGENCE — WORK
DONE FOR PRIVATE CORPORATE BENEFIT.— Where a city,
having been empowered to improve its streets and assess the cost
of improvements to abutting owners, owns and operates a steam
roller and retains compensation for rolling streets when macadam-
ized, its liability for injuries resuting from fire started through the
negligent operation of the roller Is similar to that of an Individual
engaged In doing the same worlt. It cannot escape such liability by
pleading that the worli was done for the public benefit (McMahon .
T. Dubuque, 143.) (
13. MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS— TAXATION— MANDAMUS
TO COMPEL.— Where statutes have been passed, abrogating or re-
stricting the power of taxation delegated to a municipality upon the
faith of which contracts were made with her, and upon the continu-
ance of Mhich alone they can be enforced, a party interested may
by mandamus compel the exercise of that power as if no legislation
had ever been attempted. (Broadfoot v. Fayetteville, 610.)
14. MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS— BONDS— POWER TO TAX
FOR PAYMENT OF.— Where the resource for the payment of the
bonds of a municipal corporation is the power of taxation existing
when the bonds were Issued, any law which withdraws or limits the
taxing power and leaves no adequate means for the payment of the
bonds, is forbidden by the constitution of the United States, and Is
null and void. (Broadfoot v. Fayetteville, 610.)
15. MUNICIPAL CORPORATION — BONDS — PAYMENT BY
NEW CORPORATION— STATUTE PROHIBITING.— Where a mu-
nicipal corporation has Issued bonds, and before their payment its
charter has been repealed and a new corporation formed, a statute
which prohibits the levying of taxes for the payment of the bonds
by the new corporation Is invalid and cannot be regarded. (Broad-
foot v. Fayetteville, GIO.)
16. MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS— REMEDIES OF CRED-
ITORS—POWER OF LEGISLATURE.— The remedies of a creditor
for the enforcement of his debt assumed by a municipal corpora-
tion, which existed when the contract was made, must be left unim-
paired by the legislature; or. If they are changed, a substantial
«auivalent must be provided. (Broadfoot v. Fayetteville, 610.)
1014 Index.
17. MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS— REPEAL OF CHARTER-
EFFECT ON DEBTS.— Debts due from a municipal corporation are
not extinguished by tlie repeal of its charter, and still exist not-
withstanding that repeal. (Broadfoot v. Fayetteville, 610.)
18. MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS — LIABILITY OF NEW
CORPORATION FOR DEBTS OF OLD.— When the old charter of a
municipal corporation is repealed and a new one is granted, upon
which latter are bestowed by law all the benefits and property of
the old, the burden of the old must be borne by the new; where the
benefits are taken, the burdens are assumed. (Broadfoot v. Fayette-
ville, 610.)
19. MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS— WHEN A NEW CORPO-
RATION IS THE SUCCESSOR OF AN OLD ONE.— Where the old
charter of a municipal corporation has been repealed, and a new
one, creating a new corporation, has been granted, the new cor-
poration, embracing the same territory, the same inhabitants and
the same taxable property, Is considered as the successor of the old.
(Broadfoot v. Fayetteville, 610.)
20. MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS— LIABILITY OF SUCCES-
SOR OF OLD CORPORATION— CONSIDERATION.— The founda-
tion on which the liability of a new municipal corporation for the
debts of the old rests, is that the new corporation embraces the
same territory, the same corporators, the same taxable property^
and has received the property of the old corporation without con-
sideration; and for these benefits must. In return, bear the bur-
dens of the old corporation. (Broadfoot v. Fayetteville, 610.)
21. MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS— CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
—STATUTES PROHIBITING PAYMENT OF DEBTS OF OLD
CORPORATION. — A statute expressly prohibiting a municipal cor-
poration from assuming the debts of its predecessor, or from pay-
ing any part of them, is unconstitutional. (Broadfoot v. Fayette-
ville, 610.)
22. MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS— PUBLIC AND CORPOR-
ATE DUTIES— LIABILITY ARISING FROM PERFORMANCE.—
While a municipal corporation sustains no liability to one suffering
injury from the negligent or imperfect exercise of its legislative or
governmental powers, the contrary is true as respects the perform-
ance and execution of mere corporate duties. As respects such mat-
ters, the rule of respondeat superior applies, and the city will be-
come liable for the act of Its servants and agents which it bas-
authorlzed or adopted. (Hollman v. PlattevlUe, 899.)
— See Cemeteries, 2.
MURDER,
See Homicide.
NAMES.
1. NAMES, CONTRACT UNDER ASSUMED-IDENTITY.- A
person, not engaged in a fraudulent or criminal pui-pose, may enter
into a contract under any name he may choose to assume. All that
the law looks to is the Identity of the Individual, and when that
is established the act will be binding upon him and upon others.
(Scanlan v. Grimmer, 320.)
2. NAMES, CONTRACT UNDER ASSUMED-KNOWLEDGB
OF OTHER PARTY.— A contract entered Into under an assumed
name is binding, even though the other parties thereto were in-
Index. * 1016
duccd to believe that the assumed name was the person's real name,
and though such parties were opposed to entering Into a transac-
tion with the person himself. (Scanlan v. Grimmer, 326.)
NEGLIGENCE.
1. NEGLIGENCE.— ALTHOUGH A PERSON IS BOUND TO
USB ORDINARY CARE to protect himself against the known dan-
gers of his situation, he need not exercise care to protect himself
against an intentional Injury by another of which he has no no-
tice. (Illinois Central R. R. Co. v. King, 93.)
2. NEGLIGENCE— TRUCKMEN— MOVING OF HEAVY MA-
CHINERY—COMMON CARRIERS.— It Is not material, In any action
against truckmen to recover damages for injuries to heavy ma-
chinery, which they have been employed to transport, whether the
defendants are answerable as common carriers, where the case la
tried and submitted to the jury, not upon the theory that the de-
fendants are liable as insurers of the safety of the property, but
upon the theory that they were negligent In unloading the machine,
and thus caused the Injuries. It was not, therefore, prejudicial to
the defendants for the trial court to refuse to charge that they were
not common carriers. (Jackson etc. Works v. Hurlbut, 432.)
3. NEGLIGENCE— TRUCKMEN— MOVING OF HEAVY MA-
CHINERY—LIABILITY.— If truckmen are employed to transport a
large and heavy planing machine, used for planing Iron, they must
use, at least, ordinary diligence and care, and are answerable if
they negligently break and seriously Injure the machine while un-
loading it. (Jackson etc. Works v. Hurlbut, 432.)
4. COMPARATIVE NEGLIGENCE.- The doctrine of compara-
tive negligence has never been recognized In Minnesota. (Fonda v.
St. Paul City Ry. Co., 341.)
6. NEGLIGENCE— STANDARD OF DUTY.— A person cannot,
by the adoption of private rules, fix the standard of his duty to
others. (Fonda v. St. Paul City Ry. Co., 341.)
6. CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE— POWER OF DEFEND-
ANT TO AVOID CONSEQUENCES OF PLAINTIFF'S NEGLI-
GENCE.—The doctrine that a plaintiff may recover If the defend-
ant might, by the exercise of care, have avoided the consequences
of the plaintiff's negligence. Is only applicable to cases in which the
plaintiff's negligence preceded that of the defendant. But when
the negligence of the two persons is contemporaneous, and the fault
of each operates directly to cause the injury, neither can recover
from the other. (Fonda v. St. Paul City Ry. Co., 341.)
7. CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE— WILLFUL ACT OF DB-
FENDANT.— Where the defendant's acts are willful and Inten-
tional, the negligence of the plaintiff, if any. Is no longer deemed
In law a proximate cause of the Injury. (Fonda v. St. Paul City Ry.
Co., 341.
8. NEGLIGENCE— ACTION FOR DEATH OF HUSBAND-
RELEASE BY HUSBAND.— A settlement and adjustment of a claim
for pex'sonal injuries made by a deceased huslmnd in his lifetime
bars an action by his widow for his death resulting from such In-
juries. (Brown v. Electric Ry. Co., 666.)
See Animals; Banks and Banking, 2, 3; Damages, 4; Innkeepers,
1. 2; Landlord and Tenant, 1. 5; Master and Servant. 4, 5, 11;
Municipal Corporations, 2; Railroad Companies, 11. 19, 20, 22,
27; Telegraph Companies, 4, 5, 6; Waterworks and Water Com-
panies, 5.
1016 • Index.
NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS.
1. NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS— NOTICE THAT NOTES
ARE HELD AS COLLATERAL.— The mere fact that negotiable
notes indorsed in blank by the payee are overdue is not sufficient to
charge a bank advancing money thereon to the holder with con-
structive notice that the notes are held merely as collateral security.
(Young Men's C. A. etc. Co. v. Rockford Nat. Bank, 135.)
2. NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS — PURCHASE OF OVER-
DUE NOTES INDORSED IN BLANK— PROTECTION AGAINST
THIRD PARTIES.— A bank advancing money to the holder of
overdue negotiable notes indorsed in blank by the payee without
notice that they are held as collateral security is protected against
latent equities in third parties. (Young Men's C. A. etc. Co. v.
Rockford Nat. Bank, 135.)
3. NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS— WHAT WORDS DO NOT
BIND ONE AS AN INDORSER.— The words, "Estate of Jona. D.
Wheeler, Henry P. Wing, Executor," Indorsed on a promissory note,
mean "Estate of Wheeler by Wing," and do not bind Wing by con-
tract. Wing's estate is not, therefore, liable upon such an indorse'
ment. (Grafton Nat. Bank v. Wing, 303.)
4. NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS — INDORSEMENT — EVI-
DENCE.—If commercial paper is indorsed in blank, parol evidence
Is admissible to show that the terms of the agreement between the
parties are other and different from those which arise by presump-
of law. (United States Nat. Bank v. Geer, 390.)
5. NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS — INDORSEMENT — EVI-
DENCE.—A certificate of deposit indorsed for collection for the
account of the indorser is a restrictive indorsement which vests no
general property in the paper in the indorsee, but makes him merely
a collection agent; and parol evidence is not admissible to show that
the transfer of the title was intended to be absolute. (United States
Nat. Bank v. Geer. 390.)
a. NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS — INDORSEMENT — EVI-
DENCE.—A restrictive indorsement to commercial paper unam-
biguous in its terms, cannot be contradicted or explained by parol
evidence. (United States Nat. Bank v. Geer, 390.)
7. NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS — RELATION OP IN-
DORSER AND HOLDER.— The relation of an indorser and a holder
of negotiable paper is analogous to that of a principal and surety.
(Mercantile Nat. Bank v. Macfarlane, 352.)
See Contracts, 6, 7; Evidence, 5-7; Executors and Administrators;
Insolvency, 4, 5.
NONSUIT.
See Appeal, 16.
NOTARIES PUBLIC.
NOTARIES PUBLIC— OPFICIAL SEAL.— A notary public Is
required to attach his official seal to his official acts, and his certifi-
cate, unauthenticated by the impression of such seal, Is void. (Wel-
ton v. Atkinson. 416.)
See Banks and Banking.
Index. 1017
NOTICE
See Corporations, 20, 28, 33; Cotenancy, 1; Deeds, 5; Eminent Do-
main, 5; Insane Persons, 1; Liens, 1; Mechanic's Lien, 5, 6;
Negotiable Instruments, 1; Telegraph Companies, 1; Vendor
and Purchaser, 3, 5.
NUISANCE.
See Railroad Companies, 24.
OCCUPANCY.
See Homestead, 4.
ORIGINAL PACKAGE.
See Interstate Commerce, 3, 4.
PARENT AND CHILD.
See Descent; Husband and Wife, 5-7; Wills, B.
PARTIES.
See Guardian and Ward, 3; Negotiable Instruments, 4,
PAYMENT.
PAYMENT-EFFECT OP PRESCRIBING WAY OF.— If a
■way of payment Is prescribed by statute, or by contract, that way
must be strictly pursued. (Weston v. Syracuse, 472.)
See Deeds, 1; Insurance, 12-14; Judgment, 1, 2; Limitations of Ac-
tions, 1-5; Mortgages, 3.
PERCOLATING WATERS.
See Waters and Watercourses, 1-8.
PERJURY.
See Judgment, 4.
PHYSICIANS AND SURGEONS.
See Witnesses, 15.
PLEADING.
PLEADING— BILL IN EQUITY.— MULTIFARIOUSNESS
does not arise from the presentation of different views of the same
collocation of facts, but it must be two distinct collocations of dis-
tinct and different facts, each collocation presenting different rights.
And calling for different relief. Hence, a bill is not multifarious
because a party states his case in the alternative. (Snyder v. Grand-
staff, 863.^
See Contracts, 8; Elevators; Equity, 4, 6, 8; Estoppel, 2, 8.
POLICE POWER.
1. POLICE POWER— PROTECTION OF PUBLIC HEALTH-
DEALING IN OLD RAGS.— As the business of collecting, storing,
and dealing in old rags, old papers, and like material, may be dan-
gerous to the health of the community, it is proper that trust-
worthy persons only should be permitted to carry It on. When the
interests of individuals conflict with the rights of the public, the
individual interest must yield to the paramount right (Common-
wealth V. Hubley, 242.)
1018 Index.
2. FOODS— ADULTERATION OF.— An indictment charging the
manufacture and offer for sale of an adulterated article of food
must allege the article with which it is adulterated, under a statute
which malies any article of food criminally adulterated "if any sub-
stance or substances has or have been mixed with it so as to reduce
or lower or injuriously affect its quality or strength, or if any in-
ferior or cheaper substance or substances have been substituted
wholly or in part for the article." (Dorsey v. State, 762.)
3. FOODS— ADULTERATION OF— POWER TO REGULATE.—
A statute providing that, if certain named wholesome and nutritious
articles of food are mixed or intermingled, the product must be la-
beled, showing the component elements thereof, and punishing a
failure to so label, is valid, but a statute which embraces all arti-
cles of food or drink, without naming any, and makes the mixture
of any articles of food, however nutritious, without labeling the
product, an offense, is too .ceneral in its terms and cannot be en-
forced. (Dorsey v. State, 762.)
4. FOODS— ADULTERATION OF— POWER TO PROHIBIT.—
Under the police power of the state, the legislature may legally pass
an act stating in distinct terms, as to any article of food or drink,
that if any person shall adulterate such article, naming it, with
any other substance, without labeling it, he shall be guilty of an
offense; but it is not competent to make criminal the mixing or
mingling of articles of food which are wholesome and nutritious
and absolutely prohibit the sale thereof. (Dorsey v. State, 762.)
5. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW — POLICE POWER — KEEPING
INTOXICATING LIQUORS.— The keeping of liquors in his posses-
sion by a person whether for himself or another, unless he does sa
for the illegal sale thereof, or for some other improper purpose,
cannot injure or affect the health, morals, or safety of the public.
Hence a statute prohibiting such keepiug in possession is not a
legitimate exercise of the police power, but it is an abridgement
of the privileges and immunities of the citizen, without any legal
justification, and therefore void. (Ex parte Brown, 743.)
6. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW— POLICE REGULATIONS.— The
state may interfere under Its police power to prohibit the keeping
of property injurious to the lives, health, and comfort of all per-
sons, but It Is not authorized, under the guise of a police regulation,
to Invade the fundamental privileges and interfere with the full
enjoyment by the citizen of his recognized property rights, and if a
statute purporting to have been enacted to protect the public health,
the public morals, or the public safety has no real or substantial re-
lation to those subjects, It Is the duty of the courts to so adjudge.
(Ex parte Brown, 743.)
7. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW — POLICE POWER — INTOXI-
CATING LIQUORS.— An attempt by the legislature to make the
keeping of liquor by one citizen for another in a local option terri-
tory, whether in a house, tent, or anywhere else, and whether for
a consideration or without, a crime, or an attempt on the part of
the legislature to make it criminal for a person who may be the
owner or proprietor of any building, in local option territory, to
solicit or take and order for another person for Intoxicating liquors,
to be sent or delivered to the proprietor or owner of such house for
the person giving such order, is without authority of law, as viola-
tive of the citizen's fundamental right to use his own property a&
he pleases, not Injuring another person, and it is not competent for
the legislature, under its power of police regulation, to Impair the
legal ownership and holding of one's property, either by himself
or by another person. (Ex parte Brown, 743.)
Index. 1019
8. police poweit-regulation by states of inter-
STATE COMMERCE.— Every state has the right under Its re-
served police power to prohibit the importation and sale of all ar-
ticles inherently unworthy of commerce and unfit for the use of
Its people, and, In the absence of congressional action to the con-
trary, the determination by a state legislature that an article of
doubtful commercial quality is not a legitimate article of commerce.
Is conclusive. (Austin v. State, 703.)
9. POLICE POWER — MANUFACTURE AND SALE OF
CIGARETTES.— A state statute prohibiting the sale of cigarette*
manufactured within the state, is valid as an Internal police regu-
lation. (Austin V. State, 703.)
PRELIMINARY EXAMINATION.
See Criminal Law. 3-7, 10.
PRESCRIPTION.
See Waters and Watercourses, 2.
PRESUMPTION.
PRESUMPTION — SUPPRESSION OF EVIDENCE. — The
presumption arising from the spoliation or suppression of evidence-
that it would, if produced, be unfavorable to the party destroying:
or suppressing it, is not limited to the case of documentary evi-
dence is the exclusive possession and control of the party. (Fonda
V. St. Paul City Ry. Co., 341.)
See Burden of Proof; Corporations, 29, 34; Courts; Evidence, 4;
Homicide, 9; Judgment, 6; Rape, 4; Statutes, 21; Vendor and
Purchaser, 2; Witnesses, 6.
PRIVATE WAYS.
See Cotenancy, 5.
PROCEDURE.
See Statutes, 2.
PROCESS.
See Jurisdiction, 2.
BAILROAD COMPANIES.
1. RAILROAD COMPANIES— DUTY TO TRESPASSERS.— A
person stealing a ride on a railroad train is a trespasser and gain*
no rights; but It is the duty of the railroad company and its em-
ployes not to injure him willfully or intentionally. (Illinois Central
R. R. Co. V. King, 93.)
2. RAILROAD COMPANIES — DUTY TO TRESPASSERS —
LIABILITY FOR ACT OP BRAKEMAN.— A railroad company 1»
liable for the willful act of its brakeman within the scope of his
authority in putting a trespasser off Its train. (Illinois Central R. R.
Co. V. King, 93.)
3. RAILROAD COMPANIES— DUTY TO TRESPASSERS— EVI-
DENCE OF WILLFULNESS.— Evidence that a brakeman pulled a
person who was stealing a ride on a railroad train from under thfr
train while It was in motion, and manifested his feeling and will-
ingness to Inflict needless injury by cursing him and throwing a
1020 Index.
stone at him, is evidence that the act of the brakeman was willful.
<Illinois Central R. R. Co. v. King, 93.)
4. RAILROAD COMPANIES — LIABILITY FOR WILLFUL.
INJURY TO TRESPASSER.— The negligence of a trespasser in talk-
ing a position under the cars to steal a ride upon a train is not an
Issue in an action to recover for injury received while he was be-
ing dragged from such position by the willful act of a braliemau
while the train was in motion. (Illinois Central R. R. Co. v. King,
«3.)
5. RAILROAD COMPANIES— ENTRY ON LAND— RIGHT TO
IMPROVEMENTS.— If a railroad company lawfully enters upon
land under conveyance from a tenant for life, and malies improve-
ments necessary to its business, it has a right, upon abandoning
the premises at the expiration of the life estate, to remove such
improvements, and, if it continues in possession thereafter, the value
of such improvements should not be considered in assessing the
damages to which the remainderman is entitled. The amount which
the latter is entitled to recover is the marljet value of the property
at the time the life estate terminated, with interest, the value of
such improvements placed on the property at the expense of the
company and necessary to its business not being considered In ascer-
taining such market value. (Charleston etc. Ry. Co. v. Hughes, 17.)
6. RAILROAD COMPANIES — ENTRY ON LAND — EJECT-
MENT.—If a railroad company enters upon land and constructs its
road either with the consent of the owner or without lawful author-
ity, and the landowuer acquiesces in the appropriation of the prop-
erty to a great public use until it has become a necessary component
part of the property acquired by the railroad to perform its public
■duties, the landowner must be held to have waived his right to
retalie the property in ejectment, and must be remitted to such other
remedies for the wrong done him as will not interfere with the
Tights of the public to have the railroad maintained and operated.
(Charleston etc. Ry. Co. v. Hughes, 17.)
7. RAILROAD COMPANIES— ENTRY ON LAND BY CON-
SENT—ESTOPPEL AGAINST LANDOWNER.— If a railroad com-
pany enters upon land with the consent of the owner, or under
license from him, and the property thus talien possession of becomes
such a component part of its railroad that to surrender its possession
would interfere seriously with the interests of the company or of
the public, the landowner, though entitled to compensation for his
property, is estopped from asserting against the company the legal
title to the property by an action of ejectment. (Charleston etc. Ry.
Co. V. Hughes, 17.)
8. RAILROAD COMPANIES— LEGISLATIVE POWERS OVER
—REASONABLE REGULATION.— The property of a railroad com-
pany is dedicated to a public use, and the legislature has the power
to regulate that use in a reasonable manner, unless the charter of
the railroad company expressly protects it from such regulation.
The compelling of intersecting lines to put in a connecting switch
is a reasonable regulation. (Jacobson v. Wisconsin etc. R. R. Co.,
-358.)
9. RAILROAD COMPANIES-LEGISLATIVE POWER OVER.
The legislature has the power to compel a common carrier to do
business in the ordinary and usual way, and therefore may compel
such Interchange of cars as incidental to the business for which
the company was chartered. (Jacobson y. Wisconsin etc. B. B. Co.,
258.)
Index. 1021
10. RAILROAD COMPANIES — INCIDENTAL POWERS.— As
Incidental to the operation of Its road, a railroad company has the
power to Interchange cars with other connecting companies. (Jacob-
son V. Wisconsin etc. R. R. Co., 358.)
11. STREET RAILWAYS— CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE-
WANTON CONDUCT OP MOTORMAN.— A plaintiff may recover
of a street railway company, notwithstanding that he might have
negligently placed himself in a place of danger, if the conduct of
the motonnan In running him down was wanton and willful, or If,
after discovering the plaintiff in a place of danger In time to have
prevented the injury by the exercise of reasonable care, he failed
to do so. (Fonda v. St. Paul City Ry. Co., 341.)
12. STREET RAILWAYS — EVIDENCE— GENERAL INOOM7
PETENCY OF MOTORMAN.— Evidence of the general Incompe-
tency of a motorman, based on the observations of witnesses who
had seen him operate his car on prior occasions, is inadmissible to
establish negligence at the time of the accident. (Fonda v. St. Paul
City Ry, Co., 341.)
13. STREET RAILWAYS— MASTER AND SERVANT— EVI-
DENCE—RULES Or' COMPANY.— The private rules of a master
regulating the conduct of his servants in the management of his
own business. Intended only for the guidance of his servants, al-
though designed for the protection of others, are not admissible in
evidence to establish negligence on the part of the master. (Fonda
V. St. Paul City Ry. Co., 341.)
14. RAILROADS-COUPLING OF CARS— ASSUMPTION OP
RISKS— LIABILITY FOR INJURY.— If one railroad receives a cap
from another railroad, with a drawbar different in make and
height from that which it uses itself, and an experienced man is
ordered to couple the cars together by a link and pin, but he is
crushed between the sills of the cars while attempting to make the
connection, because one drawbar slides over the other, the railroad
company is not answerable for the injury, because the difference
in height was an obvious risk assumed by the plaintiff. (Ellsbury
V. New York etc. R. R. Co., 248.)
15. RAILROADS— STREET-CARS— RISK ASSUMED BY PAS-
SENGER^EXPELLING DRUNKEN MAN.— A passenger upon a
street-car assumes the risk, when he takes passage, of the conse-
quences of a lawful and reasonable act of the conductor in expelling
a drunken man from the car. (Spade v. Lynn etc, R. R. Co., 298.)
10. RAILROADS— STREET-CARS— OBLIGATION TO NERV-
OUS PASSENGERS.— The obligation of a street railway company
toward a passenger cannot be increased simply by his notifying the
notifying the conductor that he has unstable nerves. (Spade v.
Lynn etc. R. R. Co., 298.)
17. RAILROADS— STREET-CARS— DAMAGES FOR FRIGHT
CAUSED BY EJECTING DRUNKEN PASSENGER.— If the con-
ductor of a street-car, in ejecting a drunken man therefrom, jostles
against another drunken man, who falls upon a lady passenger,
and the injury from the fall is slight, though she suffers physical
Injury from fright caused by the fall and the rest of the occurrences,
she can recover, if at all. only for the fright caused by the inad-
vertent battery, and not for that attributable to the general disturb-
ance. (Spade V. Lynn etc. R. R. Co., 298.)
18. RAILROADS — STREET-CARS — UNAVOIDABLE ACCI-
DENT TO PASSENGER IN E.TECTING DRUNKEN MAN-
RIGHT OF ACTION.— If due care is used In expelling a drunken
man from a street-car, an unavoidable battery committed on a pas-
1022 Inde^
cenger's person, during the process, by the conductor's jostling an-
other drunken man, who falls upon the passenger, seems not to be
actionable. (Spade v. Lynn etc. R. R. Co., 298.)
19. RAILROAD COMPANIES— NEGLIGENCE PER SEr-FAIL-
URE TO USE SELF-COUPLING DEVICES.— Failure ot a railroad
company to equip its freight-cars with modern self-coupling devices
is negligence, per se. (Troxler v. Southern Ry. Co., 580.)
20. RAILROAD COMPANIES— DUTY TO USE SAFE APPLI-
ANCES IN GENERAL USE.— The employes of a railroad company
and the traveling public alike have a right to be protected against
any dangers which can be avoided Dy the adoption of safety appli-
-ances which have been tested by experience and which have come
.into general use. (Troxler v. Southern Ry. Co., 580.)
2L RAILROAD COMPANIES — SAFE APPLIANCES — DE-
FENSE OF POVERTY.— If an appliance is such that the railroads
€hould have it, the poverty of the company is no sufficient excuse
for not having it. (Troxler v. Southern Ry. Co., 580.)
22. RAILROAD COMPANIES — FAILURE TO USE SELF-
COUPLING DEVICES— NEGLIGENCE OF EMPLOYE.— Where a
railroad company fails to equip its freight-cars with modern self-
•coupling devices, and an employ^ Is injured in coupling cars by
hand, the company is liable, whether such employs was negligent
In thfe manner of making the coupling, or not. (Troxler v. Southern
Ry. Co., 580.)
23. RAILROAD COMPANIES— INJURY TO PRIVATE PROP-
ERTY—COMPENSATION.— If the convenience of a railroad com-
pany requires a change in its terminal yard, so that what has been
■done in one part thereof with one kind of appliances without in-
jury to private property, when done in another part with another
kind, inflicts serious injury upon the buildings on adjoining land, it
becomes the duty of the company to acquire the right to thus vir-
tually use the neighboring property either by purchase or through
the power of eminent domain. (Garvey v. Long Island R. R. Co.,
650.)
24. RAILROAD COMPANIES-INJURY TO PRIVATE PROP-
ERTY—NUISANCE.— A statute simply authorizing a railroad com-
pany to construct and operate a steam surface railroad does not
•confer power, either express or implied, to construct and use, with-
out making compensation, a turntable in its terminal yard in the
immediate vicinity of dwelling-houses on private property, so as to
seriously, continuously, and permanently injure such premises and
impair their enjoyment. Such construction and use of a turntable
is a nuisance which may be enjoined. (Garvey v. Long Island
K. R. Co., 550.)
25. RAILROAD COMPANIES-INJURIES TO SERVANTS-AS-
SUMPTION OF RISKS.— A section hand who continues to use a
hand-car, the brake on which he knows to be dangerously defec-
tive, assumes the risk arising from such defect and cannot recover
for injuries resulting therefrom. (Gann v. Railroad, 687.)
26. RAILROAD COMPANIES— INJURIES TO SERVANTS—
FELLOW-SERVANTS.— While a section foreman and his subordi-
nates generally occupy the position of vice-principal and servants
as to each other, yet such foreman may become the fellow-servant
of his subordinates during the performance of work properly that
of a fellow-servant, as by handling the brake on a hand-car used
by the section gang. While engaged In such work the principal Is
not liable for injuries resulting to a member of the section gang
from the foreman's negligence. (Gann v. Railroad, 687.)
Index. 1023
27. RAILROAD COMPANIES— INJURIES TO SERVANTS-
SAFE APPLIANCES— NEGLIGENCE OF SECTION FOREMAN.
In the matter of providing safe appliances for the use of his sub-
ordinates, a section foreman bears to such subordinates the rela-
tion of a vice-principal, and for his negligence in this regard the
company Is liable. (Gann v. Railroad, 687.)
See Eminent Domain, 2, 3; Interstate Commerce, 1.
RAPE.
1. RAPE— FRAUD IN PERSONATING HUSBAND.— In order
to constitute the crime of rape by fraud in personating the hus-
band the defendant must resort to some device or stratagem, some
artifice or tricli, intending to deceive the prosecutrix and make her
believe that he is her husband, and the effect of siich stratagem
must also be to deceive and Impose on her and malie her believe
that he is her husband at the time the act Is committed, and by
this means gain her consent to the copulation. (Payne v. State, 757.)
2. RAPE-FRAUD IN PERSONATING HUSBAND-INDICT-
MENT.—An indictment which charges a rape by fraud In person-
ating the husband must allege that the injured female Is a married
vroman, and not the wife of the defendant; and while It Is not
necessary to allege the name of the husband. It is the better prac-
tice to do so. (Payne v. State, 757.)
3. RAPE— BY FORCE— PERSONATING HUSBAND.— If a man
begins the act of copulation with a married woman while she Is
asleep, and upon awalieuing she maizes no resistance, believing him
to be her husband, the crime may be rape by force, but not by
fraud. (Payne v. State, 757.)
4. RAPE— ATTEMPT TO COMMIT.— A BOY UNDER FOUR-
TEEN YEARS OF AGE is conclusively presumed to be Incapable
of committing the crime of rape, whatever may be the real fact.
Evidence to rebut the presumption Is inadmissible. He cannot,
therefore, be held guilty of an attempt to commit the offense. (Fos-
ter y. Commonwealth, 846.)
RECEIVERS.
RECEIVERS— FOREIGN— SUITS BY.— The right of a re-
ceiver to bring suits In a foreign Jurisdiction to enforce a liabil-
ity arising under the law of the state of his appointment cannot
be conferred upon him absolutely by his order of appointment, but
can arise only through an exercise ot comity between states, and
«uch exercise will be denied where it would be In contravention of
the rights of citizens and opposed to equity. (Wyman v. Eaton, 193.)
See Insolvency, 2.
BECOGNIZANOa
See Libel, 2. ;
EECORDINO.
See Deeds. S.
RELEASE.
RELEASE— IGNORANCE OF CLAIM.— A party cannot re-
lease a claim of which he had no knowledge, and of the existence
of which he had always been fraudulently kept in ignorance.
(Cooper v. Hayward, 330.)
See Negligence. 8.
1024 Index.
REMAINDER.
See Devise, 8-6; Eminent Domain^ 7.
RESCISSION.
See Joint Stock Companies.
REWARDS.
REWARDS— EVIDENCE TO PROVE OFFER— COPY OP
GOVERNOR'S PROCLAMATION.— To prove the offer of a reward
for the arrest of a person, a copy of the governor's proclamation,
duly certified by the secretary of state, vrith whom the original is
deposited, is admissible in evidence. (McPeek v. Western U. T. Co.,
205.)
SALE.
See Fraud.
SCHOOLS.
SCHOOLS— SCHOOL FUNDS— LIABILITY OF COUNTY.—
School orders issued by the school committee upon the treasurer of
the county board of education, under the North Carolina laws in
force in 1886, were payable out of the school fund only, and were
not a valid charge upon the public funds of the county. (Bear v.
CommisisonerSj 586.)
SENTENCE.
See Habeas Corpus, 2.
SERVICE.
See Attachment, 3, 10.
SETOFF.
1. SETOFF-CLAIMS MUST BE MUTUAL AND DUB.— Claims
or demands sought to be set off must not only be mutual to the
extent that they are owing by each to the other, but they must
be due and payable, and, therefore, a claim not due cannot be set
ofif against one that may be presently enforced. (De Camp v. Thom-
son, 570.)
2. SETOFF— DISCRETION OF COURT IN ALLOWING.— The
question whether a setoff should or should not be decreed, rests In
the discretion of the court to which the application is made, and
is not subject to review. Such relief should be admininistered In
all cases upon such equitable terms as will promote substantial
justice, unless the absolute right is created by statute, or otherwise
firmly established. (De Camp v. Thomson, 570.)
See Judgment, 9.
SITUS OF DEBT. '
See Attachment, 9; Taxation.
SOCIAL CLUBS.
1. SOCIAL CLUBS— TIPPLING-HOUSE.— A social club which
furnishes Intoxicating liquors to its members only, to be drunk by
them on the premises where sold, is a tlppling-house within the
■ meaning of a statue prohibiting the keeping open of tippling-houses
on Sunday. (Mohrman v. State, 74.)
Index. 1025
2. SOCIAL CLUBS— TIPPLING-nOUSE.— Although the selling
and drinking of liquor in a social club Is merely Incidental to the
main purposes of the club, it is none the less a tippling-house within
the meaning of a statute prohibiting the keeping open on the Sab-
bath day of houses where liquor is furnished and drank. (Mohrman
V. State, 74.)
3. SOCIAL CLUBS — TIPPLING-HOUSE — LIABILITY OP
MANAGER.— The manager of a social club, who is also a member
and officer therein, and who exercises general superintendence over
a bar therein from which intoxicating liquors are sold. Is amenable
to a statute prohibiting the keeping open of tippllng-houses on Sun-
day. (Mohrman v. State, 74.)
SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE.
See Equity, 2.
STATUTE OF FRAUDS.
1. STATUTE OF FRAUDS — ORAL CONTRACT.— A court of
equity cannot make valid a contract void under the statute of
frauds, under pretense of aiding an imperfect attempt to execute
a contract. (Bloomfield State Bank v. Miller, 381.)
2. STATUTE OF FRAUDS.— An exception to the statute of
frauds taking out of its operation estates arising by act or opera-
tion of law does not Include a case where the creation of the estate
depends solely upon the intention of the parties to a contract.
(BlQomfleld State Bank v. Miller, 381.)
See Corporations, 6.
STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS.
See Limitations of Actions.
STATUTES.
1. STATUTES.— A PENAL STATUTE IS EX POST FACTO
where it, In relation to the oflfense or Its consequences, alters the
situation of the party accused of the crime to his disadvantage; a»
where the penalty is increased, or the accused is deprived of sub-
stantial rights or privileges to which he was entitled as the law
stood when the offense was committed. (Murphy v. Commonwealth,
266.)
2. STATUTES— EX POST FACTO LAWS— PROCEDURE-
PRISON DISCIPLINE.— Statutes which relate to procedure or
penal administration or prison discipline are not, as a general rule,
objectionable as l>elng ex post facto, though passed after ihe of-
fense, even where the effect may be, In the last two instances, to en-
hance the severity of the confinement. (Murphy v. Commonwealth,
266.)
3. STATUTES— EX POST FACTO LAWS— CREDITS FOB
GOOD BEHAVIOR.— A statute which gives a convict a right to de-
ductions for good behavior, thus practically shortening his term of
imprisonment, cannot be construed merely as a measure of prison
discipline or regulation, and therefore liable to change from time to
time, as the legislature may see fit, without interfering with any
rights on the part of the convict. (Murphy v. Commonwealth, 266.)
4. STATUTES — EX POST FACTO LAWS — INTEmFERING
WITH CREDITS FOR GOOD BEHAVIOR.— If the effect of good
conduct, on the part of a prisoner, under existing laws, Is to shorten
Ax. St. Ekp., VoU LXX.-65
1026 Index.
his term of Imprisonment, and to give him a right to his discharge
at the expiration of the shortened term, a subsequent statute which
has the efifect of taliing away the right of deduction for good beha-
vior, or which interferes with it to the disadvantage of the convict, is
clearly ex post facto, because it practically lengthens the sentence
which was provided by law for the ofCense at the time when it was
committed. (Murphy v. Commonwealth, 266.)
5. STATUTES.— A CRIMINAL STATUTE IS TO BE CON-
STRUED PROSPECTIVELY, to apply to sentences for offenses
committed after it took effect. (Murphy v. Commonwealth, 266.)
6. STATUTES— CONSTITUTIONALITY.— A law cannot be con-
stitutional in some cases and unconstitutional In others involving
like circumstances and conditions. If it is unconstitutional as to
any it is unconstitutional as to all. (Murphy v. Commonwealth,
266.)
7. STATUTES— EX POST FACTO LAWS.— THE LEGISLA-
TURE cannot, upder the guise of laws relating to procedure or
prison discipline or penal administration, take away or Interfere
with any substantial right or privilege which was secured to a party
by the law as it was when the offense was committed. (Murphy v.
Commonwealth, 266.)
8. STATUTES.— THE TERM "EX POST FACTO" applies only
to penal or criminal matters. (Murphy v. Commonwealth, 266.)
9. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW — PAYMENTS TO DRAFTED
MEN BY TAXATION.— A statute which empowers and directs the
supervisors of several counties, upon a petition of the majority of
the taxpayers, to raise by ordinary taxation the money needed to
pay to any drafted man who served personally In the Civil War,
or paid commutation money, or to his heirs a specified sum of money,
with interest for a period of years, is void as being beyond the tax-
ing power of the legislature, and as being In violation of a state
constitution forbidding any county, city, town, or village to give
any money to or in aid of any Individual, or to Incur any Indebted-
ness except for county, city, town, or village purposes. (Bush v.
Board of Supervisors, 538.)
10. WAGES— PREFERENCE TO CLAIMS FOR— CONSTRUC-
TION OF STATUTE— SALARY.— The word "wages," In a statute
giving a preference to "the wages of the employfis, operatives, and
laborers" In the hands of a receiver, conveys the idea, in Its appli-
cation to laborers and employfis, of subordinate occupation which
Is not very remunerative. Such a statute is not, therefore, designed
to give a preference to the salaries and compensation due to officers
and employes of a corporation occupying superior positions of trust
or profit. (Matter of Stryker, 489.)
11. WAGES-PREFERENCE TO CLAIMS FOR— LIMITATION
UPON WORD "EMPLOYES.'— In determining what claims shall be
preferred, under a statute which gives a preference to "the wages
of the employes, operatives, and laborers" of corporations in the
hands of a receiver, the general and comprehensive word "employes"
must be limited by the more specific words, "operatives and labor-
ers." (Matter of Stryker, 489.)
12. WAGES— PREFERENCE TO CLAIMS FOR— CONSTRUC-
TION OF STATUTE.— A statute giving a preference to "the wages
of the employ6s, operatives, and laborers" of corporations In the
hands of a receiver is intended to limit the preference to the par-
ticular class whose claims would be properly expressed by the use
of the word "wages." (Matter of Stryker, 489.)
Index. 1027
13. STATUTES-CONSTRUCTION— ANALOGOUS WORDS.—
"Wlien two or more words of analogous meaning are employed to*
«etber in a statute, they are understood to be used in their cognate
sense, to express the same relations and to give color and expression
to each other. (Matter of Strylcer, 489.)
14. STATUTES— GENERAL LAW— ILLUSTRATION— WORK-
MEN'S UNION LABEL ACT.— An "act for the better protection
of skilled labor, and for the registration of labels, marks, names,
brands, or devices covering the products of such labor of associa-
tions or unions of workingmen or women," where there is nothing
in It limiting its provisions to any particular locality of the state,
or to any designated association or union of workingmen or
women, is not a local or private law, but a general one, and does
not, therefore, contravene a constitutional provision that the legis-
lature shall not pass a private or local bill granting any exclusive
privilege or franchise. (Perkins v. Heert, 483.)
15. STATUTES — GRANT OP EXCLUSIVE PRIVILEGE —
STATE POLICY.— If a state constitution authorizes a grant, through
legislative action, of an exclusive privilege. It must be deemed to
be In accord with the policy of the state. (Perkins v. Heert, 483.)
16. STATUTES— ACT HAVING BUT ONE SUB.TECT EX-
PRESSED IN ITS TITLE— ILLUSTRATION.— One subject only la
mentioned In the title of an act entitled, "An act for the better
protection of skilled labor, and for the registration of labels, marks,
names, brands, or devices covering the products of such labor of
associations or unions of workingmen or women," and that Is the
better protection of skilled labor by the registration of labels, et
cetera, covering the products of such labor. (Perkins v. Heert, 483.)
17. STATUTES NOT CONTRARY TO PUBLIC POLICY-
WORKMEN'S UNION LABEL ACT— CONSTITUTIONALITY.—
Aji "act for the better protection of skilled labor, and for the regis-
tration of labels, marks, names, brands, or devices covering the pro-
ducts of such labor of associations or unions of workingmen or
women" Is not unconstitutional and void, for the reason that It Is
contrary to public policy. In that It unjustly discriminates In favor
of the labor of members of associations or unions as against that of
nonunion workmen. (Perkins v. Heert, 483.)
18. STATUTES— GRANT OF EXCLUSIVE PRIVILEGES UN-
DER GENERAL LAW.— An exclusive privilege or franchise is au-
thorized, If obtained under general laws, where the state constitu-
tion authorizes the legislature to pass general laws, under which
such a privilege or franchise may be granted. (Perkins v. Heert,
483.)
19. WAGES— PREFERENCE OP CLAIMS POR-SALARIED
PERSONS WHO CANNOT CLAIM.— Under a statute which gives
a preference to "the wages of the employ6s, operatives, and labor-
ers" of corporations in the hands of a receiver, the claims of those In
the employ of an insolvent manufacturing company, such as a clerk
and bookkeeper, the superintendent, shop foreman, and a draftsman,
all under salaries ranging from one hundred to two hundred and
twenty-five dollars per month, are not entitled to preference as
claims for wages. (Matter of Stryker, 489.)
20. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW— TITLE OP ACT.— An act known
as the "cold storage act,'* and entitled, "an act to define and prevent
cold storage In a local option county, precinct, city, town, or sub-
division of a county, and to affix a penalty for running, keeping, or
maintaining them in such county, city, or town, or subdivision, sufll-
ciently embraces the subject-matter of the act, and Is not within
1028 Index.
a constitutional provision Invalidating laws where the substance of
the act Is not embraced in the title. (Ex parte Brown, 743.)
21. STATUTES — PRESUMPTION OP CONSTITUTIONAL-
ITY.—All intendments are in favor of the constitutionality of every
statute passed with requisite form and ceremony. (Austin v. State,
703.)
22. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW. — THE TERRITORIAL LAW of
Utah so far as it purported to confer general common-law and chan-
cery jurisdiction on probate courts is void. (In re Christensen, 794.)
See Adoption, 1, 4, 5; Banljruptcy; Building and Loan Associationa,
6, 11, 12; Corporations, 36; Deeds, 3; Descent; Dower, 1, 3; In-
terstate Commerce, 5, 6; Larceny; Libel, 3; Municipal Corpora-
tions, 15, 21; Police Power, 3, 6, 8, 9.
STREET RAILWAYS.
See Railroads, 15-18.
SUBROGATION.
See Appeal, 14; Insolvency, 2.
SURETIES.
1. SURETIES— APPEAL BONDS AND BAIL— PRIMARY LIA-
BILITY—ILLUSTRATION— RELEASE OF SURETIES— REIM-
BURSEMENT.—If the plaintiff in a civil action obtains an order
for the arrest of the defendant, who is discharged upon giving bail,
and the action results in a judgment for the plaintiff, whereupon
undertakings on appeal are given, one to the general term, and the
other to the court of appeals, with conditions that the sureties in
each case will pay the amount of the judgment and costs in the
event of an affirmance, the plaintiff, in the event of an affirmance
at the general term and of a judgment for costs in the court of ap-
peals, cannot, where he collects from the general term sureties the
whole amount due him, except on the judgment for costs in the
court of appeals, recover thereafter from the bail, either for hia
own benefit or that of a general term surety, anything more than
the amount due on the judgment for costs in the court of appeals,
and not even that if he has released the court of appeals stireties;
and, if he recovers the amount of the judgment for costs in the
court of appeals, from the bail, the latter will have the right of re-
imbursement from the court of appeals sureties. (Culliford v. Wal-
ser, 437.)
2. SURETIES— DIFFERENT SETS OF, INCLUDING BAII^
ORDER OF LIABILITY.— As between different sets of sureties
who undertake to secure the same debt^ although in different stages
of legal proceeuings, tlie primary liability rests upon the last set;
and bail, being sureties, are, therefore, within the same rule. (Cul-
liford V. Walser. 437.)
See Contracts. 7.
TAXATION.
TAXATION— SITUS OF A DEBT.— The situs Of a debt for
purposes of taxation, and usually for all purposes, is with the
creditor. (Balk v. Harris, 606.)
See Legislature; Mandamus, 1; Municipal Corporations, 13, 14;
Statutes, 9.
Index. 1029
TAX TITLE.
See Cotenancy, Q.
TELEGRAPH COMPANIES.
1. TELEGRAPH COMPANIES— NOTICE OF IMPORTANCH
OF MESSAGE.— In an action for damages occasioned by the delay
of a telegraph company in delivering a message, extrinsic evidence
Is admissible to show that the company had notice of the Import-
ance of the message, (McPeek v. Western U. T. Co., 205.)
2. TELEGRAPH COMPANIES— LIABILITY FOR NONDE-
LIVERY OF MESSAGE.— The liability of a telegraph company to
the sendee of a message for damages resulting from a delay In
delivery is not one arising from contract, but Is based upon its
negligence In the performance of a duty In Its public capacity as a
common carrier of messages. (McPeek v. Western U. T. Co., 205.)
3. TELEGRAPH COMPANIES— DAMAGES FOR DELAY IN
DELIVERY OF MESSAGE— LOSS OF REWARD.— Where a per-
son has laid a plan for the capture of a fugitive from justice with a
view to obtaining the reward offered therefor, and has notified a
telegraph agent that he Is expecting a telegram of great importance
to the success of his plan, and the agent knows that prompt de-
livery of such message will be necessary, the telegraph company
will be liable In damages to the amount of such reward if the agent's
delay In delivery of the message frustrates the sendee's plan. It is
not necessary that the agent have actual notice of the offer of the
reward, he being charged with knowledge that such offer might be
made. (McPeek v. Western U. T. Co., 205.)
4. TELEGRAPH COMPANIES— NEGLIGENCE IN DELIV-
ERY OF MESSAGE— BURDEN OF PROOF.— In an action against
a telegraph company for the loss of a reward offered for the capture
of a fugitive from justice, which loss Is alleged to have resulted
from the negligence of the defendant in delivering a certain tele-
gram, the burden of proof rests upon the plaintiff, and the question
whether or not such loss resulted from the negligence alleged is for
the jury. (McPeek v. Western U. T. Co., 205.)
5. TELEGRAPH COMPANIES— LIABILITY FOR NONDE-
LIVERY OF MESSAGE— OFFICE HOURS.— An agent of a tele-
graph company undertaking to deliver a message outside of ofl3ce
hours is acting within the scope of his agency, and the company
Is liable for his failure to exercise reasonable diligence. Whether
or not such diligence was exercised Is a question for the jury. (Mc-
Peek V. Western U. T. Co., 205.)
6. TELEGRAPH COMPANIES— DELAY IN DELIVERING
MESSAGE— MEASURE OF DAMAGES.— A person Injured by the
-delay of a telegraph company In delivering a message to him is
not limited In his recovery to such damages as might reasonably
have been within the contemplation of the parties, but recovery
may be had for all the Injurious results which flow therefrom, by
ordinary natural sequence, without the Interposition of any other
negligent act or overpowering force. (McPeek v. Western U. T. Co.,*
205.)
7. TELEGRAPH COMPANIES— ACTION FOR ERRONEOUS
TRANSMISSION OF MESSAGE— EVIDENCE.— In an action
against a telegraph company for damages resulting from a con-
tract entered Into In reliance upon an erroneously tr-insmltted mes-
sage, the plaintiff Is properly allowed to testify that the contract
In question would not have been entered into except for such error
1030 Index.
on the part of the defendant. (Hasbrouck v. Western U. T. Co.r
181.)
8. TELEGKAPH COMPANIES— DAMAGES FOR ERRONE-
OUSLY TRANSMITTED MESSAGE— DUTY OF PLAINTIFF TO
RESCIND CONTRACT ENTERED INTO IN RELIANCE UPON.—
Where a principal has been influenced through the erroneous
transmission of a telegram from his agent to authorize the latter
to enter into a contract of settlement with the former's creditor
which he would not have authorized except for such erroneous
transmission, he is not bound to talie steps to rescind the contract
before bringing suit against the telegraph company for damages
BufCered. (Hasbrouck v. Western U. T. Co., 181.)
See Agency.
TORTS.
TORTS- -"MALICE-DEFINITION.-The term "malice.*' a»
applied to torts, does not necessarily mean that which must pro-
ceed from a spiteful, malignant, or revengeful disposition, but a
conduct injurious to another, though proceeding from an Ill-regu-
lated mind not sufficiently cautious before it occasions an Injury to
another. (Brown v. Brown, 574.)
TRESPASS.
1. TRESPASS— INJUNCTION AGAINST.— If strong and ag-
gravated instances of continuing trespass are shown, which must
necessarily result in substantial damages to plaintiff's property that
are in no way offset by benefits, a permanent injunction may be
issued, although the amount of damages is not fixed. (Garvey v.
Long Island R. R. Co., 550.)
2. TRESPASS— INJUNCTION AGAINST.— If one who owns
valuable mining property and a water supply at a considerable dis-
tance therefrom digs a trench and inserts a pipe line therein under
the surface of worthless, uncultivated, and unused land of another
from his water supply to his mine, covering the trench with the ma-
terial taken out, and not causing the landowner any damage except
nominal, the latter is not entitled to an injunction restraining the
trespass, when it appears that to restrain the laying of the pipe
line would cause irreparable damage to the mine-owner and de-
stroy a large industry without any benefit to the landowner. In
such case, the remedy at law being adequate the landowner must be
required to resort to. such remedy for the recovery of damages at-
tending the trespass. (Crescent Min. Co. v. Silver King Min. Oo.^
810.)
See Railroad Companies, 1-4.
TRIAL.
1. TRIATv-ERRONEOUS INSTRUCTIONS.— It Is not ground
for reversal of a judgment that an instruction assumes as proven
a fact established by the evidence without contradiction. (Illinois
Central R. R. Co. v. King, 93.)
2. TRIAIv-IMPANELING .JURY- EXAMINATION ON VOIR
DIRE.— In Impaneling a jury In a trial for homicide, defendant's
counsel should not be allowed, in the examination of jurors on their
voir dire, to ask them whether defendant's failure to testify In hi»
own behalf would prejudice him in their minds. (Commonwealth
V. Wireback, 625.)
Index. 1031
3. TRIAL— REFUSAL OF COURT TO SUBMIT ISSUES.—
Where every phase of a defendant's contention could be and waa
presented without prejudice under the Issue submitted by the
court, tbe refusal to submit other issues, though asked, is not error.
(Kendrick v. Life Ins. Co., 592.)
4. TRIAL— CRIMINAL CASES-OB.TECTION TO GENERAL
COURSE PURSUED BY PROSECUTING ATTORNEY.— If a prose-
cuting attorney, in a criminal case, persists, after repeated objec-
tions, in making improper statements during his address to the
jury, and such objections go to the general course pursued by him,
no further objection or exception is necessary after the court sanc-
tions such course, pronouncing it "perfectly proper." (People v.
Fielding, 495.)
5. TRIAI^IMPROPER APPEAL TO JURY— CURING OF
ERROR.— INSTRUCTIONS to the jury do not always neutralize,
either as a matter of law or fact, the effect of improper remarks la
their presence. (People v. Fielding, 495.)
6. TRIAL-CRIMINAL CASES— ARGUMENT— PROSECUTING
ATTORNEY— DUTY OF.— The prosecuting attorney, in a criminal
case, represents the majesty of the people, and, having no respon-
sibility, except fairly to discharge his duty, should put himself un-
der proper restraint, and should not, in his remarks before the jury,
go beyond the evidence or the bounds of a reasonable moderation.
If he lays aside the impartiality that should characterize his ofl3clal
action to become a heated partisan, and by vituperation of the pris-
oner and appeals to prejudice seeks to procure a conviction at all
hazards, he ceases to properly represent the public interest. (People
V. Fielding, 495.)
7. TRIAL — CRIMINAL CASES — IMPROPER APPEAL TO
JURY— CORRECTION OF ERROR.— When a prosecuting attorney,
in a criminal case makes improper statements in his address to
the jury, and the court seeks to correct them, the correction should
be as broad as the error, and cover substantially the same ground.
It should be clear and specific enough to repel the presumption of
injury. Otherwise, the error is not cured. (People v. Fielding, 485.)
See Homicide, 13.
TRUCKMEN.
See Carriers, 2, 3; Negligence, 2, 8.
TRUSTS.
See Wills, 8-10.
**UPSET" BIDS.
See Judicial Sales, 2, 4-6.
USURY.
Bee Boilding and Loan Associations, 1, 6, 7, 8b lit 12.
VALUE.
See Estates.
VENDOR AND PURCHASER.
1. VENDOR AND PURCHASER— ASSUMPTION OF DEBTS-
PRIMARY LIABILITY OF PURCHASER.— When a purchaser
assumes the payment of certain debts of his vendor, in considera-
1032 Index.
tion of a conveyance of land, he is personally answerable therefor,
and, as between the vendor and himself, he is primarily liable for
such debts. (Moore v. Triplett, 882.)
2. VENDOR AND PURCHASER— VAEIANCB BETWEEN
CONTRACT FOR SALE OF LAND AND DEED— PRESUMPTION
— BURDEN. — In the event of a conflict between the terms of an
agreement for the sale of land and a subsequent deed to it, the
presumption is, that the purposes of the parties were altered, and
that the deed expresses the final and true agreement between them.
Hence, the burden of proof is upon him who denies that the writing
speaks the final agreement to rebut this presumption by the clearest
and most satisfactory evidence. (Snyder v. GrandstafC, 863.)
3. VENDOR AND PURCHASER— BURDEN OF PROVING
NOTICE TO PURCHASER FOR VALUE.— One who alleges that
t purchaser for value had notice must assume the burden of prov-
ijg it, and mere proof of confidential relations between the grantor
and tlie grantee is insufficient. (Snyder v. Grandstafif, 863.)
4. VENDOR AND PURCHASER— AFFIRMATIONS OF TI-
TLE.—Purchasers for value have a right to rely on the affirmations
of grantors, and grantors are bound by their affirmations of title.
(Snyder v, Grandstaff, 863.)
5. VENDOR AND PURCHASER— NOTICE TO PURCHASER
FOR VALUE— SUFFICIENCY OF.— To charge a purchaser for
value with notice, it is necessary that the evidence should establish
notice, either actual or constructive. Otherwise, It is insufficient.
(Snyder v. Grandstafif, 863.)
6. VENDOR AND PURCHASER— LATENT EQUITIES— MU-
TUAL MISTAKE.— A PURCHASER FOR VALUE is not affected
by any latent equity, whether by lien, encumbrance, trust, fraud,
or any other claim; and a mutual mistake stands on the same foot*
Ing as any other equity. (Snyder v. Grandstafif, 863.)
See Judgment, 1, 2.
VOLUNTARY ASSOCIATIONS.
See Associations, 7.
WAGES.
WAGES-APPLICATION OF TERM— SALARY— FEB.— The
word "wages" is applied, in common parlance, specifically to the
payment made for manual labor, or other labor of a menial or me-
chanical kind, as distinguished from salary, and from fee, each of
which denotes compensation paid to professional men. (Matter of
Stryker, 489.)
See Statutes, 10-12, 19.
WARRANTY.
See Waterworks and Water Companies. 4.
WATERS AND WATERCOURSES.
1. WATERS AND WATERCOURSES — PERCOLATING
WATER, so long as it remains in an artificial tunnel or mining
claim of the proprietor of the land. Is not open to appropriation by
another. (Crescent Mln. Co. v. Silver King Min. Co., 810.)
2. WATERS AND WATERCOURSES — PERCOLATING
WATERS.— PRESCRIPTIVE RIGHT TO.— Whenever percolating
water is so hidden in the earth that its course is not discoverable
Index. 1033
from the surface, there can be no such thing as a prescription In
favor of an adjacent proprietor to have an uninterrupted flow of
such stream through the land of his neighbor. (Crescent MIn. Co. v.
Sliver King Min. Co., 810.)
3 WATERS AND WATERCOUKSBS — PERCOLATINO
WATER.— A PERSON MAY LAWFULLY DIG A WELL on his
own land, though thereby he destroys the subterranean, undefined,
percolating water of his adjoining neighbor's spring, and no action
can be maintained therefor. (Crescent Mln. Co. v. Silver King Min.
Co., 810.)
4. WATERS AND WATERCOURSES — PERCOLATING
WATER.— If water percolates through and under the surface of the
earth upon the land of one person and comes to the surface just
before it empties Itself upon the land of another, the owner of such
land has no right to demand that such percolation shall continue.
(Crescent Mln. Co. v. Silver King Min. Co., 810.)
5. WATERS AND WATERCOURSES — PERCOLATING
WATER— APPROPRIATION.— Percolating water, after passing in-
to an underground artificial tunnel, and not naturally flowing from
or Into a natural stream with a well-defined channel, banks, and
course, is not subject to appropriation by another while It remains
In the tunnel upon the owner's land; but If the water Is allowed
to flow Into an artificial lake upon public land It is then subject
to appropriation. The appropriator does not, however, thereby ac-
quire an easement in the tunnel nor a prescriptive right to have the
water flow from the tunnel into the lake uninterruptedly and con-
tinuously, although he has continually used the water of the lake
for a long period of years. (Crescent Mln. Co. v. Silver King Mln.
Co., 810.)
6. WATERS AND WATERCOURSES — PERCOLATING
WATER.— APPROPRIATION.— The ordinary rules of law apply-
ing to the appropriation of surface streams do not apply to perco-
lating waters and subterranean streams with undefined and un-
known courses and banks. (Crescent Min. Co. v. Sliver King Mln.
Co., 810.)
7. WATERS AND WATERCOURSES — PERCOLATING
WATER which has been gathered in artificial tunnels or ditches
and allowed to flow from the proprietor's land to an Inferior pro-
prietor, and has been used by him a greater period of time than that
allowed by the statute of limitations, does not become his by pre-
scriptive title. (Crescent Min. Co. v. Silver King Min, Co., 810.)
8. WATERS AND WATERCOURSES — PERCOLATING
WATER.— The owner of the soil Is entitled to the waters percolat-
ing through It. Such water Is not subject to appropriation until
It leaves his land. (Crescent Mln. Co. v. Silver King Min. Co., 810.)
WATERWORKS AND WATER COMPANIES.
1. WATER COMPANIES— BREACH OP CONTRACT— NATU-
RAL AND PROXIMATE RESULT— DAMAGE BY FIRE TO
TAXPAYER,— Where a party undertakes to furnish water In such
mode and quantity that it may be used to extinguish fires In the
city In which it is to be supplied, damages sustained by a citizen
and taxpayer by the destruction of buildings, by the failure to so
furnish water, is a natural and proximate consequence of such
breach of the undertaking. (Gorrill v. Water Supply Co., 598.)
2. WATER COMPANIES — LIABILITY FOR DISTRIBUTING
POLLUTED WATER— EVIDENCE OF SUBSEQUENT PRECAU-
TIONS.—In an action against a water company for the death of a
1034 Index.
person, occasioned by nslng Impure water famished by It, it Is Im-
proper to admit evidence that greater precautions were taken by
the defendant, after the occurrence complained of to secure pure
water, than were taken before. (Green v. Ashland W. Co., 911.)
3. WATER COMPANIES — LIABILITY FOR DISTRIBUTING
POLLUTED WATER— KNOWLEDGE OF PERSON USING SUCH
WATER.— A water company which knowingly distributes water
which, from a cause not discoverable by the exercise of reasonable
care, is dangerous for domestic use, it owes the duty to Its custom-
ers of disclosing such danger, and a failure to do so Is fraud in
law, rendering the company liable to any person injured thereby
without fault on his part, and the failure of duty amounts to action-
able negligence, to which the same liability is Incident. But if the
person injured used the water with knowledge, actual or construc-
tive, of Its dangerous condition, no liability attaches to the com-
pany. (Green v. Ashland W. Co., 911.)
4. WATER COMPANIES — LIABILITY FOR DISTRIBUTING
POLLUTED WATER— WARRANTY OF QUALITY.— A water
company engaged In distributing water for compensation does not
impliedly warrant the quality of the water carried and distributed.
(Green v. Ashland W. Co., 911.)
6. WATER COMPANIES — IMPURE WATER — CONTRIBU-
TORY NEGLIGENCE IN USING.— Where It has been for some time
a matter of common knowledge that water furnished by a water
company is dangerously impure. It will be presumed that a person
of average intelligence living In the community had notice of such
fact, and, unless such presumption is rebutted, he will be deemed
guilty of contributory negligence if he uses such water. (Green
v. Ashland W. Co., 911.)
6. WATER COMPANIES— LIABILITY FOR FURNISHING
IMPURE WATER— EVIDENCE.— Where It Is sought to Impose
upon a water company a liability for injuries occasioned by impure
water furnished by it, it is error to admit in evidence newspaper
comments generally Irrelevant to the issue, and of a sort tending
to prejudice the jury against the defendant. (Green y. Ashland W.
Co., 911.)
WILLS.
1. WILLS — EXECUTION — PROOF OF — ATTESTING WIT-
NESSES.—Where a will Is signed by the testator's making his mark,
and the subscribing witnesses are dead or beyond the Jurisdiction
of the court, proof of their handwriting is a compliance with the
law as to due execution; and it need not be proved that the testator
had the will read over to him, or was Informed of its contents, before
he signed It. (Scott v. Hawk. 228.)
2. WILLS— EXECUTION— PUBLICATION.— In the execution
of a will, nothing more than compliance with the statute Is neces-
sary, and publication is not necessary unless made so by statute.
(Scott V. Hawk, 228.)
3. WILLS-SIGNATURE-TESTATOR'S MARK.— Where a tes-
tator, being unable to write his signature to his will, makes his
mark Instead, the will so executed Is "signed" within the meaning
of the law. (Scott v. Hawk, 228.)
4. WILLS— SIGNING WITH MARK.— Where a testator signed
his will by making his mark, It Is not essential to the valid execu-
tion of the will that his name be written by one of the attesting
witnesses. (Scott y. Hawk, 228.)
Index. 1035
b. wills— illegitimate child as an "heir by
BLOOD."— An Illegitimate child Is the "heir by blood" of his mother
within the meaning of a will wherein the term "heirs by blood" Is
used, where It plainly appears that the testator Intended by the use
of that term to indicate those persons whose relationship was by
some tie of consanguinity; and to exclude all others, such as hus-
band, wife, or adopted children. (Hayden v. Barrett, 295.)
6. WILLS— DECLARATIONS OF TESTATOR AS EVIDENCE.
Wliere a will Is attacked on the ground of forgery, declarations of
the testator as to his intentions are admissible for the purpose of
corroboration, but such evidence is not sufficient either to establish
the execution of the will or to overcome the testimony of the sub-
scribing witnesses. (Swope v. Donnelly, 637.)
7. WILLS— DECLARATIONS OP TESTATOR— NOT PROP-
ERLY ADMISSIBLE.— Where the Issue is whether or not a will
purporting to have been executed on a certain day Is a forgery,
declarations of the testator that a will with which he was satisfied
was in existence two months before that day, also an expression of
intention made by him five years before that time, are irrelevant and
inadmissible. (Swope v. Donnelly, 637.)
8. WILLS — CHARITABLE TRUST — DESIGNATION OP
TRUSTEE.— If a testator, after providing for certain beneficlariea
in his will, declares therein that "after the death of each one I de-
sire that my executors shall make over to the presiding bishop of
the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints the half of my es-
tate from which that wife's Income was derived. The presiding
bishop shall receive It In trust and expend the annual Income ac-
cording to his discretion, for the benefits of the members of the
Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints," the will clearly
designates such presiding bishop as trustee and sufficiently do-
scribes the beneficiaries under the will. (Staines v. Burton, 788.)
9. WILLS— CHARITABLE TRUSTS.— A bequest by will to the
presiding bishop of a certain church, in trust, to expend the annual
income, according to his discretion, for the benefit of the members
of such church, "whether It be for public schools, parks, watering
cities, acclimatizing foreign plants, or anything else whereby the
members may be benefited, creates a charitable use or trust, and is
not within the rule against perpetuities. (Staines v. Burton, 788.)
10. WILLS— CHARITABLE TRUSTS— CONSTRUCTION.— If a
charitable Intent appears on the face of a will, but the terms used
are broad enough to allow the fund being applied either In a lawful
or unlawful manner, the gift must be supported, and Its application
restrained within the bounds of the law. (Staines v. Burton, 788.)
11. WILLS— CONDITIONS SUBSEQUENT— IMPOSSIBILITY
OP PERPORMANCE— EFFECT OP.— If a testator devises to his
wife, for her life, his "homestead and five acres around the house,"
with the understanding that his son will support and take care of
her, and that, at her death, the "homestead and land shall return to"
the son "as compensation therefor," but the wife of the testator
dies in his lifetime, and he makes no change In his will, the whole
will, taken together, including the wish therein expressed that the
son shall support and provide for his two sisters as long as they
remain single, shows that the condition upon which the son Is to
take the estate is a condition subsequent, and not a condition
precedent, and its performance having been rendered Impossible
by the act of God, In the death of the wife In the lifetime of the
testator, the son holds the estate by an absolute title, as If the
testator had attached no condition to the devise, for the act od
1036 Index.
which the estate depends does not necessarily precede the vesting
of the estate, but may accompany or follow It. (Burdis t. Burdis,
«25.)
12. WILLS— CONDITIONS PRECEDENT AND SUBSEQUENT—
WHAT ARE— DISTINCTION.— There are no technical words to
■distinguish between conditions precedent and conditions subsequent.
The distinction is matter of construction. The words may indif-
ferently malte either, according to the intent of the person who
creates the condition. If the language of the particular clause, or
■of the whole will, shows that the act on which the estate depends
must be performed before the estate can vest, the condition is
precedent, and, unless it is performed, the devisee can talie nothing.
If, on the contrary, the act does not necessarily precede the vest-
ing of the estate, but may accompany or follow it, and this can
be collected from the whole will, the condition is subsequent. (Bur-
dis V. Burdis, 825.)
See Devise.
WITNESSES.
1. WITNESSES— TESTIMONY OP EXPERTS.— In an action
for damages occasioned by fire ignited from sparl£S escaping from a
road-roller engine, it beiug alleged that the defendant was negligent
in failing to provide such engine with a sparli arrester, expert wit-
nesses, in testifying, may be allowed to exhibit a model of a loco-
motive engine to the jury to illustrate the use of a spark arrester,
^nd to indicate how it could be applied to the roller-engine in ques-
tion, but they should not be allowed to use such models for any fur-
ther purpose. (McMahon v. Dubuque, 143.)
2. WITNESSES— MATTERS OP OPINION.— In determining
the condition of a house at the time of its destruction, whether or
not it was in good repair, a witness may describe the house In de-
tail, but he should not be permitted to testify whether or not the
house was in good repair, such testimony being merely an opinion.
(McMahon v. Dubuque, 143.)
3. WITNESSES— IMPEACHING ONE'S OWN.— A party cannot
«how inconsistent statements made by his own witness for the pur-
pose of impeaching him. (Fall Brooli Coal Co. v. Hewson, 466.)
4. WITNESSES— OFFER OF— WHEN COMPLETE.— A person
Is not made a witness so as to burden the party calling him with
the necessity of supporting his character to the end of the trial,
until he is called, sworn, and some material question is asked and
xinswered. (Fall Brook Coal Co. v. Hewson, 4G6.)
5. WITNESSES— OFFER OF— IMPEACHMENT.— If a party
calls a witness, but excuses him after he Is sworn, but before any
material question is asked, he is not afterward precluded from Im-
peaching his credibility by contradicting him, where the witness
gives material testimony for the other side. (Fall Brook Coal Co.
V. Hewson, 466.)
6. WITNESS, FAILURE TO CALL — PRESUMPTION — IN-
STRUCTIONS.—The om'ssion of the defendant to call Its motorman
as a witness, though available, will justify the court In Instructing
the jury that, in weigliing the evidence introduced, they are at
liberty to Indulge in the presumption that the testimony of the
motorman, if Introduced, would not have been favorable to the de-
fendant's cause. (Fonda v. St. Paul City Ry. Co., 341.)
7. WITNESSES-RULING OUT QUESTIONS CALLING FOR
AN OPINION.— A question which calls for nn opinion of the wlt-
nrss In regard to iho legal efTect of a contract Is properly ruled out.
^Mclsaac v. Northampton Elec. L. Co., 244.)
Index. 1037
8. WITNESSES.— IMMATERIAL QUESTIONS asked of a wit-
ness are properly ruled out (Mclsaac v. Northampton Elec. L. Co.,
244.)
9. WITNESSES— EXAMINATION OF— STRIKING OUT AN-
SWER.—A witness' answer which Is not responsive to the question
may rightly be stricken out. (Mclsaac v. Northampton Elec. L. Co.,
244.)
10. WITNESSES— EXPERTS— QUESTION OF SANITY— PENI-
TENTIARY WARDEN.— Where the prisoner's Insanity Is set up In
defense of d prosecution for homicide, and expert testimony Is given
in support of such plea, together with evidence of acts and declara-
tions of the defendant tending to show insanity, a penitentiary
warden who, through a long period of service, has had opportunity
to study criminals, is competent to testify that very many prisouera
feigned insanity and delusions, and that some had deceived him and
physicians. (Commonwealth v. Wireback, 625.)
11. WITNESSES — CROSS-EXAMINATION — MAKING ONE
PARTY'S OWN WITNESS.— When the matter elicited from a wit-
ness in his examination in chief is departed from, or when the facts
sought to be established on cross-examination are not pertinent or
germane to those elicited in the examination in chief, the witness
becomes the witness of the party attempting to prove such matter.
(Jones V. State, 719.)
12. WITNESSES — COMPETENCY — WIFE IN CRIMINAL
CASE.— A wife can be a witness for her husband, but not against
him, and the state in a criminal case has the right to cross-examine
her pertaining to the facts sworn to by her on direct examination.
When the state leaves the matter elicited in the examination In
chief, and attempts to prove independent material facts by her, it
makes her its witness and a witness against her husband against
his objection. This cannot be legitimately done. To permit it is re-
versible error. (Jones v. State, 719.)
13. WITNESSES— IMPEACHMENT.— If a witness is attacked by
showing that he has testified corruptly, or has recently fabricated
his testimony, he can be supported by proof that that he had at a
prior time made the same statements, before any motive could have
existed. (Jones v. State, 719.)
14. WITNESSES— EXPERTS— OPINION EVIDENCE.- Where
It is sought to recover from a water company for death from typhoid
fever, which disease, it is alleged, was communicated to the deceased
by impure water furnished by the defendant company, expert wit-
nesses should not be permitted to give opinions going to the ques-
tion of how the disease was contracted, based upon the evidence
Introduced upon that question, such evidence being contradictory.
(Green v. Ashland W. Co., 911.)
15. WITNESSES — EXPERTS — PHYSICIANS —CAUSE OP
DEATH.— The rule that a physician may testify as to the cause of
death, from personal examination or knowledge, extends no farther
than the immediate cause of death, and not to what set the cause in
motion. (Green v. Ashland W. Co., 911.)
See Appeal, 6, 10; Evidence, 12; Homicide, 11-13 jinsane Persons, 4;
WUI9, 1.
WRITS.
A WRIT OP ERROR MUST BE DECIDED according to the
law as it was at the time the judgment was rendered without anj
consideration of subsequent acts. (Wilson v. Hundley, 837.)
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